3 IN LUCE TUA Familia 74: Ujamaa Safari; Why Limit Public Service Projects to Railroad Tracks?; Hagar or Sarah?; Notes from the Editor's Notebook
6 Calvin J. Eichhorst Moral and Theological Issues in the Abortion Controversy
9 Donald A. Affeldt Notes in Response to Dr. Eichhorst
13 R. S. Andrew Creszwokak In Preparation; In a Summer Park the Boys Field
17 David M. Borostnitz Abortion: Should the United States Constitution Protect the Right to Choose?
19 Discussion of Horowitz/Garton Lectures
24 Religion and Paula Hoped The Shape of the Christian Family
26 Patricia Stuck The Skill of Sight-Singing
28 William M. White Gament Upon the Plight
33 Thomas G. Hall Narnia: The Gospel According to C.S. Lewis
44 Walter Sorell Farewell to a Season
46 Harry Martinson Letter From a Grease Monkey

ALBERT G. HUEGLI, Publisher
O. P. KRETZMANN, Editor Emeritus
KENNETH F. KORBY, Editor

Departmental Editors
Richard H.W. Brauer, Visual Arts; Design Advisor
Richard H. Luecke, The City
Theodore Jungkuntz, Religious Books Reviews
Joseph F. McCall, Recordings
Jill Baumgaertner, Poetry Consultant
Dorothy Czamanske, Editorial Assistant
Jacki Lyden, Student Intern
Robin Rademan, Student Intern

Contributors
Walter Sorell, Theater
Albert Trost, Politics
James A. Nuechterlein, Politics

Editorial Board

Business Managers
Wilbur H. Hutchins, Finance
Ruth Pullmann, Circulation

THE CRESSET is published monthly except July and August by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383. as a forum for scholarly writing and informed opinion. The views expressed herein are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of opinion of Valparaiso University or within the editorial board. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Letters to the editor for publication are subject to editing for brevity. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Subscription rates: one year — $3.00; two years — $5.50. single copy — 15 cents. Student rates, per year — $1.00: single copy — 15 cents. Entire contents copyrighted 1975 by the Valparaiso University Press, without whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden.

Above: Martin Christensen, Tree Study, 1975, black and white photograph. Cover: Martin Christensen, Indiana Dunes Flora, 1975, photographic mosaic, black and white. This photograph and the one above were taken by the artist while a student in an Art Department photography class at Valparaiso University.
Familia 74: Ujamaa Safari

IN JUNE 1974 A MEETING was held in Tanzania, a meeting whose story bears the interesting title “Ujamaa Safari.” According to the story in Risk magazine, “Familia 74 was a meeting planned jointly by the World Council of Churches Unit on Education and Renewal and the International Confederation of Christian Family Movements. It was supported by the UN World Population Year Fund and other donors. It brought together in Tanzania from 54 countries about 250 men and women for 15 days of meeting.”

Some of the material reported in Risk magazine was fascinating and coincides well with the intention of The Cresset to engage in discussions about family life which (hopefully) will contribute to the business of reconstruction of the family, especially the Christian family. Bells are ringing for marriage: some of us hear them as insistent as fire alarms. Humanity itself is at stake with the family, for an attack on the family is also an attack on human personality, on men, women, and children.

Ujamaa Safari was also concerned about the reconstruction of the family. One of the elements that made this meeting so full of promise and its consequences (according to the reports) so important, was the simple fact that married couples constituted the majority of the participants. Another element of value was the visit made to “Ujamaa” villages. Ujamaa villages are “familyhood” villages—what the report calls “a prime example of ‘family socialism,’” an African form of what is called the extended family.

The report, including some of the speeches by African leaders, shows that the struggle for a basic model for the family is going on in Africa, too, although there is not yet the presence of the “urban man” as in the West. Members of the meeting, particularly the Africans, were sensitive to the interplay between the model of the society and the model of the family. The nation reflects the conception of the family, and vice versa. The democratic ideal for society and the emancipation of women, as ideologies and movements, obviously collide with a patriarchal (or matriarchal) model of the family, with a hierarchy of social relationships. Whether or not socialization of the family (and the society) will remove exploitation, produce more food and wealth, insure the equal distribution of wealth, etc., is still to be seen. These concerns of the people of Tanzania (and of the participants in the conference) must also receive prime attention in our discussions about the family. But deeper than these concerns is the shaping of human lives and social existence where created and redeemed people grow in holiness.

Of extraordinary value and perception was Michel Evdokimov, “The Family in Literature” (Risk, X, No. 4 [1974], 29-32). After a brief comment on Christianity and Marriage, the author analyzes the myth in literature: being in love with unhappy love where the aim and climax is death. Other problems arose (he says) in the West with industrialization and its attending revolution, but the myth continued. Finally, by means of a discussion of some Russian authors, the author talks about the purification of married love through suffering. Notably absent from his comments is any mention of what must be one of the best (if not the best) of books on the growing interior history of married loves, Soren Kierkegaard’s second volume of Either/Or.

What The Cresset began in February 1974 with Ernst Schwidder’s “On Human Habitation,” it continues in this issue with the Long family’s “The Shape of the Christian Family.”
Why Limit Public Service Projects to Railroad Tracks?

SENATOR BIRCH BAYH (D-Indiana) has been attempting to prod federal railway authorities to plan a massive project of upgrading decrepit tracks in the bankrupt Midwest and Northeast rail corridors. His program attempted also to tie into the maintenance project the use of some of the large number of unemployed. In March Senator James Buckley (Cons.-NY) introduced a plan calling for $500 million to provide 50,000 jobs in railroad improvement, a plan again related to both the need for maintaining the roadbeds and tracks and for dealing with recession unemployment.

Senator Vance Hartke (D-Indiana) in an alternate but related plan suggested government ownership of the railroads with a non-profit government corporation formed to purchase, refurbish, and maintain the track. Hartke has said he introduced his plans "only for debate purposes."

Rather than argue for the Bayh/Buckley proposals and against Hartke's (although I think I would argue in that direction), I would like to raise another question: Why limit public service projects to the railroad tracks? What about the maintenance of countless houses in many sections of our cities and numerous houses and outbuildings in rural or small town areas? Why cannot local jurisdictions organize local work forces for such work, including yard, lawn, garden, boulevard, and park work? Local union people could furnish leadership; old masters of various skills and arts could furnish training for young people who would be taught about wiring, plumbing, gardening, tool maintenance, house construction and maintenance. Local school personnel could furnish leadership for local, socially-related activity: singing, folk-dancing, games, and contests. There are many older, skilled people who could furnish leadership in common food preparation for one or two meals per day for the work crews (and for others who might need the meals). In this way young men and women could be trained in matters of diet, food preparation, management, etc.

And why not move into the areas of constructing parks and hiking and camping areas? Why not plant flowers, shrubs, and trees in the land along the freeways? Gardening, tree-pruning, care of flowers could be taught and learned in the process. Many skills of craft and shop could be put to genuine public service.

There are a number of advantages to such projects of public service: the old masters of various trades and skills could contribute to the education and training of younger people; the young people could learn the basics of house and yard maintenance without cluttering the expensive and inefficient school systems; the building of a public spirit to improve and maintain both private and public properties would be generated within the communities; the young who have difficulty securing summer jobs and the unemployed would receive both employment and training.

Disadvantages can be overcome if the financing and control are kept close enough to the communities. Problems with labor laws and union regulations with wages and costs could be solved if there were local good will and broad national support. Such public spirit and public service would be highly fitting as a way to engage in the bicentennial celebration.

Hagar or Sarah?

THE PROPOSITION: THE strident and rigid claims made about the Bible, particularly when such claims do not have one text of the Bible to support them, reveal the presence of a religious covering for a horrifying doubt, not a strong faith boldly confessed. These claims are a show of piety by which concessions are made to a genuine, even innocent, piety. When such claims become the instruments for disciplining people for what they way about the Bible, they reveal mistrust of the Word of God.

Discipline there must be for disciples, discipline for discipleship in faith and love. Discipline that is coercive application of opinions, as if such opinions were doctrine, not only fails in the task of disciplining in faith and love; it reveals the mistrust of the Word of God. Such mistrust is camouflaged under pious statements about the Word of God.

Indifference to pure doctrine, betrayal of the truth, and concessive sellout are to be disciplined. They, too, are signs of unfaith and tokens of mistrust in the Word of God. But discipline is not the exercise of rational or religious powers to force God's promises to come true. God's blessing comes at God's initiative, by his spoken promises.

Discipline is to train the crushed and stripped heart to receive, cling to, and trust nothing else than the promises of God to bless. Faithful people, trusting the Word of God, exercise discipline. They count on
the Word of God to reveal, condemn, and break the illusions of religious attachments that are idolatrous opinions or spiritual errors. And they count on the Word of God to train the broken heart to trust the forgiveness of sins for Christ’s sake. This Word of God purifies the soul. Such purification by that Word of forgiveness through Christ’s cross is received by faith. The pure heart, like pure doctrine, receives its purity in that nothing else than this cross of Christ is believed or taught in that nothing else than this. This Word of God alone, received by faith alone, can do this work of God. No other discipline, rational, legal, or religious, can achieve this work.

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR’S NOTEBOOK

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE many (too many, in my opinion) denigrating comments made about little (old) women in tennis shoes, my experience with Ladies’ Aids and with the women of the Valparaiso University Guild has made me suspicious of the makers of the comments rather than of those commented on. This is especially and pre-eminently true about Bernice (“Ber”) Ruprecht, for many years the Executive Director of the Valparaiso University Guild.

We salute this remarkable woman as she concludes her years of service to the University, via the Guild. “Ber” is a remarkable woman; she and her husband Emil have built a marriage which has exhibited to us all, even those with bad eyesight, the truth of the apostolic teaching about the relationship between husband and wife displaying the relationship between Christ and his church.

“Ber” has a gracious tenacity, a winsome durability. She remembers countless women by name, recalls events and people in their lives, and gives thoughtful attention to them without fawning or flattering.

Where most of us use file boxes and cards to gather such information, “Ber” uses her memory. She is shrewd in her knowledge, and full of charity. For this reason she is aware of motives and pressures that are best cloaked in modest restraint. And yet, she is neither cynical nor disloyal. Valparaiso University owes much to the Guild women, and this debt focuses in a special way in “Ber.” We wish for her and her husband an inner fulness of contentment and days of hopeful joy.

PROFESSOR THOMAS HALL’S review essay of the Narnia stories by C. S. Lewis continues the tradition of The Cresset to contribute to a summer reading program. We hope our readers will benefit from the thoughtful reflection of Professor Hall. The Narnia stories, as much as any literature we know, make excellent reading for the whole family. The happy memory of our own family reading these stories fuels our hope that families will not only set aside such time to read them at home, but perhaps even to take the books along for reading during the vacation.

Correction
We apologize for the inaccurate information given in the byline for Clarence Rivers, Jr. in the May (1975) issue of The Cresset, page 13. The information should be corrected to read as follows: “Clarence Rivers, Jr., ACSW, received the MSW degree from Indiana University (1967). In addition to his teaching duties, Mr. Rivers is Chairman of the Department of Social Work at Valparaiso University.”

And for us this is the end of all the stories, and we can most truly say that they all lived happily ever after. But for them it was only the beginning of the real story. All their life in this world and all their adventures in Narnia had only been the cover and the title page: now at last they were beginning Chapter One of the Great Story, which goes on for ever: in which every chapter is better than the one before. (The Last Battle)

June, 1975
Moral and Theological Issues in the Abortion Controversy

DR. CALVIN J. EICHHORST

IT IS NOT OFTEN IN THE COURSE OF LIFE'S pilgrimage that one comes to a place where one says, "Here I stand!" but that is precisely my history on the abortion question. To provide a context in which such a stance makes sense I want to relate it to three other significant issues which are part of that pilgrimage: ecumenism, the war in Viet Nam, and the race issue. When dealing with all three of those in the course of fifteen years I was at home in the more liberal wing of the religious and ecclesiastical community. Because of abortion I am at home there no longer.

In 1958, the year when Pope John XXIII was elected Pope, I was one of the initiators of a dialogue between Lutherans and Catholics which continued for twelve years. At that time it had to be done sub-secreto lest the two academic institutions involved find their standing in the larger ecclesiastical community jeopardized. Anti-Catholicism among Lutherans was taken for granted. The same was true of anti-Protestant sentiment in the Catholic community. Then in the mysterious providence of God's Spirit, Pope John was moved to convocate an Ecumenical Council. It started in the fall of 1962. When the final session began in 1965 I was there, personally observing what I could not have hoped for or even imagined ten years earlier. The embrace of love which swept over much of the Christian community of the world was nothing short of astonishing.

But today anti-Catholicism is again on the rise. The abortion question seems to have assumed paramount importance. Catholics are being subjected to a strategy of isolation. Abortion is being turned into a Catholic issue and few are the Protestant ecumenists willing to rise to challenge that claim. The wider witness of the Christian church of the world, especially of that such as the Lutheran Church of Norway which stands firm in opposition to abortion, is being selectively dismissed. Because of my own past my witness on abortion shall be sensitive to ecumenical dimensions. With pride I again will stand alongside my Roman Catholic brethren in Christ.

The crisis precipitated in America by the Viet Nam war pressed in upon me so I could not sit that controversy out. I became involved in the protest and supported Senator Eugene McCarthy for the presidency in 1968 while I was active in the Democratic Party. From that experience I learned much about the verbal manipulation of reality. McCarthy called the language in vogue over the newscasts made available to the public from the Department of Defense, "Pentagonese." You remember those statements about "protective reactionary strikes," "body count," "saving a country even if we have to destroy it to do so."

In dealing with the race issue in the sixties I also got an education about the way a nation had manipulated reality by manipulating language. While a college professor for a number of years I had the privilege of being an Advisor to an Afro-American Student League. The history and experience of those black young men and women pressed in upon me. I learned how blacks had been dealt with not as persons but as property; I learned how anthropologists and psychologists from leading universities were measuring brain capacity by pouring lead shot into skulls in an effort to determine whether they were closer to homo sapiens or apes.

What I confronted in a powerful way both on the war and the race issue was the process of DEHUMANIZATION through the verbal manipulation of reality. It points up what I regard as one of the major moral questions which must be confronted on the matter of abortion. IT IS THE QUESTION OF TELLING THE TRUTH. To demonstrate what is involved we need only be reminded of what happened on the war and race
issue in terms of our visual perception of truth and reality. The media portrayed the war for us in real blood and guts color, bringing it right into our living rooms and bedrooms via TV. We were exposed to My-Lai in all of its brutality. The weekly news magazines did not spare any gory details.

During the March on Selma, now ten years ago, the confrontation on the bridge was captured by the media in such a way that we could see the gushing of blood following the pounding of clubs. We saw the dogs tear the skin of blacks. With both the war and the race issue this was a way of telling the truth. To tell it thus was to TELL IT LIKE IT IS! There was no outcry in principle that this was wrong, or too emotional. Rather, emotion was part of packaging truth.

But, when it comes to abortion there is an assumption operative in much of the same community of people who so favored "telling it like it is" that to show slides of aborted babies is gruesome and a blatant appeal to emotion. How in principle can such an objection be sustained in view of what was acceptable in the previous cases?

The question of telling the truth should arise in our minds whenever we run into that process of rationalization which began in the Garden of Eden and is being perfected regularly, not in the least of all in the academic community. It is present in the attempt to construe the matter of becoming pregnant in such a way that it is thought of as an "accident" or "happening"—language which treats those involved in events as victims. At best this is a verbal game and at worst an insult to what is involved in human personhood in terms of responsibility for moral consequences.

