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Above: Gordon Grant, American (1875-?), Fishing Schooner at Quay, Lithograph, 9 x 12". Gift in 1974 to the Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University by Mr. and Mrs. Fred A. Reddel.

Cover: Jack Beal, American (1931), Still Life with Self Portrait, 1974. Oil on canvas, 29 x 28". 1974 Sloan Fund Purchase, Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University.
AMID NEWS REPORTS OF the imminent collapse of the United States client state in Vietnam and debate over continued military aid to that government came news of the death of Chiang Kai-shek—a man whose policies three decades ago prompted a similar U.S. military aid debate. While many of the editorial remarks following his death have stressed Chiang’s relationship with the United States, his anti-Communism, and his World War II status as one of the Big Four, it is more fruitful to evaluate Chiang in terms of the history of the Chinese people.

A half century ago, following Sun Yat-sen's death, Chiang became the symbol of Chinese revolutionary nationalism. Trained at Chinese, Japanese, and Soviet military academies, Chiang rose to power as his Nationalist party used a Soviet-advised army to move north in an expedition to throw out both warlord and imperialist rule in China. Many Chinese felt that their nation at last had a savior who could redeem the rights China had lost to the rapacious West during the preceding century.

In the decade 1927-1937, when he was the recognized head of the Chinese government, he did play the nationalist by regaining some of the rights taken from China by Western imperialists. It was his finest hour. Yet, to the chagrin of many, he began to seem less and less nationalistic, continuing to accede to Japanese demands for Chinese territory from 1931 on—all the while proclaiming the need to crush Chinese dissidents and insurgents.

By the early 1930s he looked to the fascism of Germany and Italy as a model for China. He wrote that “in fascism the organization, the spirit, and the activities [of the state] must all be militarized . . .” The New Life movement which he announced in 1934 to revive the Chinese spirit had as its purpose, in Chiang’s words, “to thoroughly militarize the lives of the citizens of the entire nation.” In sum, the revolutionary nationalist had become the fascist; and, as President Whitney Griswold of Yale said, Chiang’s government was a “fascist dictatorship.”

Chiang asked all Chinese to read and emulate his personal hero, Tseng Kuo-tan, the nineteenth-century Confucian suppresser of the Taiping rebellion. His championing of Tseng was fitting, for Chiang’s talents were best suited to the old China. He worked as a bureaucratic centralizer, with his subordinates churning out blueprints for reform from the top—plans which yellowed with age. He never realized the potentiality of unleashing the latent energies of China’s masses for bringing about basic change from the lower levels of society.

He came to associate China’s future with his own, little understanding twentieth-century China’s problems or capabilities. He executed Shanghai workers who had helped him take that city in 1927—out of fear that they were Communists. His repressive political policies alienated intellectuals and students. He lost the support of the white-collar class because of economic policies which put 1948 prices three million times higher than those of 1937. While innumerable peasants in a Honan famine died or were forced to cannibalism, he felt obliged to hold a press conference to assure China and the United States that he was not having an affair with his nurse.

In Taiwan, Chiang inflicted harsh military rule which led to a 1947 bloodbath in which many Taiwanese lost their lives. In exile there after 1949, he and the two million “mainlanders” who fled with him treated the thirteen million Taiwanese with disdain. For many Taiwanese Chiang
was a hated and feared despot; even outside of Taiwan, such as at the East-West Center in Honolulu, they refused to speak openly of politics, fearing reprisals based upon reports from Chiang’s spy among their peers. One student in the 1960s who did participate in anti-war activities in Hawaii was kidnapped by Chiang’s agents when he reached Tokyo where he had hoped to live. Despite protests to our government and his, the student was tried and disappeared into a political prison.

One feels pity that Chiang never realized his lifetime hope of leading a strong, united China. Historical forces larger than Chiang were at work in modern Asia; and it was tragic that his efforts to stop them, like the efforts of Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam, were not only futile, but caused even further suffering and anguish for the people, who have long seen too much of both.

R. KEITH SCHOOPPA

“IT’S ABOUT TIME”

THE PR DRUMS BANGED and the cymbals clanged and organized baseball did it again, columns and columns of favorable free publicity about one of its deficiencies, the long overdue appointment of the first Black manager in the major leagues.

The appointment of Frank Robinson as manager of the Cleveland Indians came 27 years after the equally long overdue entry of another Robinson as the first Black player in all of major league baseball. The delay still defies reasoned comment.

In general the media chose to report the “event” as another milestone creditably achieved. To our knowledge, none chose to report it as the removal of a millstone which had defied movement for the 105-year history of major league baseball. No comment was made about the fact that, though one in ten Americans is Black, it took baseball 78 years to let the first Black Robinson play, or that, though 150 of today’s 600 major league players are Black, it took baseball 27 more years to find a Black player who could manage. (One owner said, “He[the Black] had to be the right one.”)

Owners basked in the smugness that their wonderful “game,” being the national pastime and all that, was making such a progressive move. We suggest instead that the American national pastime is racism, and that baseball is a microcosm which simply, yet aptly, reflects the national pastime.

The selection of Robinson was interesting, and deserves a closer look. The owners, in waiting for the “right one,” carefully hedged their bets on appointing a Black manager in several ways.

First, there was the nature of Robinson himself. Traded players are suspect, either because they were considered expendable, or because they have become clubhouse lawyers or night owls on non-game nights. Robinson was four times suspect since he was traded four times. Despite the fact that he made the All-Star team regularly and was the only player ever to win the Most Valuable Player award in both leagues, one could imagine the owners having said, “We gave him a chance but you know how he was . . .”

Second, there was the nature of the contract. He was hired as a player-manager on a one-year contract. If he becomes the first Black manager to become fired (and that is a possibility), he still owes the Cleveland Indians his considerable playing talents.

Third, there was the nature of the appointment. Instead of simply hiring super-player Frank Robinson as a manager (with solid credentials earned in the winter league), the owners were able to capitalize even on the final relinquishment of their long term racist policy. Robinson went to the dying Cleveland franchise which has anemic attendance, internal problems, and a league-wide reputation as a “graveyard for managers.” Note that he was not placed in an established, healthy franchise relatively free of problems.

Robinson has considered managing for over ten years and has seriously sought such appointment for eight years. Players and associates (not identified by color, incidentally) consider Robinson a candidate with superior managerial potential—he has been a team leader, a tough competitor, and a man of great skills who has been there and back as a player. So why did it have to take eight years?

Robinson’s own statement is the best interpretation of the appointment, “My ambition is someday just to be considered the Cleveland manager, period.” No way, Frank, because it doesn’t sell tickets and would also destroy the market value of that highly saleable and enduring American favorite, racism.

The media must share blame for the state of the Robinson affair. Commentary was far and away positive, with little more than gentle digs at the owners. One publication pontificated that it would be harder for Frank Robinson than for Jackie Robinson because while Jackie had to only manage himself, Frank must manage himself and a whole team.

Why must Robinson manage himself? Why was it necessary for the earlier Robinson to manage himself? Were both guests in the house of the lords of baseball? When was the last time you heard a White manager being told he must “manage himself” or be the “right one”?

We do not consider the hiring of Frank Robinson to be the occasion of great accolades to baseball. For us, “It’s about time” is more than adequate.
STAGES IN THE HUMANIZING OF ARCHAEOLOGY

Walter E. Rast

The essay traces some of the new directions in redefining archaeology: first, the new developments, uniting the disciplines of archaeology and anthropology; secondly, reflection of the relation of archaeology to the Arts and Sciences; finally, reflections on problems of important to the thoughtful Christian and to the study of theology.

SOMETHING APPROACHING THE LEVEL OF shockwaves may presently be observed in the field of archaeology as new conceptions make their way into what were thought to be solidly fixed understandings. That the changes are as impressive as they are is due in no small part to the youthful age of the discipline. Still attempting to work its way toward maturity, the field is characterized not only by the excitement of new discoveries which continue to be made, but also by reflection on goals, theory, and the scope of archaeological work. The discussion following traces some of this redefinition. It aims especially to see how some of the newer movements lead to a more humanizing grasp of ancient man and his life. In the first part, some of the developments leading in this direction are reflected on, especially those stemming from the meeting of archaeology and anthropology. In the second section, the role of archaeological study in the Arts and Sciences is looked at; and in the final part several observations are made on what problems are important for theology and for the thoughtful Christian person.

ARCHAEOLOGY IS DELIBERATELY ENGAGED in recovering the material remains of peoples of the past as these survive in the earth's soils. Archaeology is dependent, then, upon its handmaiden, excavation. Since little excavation occurred before the eighteenth century, we can say that the discipline had its birth not much more than two hundred years ago. The excavation of the lava-covered remains of Herculaneum (1738) and Pompei (1748) are some of the earliest sites to be so explored.

No doubt it was the Renaissance in Late Medieval Europe which provided a particular impetus to such
exploration, even though the concerns of this movement sprang from specific psychological and spiritual needs. Dried out souls and scorched intellects, seeking for new experiences of truth and beauty, found them in the written and artistic treasures of the classical world. The step was not a large one from this pursuit to the search for buried remains of these civilizations, but the latter could not occur until further discoveries were made, principally the notion of the stratification of the earth’s soils.

It has become customary to speak of two major types of archaeology, each the result of a differing momentum producing it (Deetz, 1967:3; Daniel, 1967: 18-20). On the one side was the archaeology stemming from and devoted to the rediscovery of the classical world or the Near East, the cradle of civilization. The other was dedicated to the recovery of prehistoric man and his societies, a type of archaeology with distinctive methods and goals since it could not depend on written records. Both streams of archaeological recovery are important to consider in discussing the humanizing tendencies in the discipline.

Taking the archaeology of the classical world and the ancient Near East first, if we can judge from the records of the people who first became fascinated by these civilizations, we would have to conclude that they were some distance removed from studying the ancient peoples on their own terms, even though new steps were being taken to learn something about another area of the world. Those interested in this kind of archaeology were from the elite ranks of European or English society, usually professional scholars or people with the means to travel to Italy or Greece. The goal of many who were able to make such visits was to return with prized purchases which could add elegance to an estate, or, if the reason was not so selfish, to offer people back at home the opportunity to enjoy some of the cultural artifacts of the past which the travellers had enjoyed while on their journeys (Daniel, 1967: 35). The Society of Dilettanti, a group of such antiquarians, was formed in 1714 and devoted itself to such activities (Daniel, 1967: 35). The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the rise of a new class of collectors or entrepreneurs, whose livelihood was made by trafficking in antiquities.

