IN LUCE TUA: W. H. Auden: More than Footprints; Tolkien: A Tribute; Conserving What?

Richard H. Luecke THE SOCIAL CRISIS AND THE WORK OF PROS

Walter Sorell LETTER FROM ABROAD: FROM HERE AND THERE, SNAPSHOT OF THE TORTURED CREATURE, MAN

Sandra Y. Govan A REFORMED CYNIC'S REVIEW

Walter Sorell WHERE DOES CHARITY BEGIN?

A REVIEW ESSAY (PART II) OF A STATEMENT OF SCRIPTURAL AND CONFESSIONAL PRINCIPLES

Newman W. Howell RECORDINGS: HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY OF MUSIC—THE BACH GUILD

Jill Weinfart Books

J. T. Ledbetter A GIRL

John Strietelmeier IN CONCLUSION

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Above: D. H. Burnham & Co., architects. Reliance Building, Chicago, 1895. At the time it was built, the Reliance offered the most advanced expression of the steel skeleton construction in all Chicago. With no bearing columns exposed on the surface, the facade of this 16-story skyscraper is remarkably open, sheathed almost entirely of glass. Wide "Chicago windows" make up the glass area of the Reliance. Since the movable sash segments of the bays fall in diagonal planes, they admit light from three directions and catch breezes from two, quite an advantage in days when electricity was new and there was no air conditioning. When constructed, the building set an engineering record: the steel for the top ten stories was erected in only 15 days. This old photo was taken when the Reliance still had its cornice and when the terra cotta was white and new. Chicago Historical Society.

Cover: The Reliance dwarfed by today's larger high-rises. Nevertheless, it is clear that this 1895 building set a precedent for the equally famous Chicago architecture that followed it. Richard Nickel, photographer. Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks.
W. H. Auden:
More than Footprints

Since brass, nor stone, nor earth...

Sometimes it is difficult to mourn an artist's death. He leaves himself behind in a way no teacher or statesman or scientist ever could. The teacher gives something that becomes a part of the collective unconscious of his students—something felt, but not seen. The statesman leaves his mark in law and treaty—all public issues. The scientist's work also becomes a part of public knowledge. How inaccessible the man becomes in the chemical formula, the charter or the syllabus.

But in the paintings, nocturnes or poems we still experience the artist's blatant splashes, nibulous urges and shining images. These are much more himself than the stockings, tie clasps, and half empty cologne bottles he leaves on his dresser.

W.H. Auden has left more than footprints. It is as if he belongs to some eternal Present. His own poem, "In Memory of W. B. Yeats," says it all so well.

For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives
In the valley of its making where executives
Would never want to tamper,
flows on south
From ranches of isolation and the busy griefs,
Raw towns that we believe and die in; it survives,
A way of happening, a mouth.

No man is more visible and alive after death than he. For him and for us, his death has lost its somber clunk. This is the miracle with might: in Auden's work his love may still shine bright.

Jill Baumgaertner

Tolkien: A Tribute

John Ronald Reuel Tolkien was a prodigy of imagination. Davenport has described that imagination as "gorgeous," unequaled in English literature since Spenser.

Tolkien, a philologist at Oxford University from 1925 to 1959, died in his 81st year on 2 September 1973. He is quoted in the New York Times as having described his impulse to write with the sentence, "A pen is to me as a beak is to a hen." One can imagine that his own life was very much like the hobbits he wrote about: it would have been easy for humans not to see him. As one student described him, he walked "as if on furry feet," and had an appealing jollity. But, as with the case of Frodo, the most famous hobbit, "there was more to him than meets the eye."

With The Hobbit and the three volume work, The Lord of the Rings (the first volume of which appeared in 1954), Tolkien has developed a consistent and complex world, Middle-earth. Middle-earth is peopled with elves, dwarfs, wizards, orcs, nazguls, ents, and hobbits. Middle-earth has a geography and a topography in which not only the characters live, act, and die, but into which the reader also moves. He can "smell" it, "hear" it, and "see" it. Tolkien, who began the trilogy as
kind of “linguistic esthetics,” displays his prowess of imagination also by the invention of strange alphabets and consistent languages. It is rumored that he has developed a whole new language. Perhaps we shall learn something of that if the (rumored to exist) work, The Silmarillion, yet gets into print. After his retirement from Oxford in 1959, he resumed writing on this work, a myth of Creation and Fall.

Meeting an imagination of this magnitude is always fascinating, and (to me) perplexing. Tolkien's imaginative writings are marked by a description of horrendous evil, consistent in its malice, devastating in its operation, and yet always under the power of Another. He tells a story in which it is revealed that man's wickedness is very great, “. . . that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (Genesis 6). And yet, an evil man (or being) could not and cannot imagine the startling and terrible good which Tolkien has pictured in this fantasy. The schemes of evil in the trilogy are consistent; they cannot comprehend the surprising turns taken by the good, although it is possible for the good to imagine the plans of the evil one without getting sucked into those plans. There is nothing cynical in Tolkien's imaginative work. At the same time, Tolkien pictures characters and situations that are clear and cut to the heart of fear and evil, or courage and goodness. The rich interplay of characters in conflict leads the reader beyond the story. It is this quality that impels many to read Tolkien's imaginative works as allegory, a label he emphatically denied to them.

Not all critics approve Tolkien's work in these stories. Neither did a number of publishers, initially. But the trilogy, which took fourteen years to write, captured the imagination of many, including large numbers of young people on college campuses. Ten months after The Lord of the Rings appeared in paperback (Ballentine and Ace Books) a quarter of a million copies were sold. Tolkien fan clubs were organized; many, including students, plastered the walls of their rooms with maps of Middle-earth. As unlikely as it was to conceive of Tolkien as "modern," just so surely did he become the point of contact with great fantasy for many young people. For them this work has been like magic.

Tolkien conceived the fantasy of the fairy tale to be for joy—and escape. The Lord of the Rings (and The Hobbit, too) are illustrations of Tolkien's concept of the fairy tale. For that reason, Tolkien was not disturbed when detractors criticized these works as "escapist literature." Why shouldn't one escape from factories, smog, guns, and engines? Tolkien asked. Why shouldn't the reader experience a catching of the breath and a lifting up of the heart when he comes to the turn in the story? The fairy tale is for joy; escape is for rest and courage. The trilogy does its work well as a first-rate fantasy. The burden of the Ring, carried by Frodo to the Cracks of Doom, is a story that gives escape into courage and rest.

Tolkien's story is about life full of hard choices and conflicts that are "for keeps." It is the story of a frightful, indeed, horrendous, use of power. Many strong and persuasive arguments are advanced, urging the abandonment of civilization for power, especially the power of the Ring. And yet, Another power is always present, a power that uses all other powers—and controls them. Sometimes this Other power uses the most unlikely agents for its work. And however real the conflict, the Other power always wins. W.H. Auden's essay, "The Dethronement of Power," is a remarkable study of Tolkien's treatment of this theme of conflict and victory.

Combined with this description of choices, terror, and power, is the remarkable description of fellowship. Frodo is the burden-bearer. He, and no other, must carry the Ring, albeit he also chooses the burden. In this union of necessity and choice, where Frodo's vocation lies, Tolkien gives context to the theme: there is more to Frodo than meets the eye. Similarly, those who accompany Frodo know they can help him, but they cannot do his work. With this clear distinction of vocation, Tolkien weaves a picture of complementary characters in a profound and serving fellowship. Even pathetic Gollum, the being infected with insatiable lust for the ring (which he calls "my precious"), renders a strange service to Frodo in the completion of Frodo's mission. "Even Gollum may have something yet to do," Frodo says, quoting Gandolf.

Paul Pfotenhauser's words in The Cresset (January, 1969) sum up the impact Tolkien's story makes on the reader:

... I want to say something about the effect of Tolkien's range of characters on a person's view of his fellowman. The person who has met wizards and nazguls, elves and orcs, hobbits and dwarfs, isn't apt to despite or think lightly of the everyday experience of meeting another human. In fact he will treasure it. For at any meeting, if he looks closely, he is likely to discover a hobbit hiding in the wrinkles around a man's eyes or an orc in the sneer of another man's face. And if he is truly fortunate, every now and then he will come across someone who looks positively entish.

Keep your eyes open.

Conserving What?

Not many people believed me when I said I supported President J. A. O. Preus for a second term as president of the Lutheran Church—

The Cresset
Missouri Synod. True, my support was not aggressive. But it is really a matter of indifference what my choice was, for I did not then see, and do not now see, the chief goal to be the election or defeat of President Preus. What is desperately needed is a public debate about Lutheran confessional theology. Under the stimulus provided by President Preus such a debate has been forced, and it appears that there is no alternative, now, to that debate.

The time is ripe for such a debate. The turmoil about the church's life and work is widespread. Countervailing claims about the church in the American scene call for a clear confession from Lutherans, also those of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. The viability of Lutheran theology in the English language and on the American scene has still to be demonstrated. The process of the Missouri Synod becoming an American church, contributing to American theology and church life those good and precious elements of its heritage, has come to the point where critical choices must be made. Other denominations in America have faced, and most have gone through, similar struggles as they have come to grips with intellectual and social issues of our nation. With regard to questions of the Bible and the church's mission, most denominations have "blown" the challenge.

"Liberal" and "Conservative" in the American Churches

Theological liberalism has been engaged in a sell-out, particularly with the capitulation to religious experience as the norm of religious validity. Under the heading of "the prophetic voice," theological liberalism has joined in social action where the Gospel too generally has been understood as a platform for political or social revolution, where the passion is more appropriately a humanitarian moralism than an unmitigated preaching of God's demanding Law and a regenerating preaching of God's free Gospel. Questions related to definition of the Gospel, the nature of Biblical authority, and moral values were answered in such ways as to take the cutting edge from God's Law and to take the heart out of the consolations of God's Gospel. A homogenized liberal theology is more known for its enthusiasm for avant-garde movements, its critical stridency, and its race to be on the cutting edge of social issues than it is for its fidelity to the truth of the scriptural message.

Many Christians are legitimately fearful of such a direction. Their capacity to articulate their fears was no greater (in many instances) than their capacity to articulate their objections. Consequently, many of these Christians have responded with a sense of relief when someone seemed to articulate their fears and promised them deliverance. Quickly and gladly many of them have lent their loyalty to the claims of some who call themselves "evangelical" and "conservative." When such positions have capitalized on slogans, a kind of theology by cheer-leading, the choices before these people seemed simple and clear.

As an opponent to this theological liberalism, there seems to be one solid alternative. That alternative is the theological position that calls itself "evangelical" and "conservative." It is a position that nourishes itself on what is (and has been) a strong tradition in American religious life. It is a tradition that is nourished by ancestral roots that go back to the Radical Reformation, with an intertwining of those roots with the Reformed Protestantism of Calvin, Zwingli, Bucer, John Knox, the Wesley brothers, Whitefield, and the Puritan tradition of covenant theology. The heirs of this tradition have given both a spirit and a content to the word "evangelical." For this tradition there is a certain function for reason in defense of the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible, there is a specific way to relate the church and the moral life of society. The evangelistic task of the church is seen under the category of "reval." Both the revival as a form of evangelistic service, and individual witnessing, are grounded in the notion of faith as "making a decision for Christ." Along with this theological position there are attendant (and consistent) views on the sacraments and the nature of the church. Those who hold this position prefer to call themselves "conservative" and "evangelical."

However, too many distinctions are blurred with the labels "liberal" and "conservative." While these terms may be useful for groupings in the political sphere, they have virtually no value for theological and church life. In fact, they are downright misleading. Hence, there is a growing homogenization of the "conservative" position around what is claimed to be the center of the conflict, the Bible. Questions, claims, and issues all come to the same center: the question about the Bible. While there are deep conflicts between various groups of "conservatives" there is an over-arching unity as the questions gravitate toward the common center of the defense of the Bible.