The second moral issue of major consequence deserving of attention concerns the child which is truly the innocent victim of abortion. What are we going to say about the unborn child developing in a woman's womb? How are we going to decide whether or not he or she has enough humanity to merit protection within the society?

Here we must be clear about the current status of the unborn child before the law as a result of the Supreme Court decision of January 22, 1973. Right now in the state of Minnesota where I live this child does not have as much legal protection as the hub caps of my car. This is not a neutral position; it presupposes a firm moral commitment. Life at this stage and in this form has been perfected regularly, not in the least of all in the academic community. It is present in the attempt to construe the matter of becoming pregnant in such a way that it is thought of as an "accident" or "happening"—language which treats those involved in events as victims. At best this is a verbal game and at worst an insult to what is involved in human personhood in terms of responsibility for moral consequences.

The third moral question of enormous consequence is present in terms of what abortion does to women. If treating the child like another thing to be kept or loved in terms of tastes and desires represents a consumer oriented society at its worst, the exploitation of women through abortion represents male chauvinism par excellence. Who has the abortion? The woman. Who made her pregnant? The man. Where does total responsibility for contraception or birth control lie in terms of present societal expectations? Totally with the woman. After extensive involvement with this issue over the past six years I have had to conclude that women are being had. Men have gotten off the hook almost entirely when it comes to responsibility for sexual behavior.

Ironically, many who fight vociferously to keep from falling captive to the computer or to modern technology have surrendered themselves totally to technology as it relates to sexual behavior. There is profound anxiety about evacuating the earth in the form of strip mining, leaving it barren. There is little corresponding anxiety about evacuating the uterus leaving it barren and a wasteland.

Not many years ago I taught college students what Harvey Cox had written about Playboy morality as being fundamentally anti-sexual because women are treated as objects to be played with, manipulated, and used. They are not to be related to as persons. With the coming of abortion much of women's liberation has bought into the logical extension of Playboy morality. It was the back-up system for those playthings who got caught.
Men are willing to play and perhaps to pay but women are the losers.

There is mounting evidence of how women lose both medically and emotionally. The pro-abortion media is not likely to show its own mistaken judgment in the past by bringing to public attention the results of studies coming out of the Eastern European countries, Japan, and England, indicating how devastating abortion really is to women. Through abortion women are endangering their future child bearing capacity; they are increasing very significantly the risk of tubal pregnancy; they are opening the door to far greater risk of premature births with consequent deformity and retardation. Perhaps most of all, women are in danger of losing their dignity and surrendering their bodies to be controlled far more by men than by themselves.

THUS FAR I HAVE DEALT WITH MORAL issues without developing the grounds for the appeal that I have been making for what is morally good or right. Now, by contrast, I shall make a conscious appeal to religious grounds, and thus deal with three of the many theological issues that are at stake in abortion. I assume that someone who is Christian does make decisions regarding action, thought, and behavior with reference to the Bible and theological content. A major theological issue which must be faced in the abortion issue is the matter of Christian freedom. What is Christian freedom? Certainly it is not the freedom to do as one pleases or function merely in terms of one’s conscience. It is not the freedom to do “one’s own thing.” To live thus would be to live according to what the apostle Paul calls “the flesh.” While Christians should pay serious attention to their conscience—as anyone should—that conscience should be formed and informed on the basis of the Bible, particularly the normative revelation of God in Christ. Conscience does not function so much to give us information about what is right or wrong as it does to tell us whether we are going to act or have acted according to what we believe to be right or wrong. For Christians it might be stated that conscience functions to inform us whether or not we are acting according to what we believe to be the will of God. Of course, we might always be wrong about precisely what we believe the will of God to be. That is not for us to decide willy-nilly but a matter to surrender up to the Scriptures as they are interpreted to us in the Christian community.

I am willing to say categorically that the language as it is used within the abortion movement which speaks of the “right of the woman to control her body” is not Christian. No Christian, neither male nor female, has the right to control his or her body as he or she pleases. The body in Christian terms is the temple of the Holy Spirit. God does not work out his will for us through some non-material entity called soul but rather works it out through us in our full corporeality. He takes on human flesh in us even as he took on human flesh in Jesus whom we confess as the Christ. The Spirit of God is the major point of control in terms of freedom to use our body.

Christian freedom which is truly Christian does not seek the freedom to destroy the body of another merely for keeping my plans uninterrupted or achieving some career goals which I have set for myself. Christian freedom does not liberate me to sacrifice another human being but liberates me to sacrifice for another. The kind of freedom to which the gospel calls me is freedom to suffer and die for someone else. It does not give me freedom to force them to suffer and die.

We ought to name much of the rhetoric about freedom precisely what it is; it is a practical heresy. The freedom language of the abortion movement does not have its roots in the Christian faith, in spite of efforts being made to read the history of the church that way. The freedom of the gospel is being distorted; it is being transformed into a principle of human liberation which has its roots in the Enlightenment, not in Scripture.

A second point where appeal can be made on theological grounds concerns the unborn child. While a strong case can be made from the biblical texts which explicitly deal with the child developing in the womb, such as Psalm 139, let me suggest that we appeal to the Scripture which defends the weak and defenseless members of a community. The Christian community is indeed an advocate on behalf of the weak and powerless. Thus the poor, the orphan, and the widow had a special place in God’s covenant concern. The unborn child should be seen in relation to that same concern. He or she should be kept within the sphere of neighbor—to be guarded and protected from brutal attack.

A theology which directs us to join the exploiters, the strong against the weaker members of society is a theology which has lost its substance. It is bankrupt and should be called into question prima facie. Why is it that we have begun to comprehend that in relation to minorities and the poor but cannot see it in our society in terms of the unborn child? Is it because we do not know the truth or is it because we will not do the truth.

In the third place, seen theatologically, abortion is part of a secular and demonic quest for perfection. Man cannot accept himself as fallen and must not accept salvation given by God. In a society which values life ultimately according to physical health, sexual potency, and capacity for sensual enjoyment, salvation must be achieved on those terms. The perfect physical specimen must be developed. There is not room for those who are deformed, those who are unwanted, those who are retarded. The new biological utopia must be man’s own doing.

Precisely here the Christian critique on the basis of a doctrine of creation and the fall must be brought to bear on the whole process or 1984 will not be a joking matter. In fact, it no longer is a joking matter.

The Cresset
IN CONCLUSION LET ME COME FULL CIRCLE to state that we as Christians must be prepared to stand in a posture that puts us more in conflict with secular society. The cross will again have to be seen as something more than optional equipment for a Sunday stroll. A new form of witness is called for from the Christian community. For this we have on our side a long and illustrious history. It dates back to the time when Christians worshiped in the womb of the earth, carving out catacombs to cope with a hostile society intent on destroying the Church in infancy.

Professor George H. Williams of Harvard, a Unitarian clergyman, who has researched the abortion question during those early centuries, has written that in Roman imperial society Christians were not distinguished from others by what they wore, or where they worked, or what they ate. But among the distinguishing marks were these mentioned by Diognetus: “They did not cast off their children to die of exposure on the rocks, they did not sell their children into slavery. And they did not abort their offspring.” In this tradition he has indicated that Luther and Calvin also stood firm. It was the tradition of the Christian church in an overwhelming way up until the past fifteen years. With courage we are called to make it ours again.

When I think of the kind of witness that is called for, I am reminded of what Einstein said about the way Germany fell under the spell of Hitler’s power. First he looked to the universities thinking that surely there men of knowledge and courage would speak up. But they were silent. Then he looked to the press with their freedom and power. But they were silent. Then he looked to the Church. There was a word of witness and some resistance offered. That word of witness and some resistance is needed once again.

DONALD A. AFFELDT

Notes in Response to Dr. Eichhorst

MY REMARKS THIS EVENING HAVE BEEN billed as “A Response” to Dr. Eichhorst, who sees acts of abortion as posing a “threat to Christian Faith.” If you noticed the Torch* of last Friday, you learned there (as indeed I myself did) that I am, as the saying goes, “pro-abortion.” Thus I expect some of you may await my comments with considerable fascination, since you may think that you are about to be treated to the bizarre spectacle of someone in a Christian University deliberately threatening the Christian Faith or advocating death for the unborn or generally furthering the cause of perversity. I regret, however, that I will satisfy no such expectations, at least not consciously or deliberately. This is not due to a lack of nerve, I want you to know, for it takes some nerve to register even a qualifying voice, let alone a dissenting opinion, before an assembly such as this and as a part of a program which quite clearly (and no doubt properly) is designed to celebrate the value of life and to promote its continuation, particularly in the case of the unborn. Rather, my hesitancy to stake out a clear pro-abortion position derives from my own uncertainties as to defensible positions on the whole range of issues which must be dealt with under that general subject heading. These uncertainties, in turn, derive from the immense complexity of any one of those issues. So the most I hope to do in the few minutes allotted to me this evening is to suggest why some of us find ourselves unable to take a clear and unambiguous stand on the question of abortion, and furthermore to sketch an agenda of discussable questions the resolution of which seems to me to be a pre-condition for any defensible viewpoint on so weighty and problematic an issue area as is abortion. Finally, the matter of abortion has been much discussed on this campus and in the country at large in the last few months, often by people far more knowledgeable on the medical, legal, theological, economic, sociological, or biological aspects of the issue than I could ever hope to be. I shall try to confine my concerns to the moral questions involved and, even more particularly, to aspects of those moral questions that have perhaps received less attention in the foregoing discussion than they should have.

The first point I should like to remind you of is that in all except the most extraordinary cases, becoming pregnant is not something that a woman does, or that she and her mate do, but rather something that happens to her, or, if you like, to them. That is to say, the onset of pregnancy is not, typically, an action. It is, rather,

Don A. Affeldt, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Law in Christ College, Valparaiso University, received his MA (1965) from the University of Chicago. He has published frequently in The Cresset.

June, 1975

*The Torch is the student newspaper of Valparaiso University.
in the classical sense of the term, a passion, something undergone. To be sure, there are actions that women can take to affect the probability of this event occurring, but the point remains that in the simplest and most straightforward sense of the term, getting pregnant is not something a woman does. Indeed, it is usually weeks after the event, sometimes months, before the woman knows that the event has transpired.

A second, and perhaps equally obvious, point is that the abortion controversy centers on only those women who do not want to bear a child, or, more precisely, who do not want to bear this child. If a woman does want to bear the child with which she is pregnant, then presumably she will do so. In any case, so far as I know there is no one who is presently advocating that pregnant women who do want to bear their children be denied the right to do so. In sum, then, the problem of abortion may be said to concern only those women to whom something has happened, namely getting pregnant, which they did not want to have happen, and the consequences of which seem to them to be undesirable.

As a parenthesis here, I might add that many qualifications could, and probably should, be attached to these observations. We could, for example, go into the question of when and under what circumstances people may engage in sexual intercourse that has any chance at all of producing a pregnancy. Or into the question of the purpose, if there is just one, of sexual intercourse. Or into the theological question of whether pregnancy is an act the agent of which is God Himself, the patient of which is the mother, and the means for which are the sperm of the father and the ovum of the mother. I lay all these interesting questions aside for the moment so as to stick as close as possible to the moral question of abortion itself. If it will help matters for you, imagine that there is at least one case fitting the description I am sketching, and interpret my remarks as applying just to that one paradigm case of moral decision-making about abortion.

Now this woman to whom something has happened that she did not want, namely getting pregnant, is presently in our legal order faced with a choice between two basic alternatives: she can undergo an abortion to end the pregnancy or she can undergo the rest of the pregnancy. Note, please, that neither her biological make-up nor the present state of technology offer her the choice of reversing the process, of making the fetus magically disappear or be absorbed into the body, or of instantly having a baby or a miscarriage. That is, there is no single specific act that the woman can perform which will put an end to the matter. On the contrary, the woman's choice is only between two further happenings to her: continued pregnancy to term or discontinued pregnancy via surgical procedures of varying degrees of hazard and complexity.

With even so sketchy a description of the woman's situation in hand, some observations can be made about the moral dimensions of her plight. First, on the assumption that we have properly described this woman's situation as one she did not choose and one she does not want, and which she did not deliberately and knowingly create, her moral choice is properly viewed as a choice between the lesser of two evils. The question she faces is not the general question of whether to abort or not to abort, on an analogy with, say, whether to deceive or not to deceive, or whether to steal or not to steal—questions which, in the abstract, admit of only one answer. Inasmuch as abortion always involves some pain and suffering for a woman, on that ground alone it is presumptively immoral—provided the consequences of not aborting are not themselves even worse. Yet that is precisely her situation: the consequences of her remaining pregnant would be at least as bad, in her mind, and probably worse, all things considered. Thus no abstract judgment on the moral quality of the act, described simply as the act of abortion, helps to deal with this woman's moral dilemma. And we do her an injustice, therefore, if we formulate her moral problem without giving due weight to the perceived undesirable consequences of the alternatives available to her.

Nor, I think, is her problem fairly depicted by ignoring the possibility of choice that confronts her. There was a time, not so long ago, when a moral choice for abortion was considerably more difficult to defend. This was because abortion techniques were more primitive, medical knowledge was not so far advanced, and the laws proscribed abortion. These factors do, I think, properly bear on whether or not the woman should abort. Now, however, the situation has changed to the point where abortion is both a relatively safe procedure, so far as maternal health is concerned, and a legal action, within limitations. While changing circumstances have not disposed of the moral problem—indeed, in some respects, they have clarified the basic issues involved—it is, I think, a mistake not to recognize the changing nature of the problem. Nor is it an adequate response to the problem to ignore or overlook the very real possibility of choice that confronts the woman. In general, we might say that as choices become available, action is possible and with action, morality enters the picture. In the New Testament period, for example, I doubt very much whether having a baby was thought by anyone a matter for moral decision, simply because you either got pregnant or you didn't, and if you did there wasn't much you could do about it. But now there is, and to suggest that we mentally roll back the clock and adopt the simple attitudes of a prior generation is not to solve the problem, but rather to ignore it. To state the point more explicitly, unwanted pregnancies have always occurred in history, but their being unwanted was, until fairly recently, not a good reason for terminating them, simply because there was either nothing to be done to accomplish that end, or because whatever the remedy was, it was worse than the problem. Accordingly, if the time ever comes when no one gets pregnant except those
women who choose to do so and want to carry their children to term, the problem of abortion will largely vanish.

As it is, we presently find ourselves in an intermediate situation where something can be done to prevent unwanted pregnancies and something can be done safely to terminate them if they have not been prevented. What needs deciding now is what reasons are sufficient to morally justify our exerting the control that we have in our power. I personally am of the opinion that in our present state of technology, and assuming an average level of awareness or education on the part of potential parents, the burden has shifted to them to provide reasons for having children in the first place. It is no longer sufficient to say, "Well, it's just natural," for at least in our culture, becoming pregnant is not altogether just natural. I am not suggesting that any very complicated set of reasons currently needs to be furnished to justify having children. It may be sufficient, at present, for the parents to say, "We genuinely want a child, and will care for it to the best of our ability." Yet perhaps some time in the future this reason will not suffice for purposes of moral assessment. Much as we may presently regret any such development, we certainly do not cope morally with it by refusing to admit that it may exist—or perhaps even does already exist to a greater extent than we presently realize.

