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The Cresset (Vol. XXXIX, No. 5)

Valparaiso University

THE CRESSET

A REVIEW OF LITERATURE,

THE ARTS, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MARCH, 1976

THE CRESSET

March, 1976 Vol. XXXIX, No. 5

ISSN 0011-1198

THE CRESSET is published monthly except July and August by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, as a forum for scholarly writing and informed opinion. The views expressed herein are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of opinion of Valparaiso University or within the editorial board. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Letters to the editor for publication are subject to editing for brevity. The *Book Review Index* lists *Cresset* reviews. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Subscription rates: one year—$3.00; two years—$5.50; single copy—35 cents. Student rates, per year—$1.00; single copy—15 cents.



ABOVE AND COVER: Ernst Schwidder, *Christus Rex, circa* 1959. In-the-round, brass mosaic, model. Height, 55"; breadth, 22"; depth, 3 1/2". Owned by Jeanne A. and Kenneth F. Korby.

IN LUCE TUA



PAUL ROBESON (1898-1976)—AN APPRECIATION

Had it pleased heaven
To try me with affliction; . . .
Given to captivity me and my utmost hopes,
I should have found in some place of my soul
A drop of patience.

OTHELLO, Act IV, Scene ii.

HE WAS AN ATHLETE, A scholar, a singer, an actor, a movie star, and an activist. Paul Robeson, one of the most powerful and controversial personalities of our time, died on January 22, 1976. His illness began in Germany in 1961; he remained hospitalized in an East German hospital for two years, then came to live quietly in a Harlem apartment until a few years ago. He then moved to Philadelphia to live with his sister until his final illness.

Paul was born on April 9, 1898 to the Reverend W. D. Robeson, a former plantation slave, and Louise Bustill, a Philadelphia school teacher, who died when he was but a child. Young Robeson grew to be a superb physical specimen (in his prime 240 pounds at 6 feet 3) and possessed a fine enough mind to be admitted as a scholarship student to Rutgers University. At Rutgers he excelled as an athlete, winning a dozen sports letters in football, baseball, basketball, and track, and was named a member of the All-American football team. He won a Phi Beta Kappa key in 1918 and was elected to the Rutgers honor society as a senior.

In 1919 Robeson moved to Harlem and entered Columbia University Law School, graduating in 1921. In the same year he married Eslando Goode, who persuaded him that his future lay not in the law, but in the theater. She remained his wife and manager until 1965, when she died. After appearing in a few amateur theatricals, he was given the part of Jim in *Taboo* on Broadway. As a result, Robeson was invited to repeat this role in London opposite Mrs. Patrick Campbell. He returned to New York and joined the Provincetown Players, where he starred in O'Neill's *All God's Chillun Got Wings* and a revival of *The Emperor Jones*. George Jean Nathan called him "one of the most thoroughly eloquent, impressive, and convincing actors I have come upon."

In the meantime Robeson's fellow players urged him to give his first voice recital with Lawrence Brown, pianist, in a Harlem Church. He possessed a fine natural bass-baritone voice of movingly dark timbre. It was perfectly suited to the plaintive quality of the many spirituals which he always included in his programs. He moved on to other stage triumphs returning to sing the part of Joe in *Showboat*. The famous solo, Ol' Man River, came to be a signature-tune for him. He stayed on in London until 1939, mostly because there he was completely socially accepted, whereas in his native country he was referred to as "a credit to his race," an epithet he despised.

Robeson continued to appear in many plays in London, but his most acclaimed performance was in the title part of *Othello*. He also toured many European cities singing recitals to wide acclaim. After appropriate study, he broadened the scope of his recitals by the inclusion of German *Lieder*.

AT A LUNCHEON IN 1928 where G. B. Shaw was also a guest, the famous playwright asked Robeson his opinion on Socialism. The question left Robeson perplexed for at that time he knew nothing about it. However, a concert tour in 1934 left a deep impression on him. Robeson found himself the object of boos and curses in Nazi Germany; in the Soviet Union he was treated as an equal. Robeson expressed his admiration for the appearance of equality he saw in Socialism, as practiced in Russia, and such views were considered acceptable at that time, especially during the years of World War II when Russia was an ally of the United States.

Robeson continued to receive excellent press notices for his concert and acting appearances. These rose to their strongest crescendo pursuant to his performance of Othello in a Theater Guild production with an all-white supporting cast. Robeson was also honored with a number of degrees and prizes, including the famous Springarn Award from the NAACP.

Robeson's political activism intensified with his leading a delegation to persuade Baseball Commissioner Landis to drop racial barriers in that sport, and by calling on President Truman to enact civil rights legislation. The failure of the major political parties to take action on racial issues led Robeson to support Henry Wallace's Progressive Party candidacy in 1948.

The climate of opinion changed in the post-war years and a great deal of Robeson's harassment during the cold war grew out of a statement he made at the Paris Peace Conference in 1949, "It is unthinkable that American Negroes will go to war on behalf of those who have oppressed us for generations against a country which has in one generation raised our people to the full dignity of mankind." This statement was taken out of a context which emphasized a completely righteous cause, and used viciously to accuse Robeson of being a traitor to his country. The matter deteriorated further when Robeson, in appearances before Congressional Committees, pleaded the Fifth Amendment on the question of his being a Communist, while admitting in private conversations that he was not. Robeson's detractors found further ammunition when he was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize in 1952. As a result, Robeson's income dropped from a high of $100,000.00 in 1947 to $6, 000.00 in 1952.

After his passport was revoked by the State Department in 1950, Robeson pursued his cause up to the Supreme Court, where he was finally exonerated in 1958. He immediately left for London, where he again enjoyed a great success as Othello at Stratford-on-Avon. From there, Robeson went to more successful concert tours of Europe. Critics felt that the bloom had left his voice, although his singing communicated a great deal.

PAUL ROBESON WAS ONE OF of the great figures of the Black Renaissance. This movement which followed World War I, was the result of several factors, the chief being white interest in the sociological background of the black man, growth of interest in black art, the development of effectiveness of organized black groups, the interest of white novelists and dramatists in black subjects, and, finally, the fact that the black man had fought for the freedom of others in Europe but returned home to sociological servi-

Black talent was not to be denied. Black composers' music was not accepted for publication; but composers like Harry Burleigh, Clarence Cameron White, and Nathaniel Dett were performed in concert and symphony programs. The great black singers were not allowed to perform in many concert halls nor in opera companies, yet this period produced a magnificent quartet of black singers: Roland Hayes, tenor, Marian Anderson, contralto, Paul Robeson, bass-baritone, and Dorothy Maynor, soprano. These four artists possessed voices of extraordinary beauty and unique timbre. Many talented black artists were helped by the open-door policies of three eastern Music shools: the Curtis Institute, Juilliard School, and the Eastman School. But even with this assistance, the struggle was difficult, and it is an extraordinary tribute that by 1940, three of the quartet were among the top ten box office concert artists in the United States.

It is the death of such a great and talented person as Paul Robeson that leads us to reflect on the injustices of the past. His fate helps us to resolve that prejudice should never again be an obstacle to great talent. Oscar Hammerstein's lyrics should serve to remind us hauntingly that such talent may emerge from any segment of our society and we must help it to "jes' keep rollin' along."

JOSEPH F. McCALL

AMBOY:

BANK ROBBERS, BEWARE!

NO, BILLY, "AMBOY" IS NOT a new character on the Waltons, a kind of twin to "Johnboy." Amboy is the name of a real town in northern Indiana, a railroad community of 476 people.

But our little town has developed quite a reputation for capturing,

and foiling, bank robbers. The latest episode is kind of "Superwoman" in real life. The chief characters were Rebecca Riggs and her sister, Shirley "Casey" Bowland. While parked in line at the drive-in window of the local bank, they noticed a car with its engine running parked across the street. In jest they began to imagine a bank robbery under way.

They were jesting; the bank robbers weren't. When the bank manager ran out of the bank telling them there was a robbery going on inside and asking them to run for help, the sisters went into operation. Shirley ran to the parked car, turned off the ignition, and began to let air out of the tires. When the robbers came from the bank, she ran to a nearby restaurant. Meanwhile, Rebecca drove her car past the restaurant, picked up her sister, and the two of them began to pursue the fleeing robbers.

The local owner of the lone supermarket in town came from his store and fired a shot over the heads of the thieves. When one of them gave up, Rebecca ordered him to lie on the ground. She tied his hands together with her belt and firmly placed her foot on his back. Thus, with all her five feet three inches, she stood guard over him until both women marched the man up town to wait for the state police.

Both thieves were apprehended. Neither of them knew that a number of citizens had been involved in catching three bank robbers barely one month before this episode. One of the robbers grumbled, "It was an old fashioned bank robbery, just like Dillinger used to pull. The only difference is that Dillinger is dead."

It was reported that the children were delighted at the episode while the husbands were disturbed. The women are reported to have said they would do it again. Let the bank robbers beware of Amboy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR'S NOTEBOOK

PLAUDITS TO THE LOS ANgeles School Board! They are not going to give high school diplomas to any students who cannot pass the "Literacy Survival Test." Realizing the pathetic realities in the situation, the Board will put the demands into effect gradually. Nevertheless, the decision of the Board to demand that high school graduates be able to read signs, directions, applications, and other survival information, ought to be supported and emulated.

Demands indeed! Why not? But why wait until the end of the senior year? What are the teachers doing during the twelve or thirteen years prior to this? Is there no way that demands can be issued on the teachers to produce students who can read, write, and compute? Coaches have to produce. Why not teachers? Why don't the people who pay the bills ask for results? If teachers and school administrators cannot do the simple things for which schools are simply invented, then we ought to know why. To advertise one thing and deliver another is a rip-off. Why should teachers and schools be allowed to do it?

It is easier to fix the blame than it is to fix the problem. But it seems clear that schools are so oriented to afford such a range of experiences for the students that the students fail to experience the demands or the delights of knowing their mother tongue. In the anxiety to be omni-experiental, schools (especially the professional educators) have forgotten that not all education goes on in school: the school is an artifact of civilization that has very limited purposes. Most of those purposes are limited to the demands of training minds and spirits to use the tools of civilization.

And what about the professionals' demands in their own societies? Most of the hoopla of the Teachers' Union is about increasing the salary, the security, and self-interests of the teachers. Perhaps the salaries are too high, unrelated to the demand for competencies in the teachers. Perhaps the tenure is not tenuous enough, related too much to the love of security and prestige and not enough to the love of learning. Let us hear something of the power of the unions to desire, develop, and demand excellence of its teachers. And let those demands and standards be set not merely by the "professionals" talking to each other; let the standards be set somewhat similarly to those for coaches and musicians.

If the graduates must pass a literacy survival test before they receive their high school diplomas, why not a competency survival test for teachers before they continue to teach?

HUMAN LIFE IS ALWAYS interdependent. When it is not, it begins to deteriorate; it becomes incoherent. Like the "city," the university, when it functions well and fully, is a kind of ideal of that interdependence as well as an expression of it. The editor was made aware again of this reality during the fall semester when he was on leave. Dr. Arvid F. Sponberg ("Gus" in our university community) gladly took over the editorial chair. His willing and decisive activity left the editor neither room nor reason for anxiety. Just as willingly, Ruth Pullmann, officially designated as "circulation manager," but in reality, office manager, secretary, mock-up artist, etc. (like the budget account, "all others"), brought her capabilities to the service of the Acting Editor.

The editor especially, but also the publisher and the readers of *The Cresset* express their thanks to these two willing and competent workers. We wish them well in their old and new endeavors.

Second of a Series

ST. OLAF COLLEGE

Sidney A. Rand

DURING A RECENT WEEK I HAD TWO RATHER different conversations with persons closely connected with St. Olaf College. One was a student who told me of her displeasure with the college, emphasizing what to her was the patent lack of integrity on campus. The college claimed to be Christian, but there were people who were mean and harmed others. The college claimed to exalt "learning," but really was only after students to get their money and build the "image" of the college.

The other conversation was with a young man who had graduated from St. Olaf a few years ago. He told of his appreciation of what he had received through his college education. "I didn't even go on any foreign study programs, great as they were," he said, "because I didn't want to miss a single opportunity to be on campus and get all I could out of my four years."

