Symposium: Money in Politics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

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Symposium: Money in Politics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Articles and Speeches

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AFTER McCUTCHEON V. FEC

James Bopp, Jr., Randy Elf, and Anita Y. Milanovich*

I. INTRODUCTION

With McCutcheon v. FEC having struck down particular contribution limits, this Article addresses two issues. Part II addresses the constitutionality of limits on contributions for independent spending for political speech, which Buckley v. Valeo calls “independent contributions[.]” While Part III addresses what Buckley calls “direct[.]” contributions to candidates. Each presents important issues under the Constitution.

II. LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENDING

A. Quid Pro Quo Corruption or its Appearance

Applying the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the only interest which suffices to ban, or otherwise limit, political speech is the prevention of corruption of
candidates or officeholders, or the appearance of corruption.\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Citizens United v. FEC} reaffirms this by addressing a ban on spending for political speech and holding "independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption."\textsuperscript{4} 

\textit{Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett (AFEC)} further reaffirms this and holds that when spending for political speech is independent, the "candidate-funding circuit is broken."\textsuperscript{5} AFEC understates its point here: when such spending is independent, \textit{there is no} corrupting link to candidates or officeholders.\textsuperscript{6} It is not that the corrupting link is "broken" — it just is not there.\textsuperscript{7}

Independent expenditures—i.e., noncoordinated \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} express advocacy—are the highest grade of independent spending for political speech.\textsuperscript{8} So when a person’s independent expenditures “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption[,]”\textsuperscript{9} no independent spending for political speech by the same person “give[s] rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”\textsuperscript{10} Thus, a person who has a First Amendment right to engage in independent expenditures has a First Amendment right to engage in any independent spending for political speech.

Furthermore, when “\textit{Buckley} identified a . . . government['] interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to \textit{quid pro quo} corruption.”\textsuperscript{11} Influence, access, favoritism, and gratitude/ingratiation are not \textit{quid pro quo} corruption or its appearance.\textsuperscript{11}


\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Id.} at 2826. See \textit{id.} (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its appearance).

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Id.} at 2826. See, e.g., \textit{Citizens United}, 558 U.S. at 356–61 (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its appearance).

\textsuperscript{8} “Independent expenditure” means \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} express advocacy that is not coordinated with a candidate. \textit{Buckley v. Valeo}, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52, 46–47, 78, 80 (1976). Thus, noncoordinated spending for political speech that is not \textit{Buckley} express advocacy is independent \textit{spending} but not an independent \textit{expenditure}. See \textit{id.} at 44 & n.52, 80 (defining express advocacy and thereby independent expenditure).

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Citizens United}, 558 U.S. at 357 (quoted in AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826).

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Id.} at 359 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial \textit{quid pro quo} dollars for political favors.”).

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Citizens United}, 558 U.S at 359–60.
Transparency does not suffice, nor is what “the public may believe” the *quid pro quo*-corruption-or-its-appearance yardstick. 12

These *Citizens United* holdings are binding, even if lower courts disagree with them. 13 Those who believe independent spending for political speech causes *quid pro quo* corruption or its appearance must also believe, contrary to *Citizens United* and *AFEC*, that government may ban, or otherwise limit, such spending to prevent *quid pro quo* corruption or its appearance. 14 “Hence their objection is not [just] to *Citizens United* but to constitutional protection of advocacy-funding practices that are as old as the Republic.” 15

B. McCutcheon Raises the Bar

Any doubt that these principles apply not just to spending for political speech but also to contributions is gone after *McCutcheon*, under which government may ban, or otherwise limit, contributions or spending only to prevent “‘*quid pro quo*’ corruption or its appearance[,]” with *quid pro quo* corruption now meaning only “a direct exchange of an official act for money.” 16 No “other objectives” suffice. 17 Courts “drawing” this “line” “err on the side of protecting political speech[.]” 18

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16 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (quoting *Citizens United*, 558 U.S. at 359; citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)). This is “an effort to
No “conjecture”—including about “recontributed funds” or contributions “rerouted to candidates”—suffices.\textsuperscript{19} To limit contributions, government must show they are in turn “used for” contributions, i.e., “are directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”\textsuperscript{20} When government shows no such McCutcheon “exchange” or its “appearance[,]” much less any exchange or its appearance involving “large” or “massive” contributions to candidates, contribution limits are unconstitutional, at least as applied, regardless of whether strict scrutiny or closely-drawn exacting scrutiny applies, although strict scrutiny is preferable.\textsuperscript{21}

control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties”—i.e., “an act akin to bribery.” Id. at 1450; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although government may “limit the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large . . . financial contributions’ to particular candidates . . . [g]overnment’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of \textit{quid pro quo} corruption[,]” Id. at 1450–51 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)),

\textit{McCutcheon}, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826).

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.} at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc \textsuperscript{\textit{WRTL-II}}, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007)).

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Id.} at 1452, 1457 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)).

\textsuperscript{19} Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 2013) (“limits on contributions to political committees that are to be \textit{used for} independent expenditures” (emphasis added)), id. at 1092 (“the court concluded, as has nearly every circuit court since \textit{Citizens United}, there could be no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to be \textit{used for such expenditures}” (emphasis added)); id. at 1093 n.2 (“limits on contributions to PACs for the purpose of making independent expenditures are unconstitutional even under a lower level of scrutiny”); id. at 1096 (“limits on contributions for the purpose of making independent expenditures promote no anti-corruption interest”); id. at 1103 (holding law “unconstitutional as applied to contributions to those organizations to be used solely for independent expenditures”). \textit{McCutcheon}, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{McCutcheon}, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450–53 (citations omitted); see id. at 1445–46 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail either way). Under strict scrutiny, a court first asks whether there is a compelling government interest in regulating the speech, and only if there is does a court ask whether the law is “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” \textit{WRTL-II}, 551 U.S. at 464 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)) (quoted in \textit{Citizens United} v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).

Meanwhile, “closely-drawn” exacting scrutiny is different. \textit{Shrink Mo.}, 528 U.S. at 387–88 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16, 25 (1976)). A court first asks whether there is a “sufficiently important” government interest in regulating the speech, and only if there is does a court ask whether the law is “closely drawn” to achieve that interest. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (\textit{Colo. Republican-II}), 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (quoting \textit{Shrink Mo.}, 528 U.S. at 387–88). \textit{McCutcheon} puts teeth into the phrase “closely drawn[,]” \textit{McCutcheon}, 134 S. Ct. at 1456. The Court states:

In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive

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C. The Next Questions

Except for foreign nationals, the Supreme Court has held that government may not limit independent spending for political speech, including independent expenditures properly understood. The next questions are: (1) What does this mean for contributions received by organizations engaging in only independent spending for political speech?; (2) What does this mean for contributions received by organizations for independent spending when they both make contributions and engage in independent spending?; and (3) May government ever limit contributions for independent spending for political speech? If so, when?

The short answer is that regardless of the scrutiny level, the principle that independent spending for political speech does not “give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption” applies when organizations

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means . . . but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits, it impermissibly restricts participation in the political process. Id. at 1456–57 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (citations omitted).

Regardless of the scrutiny level, government must prove political-speech law survives scrutiny. WRTL-II, 551 U.S. at 464 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 387–88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25) (applying closely-drawn exacting scrutiny); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (discussing government’s burden to prove speech law survives scrutiny). When government seeks to ban, or otherwise limit speech, government must prove _quid pro quo_ corruption or its appearance. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232 (highlighting government’s burden to prove corruption or its appearance); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing contributions and spending).