The nineteenth century saw this fascination carried a step farther by large-scale planning of nationally identified excavations. It would be difficult to conceive of the archaeological work of this century without the supportive influence of the colonial establishments of western Europe and England. Thus the work of British, French, or German excavators in such countries as Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, would have been difficult and often impossible without the weight of their backing nations. The establishment of British and French institutes and schools of archaeology in strategic cities such as Cairo, Baghdad, and Istanbul took place late in this century and in the following. As for Palestine, the year 1865 was important for the beginning of the Palestine Exploration Fund, which has sponsored British work in that area until our own time. Under its auspices the British School of Archaeology was founded in Jerusalem. The United States entered the field in similar fashion with the founding of the School for Classical Studies in Athens and the American Schools of Oriental Research in the Near East, both being established near the turn of the century. Mention can also be made of the University of Chicago’s Center at Luxor in Egypt, still a small but impressive island of impeccable research at the great sites along the upper Nile.

THE EXPLORATION CARRIED ON IN THE nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was often done on an impressive scale and resulted in many contributions to the countries themselves as well as to the western nations. There were usually benefits to local people, who could work on excavations and receive higher salaries (although still pitifully small) than they would in ordinary life. At the same time, local inhabitants would enjoy the contacts with the strange people from the western countries as much as the latter would be fascinated by the simple timeless life of the former. There would be lively interchanges, and sometimes a peasant from a small village would be stimulated to a new appreciation for the richness of his own past as it lay buried in the debris near his farmland or town. Ironically, however, these were also the days when antiquities were carted off in great numbers to enhance the museum collections of the west. The treasures of the museums in London, Paris, Berlin, New York, and Chicago were acquired in large part during this period. The nationalizing of most of the countries has subsequently reduced such possibilities, and excavated objects now are controlled by principles of ownership and acquisition established by such international bodies as UNESCO.

Both the extent and limit of the humanism of this period are suggested in the previous paragraph. If we were to seek for the spirit behind the archaeology of this period—the kind described so lucidly by the late C.W. Ceram in Gods, Graves and Scholars—we would have to identify it with the desire on the part of western archaeologists to experience as closely as the remains would allow the great civilizations of the past and their cultural productivity. Each new discovery introduced new excitement as it helped to unravel the mystery of the past, and each novel piece of evidence promised to bring the ancient peoples that much closer to us. Imagination and the ability to identify were prime qualities necessary for this kind of endeavor. For Heinrich Schliemann, the admirer of the ancient Greeks, the search for Troy and the uncovering of Mycenae and Tiryns became an epic quest. Similarly, the Egyptologist epigrapher spending months and years attempting to bring to light yet one more temple text could not but hope that his work would fill out a hidden aspect of the fascinating people of the Nile. A similar enthusiasm would overtake biblical scholars with the discovery in 1947 of the incredible
Dead Sea Scrolls, which promised to put them into touch with people of the world of Judaism and the New Testament.

The humanism motivating this kind of work was real and often expressed. Inevitably it was more oriented toward history and for that reason was also limited. History is more often concerned with the records of leaders, kings, warriors, and heroes, the so-called "makers of history." More likely than not, ancient texts that might be preserved would tell us of that segment of the society, but would leave us with little about what it was like to be an ordinary human being. What was chosen as subject matter for the wall inscriptions at Luxor in Egypt was certainly related to the Pharaohs and their religious and political needs, even though the Egyptian monarchs were thought to embody the people as a whole. In the excavation of sites it was a natural response to pass quickly through the poor remains of common people and to expend greater effort on the palace of a king or a royal temple, particularly since it might well be that in such structures written remains would appear. Benefactors supporting excavation might also be inclined to donate sums to expeditions promising more impressive results. Thus one would have to conclude that the humanism of classically based archaeology had its limitations, self-imposed by the character of its interests. While this should not denigrate its contributions to us, which indeed have been great, it remained for other kinds of experiments in the field to open new vistas in archaeological work and meaning.

It is to the second stream of archaeological activity that we owe a special debt for new insights which only recently have come to be recognized for their novel and humanizing effect on the field. The extent of this novelty is found in the expression sometimes used, the "new archaeology," and its impact is even referred to as revolutionary (Martin, 1971). Simply put, this type of archaeology is more closely allied with anthropology than history, though it does not ignore the latter (Deetz, 1967:3). Indeed, it can be said that classical archaeology is going through significant changes as a result of its meeting with this second stream of work, as will be seen below.

Actually, this second kind of archaeology is not really new, for it had its beginnings in the previous century and frequently operated alongside the classical approach. Nor is it entirely accurate to suggest that the two streams have only recently begun to interact, since neither approach has been unaware of the contributions of the other. In any case, the works of two of the nineteenth century's most brilliant explorers and theorists were of special importance for the origin of this type of archaeology, that of Darwin on man and of Lyell on geology. Darwin's books on the origin of species and the descent of man were based on deductions drawn from the observation of living representatives of the animal and human species. His work, nonetheless, offered a dimension which would not fail to be of importance to archaeological activity. When early human skeletal finds began to come to light in various areas of Europe, the Orient, the Near East, and, more recently, Africa, Darwin's theory appeared to receive independent confirmation, just as the finds were more readily understandable in the light of his construction. The studies of Sir Charles Lyell, such as his Principles of Geology (1830-33) on the stratification of the earth's layers, synthesized a further indispensable tool for archaeology, by making available a means to test the relative ages of finds sealed in their specific strata. Neither of the two streams of archaeology, as they continue today, can do so without careful attention to soil layers from top to bottom in an investigated area.

As mentioned earlier, anthropological archaeology became especially important for the study of human groups from whom there are no written records. Usually this is referred to as the study of prehistoric cultures, a categorizing which assumes that the term historic culture should be reserved for those peoples from whom we have written remains, and who have, therefore, left us some documentation about their societies. But what of peoples whose traces are preserved only in the muted leftovers of their dwellings, campfires, seeds, pottery, flints, and in the burial of their dead? For these the approach was necessarily different. There were no texts with which to attempt to correlate the archaeological strata, no written documents to be expected among the archaeological finds. Yet the right kinds of questions and objectives, appropriate to these distinctive data, could lead to work as valuable in its results as the uncovering of thousands of written texts at a great historical site. This kind of archaeology would introduce questions about the life patterns of peoples, not merely those holding primary positions and determining history, but also common people. It would examine burial traditions, not only in search of artifactual and ceramic remains but also of kinship patterns and family groupings and their effect upon social organization. It would also attempt to obtain data supporting hypotheses about economic organization, the effects of food gathering or production, and the role of religion as an integrative force.

The interpretation of prehistoric assemblages in southwestern Europe, including the possible significance of the cave paintings at Lascaux and Altamira, could scarcely have been carried on successfully apart
The new kind of archaeology will be “ecological in the broadest sense. It will attempt to establish the living patterns of the people as a whole, and their interaction with environmental determinants.”

from such an approach. Similarly, the significant material of Palaeolithic man from Mount Carmel in Palestine, excavated by the British archaeologist of prehistory, Dorothy Garrod, could only be adequately synthesized in such an interpretive context. In this respect North American archaeology has more recently had a special impact. An impressive number of archaeologists in this country, dedicated to the exploration of lost cultures of the New World, have refined the approaches of anthropological archaeology to a degree that can rightly be called revolutionary (Binford, 1962). An amazing example of what is attainable by such methods is that achieved at the Theodore Koster Farm Site in Illinois, with its more than fifteen defined strata reaching back to nearly 8000 B.C. The importance of discoveries of this magnitude in North America can hardly be passed over by anyone sensitive to the history of this region, a matter to which we shall return below.

AT THIS POINT IT IS WELL FOR THE WRITER, as one bred in the classical tradition, to describe some of the personal agony and ecstasy of encountering the “new archaeology.” My initial experience of field work took place in the summer of 1963 at a large and important biblical site west of the Jordan River. The excavations conducted at this site were some of the best-planned and directed of the previous decade. The methods employed included strict stratigraphic digging and careful recording and photographing. They were based on the field approach developed by the renowned Sir Mortimer Wheeler (Wheeler, 1954) and one of his illustrious successors, Kathleen Kenyon. The results of this work, and that of subsequent seasons, are still in the process of being studied and prepared for final publication. The main information obtained was a thorough history of the site through a number of important historic periods between ca. 2800 B.C. and ca. 1200 A.D. We were able, for example, to reconstruct the formidable character of the earliest city between 2800 and 2900 B.C., during which time it was surrounded by a thick defensive wall in the manner typical of many other cities of this period. During the Middle Bronze Age, especially in its latter part (1700 - 1550 B.C.), the site was dominated by a people called the Hyksos, who built a large fortress in a style of architecture found also at other Palestinian sites. The remains from the age of Solomon are especially noteworthy, including a shrine area where many objects used for religious purposes were discovered in the burned debris of a building still partly preserved. The destruction is no doubt that recorded in I Kings 14:25-26, to be attributed to the Pharaoh Shishak. The date of the event is commonly held to be ca. 918 B.C. Above this destruction there were materials such as broken walls, buildings, and pits from Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, and Arab times.

What the previous description shows is that our finds were chiefly of historical significance. It is that kind of data that we were seeking and we were not disappointed. When this material begins to be published (the first volume will appear shortly), it will be of considerable importance for the history of a significant biblical site. At the same time, it will tell the story of mainly ruling groups at the site, and the buildings in which they lived. It will not clarify much about the life patterns of the people, since this was not a major objective of the expedition. All of which illustrates that an archaeological team turns up data largely in terms of the goals it has set for itself.

By contrast, a second area has recently become important and is the focus for future plans. It has also provoked considerable rethinking of objectives and procedure. Along the southeast plain of the Dead Sea, the writer and a colleague discovered a series of Early Bronze Age sites during a survey in 1973. These sites have special biblical significance for spatial and temporal reasons. Spatially they are located in that very area where both ancient tradition and modern scholarship have preferred to situate the biblical “cities of the plain,” Sodom and Gomorrah being the best known (Gen. 14:2). Temporally the fact that they are all datable by pottery evidence to the Early Bronze Age (3100-2100 B.C.) also speaks for possible connections with the seemingly old traditions of these cities preserved in the Book of Genesis. This was already noted by W.F. Albright, who in 1924 led the expedition that discovered one of the five sites, and by the late Paul Lapp, who excavated at the latter between 1965 and 1967. Future excavation here will have a significant bearing on these sites and their relation to Old Testament history.