This "bad news—good news" experience happens with some regularity on a college campus. Those of us who live and work at a college hope there is more of the good news than the bad.

People have come to expect much of colleges. These institutions of higher learning are exposed fully to view not only because there is such a large percentage of our society directly involved, but also because they have been quite effective in selling themselves as servants of that society and advertising what they have done and can do.

Now, we are told, colleges live in a "twilight zone." No longer will enrollments zoom. No longer will young people believe a college education to be the best ticket to a successful future. No longer will people pay the high cost of higher education.

Sidney A. Rand, President of St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota, received his BA (1938) from Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota, his theological certificate (1943) from Luther Theological Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota, and was awarded the DD (1958) by his collegiate Alma Mater.

Church colleges live in double jeopardy. Not only are they targets of a growing skepticism with regard to higher education. They are also suspect because many persons believe there is no real difference between an education offered in the name of the Christian faith and any other program of higher learning.

In 1974 St. Olaf College celebrated its Centennial. A hundred years previously a group of Norwegian Lutherans in southern Minnesota had decided there should be a school where their sons and daughters could have the opportunity for higher education. The Centennial was properly celebrated with various events on campus, a visit to the congregation of the founding pastor, and, of course, a special fund-raising venture.

But more than that, the Board of Regents authorized a study of the college's program and future plans. A summary of this prospect for the future was published under the title *Identity and Mission in a Changing Context.* It spoke of the college as it appears to the casual observer (a co-educational, Lutheran, liberal arts college with emphasis on quality academic work, music, and science), the college's church relationship and Christian context of learning, the place of residential life as an integral part of the college program, and the way St. Olaf sees career preparation as part of its program.

This general but unequivocal statement of St. Olaf's posture was followed by a series of specific recommendations for ways to fulfill the desired objectives. These recommendations were adopted in large measure by both the faculty and the Board of Regents. They included such diverse proposals as expanding non-western studies, recruiting more minority persons for the staff and student body, initiating a basic studies program, co-operating more fully with Carleton College (another private college in Northfield), and devising a way to encourage students to complete requirements for the baccalaureate degree in less than the normal four-year period. There were other recommendations having to do with faculty development, increased diversity in the student body, and continuing education.

The study revealed a willingness on the part of all

responsible parties to move in new directions as long as this did not compel a departure from the traditional St. Olaf commitment to the liberal arts, viewed from the standpoint of the Christian faith.

Another aspect of the St. Olaf Centennial was the publication of a history of the college by Joseph Shaw, professor of religion and alumnus of the college. This 700-page volume presented a thorough review of the first hundred years of the college and a critique of its program and history.

Shaw spoke of four "distinctive aims" which guided the founders of St. Olaf: (1) educational purpose, (2) religion, (3) co-education, and (4) the ethnic factor. These aims have continued to characterize the college's development and still distinguish it at the start of its second century.

EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE

FROM THE BEGINNING ST. OLAF COLLEGE was dedicated to the liberal arts. This was not a unique objective among private, church-related colleges. Many of them, begun before the founding of most of the nation's state colleges and universities, had accepted the role of chief higher education institution in their individual regions or with particular constituencies. They sought to prepare young people for professional service in the Church, for teaching, and for various other careers. But their aims usually included recognition of the need for an educational program patterned after either the colleges of the eastern seaboard (the Congregational-Presbyterian tradition) or the universities of Europe.

St. Olaf College was founded by a group of Norwegian Lutherans led by the Reverend Bernt Julius Muus who had received his education in Norway at the Cathedral Latin School in Trondheim and the theological faculty of the University of Oslo. His vision of education rested on the firm belief that young people needed grounding in the Christian faith. He sought to establish a school which would emphasize basic intellectual skills and cultivate in students an appreciation of their heritage and their opportunities in a new land.

There was no clear definition of the liberal arts to guide the founders even as there is no single definition of this type of education common to those who espouse it today. But Muus and especially the first president, the Reverend Thorbjorn N. Mohn, often spoke of "humane" studies or those subjects which would offer students the opportunity to grow as persons. They believed firmly that such education could take place best under the auspices of those who were committed to the Christian faith, for they believed the gospel provided the only sound basis for the education of young people.

St. Olaf began "St. Olaf's School" in two rented buildings in downtown Northfield. It was a high school, not a college. In 1886 college work was introduced and in 1889 the name was changed to St. Olaf College. It is not strange that the name St. Olaf was chosen. The great patron saint of Norway was King Olaf who was slain in the battle of Stiklestad in 1032. Norway at that time was torn by civil war and was hardly a united nation. Olaf had tried to unite the nation on the basis of Christianity and his death in battle resulted in his canonization by the Roman church soon afterward. He has since been accepted by Norwegians as the symbol of the nation's unity and allegiance to Christianity. Stiklestad is not far from Trondheim where B. J. Muus spent his childhood. Undoubtedly it was easy for him to believe it would be appropriate to name a school in the new land for this hero of the "old country."

The early devotion to a broadly cultural understanding of education has persisted at St. Olaf. While the college has emphasized preparation for certain occupations, it has never permitted career education to become its dominant purpose. A steady stream of St. Olaf graduates has entered medicine, the ministry, law, dentistry, teaching, missionary work, and business. The college has gained recognition for its strong programs of preprofessional education, but even these have been carried on with a conscious attempt to relate all education to the meaning of human life.

The college still has a foreign language requirement and all students take three courses in religion. The faculty debates regularly which courses or areas are to be required of every student. While some of that debate reflects the desire of faculty members to protect or strengthen their own area, there is still a strong conviction that every student must experience breadth as well as depth in his course of study.

The Centennial study put it this way: "Our description of liberal education matches our understanding of the wholeness of human personality. The emphasis upon an integrated development of intellect, imagination, and will, together with our stress on the bodily and sensuous dimensions of liberal learning implies the psychophysical unity of man."[1]

The report describes liberal learning in terms of its aims. It "seeks to instill in students those habits of reasoning and attitudes of mind which constitute intellectual competence," to confront students "not only with various disciplines, but with the pervasive cultural consequences of dominant modes of thought," and "to form and deepen the student's appreciation of the realm of art."[2]

St. Olaf has never believed there is a single way to achieve these noble goals. The curriculum has changed, hopefully to fit the times as well as the students' needs. Most faculty meetings are concerned with courses to be added. (Faculties don't usually drop courses until students stop registering for them or an instructor teaching

1. *Identity and Mission in a Changing Context* (Northfield: St. Olaf College, 1974), p. 11.
2. Ibid., p. 10.

a favorite specialty leaves the college.) Courses are continually being "re-packaged" also.

Twelve years ago St. Olaf adopted the 4-1-4 calendar which divided the college year into autumn and spring terms of four months each, separated by a January interim of one month. This system also led to a revision of the course structure. All courses were to have the same value. A student would take four courses in each of the longer terms and one course during the interim. That sounded good. It reduced to decent order the plethora of one, two, three, and four semester hour courses which had evolved. But Utopia was not to be! Applied music, physical education, practice teaching, certain laboratory experiences, and some other curriculum areas did not lend themselves easily to such structuring. The result is a less than perfect system, but still one which seeks to keep a student from scattering his interests too widely at any given time.

In 1970 the college began a different type of curricular revision. At the suggestion of Dr. Albert Finholt, Professor of Chemistry and Dean of the College, the paracollege was begun. This is a program by which students may proceed through college at their own pace and complete their studies, not on the basis of course credits earned, but on the basis of examinations passed, journals of weekly activity kept, and regular meetings with a faculty tutor. Approximately 10 per cent of the student body (250 to 300 students) are enrolled in this program. The paracollege appeals to the student who likes to set his own pace, is highly motivated to work without regular supervision, and has educational objectives which depart from the conventional pattern of courses and majors.

There are many ways to recognize a quality academic program. St. Olaf has a distinguished record with regard to the number of graduates who have earned the doctorate, who have gone into medicine, and who teach in graduate schools. Only four other institutions have had more of their graduates receive one-year fellowships for theological study from the Fund for Theological Education since that "trial year" program was begun in 1954. In 1948 St. Olaf was granted a chapter of Phi Beta Kappa, the national honorary scholastic society.

However, the reason a college attains any kind of academic distinction is because it has a distinguished faculty which attracts a highly qualified group of students. St. Olaf has had and continues to have a faculty made up of persons who have outstanding records of scholarship and teaching performance. F. Melius Christiansen, founder of the St. Olaf Choir and long-time chairman of the music department, brought that area of the college's work to a high level of quality in the forty years he served on the faculty. O. E. Rolvaag, noted author of *Giants in the Earth* and other novels, established the department of Norwegian. C. A. Mellby taught almost everything in the curriculum and introduced such disciplines as art and sociology. Nils Flaten was a long-time teacher of languages and his son Arnold recently retired after a forty-year career as a teacher of art. His sculptures in wood and stone grace not only the St. Olaf campus, but churches and other buildings across the country. P. M. Glasoe is credited with beginning the science emphasis at St. Olaf and in this he was ably assisted by men such as Emil Ellingson, Erik Hetle, and Peter Fossum. Julius Boraas in education, George Weida Spohn and Marie Malmin Meyer in English, Karen Larsen, Agnes Larson, and Kenneth Bjork in history, Olaf Christiansen in music and Ade Christensen in physical education and athletics all added stature to St. Olaf during their years at the college. Numerous current members of the faculty continue this tradition.

RELIGION

THE FOUNDERS OF ST. OLAF WERE CONcerned not only with strictly educational aims. They sought to give religion a proper place in their new school.

As Shaw says, "the place of religion in the original conception of St. Olaf's School was prominent but not conventional."[3] Religion was to be accorded a "proper" place. The school was not to be a "school of religion" as President Mohn put it, but "it is for the sake of religion that the school is founded."[4]

What the founders meant was that St. Olaf was not to be a "preacher's school" or a place simply to provide church workers or to offer Bible training. It was to be an educational institution in the truest sense, but one doing its work because of the belief that education, as all of life, needs the influence of Christianity if it is to achieve its highest purposes.

The founders were also specific about what they meant by the Christian faith. The articles of incorporation and by-laws of the college made it clear from the beginning that the authors were referring to the evangelical Lutheran faith. Theirs was to be no generalized loyalty to Christianity, but a frank and open allegiance to the faith they held as Lutherans.

Two important points need to be made in this connection. This loyalty to the Lutheran Church has never been interpreted to mean that there shall be a church-determined point of view presented in the courses of study. From the beginning, teachers were free to teach their courses as they believed they should. The president of the college has received letters written in anger or disappointment because someone has heard that students were being exposed to ideas not in harmony with some accepted interpretation of the faith. The writer of such a letter usually received a reply stating the confidence of the president in the teacher and explaining that the college did indeed permit ideas to be presented even

3. Joseph Shaw, *History of St. Olaf College* (Northfield: St. Olaf College Press, 1974), p. 17.
4. Quoted from Georgina Dieson Hegland, *As It Was in The Beginning* (Northfield: St. Olaf College Press, 1950), p. 25.

though they might not represent the opinion of the majority of church members. This attitude of freedom seems to have been beneficial and still prevails in the academic program.

A second point of clarification has to do with the meaning of church relatedness. St. Olaf was begun as a "church school," but not in the usual Lutheran sense. No sponsoring church body was present at its birth. In fact the founders tried to get their church, the Norwegian Synod, to recognize the school, but church leaders knew that recognition would mean financial support and they already were operating Luther College at Decorah, Iowa. The fact that the Northfield group emphasized the idea that "St. Olaf's" was not to be a "preacher school" did not seem to matter. So it was founded as a Lutheran school, but independent of official church connection. Except for a few years around 1890, St. Olaf remained without official church connection until 1899 when it was adopted by the United Norwegian Lutheran Church. Since then the college has maintained its official church identity. It could be said that the college went from one extreme to the other with regard to church relationship, because when the Church finally accepted the college, the St. Olaf Corporation was defined in the same way as that of Luther College. The biennial convention of the Church became the college corporation, a legal tie with the Church that continues to the present.