We are now at the point, I might add, where considerations which previously did not justify abortion now do. Where for good and sufficient reason the woman believes that her pregnancy will produce a seriously defective child she has a reasonable basis for preferring an abortion to a continuation of her pregnancy. What has changed is the reliability of advance indicators of deformity or defectiveness, and this change in the reliability of our knowledge changes the moral situation of a woman affected by it. I would like to draw on an analogy easily misapplied in this sort of situation. A doctor who discovers two or three small tumors in a woman's breast may now be justified in performing a radical, as opposed to a so-called simple, mastectomy on the woman, whereas he once was not, morally speaking. This is because he now has the technology to form a reasonably accurate idea of the probability of the cancer's persistence without radical surgery. Furthermore he knows with reasonable certainty the consequences of the disease for the woman, in terms of pain, suffering, and perhaps death. Similarly, a woman in the very early stages of her pregnancy who learns that her child is probably defective in a way that may cause it pain, continuing perceived hardship, or an early death, has a reason, to the basis of that knowledge, to choose abortion. Just ten or fifteen years ago she may not have had that alternative. This is just a sketch of some of the ways that advancing knowledge, technology, and burgeoning possibilities for action affect our changing moral situations. The tendency to overlook or deny the more significance of changes in culture and technology in favor of hard rules formulated in view of simple choices does little justice, I think, to the reality of the moral complexities we face in an issue such as we find in the problem of abortion.

SO FAR I HAVE BEEN ADDRESSING THE moral question of abortion largely from a conceptual and physiological point of view. Even with this limited perspective some light can, I think, be shed on the moral problem. The questions multiply when seen in that light precisely because human life itself is seen by many people to be the most valuable thing there is, to be set aside as a value by nothing whatsoever at any time, and because all the other things that we value are intimately, even physically, connected with human life. Because of the importance of the concept of human life to discussions on abortion, I should like to devote the remainder of my remarks to the bearing this concept has on some of the moral questions that arise in this connection.

First, I said that abortion happens to involve the taking of a human life. I see no essential connection between the idea of abortion and the idea of the loss of life. Abortion essentially involves premature delivery of a human offspring, usually with the intention that it not live. But that, of course, does not entail that the offspring was living already in the sense in which it is denied future life in the act of abortion. The point here is a conceptual one again, and I bother to mention it not so much because I think it is presently important to clear moral thinking about abortion, but rather because I think it might become important to future discussions about the problem. As a matter of fact, we presently have no clear and uncontroversial procedures, methods, or concepts for precisely demarcating and identifying life in all of its morally relevant forms. Yet we might one day devise such procedures or develop such concepts, and, in that event, we may be able to deal more clearly with problems like abortion and euthanasia. Lacking such conceptual and technological precision, however, it seems pointless to deny that, from a taxonomic point of view, the fetus is human and, from a medical point of view, it is alive rather than, say, dead. So for the present, moralists who tolerate abortion in any form must, it seems to me, cope with the problem expressed in terms that stipulate that abortion involves the taking of human life.

This concession does not, however, leave such moralists speechless. For it seems to me, at least, that it is not self-evidently true that human life itself is the most valuable thing there is, to be outweighed in value by nothing whatsoever at any time, or even, if you press the point, that human life is intrinsically valuable—sacred, some call it—because of its connection with all our other values. I shall take up these points in turn, illustrating them with personal experiences lest it be thought
that this discussion is altogether too academic and removed from the context of decision and action.

Nearly two years ago my father, a man of fifty-eight, at the peak of his powers despite a coronary some twenty years earlier and occasional subsequent bouts with angina, was taken ill with simple pneumonia just before Christmas. He was at first reluctant to seek medical attention, and when he did get an examination on the 23rd of December, his case was thought not to be serious enough to require hospitalization over Christmas. So he was sent home where we could care for him and wait the forty-eight hours for the antibiotics to begin taking effect. His temperature continued to run very high, often hitting 105 degrees, and he became delirious occasionally and increasingly incapable of attending to himself in any way at all. On Christmas day the family was sufficiently alarmed about his worsening condition to take him by ambulance to the hospital, where he was given some oxygen and regular treatment on an inhalator machine. Meanwhile, the family waited anxiously for the medicine to take effect, even as we watched him lapse into what we later realized were periods of unconsciousness. By the night of the 27th of December it was apparent to the hospital staff that he probably would not recover and that if he did, he would have to undergo a long period of recuperation with no assurance at all that he would regain his former powers. Shortly after nine o'clock family and friends joined round his bedside as he received the Lutheran equivalent of extreme unction, and by ten o'clock he had taken his last breath.

One great comfort to the family in our subsequent grief was the thought that if he had lived, he probably would never have been his former self, either in our eyes or in his own. A subsequent, even stronger, comfort came shortly after his death, when the college to which he had given devoted service for the last fifteen years of his life began radically to change direction in ways that would have caused him great pain and anxiety and disillusionment. Much as we mourn the loss of my father, the family now sees what a blessing it was to him, and therefore also to us, that he was spared a sad and declining end of life, that he died relatively painlessly and attended by those who loved and respected him.

Now it seems to me that these are either simply pious thoughts, perhaps even rationalization to cope with grief, or else they express a truth which is worth very little. I didn't so much mind the thought of losing that; what I did mind was the thought that I might never again have another conversation with a friend, share a happy memory with my wife, listen to interesting music, or see my way through to the end of an argument. Thankfully, the armed robbers apparently valued something else more than they disvalued human life, so I was spared some more time for the experience of these values. Incidentally, I might add that an experience like this goes a long way toward sorting out one's value-priorities.

In sum, human life in and of itself seems to me to be the one value we speak of which is altogether extrinsic—that is, good as a means—whereas very many of the other valuers we have are properly considered good in themselves. When, then, it is said that abortion is immoral just because it involves the taking of human life, I always have the feeling that the argument is incomplete, that more must be said before the point is evident to me. I might add that this line of thought is particularly vexing with respect to the abortion problem, because certainly the fetus itself does not experience any of the values that give value to human life. Even unlike the newborn infant, who may as yet directly experience few values but who nevertheless is capable of bringing the experience of value to others, the fetus's value, if
you will, appears to lie altogether in its potential and not at all in its present experience or in the experience of it on the part of another—in the case, that is, of a mother who does not want it.

You will notice that I have so far made only passing reference to theological considerations. That is because I think that the moral questions of abortion have no necessary theological dimension. In short, morality does not essentially depend on theology, though of course the moral views of many people, perhaps those of everyone in this room, have a significant theological component. Still less, incidentally, do I think that legality is essentially connected with morality. This is a large topic, and will be discussed in some detail in the final session of this colloquium, but in closing I would sound a note of caution against the tendency to think that one’s moral, or moral/theological, opinions should be enshrined into law, especially with respect to a matter so complicated and variegated as that of abortion. I am all in favor of trying every means, short of compulsion, to get others to act as I morally or theologically think they ought to act. Yet when reasonable people can disagree on these matters, and when, further, the problem concerns a situation they did not directly and intentionally bring about and which can be resolved without direct consequence to any other member of society, there is sufficient reason to be very cautious about asserting one’s own judgments via law on the lives of others.

If I had to make a general response directly to Dr. Eichhorst I support I would stress a point that I hope my own remarks exemplify, namely that despite the plausibility of general moral premises, the properties of morality and immorality, right and wrong, attach to specific actions by particular people. There is, as I’m sure he would agree, a need to take the particular situations of people into account in determining the morality of their contemplated actions. Anything short of this careful casuistry may itself be immoral for failing to recognize morally relevant distinctions that need to be made. Anything much grander than casuistry—or considering situations on a case-by-case basis in the light of certain general moral rules and principles—runs the risk of misstatement. These are risks I myself may have fallen victim to in attempting to suggest so briefly some items for your consideration. If so, I sincerely invite you to bring this fact to my attention, for in matters as important as these nothing but continued reflection and discussion promises to bring greater clarity to any of us.

IN PREPARATION

july along these last, hot weeks
a song comes, heat
crazed into being as I softly say, christmas . . .
“House!” i plucked its root with the thought “Listen!”
“I’m bringing my girl!”
my house says nothing
i know its shamed, its
grayspeckled white outside fire proof tiles
dirty and scabbed under the armpit eaves—
So
mutant, gone gaunt behind a garage,
alley backed, my old house
squatting its two stories’ worth on my street’s thermometer end
sits as I sweat lifting ladders a siege on it
to be a paintflaked man,
eyebrows,
hair almost to Neihardt
extension cored glacier
scraped in my hand over windows and the door.
in preparation I lay it all brown
travel around
and once,
catching my wheel on a spider,
softly swore.

ANDREW GRZESKONIAK

June, 1975
Welcome to our series, Light on Life. Tonight we would like to discuss the constitutional and legal ramifications of the question, “Abortion: Should the United States Constitution protect the right to choose?” The background is the recent Supreme Court decision which pretty well demonstrates that the unborn do not have any constitutional rights. Consequently, proposals have been made for constitutional amendments, attempting to secure some constitutional, and therefore, legal, rights, for the unborn. We are examining that question and really its reverse—whether the Constitution should thus be amended or whether by turning down such an amendment the Constitution would in effect be preserving the right to choose. As our spokesmen this evening we have, first, Rabbi David Horowitz, Rabbi at Temple Bethel in Hammond, Indiana. He is here representing the Northwest Indiana Freedom of Choice Coalition. He also acts within the Interreligious Commission on Human Equality. We also are very pleased to have with us this evening Mrs. Jean Garton, a member of the Social Concerns Committee of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. She has spoken on this question in many forums; not least, in the sub-committee of Senator Birch Bayh, holding hearings on these human life amendments, and testifying before them. It is with a great deal of pleasure, then, that we present these two distinguished visitors to our campus community. From the introductory remarks by Walter E. Keller, chairman of the Department of Theology, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana.

Abortion:

Should the United States Constitution Protect the Right to Choose?

David M. Horowitz is Rabbi at Tempel Beth-El, Hammond, Indiana. He received his Master of Arts in Hebrew Letters from the Union-College-Jewish Institute of Religion and was ordained at the same institution in 1969.

Jean Garton is a member of Martin Luther Lutheran Church, Pennsauken, New Jersey. She attended Concordia College Bronxville, New York; she received the BA (1950) from Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania.
to is: If your girlfriend is pregnant, can she get an abortion? If your wife is pregnant, can she get an abortion? If you are pregnant, now speaking generically, can you get an abortion, and legally do so in the United States? Perhaps we must spend a minute or two seeing where we came from, where we are, and where we might be going.

Until recently, most states of the United States had some sort of abortion legislation. And most states still do, in effect, have abortion legislation. Since I’m not a lawyer, and therefore not embarrassed by the facts, I can speak freely. These previous laws ranged from the latest in New York which permitted abortion freely, to state laws which prohibited abortion entirely; some with exceptions, some without exceptions. On January 22, 1973, in a Supreme Court decision (a very lengthy decision which we can read in toto during the discussion, if you like) the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 (two justices dissented and wrote dissensions) in the case Roe v. Wade, that the abortion law was unconstitutional in Texas. It did not comply with the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. But the decision was lengthy, written mostly in “legalese,” with which I have difficulty.

Now with this decision (since most abortion laws in most states followed the pattern of the Texas law), there were not significant differences between the states. In effect, abortion became available to most people in the United States. Indeed, what we had before seemed a way of the past. The question previously was if standard abortion was going on. Certainly abortion has been with us a long time, as long as unwanted pregnancies have been with us. I suspect the only way to insure against unwanted pregnancy is abstinence—but I’m cynical enough to believe that we won’t get to that point very quickly.

Abortions were available to those who could leave the country and get them legally elsewhere. Abortions were available to those with enough guts to find an illegal abortionist in the United States. Abortion was available to those who could enlist a physician whose ethics allowed him to bend the law, but not break and shatter it. Abortion could be obtained by anybody with money and the willing desire to travel to New York. Those who could not get an abortion, by and large, were the poor who could not afford to travel to New York or other countries, and those who didn’t have enough guts to go to the butcher next door. The Supreme Court decision seemingly answers this basic question.

Now, as I stand here today, the Supreme Court decision meets with a challenge, a challenge which can only show strength in constitutional amendment. Many who oppose abortion feel we must have such an amendment. The question is, should the Constitution protect the right to choose? I submit that the Constitution, by interpreting the 7-2 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to this point, makes clear that the Constitution protects the right to choose.

On January 22, 1973 the “crabby Lucy” philosophy became the law of the land, and we can now eliminate those in the human family who are smaller than we are simply because they bug us. But unlike Charlie Brown, a growing number of people don’t think it’s smart to remain uninvolved when they understand why Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, called that decision “an exercise in raw judicial power.” Our nation has not allowed for the elimination of fetal children when their existence is inconvenient. Our nation has had chosen for it, by the voice and power of seven men, a social and economic solution which takes us down that first step of what some have called “the slippery slope of selective extermination.”

As a result we ask, should the Constitution protect the right to choose? My response is, emphatically and definitely, yes! For in that Supreme Court decision, whole groups of people were denied “the right to choose.”

First, the electorate. The Supreme Court had the abortion cases before it for a year and took no action. In November, two states brought the matter before their people. In Michigan, where the polls indicated the vote would be 60 per cent in favor of abortion-on-demand, the actual vote was 62 per cent against abortion-on-demand. In North Dakota, with a population only 12 per cent Roman Catholic, the vote against abortion-on-demand was 78 per cent. Within a few weeks the Supreme Court gave its decision, and “the right to choose” of those states was denied. This is one of the significant reasons for seeking a constitutional amendment, for through state ratification of an amendment the people could speak in an open and democratic forum.

Secondly, taxpayers have been denied “the right to choose.” New York had a liberalized abortion law for almost two years, and people there sought to appeal that law. The appeal passed both legislative houses with a greater majority than the original liberalized abortion law, but Governor Rockefeller vetoed the appeal. One major reason given for seeking an appeal was that, in those few months, the liberalized abortion law cost 21.4 million dollars in federal, state, and local tax money. In September, 1974, HEW announced that Medicaid finances between 222,000 and 278,000 abortions each year at the cost of 40 to 50 million dollars annually. If an abortion decision is a private matter, why should abortions be paid for with public money? The taxpayer cannot claim to be a conscientious objector. He or she pays for a process believed to be intrinsically evil, and those who oppose abortion do not have “the right to choose.”

What “right to choose” do parents have? In many states, minors cannot obtain an aspirin from the school nurse without written parental permission. But in many states minors can now get an abortion without parental consent and, in some cases, without parental knowledge.
United States, already protects our right to choose. Without changing a jot or tittle, that Constitution protects the right to choose.

But let us turn to the question of constitutional amendments. Should they be passed? Should the Constitution be changed? We have three possibilities currently before the legislature. More may come or there may yet be changes, but now we have three possibilities. They go under the sponsors’ names in the House and/or Senate.

One is the Helms/Hogan Amendment (or Hogan/Helms Amendment; I guess it depends on whether you’re partial to the House or the Senate). The amendment would basically give equal right under the law to the fetus. It would basically—as now written—prohibit abortion for any purpose. For any purpose. I have the text and, if time allows, I’d like to read it. It would preclude abortion for any purpose. My wife could die of a tubal pregnancy. My wife could die of a dangerous pregnancy. Or my daughter could conceivably find herself in great mental anguish or in danger of life and have no legal recourse under the Hogan/Helms Amendment.