However, the possibility of such connections with biblical history, as important as these may be, are not the only reasons the sites are important, if the perspective of anthropological archaeology is taken into consideration. Lapp’s exploration has already shown that they reflect one of the most important transitions in the life of ancient man, that from earlier village and open-air settlement to urbanism. Several of the sites will have important data on this problem, since they contain evidence for a pre-urban settlement pattern dating from ca. 3100 to 2850 B.C., followed by an urban period from ca. 2850 to 2200 B.C. At the very end of the latter period the urbanized citadels at each of the sites, with the possible exception of one, were terminated by destruction.

It has become clear in the planning for excavation at these sites that only an interdisciplinary approach can do justice to the many problems and fascinating chal-
lenges of these sites and the region as a whole. Since previous excavation at one of the sites brought forth no evidence whatsoever of written remains, we are compelled to consider seriously the field methods of a more anthropologically based archaeology. Our main objective will be to reconstruct the life patterns of the people of the southeast plain of the Dead Sea during the long period beginning about 3150 B.C. and terminating about 2100 B.C. This goal will include determining changes in social and political organization, the manner in which the Dead Sea flat land was exploited for the production of an adequate food supply, and perhaps even such problems as family patterns and social groupings during this period. Ultimately historical questions will arise, and we will attempt to establish whether the Dead Sea population was a satellite of Mesopotamian civilization, from which some of the early impulses toward urban life proceeded.

A brief look at the basic staff thus far gathered for the excavation will tell something of the nature of the work to be undertaken. An indispensable member of the team will be a geologist, whose work will consist of examining varied geomorphic features of the southeast plain and their impact on human settlement, as well as the way natural resources were utilized by settlers in the area. A physical anthropologist will study the vast numbers of burials of three of the sites. By examining patterns within burials it may also be possible to draw inferences regarding kinship or family grouping, and perhaps even intra-marriage (endogamous) or extra-marriage (exogamous) customs among the population. The search for cereal remains in soil samples will reveal basic diets of the people in this area, and a palaeoagronomist will be of importance for this work. Similarly, the expedition will have a specialist in ancient flint and stone tool making, who will help to analyze technologies necessary for the agriculture practiced in this region. For pottery making, a ceramic technologist will search for clay beds to determine sources used in pottery making. He will also attempt to find several modern potters in the area, to study the relation of their craft to that of ancient potters in this region (Johnston, 1975). All in all, this kind of archaeology will be ecological in the broadest sense. It will attempt to establish the living patterns of the people as a whole, and their interaction with environmental determinants.

It is this kind of archaeology, more closely co-ordinated with the rhythms of personal and social life, that has within it new and important humanizing tendencies. Its aim is to understand the dynamics of the life patterns of the ancient people, to identify with them in their quest for life and meaning, and to attain that kind of knowledge that may be helpful to our own self-understanding, in that our patterns of work and leisure have, in many ways, emerged from those of our ancient predecessors. In any case, if our aim through archaeology is to try to understand a people quite removed from us in time as well as custom, this type of investigation promises much for such a quest. In doing so, it also advances us beyond a limited set of historical questions. It may be well to sum up this section by quoting from a well-known historian of ancient Assyria, who has also reflected on the matter we have been treating here:

If the new directions here surveyed mean that Assyriology will eventually move away from the humanities and nearer to cultural anthropology, I shall shed no tear. The humanities have never been successful in treating alien civilizations with that tender care and deep respect that such an undertaking demands. Their conceptual tools are geared to integration on their own terms, and to assimilation along Western standards (Oppenheim, 1964:30).

Although this statement is somewhat more extreme than I would prefer to make, it nonetheless exhibits the rethinking that has been going on on a broad scale.

II

THE IMPACT OF WHAT HAS THUS FAR BEEN discussed on the Arts and Sciences is far-reaching. The first point to be made has been suggested already in some of the discussion above, the interdisciplinary character of the "new archaeology." Stated positively this means that archaeological investigation may frequently offer itself as a point of coalescence for various disciplines to make their distinctive contribution and to learn from each other in seeking a more wholistic interpretation.

The dehumanization felt in the educational process in our time is due to a number of tendencies. One, well-known and much-analyzed, is the increased specialization of the disciplines and their separation from each other. Not only has this produced fragmented interpretations of man; it has also been especially unsatisfying to modern people facing perilous problems and looking for the affirmation of values. Awareness of the results of such a course has led to efforts at interdisciplinary programs in colleges and universities. However, the latter have often seemed to involve the humanities, such as religion, philosophy, or the personal and social sciences, while other areas, such as the physical sciences, were left to the side. The experimental developments in the field of archaeology outlined above have the distinct advantage of inviting collaboration from a variety of usually isolated disciplines around the subject of man and his society.

One consequence of disciplinary specialization is the "new vocationalism," the mark of campuses in the seventies. Academic people specialize because the sheer amount of material in a given area is such that to attain even a partial mastery requires full-time concentration. Vocationally oriented students specialize to secure maximum advantage in a pressing job market. Both move-
"The study of an ancient culture through archaeology can increase that sense of identification which may make us critical of subtle or overt forms of cultural domination and suppression."

A third and final point follows from this. Archaeology can assist human beings in attaining a greater tolerance of differing life styles. This may sound platitudinous at a time when the Smithsonian Institution has announced a salvage program of filming non-western cultures before the last vestiges of cultural diversity fade into oblivion. Diversity is not manageable and thus it does not fit neatly into a social and economic organization based on a high degree of conformity. Nonetheless, with such an almost insuperable difficulty facing us in a complexified world, the person who can empathize with a life-pattern quite different from his own is apt to contribute something hopeful to the world. We have a particular difficulty with this in the United States. Robert Braidwood has written of the "flat" conception of the past possessed by the average person in our country (Daniel, 1967:16). That is to say, we are largely ignorant even of the cultural history of our own continent. Until recently large parts of the American populace were but dimly aware of the various Indian cultures whose remains are copious, as North American archaeologists are discovering. Even less so have we been sensitive to the continuance of Indian groups and cultures to our own time.

On a world-wide scale, the impingements of advancing technology upon more traditional societies is one of the facts of our time. This does not imply that the west is to be credited as the inventor of technology, nor that it is the first time disruptions of this sort have occurred. Nonetheless, the impact is surely present, and not a few societies are faced with inescapable influences stemming from the west which challenge long-established lifeways. As an illustration close to home, Mumford cites the colorful figure of the hunter in Cooper's Leatherstocking Tales, who watches at a distance as new settlers clear the ancient woods, instigating a life never before known. This pattern has been repeated many times in history, and not least in our own. But, if in our global village we today are responsible for the quick upset of long-established ways of life, through industrial expansion or military intervention or manipulation, at least some among our educated people should have been challenged to develop a sensitiveness to what this means for people and eventually also for the understanding of our own humanity. The study of an ancient culture through archaeology can increase that sense of identification which may make us critical of subtle or overt forms of cultural domination and suppression.

III

SUCH THOUGHTS BRING US CLOSE TO A form of humanism to which I would like to add the qualifier "Christian." When the term humanism is employed, as has been done in this article, it is used not in an idealist or naturalistic sense. There is the recognition of the
fractured nature of the human family through its long
and variegated history and development and its need
for redemption from the powers of death and destruc-
tion which have seemed to be ever present, though
in differing forms and expressions. Viewed in this way,
the matters which have been discussed have importance
for theology. One contribution of this kind of investiga-
tion is that it can serve to keep theology and theologians
from abstracting man from his existence as the object of
the protection and love of God the Creator and Redeem-
er. Archaeology puts us close indeed, not to humanity
in general but to human beings. From it we learn of the
struggles of human beings for survival, the encounters
with death and always imminent destruction, while
through their artistic remains we recognize the creative
potentialities of the creatures of God. And we learn also
of the earth as a gift of the Creator to mankind, and the
invitation of God to man to make good but sensible use
of His earth. At the same time we learn, even as the Old
Testament seems to have been painfully aware
(especially Genesis 4), that the increasing technological
and urban advancements of the human family were not an
unmixed good, but inevitably brought new forms of
human exploitation and perversity. It is an unfortunate
viewpoint, and one without basis, that ancient man and
his society were more savage, and that the movement
has been upward from barbarianism to advanced mo-
dernity. That schema collapses in the face of archaeo-
logical inquiry, and doing so, prepares theology to do a
more realistic analysis of the human condition today
in which it desires to proclaim the redemptive act of
God in Christ.

In the Middle East the great contributions of archae-
ology in the past have often illuminated the Bible. This
massive agglomerate of material is still coming in and
the full weight of its effect remains as a continuing chal-
lenge. As we move into the “new archaeology” also in
the lands of the Bible, the prospects for theology become
even broader, for they open to us new dimensions about
the depth of the human family and its diversified pres-
ence on the earth. In no less a way, a similar anthropo-
logical archaeology in North and South America, to
say nothing of the African continent, Russia, the Bal-
kans, or the lands and islands of the Orient, opens up
an abundance of new problems. I do not myself know yet
how to assimilate all of this into an interpretation that
can do justice to it theologically, but certainly this will
be a major task in the years ahead. In a sense one could
be grateful to the Creator for opening up to us in new
ways the “wonder” of His world and the creature we
have learned from Him to call man.

Confronting this, I experience a faith-reaction which
may be somewhat akin to that encountered by Paul of
Tarsus when he was given his new insights not only into
the Gospel, but also into the relation of the Gospel to
the vastness of the world of his time. If the Old Testa-
ment was essentially confined to seeing the meaning of
the divine work for Israel as a chosen people, as a schol-
ar like Harry Orlinsky reminds us in numerous arti-
cles, then the man from Tarsus was shaken up by the
knowledge that God’s work in Christ was directed to the
human family beyond Israel as well as to Israel. We can-
not exaggerate the impact of that insight. Thus Paul
went forth into the oikoumene of Rome, and no doubt
experienced some theological anxiety in the process.
For Paul it was a whole new horizontal dimension he
found himself in touch with, not only by the revelation
of Christ but also by the exposure to the new worlds of
his missionary journeys. Although not exactly parallel,
perhaps for us the new experience is vertical, accenting
the depth of time of man’s existence on the earth. For
the human remains, being brought to light as they are
in various parts of the world, force upon us new prob-
lems with which to wrestle. What theology has to say to
such discoveries will be a prime matter on the agenda of
the future.