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24 _Cf. id._ (addressing contributions received by organizations engaging in only independent spending).
engage in only independent spending. This principle also applies when organizations both make contributions and engage in independent spending. Before *Citizens United*, and particularly after *Citizens United*, limits on contributions for independent spending are unconstitutional when contributors are not foreign nationals. *McCutcheon*’s dictum regarding transfers “among candidates and political committees” does not support limiting contributions for independent spending, and extends beyond transfers and contributions used for independent spending.

Notwithstanding Second Circuit holdings, government may prevent “circumvention” but not with otherwise unconstitutional law.

25 See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093 n.2 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail regardless of the scrutiny level); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff prevails regardless of the scrutiny level); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1082–84 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail regardless of the scrutiny level). *Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC* incorrectly implies that the scrutiny level affects the result. See 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38–39 n.18 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating pre-*McCutcheon*, 134 S. Ct. at 1445–46, that because “any political contribution enjoys . . . lesser . . . First Amendment protection than any . . . political expenditure, . . . *Buckley* . . . was ultimately untroubled by limits on political contributions because the overall effect of contribution limits ‘is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons’”); *Citizens United*, 558 U.S. at 357 (quoted in *AFEC v. Bennett*, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011)) (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its appearance). See, e.g., *Republican Party of N.M.*, 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its appearance); *Barland-I*, 664 F.3d at 151–55 (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its appearance); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (“Supreme Court precedent forecloses the . . . argument that independent expenditures by independent[-]expenditure committees . . . raise the specter of corruption or the appearance thereof.”); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its appearance).

26 See, e.g., *Republican Party of N.M.*, 741 F.3d at 1097 (explaining that government may limit contributions that are, in turn, used for contributions yet not contributions that are, in turn, used for independent spending); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that government may limit contributions that are, in turn, used for contributions yet not contributions that are, in turn, used for independent spending).

27 See *Emily’s List*, 581 F.3d at 9–12 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending *pre-*Citizens United); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-III), 525 F.3d 274, 291–95 (4th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending *pre-*Citizens United); see also *Republican Party of N.M.*, 741 F.3d at 1093 n.2, 1095–97 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending *post-*Citizens United); *Barland-I*, 664 F.3d at 151–55 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending *post-*Citizens United); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending *post-*Citizens United); *Bluman*, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285–89 (upholding a ban on contributions and independent expenditures by foreign nationals).

Preventing “circumvention” cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional law. This is because “there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention interest.” In other words, “anti-circumvention is not an independent state interest.” The fact that “speakers find ways to circumvent campaign[-]finance laws” does not mean preventing circumvention can justify unconstitutional law. Otherwise, government could justify limits on contributions to one’s own campaign, banning contributions by minors, unconstitutional Randall v. Sorrell-like limits, or aggregate contribution limits by somehow preventing “circumvention” of the same or other limits. This is

Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2012)) (holding that contribution limits “could be justified as preventing circumvention of contribution limits”).

30 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60.

31 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1102.


33 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–48 (applying this principle to contributions and independent spending).

34 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176–77).

35 Contra Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54 (holding that limits on contributions to one’s own campaign are unconstitutional); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232 (holding a ban on contributions by minors unconstitutional); Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–62 (holding a limit on contributions unconstitutional); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60 (holding aggregate contribution limits unconstitutional).
contrary to the principle that contribution limits must rise or fall on their own merits. To put it another way: on the one hand, when law is constitutional, there is nothing wrong with legally circumventing it; however, there is something wrong with illegally circumventing it. This is the difference between avoiding and evading taxes—avoiding taxes is legal, while evading them is not. On the other hand, when a court enjoins unconstitutional law, government may not enforce it, and there is nothing wrong with circumventing it.

D. Organizations Engaging in Only Independent Spending

The District of Columbia Circuit holds that government may never limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending. A Supreme Court concurrence agrees. This is the controlling opinion in California Medical Association v. FEC. The Fourth Circuit also agrees, holding that “contribution limits are . . . unacceptable when applied to . . . independent[-]expenditure committees[.]” The organizations “furthest removed from the candidate” are those that engage in only independent spending. It “is ‘implausible’ that contributions to independent[-]expenditure political committees are corrupting.” The Seventh and Tenth Circuits resoundingly agree.

36 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232; Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–62; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54.
38 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010); see Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9–11, 14–15 & n.13, 15–16 n.14 (holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending).
40 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1099 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)); Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9 n.8 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
42 Id. at 293.
43 Id. (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-II), 344 F.3d 418, 434 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 541 U.S. 1007 (2004)).
44 See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending). Barland-I holds:
The Fifth Circuit holds not that a limit, but a source ban on contributions from corporations, and by extension unions, for independent spending is unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit’s approach in effect closes the door on limiting contributions for independent spending except when contributors are foreign nationals. The key to the inquiry is whether contributors themselves are “entitled to exercise individually” the First Amendment right to spending for political speech that they “enjoy and effectuate” by making contributions for independent spending. Only Wisconsin’s $10,000 aggregate annual contribution limit is unconstitutional as applied to organizations, like the [Wisconsin] Right to Life [State] PAC, that engage only in independent expenditures for political speech. This is true even though the statute limits contributions, not expenditures. Whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” standard applies, the anticorruption rationale cannot serve as a justification for limiting fundraising by groups that engage in independent spending on political speech. No other justification for limits on political speech has been recognized, and none is offered here. Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 154 (emphasis in original). Quoting Barland-I, Republican Party of New Mexico holds “there is no valid governmental interest sufficient to justify imposing limits on fundraising by independent-expenditure organizations.” Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095.


Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach holds organizations engaging in only independent spending:

[F]or a distinct medium through which citizens may collectively enjoy and effectuate those expressive freedoms that they are entitled to exercise individually. Many “individuals contribute to a political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own personal direction.” Just as the soloist’s song becomes more powerful when joined by a chorus of people singing along, . . . citizen[s’] message[s] may become more widely and effectively disseminated when [t]hey join[ ] an [organization] of like-minded citizens. 603 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir. 2010); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–51 (1976) (holding that government may not limit spending for political speech); see also Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 698 (holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending); Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 867–68 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Long Beach to recall elections); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1118–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending); Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085–87 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (applying Long Beach.
when contributors are foreign nationals do they not have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech as the “contributees.”

E. Organizations Making Contributions Too

The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits apply these same principles when organizations both make contributions and engage in independent spending for political speech from separate accounts. Each of these circuits holds limits on contributions that organizations receive for independent spending are unconstitutional.

How can quid pro quo corruption of candidates or officeholders, or its appearance, ever arise when organizations engaging in only independent spending for political speech receive contributions from persons who themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech as the organizations? And how can quid pro quo corruption of candidates

preliminary-injunction motion on an as-applied contribution-limit claim, and inadvertently rejecting a facial holding the plaintiffs did not seek); Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039–42 (D. Haw. 2012), appeal docketed on other grounds, No.12-15913 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012) (granting summary judgment on the contribution-limit claim and correcting the previous holding).