The second amendment is the Buckley Amendment. The Buckley Amendment basically protects the rights of a life from its very conception. It differs from the Helms/Hogan Amendment only insofar as it permits abortion for a medical emergency, i.e., the imminent death of the mother. It makes no provisions, however, for mental or physical health, other than the threatening of the mother’s life.

The third amendment is the Whitehearth Amendment. It is a states’ rights amendment which would allow the states to pass legislation limiting or outlawing abortion as their state legislatures deem fit. That one doesn’t sound bad on the surface. But when I live in the state of Indiana, aware that Senator Gubbins in Indianapolis is working full-time defining sex education as teachers telling children they are men and women (while anything beyond that is considered horrifying), I have no confidence, in my heart, that the states can write a better abortion bill than the Federal government.

THE BASIC QUESTION, THEN, IS WHETHER OR not abortion is murder. Is it murder? If it’s not murder, then why change the Constitution? For then we are dealing with a matter of opinion, of feeling, of sensitivity. But if abortion is murder, the question is whether murder is ever justifiable. For justification, we could first go very quickly through the legal killing permitted by both church and state. Just wars are one area. A pilot in a bomber flying over a town, knowing very well the bombs will kill women and children as well as soldiers, nevertheless drops his bomb because that’s a just war. And we can kill to protect our freedom, liberty, God, and country. We can kill for self-defense, and

However, parents must pay the abortion costs if the minor cannot. What “right to choose” does a father have? I know of no court case in which a father seeking to save his child has been successful, not even the father who made his plea—not on fatherhood, not on the unborn’s humanity, but on the contention that whatever was in his wife’s womb was at the very least community property.

What “right to choose” do medical people have? State after state has found it necessary, because of coerced hospitals and harassed doctors, to seek “conscience legislation.” Yet the very groups which oppose passage of these clauses are those who claim “the right to choose.” In my own state of New Jersey, we sought a conscience clause and it was a tough uphill battle all the way. All of those organization who, before the Supreme Court decision, said that no doctor or hospital should be coerced and that everybody should have “the right to choose,” were the very organizations which opposed us. And when the conscience clause was passed, they started litigation to call it unconstitutional and now the clause cannot be implemented. Doctors in New Jersey are being harassed. We have to recognize that if someone is given a right, then someone else must insure that right. As a result, the women’s rights are so absolute that the rights of taxpayers, the electorate, and on down the list have now been jeopardized.

But, of course, there’s one whose “right to choose” isn’t even considered: the unborn’s. He is the latest victim of our propensity for dividing humanity into human and sub-human, and the net gain determines where that line will be drawn. “The Indian is not as human as I”—because we wanted his land. “The Negro is not as human as I”—because we wanted his labor. “The Jew is not as human as I”—because we wanted racial purity. “The unborn is not as human as I”—why? For the same hoped-for solutions to spatial and economic problems. Or, in the broader picture, because we want his air, his food, and his space!

The method used to sell abortion has been to persuade the American public that the alternatives to legal abortion are women butchered in back alleys, a growing number of battered (because unwanted) children, and a pollution of society burdened down with mental and physical defectives. The appeal is to fear.

SIX YEARS AGO IN PITTSBURGH I WAS VERY active in a group seeking to liberalize the abortion laws. But as my involvement grew, so did my concern for the obvious distortion of the embryological facts. If the case was true, just, and honorable, we did not need to falsify our position. We could meet those facts head-on. But nobody wanted to talk about embryological data. They belittled it. I had difficulty knowing that the unborn’s heart begins beating at twenty-one days and
to defend our property. We can blast a person with a shotgun if he comes into our house, I suppose, although, thank God, questions have been raised about that lately. All this is to examine killing, not getting hung up with the word “kill” itself. Killing is done every day. That doesn’t justify killing, but our church and state certainly justify it in times of war and self-defense.

I’d like to present the possibility that abortion is not murder. Therefore, any change in the Constitution of the United States would be, not an additional aid to our society, but a limitation of my religious freedom. A majority of religious organizations have taken abortion stands. I recognize, too, that a great many have kept their mouths shut so far. So we can’t count them either way.

Is abortion murder? One tends to speak from his own background. I will try to avoid it, but forgive me if my examples weigh more heavily on Judaism than they might on the United Methodist Church or another denomination I might use. In the Bible, Exodus 21 or thereabouts (I’m a terrible quoter of verse and chapter, but if we get a Bible I can find it) is concerned with the fetus’ life in its mother’s womb. From those passages and from discussions which follow, at least in Rabbinic literature (I suspect even in Roman Catholic literature) it can be determined whether or not the loss of a fetus is homicide. Is it feticide? Is it, in fact, murder? Let me sum up the position from Jewish tradition (and make a case from other traditions as well).

Jewish tradition very clearly sees that a fetus is part of its mother. It is a tissue of the mother; it has the mother’s rights and no more rights than that. Capital punishment does not apply to killing a fetus in Exodus 21. It does not apply because killing a fetus is not a capital crime. In effect, it is not murder. Damages were collected for such injury that might cause the loss of a fetus, but not as murder. Viewed as a loss to the family, killing a fetus was not the crime of murder. Indeed, one Rabbinic commentator, Rashi, writing in the fifth or sixth century, says a person is not a person until born. Until birth personhood is not part of him. When we come to secondary questions of therapeutic abortion concerning the mother’s life and health (mental and physical), Jewish tradition not only permits abortion, but requires abortion to save her life.

I mention these examples, not to give a quick course on Jewish theology. I mention them for this purpose: the Hogan/Helms Amendment would abridge my religious freedom. Under the Hogan/Helms Amendment, I could not turn to my congregants or to my wife or to my daughter whose life may be threatened by a tubal pregnancy or by psychological fears that might make them nervous wrecks or lead to suicide, and tell them they ought to have an abortion, as my religious tradition would require me to do in such a serious case.

doesn’t stop until the moment of death; that his brain wave pattern can be recorded at forty-three days; that while still in the womb he can be taught; that he experiences pain and cries; that he dreams and remembers; and even that he makes conscious decisions. I was stunned to find that by five months he can distinguish the voice of his mother from others around him. But my uneasiness grew when we were taught to speak the “right” language: never give any humanity to the unborn child; never talk about him as a child or a baby; always speak of “the product of conception,” “the abortus,” or “mass of tissue”; always talk about “terminating a pregnancy,” as if it were a victimless procedure.

But I think what really finally got to me was the sentence, “A woman should have the right to control her own body.” I’m a feminist, and I endorse that concept. But in this context I did not believe there was valid use of that concept. Without the placenta, which never exists in a woman until the child puts it there, the child would be rejected as foreign tissue. And then I thought of my own children and wondered, How can this be my body? Two children I carried are boys. Can one body be both male and female simultaneously? Two of my children have blood differing in type and factor from mine. Can two blood types be compatible in one body simultaneously? And what of the child who died while I carried him? Can one body be alive and dead simultaneously? By any reasonable biological standard, abortion destroys a separate human body.

At the same time my involvement in the women’s movement grew. And I soon found I was a far more radical feminist than most of the group. It was inconsistent that after years of pleading for a voice, demanding equality and self-determination, and protesting being viewed as objects to be cast off when inconvenient, that when we finally achieved a voice we used it to demand that another whole segment of the human family be viewed as objects to be discarded when inconvenient. And being discarded were females—the most helpless and innocent of females—little women whom rhetoric defined out of existence. I believe women deserve more than a lunch-hour procedure exposing them to immediate and long-range dangers. I believe women deserve more than death to their offspring as solutions to their problems. And I have come to believe that abortion is the ultimate exploitation of women. What is promoted as freedom and liberation is really promotion of a distinctly masculine form of aggression and selfishness.

When you talk about “the right to choose,” what about that woman herself? Does she really have a choice, when insurance companies pay for the abortion of a single woman but don’t pay the cost of a delivery? Does she really have a choice when the new adoption laws require her to identify the father who must give written permission for adoption; and if she can’t or won’t identify him,
Even among orthodox Jewry, and even among orthodox rabbis who would tell you abortion is an absolutely terrible thing to perform, they would also have to say that, based on literature written three or four years ago by the chief rabbi of Israel, mental anguish is reason enough to justify, perhaps require, abortion. Judaism and other religious sensibilities would certainly condone abortion as a remedy in a rape case (indeed we are taught that to uproot a seed illegally sown is perfectly permissible). The law now enables one to obtain an abortion as legally and safely as any surgical process; any change in this law I find to be an absolute abridgment of my religious right, my civil rights, my personal rights.

When one speaks on abortion to women, one feels like a male gynecologist telling a woman what birth is like. I've never had a baby and I've never had an abortion and I've never gone through the pangs of an abortion in my own family. I have, obviously, with those I counsel. I do not like abortion as a remedy. I do not like abortion as a practice. I would argue that the law now standing is often abused. But I stopped to buy a pack of cigarettes on the way here and noticed that the Surgeon General told me that smoking is injurious to my health. I would fight any law that made cigarette manufacturing illegal. I would fight any law not protecting my right to choose. I think the seatbelt law in the United States is horrendous. If I want to kill myself by going through a windshield, let me kill myself by going through a windshield. Don't put me in danger of not starting my car quickly.

The essential point I'm making is that I would not support, and would fight strongly against, any law that said (1) a deformed child must be aborted, (2) a mongoloid child must be aborted, or (3) a woman who has seventeen kids must abort her eighteenth. I would argue against such laws just as vehemently as I argue against any change in the Constitution limiting abortion rights. I would fight against it for the same reasons I would not force anybody to an abortionist. I would not force anybody to violate religious or medical feelings; doctors who do not wish to perform abortions should not; women who feel they cannot have an abortion should not.

I am very satisfied with the law of the United States of America. I am very satisfied with the Constitution of the United States that says I do not have to take my wife for an abortion. I don't have to take my daughter for an abortion. I may choose whether I believe abortion is murder or whether I wish to subject somebody to it.

I will conclude. There are lists upon lists upon lists of organizations on both sides of the abortion issue. I study them, not because numbers make correctness.

---

Garton

she must consign her child to institutional care? Do we really give that woman a choice when, by giving birth, she knows her child carries a lifelong record stamped "illegitimate"? If it's less expensive to have an abortion, and if laws oppress her from giving birth to her child, are we really giving her a choice?

Nations, like individuals, define themselves by choices. A choice has been made for us by seven men. But that choice does not stand alone. Abortion does not exist in a vacuum. Before his death Rev. Niemoeller, a German Lutheran clergyman during the Nazi era, wrote: "They came after the Jews, but I wasn't a Jew so I didn't protest. They came after the Catholics, but I wasn't a Catholic so I didn't protest. They came after the labor unions, and I wasn't a member so I didn't protest. Then they came after me, but no one was left to protest." If we don't protest now the elimination of innocent, defenseless lives for social expediency and economic utilitarianism, then we had better have an iron-clad guarantee that we will always be wanted, productive, privileged, and perfect. Or else, like the unborn, we may find ourselves without a defense, without a voice, and without a choice.

---

Horowitz

I know that if the whole world decided to burn down Valparaiso University, the president of Valparaiso University would be unhappy. Might alone does not make right. I will not read the list in toto, nor do I use it for numbers. I use it to show that enough doubt exists about whether we are dealing with murder or homicide, or whether abortion is justifiable if it is homicide. Tampering with the laws of the United States would be greatly unjust to the majority of its people. Legal organizations listed in favor of the right to choose are the American Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, and a few others. Of national legal organizations none has verbally taken a position against the right to choose. Only eight medical organizations have taken opposition positions: the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists; the California Medical Association; Catholic Hospitals Association Worldwide; Doctors and Nurses Against Abortion; Doctors and Nurses for Life; and Sciences for Life. The following organizations have all taken positions favoring free choice: the American Association for Planned Parenthood; the American College of Obstetricians; the American College of Osteopathic Obstetricians; the American Medical Association; et al. (quite a list).

I skip to religious organizations because I feel the fight should be fought there, not in the country's courts and legislatures. Ten organizations have publicly favored
changing the law, favor stripping the right to choose: the Cardinum and Denby Foundation; Preachers Against Abortion; Preaching Crusade; Lutheran Synod; National Board for Social Concerns of the Lutheran Church; Rabbinical Council of America; Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops; Society for the Christian Commonwealth; Roman Catholic Church; and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. I hold up the other side just to show you the pro right-to-choose list.

I don't want to take away my religious freedom and yours over the abortion question. I do not believe it is murder. I'd be glad to go into sources and reasoning during the discussion. I end with hope for a happy medium, that those who do not wish abortion are not forced to it.

**DISCUSSION**

**Question.** Rabbi Horowitz, you said at the end, "the choice to decide if abortion is murder." If you have already decided that abortion is murder, then wouldn't you, in good conscience, be compelled to oppose abortion? It becomes morally indefensible to allow the right to murder, given that situation.

**Horowitz.** I understand. Let me just rephrase it. If one is convinced a murder is going to take place, can one sit by and allow laws to permit that murder to take place? The obvious answer to that question is no, of course not; we can't condone murder. However, having said that, let me say that I, for one, do not believe it murder. I, for one, can find many others far more educated, both theologically and medically, than I, who would also say it is not murder. Senator Hatfield made a very beautiful speech, saying, "If we're going to err, let us err on the side of caution," which sounds very exciting. Maybe it's not murder, but we'll err on the side of caution. Saying that, however, he shuts the door to some religious groups' demands. Unanimity does not exist in the medical profession nor, obviously, in the theological realm, and apparently not in the legal realm, for the Supreme Court and the majority decision basically said that it could not decide questions that theologians and doctors could also not decide, i.e., when is life? Is it murder? etc. A step further would say, because I feel it to be murder, I will pass a constitutional amendment that will make my definition of murder the definition of murder. I cannot live with that kind of approach.

**Question.** I understand your argument to be that legislating against abortion would oppose American free choice. As the Constitution now stands, this freedom is given to the states. Is this correct?

**Horowitz.** It is the Supreme Court's decision that we are free to choose. To choose what is the question, of course.

**Question.** I find that right now the Constitution limits choice for the sake of preservation and dignity of human life. How can you say that a constitutional amendment which limits the right to choose destroys the unborn American against the freedom of choice now stated in the Constitution?

**Horowitz.** I think we're dealing in definitions. You are defining (as the court did not define) the fetus as an entity with legal, moral, and actual rights. That's the question it really boils down to: Is the fetus a human being? Is the fetus an entity with rights, legal, moral, or any other? I think I can make a case out of at least two religious traditions, by the same phrase which Mrs. Garton just used: an "eight-month baby," "an eight-month child." That phrase has no place, frankly, in Jewish tradition. A child is not a child, even to be buried with ceremony, until after birth. Indeed, not a child to be buried, in terms of traditional Jewish burial rituals, until perhaps thirty days after birth. So we're dealing with definitions: do we have a person, whose rights are being abridged under the law? I do not believe we are dealing with a person, but rather with a potential life. And that potential life is serious. Prenatal care should certainly be a part of a pregnant woman's life, because she deals with potential life. In her doctor's medical opinion, an abortion might be necessary to her life. Ensoulment is a theological argument dealing with this potential life. I'd be glad to argue ensoulment. I enjoy a theological discussion much more than I enjoy a legal discussion. "Ensoulment," "life," "potential life"—I don't believe definitions for them are clear. And I don't believe that any definition—in terms of a right to choose and in terms of my own religious dictates—would be made illegal by such legislation.