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April, 1975
FOR ALMOST THREE YEARS THE DISCIPLES had been with their rabbi, Jesus, or, without summer breaks, about eight semesters. Jesus had taught them, demonstrated his power, exposed them to the divine mystery of the redemption. He had led them into the Scriptures. Yet the Passion of Christ caught them unawares, and the Resurrection was beyond belief. St. Luke tells of the bewildered disciples shortly after the Resurrection coming together for the thin comfort of fellowship with friends and acquaintances. But when Christ appeared, they were terrified; they thought they were seeing a ghost. When Jesus spoke to them, he found them perturbed, questioning, unconvinced, still wondering, for His presence seemed too good to be true.

Their minds could not comprehend what they had seen and heard and lived for three years, or even for three recent days. This was the human condition, not just dullness in peasant disciples. Our limited minds so frequently fail to comprehend what surrounds and happens to us. A learned friend once remarked that it is indeed a fortunate person who has one fresh, truly original idea in a year. We merely rearrange our ideas and then persuade ourselves that we are original. We resuffle old ideas like a pack of cards, and usually lack the good grace to cut the deck.

St. Peter called upon the poetry of Isaiah to depict another aspect of the human condition:

All mortals are like grass,
And their splendour like the flower of the field;
The grass withers, the flower falls.

Not only does man not comprehend, but his life is brief,
his kingdom, power, and glory ephemeral. Particularly in our neo-romantic age of extreme individualism we assume that our lifetime is the crowning age of history. The fulness of time, the fulness of knowledge, yea the fulness of Creation is reached in oneself or, if one is suitably modest and humble, in one's generation. It is the human condition.

All mortals are like grass,
And their splendour like the flower of the field;
The grass withers, the flower falls.

TIME MOVES SLOWLY, YET SEEMS ALSO TO rush by. Incomprehensible of his past, baffled by the present, apprehensive of his future, time-bound man is baffled by time. It is the human condition. And in the Incarnation Jesus assumed the human condition and its time-strictures; the Son of the Infinite became time-bound.

But the grand design of God in the resurrection of Christ was to free man from the incomprehending mind and the chains of time. When Christ appeared to the disciples in Jerusalem, says St. Luke,

he opened their minds to understand the Scriptures.
“This,” he said, “is what is written: that the Messiah is to suffer death and to rise from the dead on the third day, and that in his name repentance bringing the forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed to all nations. . . . You are the witnesses of all this.”

He opened their minds. What they had heard and seen for three years, and especially in three days, suddenly came into focus and assumed clarity and meaning. He opened their minds. What a vivid picture of illumination, indeed of the educational process, hangs in that sentence. Sight became insight.

Furthermore, so that the illumination of the mind should not be blinding, Christ would “send upon you my Father's gift” who (according to St. John) would “guide you into all truth.” Remembrance of things past, comprehension, unblinded eyes and unshrivelled minds, an understanding of the grand design of God would come with the Comforter's illumination.

This insight and knowledge transforms that being and leads to new action. St. Peter describes the change as a new birth, not of mortal parentage but of immortal, through the living and enduring word of God. Obedience to the truth will purify the soul, and the petty, selfish individual will become a loving person, not selfish, but selfless. Even the peculiarly academic sins will be purged, the backbiting, the slander and defamations, the set minds.

The condition of man is changed, not in the alluring but preposterous “withering away of the state” of Marx and Lenin, but “in sincere affection towards your brother Christians,” in a mind opened to the grand design divine, a mind freed from the shackles of time to the timeless love of God, a mind liberated from proud satisfactions and cynical boredom to a sense of amazement, of constant wonder, of joyful discovery.

All mortals are like grass,
And their splendour like the flower of the field;
The grass withers, the flower falls;
BUT THE WORD OF THE LORD ENDURES FOREVERMORE.

And this “word,” says St. Peter, is the word of the Gospel preached to you.
Gordon Grant, American (1875-?), *Drying out the Net (Net Overhaul)*, watercolor, 14-1/4 x 21". Gift in 1974 to the Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University by Mr. and Mrs. Fred A. Reddel.

THE CLASS OF THE 94th

The newly elected Democrat members of the U.S. House of Representatives are not just another group of freshman Congressmen. "They are different, first, as freshman 'classes' go, because they are a large group; one of the largest ever elected to the House. . . . There are at least three additional points to remember about the freshman Democrats. They appear to be change-oriented; the changes they prefer should be considered in context with recent developments in the House, and, finally, the changes they have helped to bring about may have significant institutional, procedural, and policy implications."

THEY HAVE DECIDED TO refer to themselves as the "Class of the 94th." Based on their voting record in the early days of the 94th Congress, there is little doubt in the minds of most students of the Congress that in several ways these seventy-five newly elected Democrat members of the U.S. House of Representatives have left and will continue to leave their collective imprint on Congressional affairs over the next two years; in fact, possibly far beyond the next two years. As a group they are different by who they are and by what they have already accomplished with regard to the patterning of influence in the House of Representatives. Whatever they and their colleagues finally accomplish, and the legislative-institutional record is far from complete, they are not just another group of freshman Congressmen.

They are different, first, as freshman "classes" go, because they are a large group; one of the largest ever elected to the House. Collectively they represent more than one in four of the House Democrats, a fact not to be overlooked by the majority party's leadership. Elected in many cases from "swing" districts, they will be under considerable pressure to carry out many of the promises made during the campaign. Interestingly, the Southern members of the class are of a slightly different mold from those generally elected from the South. In many instances representing areas of the South experiencing some of the same urban problems experienced in the districts of Northern Democrats, it is expected they will represent a more national than regional outlook in their voting in the House. This would only seem to add to the difficulties of the more senior Southern Representatives who have traditionally voted more conservatively than their Northern party colleagues. It also could mean added trouble for a comparatively conservative President who will be looking for legislative support from whatever quarter he can find it.

I think there are at least three additional points to remember about the freshman Democrats. They appear to be change-oriented; the changes they prefer should be considered in context with recent developments in the House, and, finally, the changes they have helped to bring about may have significant institutional, procedural, and policy implications.

Change in the Caucus

FIRST, FROM EARLY INDICATIONS, they are a more "reform" or, if you prefer, "change" oriented group than were their predecessors. On key votes taken in the House Democratic Caucus these younger and generally more liberal freshmen combined their voting strength with the more senior members of the liberal oriented Democratic Study Group to provide the margin of success on key motions to change the House Democratic Party's rules—rules changes which would ultimately challenge senior members in key positions in the chamber. Of the many votes taken in Caucus, there are three which are particularly significant: the vote on (1) selection of committee chairmen, (2) the method for filling Democratic vacancies on Democratic Caucus these younger generally more liberal freshmen combined their voting strength with the more senior members of the liberal oriented Democratic Study Group to provide the margin of success on key motions to change the House Democratic Party's rules—rules changes which would ultimately challenge senior members in key positions in the chamber. Of the many votes taken in Caucus, there are three which are particularly significant: the vote on (1) selection of committee chairmen, (2) the method for filling Democratic vacancies on standing committees, and (3) the method for filling Democrat vacancies on these committees. Although House Democrats had voted in their 1972 pre-session Caucus meetings to select standing committee chairmen by Caucus vote, the method for filling Democratic standing committee chairmen as well as filling Democratic Party vacancies on these committees remained with the

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Democratic Party members serving on the Ways and Means Committee. Further, despite the Caucus vote required on chairmanships, there had been no violation of the more than sixty year old norm of “seniority.”

Although liberal House Democrats had mumbled for some time about the role of Democrat Ways and Means Committee members in nominating Democrats to standing committees, it was the all too apparent night-time activities of Ways and Means Committee chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark) which probably contributed more than any single event to triggering the votes which would place in the hands of the Steering and Policy Committee, an arm of the House Democratic elective leadership, the power to nominate Democrats to standing committees. Their decision, in turn, would be subject to the final approval of the full Caucus, a Caucus increasingly dominated by members of the Democratic Study Group and the newly elected freshmen.

The loss of the nominating power coupled with the vote to expand the size of the Ways and Means Committee from twenty-five to thirty-seven members has meant a substantial loss of power for the Committee. Not only does it mean a diminished role in selecting members of other standing committees, but it also means the Caucus and the Democratic leadership can work to “stack” one of the most prestigious committees in the Congress, the committee which has traditionally exercised the House’s constitutional power to write tax legislation.

It probably also was in large part Representative Mills’ life-style which provided the young members of the Democratic Caucus with the opportunity for actually carrying out the successful attack on one of the more sacred institutions of the Congress—the seniority method for selecting chairmen of standing committees. Although Mills apparently had convinced the people in his Arkansas district of his sincerity in “taking the cure,” some of his House party colleagues remained just a bit skeptical of his ability to direct with a steady hand the Ways and Means Committee. Just as the House Democrats had not accepted the flamboyant Bimini lifestyle of the late Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D-N.Y.), neither would they condone Mills’ escapades with a Washington burlesque performer—the “Tidal Basin Bombshell.” Thus Mills became the first House standing committee chairman in more than sixty years to lose his chairmanship despite his seniority on the Committee. In his place the Caucus selected Representative Al Ullman (D-Ore.), significantly the next most senior Democrat on the Committee.

Although the move against Mills had been expected, what proved surprising was the breadth of the attack against seniority. The chairman of the Committees on Agriculture, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, and House Administration all came under attack by the Caucus. Of the four, only Representative Wayne Hays (D-Ohio) successfully retained his chairmanship of the House Administration Committee. Despite the fact the other three were replaced by committee members ranked second in committee seniority, I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that the position of the standing committees and their chairmen will not be quite the same for a long time. The Caucus votes on selecting committee chairmen and filling committee vacancies represent two of the most significant moves in recent House history to centralize influence in the majority party Caucus and, potentially, the elective leadership.

This centralizing trend was made even more complete by the Caucus vote which empowered the Speaker to select, with Caucus approval, the Democrat members of the House Rules Committee. Instrumental in scheduling and outlining the terms of debate on legislation, the Rules Committee, particularly its conservative members, had long been criticized for delaying or killing legislation which enjoyed widespread House support. As a result of this particular Caucus vote both the Speaker and the members of the Rules Committee were placed on notice that members of the Caucus would no longer tolerate the Committee’s obstruction in the face of popular support for legislation.

In sum, the newly elected Democrats have played an important if not instrumental role in significantly altering an institutionalized pattern of fragmented decision-making and substituting for it a substantial movement toward a “more responsible parties” or majoritarian model.