Whether the person challenging a contribution limit is a contributor or a contributee is immaterial. See, e.g., Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81 (addressing contributors); Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 147 (addressing a contributee). A contributor’s right to make contributions would be useless if a contributee lacked the right to receive them. Similarly, a contributee’s right to receive contributions would be useless if a contributor lacked the right to make them—it would be like a beautiful car without gasoline. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18 (cited in Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 692) (comparing being “free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures” with “being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline”).

Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18 (cited in Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 692) (comparing being “free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures” with “being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline”).

Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2013); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 11, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Republican Party of New Mexico states:

If a contribution to outside groups for the purpose of making independent expenditures implicates the government’s anti-corruption interest, then the same interest is implicated by the independent expenditures themselves. This would mean that “the entire Buckley edifice, built on a foundation of a contribution-expenditure dichotomy, falls.” Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 70 (2004). “Is that what the Court really intended buried in a few sentences of a footnote in one of the longest cases in Supreme Court history?” Id. See also Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 14 n.13 (declining to adopt expansive reading of footnote 48).

741 F.3d at 1000 n.7 (discussing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003)).
or officeholders, or its appearance, ever arise when organizations making contributions and engaging in independent spending for political speech receive contributions for independent spending from persons who themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech as the organizations?

Since there is no corrupting link between candidates or officeholders and organizations’ independent spending, the presence of contributions from persons who themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech as the organizations, cannot somehow create that missing corrupting link. First, as a matter of law, organizations’ independent spending cannot be a “corrupt ‘quo’”; second, as a matter of law, contributions for organizations’ independent spending cannot be a “corrupting ‘quid[,]’” because only government officials have the power to grant corrupt or apparently corrupt “political favors.” 49 Again, it is not that the corrupting link is “broken”—it is just not there. 50 It does not matter whether the contribution limit is 1 cent, $1, $1000, or $1 million. 51 Except as to contributions from foreign nationals, contribution limits are unconstitutional per se as applied to contributions for independent spending, so government is without power to say how big is big enough. 52 The size of the contribution limit is immaterial. 53

Even if a contributee has “interests closely aligned with a political party, this alignment would not change the analysis because, under
Supreme Court precedent, political parties [can] also make unlimited independent expenditures.\textsuperscript{54} Republican Party of New Mexico v. King’s “caveat” about political parties’ receiving contributions for independent spending is \textit{dictum}, because no political party even had a claim at stake in the Republican Party of New Mexico appeal, much less sought to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending.\textsuperscript{55}

Under McCutcheon, “the risk of \textit{quid pro quo} corruption is generally applicable only to ‘the narrow category of money gifts that are directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.’”\textsuperscript{56} That is not what happens when organizations use contributions for independent spending.\textsuperscript{57} There is no “risk of” a “direct exchange of an official act for money.”\textsuperscript{58} Such contributions are not “used for” contributions.\textsuperscript{59} They are not “directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”\textsuperscript{60} There is no McCutcheon exchange or its appearance, much less any involving “large” or “massive” contributions to candidates.\textsuperscript{61}

\section*{F. Circuit Splits}

Three circuit opinions have created circuit splits, with \textit{Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell} (VRLC-II) alone splitting in multiple

\textsuperscript{54} Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2013) (recalling the district court’s holding).
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Id.} at 1098–99, 1102–03; \textit{infra} notes 129–132 and accompanying text. Republican Party of N.M. 741 F.3d at 1091, 1092, 1097 (“only non-party political committees have challenged the constitutionality of the law as applied to them”). By contrast, in Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, political parties \textit{did} challenge limits on contributions for independent spending. No.14-00853, VERIFIED COMPL. ¶¶1-5, 11–16 (D.D.C. May 23, 2014), voluntarily dismissed, (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V96J-3LWT. However, the result would be the same, because political parties present no “special danger[] of [\textit{quid pro quo}] corruption” or its appearance, so government may not limit contributions that political parties receive for independent spending. Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996). And “the constitutionally significant fact” in assessing whether particular speech—not the entire political-party organization, but the particular speech—is independent, “is the lack of coordination” with candidates. \textit{Id.} at 617.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{McCutcheon}, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
\textsuperscript{57} Anyway, “there is not the same risk of \textit{quid pro quo} corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.” \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id.} at 1441, 1452 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)). There is no “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties,” \textit{i.e.}, no “act akin to bribery.” \textit{Id.} at 1450; \textit{id.} 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{59} See \textit{supra} note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091–93 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013)) (holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions).
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{McCutcheon}, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.} at 1441, 1450–53 (citations omitted).
ways.  First, the plaintiff-contributee, Vermont Right to Life Committee Fund for Independent Political Expenditures (“VRLC-FIPE”), is a political committee connected to Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. (“VRLC”). VRLC-II finds VRLC-FIPE is part of one organization with another political committee, Vermont Right to Life Committee— Political Committee (“VRLC-PC”), which makes contributions. VRLC-II expressly splits with North Carolina Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-III). NCRL-III addresses parallel North Carolina organizations and holds NCRL-FIPE is “independent as a matter of law” from NCRL and NCRL-PAC. As a matter of law, a political committee that an organization forms/has is a legal person unto itself; it is not part of another organization—its speech is its own.

Second, VRLC-II addresses “circumvention of contribution limits” without acknowledging that government may prevent “circumvention” but not with otherwise unconstitutional law. In other words, preventing “circumvention” cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional law. VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico’s holding that “there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention interest.”

Third, VRLC-II holds the government may limit contributions to organizations making contributions and may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending. However, even conceding arguendo all of Defendants’ asserted undisputed facts, including that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization and that

63 VRLC is not a political committee and challenges Vermont law requiring it to be one. Id. at 135–39.
64 See id. at 140, 142, 143–44 (describing the organizations).
65 Id. at 141 (quoting NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 294 n.8 (4th Cir. 2008)).
66 See United States v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (holding that a political committee that an organization forms/has “is a separate association from the” organization); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (holding that a political committee that an organization forms/has “is a separate legal entity” from the organization). Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles (ARLC) implicitly recognizes this even when “three entities share the same director and the same board of directors” and the “degree of financial separation among the three entities is unclear from the record.” 441 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 886 (2006). Claiming that a political committee that an organization forms/has “is merely the mouthpiece” of another organization “is untenable.” Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 196. The fact that another organization “agree[s] with the views” of the political committee “does not convert” the political committee’s “speech into that of” the other organization. Id.
67 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 140 n.20; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452–60 (2014).
68 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60.
69 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 761 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2013).
70 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 139 (quoting Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), reap’d on other grounds, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)); id. at 140 (citing New York Progress & Protection PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013)).
VRLC-FIPE “is completely enmeshed with VRLC-PC[,]” VRLC-II does not recognize a crucial point.\(^\text{71}\) It does not recognize that organizations that both make contributions and engage in independent spending—as the alleged “single” VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC organization does—may receive unlimited contributions for independent spending.\(^\text{72}\) The organization “merely needs to ensure that its contributions to parties [other than for independent spending] or candidates come from an account set up for that purpose, not one used for independent expenditures.”\(^\text{73}\) VRLC-PC and VRLC-FIPE have separate accounts, just as a victorious Republican Party of New Mexico plaintiff does.\(^\text{74}\) Thus, VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Emily’s List v. FEC.\(^\text{75}\)

Fourth, along that same line and most importantly, even conceding arguendo all of Defendants’ asserted undisputed facts, including that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization and that VRLC-FIPE “is enmeshed completely with VRLC-PC[,]” VRLC-FIPE still prevails because Defendants did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is “used for” anything other than independent spending for political speech.\(^\text{76}\) That, not Defendants’ facts, is the crucial—and now a circuit-splitting—question. Defendants never responded to, much less

\(^\text{71}\) Id. at 141–44.