Interestingly, the history of the college reveals that it made little difference that the Church finally adopted the college. The college has functioned as freely within the Church as it did outside. Through the years the Church has provided financial support and some coordination for all of its colleges, but the internal operation of St. Olaf, and especially its academic program, has never been subject to church audit or control. The constitution of The American Lutheran Church states that the Division for College and University Services shall "supervise" the educational institutions of the Church. The word "supervise" has never been interpreted in its strict meaning, probably because a more advisory role has proved to be satisfactory for both the Church and its colleges. Such a relationship demonstrates that there can be significant permeation of church influence in a college program even though the legal ties with a church may vary. It also testifies to the good judgment of church leaders who through the years have regarded highly the principle of autonomy for an educational institution.

It has been said frequently that St. Olaf is a church college, not because a church once decided to found or to own it, but because the college itself, from its beginning, has determined to be a church college. The college has consciously chosen a course of action which identifies it with the Lutheran church and this determination, more than any legal connection, makes the college what it is.

There are many evidences of religion's continuing role in St. Olaf's life. There are the outward signs such as daily chapel, Sunday worship, required study of religion, and the presence of several Lutheran clergymen on the faculty. There are the official actions of the college, such as the Centennial study referred to above, which openly and consciously commit the college to the Christian faith. More subtle evidences of religious emphasis are the influence of Christian faculty and staff members and the fact that most students identify themselves as members of Christian congregations, 60 per cent of them Lutheran.

The annual Christmas festival, in which five hundred students participate, the regular concerts by college music organizations, the special "religious emphasis" programs both college-wide and in smaller groups, are other ways in which the college maintains a climate of Christian worship and consciousness.

Some say that church influence on the college is too great or too restrictive. More than one faculty member has joined the staff for a time and then left saying he can't accept the pervasive Christian influence. Some students protest, but they can and do ignore chapel services (voluntary attendance has prevailed for decades) and most other religious influence. Their protests regarding the religion requirement usually fade as they get involved, and hundreds of students take more than the prescribed three courses.

CO-EDUCATION

A THIRD INITIAL AIM OF ST. OLAF WAS co-education, although in 1874 that was far from normal practice in church colleges. The idea that young women as well as young men should have the opportunity for education was a conviction of men like Muus and Mohn and there is little evidence that they ever got much argument. It is to the credit of the pastors, farmers, and small business men who were the heads of families supporting St. Olaf at the start that they not only permitted, but encouraged, their daughters as well as their sons to attend the Northfield school.

The first name on the first list of students at St. Olaf was Marie Aaker. Ten other girls were among the thirty-five who enrolled at the beginning. In 1893 the first three students were graduated with the baccalaureate degree. One was a woman, Agnes Mellby, who later for many years was the "preceptress."

Throughout its history St. Olaf has stressed areas of interest to women students. Teacher education traditionally has had greater appeal to women than to men. The college has had a home economics department through much of its history and in recent years male students have enrolled in several of its courses. Since 1952 St. Olaf has offered a collegiate program in nursing.

In general, the St. Olaf curriculum has been the same for men and women. This is undoubtedly in keeping with the purposes of the founders. Present emphasis on women's studies has already resulted in new courses and new units within courses, and will no doubt result

in further curricular changes in the future. Currently, active emphasis being placed on women's studies and careers for women indicates a new awareness of the greater opportunities for women in education and in society.

There have been outstanding women faculty members at St. Olaf who have not only been role models for women students, but have made distinguished contributions to the total life of the college. In addition to those mentioned earlier, we should name Gertrude Hilleboe, long-time dean of women and teacher of Latin, Grace Holstad, for thirty-five years a teacher of biology, Inez Frayseth, registrar, Charlotte Jacobson, librarian and teacher of English, Ella Hjertaas Roe and Gertrude Boe Overby, voice teachers and performers, Hildegarde Stielow and Gertrude Sovik, teachers of German. This tradition continues today, with women constituting about one-fourth of the faculty and several being active in general college policy study and formulation.

Co-education received a new emphasis in 1971 when the college adopted a policy permitting men and women to live in the same dormitory. Housing in all college dorms except two make provision for women and men to live on alternate floors of the same building and to share lounges and recreational areas. Inter-visitation in student rooms is permitted with limitations on the hours when this will take place. Those in charge report improvement in the care of buildings and less noise than under the previous policy of single sex housing. Whether such noble goals as "better communication" and "sounder learning environment," which were used as selling points by those who originally sought co-ed housing, have been achieved in a conclusive way is perhaps debatable. Interestingly, when St. Olaf moved to its present location "on the Hill" after three years in downtown Northfield, the Main building, then a new four-story structure, provided co-educational housing. It was the only building on campus and included classrooms, offices, the boarding club, and an apartment for the president and his family, as well as housing for all students. Supervision was a bit more direct then than it is now, but at least the idea of male and female students under the same roof was not as revolutionary a thought as some believed it to be in the late sixties.

THE ETHNIC FACTOR

PROFESSOR SHAW LISTS THE ETHNIC FACtor as a fourth distinctive aim of St. Olaf. Perhaps it was more of an inevitable characteristic than an aim, at least in the early days. But in recent times an awareness and cultivation of its ethnic heritage has become a conscious purpose in the life of the college.

Almost all the early board members and teachers at St. Olaf were either Norwegian immigrants or their children. It was inevitable that a Norwegian "flavor" would permeate the campus. Classes in Norwegian were conducted from the beginning. The customs of Norway in church and family life were adopted by the college. Throughout its history spokesmen for St. Olaf have insisted that there is nothing inconsistent about being a thoroughly American institution and at the same time being one which cultivates an interest in things Norwegian.

During each of the last several years there have been more than 300 registrations for Norwegian language, literature, and culture courses. The department of Norwegian includes five faculty members. A special scholarship fund provides financial assistance to students from Norway and each year at least ten of them study at the college. St. Olaf students likewise study in Norway, and groups such as the band and choir have made several trips to Scandinavia. The University of Oslo maintains an American office for its International Summer School on the Northfield campus and the Norwegian-American Historical Association, which seeks to preserve in literary form a record of immigration and immigrant life, has its headquarters and editorial office at St. Olaf. Its extensive archives are part of the college library.

It is not strange to those connected with St. Olaf that the present King of Norway, His Majesty King Olav V, has visited the college on three occasions. Other Norwegians have also visited the campus in large numbers.

The ethnic interest at St. Olaf, once so exclusively Norwegian, has broadened in recent years. Students come from increasingly diverse origins whether they be Americans or from other lands. The faculty likewise represents various backgrounds. The college offers courses and academic concentrations in American minority studies, Asian studies, and of course in such western cultures as German, French, and Spanish. Travel to other countries has become increasingly common as students pursue their interests in other cultures. Approximately one-half of all recent graduates have studied abroad during part of their four years at the college.

Every indication is that this interest on the part of students and the college as a whole will continue. It is generally viewed on campus as a positive aspect of the college program, adding both breadth and depth to academic life.

CONCLUSION

IN SEPTEMBER, 1975, THERE WERE 2881 STUdents enrolled at the college. All but 40 were full-time, indicating the strong residential character of the college. More than 2200 live on campus while the others are either engaged in off-campus study or live in homes near the college. There are 200 faculty members.

The college operates on an annual budget of $15,000,000, of which three-fourths represents income from students. Annual gift income is approximately

$2 million, but during the past three years a special Centennial Fund campaign resulted in $11.8 million in gifts and pledges being made to the college. The physical plant of St. Olaf has a book value of $28 million and a replacement value of perhaps twice that amount. A new music building will be completed in 1976.

St. Olaf enjoys a capacity enrollment and does not plan to grow larger. Each recent year it has been necessary to turn down qualified students seeking admission, but the college is cautious about expanding its residential capacity in view of generally accepted estimates of falling college enrollments beginning in the 1980s.

St. Olaf is governed by a Board of Regents composed of twenty members elected by the Corporation to six-year terms. Four of the Board members are women, three are clergymen, two are non-Lutherans, and twelve are alumni. The chairman is H. P. Skoglund, Minneapolis business executive and philanthropist. Several years ago he and his wife, both members of the class of 1925, provided the college with a $2 million physical education and athletics facility.

While the Board of Regents is the final arbiter of college policy, the practice at St. Olaf is that which prevails at most colleges, in that the faculty determines academic policy with the Board holding the right of veto. The Board itself initiates policy chiefly in matters of finance, budget planning, campus facilities, and the purchase and sale of property. The President is chairman of the faculty and administrative head of the institution.

St. Olaf looks forward with optimism. Countless alumni, church members, parents of students, and other friends have continuously given their generous support. Recognition of the academic program continues in the form of fellowships for graduates, grants for faculty members, and subsidies of various kinds from foundations and other funding agencies. The college shares all the vexing problems which beset colleges generally these days, but believes none of them is more serious than many faced in the past. Those responsible for the affairs of the college are confident that our society will have need of its services in the future.

ALPHA AND OMEGA

I

Idolatry only strung bones
From the yew branch. Protruding eyes,
Glossed, were yet articulate,
Mocking the passion's hollow groan.
Judas, form dangling as it died,
Eastered the empty deviate.

Eternally, love's self implies
Other, nor ever can impair
Essence, co-mingling with despair.
It hears the farthest self that cries
Once self denies.

II

The seven headed undulates;
Across the sky his crimson tail
Drags, sloughing stars like flint-flakes.
Yet you, among the margent wails
(Articulation of the snake),
Respond with politic debates.

But bandied words echo and pass.
Down chasms in the earth broad trails
Open; the armed archer assails—
His stallion is unleashed, white ass
Grazed on the clotting grass.

ROBERT L. BARTH



BEWARE OF PRACTISING HUMILITY

John 13: 1-10

NORMAN NAGEL

Norman Nagel is Dean of the Chapel of the Resurrection at Valparaiso University and Preacher to the University.

INI

BEWARE OF PRACTISING HUMILITY. IT IS one of the greasiest ways into self-regarding religiosity away from Christ. Peter tried it, and Jesus would not have it. "He came to Simon Peter; and Peter said to him, 'Lord, do you wash my feet?' " There was some genuine humility in that. Jesus was above him and it was not right that Jesus should lower himself beneath Peter and be his servant in the lowliest task of washing his feet. There was respect in Peter and affection. Washing feet was servant's work and he did not want Jesus to be doing that, not to him anyway. He would not be a part of Jesus lowering himself thus. "Jesus answered him, 'What I am doing you do not know now, but afterward you will understand.' " Gently Jesus moves on to doing what he would do for Peter. He does not reproach Peter, but offers a reason why he would not blame Peter. "What I am doing you do not know now." True, Peter does not know. To him it makes no sense at all—now. Afterward he will understand when Jesus has done that into which this foot-washing fits as altogether of a piece, and characteristic of him, of who he is.

We heard that at his baptism. Son of God, Servant of God, Ebed Yahweh. Suffering servant who gets down below us all, to bear our grief, carry our sorrows, and make himself an offering for sin, like a lamb that is led to the slaughter. But for such a one there was not in Peter's or anybody's experience anything into which he could be fitted, or made sense of.

A Jesus who was Lord and Master was acceptable. We can handle that, but he has to stay in his place if we are going to go on being humble before him above us. We can handle a moral example too. Humble loving service, that is good. We can do that, or keep trying harder to do some foot-washing sort of things.

But that is not Jesus' way. He will not suffer himself to be held above us by our humility, or let us secure our place by striving to do some good things, that qualify us for his approval, humble things that show how humble we are. Peter is protecting himself with his humility, keeping himself where he wants to be according to how he has things figured out, and keeping Jesus where he is supposed to be, a Jesus that can fit Peter into a lord and mastering scheme of things, and while at it, why not fairly high up. How can Peter go on being humble toward Jesus if Jesus gets down on the floor and washes his feet? If he can't go on being humble he can't go on being proud either. All this of himself is threatened when Jesus comes to wash his feet.

Peter can't let himself just be given to. He's got a few things going that he wants to keep, things that he can point to in himself that make sense of him, that make him worth something. So long as Jesus stays above him Peter can be humble, and can expect down from Jesus his approval and elevation. But Jesus won't stay up there. He is kneeling down before Peter and ready to go to work on his dirty feet.