**Question.** Rabbi Horowitz, why do you say the unborn child does not have any rights? Is it because you cannot see him, touch him, look him in the eye, feed him, or anything like that? Suppose he does have rights—does that give you the right to impose your religious choice on him?

*June, 1975*
Horowitz. First, no. My basis for saying that the fetus has no rights is not that I can't see him, for indeed, I can't see him. I could use proper X-ray equipment at certain times during pregnancy when it wouldn't harm the fetus, to show me a fetus quite clearly. I could even do surgery, tap the amniotic fluid, or someday be able to do intra-uterine surgery, and then be able to touch the fetus itself. So, no, it's not based on the fact that I can't see it, touch it, feed it, etc. I ask the theological question of when life begins. When is ensoulment? When are there rights to that fetal life? It has nothing to do with whether I can see it or not see it. It's based on something far beyond that.

Now the second part of your question. Again, obviously my answer should be no. If the fetus has rights, then I shouldn't impose my religion and take the fetus' life. I suspect that's the question's intent. There is a case—you'll forgive me for using examples from Judaism—known as the rodef (translated literally as “pursuer”). Almost all legal systems provide for justifiable homicide, whatever that term may mean, to eliminate the life of a pursuer. If I chase you to kill you, then indeed I can be stopped on the basis of defense. Where the mother's life is threatened, we talk about definition of life. I am not content to define life as whether or not the mother comes out breathing. I think more involves life in physical and mental health. But in the case of the pursuer, I want the opportunity to take action against the pursuer. In this case, I see the pursuer as the fetus. So therefore not only do I talk about my religious beliefs imposed upon the fetus, I also talk about right to life for an individual involved in a pregnancy.

Now we can deal with the Buckley Amendment which theoretically gives as a loophole the right to protect the mother's life. I am not satisfied; I am not satisfied with pending legislation. All of these amendments carry the clause (I don't remember the exact wording) “the various and sundry states shall be empowered to enact legislation to implement this amendment.” I am not at all convinced that those states will not define away the concept of life as I see it. I am more willing to put my trust in the medical profession (as misplaced as that trust often is), I am more willing to put that trust into my own and my wife's judgments, than I am in the legislations of fifty states.

Question. What if it comes down to a choice of whether you're going to save the mother's life or the unborn's life? You seem to say that I must choose the mother's life.

Horowitz. I don't think there is a choice in my religious tradition.

Question. But what about choosing that the child live rather than the mother?

Horowitz. The basis for that argument is the question of salvation for the embryo. I've done a lot of reading in church documents in the last few months. I find them almost as incomprehensible as I find “legalese.” The question boils down too often to the salvation question. For example, a mother's life/child's life choice might very well tell us a mother has been baptized, has gone through various sacraments, and so on, and therefore eternity may be very well for her. However, a child, having an unbaptized soul, may very well die in an abortion or spontaneous abortion and therefore be damned because of no Baptism. That is a religious argument, not a legal argument. Because of my tradition and many traditions, including the position of the early Roman Catholic Church, I do not posit the eternal soul of a fetus, and, indeed, question whether that fetus has a soul. If that decision must be made, you yourself make that decision. You help your wife make it. Let me decide it with my wife.

Question. Rabbi Horowitz, twice I have listened to Rabbi Tannenbaum, and in his pro-life stance he was very emphatic about the Jewish tradition. He respects every man's life, including the unborn's. He especially talked about Genesis and every man being made in God's image and likeness. According to Judaism's sacred books, life in a womb is sacred and God is present there. He emphatically stated that if you protect one human being's life, you protect all men's lives. He emphasized standing for the poor, the hungry, the discriminated, the Jews in Russia, but was very willing to begin that respect for life with the unborn, beginning with conception. He said this was Jewish tradition, and didn't see it any other way. Tonight you seem to be saying the opposite.

Horowitz. I'm glad you raised that. I agree with everything Rabbi Tannenbaum says, and I've read much of his literature. I'd respond to you by saying that in available literature from the Talmud and the Bible and in modern literature, the position is clear. Rabbi Untermann, who took a position against abortion and who wrote the last recognized work in the area, concludes: (1) The life of a mother is not questioned. The mission requires that her life be saved. (2) He is willing to extend this into severe medical questions (but he himself would not define what a severe medical question was). (3) Though pushed into the problem of mental health, abortions are to be allowed "where you can determine suicidal tendencies that might come as a result of a pregnancy." Again, he was unwilling to define where that point of "suicidal tendencies" enters. So I agree with Rabbi Tannenbaum's reverence for life. If I were arguing a strictly Jewish position, I would say that every consideration must be given to what I think is a very serious procedure affecting future life. That should be protected.
Question.  Mrs. Garton, I have never heard the point made about abortion being exploitation of women. Would you say more about that?

Garton.  First, money is made off women's bodies. This has always been true. We see that in England, for instance, if one doctor is paid the same amount of money as another, 95 per cent refuse to do abortions because they don't make any money from it and because it's not within their concept of medicine. Here, however, because of the dropping birth rate we see more and more doctors performing abortions. Stock in suction abortion machines doubled within three days of the Supreme Court decision. Upjohn, which is introducing a drug effective for aborting four to six-month fetuses, announced that it had taken fifteen years of untold manpower hours plus $30 million dollars to perfect it. They've got to recoup that, and it won't be on men's bodies.

Playboy carried an article (I think in its January, 1974 issue) about how much money had been put into the abortion movement and how much legal information had been provided through their education fund. I am convinced that many people talk about trying to help women, but indeed talk about trying to line their own pockets. And in that sense, I meant abortion exploits women.

Question.  Don't you think that even before abortion was legal, when the situation warrants, you'll always find people who line their pockets?

Garton.  Yes.

Question.  Do you stand totally against legalization of abortion or just against a modification of the laws?

Garton.  Legislation should remove existing pressures. As to my abortion stand, I have moved back and back and back. I am now at the point where I would support a constitutional amendment that allows for abortion only to prevent the mother's death. Rape loopholes are appealing, except that they provide an extremely big loophole.

In Pittsburgh there is a very well-known abortionist. You may have seen him on the “Today” show. He's one of the doctors who went to Bangladesh and aborted the women who had been raped. He just did an abortion that delivered an eight-month-old baby (three pounds, one ounce) who lived. But he refused it any kind of life-support. The doctor let the baby die. He allowed no one to help it even though he kicked and it breathed. They had photographed him doing the abortion because he was being funded. He received $479,000 to experiment on women while aborting them. This was filmed but he didn't care because he felt he had no worry. The law said he could abort. Well, it turns out a problem developed and he left the country. The district attorney subpoenaed the film.

My point is that a rape exclusion or exception leaves a very, very big loophole. So does a defective child clause. We have no way of knowing whether a child is defective, even using amniotic fluid tests. The test itself may cause defectiveness, and it doesn't measure the degree of defectiveness. So I would support no loopholes except to save the mother's life. There may be times I would allow for an abortion. Right now I can't say, well, for rape or for this. But I hope that the law would then subject any abortion to due process. We have laws that say you cannot kill anyone. If you hit somebody with your car or if you've killed them in self-defense, that must go through the legal system.

Question.  Could modifications be amended by time factors?

Garton.  Most abortions are not done before eight weeks. They have found that complications during that time are extremely high. So if we say that all that is being aborted during the first eight weeks is a fertilized egg, that is a situation which does not exist. The fetus must be sufficiently large since the womb penetrates so easily and the woman might need a hysterectomy to stop hemorrhaging. Abortions are rarely done before eight weeks. There's no way we could abort during the first week. So there we are, at eight weeks, with a fetus that has a beating heart and brain waves, moves, experiences pain. I could not justify abortion at two months any more than I could at eight months simply because the fetus is less developed.

Question.  I'd like to make two comments and then ask a question. First, calling abortion a means of contraception is incorrect. Contraception prevents pregnancy, whereas abortion destroys life already begun. Talking about abortions for women pregnant only a few days is ridiculous. Usually a woman does not realize she's pregnant until after six weeks. This is the first time when a urinalysis can really be judged correctly—at six weeks. Whether there are problem pregnancies or not, eight out of ten women reject their pregnancies in the first three months. There's a very good reason for this. During the first three months of pregnancy, the woman's hormonal system changes radically. Consequently, many women during the first three months turn moody and their emotions really come into play. But as time goes on, the hormonal system seems to balance out.

Secondly, in response to the idea of abortions solving mental anguish or mental disease, no mental condition will be cured
by abortion. And now, my question: Mrs. Garton, in the earlier part of this century, several groups convinced legislators that banning alcohol sales would legislate people's morals and many problems would be solved. It didn't work. I'm wondering whether abortion is a moral problem, and if it is, can you cite an example where legislation would help solve our moral problems?

Garton. I would relate the alcohol issue to the pack of cigarettes Rabbi Horowitz told of. If you personally choose to smoke or drink, fine. But I would go back further in history to the Supreme Court's decision of 7-2 which declared the black man not to be a person by constitutional meaning. I believe the issue in this decision involves a victim. It's not that the woman decides and it affects no one else. Someone else is at stake. As for legislating morals, all our laws base themselves on somebody's moral code. But we're talking about protecting another life. And that's different from alcohol.

Question. Legislating abortion may result in mothers' lives being jeopardized by going to "butchers." If you're concerned about taking care of people's lives, how do you deal with that?

Garton. Fortunately we have a history to deal with. No country has experienced a decline, in the long run, of illegal abortions. The initial impact after legislation is decline, but the figure immediately rises. So we are not guaranteed that we will eliminate illegal abortions. Women will always at some time want privacy. And if you go to a clinic or a hospital, it's written down somewhere. There will always be those who go to the neighborhood abortionist, even if they could go to a legal abortionist.

Question. Why legislate then? If the same number of people will go to an illegal abortionist, why introduce legislation?

Garton. Because we will protect that many more of the victims. Using your philosophy, we might say there is $10 million in merchandise shoplifted daily. Therefore, since people will shoplift and so much is taken, and because 50 per cent of the teenagers arrested claim they don't see anything wrong with it, shoplifting should be legalized. Simply because people will do things that are wrong is not a reason to legalize it. Legally we're killing innocent people.

Question. If you are concerned about the people, I can't see how legislation can help. What seems most crucial is the mother's safety.

Garton. Perhaps you assume that legal abortions are safe. The complications from legal abortion are mounting. People think that if it's done in a hospital by a doctor there are no complications. That's not so. The complications recorded are immediate ones of hemorrhage and infection, but long-range physical and emotional complications are very, very serious.

Question. The most conservative Supreme Court in the history of the United States passed this abortion legislation. Why?

Horowitz. In reading the Supreme Court decision, which took a long time, an idea came to me. Obviously I can't speak for any one of the justices (they spoke for themselves in the decisions), but the decision was based primarily on the fourteenth Amendment—the right to privacy, the right to control one's body. Now we've heard rights being bandied back and forth. Whose rights are we stepping on? I share sympathy with Mrs. Garton for those doctors who apparently are pressured to perform abortions. Their rights ought to be protected also. I suspect, however, that most of you would not agree with me if I said the United States ought to pass a law saying all clergymen should do marriages for people only within their own denomination. I use this example because I'm under enormous pressure in the Jewish community to perform intermarriage ceremonies, and this has become a difficult question. Every day I've got several requests from good congregants, who pay my salary, that I ignore my religious dictates. I'd love a law that would say I can't do it, and courts which would say I can't do it. I really believe this conservative Supreme Court acted very much in line with strict conservative constructionism. They were interpreting constitutionality and reached a decision they felt was within the meaning of the Constitution's language.

Garton. Your question was why such a conservative court reached this opinion. Three days after the decision Harry Blackmun spoke to Sioux City's Chamber of Commerce, where reporters asked him what he thought of the decision. He said, "Oh, I really wish I'd had more time to think about it. I wish I could have put my feet up on the desk and really spent more time on it." He'd had up to fourteen months. Another reason a conservative court came out with this decision had nothing to do with being conservative. In the decision there are statements like "in the face of overpopulation," or "considering the burden of unwanted children." I think the justices reacted to the same fears which exist in society today. They saw a solution to social and economic problems. It had nothing to do with a conservative court. I would have to disagree that they were strict constructionists. The Fourteenth Amendment dates from 1868.
Let's back up a little from 1868. New facts about human conception had just been found and medical society pressured legislators to protect that new life. As a result, strong anti-abortion laws went on the books.

In 1866, the same people who endorsed the Fourteenth Amendment passed an expanded assimilative crimes act which endorsed all the anti-abortion laws. No word or act in history indicates that those who framed the amendment, or the Congress which proposed it, or the states which endorsed it ever intended that amendment to provide, under right to privacy, the right to terminate a pregnancy.

On the other hand, regarding the unborn, Justice Blackmun's sources were very much the same used with the Supreme Court's 7-2 decision in the Dred Scott case of 1857. In that decision they said that since the black man, a hundred years earlier, was not considered a person, they also didn't consider him a person. Now Blackmun has said, "Two hundred years ago when the constitution was written they didn't consider the unborn a person." Nowhere in the recent decision did they ask whether embryological information of recent years might not compel the court to review its definition of person. So in that sense they are strict constructionists, but under rights of privacy they are evolutionists. It's an inconsistent way of presenting a decision.

Question. Very recently, an administration representative pleaded with the Senate Hearing Committee to grant more people free abortions for the stated purpose—not moral reasons—of giving the medical profession abortion practice. Mrs. Garton mentioned that if we are so wise, we must look at those people whom we consider less than human. We are dealing with the poor in this country, who apparently are not considered worthy of carrying on their lives. Would you like to respond to that?

Horowitz. Medicaid pays for all sorts of elective surgery. Medicaid may have all sorts of problems as a legal piece of legislation. That Medicaid is also paying, according to the statistics, 220,000 abortions this year does not automatically upset me. My tax dollars go to many things I personally find abhorrent. During recent years, the Vietnam war was probably the highest of those things. It pained me every time I filled out a tax return. So in this sense I do not find it difficult to accept that the only people we have previously precluded from abortion possibilities have been those who couldn't afford it. I think that abridges more civil rights and liberties than some other civil rights and liberties which may be abridged. I don't see a direct connection in what you're saying, because we're dealing again with definitions—the definition of life, of ensoulment, and all sorts of complicated things. DNA is the source of life. We brush more DNA off our teeth every day than is done in an abortion. Even having said that, I find abortion to be a serious step, according to my religious tradition. I do not consider abortion murder, but there certainly is a life potential that I don't wish to discard without thought.

IN A SUMMER PARK THE BOYS FIELD

In a summer park the boys field
large red round playground balls
Kicked o so far
preceded by pleas,
Give us a high one!
Over and over the ball plummets through waiting arms,
never quite closed
over and over the cry,
Give us a high one!
The girls forgot their jacks
so they say they gots nothing to play.
But the openarmed boys chase and all afternoon
embrace the air
gonna catch one any minute, now . . .
the song endless as their hope:
Give us a high one!

ANDREW GRZESKOWIAK
The Shape of the Christian Family

Ralph and Linda Long

Two assumptions underlie the request of the editor for Christian families to write about their own families: (1) the models by which Christians shape their families are getting rarer, while alternate (and not so satisfactory) alternates are pressed on every side; (2) Christian families can learn about family life from each other. One avenue for mutual learning and teaching is to have Christian families describe their own families. Authors are invited from various age and economic levels, from different professions, and from various family situations. Some people will be invited who have chosen to remain single.