\(^\text{72}\) See id. at 140–41 (recognizing only “independent-expenditure-only” organizations). VRLC-II implies they may not, and this is at the heart of the VRLC-II circuit split. See id. at 141 (citing Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 43 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that “separate bank account[s]”—which VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC have—do “not prevent coordinated expenditures”); id. at 144 (finding “VRLC-FIPE is not meaningfully distinct from VRLC-PC” and therefore affirming summary judgment on the contribution limit). But preventing organizations’ coordinated spending—i.e., contributions—is unnecessary for the organizations to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47, 78 (1976); Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether Defendants proved any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is used for anything other than independent spending for political speech. Infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.

\(^\text{73}\) Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097 (citing Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12).

\(^\text{74}\) VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143; Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097.

\(^\text{75}\) Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141 (citing Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12).

\(^\text{76}\) VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141–44 & n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”); see supra note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091, 1092, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions); see also Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1096 (“contributions for the purpose of making independent expenditures”); id. at 1103 (“used solely for”). Cf. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that “contributions to a committee that makes only independent expenditures pose no . . . threat . . . of actual or potential corruption”).
disputed, this. What remains is “conjecture” regarding “recontributed funds” or contributions “rerouted to candidates.”

Indeed, VRLC-II acknowledges “that the record does not show that funds from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions.” However, VRLC-II means only direct contributions to candidates. Yet Defendants also did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is “used for” any indirect contribution to candidates, i.e., contributions to candidates via intermediaries or spending for political speech coordinated with candidates. By nevertheless holding that Vermont may limit contributions that VRLC-FIPE receives, VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Emily’s List.

Holding that mere voter guides are coordinated spending splits with Clifton v. FEC, because “coordination” implies “collaboration beyond”

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78 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”); cf. id. at 143 (explaining voter guides and fundraising). VRLC-II finds this even while finding “fluidity of funds between VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC.” Id. at 143. The reason is that the “fluidity” Defendants allege all flows from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does not), not vice-versa. E.g., id. at 143 & n.23 (finding “fluidity of funds between VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC” while overlooking that “funds” flow from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does not), not vice-versa); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, No.2:09-cv-188, PLS.’ SUMM. J. RESP. BR. at 41–42 & n.48 (D. Vt. Nov. 18, 2011) (refuting Defendants’ fluidity-of-funds argument and showing that the alleged fluidity of funds is not a genuine issue of material fact, because the only alleged fluidity of “funds” flows from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does not), not vice-versa); accord VRLC-II, PLS.-APPELLANTS’ VRLC & VRLC-FIPE’S REPLY BR. at 39–48 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2012) (citing the district-court record and showing that Defendants did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is used for anything other than independent spending for political speech). So the “fluidity” Defendants allege cannot mean any contribution VRLC-FIPE itself receives is used for anything other than independent spending. VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143.

79 See VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”). Direct contributions are one form of contributions to candidates under the Constitution. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 n.24 (1976).

80 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23; see supra note 76 and accompanying text (highlighting the term “used for”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 219–21 (2003); Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1996); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47, 78 (quoted in FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 1995)) (discussing particular speech coordinated with candidates). Contributions can lead to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance only when candidates are involved. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.

81 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141 (citing Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
merely asking for candidates’ positions on issues. So asking for and publishing candidates’ positions on issues is not coordinated spending. Nor did Defendants show under McCutcheon any “direct exchange of an official act for money” or its appearance, or that contributions “are directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.” Much less did they show any “large”/“massive” contributions to candidates.

Fifth, even conceding arguendo that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization, VRLC-II errs in how it assesses under constitutional law whether VRLC-FIPE engages in coordinated spending: VRLC-II asks whether organizations are coordinated. Instead, the question is whether

82 VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 144; Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47).
83 Cf. Colo. Republican-I, 518 U.S. at 613–20 (cited in Clifton, 114 F.3d at 1311). Otherwise, every voter guide would be coordinated spending, and therefore a contribution. But see 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.f (establishing post-Clifton that a “candidate’s or a political[-]party committee’s response to an inquiry about that candidate’s or political[-]party committee’s positions on legislative or policy issues, but not including a discussion of campaign plans, projects, activities or needs,” is not coordinated spending).
84 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)). They showed no “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties”—i.e., no “act akin to bribery.” Id. at 1450, 1452; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1450–53.
86 See VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 142 (asking “whether a group is functionally distinct from a non-independent-expenditure-only” organization (emphasis added)); id. at 144 (finding that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC coordinated voter guides and the VRLC’s executive director advised a gubernatorial candidate/campaign on issues); id. at 144–45 (focusing on VRLC-FIPE and “its independence from” VRLC-PC, not the independence of particular speech); id. at 145 (focusing on whether “VRLC-FIPE is indistinguishable from VRLC-PC” and not the independence of particular speech). The NCRL-III dissent, which VRLC-II follows, makes the same mistake. See NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting). This VRLC-II holding makes it more than “difficult at times” for low-budget organizations to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending. VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 145. It makes it nearly impossible. Low-budget organizations such as VRLC, VRLC-FIPE, and VRLC-PC cannot afford not to work together. Their working together is not coordination under the Constitution. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing further whether particular speech is coordinated with candidates); cf. Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (holding that persons who “individually” have a First Amendment right to engage in particular speech may “collectively enjoy and effectuate those expressive freedoms”). If their working together were coordination, if their joint speech were coordinated, and if VRLC-FIPE were constitutionally ineligible to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending, then two other similarly-situated, low-budget plaintiffs would have lost—but they won. See Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011); NCRL-III, 525 F.3d at 291–95. Firewalls are not affordable for low-budget organizations—not even the FEC requires them. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.h. Besides, under McCutcheon, First Amendment rights are important regardless of the size of the speaker. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)).
particular speech is coordinated with candidates. Defendants did not show VRLC-FIPE coordinates particular speech with candidates, much less that any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is “used for” coordinating particular speech with candidates. Considering whether organizations are coordinated splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Clifton. Nor did Defendants show any “approval (or wink or nod)” by any candidate/candidate’s committee—i.e., an “arrangement with a candidate[,]” or a “request or suggestion” from the candidate/candidate’s committee.

Sixth, VRLC may and does “wholly control” its own political committees. Yet if such control meant VRLC-FIPE may not receive unlimited contributions for independent spending, then plaintiff-
organizations in three other appeals would have lost—but they won. Moreover, by looking to the board-appointment process, board membership, committee membership, identical meeting times, and VRLC-FIPE’s and VRLC-PC’s discussing “important tactical campaign issues” together, VRLC-II splits with Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles (ARLC). Under ARLC, VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are separate even if they “share the same director and the same board of directors” and the “degree of financial separation among the three entities is unclear from the record.” VRLC-II also splits with Republican Party of New Mexico, under which “overlapping leadership” among VRLC, VRLC-PC, and VRLC-FIPE does not help Defendants. Like the parallel, low-budget plaintiffs in NCRL-III, VRLC, VRLC-FIPE, and VRLC-PC “share staff”; sharing leadership/staff is not only legal but also common, because it saves money and prevents operating at cross purposes.