Peter's vehemence is a cry of self-preservation, "You shall never wash my feet." He can't let everything go and just be given to by servant Jesus. But servant is who Jesus is. So said the voice from heaven at his Baptism, and then these words, "I am among you as one who serves." "The Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many."

We are here at the heart of all that is packed into the word "grace." Jesus loves Peter and wants to free him from his little securities that pathetically would defend him against grace, against Jesus. If he loses these securities what will he have left to rely on?

Jesus tells him, "If I do not wash you, you have no part in me." Peter would have a "part in Jesus." That is what he would be left with, and it would be by grace only. Peter seems to realize that involved with this foot-washing is the highest gift, "part in Jesus." So he swings right round—falls off the other side of the horse—and wants now to clutch all he can have. "Not my feet only but also my head and my hands"—all that is further available for washing, and with them too all his thoughts and his actions. Now he wants all that shiny clean too. And Jesus says no. Technical diagnosis of Peter's malady is Perfectionism, the achievement of complete sanctification, no more sins, and this evidenced by observation of himself. Quantitative measurements of himself up to Jesus' level, or getting there—not quite yet, but with the score mounting day by day. Peter would then still qualify by demonstrable sinlessness, mind's purity, heart's glowing experience, or hands' good deeds.

Not bad things, but when we think of producing evidences from ourselves—perhaps even saying humbly the meanwhile that it is all the Lord's doing—we are looking in the wrong direction. Can't make it that way, and Jesus doesn't want to let Peter perish in the attempt. Cleansing is Jesus' doing. The cleansing he does is as sure as he is, as sure as his cross, and it is not for just a part of us. "He who has bathed does not need to wash . . . but he is clean all over." Jesus does it.

WHY DID I LEAVE A BIT OUT THEN? WELL, because it is a puzzling bit. Some manuscripts leave it out, but then since it makes the sentence more difficult, it is not likely to have slipped in later. The whole verse is, "He who has bathed does not need to wash, except for his feet, but he is clean all over." If you have bathed then your feet have too, so why do they need extra washing? Bathtub pondering does not give us the answer, but perhaps reflection on the character of the Gospel of John may. Here things are put evocatively. One bell sets another bell ringing. Water, washing, cleansing, by Jesus—Baptism. As chapter six has massive overtones of the Lord's Supper, so here perhaps overtones of Baptism. Try it out. The word "bathed" is used elsewhere baptismally. In Baptism we are washed, full cleansing, full forgiveness, but still we sin. Each day's journey brings dirty feet that each day then call for washing clean, for forgiveness.

Baptism cleans by giving us "part in Jesus," in his death for our sins, and his resurrection. In Baptism the name and word of God are with the water. Jesus said, "You are already made clean by the word which I have spoken to you." "The blood of Jesus cleanses us from all sin."

All of this is ringing round when Jesus is lowly servant washing feet, making clean all over. To have "part in him" is what it is all about, and Lent to help us. He does it, servant for us. Then we are freed from the whole humility-pride gamut, self-preservation, pushing up our score. We are only given to by Jesus who does it for us. He won't stay where we can keep our humility or pride going. No chance for that when he is down on the floor washing feet, or hanging up on a cross. "Afterward you will understand."

"Part in him" is by receiving his servant's cleansing work for us and being drawn into his way, his servanthood which leaves behind gradations of humility. Beware of practising humility, beware of foot-washing as an exercise in notching up your humility. "Did four feet yesterday. You can imagine the effort it cost me. How they smelt. Scored five today, and am shooting for eight tomorrow."

Lent centers in Jesus, servant Jesus, receiving from him cleansing, having "part in him," his way, and now and then you will be surprised to find yourself having washed a foot or two—glad of it and Jesus with you too.

The Gospel of John is especially inexhaustible. There are tones, overtones, and overtones of overtones. Let these words ring and grow in you and in your prayers.

"What I am doing you do not know now, but afterward you will understand." Now, afterwards.

"He who has been bathed does not need to wash, except for his feet, but he is clean all over and you are clean."

"The blood of Jesus cleanses us from all sin."

"You are already made clean by the word which I have spoken to you."

Deep, blessed, happy Lent.

Review Essay

STANLEY HAUERWAS

REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATION OF MORALITY AND ART.

ART AND MORALITY.
R. W. Beardsmore. London: Macmillan, 1971. Pp. 77.

MOST ATTEMPTS TO DISCUSS THE RELATION between art and morality tend quickly to become mired in fruitless controversy of hopeless confusion. I suspect this is partly due to the abstractness of the terms of the relation. It is at least as difficult to say what art or morality is as it is to specify any supposed relation between them. Moreover, to put the issue in terms of the relation between "art" and "morality" is misleading as it seems to assume there must be one thing called art and another thing called morality. We mistrust those who want to claim some relationship between art and morality, for we suspect that what they really want is for art to support their particular interpretation of what constitutes the moral. It may seem more fruitful, in order to avoid these problems, to discuss particular works of art for their human significance. In doing this, however, we will still be guided implicitly by general assumptions about how art is related to morality.

Of course the question of the relation between art and morality can be construed in terms of the relation between esthetics and ethics—that it is a relation between discrete philosophical areas. Though I suspect that this would prove to be an extremely fruitful interchange, it is unclear that much would be learned from it about the relationship between art and morality. For though esthetics deals with the theory of art it does not need to talk very much about works of art. (It is simply unclear what the status of esthetics is in relation to the real world of art. By this I am not implying any criticism, as it may well be that the issues associated with esthetics cannot and should not be limited to art. For example, I take it to be one of the major issues of esthetics to ask what is the conceptual difference between natural beauty and that which is dependent on the skills of the artist.)

However, the relation between esthetics and art is direct compared to the relation between ethics and morality. It has become a common objection, especially among those who disdain analytical philosophy, that contemporary ethics has almost no relationship to the moral life. The fine distinctions between meta-ethics and normative ethics, between act and rule teleology or deontology, are overrefined at best or irrelevant at worst. As a practioner of ethics I often find these kinds of criticism unfair, though at a deeper level it must be admitted that, as we have known since the *Meno,* it is by no means obvious how ethical reflection relates to or enhances the moral life. (It may well be that the interest in the relation of art and morality is an attempt to expand the assumptions surrounding contemporary ethical reflection.)

Therefore it would seem extremely unwise to try to understand the relationship between art and morality as that between ethics and esthetics. We are left with having to find a different way to deal with the relation of art and morality. In that case R. W. Beardsmore's book, *Art and Morality,* seems to be an excellent place to begin. Beardsmore's account has the virtue of going beyond the stated positions in a manner that demonstrates that there can be no "simple account of the relationship between art and morality." Indeed I think the great value of his book is to help us see that the two dominant accounts of the relationship, which he calls moralism and autonomism (hereafter referred to as M and A),

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are both misleading in important ways (that is in ways that we can learn from).

Both M and A, he suggests, arise from the philistine question of "What good is art?"—or in a more sophisticated vein, "What are the primary purposes of artistic endeavors?" Beardsmore argues that the essential mistake for both M and A is to assume that such questions are intelligible—in other words the primary mistake is to try to answer them. For by trying to answer the questions both M and A distort the nature of art.

Crudely but rather accurately stated, M is the belief that the point of art is to teach or influence morality in some manner; A is the belief that art has and should have nothing to do with morality, thus the slogan, "Art for art's sake." Beardsmore's basic argument is that even though M and A appear to be antithetical they share the basic assumption that art must be for some purpose. A, by rejecting the idea that art can serve some moral end, continues to be "wedded to the moralist's assumption that the only way in which a work of art *could* have significance would be by its functioning as a means to an end, since he cannot conceive of any account of meaning other than a purposive one" (p. 30), he concludes that the purpose of art must be for art itself.

The problem with the assumption that art must have a purpose even if it is art itself is that the significance of the distinction between purposive and artistic activity is overlooked. "The moralist holds that a work of art, a novel or a painting, is an instrument for transmitting some set of moral beliefs. And in doing so, he introduces a radical confusion *about the way in which* a work of art tells us something" (p. 15). What the M fails to appreciate is the difference between understanding a novel and understanding an essay. To understand the essay the important thing is to get the conclusion—i.e., the point of the essay could be made in another way. (I suspect that Beardsmore does not properly appreciate the "art" involved in essays rightly done, but his argument is not dependent on this.) The various parts of the essay are simply means to that end and are thus only contingently related to the purpose of the essay. In the novel, however, there can be no possibility of finding "alternative means of communicating some message external to the work itself"—i.e., the message of the novel is its style.

IN MEANS-ENDS (PURPOSIVE) JUSTIFICAtions some aspects of the total action are irrelevant to how the end is achieved—i.e., there are other possible ways the end might be achieved. But in art the "means" cannot be distinguished from the end. The colors of a picture and the words of a poem are the only colors and words that can do for this particular work of art. It is exactly the artist's ability "to select just the right word and just the right tone, which allows him to tell us anything at all. It follows that any talk of alternative means by which the same end might have been achieved is quite out of place here" (p. 17).Thus the artist cannot be said to write or paint for the sake of anything, even for the sake of art, any more than the man who enjoys conversation can be said to talk for the sake of talking (p. 21).

Beardsmore thinks this argument is decisive against the M position. However, this argument, though he thinks it also counts against A, seems decisively to favor some A accounts of the relation of art and morality. For it is exactly the virtue of the A account to understand the autonomy of the artistic medium against all attempts to provide higher or lower accounts of the purpose of art. It should also be noted that Beardsmore seems to base his case on what Giles Gunn has called the objective theory of literature—i.e., that works of literature are considered to be "self-sufficient entities whose particular mode of being can only be understood in terms of the parts internal to them." ("Introduction" in *Literature and Religion,* edited by Giles Gunn [New York; Harper and Row, 1971], p. 9.) This view assumes that it is the virtue of the artist to use language in "fresh and unusual ways that enables him to be able to express certain kinds of experiences in a manner no other medium can duplicate." (Gunn, p. 10) (This point indicates that how one thinks about the relationship between art and morality is relative to one's theory about literature. Besides the objective, Gunn denotes the imitative, the instructive [or pragmatic], and the romantic [or expressive] as the primary alternative models.)

It therefore becomes Beardsmore's primary burden in the rest of the book to find a way of extricating his own argument from being interpreted in A's fashion. For, as he quite rightly points out, to think that art cannot be reduced to a vehicle for the propagation of moral ideals is not to be committed to the assumption that there can be *no* relationship between art and morality. (Beardsmore, p. 4) His arguments against A however are much more problematic than his argument against M. He mounts two main arguments against A: one conceptual and one descriptive.

The conceptual claim is that insofar as we are engaged in any activity it is a moral matter, for morality is inherent in any affair of interest. The nature of morality "involves a standpoint from within which we can judge a man's willingness or unwillingness to take part in *any* activity" (p. 30). Morality is the kind of matter that one cannot choose not to be without. If a man cares about doing right he cannot at the same time wish to be freed from this concern (though he may of course psychologically wish that he were). Thus it may be possible for a man to claim he does not wish to be a good artist or scientist, but he cannot consistently say he does not want to be a good person—for he is always open to the further judgment, "Well you ought to want to." Therefore the distinction between art and morality can only be raised from "within the standpoint of morality" (p. 30).

However, if this argument is true it is trivial or if it is not trivial then it is not conclusive. The issues involved in the argument have dominated moral philosophy since Kant, and Beardsmore hardly gives an adequate account of them in the few pages he devotes to this argument. In brief, Beardsmore is trying to claim that morality is inherent in the very concept of human action. If this is the case then it must be possible to show that the amoralist is not only immoral, but involved in some decisive way in a conceptual or logical confusion. However Beardsmore has not shown why the immoralist is necessarily committed to a moral judgment simply because he has interests – he may well be able to continue to act even though he assumes that doing one thing rather than another is an affair of moral indifference.