Change in the House

THE ABOVE CHANGES, SIGNIFICANT as they might be, take on added importance when placed in context with other recent developments in the House. To a great degree these changes are explained by differences between former President Nixon and the Congress, first, over policy priorities and, second, over methods for achieving these policies. These differences were finally highlighted by several “confrontations” between the former President and Congress. Before his resignation Mr. Nixon witnessed the military powers of the Commander-in-Chief substantially limited, and

1. Although Representative Adam Powell lost his chairmanship of the Committee on Education and Labor, he had first been “stripped of his seniority by the House Democratic Caucus.

2. Interestingly, one of the first occasions on which the Caucus translated this into policy demands involved the President’s tax bill. The Caucus requested the Speaker to instruct the Rules Committee to issue an open rule, a rule permitting amendments on the floor of the House. The ultimate purpose of the Caucus was to offer an amendment which would eliminate the oil depletion allowance. The Rules Committee issued the open rule, the amendment was offered on the floor and was adopted over the objections of Ways and Means Committee chairman Al Ullman.

Despite his concern for retaining a strong Presidency, he also saw the President's power to impound previously authorized and appropriated funds sharply curtailed. Finally, for the first time in more than one hundred years, articles of impeachment were introduced, debated, and voted on in committee.

I suspect it also was in part a consequence of poor legislative-executive relations as well as a generally deteriorated policy-making position which led the Congress to overhaul its own policy machinery. To this end two important pieces of legislation were enacted: the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.5

Under provisions of the first of these acts committee staffing was improved for both the majority and minority parties, information systems were improved in the Congressional Research Service, and members of the Executive Branch were obligated, when requested, to provide information on federal programs currently in operation. Significantly, the proceedings of the Congress, particularly the House, became more “visible” through provisions which limit the “teller” system,6 through requiring publication of roll call votes taken in committee, and requiring that committee and requiring that committee hearings be open to the public unless a majority of the committee decides to go into executive session. The record over the past four years indicates a substantial increase in the per cent of open hearings conducted in the House. Whereas in 1971 41 per cent of the House hearings were closed, in 1974 only 8 per cent were closed to the public.

Among other concerns, the second of the acts clearly indicates the intent of Congress to regain from the Executive greater control over the development of spending priorities as well as the final use of appropriated funds. In addition to changing the national government's fiscal year to parallel more nearly the Congressional calendar, Budget Committees are established in each of the chambers which are mandated to co-ordinate Congressional fiscal processes which have heretofore been fragmented among dozens of authorizing as well as revenue raising and appropriating committees. A Congressional Budget Office created under the act will provide sophisticated fiscal analysis for the Budget Committees. Looking to the day when the CBO and the Budget Committees will be fully operative, optimists even anticipate the Congress to be able to effectively set “responsible” expenditure ceilings as well as play a stronger role in establishing policy priorities.

**Implications**

**ALL OF THE ABOVE SEEM TO INDICATE BUSINESS IS NOT BEING CONDUCTED AS USUAL IN THE HOUSE.** Congressional turnover, undoubtedly the single most important ingredient necessary for policy change, has occurred. The Democratic Caucus has come to life as a policy arm of the party. Senior and generally more conservative House Democratic leaders have been placed on notice by the party’s novitiates they will, if necessary, answer to a majority of the Caucus. In the House as a whole policy and high constitutional issues have been debated and voted upon in a far more open and visible way than would have been thought possible three or four years ago. And both chambers demonstrated their awareness that something had to be done to improve the policy machinery of Congress. Before being carried away with excitement associated with Congressional change, it should be noted that in politics there normally is a quid for each quo. For each intended effect resulting from a conscious choice there frequently are several unintended consequences. For changes in the seniority system, increased visibility of House action, and influence centralization subtle trade-offs undoubtedly will be made.

As an example, take seniority. No doubt there are cases in which obdurate and conservative committee chairmen ignored majorities on their committees as well as in the House. Yet, these same chairmen frequently achieved prestige, legislative expertise, and a more independent power base which, in combination, permitted them to make “unpopular” decisions others in the House preferred not to make. Who, for example, would for one minute have expected the late Congressman from Harlem, Mr. Powell, to have succeeded in holding up federal aid to education until “anti-discrimination” amendments had been added to the legislation were it not for the House’s unwritten “rule” of seniority, the teller system, and extreme tolerance for decisions made in committee?

Although I regard increased visibility of House action and centralization of influence in the Democratic Caucus as two of the more substantive developments, they each present potential problems for the leadership in developing and maintaining party unity as well as for the careful drafting of legislation. Based on previous research we know the problem of developing party unity increases with the visibility of an issue.7

Substantial, forceful, yet cautious leadership by the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Caucus chair-

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5. PL 91-510 and PL 93-344, respectively.
6. A substantial amount of the House business had been conducted using “teller” votes. This involved Congressmen lining up and passing down the aisles of the House to register their vote on a question. No record other than whether the motion was adopted or defeated was kept. Under the terms of the Reorganization Act, one-fifth of the members present can demand “tellers with clerks.” This obligates members present desiring to vote to pass down the aisles and hand clerks colored pieces of paper on which appear their names and positions on a motion. This position is then made public.
7. Apparently other conditions which have a bearing on party unity are whether the vote is on a procedural or substantive motion, constituency pressures, and activities of the
man, coupled with restraint by members of the Caucus will be necessary if the House is not to be governed by a headless horseman.

Further, great care must be exercised in differentiating between important policy decisions which, in my estimation, belong either in the Caucus or in committee on instructions from the Caucus, on the one hand, and, on the other, indiscriminate “rewriting” of legislation in Caucus. The latter practice coupled with scant study of legislation in committee has frequently been the practice in American state legislatures. To the extent this becomes the case, and there are substantial systematic differences between Congressional and state legislative committee systems to be remembered, increased time will be required in debating, amending, and “polishing” legislation on the floor of the House. The Democratic Caucus cannot become a substitute for soundly functioning standing committees. Visibility for unity, centralization for effective committee work are possible trade-offs, as is added chamber conflict for budgetary change. Already, it seems, authorizing committees are performing pretty much as usual in the expenditure ceiling setting game they traditionally play with the Appropriations Committees. However, both

8. Republican Congressmen are concerned, for example, that one-third of the members of a committee will constitute a quorum and that minority party staffing has been reduced despite the terms of the Legislative Reorganization Act. Most students of legislative processes would question the wisdom of each of these decisions if competent committee work is a chamber objective.


groups of committees are taking exception to requests of the Budget Committees. Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees, in particular, view the Budget Committees as “interlopers” on their jurisdictional “turf.” Although the Budget Committees will not be fully operative this fiscal year, it seems safe to say that a good deal of change will be required before they realize their full potential in responsibly establishing budget ceilings as well as helping Congress to play a greater role in setting national policy priorities.

The class of the 94th has obviously earned a place in Congressional history. Their size, their lack of reticence, their programmatic orientation have enabled the newly elected Democrats to bring interesting times to the House of Representatives. The legislative record they leave behind for the American people remains to be written.

8. Republican Congressmen are concerned, for example, that one-third of the members of a committee will constitute a quorum and that minority party staffing has been reduced despite the terms of the Legislative Reorganization Act. Most students of legislative processes would question the wisdom of each of these decisions if competent committee work is a chamber objective.
Farces
Here and There

Zurich—New York. I HAVE ALWAYS thought that one day a daring dramatist would write a sequel to A Doll's House, particularly now with the Lib Movement on everyone's mind. Nora, who walked out on her past and slammed the door behind her, has often occupied my mind. I have often asked myself: Was she really so simple-minded or unrealistic as not to know that for­
gery can easily have serious conse­quences whatever noble motif may have prompted it? After having shown her stuffy husband that she could leave him and her innocent children, would she not ring the bell again and say to Helmer: "Hello, I'm back. Now that you know what I'm able and was about to do, it is up to you to change your attitude, or I'll leave you really forever!"
But could a man like Helmer change overnight? Not in 1879, nor in 1975. I would not think too much of another try to test their failure. Since she said: "I have no idea of what is going to become of me," it might be interesting to trace her fate, to see what could have happened to her twenty years later. Why has no dramatist as yet thought of it?

Ephraim Kishon, world-famous humorist, dared to attack a far more difficult topic. The many improba­bilities in Romeo and Juliet made him think that not everything had to go wrong all the time. He assumed that the final potion was not poison and the star-crossed lovers remained married happily ever after. But there's the rub! How turn marriages out after such a passionate courtship? How about looking at their life thirty years later? Kishon asked himself.

Obviously, this is a magnificent idea for a farce, and Ephraim Kishon, being not only a born Hungarian now writing in Hebrew, but also a born humorist, dramatized this notion. He called his farce: It Was the Lark. Kishon may be one of the best-selling humorists in the world and prove that humor is not a matter of geography. I doubt this, and certainly it is a question of the mind and heart. Kishon wrote film scenarios full of Jewish gallows humor in which the clowning and wit were marked by a tragic undertone. I missed this, the immediacy and a sense of life, in his comedy.

The Hungarians have always had a knack for dramatic writing, from Molnar to Bus-Fekete. There was a jocular saying in the Forties when so many of them came to live in these States that only Hungarian writers could pass through the gates of Hollywood. This testifies to their writing skill, the lightness of their minds, and the facile fibers of their hearts. Kishon has a great deal of all this.

In a certain way too much of some of it. A sense of humor makes sense only when balanced by a sense of the tragic. There is much to the cliche of the sad eyes beneath the clown's mask. Kishon and his charac­ters on stage clown while their eyes sparkle too much. You cannot help noticing how the actors enjoy the way they can indulge in their horseplay and get away with giggles and laughs while having murdered the sublime sense of the comic. Kishon hits too often below the belt of the spectator's intelligence and triumphs with the help of banalities and trivia.

Turning the tables is one of farce's favorite devices, and Kishon makes good use of it the very moment the curtain goes up on his farce. Romeo, in our mind the youthful hero of passionate love, gets up from the bed where he lies with Juliet and, when he rises with a hot water bottle in his hand—as a new love symbol and the great attachment of his mature years—hits us right between our cliche' eyes and stimulates our imagination. But he immediately stumbles, and our expectations of a more sophisticated farce is at once lowered to the burlesque. But when Juliet wakes up, a rather barren stretch of a domestic scene ensues over coffee, dishwashing, and radishes, which Romeo seems to like a great deal. The comic effect is kindled again when we learn that these truly star-crossed lovers begot a girl, now a modern-day brat of a teen­ager, whose name is Lucretia and who is called Luky. You smile or giggle again, perhaps depending on age and sex, when Luky tells her parents: "What do you two know about love?" and exits bubble-gum­ning.