The second of three circuit splits is in Alabama Democratic Conference v. Broussard, which upholds limits on contributions to an organization that both makes contributions and engages in independent spending, because “both accounts are controlled and can be coordinated by the same entity.” Without saying so, this presumes the question is whether the organization—in any of its activity—can cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. But instead, the question is whether particular speech can. The fact that organizations may and do “wholly control” political committees that they form/have does not mean their

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93 Id. at 143–44; ARLC v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 886 (2006). Even the FEC understands the same people can be part of both an organization and its political committees. See ADVISORY OP. 2010-09 at 1–4 (Club for Growth) (FEC July 22, 2010).

94 Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2013).

95 NCRL-III, 525 F.3d at 294 n.8; see Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 143 (addressing other parallel plaintiffs).


97 While discussing organizations that make contributions and engage in independent spending, Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC expressly inquires whether the organizations cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38, 40–44 (D.D.C. 2012) (addressing entities, a PAC, a hybrid PAC, and a single entity).

98 See supra notes 79, 83 and accompanying text (asking whether particular speech by an organization, not the organization itself, can cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance). Republican Party of New Mexico, 741 F.3d at 1096 n.4, 1102 n.11, expressly disagrees with Alabama Democratic Conference, 541 F. App’x at 931.
independent spending can cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.\footnote{FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003); supra note 92 and accompanying text.} Merely finding that organizations contribute to each other, have common members, or receive contributions from candidates cannot establish that contributions the organizations make cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance absent evidence that the contributions go to candidates.\footnote{Ala. Democratic Conference, 541 F. App’x at 936; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014).}

The third of three circuit splits is \textit{Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC}.\footnote{Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014),\textit{ cert. denied}, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). The Supreme Court denied \textit{certiorari} in \textit{Stop this Insanity} on the same day that—and on the same page where—it denied \textit{certiorari} in VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014),\textit{ cert. denied}, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).} \textit{Stop this Insanity} misses the point when it tells the plaintiff-political committee, which wants to receive unlimited contributions for an independent-spending fund/account, that the political committee’s connected organization may instead receive unlimited contributions for independent spending.\footnote{See generally 52 U.S.C. § 30101.7 (2012) (defining connected organization); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 8 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (presenting a facial challenge). \textit{Stop this Insanity}, 761 F.3d at 14; see \textit{Stop this Insanity}, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 32, 44 (saying the same both about the connected organization and about another political committee).} The plaintiff-political committee is “a separate association” and “a separate legal entity” and has its own rights.\footnote{Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981).} If \textit{Stop this Insanity} were correct, connected political committees in three other appeals would have lost—but they won.\footnote{Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing WRTL-SPAC, a political committee connected to WRTL); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2010),\textit{ cert. denied}, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (addressing political committees connected to the chamber); NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 295 (4th Cir. 2008) (addressing NCRL-FIPE, a political committee connected to NCRL).} \textit{Stop this Insanity} also relies on the need for “disclosure” to support limiting contributions for independent spending.\footnote{Stop this Insanity, 761 F.3d at 16–17.} However, disclosure and limits are separate concepts.\footnote{See Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 n.9 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (recognizing that disclosure and limits are separate concepts).}
G. Aberrant District Court Orders

The *Stop this Insanity* district court order believes *Emily’s List* does not address contributions for independent spending. But *Emily’s List* does. *Stop this Insanity* also believes case law on contributions received for independent spending does not apply to such contributions received by connected political committees. But it does. The order further believes case law does not apply to connected political committees making contributions and independent expenditures properly understood from separate accounts. But it does. And, notwithstanding *Stop this Insanity*, whether independent spending is an independent expenditure does not matter here.

Meanwhile, *Catholic Leadership Coalition of Texas v. Reisman* upholds a limit on contributions for independent spending—it presumes that a contribution/contact list which an organization receives only for independent spending must also be for contributions that the organization makes, which is not true.

H. Possible Counterarguments

Any holding regarding the facial constitutionality of contribution limits in general is of no moment to challenges to limits on contributions for independent spending, because the latter challenges are as-applied...
Only in the *California Medical Association* concurrence, which is the controlling opinion, does the Supreme Court address the constitutionality of limiting contributions for independent spending. The *California Medical Association* plurality addresses a political committee that by definition makes contributions to candidates. The fact that the political committee may also engage in independent spending does not change the fact that the plurality does not address independent spending. Only the concurrence does. When the plurality refers to a political committee’s “independent political advocacy[,]” that means the California Medical Association PAC’s political advocacy is independent of the California Medical Association in the sense that the political committee “is a separate legal entity” from the California Medical Association as a matter of law.

**FEC v. National Conservative PAC**’s statement about limiting contributions for independent spending is *dictum*, because no contribution limit was at issue. Even if this *dictum* supported limiting contributions for independent spending when the Court decided NCPAC, subsequent opinions control for the reasons discussed next in addressing *Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC* (Colorado Republican-I).

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116 E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (ruling on an as-applied challenge); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011) (ruling on an as-applied challenge).

117 *Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC,* 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion, which is the controlling opinion and states that government may never limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending).

118 *Cal. Med. Ass’n,* 453 U.S. at 185 n.1, 197 n.17; id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093, 1098–99.

119 E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003) (stating that the *California Medical Association* statute “restricted . . . the source and amount of funds available to engage in noncoordinated expenditures”).

120 *Cal. Med. Ass’n,* 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093, 1098–99. *Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC* incorrectly believes the *California Medical Association* plurality and the *Buckley v. Valeo* Court address contributions for independent spending. See *Stop this Insanity,* 902 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 43 (misinterpreting *California Medical Association* and *Buckley*).


122 *FEC v. NCPAC,* 470 U.S. 480, 484, 495 (1985) (“the present cases involve [limits] on expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions they receive; and in any event these contributions are predominantly small and thus do not raise the same concerns as the sizable contributions involved in *California Medical Association*[i]”).

123 NCPAC and *Colorado Republican-I* did not support limiting contributions for independent spending, and courts did not need *Citizens United* to hold that government...
The Colorado Republican-I plurality’s statement regarding contributions that political parties receive for independent spending incorrectly presumes independent spending can cause corruption, and does not contemplate receiving contributions for a separate independent-spending account.124 Anyway, the statement is dictum, because no contribution limit was at issue.125 Even if this dictum supported limiting contributions for independent spending when the Court decided Colorado Republican-I, subsequent opinions—including Citizens United, AFEC, and McCutcheon—control in a way that extends beyond limits on independent spending for political speech to limits on contributions for independent spending for political speech.126 Regardless of whether pre-Citizens United opinions helped the cause of limiting contributions for independent spending before Citizens United, they do not do so after

124 See Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617 (1996). Colorado Republican-I states: The greatest danger of corruption, therefore, appears to be from the ability of donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may be used for independent party expenditures for the benefit of a particular candidate. We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter, might decide to change the statute’s limit[s] on contributions to political parties. Id. And Colorado Republican-I cites the California Medical Association v. FEC plurality, 453 U.S. at 197–99, which does not address contributions for independent spending. See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text (discussing the California Medical Association plurality’s opinion).

125 See Colorado Republican-I, 518 U.S. at 608–13 (discussing independent expenditures).

126 Again, the Colorado Republican-I dictum did not support limiting contributions for independent spending. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing post-Colorado Republican-I opinions holding that government may not limit contributions for independent spending); see also Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 694–95 n.5, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending); Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1094–95, 1098–99 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 153–54 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending); Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083–84 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending).
Citizens United. The only government interest in banning, or otherwise limiting, political speech—whether contributions or spending—is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Independent spending does not cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, especially after McCutcheon narrows quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. Contributions for independent spending, even ones that are large/massive, are not directed to candidates, so they cannot cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.