Even if Beardsmore is given this aspect of his argument, however, his case is only trivially true. For it is to be noted that morality in this sense is only a formal condition for material moral discourse. Morality so understood has or can have no content. Therefore Beardsmore's claim, even if true, amounts to no more than insofar as all human activity is moral activity then art insofar as it is a human activity is a moral activity. This will hardly be satisfactory to those who wish to argue that there is an important relation between art and morality; those who make such an argument obviously have more substantive claims in mind.

Beardsmore's second argument comprises the last part of the book and is primarily a descriptive account of the network of relationships and traditions necessary for art to exist. Artistic activity may be intelligible but perhaps not correctly subject to moral criticism in terms of how well it fits in the tradition. For no artist is ever completely creative, but he is creative in renewing or rejecting certain artistic traditions. Art or its traditions (since the A might admit art exists in traditions but claim the tradition itself is autonomous) cannot be an intrinsic end: there is simply no such thing.

Art cannot be separated from society, for at the very least the language the artist uses in art is the language from the life outside. The position "to understand art, we need bring nothing from life," ignores that "in order to understand, for example, a poem, one thing which I must bring from life is an understanding of the language in which it is written" (p. 50). However, this is too crudely stated for as Beardsmore himself suggests, how the artist uses the language of his society is extremely subtle. Therefore the artist's relation to his society may be much more complex than this simple point would first envision.

Generally this descriptive argument seems largely non-controversial, but I am not sure it does all Beardsmore expects from it. It certainly counts against some of the extreme objectivist accounts of art that would separate the work from the artist, social context, or artistic tradition. But it is still quite another thing to say that the work is therefore subject to moral criticism as the context and the tradition of the artist's work may not embody the critic's sense of morality. It seems that Beardsmore senses the weakness of his arguments against A as he finally tends to rest his case on A's confusion that art must have a purpose at all.

HOWEVER, IN THE LAST FEW PAGES OF THE book Beardsmore suggests, but does not develop, a different position that is much more interesting. His new argument makes clear his primary interest is not to deny the autonomy of art, but rather to suggest that the inseparability of art from its form is exactly its moral significance. In this respect it becomes clear that what Beardsmore is actually committed to is showing how this account of the moral significance of art provides a better account of the nature of morality itself. He contrasts his view with R. M. Hare who sees the significance of art primarily as the awakening of our sympathetic imagination to moral principles that can be known and followed without artistic help. Therefore for Hare art is simply accidentally related to morality as providing illustration of certain kinds of problems that help us better to learn and know how to use the basic principles of morality.

Beardsmore denies Hare's account because it fails to appreciate that "learning from the treatment of problems in literature is nothing like learning from experiencing those problems, and often the problems an author describes are such that no one else *could* experience them. In Ibsen's play for instance, Nora and her husband face difficulties in their marriage, just as my wife and I might. But they are not *our* difficulties, and the problem for someone who holds that we can learn from them only if they are like ours is that in *that* sense they could not even be like ours in the relevant respects" (p. 63). But that is just the point, for art does not tell us what reality is like or what kind of problems are involved in marriage, by imparting factual information in story form, but rather the artist helps us see the "facts" in a new way. The artist does not "draw attention to facts which have been previously ignored. What he does is to bring us to a clearer apprehension of these things; he shows us that it is possible to see them in a new light. And though this may lead to a change in the rules by which we govern our lives, this is not the artist's intention either. What we gain from his work is not information, nor new principles, but understanding" (p. 73).

Clearly envisaged here is the understanding of the dependence of art on metaphor. For as metaphors actually create through their form, art creates its vision through its refusal to separate meaning from style. Therefore Ibsen's drawing of this marriage, while unlike my own, may provide me the tools of disinterest

that help me understand my own marriage more truthfully.

Thus Beardsmore seems to be claiming that the issue of the relation between art and morality is more accurately understood when art and morality are seen as modes of imagination. They are not separate modes of understanding that must be related, but they are rather equally rooted in the fundamental images that charge the imagination and allow us to understand at all—i.e., art and morality are equally dependent on metaphor. Thus the moral life is not an affair of acting in accordance with principles but rather is more like learning to see rightly. Art and morality are therefore rooted in our language and involve the human endeavor not to have the imagination stilled by convention or distorted by fantasy. It may therefore be that morality is dependent on the autonomy of art exactly as that autonomy provides men with the necessary linguistic skills to articulate their moral condition. In a profound sense art creates life, for without art we would not have the skills to say what we are doing.

IN CONCLUDING I WOULD LIKE TO SUGgest that part of the difficulty of understanding the relation between art and morality is the assumption that it must be some kind of causal relation. In a sense I have already suggested there is good reason for that assumption in as much as art does help us see and articulate better the truth of life. Art can and should make a difference for how we live our lives. However I suspect that the relation between art and morality is not really causal but analogical. Both art and morality are affairs of the imagination, it is proper to think of them as matters we engage in for no end beyond the doing of them. This is perhaps more easily seen in art, but I think it is also true of any correct account of morality.

In this respect Beardsmore is misleading as he seems to associate the moral life with the purposive aspects of our existence. Thus, we seem to be moral for reasons or ends that point beyond morality itself. But the moral life understood as the life of a person rather than moral action a person does, only begins when the complete pointlessness of morality is seen. The courageous man does not become courageous for any other reason than he would not choose to be otherwise. To be sure there are many good reasons for being courageous, but they are not and cannot constitute the reason one must be courageous anymore than an artist can explain why he must write or paint. Morality like art is not something we choose, it is our fate. It is my hunch therefore that the relation between art and morality rests in their different but equally irreversible decision to be for no other reason than we would be less without either.

Art and morality as human endeavors involve the assumption that it is better to be tragically than to fail to be at all. The artist knows, if he is to paint or write truthfully he cannot avoid causing tragic pain and suffering in himself and others. Art rests on the awful intuition that life insofar as it is worth living cannot avoid suffering. The man of courage knows also that his being such can as easily lead to unhappy consequences as to happy ones. Neither art nor morality promises satisfaction for our lives. They only promise that if we take the risk with either our lives will be worth more than lives devoid of art or morality.

FOR THOMAS A BECKET, AN OPTIONAL MEMORIAL

My boots hollow frozen, pre-dawn, long-fallen snow
His pilgrims hollowed the steps kneeling up to their April shrine
behind me the mountains take on sun's strawberry ice-cream glow
The Pardoner jostled the Parson: "Here's a relic for thee and thine."
Scudding snow clouds spray the stucco broken-off spire
The murderer's swords slit the Parson's eyes open to see
Silvering shines on the cross surging up from the ruck to require
the altar where blood gouts burst from Becket's gutted body
for the sake of His Church, for God's most precious blood.
His pilgrims found what they brought to St. Thomas at Canterbury
Crimson-vested the priest rasps, skipping the understood
the Pardoner's brass, the Parson's gold, ironic mystery
the Christmas verse of John: "For God so loved the world"
man, martyred for God, God, whose Love was the world.

SARA deFORD

THE BEAUTY AND THE SHAME

"HONG KONG—SHAMEFUL!" screamed a headline a few days ago in the *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong's leading English daily.

"HONG KONG—Beautiful, exotic, romantic!" burble the travel posters in their world-wide campaign to lure tourists to the colony.

Which of these describes the *real* Hong Kong? Paradoxically, both of them do. Undeniably, there is much about Hong Kong that is shameful, depressing, vile. But the converse is equally true, and the euphoric claims of the travel agents are not far wide of the mark. Let's begin by accentuating the positive side of Hong Kong.

Without question, Hong Kong is one of the most spectacularly beautiful cities in the world. Its magnificent natural setting is rivaled only by those of San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, and a few others. The view from the "peak" on Hong Kong Island is breath-taking—and getting there on the almost vertical cable car is half the fun! The ships from a hundred nations that ply the waters of Hong Kong's fabled harbor offer a kaleidoscope of endless fascination. Luxury liners, freighters, warships, yachts, junks—Hong Kong's harbor offers a safe and spacious haven to them all. And I shall never forget my first view of Hong Kong from the air. There it was, a gleaming, bejeweled cameo, set among the enveloping mountains, its placid waters speckled with myriad sails. It was like descending into a fairyland.

The travel posters are right. Hong Kong *is* beautiful, exotic, romantic. No wonder that it attracts over thirteen million tourists a year—coming from all parts of the world, but especially from the United States and Japan. Not so long ago, many of these tourists were attracted not only by Hong Kong's natural beauty, but also by its reputation as a "shopper's paradise." But that reputation has long since been lost, under the double impact of world-wide inflation and recession. If you come to Hong Kong with the idea that here you can get a new suit or a piece of jewelry at bargain prices, it would be better to stay at home and visit your neighborhood shopping center.

Scenic beauty, indeed, is one of Hong Kong's two great natural resources. The other is its people. And how many of them there are! Hong Kong's current population has swollen to about four and a half million (from a pre-World War II level of about 500,000). And on any evening, not to mention Sunday afternoon, about half of them seem to be congregated on Nathan Road, the main artery of Kowloon, the mainland section of Hong Kong. For sheer congestion, I have never seen the like of it—not even on Tokyo's teeming Ginza. Nathan Road offers a nightly version, Chinese style, of New York's Times Square on New Year's Eve.

And what people the Chinese are! Highly intelligent, industrious, thrifty, ingenious, with a firm and unbreakable family loyalty that is surely one of their most admirable qualities. To live among the Chinese in Hong Kong for a while is to understand how they have become so incredibly successful as businessmen and entrepeneurs throughout Southeast Asia—often controlling the economies of their adopted countries.

What is more, the Chinese are surely among the handsomest people in the world. I have seen more good-looking individuals of both genders per square mile in Hong Kong than in almost any other city that I have visited. In garb and in "life-style" they are almost completely Westernized. This may not necessarily be a "plus," but it is a fact of Hong Kong life. Not surprisingly, either, for Hong Kong is one of the world's most cosmopolitan cities.

HONG KONG IS THE PRINcipal remaining colonial outpost of the once mighty and world-wide British Empire. (I had assumed that everyone knew this, but it is astonishing how many letters arrive that are addressed to "Hong Kong, *China.*") Although the city is 98 per cent Chinese in population, the British influence is everywhere evident: in the educational system, in the street names, in the cricket fields, in the khaki-clad British troops, and in the musty, once-regal Hong Kong Club that haughtily bestrides Statue Square near the ferry terminal on Hong Kong island (officially called "Victoria Island," although one hardly ever hears the name). The imperial presence was visibly evident last May, when Queen Elizabeth II and her consort made the first visit in history of a reigning British monarch to this Far East bastion of empire—a glittering bit of pageantry briefly enjoyed, quickly forgotten.

How long Hong Kong will remain such a colonial bastion is open to speculation. I find it personally repugnant that a proud and enlightened people like the Chinese should be governed by a Western overlord. Anything that the British can do for the Chinese, the Chinese could do better for themselves.

There is, however, virtually no "independence movement" in Hong

Kong. Unlike the resistance movements in so many other parts of the former British Empire, there are no local "freedom fighters" bent on throwing off the hated foreign yoke. On the contrary, the Hong Kong Chinese seem to take their dependent status quite placidly, even though they have very little voice in the affairs of government. From the governor on down, all the top administrative posts are held by British civil servants, with the Chinese relegated to the obscurity of lower-echelon duties.

What accounts for this passivity? My own guess is that, however distasteful the idea of colonial status may be to the Hong Kong Chinese, it is still to be preferred to the obvious alternative: subjection to the Communist rule of mainland China. While it would theoretically be possible for Hong Kong to establish itself as an independent city-state, like Singapore, the odds are overwhelmingly against its survival in that role. Without doubt it would be gobbled up by its neighboring colossus to the north before you could say "Mao Tse Tung."

For that matter, the relationship of Hong Kong to mainland China is headed for an inevitable "showdown" in about twenty years. In 1997 the British lease on Hong Kong will expire, and at this juncture it is impossible to predict whether Red China will choose to continue the *status quo*, or whether it will assert its rights and officially absorb Hong Kong into its own territory.

Meanwhile, it has proved immensely advantageous to China to allow Hong Kong to remain in its present detached status. Hong Kong is the mainland's "window on the world," a listening post as to what is going on "outside," and a point of contact between the xenophobic Communist giant and world community. Economically, too, Hong Kong is of strategic value to China. The colony provides 40 per cent of China's foreign exchange earnings, and enables the mainland to buy wheat and high technology plants and equipment.