Kishon had the good idea of intro­ducing the old nurse, at this point of course tooth- and mindless, and the even funnier idea of having the culprit of their marriage, Friar Laurence, appear at the height of his senility. These ideas could have worked beautifully if something funny had occurred to the author. It is too simple and simple-minded to have the Friar confuse Romeo with Hamlet and Juliet with Lady Macbeth. And the repetition of such high-school jokes does not make things better nor more amusing.

The comic situation improved with the appearance of Shakespeare (and the actor of the Zürcher Schauspielhaus where I witnessed Kishon's rise and fall as a dramatist was the spitting image of how we know Shakespeare or think we know him). He was naturally unhappy about his famous couple having taken mat­ters into their own hands, foiling his plot by drinking mineral water instead of poison. For a few mo­ments one could hope for a literary satire, but such hopes were soon drowned in trivia. The iambic verses the Bard uses not too skilfully, right­ly made Romeo, nicknamed Momo, remark: "And such a man dares pre­tending he wrote Hamlet!" (The lowest level of wit, by the way, was to relate Romeo's impotence to the general energy crisis.)

When the Bard wanted to elope with Luky, the one character he did
not create, the plotting no longer made any comic sense. Neither did many other dramaturgic notions: Shakespeare stepping out of his role and shaking hands with some members of the audience; nor the playing of a Tosca aria during the re-enactment of the final love scene when Shakespeare tries to turn the couple back into the lovers he originally envisioned. But his plotting is so clumsy again that they can easily trick him once more. At the end we are given to understand that their world-famous passion has gone the way of all marriages, but that, despite their quarrels about the realities of daily life, they will live together happily ever after.

Kishon's most brilliant idea was to write a three-character play for six persons, with Romeo miming Friar Laurence and Juliet masquerading as the old nurse as well as the young Lucretia. Two actors could show their metamorphic skill (and they did). On the other hand, these changes were an open invitation to the actors for a great deal of mugging (which the stage director Kishon was unable to control) and for filling the time needed for costume- and make-up changes with songs which did not rise above the situation.

THE WRITING OF FARCES is a tricky business. Kishon's concoction was presented at the Zürcher Schauspielhaus as a New Year's Eve performance, an occasion for which such clowning seems appropriate and justifiable. That it will continue in the repertory only proves the public's need to forget the world at the risk of the cheapest laugh.

This is what is referred to on Broadway as being "zany," as enjoying a blissful lunacy. Murray Schisgal is such a dramatist and his new play All Over Town exemplifies this category. Very much like Kishon he has what may be a wonderful idea, but, as a craftsman, he takes the easy way out. Comedy may very comfortably live on types, but both writers chose instead some stereotypes. What any comedy, and particularly the farce, kills is the obvious. Schisgal—without having the theatrical skill of a Neil Simon—always keeps an eye on the glib Broadway formulae. In order to prove a point he does not mind lowering his comedy to horseplay, even though his clowning is more sophisticated than Kishon's. Schisgal made the odd and unexpected triumph over cliche and logic in his best play so far, Luv.

He was not so lucky with All Over Town. The New York City Welfare Department is counselled by a neurotic, psychoanalyst who is supposed to help straighten out the more complex cases. One such case is an unemployed young man, or rather one self-employed in getting a number of women pregnant and their offspring put on welfare. An errand boy delivering a pair of shoes to the analyst's house is mistaken for the man-about-town. There is always some farcical material in mistaken identities and how a person caught up in something unexpected responds to the challenge of the new situation.

The appearance and sudden disappearance of a number of odd, eccentric characters through eleven doors on two levels—doors that incessantly seem to open and shut and thus inadvertently become a focal point of the plot—keep the goings-on fuzzy and muddled. Under the flimsiest pretext people come and go in a series of divergent actions, all behaving as if they were a part of the whole, while in reality they are self-contained nuts stretching the credulity of the dramatic threat to a thin point which time and again is fastened and bolstered by a variety of visual and verbal gags.

Economy in plotting is one of the great virtues of comedy-writing. Incoherence in the realm of the absurd does not necessarily work—or Samuel Beckett's visionary gift is needed in such a case. Even lunacy must have a touch of the sublime on stage and all clowning a purpose behind its masked mind. It simply is not true that a laugh is a laugh is a laugh. It must have meaning, depth, and wit.

April, 1975
The book is intended for Lutheran teachers and pastors as they face up to the responsibility of determining for themselves what is gold and what is dross in terms of their understanding of "The Word of God." Bretscher is uncompromising in his attitude which will only accept a "Word of God" that is "taught clearly and purely" (Luther's explanation of the first petition). He says that it will not do to regard the teachings of the cross-word merely as a matter of indifference or of Christian freedom under the Gospel. "The cross-word is the enemy of the Gospel. To permit it to stand unexposed and unchallenged is to tolerate error. We cannot consent to anything that compromises the pure doctrine of the Gospel or under­mines the clarity and authority of the Scriptures as our only rule and norm." Therefore, teachers cannot evade the testing of what they teach by passing the responsibility to pastors. Pastors cannot evade it by claiming to be "only a simple pas­tor" and "not a theologian." In fact, according to Bretscher, "Laymen and congregations cannot escape it by relying on the majority wisdom and authority of a convention."

According to Bretscher the very existence of the fiery conflict in the Missouri Synod testifies to the fact that there must be a dross mingled with the pure gold of the Word of God. In Chapter III he gives a clear and emphatic description of his definition of the Word of God: "Our true gold is the Gospel of the Cross which we have unfolded from the Scriptures at considerable length." (In Biblical usage and in Luther's Small Catechism, God's Word means essentially The Gospel, including also the antithetical "Law," accord­ing to Bretscher.) "By this Word, Christ receives His true honor as our Lord and only Savior, and our terrified hearts experience rest and comfort in Him alone. By this Word our gracious Father exalts us to be His children and heirs with Christ, promises to be our God, and invites us to serve Him and love one another. This is the Holy Spirit's Word, sealed and testified also in the sacra­ments. Its effect is faith, a clean heart and a right spirit within us, a new life, and the gathering of the Church into one Body as Christ's holy people." He says that this Gospel is and has always been Lutheran education's treasure and power and is the glory of our Synod's doctrinal position. And the grace of God has preserved it to us, so that to this day we delight to teach and proclaim it. He furthermore emphasizes that the Word is our Rock. It holds us firm and unshaken against every threat and fear, so that we dare to walk with our Lord even through His fire. It is our authentic gold, and by it we ourselves are pure gold in God's sight.

**MINGLED WITH THE GOLD** described above, however, there is also a dross. The dross is not, accord­ing to Bretscher, the use of the his­torical-critical method of Bible study. The real dross lies within our doctrine. Bretscher says: "It is mixed and fused with what we have called 'Synod's doctrinal position.' That is why the fire is so painful for us, and so incomprehensible." He suggests that Lutheran education has played a strong role in assur­ing us that our Synod possess the pure doctrine, thereby offering us the opportunity to measure the doctrine of other churches by our own. In the process we never suspected that ours might need serious testing al­so. We have felt that whatever our Synod taught must surely be "Script­ural and Confessional." Bretscher feels our recently adopted "Statement" implies as much in its very title. But now he asks, "What if the impurity our Lord intends to purge is inherent in the very 'doctrinal position' we are determined must not be changed? If His fire begins to expose that possibility to us, dare we resist its pain? Must we not rather praise God for His mercy, trust Him to do what He has in mind, and plead with Him to finish it quickly?"

Bretscher believes that "to the dross" (those who disagree with "The Word of God as Gospel" view­point) the Scriptures are gold in their own right, quite apart from the gold of their Gospel. He feels that they (the dross) regard Scripture as broader than the Gospel. Quoting from The Gospel and Scripture: The Interrelationship of The Material and Formal Principles in Lutheran Theology, A Report of the Com­mission on Theology and Church Relations of the LCMS, and A State­ment of Scriptural and Confessional Principles, Bretscher points out that we are told in these documents that the Scriptures contain also "information on other matters." Furthermore, we are told, "Chris­tians must also accept matters taught in the Scriptures which are not a part of the Gospel." "Thus" says Bretscher, "in the mind of the dross, the message which Christians must accept (to be true Christians) is more than Christ alone! It is more than 'The Gospel of the gracious justifi­cation of the sinner through faith in Jesus Christ.' The current attitude in Synod holds that anything and everything the Scriptures teach be­longs to our Synod's faith and con­fessions.

In his final chapter Bretscher pro­vides a clear and understandable harmonization of the "theological" aspects of Scripture with the "his­torical" as he comes to grips with the inevitable question: If the Scrip­tures are to be understood as "The Word of God" for the sake of its Gos­pel, what is the status of "the rest of Scripture" or of that Biblical content which is "not a part of the Gospel"? Bretscher offers the following solu­tion: He says we are not dealing with two "parts" of the Bible at all, but with two pervasive "realities." He calls the one reality "theological" (of God), and the other "historical" (of men). The theological reality Bretscher sees as a vertical line descending from heaven to earth. This line, marked by the cross, bears the Word of Christ to our hearts as from God Himself through the Spirit. The historical reality is then a horizontal line. We ourselves belong to this horizontal. "Our personal historicity is not different in kind.
from the historicity of our forefathers who wrote the Bible, who heard and read its message in each original setting and occasion, and about whom the Scriptures speak." Bretscher sees the two lines intersecting. The vertical cuts through the horizontal, both within the Scriptures and within ourselves, whenever and wherever the Word of God is spoken and heard by human beings. At the point of the intersecting Bretscher says, "The 'sparks' of the Spirit's power fly, as it were. We experience that power wherever that Word of the Gospel, through preaching, teaching, sacrament, or The Scriptures themselves, burst into Spirit and life for us." Bretscher emphasizes that the "historical reality" of Scripture is "not only precious but indispensable. Without it the 'theological reality,' the vertical 'Word of God' would be inexpressible, unknowable, and unknown."

Each of the four chapters of this 100-page paperback book is filled with ready references and numerous footnotes for easy study and reference. Because the first two chapters of the book are generally heavier reading, one might consider a quick reading of the last chapter as a preliminary step to digging into the earlier development of the theological base. The reviewer wishes only that the author would have elaborated in more detail on "the rest of Scripture" or "the historical reality" in terms of its inspiration, inerrancy, and relationship to our faith, as well as presenting some grounds for a basis of reconciliation over this matter. And while some will not agree with Bretscher's adherence to "the process of rational inquiry" which attempts to develop an awareness of how "findings become persuasive" and rejection of those that "do not seem persuasive," we must not permit a "piety among Christian educators which would suggest a 'child-like faith' as an excuse for not thinking." If we feel that we are serving God by "sacrificing the intellect," we are not trusting or serving God at all.