In reality, the two positions grouped under the headings "liberal" and "conservative" are mirror images of each other. Both deal with questions about the Bible, with moral, social, and political issues, without pursuing the fundamental question of the proper distinction between the Law of God and the Gospel of God in theology, teaching, preaching, and the Christian life. The two "conflicting" parties are like the foxes Samson sent through the fields of the Philistines. Their heads are pointing in opposite directions, but where the fire is, there they are tied to each other. Misunderstanding of and improper distinction between the Law and the Gospel leads to a confusion about obedience in the Christian life and about the nature of faith. That is, both positions foster moralism. Theologically and pastorally considered, moralism develops either pride or despair. Considered under the labels of "conservative" and

October, 1978
"liberal," moralism conserves neither the message of the demanding accusation of God's Law nor the proclamation of the liberating message of God for people who are caught in despair, uncertainty, or licentiousness.

As a group of people learning to speak English and coming to grips with the intellectual issues, with social and political movements, and shaping a life of churchly and individual piety, members of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod seem to have these two general alternatives before them. The direction the present struggle is taking in that Synod seems to indicate that these two alternatives are the only options open. If that is indeed the case, the debate will be a matter of choosing up sides under the labels of one or the other parties. Lutherans will have become "liberal." If for liberating the life of people by spiritual and political movements, and like Esau, selling their birthright; they, too, will have blown the opportunity. Lutherans, however, if they conserve their heritage and use it for liberating the life of people by the truth of God's grace, ought to be able to raise the questions in different ways. Questions about the Bible as Word of God and about Law and Gospel as Word of God do not have to be asked (or answered) in the same way that American Protestantism has asked and answered them under the labels "conservative" and "liberal." Theological and pastoral leadership in the Synod must strive for such an alternative way of debating and clarifying the issues.

Was the New Orleans Synodical Convention Conservative?

The New Orleans Convention of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod was not conservative, not in the sense of the conservative Reformation and its theology. That convention was guided and led away from the healthy growth and clarity of the confession of the pure doctrine of the Gospel, into the direction that could be called "conservative" in the general sense of American Protestantism. The New Orleans Convention has turned the course of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod away from that which is best in its (and Lutheranism's) heritage. In this respect, it is informative to take note of the sources of praise and support for the decisions of that convention. Some who laud its decisions and embrace its actions, are good, living representatives of the Reformed tradition and its theological position. But they show none of their traditional signs of uneasiness when confronted by Lutheran confessional theology. For example, Christianity Today (10 August 1973) can speak about the movement of the New Orleans Convention as a movement from heterodoxy to orthodoxy. Would they so readily approve the orthodoxy of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration by the Holy Spirit, the reality of holy absorption of penitents by the pastor, the real presence of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus in the Sacramental bread and wine? Their approval of New Orleans is not because they have moved that much closer to the confession of Lutheranism; rather, they see in New Orleans a spirit and a dynamic much more akin to their own.

The New Orleans Synodical Convention was not conservative in relation to the synodical constitution. It revised the confessional article of the constitution, contrary to the procedure required by the constitution. The convention also cavalierly ignored the conservative action of the Cleveland Convention (1962) when that convention, on constitutional grounds, rescinded the resolution on the Brief Statement passed in San Francisco in 1959.

The New Orleans Synodical Convention was not conservative with regard to the character of confessional statements adopted by the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. Consistently, throughout its history, "Missouri" has insisted that confessional statements are binding because they agree with the Word of God. At New Orleans, the confessional act was corrupted within the act of confession by making confessional statements with regard to controverted issues, binding "in so far as they agree with the Word of God."

Inevitably, when the confession and the act of confessing are not conserving the truth of the pure Gospel, there can be no conservation of clarity on the relationship of the synod to the church. Such a view of confessional statements as is manifest in the convention indicate a view of the synod as making "house rules" for itself, delineating its own understanding of its form of consensus. Gone and forgotten is the conception of the church making her one, holy, catholic confession before God and the world. Although the theme of the celebration for the first century and a quarter of its history was "rejoicing in mercy," the synod in convention forgot the synod is an advisory body. Synod is not the church. The churches are not the arms and hands of synod. The synod is the arms and hands of the churches. The churches are not sub-committees of the synod; the synod is a sub-committee of the congregations. The confusion in language that can make synod and church synonyms is bad enough. But from it grows a deeper confusion about the nature of the church and of her confession. Those who imagine confessional statements to be something like rules of membership for a club, and who think discipline is cleaning up the mess of club membership, would do well to repent and correct their actions on the basis of Jesus' description of confession in St. Matthew 16 or St. Paul's guidance on discipline in I Corinthians 5. Failure to conserve clarity on confession and discipline can indeed lead to such statements as "Those liberals (moderates) will have to take a walk"; or, "Why don't you leave synod and find a place with views congenial to your own?"

The New Orleans Synodical Convention was not conservative in its theological treatment of false doctrine (or heresy). Like all of Christendom, "Missouri" has rightfully recognized that there is such a thing as heresy, and that heresy must be
excluded from the church of God. Heresy is an error of the mind, as well as an error of the will and an error of teaching. Heresy, too, can thrive on slogans, on the kind of over-simplification to seize upon fears or allegiances. But theological analysis of heresies and false teachings, specific charges that reveal and oppose such falsity, and confessional statements that reject such error, cannot, and dare not, engage in loose or shoddy language. True discipline in the church is not at all maintained when a whole bill of particulars in a charge of false teaching ends with an etc.! Such theological work does not conserve the pure doctrine of the Gospel.

In the light of that treasure which the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod has received from the conservative Reformation and its theology, a treasure which that synod ought neither forget nor fail to transmit, those good and solid elements in "Missouri's" past ought now be used to call "Missouri" back from the strange course on which it has embarked. By conserving the proper distinction between God's Law and God's Gospel, the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod can indeed enter into debate about questions concerning the Bible without becoming like general "evangelical" Protestantism in America. By conserving the centrality of the cross of Jesus and the conferral of the benefits of his death and resurrection by the Spirit's working in the preached and sacramental word, "Missouri" can contribute its gift to other Christians as they try to understand clearly the nature of God's church, and her life and mission.

For the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod to be engaged in such conserving work, it will be necessary to rescind those decisions of the New Orleans convention which turned it in a different confessional direction and withdraw those charges which divert the disciplinary task of the church away from the purifying of the church through the purity of the Gospel. Pastors and congregations ought to begin work in their districts to get such memorials on the agenda of the next synodical convention.

Though for no other cause, yet for this; that posterity may know we have not loosely through silence permitted things to pass away as in a dream, there shall be for men's information extant thus much concerning the present state of the Church of God established amongst us, and their careful endeavour which would have upheld the same.

Professor Jack Given spoke up for professional social work in the September issue of The Cresset with such admirable dignity and indignation as to make any faculty colleague cheer. There is an attractive spunk in anyone's contending for his own vocation, and this becomes irresistible when his calling is comparatively young, gritty, and underpaid in a society that has long honored and rewarded physicians, lawyers, clergy, and other service professionals. What we missed in Professor Given's trumpet sound was any muted hint to us earlier professionals that developments during recent decades have served to call many of our more established functions and roles into question.

There is something poignant about the arrival of the social worker to show his card just at a time when the party appears, in certain respects, to be breaking up—especially since this younger pro would seem remarkably suited by virtue of experience, candor, and flexibility to lead us all out to a new game.

Professor Given began by citing widespread misgivings about the “System,” including the Social Service System and the Welfare System. He cited contributors to The Cresset, especially on “The City” pages, who have offered injurious observations about “Professional Caretakers of the Poor” (February, 1973) and about how needy people keep slipping through agency networks and professional fingers to require ad hoc attention by voluntary citizens' groups (May, 1973). Insult was added by a former White House aid, John Erlichman, who remarked in the course of dismantling a federally sponsored social program: “You'll just have to go out and find honest labor somewhere else.” When you get lectures on “honest labor” from a source like that, you begin to wonder whether something shouldn't be done about your vocational image!

Professor Given's account of the current social crisis underlies his argument for institutionalized accountability of the social workers and registration of volunteers.

Here Professor Given was led to make a remarkable claim. The system isn't working, he said, because there has been insufficient reliance on professional social work. He drew an analogy from physical and mechanical fields. “Only trained professionals who knew what they were doing” were entrusted with the moon shots and the Sky Lab mission. Unfortunately, “when it comes to helping out his fellow man, everybody has an idea of how to do it.” Untrained do-gooders intervene in social service with unhappy results. They make fewer demands. Since they are unsalaried, they are very likely seeking to meet their own need to do good—a potentially injurious motivation. Charity can never do duty for competence, any more than polishing an automobile can substitute for repairing a leaky valve. Volunteers may be acceptable as subordinates to professionals (Professor Given refers to candy-stripers in a hospital); but as it is, there are so many amateurs in the social field you can't locate or identify the pros. Yet needy people need to find the kind of worker they can trust—i.e. “service professionals who don't have client status themselves.” The “clientele society” against which Milton Kotler warned seems here!

This account of the current social crisis underlies Mr. Given's argument for institutionalized accountability through college and graduate school accreditation, for legal registration of volunteers and licensing of professionals, with additional upgrading through membership in the Academy of Certified Social Workers. It undergirds his proposal that faculty in the Department of Social Service lead the way by seeking increased administrative and budgetary independence. In this he follows a course previously charted by medical schools, nursing schools, law schools, and seminaries. The analogies with other service professions, as with mechanical competencies, are broadly asserted: professional social workers “know what they are doing”; they are able to assess a situation and determine what is needed, when, where, and how much; they know how to defer a client who seems not amenable to
treatment; they have the skill and the “synergy” to get the job done.

What we find ourselves looking for in this account is some clarification of the special character of the knowledge and skills here offered, which would enable us to distinguish them not only from those employed in other service professions but also from those employed by ordinary citizens. Without such clarification, we clients may very well continue to bungle on professional terrain. We may be inclined to ask why exactly. Our mercy and pity should now be replaced by, or become subjected to, social welfare. Without such clarification, we clients may very well continue to bungle on professional terrain.

On what basis are we to distinguish in the future between the special knowledge and skills of trained social workers and those present among, or acquirable by, ordinary folk—perhaps by poor and needy people themselves? There is an obvious sense in which the poor man himself is an expert on his own affairs. (Ivan Illich charges that this represents a great exchange indeed, one which is intrinsic to oppressive trends in the society.) We might even ask whether the new social work is not affected in some noteworthy manner by the social worker’s self-interest. (Disruption of extended families and primary communities in industrialized societies has produced a fairly stable clientele for this new personnel; but surely the social work profession does not expect to work itself out of a job?) If accreditation, licensing, and standardization are part of the answer, do they not also raise a question concerning monopoly of information and a labor market? (A question increasingly raised with respect to other professions today.)

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Once followed a teen-age client from agency to agency on Chicago’s North Side until, by his calculations, $19,000 worth of services had been absorbed. Not a dime, it should be noted, ever entered the poor lad’s pocket.) Yet more careful definitions would appear to expand the sphere of non-professional functions. Meanwhile, Daniel Moynihan has stated an obvious and incontrovertible fact: the thing about poor people, and communities of poor people, is that they don’t have much money. He has also charged that major opposition to the proposed Family Assistance Plan, which sought to provide a graduated, risk-free route out of the welfare status, came from the welfare lobby itself at every level.