Even circuit opinions issued between Citizens United and McCutcheon apply the Citizens United quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending, not just independent spending itself.

The reasons McConnell v. FEC does not support limiting contributions for independent spending are simpler and more basic than some circuits’ analyses.

While McConnell addresses, for example, 2 U.S.C. § 441i (now 52 U.S.C. § 30125), part of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), McConnell is entirely a facial challenge. Law can be facially

127 E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1096, 1098-1102 (discussing how Citizens United impacts the analysis).
128 See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text (defining quid pro quo corruption).
129 E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1094–95 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending); Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 153–54 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending); Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696–99; SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–96 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending).
130 The analysis is not complicated. See supra note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1091, 1092, 1093 n.2) (holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions). Nevertheless, three circuits have indulged complicated dicta. See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1099–1100 (addressing political parties, the discussion of which is dictum, because no political party sought to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696) (stating that “the contribution limits in McConnell and [Cal. Med. Ass’n] were justified by an anti-corruption interest because the regulated entities had unusually close relationships with the candidates they supported”—all of which was dictum, because no “unusually close relationships” were at issue in Thalheimer or Long Beach); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (addressing political parties, the discussion of which is dictum, because no political party sought to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending).
131 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 154–85 (2003). See also Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland (Barland-II), 751 F.3d 804, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that McConnell’s decision to uphold the law facially does not mean it is always constitutional as applied).
constitutional and still be unconstitutional as applied to particular speech.  

Moreover, this part of FECA reaches donations for speech other than independent spending. That is, this part of FECA reaches not just donations to organizations that engage in only independent spending, or organizations that both make contributions and engage in independent spending from separate accounts. This part of FECA also reaches donations to other organizations.  

In addressing what was solely a facial challenge, *McConnell* had no need to parse facts for subsequent as-applied challenges. Thus, the issues in *McConnell* are distinguishable. Because *McConnell* is not about only independent spending, it is incorrect to believe *McConnell* applies.

*Caperton v. Massey* does not support limiting contributions for independent spending. Rather, *Caperton* addresses whether an elected state-court justice should have recused himself when an officer of a corporation before the Court had engaged in independent expenditures, and had contributed to a committee that engaged in independent

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133 See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30125(a)–(b), (d)–(f) (2012) (reaching donations to other organizations). For example, Sections 30125(a) and (b) address federal political-party committees, and state and local political-party committees, respectively. *Id.* § 30125(a)–(b). While parties engage in independent spending for political speech, they do far more than that. See, e.g., *McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 154–85 (discussing party activities); Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608–13 (1996) (discussing spending limits). One example is coordinated spending for political speech, which counts as an indirect contribution. See *FEC v. Colo. Republican-I*, 533 U.S. 431, 437–40 (2001); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47, 78 (1976).

Section 30125(d) bans some donations to Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c) and 527 organizations. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(d). Except as the law forbids, Section 501(c) and 527 organizations may contribute directly and indirectly to candidates and political parties. *E.g.*, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012) (banning corporate and union contributions to federal political committees).

Section 30125(e) addresses how federal candidates, federal officeholders, their agents, and organizations they establish, finance, maintain or control, and raise money. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e). In particular, 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(4)(B) refers to money they raise for activity in 52 U.S.C. § 30101(20)(A)(i) and 30101(20)(A)(ii). Such solicitations can be for speech other than independent spending for political speech. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e).

Section 30125(f) addresses particular speech by state and local candidates. *Id.* § 30125(f).

134 See, e.g., *WRTL-I*, 546 U.S. at 411–12 (holding that “[i]n upholding § 203 against a facial challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges”).
expenditures, for the then-candidate for justice. The judicial-recusal standard does not inquire after corruption or its appearance as in Citizens United. Instead, the threshold is lower. As Justice Anthony Kennedy, Caperton’s author, explains in Citizens United, Caperton is different from Citizens United.

Nor do appellate opinions such a Cao v. FEC support limiting contributions for independent spending—Cao is about “in-kind and direct contributions” by parties to candidates, not contributions for independent spending.

I. Conclusion on Contributions for Independent Spending

Advocates of limiting contributions for independent spending can assign any label they please—such as “crabbed view of corruption”—to post-Citizens United law, but that does not change the law. These labels are not legal argument, nor are they helpful. Contributions for independent spending for political speech do not cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, so government may not limit such contributions from persons other than foreign nationals.

137 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (noting that “[t]he Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’”).
138 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. Citizens United states: Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due[-]process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge. Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.

139 In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011).
141 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that “[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it similarly does more harm than good to question the openness and candor of those on either side of the debate”).
III. LIMITS ON DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES

A. McCutcheon’s Impact on Contribution Limit Review

On April 2, 2014, in a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court struck down federal aggregate contribution limits to candidates or committees.142 These limits supplemented base contribution limits on how much could be given to each candidate or committee.143 So although plaintiff Shaun McCutcheon desired to contribute the maximum legal amount to numerous federal candidates and non-candidate political committees, he was restricted by overarching aggregate limits.144 A plurality of the Court found that those aggregate limits served neither a corruption nor an anti-circumvention interest.145 And even if the anti-circumvention interest were served, the Court found that the limits were mismatched to that interest, particularly because more reasonable alternatives exist.146

While directed towards aggregate contribution limits, the McCutcheon decision redefines and clarifies the legal principles governing contribution limit challenges in several key ways. First, the decision makes clear that contributions are not simply an associational right but political expression in their own right:

[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and political association…. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of those rights: [t]he contribution “serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views” and “serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.”147

Second, the decision expressly identified which state interests are cognizable and which are not. The government cannot adopt

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143 Id. at 1442.
144 Id. at 1443.
145 Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reasoning that Buckley v. Valeo’s distinction between independent expenditures and contributions were “two sides of the same First Amendment coin,” and so Buckley’s less rigorous scrutiny for contribution limits—which the plurality used in reaching its result—ought to be overturned. Id. at 1464 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976), Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 1454–56.
146 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–59.
147 Id. at 1448 (citations omitted).
contribution limits as a means of “reduc[ing] the amount of money in politics,” of “restrict[ing] the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others,” or of preventing “general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political access such support may afford.”  

It cannot attempt to “level the playing field,” “level electoral opportunities,” or “equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.” Nor may the government “seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.” Not only are efforts to “restrict the speech of some elements of our society to enhance the relative voices of others . . . wholly foreign to the First Amendment[.]” these objectives “impermissibly inject the Government ‘into the debate over who should govern’ . . . the last people [who should] help decide who should govern.” Such limits only penalize “an individual for ‘robustly exercising’ his First Amendment rights.”

The only cognizable justification for contribution limits is preventing quid pro quo corruption, with quid pro quo corruption now meaning only “a direct exchange of an official act for money,” or “dollars for political favors,” “an act akin to bribery.” The government “may permissibly seek to rein in ‘large contributions [that] are given to secure a political quid pro quo’ from current and potential office holders.” And it may “limit ‘the appearance of corruption’” — that is, “‘public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions’ to particular candidates.” The plurality cautioned, however, that “[s]pending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.” Nor do large sums spent to garner influence or access to elected officials or political parties. “[T]he risk of corruption arises when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder himself.”