This is a daring book in that it challenges some longstanding traditions within the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. It is straight and to-the-point as only Paul Bretscher can be. It offers no apologies for its premise. The book is written "for such a time as this," and is a must for all those who desire a clear understanding of one of the main issues (if not the main issue) of our current Synodical crisis. After The Purifying offers a search for truth and growth and "not an end to the discussion that is so necessary, but a beginning."

RICHARD P. SAUER

POSITIVISM AND CHRISTIANITY.


Does the sentence "Valpo is a hot-bed of fundamentalists" assert a fact-stating, meaningful proposition? That is, is it either true or false? Yes, of course — it is either true or false, particularly false. How do we know? Well, we can go to Valpo, count the professors using Affirm in classes, take the temperature during chapel, and otherwise perform a whole range of tests which verify or falsify the assertion. And then it is just obvious that the claim is meaningful but false.

Now try the sentence, "Valpo's philosophy department has at least one fundamentalist professor on its staff." Is this a fact-stating, meaningful proposition? Yes, again; it is either true or false, particularly true. How do we know? Well, we can buy the book Positivism and Christianity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) by Professor Kenneth Klein of the philosophy department, read its rather anachronistic defense of the "Verifiability criterion of Meaning" and see for ourselves. Fundamentalists — a term I use rather loosely for people overly bound by traditions of all sorts and enthralled by six-day creations, talking, burning bushes, and the like — are wont to adopt the Verifiability thesis because it demands something like the "literal" sense of things in order to make sense of anything. You can get your hands literally burnt on a literal burning bush. This hands-on view of Meaning is therefore substantial enough to persuade a person from the fundamentalist tradition that we have finally got a way of proving that it makes sense to say talking bushes burn or slithering snakes talk.

Of course, it isn't as simple as all that. Since very few people ever scorch their fingers on talking bushes or converse with reptiles it is hard to verify those claims. But the Verification criterion allows falsification, too, as a guarantee of meaning. So it makes sense, at least, to believe in talking snakes because it is false that snakes talk.

God, however, doesn't even have a hiss in His voice. And so sentences such as "God spoke to Moses" are, to say the least, hard to verify or falsify. Hence, by a Positivist criterion of meaning, it is meaningless — neither true nor false — verbiage. At this point our crypto-fundamentalist is likely to have second thoughts about God, since He and His mighty acts do not make for easy literal reading. So he has a problem. Is it meaningless to talk about God, especially a transcendent, holy, Creator-God? Can anything we do either falsify or verify language about God? A truly stubborn, Missouri-bred Positivist (and devout believer) is very likely to live a long while with the problem, perhaps even write a doctoral dissertation about it, and wind up inconclusively by saying, "It is to dilemmas such as these that the issues of the argument lead us."

Now since these are empirical, hands-on tests for detecting a tortured fundamentalist/Positivist,
and Professor Klein's book satisfies the tests, it follows that the assertion that there is at least one fundamentalist in Valpo's philosophy department is not only meaningful but true.

I am now reasonably confident that I have gotten the attention of the entire University community, and perhaps of most readers of the *Cresset*. So I want to map in a more serious way the terrain of Professor Klein's helpful book and offer a few critical comments to cast his thesis— or hope—into bold relief. I shall assay the book not so much as the product of doctoral research, which it obviously is, but as an informative and argumentative work of scholarship which seeks to wrestle with what once was fashionably regarded as a major problem for theists in general and Christians in particular. Professor Klein believes the problem still ought to be fashionable even though he concedes that it isn't. This, I take it, expresses not his excuse for publishing a book years after the debate on its theme has dwindled, but his sincere belief that Christian theology has a problem that will not, like miniskirts, follow the Arab fashion and silently steal away. As I have suggested, however, it may also indicate good Missouri breeding.

Professor Klein's opening chapter is devoted to sketching historically the intent and development of the Positivistic theory of meaning. That theory never stood still in one form long enough to make the description of it easily precise or clear, but the general idea behind it in one version or another was that an alleged statement (as opposed to a question or a directive) which could be regarded as having factual meaning (as opposed to nonsense) must be either true or false. So, for example, it is said, "There are men on Mars" has meaning if and only if it is either true or false that there are men on Mars. Thus, truth or falsity was taken to be necessary and sufficient for all "fact-stating" assertions to be regarded as intelligible. To determine whether a putative statement does have meaning, then, one had to be able somehow to ascertain whether the statement was true or false. The resulting controversy among Positivists themselves largely revolved around finding a description of just what procedures were required to determine conclusively, "in principle," directly, or indirectly whether a putative assertion was or could be either true or false. If such a procedural description was stated too narrowly it eliminated perfectly "respectable" claims. "There are men on Mars" seems meaningful but in the early decades of this century one could not get there to check it out, and by some formulations of the criterion of verifiability this would entail, counter-intuitively, that the statement was not a statement at all but meaningless. The same was true for other "respectable" statements of science, history, and common sense. If the criterion for meaning was stated too broadly, just any sentence whatever could be said to have meaning, including those the Positivists dreaded most of all—the alleged statements of what Hume, their idolized progenitor, called the statements of "divinity or school metaphysics," religion, ethics, and metaphysical babble in general ("The ground of Being is being-for-itself-in-itself").

Professor Klein's intended contribution in this book is his trinitarian thesis that (i) the criterion for meaning set forth by Professor David Ry
nincan be reupholstered to meet criticisms of earlier criteria; (ii) many philosophers and theologians in attempting to defend theism or Christianity against the Positivists' charge of nonsense deserted orthodox dogma in the process (Klein takes up Braithwaite, Miles, Hepburn, and Munz as examples in chapter 2); (iii) others who attempted to accept the Positivists' meaning criterion and show that religious statements were meaningful also failed (MacIntyre, Crombie, Hick, and Wilson are the major failures discussed in chapter 4).

The greatest benefit to the un
specialized reader or student from reading this book will likely be the very lucid analyses and criticisms which Professor Klein applies to the works of the contemporary writers mentioned above. Although they are not given full treatment, the substance of Klein's effort makes it virtually unnecessary to read the original authors. He often abbreviates abominable prose, as in the works of John Hick, gives clarity to the logic which was obscure in the original (the treatment of Antony Flew is a good case), and with precision displays the deficit spending of many theists who traded in the currency of the Positivists' arguments or counterfeited the Christian's deposit of faith. In these efforts, Klein has served well as an apologist both for traditional Christian orthodoxy in defending God's transcendence and for the Positivist demand for true/false conditions of meaningfulness.

The more technical inquirer will be forced to grapple with the fundamental claim Klein uses to justify his belief that there remains a problem of meaning for theological language. That claim is best stated in his own words:

> From the Positivist's point of view, a Christian who expressed the belief that there is a God, thereby purporting to state that there is a God, cannot really be stating anything, cannot be asserting anything true or false. He cannot because, first, a genuine factual statement must be testable, and second, the putative statement that there is a God is not testable. If either of these theses can be convincingly overthrown, the Positivist argument collapses (p. 73).

Professor Klein believes that David Rynninc's formulation of the Verifiability criterion of meaning, suitably refurbished, does in fact show that "a genuine factual statement must be testable." I would like to argue, however briefly, that he has not refurbished that criterion enough. Hence, like the claims
about God which Flew accused of an eroding death by a thousand qualifications, the meaning criterion Klein defends is itself so refined away by successive redefinition that there is no way of discovering whether there is any criterion, or, if there is, what it could possibly be. If this argument succeeds, then the Positivists' attack on religious language collapses, indeed. And though problems remain for theology, they will not have to include the problem of meaning criteria in any case.

The criticism must be cavalierly brief in this review, but it goes like this. Rynin's version of a meaning criterion simply combines the demands of earlier versions and requires that a putative statement is meaningful if and only if it is either "in principle" verifiable or falsifiable or both. It had long been recognized that verifiability or falsifiability alone were too broad, as tests of meaning, to exclude any sentences, or too narrow in disallowing clearly meaningful statements even in the sciences. But Rynin, with Klein playing defensive tackle, maintained his combined criterion met the objections. Klein admits that it does not. Sentences of mixed quantification such as "For every scholar there is one poor administrator" can neither be verified nor falsified, since one can never exhaust the list of scholars nor show by one's failure to find a poor administrator that none exists. Klein, however, defends the criterion against this type of counter-example by arguing that "it appears intelligible to suppose, doubt, wonder about, even to assert that S (in our example, 'For every scholar there is one poor administrator') is true or that it is false. But if S is true or false, albeit not ascertainably so, then surely S is meaningful . . ." (p. 96).

This exhibits the constant shifting of position that Positivists have always had to do to avoid a collapse of their endeavor, and Klein has joined the waltz. It seems clear that, as his criterion requires, either it is or is not ascertainable that for every scholar there is at least one poor administrator. Since it is not ascertainable, the sentence, by definition of "meaning," is nonsense. The fact that we know independently that it is not nonsense shows that the criterion is faulty, not that our powers of observation are limited. For Klein to say that the statement above is meaningful even though it does not meet the criterion's demands is to commit the unforgivable philosophic sin of self-contradiction. To grant that the statement is meaningful as Klein does shows, to paraphrase Russell, not that his critics are wrong but that he is wrong in perpetuating his myth about meaning.

There are other upholstering efforts Klein engages in to defend his criterion which we cannot detail here, but which have grievous objections. (1) Quibbling about what ascertainability implies and by whom something must be observed has always ended in failure for the criteria Positivists have formulated. (2) Various theories of modern physics are such that those theories or theory-complexes cannot be verified because of generality. They also are not falsified, even "in principle," because there is no logical test by which to determine whether the failure of their experimental confirmation is due to the unobservable theoretical entities referred to in them, or to other indeterminable features of the total complex. (3) Most evident of all is the absurdity of Klein's claim that "Sentences employing theoretical terms (i.e., names for empirically unobservable entities) . . . bear a relation to the states of affairs which can conceivably serve as evidence for their truth . . ." (p. 109). If the sentences referring to some unobservable entity like a neutrino have no meaning, being without verification or falsification, how can other statements be evidence of their truth? If "Bargs are wacking" is nonsense, then it is not likely to be true, no matter what experiments we conduct. (4) If intersubjective verification or falsification of statements is not required, but only the test of one observer, then again just any statement may have meaning attributed to it. (5) The conjunction or disjunction of an ostensibly nonsense assertion with an ostensibly verifiable or falsifiable assertion cannot be ruled out, as Klein suggests, by stipulating that all components must be severally verifiable or falsifiable. The truth value of compound statements is established by truth-functional rules alone. This allows a statement of the form (i) "Bargs are wacking or twice two is four" to be true, necessarily, just because one component is true. (i) is therefore verifiable and meaningful, by Klein's definition, whatever we think of Bargs. Similarly, (ii) "Bargs are wacking and Nixon retired" is false by the definition of the truth-function, since Nixon did not retire. (ii) is thus falsifiable and meaningful, by Klein's chosen definition of "meaning." If this fact makes his criterion of meaning collapse—which it does—don't blame logic, blame the author. Furthermore, if the author replies that only meaningful statements are allowed in compound statements and these are guaranteed meaningful by his criterion, then he is even worse off, for he has begged the whole issue he purports to establish.