The Communist presence can also be readily seen and felt within Hong Kong itself. On October 1, the Red Chinese national day, hundreds of the red, gold-starred flags of the People's Republic fly from banks, restaurants, stores, and office buildings. When Chou En-Lai died recently, flags throughout the colony (including the Stars and Stripes over the American Consulate!) flew at half-mast.

But there are more tangible and important evidences of the Communist influence within Hong Kong. Red China operates more than fifty department stores in the colony, together with thirteen banks, two insurance companies, three financial syndicates, a travel service, not to mention restaurants, transport firms, publishing companies, hotels, and shoe shops. The China Resources Corporation, moreover, is Peking's major trading agency.

What this all adds up to is the fact that if and when the Communist government should decide to absorb Hong Kong, it would find a considerable number of supporters among the local populace. And while the majority of Hong Kong residents have no desire to enjoy the blessings of the "workers' paradise," the conditions of life under the British Raj are not exactly paradisical, either.

In fact, these conditions are the occasion for the "Hong Kong—Shameful!" indictment recently published in pamphlet form under the auspices of the London-based Fabian Society. There seems to be ample basis for such criticism.

IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO the generous social welfare program in the United Kingdom itself, the crown colony of Hong Kong has no minimum wage; no unemployment benefits; no age pensions; no sickness insurance; and no public assistance for unemployed persons between the ages of 15 and 55. Education is neither free nor compulsory, and—perhaps as a result—child labor abounds.

Living conditions are incredibly congested. The colony is virtually a forest of high-rise appartment buildings, many of them offering sub-standard housing. Single-family houses are practically unknown. Some three million people—almost three-fourths of the colony's population—live in thirteen square miles of built-up land, at a density ten times that of New York City. Many areas abound with squatter's shacks.

It is not surprising, therefore, that crime is a major problem in the colony. Organized criminal gangs, called "triads," terrorize the underworld and operate lucrative gambling and prostitution rings. The colony registers about one hundred homicides per year. With 100,000 drug addicts, Hong Kong's rate of addiction is the highest in the world. As an international port which stands at the crossroads of Southeast Asia and the Pacific area, Hong Kong is a natural conduit for the traffic in narcotics. The situation has been exacerbated by widespread corruption in the ranks of the police. Within the past several years, an astonishing number of high-ranking British police officers have been found guilty of enriching themselves on bribes and pay-offs. This is the side of Hong Kong that the casual visitor does not see. And it is conditions such as these that lend credence to the withering accusations of the Fabian Society.

And yet, for all of its faults, Hong Kong remains an interesting, exciting, rewarding place to live. Certainly uncounted thousands of inhabitants of mainland China must think so. So many of them have swarmed over the boundary to escape the tender mercies of Mao's regime that the British government has finally been forced to close the border, since—at least this was the official reason—Hong Kong could simply not absorb them all.

And still they keep on coming—or at least trying to come. In 1974 the Hong Kong police found 207 bodies along the most popular refugee routes. With the barriers raised

to prevent any overland escape, countless refugees have risked their lives for freedom by swimming the shark-infested waters between the mainland and the colony. How many of them have perished in the attempt will never be known. But the desperation of their flight is a commentary in itself.

WHAT ABOUT THE CHRISTian Church in Hong Kong? Well, there is no dearth of Christian activity in Hong Kong. And, in all conscience, there is plenty of need for such activity. With Christians numbering only 10 per cent of the local population, there is obvious need for evangelistic outreach. The recent Billy Graham crusade packed Hong Kong Stadium four nights in a row, with an overflow crowd on Sunday afternoon. The returns from this campaign are not yet in, but its energizing impact on the whole Christian community is apparent.

Equally important, the Christian churches in Hong Kong are engaged in a wide spectrum of welfare and self-help programs among the under-privileged masses. Here, too, the needs are so overwhelming that even the combined efforts of the churches can do little more than scratch the surface. The encouraging thing is, however, that they are not merely verbalizing the Gospel, but are putting it into action.

It would be impossible to enumerate all the worth-while projects that the Christian churches in the colony have undertaken. Worthy of special mention are the pioneer work of Lutheran World Service, especially its impressive Vocational Training Center "Caritas" organization; the Project Concern mobile family planning clinic and its floating clinic among Hong Kong's thousands of boat dwellers; and the many child care and day nursery centers, handicraft workshops, youth recreational facilities, homes and programs for the deaf, the blind, the disabled, the mentally retarded, the aged; and numerous others.

As I look out my window and watch the freighters and the sailboats, the liners and the junks, ply their course through the placid waters of Hong Kong's harbor, and as I watch the lights of Hong Kong island gleam in the gathering dusk, all that seems to matter is that Hong Kong is really beautiful and exotic. And I think that its God-given beauty means much more than its man-made shame.

THEATER — — **WALTER SORELL**



TWO AMERICAN PLAYWRIGHTS

IT APPARENTLY NEEDS particular occasions to be reminded of the fact that these United States have produced some playwrights of more than passing fashion in the twentieth century. The double bill of two one-acters by Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller, as produced by The Phoenix Theatre, was done in celebration of the Bicentennial: *27 Wagons Full of Cotton* and *A Memory of Two Mondays.*

In producing one-act plays of the two most important playwrights of the period after World War II the director, Arvin Brown, did homage to both writers in an excellent production with some of the finest acting I have seen in a long time. (It can happen here, too not only in London.) Undoubtedly it is always risky to couple two such divergent dramatists on one evening because it might invite comparison. If it were a comparison in depth of what the theater-goer really feels about the two examples of these playwrights I would not mind it too much. But usually it is the mindless kind of comparison. Moreover, I have never been very comfortable with any comparisons on whatever basis. But one could hear these comparisons and see them in print. In this case it struck me as a comparison between apples and pears. In my schooldays I learned that Goethe and Schiller were often talked about together and labelled in juxtaposition. Goethe gave the right advice to his nation when he said that the Germans should be glad to have produced two such writers and that they had better let the comparison rest right there. I thought that our critics should content themselves with the happy feeling that contemporary American drama has brought forth two such writers.

Comparisons, (other than pure evaluations), between the two are possible; they have some bearing on their writing, particularly on the two plays presented. The writers are about the same age: Miller was sixty last year, Williams is four years his senior. They are both products of the post-war period. Miller with a rather typical New York background has that cosmopolitan outlook on life of the Jewish intellectual who, rooted in the American asphalt, can never quite deny certain European links.

MILLER'S PLAY *A MEMORY of Two Mondays* can be better understood when we know that his prosperous father was badly hit by the 1929 depression, that the son had to take a job in an

automobile parts warehouse before he could enter the University of Michigan. The very same warehouse is the scene of the two Mondays, and the young man Bert is the most autobiographical figure Miller ever created beside the lawyer Quentin in *After the Fall.*

His experiences as a youngster in the New York scene of many suicides and apple-selling people who had lost their fortunes during the depression (a factor in Hitler's rise to power, an event which coincides with the first Monday) have made Miller into the writer of theses plays, plays with hard-hitting messages and social realism. Miller is totally involved in the events of his environment. He took his cue from Ibsen's moral indignation and passion. Harold Clurman, who has staged many of Miller's plays, once referred to Miller as "a dispenser of moral jurisprudence." Whether Miller writes about witch-hunting in Salem or the aftermath of Hitlerism, he is deeply concerned about the ordinary man's fate in the tragic events of his environment. "Since 1920," Miller has said, "American drama has been a steady, year-by-year documentation of the frustration of man."

What he created dramatically to perfection in *A Memory of Two Mondays* is the feeling of the little man trapped by life in the meaningless routine of his daily work without any hope of ever being able to liberate himself from the doldrums of destiny. The characters around the young Bert (read: Miller) are failures in their little lives. The man with the death wish works successfully towards his aim as much as the Irish man with his poetic lilt and deceptive dreams. Bert, with a book in his head and the inner strength to convert his dream into reality, goes through this warehouse like a visitor registering the powerless struggle of his co-workers. What is so important in Miller's writing is his ability to lift the ordinary onto the level of extraordinary meaning. The dramatist is always torn between pity and judgment. Miller has had some failures on stage as has Tennessee Williams. Miller's main weakness in his dramatic efforts is that, in his colloquial prose, he sometimes feels he has to editorialize a point which his characters have made quite clear in their dramatic situation.

TENNESSEE WILLIAMS ENtered the literary scene with all the implications of the deep South. Born in Columbus, Mississippi, he studied at the University of Missouri while temporarily working for a shoe company. He, too, has learned about the frightful failings of the ordinary man in the Limbo of life. He depicted his preoccupation with man when he referred to "My little company of the faded and frightened and difficult and odd and lonely." But there is only muted protest in the parables and fables of his reality; there is no social realism, no rhetoric.

Williams would probably have been an eccentric poet in verse and prose had not his strong feeling for the stage disciplined his writing into what often is referred to as "poetic realism." Totally involved in his Self, Williams has fashioned his main characters as lost in their involvement with themselves. He has an uncanny understanding for his female characters whom he characterizes much more in depth than his male figures who are either the image of brute masculinity (Kowalski in Streetcar) or appear with an almost painful innocence walking into the traps of debauched women in a depraved world (Val Xavier, pronounced Savior, in *Orpheus*). Williams seem to be able to identify himself easily with the lost female creature, as, for instance, with the world of a neurotic, self-defeating, aesthetically suffering Blanche in *The Streetcar Named Desire.*

In contrast to Miller he is concerned with the nonrealistic aspects of an overly realistic world, wrapped into literary theatricality of which he is a master. Also in contrast to Miller, his understanding of these poor creatures shows so much pity with their inability to shatter the iron fences of their suffering souls that he never thinks of any judgment. Their delusions and shipwrecked lives are seen by him with poetic compassion. Their suffering is recreated with an astounding subtlety and very few innuendoes. As Williams himself cannot face his own reality he lives and writes about, so cannot his characters.

Essentially, he is a one-act dramatist, although most of his ideas are well extended into full-length plays. He wrote a series of one-acters—his most poetic play *Camino Real* was originally conceived as a one-act play—and *27 Wagons Full of Cotton* is only one of the more characteristic ones. It would be a very personal choice, but I would have loved to see *A Phoenix to Rise* onstage again. This playlet depicts D. H. Lawrence for whom Williams feels a great kinship. The play we saw is typical of Williams's world of a depraved society in the South, the story of a case of arson revenged by a brutal case of adultery, with a frustrated woman, or rather a creature of spiritless flesh, as the focal point of the play. The way Williams writes is psychologically relevant, with all social aspects being a mere and remote by-product.

There is a *fin-de-siecle* feeling about his writing. His psychological flourish is somewhat reminiscent of the *Jugendstil* in dramatic terms, creating a frightening sensation of a man-made deluge *before* us. The excellent acting at The Phoenix Theatre made all this clear. Altogether it was a theater-evening honoring Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller who, for quite some time now have honored the American theater. Just as Geothe said: Why should we compare them, when we can love both of them for their merits and in spite of their failings.

RICHARD LUECKE

A BICENTENNIAL WITHOUT BOREDOM

THERE HAS BEEN, LET'S all admit, a degree of confusion and embarrassment along the way to the Bicentennial, and a more than occasional yawn.

It is not just the "commercialism" in Bicentennial gimmicks that's been bothering us. That is part of the American way; without it we'd scarcely know we were celebrating at all. Anyone planning to ignore the Bicentennial because it includes elements of rip-off should have begun by calling off Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year.

What seems more worrisome is that even our historical memories haven't been doing very much for us. Bicentennial dramas and quizzes afford a painless, sociable way of recalling historic persons and events. Those spot reports of what happened 200 years Ago Today seem accurate enough so far as they go and are appropriately low key. But there's not much there that actually grabs us. We suspect they are Bicentennial "minutes" *so as* not to bore us.

That can cause a certain malaise. To give two cheers for the Bicentennial, while making a mental note that this too shall pass, can give a nagging sense that we might be missing a point, that a crucial moment might be passing us by. The truth is we are slightly bored and slightly sad at the same time.