148 Id. at 1441.
149 Id. at 1450.
150 Id. at 1451 (emphasis added) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).
152 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
153 Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26).
155 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27).
156 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.
157 Id. at 1451.
158 Id. at 1460.
The government may also justify contribution limits “by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention” of laws designed to prevent *quid pro quo* corruption.\(^{159}\) Contribution limits targeting *quid pro quo* corruption through circumvention must still, however, guard “against an individual’s funneling [of] ‘massive amounts of money to a particular candidate.’”\(^{160}\)

Third, the decision allocates the burden of proof in reviewing contribution limits: “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”\(^{161}\) This burden applies both to proof of a cognizable interest, as well to prove the limits are closely drawn.\(^{162}\) And whether it offers proof of *quid pro quo* corruption, proof of circumvention, or proof the limits are closely drawn, the government’s evidence cannot be speculative, “mere conjecture,” “highly implausible,” irrational, premised on illegal conduct, largely inapplicable, or “divorced from reality.”\(^{163}\)

Fourth, the decision discards the argument that contributions from organizations corrupt more than those from individuals: “there is not the same risk of *quid pro quo* corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.”\(^{164}\) An individual cedes control over his contribution when he gives to an independent actor, and “if the funds are subsequently rerouted to a particular candidate, such actions occur[] at the initial recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s.”\(^{165}\) This creates an ever-growing chain of attribution, with credit “shared among the various actors along the way.”\(^{166}\) Such contributions are thus diluted by all the other contributions from others to the same independent actors.\(^{167}\)

Last, the decision shows the analysis required under the “closely drawn test” to assess whether contribution limits were adequately

\(^{159}\) Id. at 1439.

\(^{160}\) Id. at 1460 (quoting *Buckley*, 424 U.S. at 38); see *supra* text accompanying note 32 (discussing anti-circumvention as a state interest).


\(^{162}\) See *id.* at 1452–53 (reasoning that Congress’s selection of a $5200 base limit suggests that a contribution of that amount or less would not create a cognizable risk of corruption).

\(^{163}\) *Id.* at 1452–56 (explaining that in the *Buckley* decision, the fear of an individual contributing substantial amounts of money to one candidate was far too speculative).

\(^{164}\) *Id.* at 1452.

\(^{165}\) *Id.*

\(^{166}\) *Id.*

\(^{167}\) See *McCutcheon*, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (explaining that any credit has to be shared with all of the various actors along the line, which consequently makes the chain of attribution much longer).
The Court evaluated whether “a substantial mismatch [existed] between the Government’s stated objective and the means selected to achieve it,” whether there was a “reasonable fit” to serve that objective. This reasonable fit, while “not necessarily the least restrictive means,” must still be “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” The availability of better, more reasonable alternatives belie a “closely drawn” claim. The closely drawn test is applied especially rigorously where a limit is part of “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis” regulation, that is, layers of regulation ostensibly designed to address the same anti-corruption interest.

B. McCutcheon’s Effect on Candidate Contribution Limits Analysis

Because of McCutcheon, key circuit court decisions that previously upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates are no longer legally sound. In the Ninth Circuit’s Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, issued in 2003, the court upheld both base contribution limits on individuals and PACs as well as aggregate limits on PACs. Its rationale for doing so conflicts with McCutcheon.

Significantly, the Eddleman decision focuses on the state’s interest in “preventing undue influence.” Relying on Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, Eddleman contends that a state’s interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is not confined to instances of bribery of public officials, but extends “to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” The court in Eddleman considered as evidence of this threat the testimony of a Montana legislator that “special interests funnel more money into campaigns when particular issues approach a vote ‘because it gets results’,” citing a letter from a state senator to his colleagues urging a

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168 Id. at 1446.
169 See id. at 1456 (stating that the Court requires a fit that is reasonable when not applying strict scrutiny).
170 Id. at 1456–57 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171 See id. at 1458 (discussing the many alternatives Congress can use to adhere to the government’s anticircumvention interest) (citation omitted).
172 See id. (analyzing the closely drawn test).
173 Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s holding that Montana’s base and aggregate contribution limits are constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment).
174 Id. at 1096, 1099 (Teilborg, J., dissenting) (“the State has chosen to enact an aggregate PAC contribution limit to prevent a candidate from being overly influenced by special interests generally”).
175 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000); Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. at 389) (internal quotation marks omitted).
favorable vote on a bill because it would ensure that a higher proportion of PAC money would flow to the Republican party, and citing a poll showing that “69% of Montanans [suspect] that elected officials give special treatment to individuals and businesses that make large contributions”—evidence that shows not bribery but influence and access.\footnote{176}

Under McCutcheon, these concerns do not rise to the level of a cognizable state interest.\footnote{177} Corruption is a cognizable interest only when defined as quid pro quo corruption, that is, “a direct exchange of an official act for money,” “dollars for political favors,” or “akin to bribery.”\footnote{178} So the Eddleman’s state interest analysis—and the Shrink’s analysis on which it relies—are no longer valid.\footnote{179}

Additionally, as to PAC contribution limits both base and aggregate, the Eddleman court held that undue influence is bolstered by the fact that the “danger of corruption in the political system is greater with respect to PAC contributions than it is for individuals.”\footnote{180} McCutcheon rejects this contention, observing that “there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.”\footnote{181} Because PACs, like political parties, are independent from individual donors, there is less danger of corruption from individuals through PAC contributions.

After establishing an “undue influence” interest, the Eddleman court determined that the focus of base contribution limits’ tailoring analysis is “as much on those aspects of associational freedom unaffected by the law as the limitations that are imposed,” justifying this approach with the Shrink presumption that “the dollar amounts employed to prevent corruption should be upheld unless they are ‘so radical in effect as to

\footnote{176} Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1093 (describing an incident in 1981 where a Republican state senator sent a letter persuading his colleagues to vote to pass a bill allowing variable annual annuities to secure a substantial portion of PAC contributions for the Republican party).

\footnote{177} See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)) (explaining that “the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption” and that “the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access”).

\footnote{178} Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

\footnote{179} Indeed, concerns about a politician being “too compliant” to large contributors speaks to undue influence concerns, not quid pro quo corruption concerns. Id. at 1469 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1099 (Teilborg, J., dissenting) (“having a limit on the amount an individual PAC may contribute to a candidate sufficiently prevents . . . ‘unfair influence’ over a candidate”).

\footnote{180} Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted).

\footnote{181} McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice beyond the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.”

So the Eddleman analysis offset burdens on association with opportunities that remained unaffected, finding that the PAC aggregate limits before it “in no way prevents PACs from affiliating with their chosen candidates in ways other than direct contributions. . . .”

This analysis fails under McCutcheon for two reasons. First, it focuses tailoring solely on the associational aspect that the contribution limits affect. But as McCutcheon states, when an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both an expressive as well as an associational right. And second, while theoretically, supporters can associate and express themselves in numerous ways other than contributing, as a practical matter, many supporters, whether individuals or groups, do not have available to them a panoply of alternative, effective means to support all of their preferred candidates or causes. Eddleman considered no evidence that such alternatives were plausible and practical.

Indeed, Eddleman fails to even consider, much less assess, less restrictive alternatives for fulfilling the state’s interests in averting actual or apparent corruption, such as disclosure. As McCutcheon unequivocally establishes, the government must show that the contribution limits are the more reasonable fit. Eddleman considered no such evidence.