There is conclusive reason to believe that the various Positivist criteria to determine meaning have done no more than declare science and common sense shot full of nonsense. Or, they have admitted the full range of nonsense to full respectability. In that bleak light, there is hardly any reason, even for philosophers, to fear that God is in jeopardy because of our alleged inability to speak meaningfully of Him. Professor Klein, I am happy to report, speaks like a devoted follower of the transcendent God. His Positivism just makes him his own worst enemy. But then, what would we expect from Missouri?

Errata noted on p. 22 "hte"; p. 94 "of" for "or," second line from bottom; p. 119 "discovery"; p. 128 unclear antecedent in the dependent
claus which follows, "Hick's argument that a posthumous confronta-
tion with Jesus of Nazareth, . . ."

C. E. HUBER

AN ETHIC FOR CHRISTIANS AND OTHER ALIENS IN A STRANGE LAND.

THE ETHICS OF MARTIN LUTHER.

THE GREAT GULF BETWEEN the recently published works by William Stringfellow and Paul Althus is not primarily one of time
or theology, but of style. One shouts a prophetic word in the public arena; the other speaks in the tones of the university lecture hall.

William Stringfellow, often called the American C. S. Lewis, has penned an explicitly polemical tract whose concerns are theological and political. Instead of using the Bible to justify America, he intends to understand America biblically. The result is a book to be read quickly to experience its power, after which it can become the object of reflection and critique.

Two biblical themes dominate Stringfellow's work. The first announces that the biblical topic is politics. The word "politics" does not refer to the activities associated with Richard J. Daley or Richard M. Nixon, nor with the recent interest in the role of politics in the institutional church. The Bible is political because it deals with the fulfillment of humanity in society, it records a saga of salvation. For this book, Stringfellow finds his outline in the book of Revelation, which is for him most patently a political writing.

Second, Stringfellow highlights the biblical portrayal of man's struggle against the principalities. These are the social modalities in which death has become incarnate, institutionalized, and real. The reader may hear echoes of Reinhold Niebuhr in the focus on the state as the pre-eminent principality. Because pietistic Christianity has focused its interpretation of the Fall on the lonely individual, it has failed to perceive the biblical insight into the fallenness of all creation.

From these themes emerges the outline of a biblical ethic. Stringfellow locates the causes of present moral poverty in a paralysis of conscience rather than in the malignity of individual persons. We need a basic sensitivity to the nature of the human struggle to uncover the stimulus and the outline for an ethic.

Following the insights of Karl Barth, Stringfellow claims a generic difference between the biblical faith and philosophies, ideologies, and religion. The latter present us with some singular conception of society perfected as a hypothetical, idealistic, or mythical tenet. This does not mean that philosophy, ideology, and religion are anathema to the biblical faith, but that they belong to a different species. Because the biblical faith focuses on social realities as they exist in time, its orientation is essentially empirical. It confronts us with the self-knowledge, reconciliation, and hope which every human and the whole world are called to live here in this world. Stringfellow locates the individualistic character of contemporary ethics, particularly of what passes for Christian ethics, in the failure to recognize the biblical understanding of man's struggle with the principalities.

Stringfellow holds out no hope for a biblical ethic which claims to be superior to all other ethics. But he claims that we can discover a reinterpretation of the world which makes the issue of ethics how to live humanly during the Fall.

The ethic proposed comes to expression in the small, everyday acts of resistance to the principalities, even though at the moment we possess no detailed picture of the shape of things to come. The Christian seeks to discern how "here and there, now and then" the Christian hope takes visible form in the present. Stringfellow claims that the biblical study which characterized the resistance movement of the German church in the 1930s still presents the primary practical and essential tactic of resistance. Out of groups engaged in such study comes the discernment characterizing a prophetic voice which avoids announcements of a predestined doom or dresses in the trappings of the occult.

William Stringfellow is not simply a man who reads his Bible and studies the daily newspaper, he is a reader who has found that they speak the same language. In this lies the power of his work, and also a question when we move to reflection on his work. This book presents us the creative and intuitive understanding of a man immersed in the Bible and the present world of action. As such it is worth taking seriously. But when other persons equally immersed in both present us with different words of diagnosis and prognosis, we need further help to understand how they have been brought together. The biblical faith cannot be reduced to an ideology, but it comes to expression in ideological form. And Stringfellow eventually must tell us why he has chosen the particular ideology he employs to expound his biblical ethic.

At times the emphasis on the unpredictable, spontaneous quality of the biblical response to situations tends to make continuity itself into a principality to be opposed. What are the continuities which tie together what appears repeatedly in the "here and there, now and then"? To claim to provide an "ethic" requires that eventually we receive these guidelines. But this book is a prophetic sermon more than an ethic, and not everything can be said in one sermon. This sermon is worth hearing and pondering.
IN STYLE, THE WRITINGS
of Martin Luther closely resemble
the volume by Stringfellow. In The
Ethics of Martin Luther, Paul Alt­
haus lays before us the fruit of a
lifetime of Luther study in a work
which is reflective, analytic, and
structured for systematic clarity. It
seeks not to convince, but to find
the key concepts and continuities in
the writings of the Reformer, which
are frequently occasional in character.
Even in this respect, his volume
omits many of the central themes
foundational to Luther's ethical
thought, since these have been cov­
ered in the earlier companion vol­
ume, The Theology of Martin
Luther.

Like his colleague Werner Elert,
Althaus distinguishes between the
ethos of faith and the ethics of the
Christian. The ethos within which
the Christian lives is defined by the
classical Reformation teaching of
the justification of the sinner through
grace in Christ received through
faith alone. This provides the
ground and the source of the Christian
life. Justification, however, entails more
than a forensic declaration about
man, since it describes an encounter
with God in which man experiences
God's love. The love of the Chris­
tian has the same divine qualities of
spontaneity, freedom, happiness,
and eagerness.

Ethics focuses on the "right sub­
stance" of human action in the sense
that it achieves what God commands
in relation to the needs of others.
The word "good" has two meanings
in Luther's thought—an ethical and
a metaethical meaning. According
to Althaus, the first defines the
right action and the second defines
the right performance of the action
measured in terms of feeling and
attitude toward God. Althaus makes
no attempt to clarify the difference
and relation between matters of
motive and feeling that he locates
under ethos with the treatment of
these same elements as they are
widely discussed under ethics.

Obviously, the distinction Althaus
employs stems from Luther's teach­
ing of the two kingdoms. The major
chapter of the book is devoted to
this topic. Unless the reader pays
close attention to the footnotes, he
may not be aware of widely diver­
gent interpretations of this teaching
formulated by other ranking Luther
scholars. Althaus provides a concise
description of the development of
Luther's thought from an early
opposition of the two kingdoms to
an understanding of their unity in
interdependence.

When he turns to the topic of eth­
ics, Althaus portrays Luther in terms
closely parallel to traditional Roman
Catholic conceptions of natural law.
The evidence of a dynamic reading
of the content of natural law from
confrontation with the historical
world, which scholars like Ragnar
Bring and Aarne Siirala find in
Luther, raises questions about the
interpretation of him as an exponent
of rational natural law in the Stoic
tradition. The latter view hovers
over Althaus's evidence that the
commandment of love was for Luther
the content of natural law, and how
Luther affirmed the formulation of
many "new decalogues."

In terms of the current debate on
the third use of the law, Althaus
contends that Luther viewed the law
as both the form and expression of
the nature of God to be loved as God
himself. The life of faith consists in
concrete acts in particular situations
performed in accord with the divine
law.

Althaus provides a brief overview
of Luther's views on love and mar­
rriage, work, property, and business.
His more expanded treatment of
Luther's attitude should correct
Reinhold Niebuhr's portrayal of the
Reformer as an early Thomas
Hobbes. Luther viewed government
as a good gift of the Creator, func­
tioning in paradise, instead of a
divinely given instrument to control
men shaped by sin. He could speak
of it as the most useful and necessary
function on earth, next to the Gos­
pel, and as a gift of God's grace to
man. Yet he was realistic enough to
speak of the great states as all robb­
ers, and recognized that a just cause
gave no assurance of eventual vic­
tory. Similar to Stringfellow, Al­
thaus affirms that Lutheran Chris­
tianity knows itself to be responsible
for nation and country, not merely
the salvation of individual souls.

Although Althaus points out that
we have moved beyond Luther in
our understanding of the signifi­
cance of Christian freedom for the
social and political order, he gives
no hint of our need to highlight
what may be even more problematic
in relating his thought to modern
society. Luther held a clearly de­
defined hierarchical picture of society.
Only in extraordinary circumstances
could ordinary persons be agents of
change. Change lay in the hands of
the lords and princes or the heroic
figures who are not bound by rules
and tradition. What is the signifi­
cance of Luther's clear affirmation
of change and development for a
pluralistic society in which all citi­
zens bear a responsibility to partici­
pate in that process? Although a
footnote reference points out that
Luther's taken-for-granted world
was that of Christendom, Althaus
makes no attempt to analyze how
Luther's interpretation of the natu­al stemmed from the marriage of the
biblical and Greek traditions within
Germanic society.

Althaus has provided us a brief,
succinct work of reference. He has
outlined the basic themes and con­
cepts in Luther's thought, as well as
providing a summary of specific
views Luther held on a variety of
topics. Robert Schultz, formerly a
member of the Valparaiso Uni­
versity faculty, should be commended
for a clear and readable translation.
And the excellent index makes this
a handy working tool. But the book
provides only small hints of the dy­
namic fashion in which Luther for­
mulated his position in interaction
with contemporary movements and
issues. In the many steps toward a
Lutheran ethic, Althaus's The Theo­
logy of Martin Luther will probably
prove more valuable than this vol­
ume on The Ethics of Martin Luther.

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