In a particularly intriguing statement, Professor Given traces our present bungling, as well as our widespread apathy, to “the absence of a knowledge of systems theory.” Perhaps it is a knowledge of “systems,” and of how the needy can avail themselves of benefits, which professional social workers bring to their clients. That indeed represents a valuable contribution. In charting our way into the future, however, much may depend on how we assess present systems. Most of the questions raised above refer, beneath their brashness, to a need for reassessment. Many observers have expressed grave doubts whether any simple extension of present forms of service, without other initiatives, could enable them to meet foreseeable social needs; and the fact is that public appropriations for social services are being retracted. Some observers sketch a modern history of service systems (medicine, schooling, welfare) in which a point of diminishing returns was reached about the mid-50’s—when new cures turned out to have deleterious side-effects, schooling served increasingly to ritualize social divisions, and welfare services tended to increase dependency on the whole. “The worst, the most corrupting, of lies,” said Georges Bernanos, “is a problem poorly stated.” As Richard Hauser of the London Centre for Group Studies is fond of pointing out, it is possible to heal a wound and make the patient worse.

The only alternative to expansion of bureaucratized services lies in community creation (something more than the mass community organization familiar in recent decades), which would provide a basis for invention of structures that render people active where they have been rendered increasingly dependent in the recent past. In Omaha, Nebraska, community-based rehabilitation homes are proving effective with members previously regarded as marginal and subjected to long-term custodial care. In Evanston, Illinois, an “Educational Exchange” puts people having something to teach in touch with people wishing to learn through an entirely neutral and “non-pro-
professionals” information system. From an MIT group comes a proposal for a network of housing services (learned in part from Squatters’ Associations) which could vastly increase the routes and decrease the costs by which people procure shelter of their own. Similar proposals have been ventured for making information, resources, and tools available which could serve to activate people in personal and mutual health care.

Social inquiry and experiment are doubtless matters of lively reflection by workers themselves. They least of all escape the present necessity for a professional style different in some ways from the one we have known in the past. Those who have borne the burden of struggle at the edges of industrialized society, and not infrequently the antipathy of its casualties, are perhaps most able to demythologize an older “professional” line.

Having made a first point, will the Social Work faculty also contribute to further discussion in the university? There is a sense in which social questions must remain a public matter—just as issues of politics, however rich and weighty, must be waged in ordinary language. Social discussion was regarded by the Greeks as a “liberal” or “leisure” activity, one characteristic of all free men as such. (In this respect, “social work” seems a paradoxical and partly misleading term.) To be sure, wise care and nurturing education are needed to equip people for social participation; and those who devote themselves to this high service should receive a good living (not “wages”). The Social Work faculty would no doubt make good use of increased autonomy.

But they also owe the rest of us their collegiality in tasks of clarifying these specialized skills which need to be exercised by some men and the “liberal arts” which are to be exercised by all. Conceivably, they could help us most of all in shaking off the dust of an older professionalism and moving creatively into the next decades—when we may all have to learn not how to become rich with uniformity but how to become poor with style.

LETTER FROM ABROAD — WALTER SORELL

From Here and There, Snapshots of the Tortured Creature, Man

Most paintings reveal an inherent power in their contrasting elements of color and shape. The dramatic conflict of the visual image does not necessarily lie in their themes. The British painter Edward Burra can create a frightening drama even with a still life or a landscape.

His retrospective exhibition at the Tate Gallery proves him to be a master of the macabre and grotesque. When you look at these many pictures of a lifetime—Burra is now seventy years old—you will find a touch of this or that source or a glimpse of something familiar. Burra has always stood outside the mainstream of all movements, but he borrowed from many sources and lets us watch how he mixes his own cocktail. Instead of a cherry he adds a skull. There is quite a bit of Bosch in his œuvre, the drama of Goya, the power of El Greco, the bitterness of Ensor, the fury of Grosz.

But Burra is in no way politically engaged; he is withdrawn like the legendary British archetype. The fury of his horror is basically nothing but an amalgam of contempt and disgust. At the sight of man he feels nauseous, he once wrote, and one can easily see how he has tried to translate Sartre’s Nausea into a visual idiom. Or does he rather illustrate the most cruel and dramatic visions which Jean Genet has not yet dared to put onto printed paper? Unlike the George-Groszian whores, his are not evil flowers of capitalism; his distorted masklike faces are not those of the ruling class. He knows no parties and ideologies; he just despises man. And while borrowing—or should I have said burraing—from this or that artist with a daring gesture, he nevertheless has a genius for creating an unmistakably new work.

There is something disarming about this man who went his own way on well-trodden paths. Perhaps this is what makes his work display an unchained quality, perhaps total innocence, the innocence of a child who laughingly says that the emperor is without clothes. When Burra became less interested in man and more in nature and inanimate things, then he found both of them surpassing the horror of
man. Everything looks at me threateningly, he said, I always expect calamities.

Edward Burra has been rather unknown to the general public so far. He has suddenly become a celebrity in England. The Royal Academy has tried in vain to be honored by his membership. The Royal Court sent him a decoration. He may still refuse to be called Sir Edward. When interviewers of a special BBC Program recently wanted to pry into his privacy, he let them hear an Homeric laughter. I gave Edward Burra, who sees life as a grotesque farce that it very well may be, a long standing ovation in London's Tate Gallery.

When I arrived in Zürich I was still haunted by Burra's images and the image of a man who so steadfastly stood far from the hustle and bustle of artistic activity, being his own self in a curious way. He made me think of fame again, which is an imagined rainbow to which a name is attached. History is full of follies and crimes, and man's mental follies and spiritual crimes weigh as heavily as those he likes to document with blood. The art of survival has been at a premium in our age. Take the case of Max Gubler who died recently. I had known about him before I researched the Swiss genius for my cultural panorama, The Swiss.* He is a painter of world calibre, but rather unknown beyond the borders of his little country where some art critics created a myth around his greatness.

He was a man possessed. "There is nothing else but to work, to look neither right nor left," he once wrote. "Everyday spent in sadness is lost." Sadness and the fear of lostness, of aloneness, were dominant in his life and work. The faces on his canvases had a frightful questioning or a stubbornly absent look. His landscapes, however, show a fulness and richness of color and design as if

Max Gubler wished to say: "Look what nature does for me and what civilized man does to me!"

Fanatically opposed to naturalism, he looked for harmony through architectonic means. In most of his canvases the interplay of light and color takes on an important role in an often strangely balanced manner. The choice of color is a focal point, full of meaning, such as his red shades which in their intense newness seem to affirm life and death alike. In one of Gubler's greatest works and largest canvases, The Procession, white is the dominant color within all colors, as if it would burn on all the faces, giving them a frightening expression of unreal reality.

Even more than Burra, Gubler kept remote from all "isms" of his time, standing apart as a man and artist. His work has signs of contemporariness and timelessness. It reveals the hand of the tortured creature man with withdrawn intensity of soulfulness, with a touch of resignation, and the flaming fire of man's will to overcome his being only human.

It is no proof of genius that he is an intimate neighbor of the madman (vide Nietzsche). But a great deal of heated discussion went on in the newspapers here about Gubler's shattered and clouded existence in which he lived for the last two decades or so. Many reasons were cited for his early psychic death: his excessive sensibility, his innate melancholy, and his creative compulsion; the dominating figure of his mother, then his strange relationship to and dependence on the Swiss art critic Gotthard Jedlicka. Were the societal pressures stronger than his struggle with his own doubts and inner demands? His early paintings clearly reveal a schizophrenic trend, a Van Goghian fury fed by the private myth of his greatness amid the fears and frustrations.

Perhaps Gubler's was a characteristic Swiss fate. There is something very specific about "Swissness," above all, a compulsive withdrawnness, a feeling of being hopelessly hemmed in by towering mountains. The Swiss artists have often felt frustrated or even crushed by the smallness of everything Swiss. Some escaped it by fleeing their country. But, strangely enough, many foreign artists came to Switzerland and found what they searched for, a place of visual inspiration and retreat, the last imaginary ivory tower, a fictitious West of Eden. Some artists and writers have a need for an isolated mindscape of peaceful beauty. But Switzerland has also been a sanctuary for those who were persecuted.

Under the title of From Büchner to Brecht an exhibition reminded us that Zürich has played an important role as refuge, mainly for the German literati, from 1836 on when the revolutionary dramatist Georg Büchner had to escape imprisonment and found open doors and a teaching position at the University in Zürich. It was not Zürich alone that offered asylum. The French part of Switzerland received such luminaries as Voltaire and Romain Rolland. But time and again it was Zürich which was the goal of those who had to flee their homeland. As early as the time of

of the German and Austrian culture written tragedies conjured up again stood in front of me like a frightening and put, so to speak, behind glass. Somewhat younger of that time. The written and unwiseing symbol of evil in its most maniacal proportions. Somewhat younger than most of those documented there, well-documented: Ignazio Silone and Thomas Mann, the illustrious and the less well-known names of the German and Austrian culture of that time. The written and unwritten tragedies conjured up again and put, so to speak, behind glass stood in front of me like a frightening symbol of evil in its most maniacal proportions. Somewhat younger than most of those documented there, I was nevertheless a part of it. And within a few minutes I relived the powerless fury of the tortured creature man.

That night I went to see the Welsh National Opera from Cardiff showing Benjamin Britten's *Billy Budd* in an almost flawless production at the Zürcher Opera. It is surprising how Britten's musical version in this all-male opera makes the complex motivation of Melville's drama come alive. The music, as it were, takes over an illustrative function on its own level. Britten's composition is melodious all the way through, in his moving chorus as much as in Claggart's lyric hatecrescendo, the Claggart who intuitively recognizes in Billy the purity of innocence which he cannot help but destroy. Britten who begins the opera with Captain Vere remembering the Billy Budd incident in his old age, created Captain Vere as the central figure. Melodically he remains the focal point, and his epilogue reflects the drum rhythms of Billy's death blended with the B-major melody of the prologue. The cyclic concept not only heightens the dramatic value of this opera, it also seems well-motivated when you see Billy Budd's tragedy from Captain Vere's viewpoint.

Billy Budd has always been for me the tragedy of a legal paragraph's triumph over humaneness. The images and documents of the exhibition I had seen a few hours previously gained new aspects. The tortured innocent creature man has probably always been crushed by the vileness of man protected by laws which decent men made to protect themselves against the hazards of man's vileness.

I am not here to complain but to report. After all, we can do little more than annotate our time and perhaps scribble a remark on its margin that seems appropriate to us. Walking home that night from the Opera, along Zürich's lake and through its quiet, peaceful streets I thought of how to end this report. Samuel Pepys, who loved to close his descriptive diary entries with the illogical and yet always fitting phrase, came to my mind: "And then to bed." Why not cover the day's events with the good-night-blanket of forgetfulness? Why not imitate time which, with cold-blooded non-chalance and serene self-evidence, buries its days each night only to give birth to itself next morning? And so to bed.
She conveyed graphically those stages of Ms. Holliday's life that were introduced to the viewer; one saw youth, rebellion, and exuberance merge into the pseudo-"sophisticated Lady," who at heart was a sensitive young thing, bursting with anticipation—new job, new love, new career, new chance at life. Then came an opportunity: a road tour with an all-white band through the rural South and into the heartland of unreasoning violent death and the viciousness of the Klu-Klux-Klan. For Billie Holliday the effects of the tour were extreme fatigue, emotional shock, and a burning need to suppress ugly scenes and haunting memories and yet to continue to work and perform. The answer she was turned on to, incidentally by a white man, was drugs.