Following are some suggestions addressed to this condition, actually three pairs of suggestions. They are herewith offered as six steps to a Bicentennial without boredom.

Step One: Remember the Bicentennial is about a Revolution

Here is something everybody knows, yet which tends to get lost in computer print-outs of Bicentennial events. The Bicentennial is not the 200th anniversary of the United States Government nor of the Constitution; we've more than a decade to go before that. It is called a "birthday" celebration only by the feeblest analogy. (A newborn infant is comparatively passive—scarcely the case with the revolutionary fathers and mothers.) What the Bicentennial is *about*, whatever else is said and done, is a "revolution."

"Revolution" may be a disconcerting and controversial term. It is certainly an ambiguous one. But one thing it is not: it is not dull.

In summing up "America's Ten Gifts to Civilization" in 1959, Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. put "right of revolution" at the top of the list. In so doing, he was echoing Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Daniel Webster, Abraham Lincoln, and many others.

To try to celebrate the Bicentennial without attention to "revolution"—*that* might prove boring. It might very well produce despondency as well.

Step Two: Check Your Responses

Let the reader make a simple psychological test. Utter the word "revolution" and what is the first response? Is it an "upper" or a "downer"? Not many, we suppose, will like the word enough to name a daughter "Revolution Now" as one Chicago mother has done.

Say the word again and what is the first association? Muskets and hand grenades, more than likely. Bombs in public places.

What about the revolution which took place in the minds and hearts of the people" long before the shot was fired that was heard around the world?

For that matter, what about revolutions in science, like the Copernican Revolution. Immanuel Kant wrote of making a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, and his was not the first such revolution nor the last. What about revolutions in religion, some of them closely related to new conceptions of self-government in politics? What about the "industrial revolution" and the need, perhaps, for another retooling? Or the "sexual revolution"? Or revolutions in art?

Any revolution which is *primarily* a matter of guns and bombs is not likely to represent much more than a change of personnel—a new group of people running the same old machines for a somewhat different clientele. That would be comparatively uninteresting and boring as revolutions go.

Such a limited view of revolution could produce a dour notion that successful revolutions lead to celebrations and unsuccessful revolutions lead to hangings and there's the end of it. It could blur attention to what was explicitly at issue in the revolutions of the late eighteenth century—and to any fundamental changes which may need to be envisioned in the late twentieth century.

Why not begin the Bicentennial year by looking at this very ambiguity? The American people began in revolution and are presently celebrating a revolution, yet for most of us the word has become a term of fear and hostility. The Americans have sought, moreover, to build a tradition from revolution a point discussed below), and are in a significant sense a revolutionary people. Yet they do not speak much of revolution and have, in fact, let the word be co-opted by others.

Richard Luecke, on leave from the faculty of Christ College, Valparaiso University, is Director of the American Issues Forum in Chicago. Chicago was one of the four cities selected for receiving special funds from the National Endowment for the Humanities to undertake a program of discussion for the Bicentennial year.

The Bicentennial could be a time for getting our past and present, our deeds and words, together. So far from being boring, that might prove an engaging prospect.

Step Three: Pay Attention to Persuasions in History as well as to Persuasions of History

When he was past 80, John Adams wrote to his old friend and rival Thomas Jefferson: "Who will write the history of the American revolution?" "Nobody," replied Jefferson, "except for its external facts. . . . The life and soul of history must forever be unknown."

Historians continue to try, and they do pay attention to "external facts." The latter afford some rollicking debunking tales. But something more seems required when we encounter, amid those roungneck events, a document of Jefferson or Adams, a tract of Tom Paine, a speech of Patrick Henry—all of which cite history in their own way. There is a sense in which historic actions can be understood only in the light of present intentions, just as present intentions seek guidance from the past.

We understand what went on within a historic revolution only by doing some similar thinking on our own.

Step Four: See How Tradition Requires Innovation

Abraham Lincoln was one who looked for "the life and soul of history." Four generations after the American Revolution, Lincoln could say he "never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the Declaration of Independence." The Emancipation Proclamation and the Gettysburg Address, whatever their military and economic expediency, found their basis in the Declaration.

What about later immigrants who did not trace their descent to the revolution? "When they find those old men saying that all men are created equal," said Lincoln, that very declaration proclaims their relation to those men "and that they have a right to claim it as though they are blood of the blood and flesh of the flesh, and so they are." Even the latest newcomers might find reason to take the Bicentennial out of wraps.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident . . ." "Self-evident" did not mean these truths were apparent to all eyes, or that they would ever be a matter of proof (of IQ tests or Shockley studies). They were not to be a matter of argument; rather, from them all future arguments were to proceed. The *nation* would be tested or proved by its adherence to these truths.

The point, of course, is that every generation requires a new working out of the revolutionary principles. Keeping the tradition may require making innovations.

The American experience is always, to cite a recent chapter title, a "returning to where we never were."

Step Five: See "Discussion" as the Way of Joining Past and Future

When it came to making a Constitution that would preserve the fruits of the revolution, what did the founders do? They did not form a unitary government that would manage everything from the top (as did the French constitution). Neither did they form a treaty organization in which states came together only for stated purposes. They invented a federal union in which new issues could emerge, new problems could be posed, and new institutional arrangements could be devised and revised.

They made provision for "government by discussion"—in a sense, for perpetual revolution.

There is no other way to explain how people like Hamilton and Madison, whose opinions were sharply opposed in the Constitutional Convention, could both promote the new plan in the Federalist Papers. They had moved from simple controversy to making a space for discussion.

Discussion seems needed today which moves beyond familiar controversies to ask new questions. The Bicentennial seems a time not merely to solve problems as previously understood, but to ask where our problems really lie.

Step Six: Go Ahead and Pose the New Problems of Individual and Community, Economics, and Culture

The American founders cited the Bible, Cicero, Montesquieu, and Locke on their way to finding and saying something new. It is not necessary to cite the same sources, but discussion does require certain broad disciplines.

It is by bringing old ideas of freedom and equality to altered conditions that new questions are found. So long as anyone could buy a wagon and move out, or open a shop and move up, Americans could look aside from certain inequities. Today they may need to become more serious about equity than ever before.

If this is not to result in something dull and stagnant, they will need to become inventive once again with respect to arrangements in their communities. This will mean talking about "health" and not merely about medicine, about "education" and not merely about schools. It will require finding economic viability not only for individuals but for communities in which such talk takes place, and therefore require cultural tasks of community-creation at local, regional, and global scales.

The questions appear overwhelming. Understandably, they cause widespread dismay and disengagement. Yet to become serious about equity and to pursue all manner of social inventions—the question, perhaps, is whether people could stand the delight of that!

Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson asserted a union between the American character and inventive citizen discussion. "It is not a part of the American character to yield to desperation, but to surmount every new crisis with resolution and contrivance."

He said this as though it were a self-evident truth.

(UNTITLED)

you wake up in the middle
of nights I never sleep and
dash off letters that read both

sideways and up and down but
end how are you never saying
what I'm going to how

if I were reckless and
young I'd say mind rejects
remembrance and wants a
more tangible target

if I were young and
reckless I'd race to
telephones no doubt
causing you some con
fusion and dismay

the speed of every
thing is measured
by mechanic
al devices
that lie hidden

but the space
of my ex
istence is
uncluttered
by direc
tion my bones
sit naked
in the glare
of your pre
cision

my
mind's traffic
has too man
y police
men who for
years have cau
tioned my im
patience

but
I would dare if
I were reckless
and moderate
ly young to say
my eyes are hun
gry and my blood
has too much wine
and these out of
balance nights play
murder with my
sleep

if I were
young and halfway reck
less I would say come
and bring me fabric
for my bones come and
let my radar fin
gers find your center
come uncork the pres
sure in my nerves and
drink this surplus wine

but I'm not
reckless and
no longer
young and I
have learned to
lie so I
answer thank
you I am
well

OTTONE M. RICCIO

BOOKS

CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
Stanley Hauerwas. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1974. 264 pp.

VISION AND VIRTUE
Stanley Hauerwas. San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975. 239 pp. $8.95.

IN HIS VOLUME *CHARACTER and the Christian Life* Stanley Hauerwas attempts to shift the dominant focus of contemporary ethics from concentration on decision-making in the situation to the character of the moral agent. This young Methodist theologian, who teaches ethics at Notre Dame, begins with the observation that every theological ethic employs a central metaphor to depict the moral life. He contends that the classical metaphor of the "command of God" has produced the present focus on decision-making, which has resulted in making ethical reflection occa-

sionalistic and has left little room for understanding the process of personal growth and moral development. The metaphor of "character" is presented to correct this tendency and to help us understand how the self acquires unity and duration in relation to a person's convictions.

Hauerwas's work seeks to develop an explicit dialogue between philosophy and theology. The first step for both is to define precisely what it means for a person to "have character." This denotes something other than possessing personality traits expressed in the observation that an individual is ambitious, lackadaisical, or aggressive. To say that a person "has character" points out that an individual qualifies his action through his beliefs and intentions. As a self-determining being each individual shapes his personal moral history. Character refers to what a person can decide to be in contrast to what a person is naturally. Hauerwas contends that considering persons in terms of character enables us to affirm the primacy of the agent in moral action without ending up in the relativism of existentialism or situation ethics.

The philosophical study begins with an analysis of Aristotle's conception of character, which Hauerwas considers the most adequate systematic treatment of the matter yet written. This is supplemented with an examination of the work of Thomas Aquinas, focusing particularly on the latter's illumination of the element of intention in human thought and action. The author then works his way through contemporary philosophical psychology and action theory to the formulation of his own constructive proposal. Of particular value is his treatment of the nature of human freedom, a discussion which moves beyond the *cul-de-sac* of determinism versus indeterminism.

The theological section begins with a critique of the ethical theory of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth. The existential orientation of the former prevented him from developing an adequate portrayal of the process of growth and development of character. While Barth's theological ethics is amenable to a treatment of character, his focus on the command metaphor aborts his handling of the topic. Therefore Hauerwas takes up the treatment of the doctrine of sanctification in the work of John Calvin, John Wesley, and Jonathan Edwards to argue that the concept of character can do full justice to their insights while maintaining the priority of justification over sanctification.

Hauerwas presents a clearly argued and comprehensive work in an area too long neglected in the dominant trends of contemporary ethics. Because of the extended expository sections this work can be read profitably by the reader who has not previously encountered the topics covered. Yet the work seems to be marred by the author's claim to be doing more than what he has done so well, namely to demonstrate the superiority of the metaphor of character over the command metaphor in theological ethics. The command metaphor seeks to maintain the relational character of the Christian moral life, and is primarily a theological expression, not simply a metaphor for the moral life. That this dimension is lacking in the metaphor of character appears to be demonstrated by Hauerwas's need to emphasize the priority of justification in the formulation of an ethics of character. This concern seems to be supplemental rather than an essential dimension of the concept of character. Despite the author's protestation, the metaphor of the "responsible self" employed by Bonhoeffer and H. Richard Niebuhr may prove more adequate in combining both the relational and developmental motifs.

THE COLLECTION OF ESsays published in the volume *Vision and Virtue* relates Hauerwas's approach to ethics to a variety of topics. The reader who cannot work through the volume reviewed above will find here a short treatment of character.

In particular two topics stand out. One is the role of vision in the moral life, which Hauerwas treats in an exciting fashion in his discussion of the relation of ethics to aesthetics. The second is found in his essays dealing with situation ethics, especially the one entitled "Love's Not All You Need."

This work also contains significant essays on the issues of abortion and euthanasia. And it makes clear that a concern for character provides both incentive and new perspectives for political and social ethics.

It may prove disconcerting to the informed Lutheran reader to confront in both these volumes the long-discredited interpretation of Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms formulated by Ernst Troeltsch. This doctrine did not separate the public from the private life of the believer, as Hauerwas argues, but sought to make clear the essential relationship and necessary distinction between justification and sanctification. The intention of this doctrine seems to be in accord with Hauerwas's own explicit concern. The author has done us a service in developing a portrayal of the process of growth in Christian character which keeps in the forefront a concern to emphasize the priority of the doctrine of justification.