The subject is the family, not merely individual members in it. The invitation is to describe the foundations for their fidelity and love, to discuss the ways pressures are met and the Christian life is nurtured, and to express the fears and hopes for the future of the Christian family. The Cresset will be pleased to play even a small part in arresting the disintegration of family life by assisting in its reconstruction.—KFK

WRITING ABOUT OUR FAMILY is risky. We hesitate to trumpet our ideals because we so often fall short of them. We are reluctant to preserve our faults on paper because we are striving to mend them. Our feelings range from wanting to share our experiences to an urge to protect our privacy. The dynamic forces of the day-to-day living in our family are difficult to shape on paper.

Becoming is the thrust of our family. Our nuclear unit centers around respect for one another. Each of us is finding his own interests and abilities. In our family it means that Linda becomes a law student after eleven years of being wife, mother, and musician. Ralph studies accounting and reads. Alan struggles with beginning violin lessons and magic. Philip explores sports announcing and math games. Each member is excited by the others' growth. In this situation, the parents respect the children as people, rather than as puppets or property. The boys recognize the personhood of the parents rather than taking after-school transportation or grocery-shopping chores for granted.

Openness and sharing with one another are essential. Discussions about kicked shins, the excitement of an Indiana school project, aspects of fraud, or a man without a home are part of the supper ritual. In our family we learn about the feelings of each of us and how to cope with them. We're discovering bit-by-bit who we are and what we can become. Yet the introspection and sharing is balanced with respect for the privacy that each of us requires.

Alan and Philip share an occasional lecture or an afternoon at the Art Institute in Chicago with their parents. Other times the parents share the spontaneity of a boisterous waterfight or the fantasy of Disneyland. Doing lots of things together has led us from court watching, to a Cubs game, to Illinois archeology.

Our family is openly affectionate to one another. Hugs and kisses are exchanged—even between brothers on occasion! We aren't afraid to say "I need a hug." Each of us is still developing a self-concept of sexuality, even father and mother. Our manhood and womanhood do not hinge on the livelihood of a man or the proportions of a woman's figure. A man can be tender; a woman can lift a shovel full of dirt.

Family is a microcosm. We are a mini-church which shares the love, needs the forgiveness, and grapples with the tensions of trying to be little Christs. Learning to relate to one another in the family teaches us to live with others in school or where we work. On the other hand, our family is often a haven where one is accepted in spite of his faults, especially times when it seems that the rest of the world rejects us.

In the family we are free... free to practice the values we hope for in the world. We can choose to use shaving soap instead of aerosols, to use leftovers from the refrigerator instead of letting them spoil, to limit faddish purchases, to use goods until they are worn out or to give them away, to limit the size of our family, to put career, money, and material goods into a perspective that places other people and self-worth first.

Coping with change is part of the dynamic of becoming. Change is a struggle between wanting to stay with the soft, warm comfortableness of the familiar and wanting to emerge into the excitement of the new and unexperienced. The familiar flashes back during the emergence. The parents watch the boys grow more individualistic and more independent. As parents we try to live our own lives, not project our goals onto the children. The boys realize that they will change, that they are becoming more independent, yet they feel the need for boundaries. They accept and understand the rationale for the rules.

Ralph E. Long (BA, Valparaiso University, 1964) and Linda Landeck Long (BA, Valparaiso University, 1974, and presently a student in the School of Law at Valparaiso University) were married in 1963. Their sons, Alan (fifth grade) and Philip (fourth grade) joined them in the discussions in preparation for this paper.

The Cresset
OUR FAMILY'S SELF-CONCEPT, like that of most families, originated in the events, ideas, and values of the two nuclear families of the parents. It has grown like every other family from the impact of world events, our education, societal trends, and the people we have known along the way.

The family of the Longs is also planted in our faith. In the context of Christ we seek to remember that our value is God-given. That is reflected in the way the boys express their feelings about God and worship. "God is someone to talk to. You can just tell Him about your day. He doesn't treat us like puppets, moving our arms with strings. We have a choice." Worship happens every day. It is out on the playground or in the bank. It is churches and people and communion and sharing. It is acting out parables, a service with clowns at the University chapel, or reading the Bible like poetry.

Living with years of chronic illness also taught us about family. For eight years we thought we did not have a future as a family, expecting to be without a father. Needs of the family required that Linda be more than wife and mother. She tried to become chauffeur, emotional mainstay, carpenter, nurse, whatever was needed.

Alan and Philip lived with the unnamed fears of their parents' anxieties. The four of us talked about death, of remarriage, of funerals, of new beginnings, of the boys' fears that they too might get the same disease their father has.

Other families enrich our family. The boys brought back their experiences from the six months they lived with three families during their father's hospitalizations out of town. Water skiing, late night hours, more brothers and sisters, family singing and family praying broadened their concepts of family structure and ideals. It gave all of us new insight into our own family.

After Ralph's year of hemodialysis and then a successful kidney transplant from his mother, the reality of resurrection set off a number of profound changes. The family had gone through the death ritual when Ralph was close to death. Because his death was so expected, the new life became a let-down to all of us, and feeling let-down made us guilty. After all, our prayers had been answered. The swirling mixture of joy and guilt, love and rejection, hope and yet fear was intense.

Then we began to change. Ralph transformed his self-concept from invalid to whole man, from unemployable to productive. Linda relinquished roles she had assumed. She found herself with time and energy to consider what would satisfy her restlessness. Alan and Philip changed their expectations of a father from one sick and very limited, to a father with whom to fish and play baseball. We began cautiously to plan for the future, something that we had not done before.

So we have never been a family patterned after traditional roles of wife/husband or parents/children. In the days of illness the boys often assisted with their father's care. Mother often changed the oil in the car or built bookshelves. Father cooked because that was the energy he could contribute to the family.

The illness was a blessing in that we have learned. We do tasks because they need to be done, not because they fit roles. The housework is shared. No one wants to do it, so we all participate as part of our function as family. Linda works the garden because she enjoys it. Ralph and the boys cook flaming French dishes because they enjoy the creativity. The boys vacuum because they can do it well.

Freedom from the idea that there are things that women do and things that men do have given our family the flexibility that allows Linda four days in school. Alan and Philip have the satisfaction of knowing ways to care for themselves, and of knowing how much the family needs their contributions. The freedom from societal stereotypes is winning us "human liberation."

CONFLICTS WITH OUR FAMILY concept come from many directions. TV commercials of mothers who find ecstasy in waxed floors, or well-entrenched value systems of relatives and friends, or subtle pressure from the Lutheran tradition of family are constantly challenging our model. Pressure of too little time to do all we want and the resulting difficulties with priorities leads to repeated reassessment of what our values in the family are.

We still have many areas where we grope for direction. Handling our differences is one of those. Rationally talking them through to resolution is the ideal. Being angry, sulking, or jealous without being destructive to people is yet to come.

As husband and wife we are still searching for the balance of friendships for each of us outside the marriage. Our friendship and commitment to each other is ready to take the growth of adding other close relationships. But we have yet to learn how to blend that with the family models and lifestyles of others.

Admitting past mistakes and talking about them and why they happen is one answer. Our hope is that understanding will lead to forgiveness and a bridge to new growing. The future has new meaning for us. Every day of continued health is a gift. We think we are equipped to handle chronic illness if and when it comes again, but with different values and priorities than in the past. We are different people. We know that we can rely on God and one another. But our focus is upon living each day to the fullest.

We talk often about butterflies... how they start out crawling and grow into something that flies... how the world (and our problems) must look entirely different from the air than from the ground... how the butterfly is a symbol both of Christ's resurrection and our own change in outlook... how something that might think it is ugly can result in something beautiful... how the butterfly symbolizes our hope, our becoming.

June, 1975
The Skill of Sight-Singing

Gordon Brock

IN LEARNING TO READ THE LANGUAGE OF words, sentences, and paragraphs, a person must acquire certain tools with which he is able to read and understand words in arrangements that he has not seen before. Parents and educators would be amiss to accept the learning of individual poems and essays without also learning the notation of words, sentences, and paragraphs. If this procedure were allowed, only those individual pieces of literature would be learned; no means would be gained by which to read new literature.

This incredible procedure is, however, tolerated in the teaching of vocal music. Students learn individual songs and choral compositions without learning to understand meter signatures, rhythmic notation, key signatures, pitch notation, clefs, and intervals. Because students do not learn these basic structural elements of music, and do not learn to reproduce the sounds that they represent, they are unable to sing at sight compositions other than those which they have heard or sung previously.

The presence of vocal music in most educational institutions indicates that there is a general acceptance of its value. This value would be more fully realized if one learned to sing at sight, rather than by rote. One would then have a tool with which to explore music which he has not encountered before.

In choral rehearsals at any educational level, the time that it takes to learn by rote the notes of a composition is subtracted from the time that could be spent in musical, rather than mechanical ventures. If the members of a choir could sight-sing, the time could be spent analyzing and further understanding the music; literature could be examined and compared to other literature; harmony, rhythm, phrase structure, text setting, form, and other musical elements could be studied and understood. Individual musicianship could be built during the time that would otherwise be used for the rote learning of notes. If all these musical components are taught in choral rehearsals, it is usually at the expense of the performance level or the amount and variety of literature studied.

The amount of literature that students are exposed to is only a tiny portion of all the literature that is available to them. The rhythmically intricate music of the middle ages is almost never performed. Renaissance compositions that are not transliterated to familiar clefs are seldom touched. These situations are a result of not learning to sight-sing.

In the same way, music that is not written within the bounds of traditional harmonic idioms is largely ignored. Music by composers such as Arnold Schoenberg, Kenneth Gaburo, Krystof Penderecki, and George Rochberg is seldom performed, simply because inability to sight-sing makes it necessary to learn such music by rote. This consumes far too much rehearsal time.

Before sight-singing is accepted as an important part of each child's education, there must be increased understanding of each human being's capabilities relative to music. If a person is able to sing a hymn, a song from the radio, or a television commercial ditty, then he has proved himself capable of hearing and reproducing pitches and rhythms. The task of learning to sight-sing then, is developing this ability and learning the notation of these pitches and rhythms. If a person has achieved fluency in the reading of words, then he has mastered a notational system more complex than that required to sight-sing. If a person has achieved fluency in the mathematical processes of multiplication and division, then he has mastered the basic mathematical processes necessary to sight-sing.

There are people, though, who will insist that they "don't have rhythm" or that they "can't carry a tune." Perhaps this is true, although thus far in the musical life of this writer (granted, this is not enough exposure from which to make any universal statements), it has never been true. This writer has yet to find a child or

Gordon Brock, Visiting Instructor in Music at Valparaiso University, received his BM from Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and his MM from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has taught sight singing at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, at a workshop for South American choral conductors in Caracas, Venezuela, and at Valparaiso University.
adult (except those who are deaf, dumb, mentally retarded, or emotionally retarded) who could not be taught to hear and reproduce pitches and rhythms. Those who insisted that they possessed these inabilities had previously lacked either the willingness or the opportunity to discover their abilities.

Discussions with and writings of other music educators confirm the conclusion that there are very few people, not possessing the handicaps listed above, who are incapable of learning to sight-sing. Yet there are very few good sight-singers. The principle reason for this is that music teachers are trained neither to sight-sing nor to teach sight-singing. A music education major’s sight-singing training generally involved less than fifteen minutes a week for two or three years. This sight-singing is almost always neither comprehensive nor concise.

Sight-singing exercises which do not cover all the possibilities of pitch, clefs, meter, and rhythm will obviously not enable a person to sing at sight all melodic situations. Time spent on overly repetitive musical examples is time spent unnecessarily. What must be taught are all pitch possibilities, all keys, all clefs, and a discriminating selection of all types of meter signatures and rhythmic situations. These things must be taught thoroughly, but without the needless repetition of already learned material.

For instance, in the following examples, there are all the possible notes to note melodic progressions excepting octave displacement) in the key of C major.

Musical Example A.

By mastering “all-possibility” exercises based on the above scales, one begins to get free of the reliance on major and minor scales and triads. This is the beginning of reading by interval, which is the basic tool for sight-singing modulating and non-tonal melodies.

One gradually progresses to “all-possibility” exercises based on the chromatic scale. When these are mastered, there is no melodic leap in our twelve-note-to-the-octave system that one will not have learned.

Stated in other terms, one need only to learn the eleven intervals and their octave displacements, and be able to sing them in the context of any other interval, to be able to sight-sing the pitches of any melody. This is not a large amount of material. The following exercises, for example, show all the melodic possibilities (again, excepting octave displacement) involving the interval of the minor second.
The same type of exercises are easily devised for learning to sight-sing all the other intervals in any context.

THE PROCEDURE FOR LEARNING THE EXERCISE is very simple. One plays the scale involved, sings it, and then practices reproducing the pitches of the scale in the sequence notated in the exercises. By constant referral to the piano, one can always check whether the pitch he is producing is correct or not. Because the exercises begin with the pitches of the major scale, most people will be able to sing the scale immediately. For those who cannot, they must begin by hearing and reproducing a single pitch, then progressing in a number of consecutive pitches until reproduction of the major scale is reached. Although it is possible for a person to learn sight-singing alone, it is more efficiently accomplished if a teacher is listening, correcting, and analyzing a student's errors, especially with children younger than eight years old.

All of these exercises must be learned in a rhythmic context so that fluency of rhythm as well as of pitch reproduction is gained. Examples of all types of beat divisions, beat multiplications, and meter signatures should be used. All possible positions of the movable C clef should be used in addition to the bass and treble clefs. Extensive use of ledger lines above and below the staff should be used. All possible notations of each pitch and each interval must be included.

When these exercises are learned a person will be able to sight-sing any melody that lies within his vocal range.

After sight-singing becomes an integral part of our educational system, singers of all ages will be able to explore the music of literally hundreds of gifted composers! The tedium and uselessness of rote learning will be replaced by exciting discovery! Since singers will then be able to sight-sing music not restricted to traditional harmonic schemes, they will have a far greater understanding of it. Then—and only then—will singers be equipped to assess its value!

The teaching of sight-singing is not the teaching of music, just as the teaching of spelling and syntax is not the teaching of literature. Music and literature are accessible through the respective studies of sight-singing and spelling and syntax.

Because most adults, including music educators, have not learned to sight-sing, and therefore have very little understanding of it, it persists in appearing to be a mysterious talent possessed by only a few. It is not. It is a skill learnable by almost anyone.

College music departments should insist that their music education students be able to sight-sing and to teach sight-singing. Parents and students should insist that sight-singing replace the rote learning of notes. Then the adventure of exploring music can commence.

LAMENT UPON THE PLIGHT
OF THE UPPER-CLASS GENTLEMAN
LOUNGING IN HIS FIFTH-AVENUE
APARTMENT AND ENJOYING A
SECOND MARTINI AT ONLY FOUR P.M.

He's got
No yacht.

WILLIAM M. WHITE
I

AND SO: THE CURTAIN CLOSES ON fourteen hundred pages of heroic quests and comic adventures in the Christianized fairy tale world of Narnia. But thanks to the art of C.S. Lewis, this is never the last chapter for readers of the seven-volume *Narnia* chronicles. For most, I have been told, it is merely the first of many rereadings about the colorful and touching life-history of the Narnians. Indeed, Narnia is to fantasy what *War & Peace* is to fiction and what the New Testament is to theology. As Lewis has promised, it is “Chapter One of the Great Story, which goes on for ever: in which each chapter is better than the one before.”