From this point on, the movie moves rapidly. We descend with Diana into Billie Holliday's private hell. We rise with her when love seemingly conquers all. We admire her strength as she undergoes treatment in a sanatorium, alone; we are shocked and angry at her arrest; we cry and celebrate with her friends, her joy at returning to her man, her life, her music; we cringe at the tortuous paths she follows back into show business, New York, and finally Carnegie Hall; we feel a terrible sense of loss, amid conflicting feelings of intense anger and raging futility, at her so unnecessary death. Circumstances—and white folks—dealt her too many blows; the only alternative she knew killed her.

Portrayals by the co-stars and supporting cast of Lady Sings the Blues is also excellent. On a scale of 0-5, they would rate a 6 from me. As any woman in the audience could attest, one could in no way fault Diana/Billie for her taste in men—more specifically for her choice of Louis McKay/Billy Dee Williams. Mr. Williams did not play a stereotypical Black male. He was strong, yet sensitive; a rock, yet he bent. One can only wishfully dream that either Billy Dee Williams (or the character he played) would step out of that celluloid strip and visit this part of the world, unencumbered by Diana, a wife, or a current girlfriend.

Richard Pryor as Piano Man played an equally warm and three-dimensional part. Berry Gordy should pray to whatever gods watch over his multi-million dollar enterprises and thank them for allowing him to hire Pryor and to considerably lengthen the Piano Man's role. Although I am not an expert on the technical aspects of filming, even I can recognize expertise in a film when I see it. Such expertise, particularly in regard to the artistic handling of selected episodes that might otherwise have distorted the film or might have been distasteful is highly evident throughout the film. Particularly is that expertise apparent in regard to the dynamic blend of haunting music that was not quite Billie Holliday but also not the old Diana Ross of the "Motown Sound." Black and white still shots are used effectively for transitions; newspaper clippings, headlines, and photographs are admirably employed to fill in and round out the story. Contrary to the current movie-makers creed, there are no all-consuming sex scenes, no all-powerful super studs, and no bludgeoning emphasis on violence. Lady Sings the Blues is just a tender, arresting film biography that tells the tale of one Black woman who fought for her life and her dignity and lost to an America that took all she had to give and gave so little in return.

If you have not yet seen Lady Sings the Blues—by all means go. See it. Find out what the blues is really all about.

Make my forgiveness downright—such as I Should perish if I did not have from thee; I let the wrong go, withered up and dry, Cursed with divine forgetfulness in me. Tis but self-pity, pleasant, mean, and sly, Low whispering bids the paltry memory live: What am I brother for, but to forget.

Louis H. Sullivan, architect, *Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., Bldg.*, Chicago. 1899, 1904. This building is famous for the exuberant cast-iron ornament on the two lower floors; for the bands of white terra cotta delineating the cage-like steel frame on the floors above; and for the huge Chicago windows stretched to form a thin glass skin over the building's surface. The curved tower over the entrance provides a transition and focus. A simple parapet replaces the original cornice that once capped the building. Richard Nickel, photographer. Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks.
THE HIGH-RISE commercial tower has become the most characteristic building type of modern times. The type developed in the late nineteenth century in response to the explosive growth of cities and their unprecedented need for a high density of office, store, banking, and hotel spaces.

After the Chicago fire of 1872 the need in the city was particularly acute quickly to build strong, fireproof structures that would provide a maximum of light, air, and space for commercial uses. Furthermore, there was often a willingness among patrons and architects to abandon traditional Baroque palace or Gothic cathedral forms for the beauty and expressiveness that might come from the technology needed to create these new "democratic" buildings.

The thick, massive masonry supporting walls (six feet thick at their base) of the Monadnock; the thin skin tile and glass non-supporting walls of the Reliance; the lean skeletal steel cage and glass walls of Carson's are sources of beauty for these buildings. Even the current John Hancock Center and the Sears Tower rely for their beauty largely on the forthright expression of the logic of their construction.

However, lacking in much current Chicago construction is the small scale detail and symbolic ornamentation found especially in Sullivan's buildings. Unfortunately the poetic celebration of creative nature achieved by his designs have no equivalent today.

Photographs and captions are from an exhibit at Valparaiso University, courtesy of the Commission On Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks.
TAKE HEART—BE STRONG
A. G. HUEGLI

"Take heart, all you people, says the Lord. Begin the work, for I am with you, says the Lord of hosts, and my spirit is present among you"  (New English Bible)  
(Haggai 2, 4b).

Dr. A. G. Huegli, president of Valparaiso University, delivered this address at the opening convocation of the school year, 1973-74.

Today we resume our life together as a campus community. We know it is good for us to be here. Yet I am sure there is a certain amount of uneasiness in our hearts. Will we have a good year? Will we enjoy success and satisfaction as students and as teachers?

When we look at society around us, our misgivings are increased. Those who occupy high public office often seem to ignore the public trust. The national economy runs wild. Even the program of our Church appears to be sidetracked by disputes and dissension. We have a feeling that the familiar things we used to depend on are coming apart these days, and we begin to doubt our own sense of direction.

How do we start a new school year in the midst of our uncertainties? Education is committed to the principle that improvement is always possible if we search for truth long enough and hard enough. What is more, people like ourselves in Christian higher education realize there are fixed stars by which we can steer our course, and we observe the old sailing orders in a storm: "Steady as she goes."

"Take heart . . . be strong," was the counsel of the Lord through his spokesmen, from the days of the prophets to the ministry of Paul. The Apostle would probably tell us, as he told the Corinthian Christians under equally trying circumstances: "My beloved brothers, stand firm and immovable, and work for the Lord always, work without limit since you know that in the Lord your labor cannot be lost."

But more than steadiness is called for now. In the midst of difficulty there may well be a creative opportunity for every one of us. That is the burden of the message of Haggai. His book consists of only two chapters. His theme is that the people of Israel in the midst of distraction and discouragement should take courage, get to work, and count on the Lord to bless their efforts. It is the kind of counsel which certainly has its application to us on this first day of classes.

Not Platiitudes but Energetic Courage

"Take heart . . . be strong" could be another platitude, but not in this connection. Just as the prophet knew there were skilled hands and sharp minds among his people, so we know too that the capabilities of every student and faculty member here exceed description. New students have had to demonstrate their competence, or they would not have been admitted. Returning students are qualified by the record of progress they have already made with us. The wisdom and skill of the faculty have been expressed in many ways; the earning of the doctorate by nine more of our professors since...
last we met is one more evidence of the potential we have among us.

Individually and collectively, we have great strength to do whatever needs to be done. Our resources have barely been tapped. The start of a semester might be a good time for all of us to take inventory of ourselves and then determine how we can use the gifts that God has given us in the months to come. By the application of our strength we can share a rich experience during the year ahead. In Heidigger's words, “the silent power of the possible” is always present deep within us.

We cannot escape some problems. Famous and successful people are not spared them either. When Dr. Albert Schweitzer returned to Lambarene in Africa after a furlough, he found the buildings of his hospital in disrepair and had to set about rebuilding them with his own hands. As he commented afterward, the poetry of his African adventure was over and he had entered into his prose period.

All of us have these alternating cycles of prose and poetry, deserts and oases in our lives. We have to continue to risk, to venture, and at the same time to trust. The Preacher in Ecclesiastes spoke from a lifetime of experience when he said: “He that observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap. . . . In the morning sow they seed, and in the evening withhold not thy hand.”

It is not as though we had no sense of who we are or where we are going. As God's people we have been shaped and molded by His hands to fulfill a destiny He has set before us. He has provided us with a set of values that give order to our surroundings and propriety to our actions. And He has opened up for us the opportunity to discover the outer reaches of our intellectual calling. In this pursuit we test out all our capacities—curiosity and the restless search for answers; knowledge about ourselves and other people; discovery of the world around us; the challenge of great minds; and imagination in the service of the arts.

Growth is what the enterprise of education is all about. It will be stunted growth unless we add the magic ingredient of enthusiasm. I have sometimes been intrigued by a disciple of Jesus named Simon Zelotes. We know virtually nothing about him except that he was an enthusiast. Andrew was the quiet one, Philip was shy, Thomas was a skeptic. But this Simon had a zeal which must have made him an eager student of the Lord, for tradition says that he died as a martyr for his faith.

This year I would hope that each one of us will become doubly strong for our tasks by virtue of our enthusiasm, personally persuaded of the importance of what we are doing and energetic in the pursuit of our endeavors. We may not by ourselves push aside the clouds that hover over the society in which we live. But our own perspective will be clear, because we have focused upon the immutable assurance of the eternal God.

**Multiplied Strength in Combined Effort**

Haggai's words were addressed to all the people, for he expected that in their combined effort they would multiply their strength.

In a University of our size and nature, none of us needs to feel alone. We are engaged in a common undertaking which will bind us closely together in the weeks and months to come.

A recent report by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education indicates that for all the turbulence of the 1960s, the traditional purposes of higher education are as important as ever. According to the Commission, colleges and universities are well advised to continue in their functions of education, investigation, community service, and evaluation. Thus it is that at our University we shall again this year be joined together in these tasks. Like many other schools, we shall be responding to Aristotle's dictum: “All men by nature desire to know.”

We shall meet together often in classrooms and offices, in dormitories and at campus events. Wherever we gather, we ought to regard one another with respect, with trust, and with understanding. For the next ten months or so, let us be one people devoted to a common end, helping each other to find fulfillment and satisfaction in the activities which engage our mutual attention.

Linked in a common endeavor, we are also one people in the recognition of our common quest for spiritual meaning. There are many pressures upon a church-related university these days to become like any other school. It would be all too easy to forget our heritage of Christian concern and our hope for the enlightening of the spirit of man through a probing of the mind of God.

But by now we should have observed that a people's strength is measured not simply by the numbers who go to college but by their moral commitment to the way and will of God. Our University has a special identity all its own because we believe that education is not complete without an appreciation of the Message of the Lord for the family of mankind. And so we seek to have the thoughts of God permeate our campus—in this Chapel, by means of courses in theology, through our daily interaction. We must try to bring much closer to our routine of living the significance of God's love which led to the tragedy of a Cross and the triumph of a Res-
ment were no less formidable than they are now. The character Moses appraise his situation in these words:

Their work received a blessing because they knew that underneath their efforts were the everlasting arms of God.

Christopher Fry’s play The Firstborn has its central character Moses appraise his situation in these words:

The plainerst soldier is sworn to the service of riddles,
Our strategy is written on strange eternal paper.
We may decide to advance this way or that way
But we are lifted forward by a wind . . .

Trying to peer into the future, wondering what’s in store for us, is like looking through a glass darkly. We contemplate the “service of riddles,” and we study a destiny “written on strange eternal paper” by our God. Yet we are not left helpless. We have strength of mind and heart and hand. We have the encouragement and support of one another. Above all we are “lifted forward by a wind”—empowered and impelled by God’s Spirit in our lives.

This is good to know in times of stress and danger, when our energies are exhausted, and we don’t think we can take another step. But how refreshing to realize that the wind of the Spirit is there to move us forward toward the high goals we have set for ourselves—toward personal improvement, toward the advancement of our University as a place of learning and of living.

There are many objectives we can achieve if we press on with all sails spread and our course clearly plotted out. Lifted forward by a wind, we shall pass marker after marker, until the next harbor shall be reached. Then, at the end of the school year, we can look back and see how far we have come and know the satisfaction of achievement.

Dr. Tom Dooley will always be remembered as a committed Christian serving in his lonely hospital in Laos. He knew he had cancer, and much to do. He therefore appreciated Robert Frost’s short lines:

The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
But I have promises to keep.
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.