Finally, Eddleman’s tailoring analysis nowhere considers the prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis aspect of Montana’s contribution limit scheme. McCutcheon expresses concern about layering aggregate contribution limits on top of base limits and mandates use of a particularly rigorous closely drawn test in such a context: a “‘prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach’ requires . . . particular[]

182 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (explaining that a donor has expressive and associational rights that are denied by the base limits).
186 See id. at 1449 (describing how the numerous other ways of contributing to a political party is unrealistic).
187 See id. at 1460 (“disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative . . . [and] offers much more robust protections against corruption”).
188 See id. at 1456 (“[e]ven when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094.
diligence in scrutinizing the law’s fit.”¹⁹⁰ But Eddleman does not analyze the fit of the PAC aggregate limits before it as McCutcheon requires.¹⁹¹ McCutcheon calls Eddleman into serious doubt.

The same can be said of the 2011 Second Circuit decision Ognibene v. Parkes.¹⁹² It too considered contribution limits: one that is a direct, “doing business” limit, and two that are bans—a matching fund ban and a business entity ban. New York City’s regulations:

[R]estrict[] contributions from [] individuals and entities who have business dealings with the City . . . [and] lower[] these donors’ contribution limits approximately twelve-fold, to $400 (from the generally-applicable level of $[4950]) for three City-wide offices; to $320 (from $[3850]) for Borough offices; and to $250 (from $[2750]) for City Council. The law also makes these contributions ineligible for public matching, and extends the ban on corporate contributions to LLCs, LLPs, and partnerships.¹⁹³

As in Eddleman, the rationale and outcome of Ognibene would be much different under McCutcheon.

First, as in Eddleman, the state interest is invalid. The Second Circuit held that while “mere influence or access to elected officials is insufficient . . . improper or undue influence presumably still qualifies as a form of corruption.”¹⁹⁴ Such “[i]mproper or undue influences includes both traditional quid pro quo and more discreet exchanges of money for favorable outcomes.”¹⁹⁵ Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned that:

Because the scope of quid pro quo corruption can never be reliably ascertained, the legislature may regulate certain indicators of such corruption or its appearance, such as when donors make large contributions because they have business with the City, hope to do business

¹⁹⁰ McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458.
¹⁹¹ See id. (stating that the Court “cannot conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are appropriately tailored to guard against any contributions that might implicate the [g]overnment’s anticircumvention interest”).
¹⁹³ Id. at 179–80 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3–703(1)(b); 3–703(1-a); 3–719(2)(b)).
¹⁹⁴ Id. at 186.
¹⁹⁵ Id. at 187.
Whether the initial limits have been successful and make the lower limits unnecessary, said the Second Circuit, “is a matter of policy better suited for the legislature.” So it held that all three limits—the doing business contribution limits, the matching fund ban, and the business entity ban—served this interest.

Under McCutcheon, averting or curbing influence—undue or otherwise—is not a recognized interest. Nor is “regulat[ing] certain indicators of [] corruption or its appearance” because “the scope of quid pro quo corruption can never be reliably ascertained.” Moreover, McCutcheon states that though ‘[t]he line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, . . . the distinction must be respected to safeguard basic First Amendment rights,” with the line “err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Not only did the Second Circuit accept what McCutcheon has since invalidated as a state interest, it extended the government too much deference, erring on the side of unproved corruption than on that of protected speech.

196 Id.
197 Id. at 189.
198 The evidence on which the court relied suggests that the real objective of the “doing business” contribution limits and the matching fund ban was to level the playing field by offsetting perceived access with lower contribution receipts. In a report on which the district court relied, the City Council states:

While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with contributions from those doing business with the City, the ability of such individuals to contribute could create a perception, regardless of whether such perception is accurate, that such individuals have a higher level of access to the City’s elected officials. It is important to eradicate this perception and reduce the appearance of undue influence associated with contributions from individuals doing business with the City.

199 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51 (stating that averting or curbing influence is not a recognized interest).
200 Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 187.
201 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007)).
202 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (“The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy . . . “).
The Second Circuit’s tailoring analysis is also inadequate under McCutcheon. All three contribution regulations are what McCutcheon refers to as “prophylaxis-on-prophylaxis” regulations. Base limits already exist establishing a contribution baseline at which the City has presumably determined that its officials are not corrupted. So to justify the lower limits and bans for business-dealing donors and business entities, their “fit” is subject to especially rigorous review, something the Second Circuit failed to do.

Under such review, the “doing business” limits would fail because the City’s evidence nowhere demonstrated that while a $4951 contribution in a city-wide campaign can bribe or appear to bribe a candidate, anything larger than $400 from a business-dealing donor results in bribery or would appear to be a bribe. The matching fund ban would fail because the City nowhere demonstrated that matching funds triggered by a contribution from someone doing business with the City will corrupt a candidate any more than funds triggered at the same rate by any other contributor. And the business-entity ban would fail because the City offered no evidence demonstrating that even $1 of corporate contributions would corrupt while contributions as high as $4950 from the corporate owners’ spouses, domestic partners, employees, and children would not. This is the type of evidence required under McCutcheon. Lacking such evidence, the limits fail.

Additionally, the Second Circuit acknowledged that more narrow regulations—bribery laws, earmarking bans, and disclosure—are more narrow options. While the government does not need to choose the least restrictive means of regulating contribution limits, it must show that other alternatives are a less reasonable fit so as to avoid unnecessarily burdening protected speech. The Court did not assess why these were not more reasonable options as McCutcheon requires.

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203 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458.
204 See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 187 (deferring to the City on the proper way to regulate quid pro quo corruption given its nebulous scope). Indeed, this reasonable fit analysis underscores that the limits serve an interest in leveling the playing field and equalizing voices. Id. at 200. The only credible reason a business donor’s contribution might have more impact dollar-for-dollar than another, non-business dealing donor, is that she may already have access to, and a relationship with, public officials—things beyond the contribution itself—that can influence a public official. Id. at 187. Attempts to equalize influence by offsetting access with contribution limits are expressly disapproved of in McCutcheon. 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51.
205 See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 196 (explaining that it was for lack of these types of regulations that the Second Circuit upheld the ban).
206 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57.
207 Such regulations would afford a better, more reasonable fit. Since the only recognized interest for regulating contribution limits is quid pro quo corruption, imposing uniform
The existence of more reasonably fitting regulations is especially obvious for the matching fund ban and the business entity ban, which extends to spouses, domestic partners, employees, and children. The City allows these individuals to contribute at the higher base amount. If the City were genuinely concerned about circumvention, the most immediate potential avenue of circumventing would be through family and employee contributions. Yet the City leaves the base limits alone for both family and employees, instead banning matching funds and business entity contributions. The City’s failure to address the most obvious source of potential circumvention suggests the bans are not a reasonable fit, and indeed, that anti-circumvention interests are not the true impetus for them. As with Eddleman, McCutcheon calls Ognibene into serious doubt.

IV. CONCLUSION

McCutcheon not only substantially changes, but makes more rigorous the analysis used in challenges to regulations of contributions for independent spending and of direct contributions to candidates. Both types of contribution limits are likely unconstitutional under its framework.

limits with disclosure requirements and a bribery prohibition with strict penalties for incumbents would more reasonably address quid pro quo corruption without unduly restricting protected expression and association.