“A Clerk there was of Oxenford.... Sownynge in moral vertu was his speche/And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly techte.” This might well have been Lewis's epitaph. He is regarded as one of the most widely-read and brilliantly logical scholars in the twentieth century. Theologians regard him as one of the most important Christian writers in decades. For myself, Lewis is a kind of Christian Socrates, a spiritual gadfly who has stung the public into a painful rethinking of religious priorities. According to his colleagues and students at Cambridge and Oxford, Lewis was immensely effective as both a teacher and lecturer—he always spoke to an overflow capacity, regardless of the topic. And apparently he was virtually untouchable in an argument, but never to the point of being vindictive or spiteful; one had the impression he was armed with a cannon while his opponent only had a toy pistol.

Today, Lewis’s appeal is still increasing by leaps and bounds, not only to readers of the *Narnia* tales (which have been the top seller in Penguin’s Puffin series for children and are now a top seller for MacMillan) and the splendid space trilogy—*Out of the Silent Planet*, *Pernalandra*, and *That Hideous Strength*—but also to readers of his theology and literary criticism. His work has been eclectic in the best sense of that term. All in all, Lewis is the author of more than forty books (and a host of essays), including the huge *Oxford English Literature in the Sixteenth Century* (a highly esteemed literary history), *Experiment in Criticism* (a text for courses in critical theory), *Selected Literary Essays* (on topics ranging from Chaucer and Shakespeare to the Romantics and Moderns), and *Surprised by Joy* (an autobiography)—to mention only a handful. Generally, the best sellers, excluding fantasy, have been *Mere Christianity*, *The Screwtape Letters*, and *The Problem of Pain*. The amazing scope of ideas found in these works is matched by a similar diversity on the part of Lewis readers, a fact which is made clear by the recent *Annotated Bibliography: C.S. Lewis*—a book which runs nearly four hundred pages. C.S. Lewis Societies have been established in England, Los Angeles, Portland, and New York, and there are several C.S. Lewis bulletins and newsletters. Journals have devoted entire issues to his work, as have national conferences and conventions. Libraries have invested large sums to obtain his works and private possessions, the Bodelian Library at Oxford and Wheaton College, to name two. All of this spells out one fact: that Lewis is a storyteller and critic of the highest order. Nowhere is this more evident than in his fantasy. *Narnia*, I should like to argue, is perhaps as representative of Lewis’s genius as any of his books, the essence of which, I believe, is both dramatic and pictorial. C.S. Lewis is both the Shakespeare and the Wordsworth of children’s literature.

**SIMPLY ON THE LEVEL OF STORY CONSTRUCTION**, the *Narnia* chronicles are remarkable conceptions. In *The Lion, the Witch, and the
**Review Essay**

*Wardrobe*, the four main characters—Peter, Edmund, Susan, and Lucy—stumble into the fantasy world of Narnia through the vehicle of a magic wardrobe. There they run into the crusty witch Jadis, a sadistic usurper who has perverted the natural order of things by turning animals into statues and by arresting the cycle of nature at icy winter—without Christmas. Jadis, as we find out, has forced the loyal talking animals into a cruel master-slave relationship. This is the reader's introduction to two recurring motifs in the chronicles: (1) the conflict between innocence and corruption; (2) the destruction of nature and animal life. The plot turns when Aslan, the Lion-King of Narnia, short-circuits her spell, allowing spring to rush in. This sets the stage for a decisive clash between Aslan and Jadis, an archetypal good versus evil battle that is played out in all of the tales. But if the scale seems to have shifted in favor of the loyal Narnians, it has done so only momentarily, for a tragic circumstance develops: Jadis, with her deep magic, gets Aslan to agree to forfeit his life as a sacrificial offering. All seems doomed, irretrievably. Aslan is slain on the Stone Table in a symbolic crucifixion scene. However, in characteristic Lewis fashion, despair in the face of such evil proves to be unwarranted, and its opposite, hope, is the predictable anticipation of a reversal of tragic action. In short, as expected and wished for, Aslan is resurrected and leads the final victory over Jadis and her minions. All ends well, in fact joyously. A typical Lewis happy ending.

In *Prince Caspian*, a quest-tale riddled with political intrigue, the same children once again sneak through the boundaries of time and space, this time through the unexpected medium of a railway platform. Caspian, the rightful ruler of Narnia, needs their help to regain the throne his greedy Uncle Miraz has seized. Together, they rally with myriad mythical creatures and articulate animals to plan a counterattack. Suffice it to say, when they finally square off with the enemy, they more than demonstrate their mettle. Aslan once again provides the spiritual leadership.

The *Voyage of the Dawn Treader*, perhaps my favorite, is compounded of elements of carnival, mysticism, and satire in a general atmosphere of lighthearted comedy. The story takes off when Edmund and Lucy, accompanied by their meddlesome, priggish cousin Eustace Scrubb, crash through a framed seascape into a very wet ocean. Along with Caspian and Reepicheep, an Arthur-like talking mouse whose knightly fearlessness shows Lewis's debt to medieval tradition, they embark on a riotous quest for the end of the world. One of the highlights of the book is Scrubb's outrageous metamorphosis into a ______ (you shall have to read the story to find out). Towards the end, as the heroes sail into the utter East, they have some glorious times, none of which for fear of spoiling the story, I had better retell. Only a hint: the final chapters show Reepicheep sailing valiantly into a mystical, impressionistic sunset to settle his claims with the Lord of Narnia. *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader* is perhaps Lewis's best use of the *Sehnsucht* motif in the *Narnia* tales.

The central figures in *The Silver Chair* are the reformed Scrubb (in more ways than one) and a runaway schoolgirl, Jill Pole. The opening scenes are thrillingly pictorial. Jill and Eustace fall off the edge of a towering precipice and soar through space on the breath of a friendly wind. After they land, they find themselves in the midst of a magnificent Narnian setting. Then promptly they are given their task, which is to rescue Prince Rilian who has been kidnapped and enchanted by the evil Queen of the Underworld—the archetypal witch of darkness. To carry this out, they team up with a Marshwiggle named Puddleglum, one of the truly unforgettable portraits in Lewis's gallery of *la condition humaine*. After tight jams and comic complications on the road, they find Rilian, but not until their heroism has been put to the test by inclement weather and brutish giants. The most exciting part of the whole adventure, at least in my opinion, takes place when the children and Puddleglum match wits with the witch’s magic. In these scenes Lewis plays with ideas from Plato and the New Testament about different levels of imaginative reality. The dialogue between Puddleglum and the Witch is a succinct summation of his view of the function of religious fantasy and the purpose of the Christian imagination. In predictable Lewis style, again, providence saves the day for our friends, in the surprising form of Puddleglum's optimistic pessimism—you have to know Puddleglum to know what I mean. At any rate, the heroes hold forth against the witch-serpent and occasion her self-destruction. Rilian's spell is broken at long last. Before they make it safely back to Narnia, however, there is a bizarre interlude at the Bottom of the World, a Dantean place where the gloomiest people imaginable are consigned to live. The heroes manage to escape, of course, and eventually surface into a picturesque, snowy winter night in Narnia. In a typically festive celebration (the Narnians are not teetotalers), Rilian is officially restored to his proper throne. *The Silver Chair* is Lewis at his myth-making best.

The next tale in the series is *The Horse and His Boy*. This is a story about Shasta, an orphan slave who searches for his father and his own identity, and a talking horse named Bree. The excitement begins when they escape the clutches of Shasta's pseudo-father and head for Narnia and the north. Directly after being hounded by Aslan in a wild
chase, they meet up with another pair of ex-patriots: the proud Aravis and her horse-companion Hwin. The four of them travel to the enemy city Tashbaan where Shasta is mistaken for Prince Corin, who later, as we might have expected, is revealed to be his brother. The suspense heightens when Shasta is taken into the courtly fold. The mistaken identity motif is duplicated by other scenes. There is also a parallel plot involving Aravis and Susan, both of whom are being pursued by repulsive suitors. This unrequited love theme leads to both serious and hilarious tangles, the chief of which occurs when Prince Rabadash the Calormen declares war on the Narnians as a cover-up for his vendetta against Susan. The dialogue in these scenes is simply superb. Happily, the Narnians later make short shrift of Rabadash and his troops. The Calormens are routed in a comically contested but vigorously fought battle.

The Magician's Nephew should perhaps be read first, or so say some readers, since it reveals Aslan's creation of Narnia. The main characters are Digory, Polly, Uncle Andrew, the witch Jadis, and a cabb. Uncle Andrew is a power-happy, thwarted magician who tricks Polly and Digory into testing his enchanted rings, only because he is too chicken-hearted to try them himself. After finding themselves in a magical world, Digory and Polly lock grips with Jadis, but to no avail; she worms her way back to England with them, hoping to take over their world. She fails in some rollickingly funny scenes; then the plot takes a sudden turn, and they all jettison back to Narnia. And here begins the famous creation sequence in which Aslan designs the Narnian topography with his music. The only problem is that, in spite of Aslan's power, evil is brought into the world. But the end is one of incomparable joy, and Aslan's love remains incontestable.

Everyone likes The Last Battle. It concerns a Napoleonic Ape named Shift who desires the overthrow of Narnia, and Puzzle, a naively helpless donkey who becomes his "yes-man." The plot is far too excellent to sum up in more than a cursory way. Generally what happens is this: Shift disguises himself as Aslan in order to implement his plan and tricks the otherwise loyal Narnians into "patriotic" and "religious" support. The rest of the story deals with the disastrous results and ultimate failure of this plan. To a large extent, the scheme in The Last Battle is apocalyptic and eschatological. The concluding battle is waged in the name of Aslan's revelation of spiritual truth and justice. For many readers, myself included, this is one of the most moving of all the tales, especially in terms of Lewis's treatment of death and resurrection. The finish is a fireworks-filled finale to the Narnia quest and a touching witness to Lewis's Christian imagination.

II

BRIEFLY, THEN, THIS IS THE STORY OF Narnia. How shall we evaluate it and define the nature and purpose of Lewis's art? Is fantasy a viable literary form as any other genre? I shall argue that it is and that, in fact, it is unique for several reasons. First, given its otherworldly levels of meaning and multidimensional reality, it offers the writer a number of flexible devices and strategies: supernatural settings (ones not governed by known spatial or temporal laws), mythical and spiritual analogies, and idealized characters and heroes. Second, given the imaginative premise of an otherworld logos, it enables him to treat the transphenomenal as a reality of its own, as a "place" with believable people, landscape, and ideas, and true-to-life situations. To authenticate this imaginary universe, the fantasist has to be a master magician in his use of descriptive detail and in his depiction of credible human motive beneath the disguise of animal or creature personality. Most important, and this holds true for fiction as well, his Weltanschauung has to have a realistic base—that is, a sense of causal order and inevitability in terms of ideas and action. In Narnia Lewis satisfies all of these requirements and more. It is the ordered form of his esthetic and spiritual wish-fulfillment, a world where the psychic and Christian contents of consciousness are given full embodiment.

Lewis's ontology of fantasy is an expression of the spiritual side of his commitment to the Sehnsucht theme in world literature. It shows his longing for a world where things might be conceived on an idealized scale of love and freedom, where human relationships might be seen in a state of potential perfectibility. In this perspective, he reverses the inward direction of Descartes' "I think therefore I exist," with a projected, or outer-directed "I wish therefore I exist." This is no easy escapism formula, however, since it means going deeper into the human psyche and, ultimately, from the standpoint of Lewis's faith, deeper into spiritual consciousness. Lewis refers to this process in The Last Battle as going "further up and further in," which means, as I hope to show, going deeper into the metaphorical structure of Christian faith. The language of religious belief in Narnia deals specifically with the archetypal essence of man's imaginative being. As such, Narnia
offers a special kind of Existenzherstellung, an illumination of the idealized esthetic constructs of the Christian imagination. In accordance with this ontology, the Narnian heroes follow an archetypal pattern of psychic alienation and imaginative rebirth on their spiritual journey. The scheme is roughly as follows: (1) the undeveloped, unfit, innocent hero is initiated into a fairy tale world of injustice, corruption, and deception; (2) the hero quests for self-perfectibility through a series of taxing encounters with evil, during which time he becomes increasingly self-conscious of both his limitations and his possibilities; (3) the hero joyously wins his battle with evil, is purged and rebaptized in the imagination, and achieves a Christ-like plateau of ideal selfhood. Thus, beyond the action itself, the quest for self is an extension of Lewis's interest in mystical visions of the meaning of life; it is the instrumentation of his Christian development of traditional mythical rituals of initiation, dislocation, and rebirth—most of which, I believe, serve the purpose of redemption or grace. This spiritual journey is the central organizing principle in Lewis's narrative art and the metaphorical agency of his witness to Christ in fantasy.

According to Lewis's Christian esthetic of fantasy, action is primarily a function of self-definition. The context of heroism, chivalry, and romance provides the Narnian hero with analogues for experience in the "real" world of England—artistic models, so to speak. At the same time, it refracts those possibilities for the reader in his own "real" world of imaginative experience. The quest, thus, is the determining factor in the moral equation of Christian fantasy like Narnia, not only in the sense that it anticipates an inward disclosure of the hero's spiritual identity, but also in the sense that it formulates that problem initially as the unknown x in all mystical Christian consciousness. Lewis's approach thus is distinctively his own because it allows him to differentiate the two-dimensional psychic consciousness of the folk tale world from the multilevelled consciousness of Christian fantasy. It allows him to work out the dynamics of the archetypal good versus evil conflict as a symbolic encounter between the satanic and angelic elements in the human imagination. The hero is called by Aslan to restore the human condition to a more divine order; and, since in fantasy anything can happen, the hero gives an ideal witness to the heroic urgency of that calling. This ideal heroic response explains, at least to my mind, the Christian significance of the pervasive illusion-reality motif in Narnia—most noticeably in The Silver Chair and The Last Battle. Only by recognizing the implicit meaning behind events in the "real" world can the hero distinguish between deceptive standards of behavior and higher ideals of perfection. Aslan witnesses to the unself-conscious children in Narnia in order to lovingly intimidate them with his truth. He teaches them the way of heroic action and inner belief. In each story the children answer Aslan's call for them to participate in a spiritual quest for a visionary or transcendent frame of reference that will serve them to measure the exact nature of the world's evil.

Lewis's method is to introduce characters who, because of their intrinsic weaknesses—the chief of which is their lack of perceptual power—fail at the outset to distinguish appearance from reality. Such a strategy is effective not only in terms of the plot itself, but also with regard to the reader's anticipation of a predictable fairy tale happy ending; it implies that an atypical hero will ideally surmount the seemingly impossible conditions imposed upon him by the quest. From the standpoint of this presupposed final victory over evil, Lewis's characterization is the manifestation of a Darwinian paradox: the survival of the unfittest. For me, this underscores Lewis's preoccupation with a happy, eschatological ending in history. Fantasy in his hands parallels the story of Revelation and makes incarnate the archetypal dreams of Christian faith. In this connection, Narnia represents a metaphysical reconciliation of the problem of appearance and reality; heroic action is the correlative of Christ's anticipated victory over appearance. Therefore, in the theological terms implied by Lewis's ontology of fantasy, heroic self-perfectibility is a shade more than a traditional reshaping of myth, legend, folklore, and romance for the sake of telling a good story; it is Lewis's pledge to the cause of an inferential reality behind the evil vestments of the "real" world.