The academic year before us is really rather short, and we certainly have much to do. The whole idea was succinctly and positively put in the Orientation Committee’s theme for the past week: “Don’t just stand there,” with its implication: “Do something.” That brings us back to Haggai’s counsel: “Take heart . . . be strong. . . . Begin . . . ” and God’s promise of His abiding presence. May the Spirit of God be with us and bless all of our endeavors.

I now declare the school year 1973-1974 to be open.

POLITICS — ALBERT R. TROST

Where Does Charity Begin?

There might be those who would charge that our country should never be selfish or self-centered and that we should share our bounty with all of the so-called developing countries. True, a philosophy of sharing is well and good. But it should be embraced only after we have solved more of the problems in our own country. After we solve more of our own problems there will be time enough to help the developing countries. Somewhere in the back of my mind I remember that charity is a virtue unless it goes so far as to make the giver a potential recipient of charity himself.


Loaded with more debt than the rest of the world combined and with inflation, spawned out of governmental mismanagement and spending beyond means, eating into the very vitals of the Nation, the world can only view with disbelief the softheadedness that makes possible even the consideration of this $3 billion foreign handout.
Congress has already taken the citizens of this country on too many foreign aid joyrides. It is time to take the blank checks away from the White House and the State Department.

From a speech by Representative H. R. Gross, Republican of Iowa, on the occasion cited above.

The United States is presently confronted by the most serious claim on its charitable instincts since World War II. Never has it seemed less likely to respond to the claims. The quotations above, spoken during the debate on the latest foreign aid authorization bill, represent such a disinclination to respond on the part of a fairly liberal Democrat and a very conservative Republican. This attitude can be roughly summarized as "if charity has to begin, let it begin at home."

There has always been a sentiment among a majority of the Congress, the White House, and the State Department that the political and economic development of Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires and should have technical and capital assistance from the United States. The majority favoring this view in the Congress and the amount of the assistance extended have both gradually declined over the last ten years. When the Mutual Development and Co-operation Act of 1973 finally passed the House on July 26, 1973, the vote was the narrow margin of 188 to 189. It authorized the expenditure of $2.8 billion, but $1.8 billion of this was for military aid. In order to insure passage of the bill, the amount of economic aid to the poor nations was cut during the floor debate from the Foreign Affairs Committee recommendation of $718 million to $650 million. The Senate had already authorized a larger amount for economic aid, so that by the time a compromise is worked out the amount should be a little higher than the House-passed figure. This will still probably represent a decline from previous years.

There are other indications of less charity. The United States is more than a year behind schedule in the current round of contributions to the International Development Association, a subsidiary of the World Bank which helps the very poorest of the poor countries with easy-term loans. The other industrial countries had to volunteer their subscriptions before they were legally obliged to do so in order to prevent the I.D.A. from stopping operations altogether. The United States' share of the I.D.A. budget is 40 per cent, a figure to which negotiators for the Treasury Department had already agreed in laborious international meetings. Similarly, the United States has not made good on an internationally-negotiated pledge of $100 million to the Asian Development Bank. Congress has had three years to appropriate this money and has still not done it. Reasons for Congressional inaction notably include (again) the "charity begins at home" theme.

Representative Clarence F. Miller, Republican of Ohio, a member of the appropriations subcommittee that handles funds for the international banks, exemplifies this attitude. The New York Times, in a news article by Edwin L. Dale, Jr. on August 19, 1973, reports that "part of Mr. Miller's district lies in Appalachia and President Nixon's budget austerity has resulted in the halting of construction on a half-finished highway there. Mr. Miller is furious and believes that his district should come ahead of little-known international lending agencies of which his constituents have barely heard."

Charity in response to appeals to support the longer-run development of poor nations would appear to be reaching its limits, at least among a growing number in Congress. In mid-1973, however, the United States is facing a much louder and persistent appeal for charity from abroad. It includes, but goes beyond, requests for technical assistance and capital. It is raised by poor nations, but also by a nation as rich as Japan. It obviously will demand greater sacrifice on the part of the American people to respond to the appeal than at any time in recent memory.

The appeal is for food, at least in the short run. For 80 to 100 million people in September of 1973 the appeal is desperate. The immediate problem, a world food shortage, is caused primarily by bad weather. This year, drastic cuts in food production have occurred in the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, India, and African states bordering the Sahara Desert.

The most severe crises are in India and that part of Africa immediately south of the Sahara. This is not to make light of the rice shortage in Asia and the need there for American rice and soybean exports.

Countries like Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines, which normally have a surplus of rice, will themselves have to import rice this year because of a combination of bad weather and inefficient management.

India is expected to import four million tons of grain this year, after Indian planners had been anticipating an internal surplus of wheat. The crisis is compounded in India because it had not been anticipated in this year's budget, and other crucial development programs, such as a birth control program, have had to undergo drastic cuts. A further complication for India is the matter of past payment for food imports from the United States. Over the last two decades, the United States has given

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India farm products at cheap, concessional rates and has allowed India to pay in the local currency, rupees. The idea was that the United States would plow this money back into the Indian economy by the purchase of Indian goods and services. This has not happened, and the United States presently holds $840 million worth of rupees. In forty years this is estimated to grow to a value of $7 or $8 billion, 20 per cent of the local money supply. India is very alarmed over this development and is calling on the U.S. to "bury" its rupee holdings and give food free to India during the present crisis, as Canada is doing. If India has to buy the grain it presently needs in a commercial transaction at present market prices, it will cost her $560 million, half of India's present foreign exchange.

United Nations officials state that there is sufficient food available in the United States, Canada, and Australia to meet current needs. What further extensions will there be by the United States to meet the current world food shortage?

The crisis in the African nations of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad appeared to be the most pressing of all. In June of this year we heard the prediction by African leaders and United Nations officials that six million Africans might die by October. The primary cause of this catastrophe would be the five-year drought in the region. By the end of June, one-third of the livestock in the region had already died. The immediate need through October was estimated at 700,000 tons of grain and dry milk. The longer range need was for capital assistance in building dams and irrigation projects. The estimate of the cost is $2 billion.

In sub-Saharan Africa, charity has been extended, at least in response to the short-run needs for food. By the end of July, 410,000 tons of grain had been shipped; 156,000 tons of this aid came from the United States at a cost of $24 million to the taxpayers for the purchase and transportation of the grain. But what of further extensions of charity by the United States to meet the current world food shortage? United Nations officials state that there is sufficient food available in the United States, Canada, and Australia to meet current needs.

However, even in this acute crisis the United States is in danger of giving in to a self-centered response. The new form of the "charity begins at home" philosophy is the cry of the American consumer about rising food prices and the rapid and obvious response of Congress and the executive branch to this pressure. The first response with direct international implications to the pleas of the American consumer was the invocation of export controls on some American farm products. At this writing soybeans are the crop principally affected, but controls on wheat and feed grains are being discussed. The soybean controls will cause shortages in Japan, the largest market for American farm products overseas.

Another very alarming response by the United States to the food shortage was the decision announced by the Department of Agriculture in mid-August that private United States relief agencies like CARE and Catholic Relief Services will not get supplies of wheat, flour, vegetable oil, and other foodstuffs in August and possibly September under the Food for Peace program. Since 1954 these private agencies have received these relief goods without cost after they had been purchased by the Department of Agriculture from surpluses. Public Law 480 states that the Administration must first satisfy domestic requirements, including aid for poor Americans, must meet foreign sales commitments, and provide a carryover of supplies before distributing foodstuffs to the agencies. The agencies claim that if they are unable to obtain supplies in October their distribution systems will break down. The agencies aid about 80 million people in 100 countries. Spokesmen for the agencies are appealing for a policy which would set aside 1 per cent of the allocation for sales abroad for the Food for Peace program. These agencies have provided another opportunity for charity.

The onus for not responding with charity to these appeals for help cannot finally be placed on Congress or the White House. In an interview in The New York Times (August 20, 1973), John M. Hennessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, discussed American responsibilities in the developing nations. He said, "one of our problems is that the people in Congress never hear from home about this."
A Review Essay (Part II) of

A STATEMENT OF SCRIPTURAL AND CONFESSIONAL PRINCIPLES.

You have, however, often heard that there is no better way of preserving pure doctrine and passing it on than the way we ourselves follow, that is, we divide Christian doctrine into two parts: the Law and the Gospel.


AN EXTENDED REVIEW OF LARGE SECTIONS of A Statement was published in The Cresset (May, 1973). In that review we acknowledged that many of the questions raised by Article IV of A Statement, particularly those raised by Sections F, G, H, and I, require closer attention than we were able to give them at that time. This second review essay fulfills our promise to give closer attention to the questions raised by these sections of A Statement.

Friendly critics of our first essay have suggested that the issues need to be drawn even more sharply and clearly than in the first essay. They have encouraged us to write for the layman, not for the technically trained theologian, and to explain our terminology as simply as possible. We have taken those suggestions seriously. However these sections of A Statement present special difficulties in this regard. They are written as though the issues were simple. However, they are not simple.

These sections deal with abstruse questions of a technical nature that can finally be understood only in terms of the historical context in which they developed, and in terms of the various answers to these questions which theologians have proposed and tested. Because A Statement does not take this historical context into account, A Statement is helpful neither in identifying and analyzing the serious theological questions that concern all Christians nor in focusing the resources of Lutheran theology on their resolution. Now that A Statement has been adopted by a synodical convention, these weaknesses will become increasingly clear. Supporters of A Statement will now have to demonstrate that A Statement provides an adequate basis for teaching and pastoral work, and that it helps the church to respond evangelically to the questions that arise out of her life and work.

In order to achieve greater clarity, we begin our essay with an introductory analysis in which we attempt to give clear and precise formulations to our basic concerns. Then we discuss the last four sections of Article IV of A Statement, following the pattern established in our previous essay.

Article IV of A Statement does not adequately present the doctrine of Scripture. On the surface it seems to say what Lutheran theologians have said frequently. It even repeats many familiar phrases and sentences. In its

October, 1973
totality, however, *A Statement* radically distorts the meaning of those familiar phrases and sentences. This distortion results from a shift in the basic theological context. For Lutheran theologians generally, theological statements have been made, and pastoral work done, in the larger context of the Lutheran distinction between the Law and the Gospel. Theologians of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod have been particularly insistent on explicit discussion of, and agreement on, this context. But *A Statement* operates in a different context. Instead of a context governed by the distinction between the Law and the Gospel, *A Statement* erects a context governed alternately by a distinction between Gospel and History, Gospel and Scripture, and the formal and material principles. Given such a change of context, familiar words and sentences no longer have the same meaning they once had. Although *A Statement* contains an article entitled “Law and Gospel,” that article only inadequately reproduces the teaching of the Lutheran Confessions. The proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel does not function as the governing context for the other doctrines treated in *A Statement*.

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One of the most striking illustrations of *A Statement*’s deviations from the Lutheran Confessions is apparent in its teaching about the Law. Frequently it says nothing about the Law, as for example in Article III, where it attempts to discuss the mission of the church without reference to the church’s proclamation of the Law. And even when *A Statement* does refer to the Law, it fails to take the Law seriously as always accusing and always calling the hearer to repentance—as though there could be a merely instructive function of the Law. The question is not whether the Law is instructive; it is always instructive. The question is whether the Law is ever *only* instructive. By speaking so frequently about the Law, apart from its accusing function, *A Statement* implies that the Law is sometimes only instructive. It does not understand that the whole life of the Christian is one of repentance (the first of Luther’s 95 Theses) and that, for that reason, the Gospel must be addressed to the Christian at every point of his life. Instead, *A Statement* implies that there are situations in which the Law informs without accusing, situations to which one therefore need not address the Gospel. Not only does such an assertion of a Gospel-free area in the life of the Christian encourage legalistic and moralistic styles of church administration and pastoral care, it also encourages the Christian to think of himself as having an area of life in which he does not need the forgiveness of sins. Faith which trusts the forgiveness of sins would not be relevant to such an area of life.