DALE G. LASKY

KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS.
Roberto Mangabeira Unger. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

THIS AMBITIOUS WORK, the product of a Harvard Law School professor, is nothing less than a critique of modern "Liberal culture" and a sketch of an alternative kind of society. It was written, he says, as an "act of hope," pointing toward a "kind of thought and society that does not yet and may never exist." It is an abstract and complicated effort, strange to the modern em-

pirical mind, but brilliantly executed and of considerable importance to philosophers, intellectual historians, and theologians. It is indispensable as a criticism of the intellectual foundations and "antinomies" of modern society.

The work has the essential merit of linking political thought once again to one of its traditional philosophical companions, the theory of knowledge and action. For Unger, the Liberal State of modernity stems from Locke, the Locke of instrumental empiricism, manipulative action, and "possessive individualism." The individual is a being devoid of classical "essence" who endlessly pursues arbitrary and material desires. Society is a nexus of conflicting pursuits of happiness, and government is resigned to the neutral and secondary role of arbiter of these individual desires for comfort, power, and glory. Thus the "nature" of human knowledge and action becomes the philosophical ground for a particular type of society and government. However, since such a culture is based upon the eternal hostility of discrete individuals in constant pursuit of selfish desires, the possibility of identifying and sharing "communal values" is remote. Substantive justice in the *a priori,* classical sense is impossible reduced to the legal arbitration of conflicting desires. The resultant social and political order is meritocratic and impersonal, a bureaucratically ruled society that evolves into a managed "welfare-corporate state."

The major difficulty, Unger believes, with such social consciousness and institutions is that there is a clear absence of community. Unger's positive theory attempts to avoid the alleged faults of the corporate state and the Utopian socialist alternatives. His argument is for the creation of "communities of life" that sound very much like the Aristotelian ideal of the *polis.* Such "organic groups" are a face-to-face *Gemeinschaft* characterized by radical alteration of the division of labor and the evocation of mutual sympathy. Unger attempts to advance the communitarian aims we associate with Rousseau: the "democracy of ends" of radical democratic theory which expands decision-making to the entire organic group. Such groups somehow come close to showing man's "species nature" (as in the young Marx) and thus substantive justice.

Yet he understands the limitations of the ideal of the perfection of man and community, and this leads him—as it did not Rousseau and Marx—to the idea of God. It is the classical political question: if there is a political good, how is it related to the ultimate good? Is there a relationship between divine transcendence and political immanence? He hopes that philosophy could once again attempt to provide the link between politics and religion, between political man and God. He concludes with no sectarian answer, only a hope for a Divine clarification, "But our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. Why then do you remain silent? Speak, God." The modern notion of the "silence of God" is thus extended to political philosophy. For the Christian, of course, God has already spoken. But Unger's work does point up the need for the vigorous reconstruction of a Christian political theory that clarifies the theological ground of political life.

JAMES E. COMBS

INDIANS OF THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST

Bertha P. Dutton. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, Hall, 1974. Pp. xxix & 298. $14.95

MORE HAS BEEN WRITTEN about the American Indian than about the cultures of any other country or continent, and books by and about Indians are more popular than ever. Thus Bertha Dutton's *Indians of the American Southwest* may go unnoticed next to angry Indians' rights manifestoes or bury-my-heart eulogies. Yet it is one of the most readable, up-to-date, and informative accounts currently available.

The publisher's claim that *Indians* is "indispensable for the Western history buff, the anthropologist, the art lover, the Indian-craft enthusiast, and the reader interested in cultures different from his own" is pure fantasizing, but does give some idea of the many attractions of the book. Perhaps its best feature is its neatly balanced combination of history and ethnography, each complementing the other; its characters can emerge as "whole" people with pasts, presents, and futures, not the ethnographic fossils of so many anthropological monographs. At the same time, Dutton *is* an anthropologist, and as such succeeds at the equally important task of understanding these cultures in their own terms.

Indians in the American Southwest are fairly unique. Their contacts with Europeans began with the Spanish in the early sixteenth century. Unlike other American Indians, who had often violent confrontations with the French, English, and New Americans, these groups lived in a harsh environment into which few settlers would go. Being relatively isolated from "foreign" influences, they managed to preserve much of their traditional culture. This isolation did not come without certain costs; hunting is virtually impossible and the arid region can support only a minimal population base. The archaeological record testifies to competition for arable land, but also to the stability of relatively permanent settlements. The familiar pueblos date back hundreds of years, and the same areas have had continuous occupation for at least two thousand. By requiring the discovery of horticulture the environment of the Southwest helped to create some of the most sophisticated cultures on the North American continent.

Dutton approached her subjects from this ecological starting-point, and in this she falls into a subtle

trap. Simply, she presents current and traditional beliefs, practices, and institutions as adaptations or responses to the environmental forces of the area. Kinship, for example, tends not to be patrilineal (i.e., reckoned through males) where women own and work fields of land; it tends to be either matrilineal (i.e., through females—preserving ownership from mother to daughter) or bilateral. Religion, too can be dealt with in the same manner; weather gods or spirits (and rituals to control them) are a response to anxiety over rainfall and high winds.

This perspective, cultural ecology, is compelling in its simplicity and apparent explanatory power. Its danger lies in its tendency to overuse, assuming that any social or cultural feature admits of an environmental explanation. While it is certainly true that horticulture is limited by available soils and water (eskimos don't grow corn), it is another matter altogether to suggest that specific cultural facts (and by implication, culture itself) are shaped only by a need to eat, stay warm, or reproduce. Although this perspective is outlined in the initial sections of her book, it does not seem to have occurred to Dutton that her richly varied portraits of individual cultures suggest something quite different—that there is a remarkably creative variety among these groups which extends beyond the mere satisfaction of material needs.

THE ONLY OTHER COMplaint one might raise about her study is that Dutton is sometimes a bit fuzzy on the details of social organization. To be sure, few readers will tolerate pages of complex kinship charts, but the failure to provide more information occasionally gives the impression that members of some groups hang together simply for the company. Consider the description of the Havasupai: "The family was the social unit, with small groups loosely bound into larger ones by blood relationships. No clan existed. No marriage or divorce laws were observed." No doubt. But we are not really told what there *is*, and even less are we warned that terms like "family," "blood," "marriage," and "divorce" are semantically sensitive and refer to very specific European concepts.

However, these are relatively minor faults which should not bother the general reader. In fact, Dutton's presentation has several strong points, particularly its highly detailed acount of religious systems in the area. One might quibble with her interpretations, but her knowledge of esoteric rituals and practices, both public and private, has not been surpassed since Gladys Reichard's *Navaho Symbolism* in the forties. At one point she quotes an investigator to the effect that "religion is involved in the whole life for any people." Clearly she understands this complex relationship and is able to offer an insightful, sensitive account. Parenthetically, she offers excellent advice for Christian missionaries, cautioning them that spiritual advantages may be outweighed by the material and psychological benefits of traditional beliefs.

A final feature of current interest should be Dutton's thorough grasp of the history of these cultures and, in particular, their contacts with the United States government. Her introductions to each chapter give illuminating reports on the contemporary status of these peoples, accounts of their attempts to regain control over their land, and the interaction of their traditional political systems with those recently imposed by the white chiefs in Washington. Although she is sympathetic to Indian desires, one is grateful for her reasonable, balanced presentation of facts and opinions, something too often lacking in modern Indian writings.

There may be better books available on Indians, but there is none which is more complete and readable on Indians in the Southwest. For this, surely, a whole generation of students will be thankful.

DONALD K. POLLOCH

E Pluribus Unum

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common good out of the depth of Christian conviction rather than in spite of their faith. Two complementary insights of faith may invigorate this affirmative participation. The first is the recognition that the human person transcends his cultural life, the second is the recognition that human culture is essential to personal existence.

The letter to the Galatians voices the first in the refusal to view people ultimately in terms of ethnic, cultural, or religious traditions—as Jew or Greek—in terms of social or economic status—as slave or free—or in terms of sexual and natural differentiations—as male or female. This insight affirms flexibility and change in social and cultural forms and insists that change acknowledge and protect the dignity of every individual as a person.

The second is expressed in the awareness that people never appear abstractly as "persons." In daily life we meet the middle-class Germanic member of a patriarchal family, the wealthy young woman of Irish descent who is committed to women's liberation, and the Puerto Rican youth who espouses male *machismo*. People grow up in and belong to particular groups, and American pluralism affirms this particularity and variety. Christians should have learned long ago to celebrate this wealth of creation and then taken up the responsibility as stewards of creation to strive for harmony, justice, and equity in and through it.

From this perspective one can do more than make his own contribution to a pluralistic society, or assert his critical judgment upon it. We can welcome our dependence upon it and learn from the new and critical ideas directed toward us, painful though it be.

Guest Opinion

DALE G. LASKY

E PLURIBUS UNUM

OUR FAMILIAR AMERICAN motto visualizes the ideal of a united people formed from a pluralism of persons and groups. It is obvious that the variety of our present pluralism far exceeds the vision of the fathers who adopted the motto. But in the midst of our bicentennial year we find ourselves searching anew to uncover the substance of the unity which should inform our common life.

Our situation invites reflection on an often neglected dimension of pluralism. By definition social pluralism refers to the common life of a people of diverse cultural backgrounds, personalities, and basic convictions. To create such a unity this pluralism requires a common rationale shared by those who participate in it. Without some common consensus pluralism is reduced to living together and practicing toleration as the supreme value: live and let live. The result of such a practice could be a society in which nothing more than bureaucratic structures and the technological maze holds together the private lives of its people. The will to create and to nourish a common life depends on the vitality of deeper convictions than this. Pluralism needs the common values which enable people living together to learn from one another and to deepen their practice of justice and equality.

Common values, however, mean something other than the same values shared by all members of a group. For example, each person in a society may place high value on holding a job which provides an adequate standard of living. In a period of economic recession the fact that all the people hold the same value may thrust them into fierce competition to secure the limited jobs available. The possession of the same values can produce tension and disharmony in the community. The concern for jobs becomes a common value only when the members of a society share the goal of enabling all to participate productively and positively in their group.

Many today sense that something more is needed than to provide each individual the opportunity to secure a full private life for himself. More is needed than to provide a job or living wage for each person, as important as this is. There remains the need to belong and to participate significantly in the life of a larger human community. In the words of one contemporary observer, our nation appears to grow uglier, more dangerous, and less pleasant to live in as its citizens grow richer. One reason is that public order, the cultivation of the arts and natural beauty wither when left to depend on the special interests of particular individuals or groups. We are confronted again with the need to create for ourselves a vital picture of what has traditionally been termed the "common good."

This does not imply that we should immediately form or join study groups trying to define the common good for our society. More likely we shall achieve our goal as we confront particular issues raised in our society with the broader concern for the common good consciously in mind. During the past two decades we have lost opportunities to renew our vision of the common good as we reduced vital issues for our society to arguments between differing interest groups. The civil rights struggle, the Vietnam war, and Watergate come quickly to mind. When the confrontation between opposing groups disappeared the issues were quickly forgotten. And we often sense in ourselves the feeling of impatience and aggravation, or frustration, when people bring them back to mind. Will we do the same with the new issues on the horizon?

PARTICIPATION IN A PLURALISTIC society presents problems for those who, like Christians, espouse an explicit ultimate commitment not universally accepted. The Christian faith claims to be more than a private religious belief, since it makes a public truth-claim. It cannot be shunted into the private lives of the pious.

Christians have devised a variety of rationales for their participation in our pluralistic society. Some assumed that the common values of our culture are to be Christian values even though not all citizens explicitly espouse the faith. But Christians may have to learn to live in a society where the dominant values and life styles contradict their traditional understanding. Other Christians have felt compelled to practice a conscious or unconscious dishonesty by restricting their truth-claims to private life. In public these claims were silenced to achieve peaceful coexistence with people of other convictions. Still other Christians affirmed the pluralistic society because they felt that it produced a more vital church life than now remains in countries where Christianity enjoyed political and social recognition. By itself this rationale appears rather self-serving.

The question remains whether Christians have learned how to participate fully in the search for the

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