The eschatological nature of the self-quest in Narnia explains the function of discipleship motifs and Passion-Story analogues in an imaginary world as-I-wish-it. In this anticipated fantasy paradise, naive self-awareness begins as an unfinished mode of consciousness but ends as a completed act of selfhood. The heroes in Narnia are finally idealized out of existence, as it were, because their fate is to enter into the mystery of Christian being beyond the phenomenal world; thus, their quest for absolute self-being (or, as I have suggested, for their archetypal essence) is necessarily conceptual in purpose; it is always associated with gradations of potential self-realization through heroic encounters with images of metaphysical evil. Such a quest, furthermore, prefigures an eschatological solution of the question of identity insofar as it tends to resolve all approaches to the meaning of human experience and insofar as it attempts to remove
that very issue from the realm of human definition. Lewis's rubric of fantasy puts its own high premium on the happy ending because such an ideal consummation of the hero's spiritual wanderings is the last chapter in the story of his battle with his own Christian shortcomings. From this perspective, heroic action bears witness to the children's self-questing potential and the otherworld's reward of self-revelation.

A word on the structure and intention of this principle of self-revelation with regard to the language of fantasy. By definition, any implementation of the archetypal self-quest in literature is metaphorical. The language of fantasy does not operate according to the strict laws of fiction, but rather, according to the "rules" of dream-logic and Christian belief. The realism of Narnia is the consequence of its believable inner life and its coherence as a tale about a preferred order of things in a wished-for universe of poetic justice. The basis of this idealization, or so I believe, is the self-consciousness of childhood dreaming. Like Wordsworth, Lewis proposes the paradox that the child is father of the man; by which he means that a child's imagination is innately in touch with fantasy-like constructions because he is not yet self-conscious to an adult degree about workable distinctions between appearance and reality; the child's imagination perceives untold fantasy like connections (the analogues I spoke of above) between illusion and fact; in short, the child instinctively separates art from life. An anti-fantasy reader, or I might add, an anti-religious fantasy reader, is often overly equivocal about this distinction and fails to appreciate the imaginative premise of all good literature. This kind of reader protests too much in behalf of his own fantasy sympathies. Obviously, the "truth" of any story, whether fantasy, fiction, or whatever, is unique to its own particular artistry and world view, as well as to the author's distinctive style. Enjoying hypothetical probabilities, whether or not they deal with images of a spiritual noumena or a surrealist otherworld, is clearly not the same as believing in them as scientific propositions or historical evidence. Believing in them as images of the truth of the inner life, however, is something else entirely. I think this is what Narnia is all about.

Nevertheless, this distinction raises a critical question about the very nature of Lewis's ontology of fantasy: is the reader's childlike approach to Narnia a condition of religious or imaginative faith or a combination of both? In spite of the fact that Lewis himself argued that a reader is never forced in an a priori manner to accept or approve the logos of a work, it remains true, I should reply, that such is usually the case with readers of Narnia. For many Christian readers, indeed, the story of Aslan is the Word of God made incarnate. Now Lewis, I am sure, would have applauded this apologia, but he would have answered that the Narnia tales were first and foremost his experiment in the art form of the fairy tale. So be it. My own students, I am afraid, might wish to cross swords with Lewis over this issue, and argue that if Narnia is anything, it is Christian fantasy. I think this is a valid rejoinder, although I would add that even if the chronicles are reducible to something this easily schematic, their riches are infinitely greater than such a methodology pretends to encompass...

Perhaps we had better make a further distinction between a spiritual and an esthetic principle of incarnation. As a verbal structure, Narnia functions as a vehicle through which Lewis expresses and artistically validates his own imagined truths about an ideal Christian life. In this generic sense, as I hope I have made clear, its meaning is essentially analogous. As a fantasist, Lewis makes the word flesh, so to speak, by giving his other worldly setting the illusion of concrete actuality. The medium of fantasy allows him to reshape and unify inherited stories from whatever source into a new but comprehensive secondary world. The Christianized meaning unfolded by this scaffolding of dimly or clearly recognizable levels of the imagination is by intention something more than what it appears to be in itself; that is to say, even for the Christian reader, it is always something "other" than the specific consciousness in which it symbolically lives by virtue of the various possible relationships brought into play by otherworldly levels. The symbolic suggestiveness of this multi-levelled otherworld is the whole point.

One last point: the escapism formula of Christian fantasy such as Lewis has developed it in Narnia, gives him the poetic and philosophical leeway to portray several of these inferential realities and present them in dramatic conflict. The reader can escape into whichever one he prefers, depending, of course, on the degree to which he wishes or is able to suspend either his disbelief or his belief. Whether or not he projects his Christian feelings onto the Narnia logos or opens up to those pictured in its pages, is always a matter of personal choice and sensibility. The fact is, in either case, such escapism is a good thing. The Narnia chronicles are read over and over again not simply because they are un-put-down-able as stories, nor simply because they provide symbolic analogues of the Christian life (and they do so to a remarkable degree), but because they touch the inner life in all of us. They hold up a mirror to our own imagination, the reversed image of which is the "truth" of our essential being. The quest for this truth was the quibble over which Lewis was willing to risk the whole world.
Farewell to a Season

ONE CAN LOOK BACK AT the past season neither in great and justified anger nor with any particular joy. Although the theatrical experience through all these months has not been too memorable, nevertheless, it was remarkable in many ways.

People wondered a great deal about the surprising box-office success of most shows in this year of inflation and recession. But at any period in which the devaluation of life reaches frightening proportions, pleasure in all its manifestations becomes the only desired aim and deceptive solace. It was, by all standards, a very rich season, and yet one in which no new American playwright was heard of, while two of the established ones failed.

One of them was the wizard of the Boulevard comedy: Neil Simon. He thought he could transplant the story of the Book of Job to a rich Jewish family living on Long Island. The Bible’s Job had already shaken his head with great doubts about Archibald MacLeish’s J.B. — a more serious attempt at its theatricalization several years back — and now could not help but damn Neil Simon’s God’s Favorite as utterly inept. Edward Albee fared somewhat better with his new play, Seascape, which, I think, is one of those magnificent failures, testifying to the author’s stature in certain ways without being quite right and convincing.

Strangely enough, it is a thin and, for a full-length play, short dramatic exploration of a wonderful theme: the adventure in rediscovering life. There is a new beginning around the corner, or it may be, also for a couple apparently too fast advancing towards the end of the middle-aged period. This is how “she” feels while being with “him” on a beach somewhere, unwilling to accept the finality of it all while his responses to her enthusiasm are those of a tired businessman: “We’ll see!” or “Let it go!” But she doesn’t believe in his resigned, “We’ve earned a little life,” even though her great monologue of “to have had it or to live our last chance to the full” goes on a trifle too long. But so far the play’s theme that life can and must be discovered anew at any age, or rather at any turn of one’s aging process, makes sense, and certainly the last word spoken in bright sunshine sounded encouraging: “Begin!”

The trouble with the play begins in the second part when Albee uses a device which inadvertently cheapens the idea. Two humanoid lizards appear on the beach where our couple wrestles with the idea of making a new start. The introduction of these humanized beasts is at best a cute gimmick with many inherent dangers. How can the playwright make it credible that also lizards speak, let alone in a more or less Americanese lingo with Mr. Lizard’s utterances of “Wow!” and “Listen here, Buddy!”? When the human species and the Lacertilia kind of reptiles start investigating their genetic and habitual differences the humor deteriorates into funny asides reminiscent of those made in high school biology classes to keep up the students’ interest. Albee holds up the mirror to man’s nature, a mirror reflecting the lizard image of another married couple. That this may be amusing at points is not disputed, but such a one-act confrontation is an easy and cheap way out and pushes the play into an abyss instead of plunging it into depths. When Mr. Lizard thought that “It’s rather dangerous up here,” he must also have thought of the hazards of playwriting.

A NEAR-PERFECT FARCE which, physically, outdoes Feydeau at every topsy-turvy turn, was written by Terrence McNally and called The Ritz which is a hotel-cum-bathhouse. It has conventional and less conventional facilities for the enjoyment of a gay crowd and more doors and cubicles than any stage can possibly provide for. As most farces this too makes the best of mistaken identities and, based on the idea of “the more the merrier,” there are so many of them that it would take pages to deal with them. If you throw into your farcical bedlam the terror of the Mafia and such types as a frighteningly overweight man, a private detective in Mafia employ with a penetratively high-pitched voice, a garbage collector’s wife disguised as a man, a Puerto Rican chanteuse who can no longer sing but wants to make a new career and mistakes the man trying to escape the Mafia for a theatrical producer while being herself mistaken for a transvestite, etc., then you can imagine what reckless and almost plotless contrivances can lead to. The minute everyone’s mistaken identity is established the chase begins and is climaxed by three very divergent people winding up
under a cot while on top the game of
errors by two other characters con­tinues to take place. All the jokes
come somewhat artificially; the
propelling motor of a plot leading
to the laughter is missing. Never­theless, the laughs are there.

And so they are in a most economic
comedy with no more than two peo­ple, Same Time, Next Year, by a
new dramatist—but known from
television—Bernard Slade. Two
people, in a way happily married,
although not to one another, fall in
love and meet once a year. The
years from 1951 to 1975 pass with
the evidence of passing years. We see
the couple six times, and they seem
to enjoy this once-a-year excursion
into an illicit romance as much as
the audience. The jokes, mostly
clipped sentences, seem super­
imposed and have the appearance
of being put into dramatized form
from notebooks, but they are skill­
fully placed and work very well
for an audience envying the guilt­
ridden courage of these two charac­ters. But what is really enjoyable
and admirable about this new sexy
version of the old comedy idea of
The Fourposter of many years ago
is the reflection of the socio-cultural
changes of the American scene that,
time and again, show up in their
conversation.

THE MOST REMARKABLE
feature of this season was the ava­
lanche of revivals of older plays,
classic and semi-classic, on and off
Broadway. It would be natural to
expect the two major British com­panies, The National Theatre and
The Royal Shakespeare Company,
to support us in our endeavor to
look back; and this, particularly
with Shakespeare in various and
sometimes strange versions, they
have dutifully and, in most cases,
beautifully done. It was even more
fascinating to find Ibsen in the for­
tfront of these revivals with Ghosts
in an avant-garde theatre downtown
or A Doll's House at the Vivien
Beaumont Theatre at Lincoln Cen­
ter. The latter, by the way, was a
much heralded but disappointingly
uneven production in which the
brilliant Swedish star, Liv Ullmann,
taught us how Nora ought to be
acted.

One cannot help asking what the
heightened interest in Ibsen, one of
the great realistic playwrights who
freed the well-made-play from its
trivialities and gave a new meaning
to economic dramaturgy can mean.
Have we rediscovered him in an era
in which loosely structured, if not
non sequitur, plays prevail and the
argument for a theme is often sup­
ported by four-letter words? His
topics are no longer hotly debated
issues, and the battles he fought
for reason and clean thinking have
meanwhile been won for him by
time—more or less. I think we cling
to him again today because we are
badly in need of being reminded of
the importance of human integrity
and vitality which have become be­
fouled by the corruptibility and
sham conventionalities of society.

THE NEGRO ENSEMBLE
Company at the St. Marks has some­
what enriched at least one sector of
the off-Broadway theatre with Leslie
Lee's The First Breeze of Summer, a
milieu play consisting of many short
scenes and depicting the life and
background of a relatively well-to-
do black family. It is a play of many
convincing moments, of a variety of
moods and dramatic situations, with
flashbacks depicting black-white and
black-black relationships. It cer­
tainly is a play that has the power of
promise, and merits the author's
encouragement.

A young but already known black
dramatist, Ed Bullins, has written a
fine play, The Taking of Miss Jennie,
a kaleidoscopic picture of some
young people in the sixties. The
central scene is a party which three
black roommates give for their for­
erm friends in college. The party is
only a point of departure from which
the dramatist throws light on the
life of a few people and their strug­
gle with being and being themselves.
Some of the figures, whites and
blacks, gentiles and Jews, are charac­
ter studies in depth, others are more
lightly touched upon. They all seem
to grope for some understanding of
a puzzling life. The play is written
like a fugue with many monologues,
choral speeches, and movements.
It was originally produced far off­
Broadway at the Henry Street Play­
house and taken to the Newhouse
Theatre on Lincoln Center by J o­
seph Papp.

This may be the first of a series of
new plays by younger American
authors which Papp will produce at
off-Broadway stages downtown and
perhaps later show at Lincoln Cen­
ter in case they fit the requirements
expected by or demanded from the
bourgeois theater-goer. One of the
more significant developments this
season was Joseph Papp's frank ad­
mission that his policy of turning the
Vivien Beaumont Theatre into an
avant-garde stage failed. He lost his
audience. The people apparently
expected from him a kind of National
Theatre with a program of classic
and new plays of some respectabil­
ity. They rejected the confusing
groping, the militant or four-letter-
word plays with which he filled his
Public Theatre downtown.

Papp promised to present a reper­
tory theater of proven plays, mainly
classics. In his recantation, I believe,
he went too far. Does he really be­
lieve he cannot find a playwright
who has something to say and who
can say it without spitting at his
audience with the fury of his despair
and throwing the excrement of his
disgust at them? In his resigned mood
Joseph Papp even vowed he would
tear down the beautifully built Vivien
Beaumont Theatre and turn its
thrust stage into a good old-fashioned
proscenium stage, re-evoking yester­
day's spirit for much money. He
seems to feel he can more easily get
the money for such an apparently
unnecessary purpose than to find a
playwright who could honor the
spirit of man, please Melpomene or
Thalia and his audiences.

There is a time when everyone,
but particularly man endowed with
creativity, must stop and turn and
look inward a little. And now may
be the time for it.
Dear Reader of this letter:
Perhaps it is foolish for me, an ordinary man, to send you this letter.
I know that your time is valuable. But would you please look over these lines that I am sending you from far away, then I shall be glad.
I am an unknown man. My occupation is that of oiler.
I travel on the sea, on vessels where I grease bearings and gears.
My occupation did not exist in the time of the Carpenter.
The era which can be called that of the oiler is mine.
It belongs to the times which have, and have had, metal wheels.
My occupation has not matured to the point of being thought of as symbolic.
People want to rush forward rapidly and for this they use all sorts of wheels and gears.
But they want to retain the symbols and signs of an older period, such as the sickle in the time of harvesting machines and the scythe as the symbol of death in the time of the machine gun, and the word wagon in the era of the flame thrower.
They mean that the older and prehistoric concepts are eternal, and perhaps they are right.
They mean that my occupation, that of oiler, is temporary, and perhaps they are right.
Which it will be depends on how much oil they require, and how they intend to use the oil, if it will be for a still faster dance or to pour oil on troubled waters.

They themselves and their symbols and my occupation, that of oiler, stand or fall according to how they use the oil.
In all ages there have been people who have stepped forward to ask questions. Their eyes have been searching.
Such searching eyes existed before sickles and scythes were invented.
And right now there comes one who asks how the oil is to be used, so that all those who now are rushing fast will not go too fast towards something where even the oldest symbols of harvest will become meaningless in comparison with the newer arrangements for harvest of all sorts.
I am asking this only because my occupation is that of oiler, and because we now have methods of oiling which create an extraordinarily smooth glide for both good and bad, and perhaps a still smoother gliding for the blind.
I beg you once more to have patience with regard to these my lines, and sorry to have bothered you with this,
Sincerely,
The Oiler

HARRY MARTINSON

*This poem was translated from the Swedish by Emeroy Johnson.