*A Statement* makes assertions about the Bible that ignore the distinction between the Law and the Gospel. That is consistent with *A Statement*’s general failure to employ the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel as the governing context of its theology. *A Statement* thus implies that the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel has nothing to do with assertions about the Bible; it implies rather that assertions about the Bible are prior to, and independent of, the distinction between the Law and the Gospel.

**The truth of the Law and the truth of the Gospel are two different kinds of truth and must be properly distinguished.**

To illustrate our point: *A Statement* asserts that the Bible is true, as if there were only one kind of truth. This is simply not so. The truth of the Law and the truth of the Gospel are two different kinds of truth and must be properly distinguished. The Law reveals man’s sin and God’s wrath. It is true because I am a sinner and am under the wrath of God, whether I ever hear the Law or not. However, the truth of the Gospel is quite different. It does not describe what I the sinner am, but it describes God’s gracious promises. Through the proclamation of the Gospel, the Holy Spirit creates and strengthens the hearer’s faith in God. The man who hears the Gospel and believes in God is no longer under the condemnation of God, but under his grace and mercy. The truth of the Gospel is thus radically different from the truth of the Law. The Law is true because it accurately describes man as sinner under the judgment of God. The truth of the Gospel is a different kind of truth. It has its source in the truthfulness of the gracious God who gives what he promises. Through the proclamation of the Gospel God creates a new man who is no longer accurately described by the Law. Because *A Statement* bypasses this distinction, it confuses the Law and the Gospel by reducing them to the same kind of word of God. All that *A Statement* says about the truth of the Bible, therefore, is inadequate and needs careful revision in the light of the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel.

Because *A Statement* assumes that the Law and the Gospel are true in the same way, it also implies that they are to be believed in the same way. Such an undifferentiated notion of faith is sternly rebuked by the Lutheran Confessions; they want to distinguish saving faith from any other kind of faith. The Apology of the Augsburg Confession (IV, 48; Tappert, pp. 113 f.) says:

Our opponents imagine that faith is historical knowledge. . . . The faith that justifies, however, is no mere historical knowledge, but the firm acceptance of God’s offer promising forgiveness of sins and justification. To avoid the impression that it is merely knowledge, we add that to have faith means to want and to accept the promised offer of forgiveness of sins and justification.
As Lutherans, we are therefore not free to speak about believing the Bible in any way which obscures this distinction. And any summary of confessional principles, such as *A Statement*, must clearly assert this distinction and make actual use of it.

Unfortunately, *A Statement* is not formulated in a way which will help us understand or preserve this distinction. For the distinction between saving faith and historical knowledge depends on the larger context of the distinction between the Law and the Gospel. *A Statement* however, operates out of the quite different context of the non-confessional distinction between the so-called formal and material principles. As a result, *A Statement* does not clarify that there is a radical difference between saving faith which trusts God and historical faith which believes that some or all of the various statements in the Bible are true. Nor does it help us to see that this latter historical faith is the same kind of faith which believes the Law when it describes the historical fact of my sinfulness and my historical experience of the wrath of God. *A Statement* thus does not help us apply the distinction between the Law and the Gospel to the way in which we believe.

As a result, *A Statement* does not give us any help in responding pastorally to one of the major problems of our age, the problem of doubt. Its authoritarian assertion of a supposed formal authority of the Scripture (formal principle) only makes matters worse. For we can make a pastoral response to doubt only if we recognize its character as not trusting in God. Such doubt is the natural condition of the sinner, particularly of the sinner who believes that the Law is true. The man who believes the condemnation of the Law cannot trust God because the Law tells him that he cannot. Such a man is not helped by insistence that the great fish really did regurgitate Jonah. He is not even helped when we tell him, and he accepts, the truth of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical fact. That is still doubt; it is not yet saving faith. The response of the people to Peter’s Pentecost sermon (Acts 2:29–42) is a good example of this. For all of its emphasis on authority, *A Statement* is remarkably unaware of the real problem of doubt in the church and in the world, and remarkably insensitive to the terrors of conscience which accompany believing the Law. It is therefore a poor guide to a church which needs to learn to respond to doubt through a more effective proclamation of the Gospel.

*A Statement’s* concern that Christians should believe all the right things, even when the truth or falsehood of such information makes no difference for the sinner’s condemnation by the Law or his forgiveness through the good news about Jesus, is neither Lutheran nor pastoral. As pastors and teachers, we have seen too many young Christians thrown into a crisis of faith because every intellectual question about the Bible was immediately equated with not believing in God. These young people came to college thinking that they were Christians because they believed the Bible. They imagined that it is more Christian to think in terms of a six-day creation than not; they imagined that it is more Christian to affirm that Noah’s flood covered the whole earth than to question it. Such young people have been programmed for unbelief. And we have repeatedly seen these young Christians come to the conclusion that they were poor Christians, or even not Christians at all, because they could no longer fit the six-day creation or the firmament or Jonah’s fish into the world in which they live.

We are not unaware that *A Statement* rejects the view: “That the acceptance of the Bible as such, rather than the Gospel, is the heart and center of Christian faith and theology, and the way to eternal salvation” (Article IV, Section C, Antithesis #1; Study Edition, p. 29b). That very language however reveals *A Statement’s* limited perspective on the problem. It is not enough to say that “acceptance of the Bible as such” is not “the heart and center of the Christian faith.” “Acceptance of the Bible as such” is not Christian faith at all. “The heart and center of Christian faith” is not “acceptance of the Bible” but rather trust in God’s promises. And acceptance of the biblical proclamation of the Law is never “the way to eternal salvation.” Acceptance of the Law leads either to pride or despair, unless the proclamation of the Law is properly interrupted by the proclamation of the Gospel.

We therefore suggest a positive reformulation of the antithesis quoted at the beginning of the preceding paragraph:

We assert therefore that the Bible as such is never the object of saving faith. Only the Gospel is the object of saving faith. The Law is true, but its truth leads to pride or despair and not to eternal salvation. Christians are distinguished therefore, not by their acceptance of the whole Bible, but by their trust in the gracious God revealed in the Lord Jesus. This trust is created by the proclamation of the Gospel. It is radically different from believing the Law. It trusts God in spite of the Law’s true description and condemnation of the man who does not believe the Gospel.

There is, however, another sense in which *A Statement’s* claim to be *A Statement of Scriptural and Confessional Principles* requires revision. Large sections of its teaching about the Scripture are neither scriptural nor confessional. These are merely traditional; that is, large sections of *A Statement’s* teachings about the Scripture are neither scriptural nor confessional. These sections are merely traditional.

they reproduce theological opinions about the Bible which frequently have been taught in the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. We acknowledge that traditional teachings may be correct. They are, however, in principle always open to revision and correction. And neither their antiquity nor their universality converts
them into confessional principles. *A Statement* does not serve the church well by presenting so many traditional teachings without clearly indicating that they are neither scriptural nor confessional. We must, therefore, carefully draw the boundaries of scriptural and confessional teaching about the Scripture before we can adequately discuss these sections of *A Statement*.

It is a remarkable, but often over-looked, fact that the Old and New Testaments say absolutely nothing about the entire Bible. There are statements about the Old Testament and statements about individual books or about specific sections of a book, but there is no Scriptural teaching about the Bible as such.

THE LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS, HOWEVER, do make two assertions about the Bible. They acknowledge it as the norm of all teaching and life in the church. And they assert that the Bible can be properly understood only if the Law and the Gospel are properly distinguished.

Every other assertion about the whole Bible in Lutheran theology is a matter of tradition, not doctrine. It is either a theological interpretation of a particular biblical passage, and such interpretations are—except when they repeat the two confessional assertions about the Bible already noted—always traditional; or it is a traditional theological opinion. To a very large extent, therefore, *A Statement's* article on the Bible is made up of teachings that are neither scriptural nor confessional, but only traditional, and therefore subject to critical examination.

When we look at the church's teaching about the Scripture, it is a surprising, but undeniable, fact that there is no dogma about the Scripture until the sixteenth century. This is particularly surprising in view of the decisive role which the Bible has always played in preaching, worship, and theology. Still, there is no official assertion about the Scripture prior to the Reformers' assertion that all Scripture is to be divided into the Law and the Gospel. The substance of that assertion conflicted with the interpretation of the Scripture generally recognized in the Roman Church. The Reformers could dare to contradict the prevailing interpretations because they were convinced that there is no authoritative interpretation of the Scripture apart from the Scripture itself. They thereby challenged the claim of the Roman Church to have the authority to issue binding interpretations of the Scripture. The Lutheran Reformers also revived the distinction between the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament and the thirty-nine books of the Jewish canon adopted by the Rabbis at the end of the first century A.D., as well as the distinction between those books of the New Testament generally accepted by the early church as apostolic and those seven, called antilegomena, about which there was some doubt (Hebrews, James, 2 and 3 John, 2 Peter, Jude, and Revelation).

The Roman Church responded at the Council of Trent (Session IV, April 8, 1546) by defining its claim authoritatively to interpret Scripture through the tradition and the teaching office of the Roman Church. It also established the authority of tradition alongside the Scripture, and exercised its teaching office by dogmatically defining an absolutely certain canon, including most of the Old Testament Apocrypha.

Calvinist Churches responded to the decree of the Council of Trent with authoritative definitions of their own canon of thirty-nine Old Testament and twenty-seven New Testament books. The Lutheran Confessions, in contrast, refuse to define a canon. They insist that the real issue is the proclamation of the Law and of the Gospel.

The Roman theologians would not accept the Lutheran agenda. They insisted that the meaning of the Bible is not always clear, and that it is not always consistent about the details of what happened. Since God's word is by definition infallible, they insisted that the Lutherans produce an infallible source for their teaching. The Romans for their part were clear that they had such an infallible source in the teaching office of the Roman Church. Unfortunately, seventeenth-century Lutheran theologians gave in to this kind of pressure. They accepted the validity of the Roman demand and asserted the infallibility of the Bible. That is an understandable rejection of the pretensions of the Roman Church's teaching office, but represents an unfortunate shift in the theological agenda. It is the historical beginning of the traditional teachings about Scripture found in *A Statement*. (For a fuller discussion of this development and its terminological problems, see Arthur Carl Piepkorn, "What Does 'Inerrancy' Mean?" *Concordia Theological Monthly*, XXXVI (September, 1965), 577-593).

The development has been further complicated since the eighteenth century when rationalist theologians presented a Protestant variation of the Roman argument. Rationalists and Romans both denied the sufficiency of Scripture. Like the Romans, the rationalists also asserted a teaching office that stood above the Scripture—not the teaching office of the church but of reason as the guide to all truth. By the authority of reason, the rationalists proclaimed a new gospel of morality in place of the apostolic Gospel of the forgiveness of sins. Because the apostolic preaching of the Gospel did not agree with the moralism of reason, these rationalist theologians rejected the Gospel as superstition.

Since Lutheran theologians had asserted the infallibility of Scripture as the validation of the truth of the Gospel, the rationalist theologians did everything they could to prove that the Scripture is fallible. Given the terms of the argument as defined by the Lutherans, the rationalists could justify their rejection of the Gospel by asserting that the Bible is fallible. If the Lutheran theologians had not asserted the infallibility of Scripture as the validation of the truth of the Gospel, the rationalists' argument from the fallibility of the Bible to the incredibility of the Gospel would have had no value.
Incidentally, we owe these rationalist theologians a real debt of thanks because their zeal to prove the fallibility of the Bible caused them to produce our dictionaries of the biblical languages, to lay the foundations for textual criticism of the ordinarily accepted texts, and to develop the methods of biblical archaeology. We may disagree about whether we also owe them our thanks for developing the techniques of historical criticism, but about the former there will hardly be any disagreement.

Unfortunately, evangelical theologians at the time responded to these rationalist theologians by further developing the position their predecessors had taken over against the Roman theologians. They did not recognize that the argument was ultimately not about the Bible but about the Gospel. Thus the traditional seventeenth-century teaching about the infallibility of Scripture became less and less Gospel-related. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, we have the interesting spectacle of rationalist theologians arguing with supranaturalist theologians about the miracles. The supranaturalist theologians argued that there had been miracles. The rationalist theologians denied the possibility. Both groups, however, agreed in rejecting the Lutheran Reformers' understanding of the Gospel of the forgiveness of sins. They thought that it was very important for them to decide the question of miracles.

Many nineteenth century Lutheran theologians made a decisive movement back to the Lutheran Confessions by combining the supranaturalist position with the simultaneous emphasis on the confessional distinction between the Law and the Gospel.

Over against such a distortion of the Reformers' agenda, many nineteenth century Lutheran theologians, such as Martin Stephan and C.F.W. Walther, made a decisive movement back to the Lutheran Confessions by combining the supranaturalist position with the simultaneous emphasis on the confessional distinction between the Law and the Gospel. Unfortunately, A Statement represents an erosion of this confessional emphasis on distinguishing the Law and the Gospel and returns to the one-sided emphasis on the infallibility of Scripture which was traditional in Lutheranism at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

We therefore have two kinds of criticism of A Statement's presentation of the traditional teachings about the Scripture which have developed in Lutheran theology since the seventeenth century. The first criticism is that A Statement inadequately presents even the traditional teaching because it dissociates it from the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel. Second, we criticize A Statement for its failure to recognize that the traditional teachings about the Scripture which have developed since the beginning of the seventeenth century are no longer adequate. We for our part assert that it is necessary for Lutherans to acknowledge the intent of these traditions in their historical context but to recognize their theological inadequacy today. That recognition sets us free to go back to the Confessions and to make a fresh start in our teaching about the Scripture that will follow through on the Reformers' own agenda of asserting the normative authority of a Scripture properly distinguished as Law and Gospel.

Section IV. Holy Scripture

F. The Infallibility of Scripture

With Luther, we confess that "God's Word cannot err" (LC, IV, 57). We therefore believe, teach, and confess that since the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God, they contain no errors or contradictions but that they are in all their parts and words the infallible truth. We hold that the opinion that Scripture contains errors is a violation of the sola scriptura principle, for it rests upon the acceptance of some norm or criterion of truth above the Scriptures. We recognize that there are apparent contradictions or discrepancies and problems which arise because of uncertainty over the original text.

We reject the following views:
1. That the Scriptures contain theological as well as factual contradictions and errors.
2. That the Scriptures are inerrant only in matters pertaining directly to the Gospel message of salvation.
3. That the Scriptures are only functionally inerrant, that is, that the Scriptures are "inerrant" only in the sense that they accomplish their aim of bringing the Gospel of salvation to men.
4. That the Biblical authors accommodated themselves to using and repeating as true the erroneous notions of their day (for example, the claim that Paul's statements on the role of women in the church are not binding today because they are the culturally conditioned result of the apostle's sharing the views of contemporary Judaism as a child of his time).
5. That statements of Jesus and the New Testament writers concerning the human authorship of portions of the Old Testament or the historicity of certain Old Testament persons and events need not be regarded as true (for example, the Davidic authorship of Psalm 110, the historicity of Jonah, or the fall of Adam and Eve).
6. That only those aspects of a Biblical statement need to be regarded as true that are in keeping with the alleged intent of the passage (for example, that Paul's statements about Adam and Eve in Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 11 do not prove the historicity of Adam and Eve because this was not the specific intent of the apostle; or that the virgin birth of our Lord may be denied because the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke did not have the specific intent to discuss a biological miracle).
7. That Jesus did not make some of the statements or perform some of the deeds attributed to him in the Gospels but that they were in fact invented or created by the early Christian community or the evangelists to meet their specific needs.
8. That the Biblical authors sometimes placed statements into the mouths of people who in fact did not make them (for example, the claim that the "Deuteronomist"
places a speech in Solomon's mouth which Solomon never actually made), or that they relate events as having actually taken place that did not in fact occur (for example, the fall of Adam and Eve, the crossing of the Red Sea on dry land, the episode of the brazen serpent, Jesus' cursing of the fig tree, John the Baptist's experiences in the wilderness, Jesus' changing water into wine, Jesus' walking on water, or even Jesus' bodily resurrection from the dead or the fact of His empty tomb).

9. That the use of certain "literary forms" necessarily calls into question the historicity of that which is being described (for example, that the alleged midrashic form of the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke suggests that no virgin birth actually occurred, or that the literary form of Genesis 3 argues against the historicity of the Fall).

A STATEMENT HAS ALREADY LAID THE foundation for its assertion of the infallibility of Scripture in its thesis on the inspiration of Scripture. Section A asserted the following:

We believe, teach and confess that all Scripture is given by the inspiration of God the Holy Spirit, and that God is therefore the true Author of every word of Scripture. We acknowledge that there is a qualitative difference between the inspired witness of Holy Scripture and the witness of every other form of human expression, making the Bible a unique book.

The thesis that all Scripture is inspired by God becomes the basis for a chain of inferences: (a) that God is therefore the true Author of every word of Scripture. We acknowledge that there is a qualitative difference between the inspired witness of Holy Scripture and the witness of every other form of human expression, making the Bible a unique book.

Secondly, 2 Timothy 3:16 uses a word that is translated "inspired by God." The simple philological fact is that that word cannot be clearly defined; it occurs nowhere else in all of our traditional Bible. Hence, the word stands there as a kind of empty verbal vessel into which many have poured their own content of meaning. A Statement capitalizes upon this imprecision. An unspecified Scripture is now confessed to be inspired; that much is Scriptural. But inspiration is then said to hold a necessary three-fold content of meaning: (a) that God is the true Author of every word of Scripture; (b) that the Scriptures are qualitatively different from every other form of human expression; and (c) that the Scripture is infallible.

These traditional interpretations may or may not be valid. But the test of the validity of these traditional interpretations cannot be an appeal to the word translated "inspired by God," for its very imprecision raises the question as to its meaning. There are a number of tests that could be applied, but the one test that in any case must be applied is the coherence of A Statement's proposed meanings with the rest of the Scripture. (By Scripture we here grant the tradition of sixty-six books without raising again the fundamental problem of the canon.)

What other Scripture passages compel us to say that God is "the true Author of every word of Scripture" (emphasis added)? There is no scriptural polemic against alleged false authors of traditional Scripture. Paul distinguishes between what the Lord commanded him to say, and what he said on his own authority, 1 Corinthians 7:25. No scriptural author claims God's true authorship of the whole Bible. And yet A Statement wants the church to think that "inspired" obviously means that "God is the true Author of every word of Scripture"! We can accept that as a traditional interpretation of Scripture, but it is an interpretation which must be clearly distinguished from what the Scriptures claim for themselves.

Does the suggestion that "inspired" implies a qualitative difference between Scripture and every other form of human expression find scriptural support? We have already shown in our previous review that it does not. When the Bible teaches the forgiveness of sins, it does not differ qualitatively from the words with which Jesus Christ himself pronounced the forgiveness of sins before the apostolic Scripture was written. And by the same token, when, after the apostolic Scripture was written, called pastors speak the absolution, we are invited to believe those words "as if Christ our dear Lord dealt with us himself." Again we must insist that A Statement confuses its traditional interpretation of Scripture with what the Scripture itself teaches.

The Cresset
NOW IN SECTION F A STATEMENT COMES to its crowning inference, the infallibility of the Scripture. Such an assertion appears nowhere in any of the biblical books, canonical or apocryphal. All of this massive unclarity is now summarized and presented to us with the introductory statement in Section F: "With Luther, we confess that 'God's Word cannot err.'" We agree most heartily. However, when A Statement then goes on to say, "We therefore believe, teach, and confess that since the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God, they contain no errors or contradictions but that they are in all their parts and words the infallible truth," it says something that neither Luther nor any biblical author says. This is nothing more nor less than the restatement of a tradition and the considered theological opinion of the authors of A Statement.

This theological opinion would, at first glance, seem to be supported by John 10:35. This passage is quoted several times in the Study Edition (for example, pp. 21a, 24a, 27a, and 32a), a fact which reflects how deeply this use of the passage is embedded in the tradition. However there are problems with the maxim, "The Scripture cannot be broken," which do not at first appear. If A Statement wants to apply this maxim to all of Scripture, it must begin by applying it to the Scripture which Jesus cites. What is the unbreakable teaching of Psalm 82? Does Psalm 82 teach that God sits in the midst of a heavenly council of lesser gods? Or, alternatively, does it teach that God, in addressing his word to men, converts men into gods, so as to eliminate the difference between men and the gods, thereby removing the ground from the Jewish charge that Jesus spoke blasphemy? The suggestion that Psalm 82 refers to men who are called gods because they exercise "divine" administrative functions is countered by the willingness of early Christians to die rather than address the Roman Emperor as "god." Perhaps there are other possibilities which we did not uncover in our examination of the traditional interpretations of this unbreakable Scripture. Our examination of the traditional citations of the maxim "Scripture cannot be broken," in any case, failed to reveal any instance in which it is interpreted in a way that simultaneously takes both Psalm 82 and Jesus' argument with his opponents seriously. Any adequate interpretation of this text (John 10:35) must meet these criteria.

Thus this section rests on a chain of theological reasoning that stands under A Statement's own condemnation of those who develop their doctrine of Scripture on the basis of "some norm or criterion of truth above the Scriptures." Note well that the traditional assertion that Scripture cannot err stands "above Scripture" as much as would the assertion that it must err. The only way to speak about the Scripture from below the Scripture is to submit oneself to hearing what the Scripture actually says. If it does in fact never err, then we may safely conclude that it does not err. If, however, it does give us two names for the man who slew Goliath (1 Samuel 17; 2 Samuel 21:19; 1 Chronicles 20:5), or two somewhat varying descriptions of a miracle, or if it confuses the text of an Old Testament quotation, then that is what it does. We have no right to eliminate any possibility in principle.

Nor does anyone have the right to impose his theological opinion on others by claiming to have some superior insight into the Scripture which permits him to know that some passages are intended as literal and historical truth and others are not. However, that is what this traditional approach increasingly requires. Apparently, for this reason the Study Edition on at least three occasions (pp. 22b, 26a, and 33a) reprints the same quotation from the Statement on Scripture adopted by the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod in 1959:

Where Scripture speaks historically, as for example in Gen. 1 to 3, it must be understood as speaking of literal, historical facts. Where Scripture speaks symbolically, metaphorically, or metonymically, as for example in Rev. 20, it must be interpreted on these its own terms. Furthermore, since God spoke in the common language of man, expressions such as sunrise and sunset, the corners of the earth, etc., must not be viewed as intending to convey scientific information (Ps. 119:105; 2 Peter 1:19; 2 Tim. 3:15).

However, we are not given adequate basis for making such fine distinctions. The 1999 Statement on Scripture says "that every statement of Scripture must be understood in its native sense, according to grammar, context, and linguistic usage of the time" (Study Edition, p. 33a). Those matters, however, can be decided only according to the best opinion of our biblical scholars, and such opinions are subject to change. For example, it is easy to understand from the text that 2 Peter 1:19 must not be understood literally; but by whose authority must 2 Peter 1:21, just a few lines later in the passage, be taken quite literally as a clear definition for a certain doctrine of inspiration? Similarly, we are told that 2 Timothy 3:15 is not to be understood as conveying "scientific information"; but the continuation of that sentence in the famous text about inspiration, 2 Timothy 3:16-17—despite its imprecision—is to be taken quite soberly as a proof text for the inspiration and infallibility of the Bible! Such assertions can be made only on the basis of principles imposed on the Scripture from above; they would surely not dawn on someone who derived his doctrinal statements about the Bible from the Bible.

THE FAILURE OF THIS SECTION TO ACKNOWLEDGE that it works with such a chain of assertions based on tradition, rather than the Scriptures or Confessions, makes the study of it difficult and analysis complicated. The antitheses (5-9) reveal the diversity of purpose of A Statement's use of its teaching on infallibility. None of these instructs the church about the truth of the proclamation of God's Law and God's Gospel. Rather,
A Statement is preoccupied with a massive structure designed to support the traditional assertion that everything in the Bible, no matter what the topic, is necessarily infallible.

We are well aware of the need for careful attention to, and restatement of, the doctrine of Scripture that will respond to the kinds of questions which arise out of the life and work of the church today. Erosion of the authority of the Scriptures, the relation of that authority to the faith and life of the church and her members, and the quest for certainty are issues vital to all Christians, not merely to a few in the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. Such questions ought not be dealt with frivolously or arrogantly. At the same time, there is also a danger of turning the word of God into a predetermined principle and the certainty of faith into security. The incriminating Law is received not with repentance but with a show of zeal about the book in which the Law of God is written. Faith in God’s promise to deliver believers from sin, and from death can be abandoned by clinging to the traditional principle of the infallibility of the book in which the promises of God are written. The conviction about the infallible book thus becomes the object to which faith clings. Such faith is not saving faith which receives from God the grace actually offered in his infallibly true promises. Precisely for that reason we criticize the use A Statement makes of infallibility, because it removes the stumbling block of the cross from the message. The appropriate response to uncertainty and doubt is the pastoral proclamation of the Law or the Gospel, not further insistence on the infallibility of the Scripture.

We, too, confess that the Bible is the word of God. But it is not scriptural to ascribe to the Bible those predicates that are appropriate only to the word of God. Consider the following examples. The Bible says of the word of God, “Forever, O Lord, Thy word is firmly fixed in the heavens” (Psalm 119:89). That is not said about written texts. The original texts have long since disappeared, and it is a simple fact that Bibles wear out. In the holocaust of the last day, texts and books will be consumed. Nevertheless, the Bible says, “The word of the Lord abides for ever” (1 Peter 1:25). What the Scripture predicates of the word of God cannot be predicated of the Bible unless the Scripture itself make such an assertion.

A Statement furthermore is concerned only about “apparent contradictions or discrepancies which arise because of uncertainty over the original text.” Of course there are textual difficulties, but most of them can be easily resolved. There are also discrepancies which cannot be traced to textual uncertainty. A Statement ignores these. But even these are of minor importance when compared with the contradictions between the Law and the Gospel, which Luther and Pieper call “more than contradictory” (Christian Dogmatics III, 250). God’s infallible word (as Law) says in the Scripture, “Cursed is the ground because of you; . . . to dust you shall return.” “Cursed be he who does not confirm the words of this Law by doing them.” And “The soul that sins shall die.” The same Scripture (as trustworthy promises to sinners) says, “He who believes in me, though he die, yet shall he live, and whoever lives and believes in me shall never die.” God’s curse contradicts man’s God-created life; it sentences him to death and puts him into the grave. God’s blessing on man through the promises fulfilled in Jesus Christ contradicts his curse; it raises to eternal life those who believe in him about whom the promises speak. So dread is this contradiction that souls need constant nourishment in the blessing which contradicts the curse. These things are plainly taught in the Scripture; why, then, turn people aside from this real and great contradiction to argue about “apparent” contradictions that arise from problems in textual criticism? A Statement leads the reader to strain out a gnat and swallow a camel.

The Scripture, especially in those sections that deal with inspiration, underscores that the purpose of inspiration is clear interpretation (2 Peter 1:20-21) and equipping the man of God for every good work (2 Timothy 3:16-17). The one point of emphasis in both passages has to do with the function of the Scripture! Since inspiration and infallibility are linked together by A Statement, we can only regret that it has so little to say about the function of Scripture. Antithesis #3 does not adequately discuss the questions raised about infallibility when the function of Scripture is seen as Law and Gospel. It would be better to follow the texts on inspiration. But because of its concern for traditions about infallibility, A Statement ignores the thrust of these passages. Any assertion about infallibility must be integrally connected with the function of the word of God which he sends out to do what he pleases and to accomplish that which he purposes (Isaiah 55).

The Scripture is most surely God’s gift to the church; it is rule and norm for the life and teaching in the church. It is inspired in word, thought and content as was also the apostolic preaching of those who wrote it. But it was written to be used as a necessary safeguard against false teaching, to stir the memory and correct it. A clear text from Scripture must support that which we assert as binding doctrine. Traditions, even ancient traditions, will not suffice. Jesus warned against “teaching for doctrines the precepts of men.”

Because A Statement does not develop its doctrine of Scripture within the context of the confessional distinction between the Law and the Gospel, it inappropriately focuses the church’s attention on questions about infallibility. We suggest this alternative to A Statement’s thesis as one possibility and as a basis for discussion:

With Luther, we confess that “God’s Word cannot err.” God’s word is spoken to us through the proclamation of the Law and of the Gospel, which we hear whenever we read the prophetic and apostolic Scripture, and when we listen to the preaching.
of the church. The Law, which condemns our sin and reveals God’s wrath, is always holy and true, that is, it always accurately describes our situation in relation to God apart from Christ. The Gospel, the good news that God has forgiven and continues to forgive our sins is also a true word of God. With Luther and Pieper, we recognize that this Gospel is “more than contradictory” of the Law. Yet we confess the Gospel to be true, because we trust that God is faithful and true to his promises, and that he has fulfilled and continues to fulfill these promises through our Lord Jesus Christ.

Any such discussion of the doctrine of Scripture within the context of the confessional distinction between the Law and the Gospel frees us from the necessity of preserving traditional doctrines about infallibility that have lost their usefulness, and even to recognize that they were less than adequate when they were first formulated. We are free to reach these conclusions without fear because we are bound only to the Scripture and to the Confessions as the norm of our teaching.

G. The Unity of Scripture

We believe, teach, and confess that since the same God speaks throughout Holy Scripture, there is an organic unity both within and between the Old and New Testaments. While acknowledging the rich variety of language and style in Scripture and recognizing differences of emphasis in various accounts of the same event or topic, we nevertheless affirm that the same doctrine of the Gospel, in all its articles, is presented throughout the entire Scripture. We reject the view that Holy Scripture, both within and between its various books and authors, presents us with conflicting or contradictory teachings and theologies. We regard this view not only as violating the Scripture’s own understanding of itself but also as making it impossible for the church to have and confess a unified theological position that is truly Biblical and evangelical.

THE ASSERTION THAT SCRIPTURE IS A UNITY requires a clear statement about its parts. A Statement cannot make a meaningful assertion of the unity of Scripture for two reasons. First, A Statement offers no scriptural basis for a canon or list of books which actually are the parts of the inspired and infallible Scripture and which comprise the unity of the Scripture. Without such a list, apodictic assertions about the unity of Old and New Testaments communicate more piety than information. The Study Edition (p. 28a) anticipates this problem and quotes an interesting assertion from the 1959 Statement on Scripture (III):

Scripture being the Word of God, it carries its own authority in itself and does not receive it by the approbation of the church. The Canon, that is, that collection of books which is the authority for the church, is not the creation of the church. Rather, the Canon has, by a quiet historical process which took place in the worship life of the church, imposed itself upon the church by virtue of its own divine authority.

This is an unexceptionable assertion until it is placed in the context of A Statement’s theology. Certainly the “quiet historical process” which established the canon was neither inspired nor irreversible. For it is that process which included the Old Testament Apocrypha in the church’s canon. And the Lutheran Reformers could both use the Apocrypha as authoritative and distinguish them from more authoritative books in ways which are foreign to A Statement. Because the limits of the canon remain fluid, it is hazardous to make inclusive statements about its contents. We have no intention of offering any simple resolution of the problem of the canon; we merely note that A Statement bypasses the problem but yet speaks as though it had been solved.

Second, and more importantly, A Statement makes much of the fact that “the same God speaks throughout the Scripture.” We do not know anyone who doubts that there is only one God who speaks—even though we have above admitted to some uncertainty as to whether he is speaking through a particular piece of literature such as Antilegomena and Apocrypha. We are not polytheists. However, we are Lutherans; and as Lutherans we have always confessed that this same God has had more than one thing to say to man. Sometimes he has spoken Law; sometimes he has spoken Gospel. As Lutherans we have always understood that those are not two ways of saying the same thing, but two quite different communications from God.

As Lutherans we have promised to maintain the distinction between the Law and the Gospel. Out of responsibility to our oath of ordination and as teachers in the church we find the assertion of “organic unity” between the Law and the Gospel to be intolerable—at least among confessional Lutherans. There is indeed continuity between the various proclamations of God’s promises and of the Gospel. However these promises and the Gospel are not all that is “presented throughout the entire Scripture.” The Law is also presented in the Scripture, and it is presented very frequently. As a result we must reject the assertion of an “organic unity” within either the Old or the New Testament. The word of God which we find there is not in an organic unity but in a dialectical relationship. Where we hear the Law, we do not hear the Gospel; and where we hear the Gospel, we do not hear the Law.

The compiler of the Study Edition (p. 35) seems to be aware of a possible problem. He therefore selects passages from the Lutheran Confessions which emphasize the distinction between the Law and the Gospel. None of these passages, however, says anything about an “organic unity” of Scripture. Taken seriously, they require a thorough revision of this section of A Statement.

The attempt to establish an “organic” or a “higher unity” of the entire Scripture is not original with A
In explanation, Pieper says:

God's justice sentences sinners to Hell; His grace declares the same sinners in the same condition heirs of salvation. How both properties, or "traits," form a "higher unity" in the one indivisible God exceeds our comprehension. Scripture does not elucidate the matter beyond saying that the gracious verdict of the Gospel upon the sinners condemned by the Law is mediated in God... through the redemption... which is in Christ Jesus. Let us, then, beware of making the Gospel's promise of grace dependent upon something in man... such as correct conduct, personal free choice, etc. We would, indeed, thus gain a "higher unity" for Law and Gospel, namely, the higher unity of human efforts, but we would thereby lose the differentia specifica (the unique characteristic) of Christianity, the Gospel, which alone can save our souls" (Christian Dogmatics, III, 250-251).

A Statement properly recognizes both "the rich variety of language and style in Scripture" and "differences of emphasis in various accounts of the same event or topic." It is important to remember, for example, that the statement of the promise changed from one Old Testament period to the next, even though the ultimate meaning of the promise did not change. For this reason, we would welcome a revision of this section of A Statement which would speak not of the unity of Scripture but of the unity of the Law and the unity of the Gospel in all their historical proclamations.

Until we have such a revision we shall put the best construction on the confusion of the Law and the Gospel in this section and conclude that its authors simply forgot about the distinction between the Law and the Gospel when they wrote it. Such an oversight, however, is no light matter in a document designed to set a standard for confessional teaching in the church. And we are not at all sure whether it is any better construction on such a statement by a Lutheran theologian to say that he forgot about the distinction between the Law and the Gospel than to say that his eagerness to make a point caused him to confuse the Law and the Gospel in his statement.

The second paragraph is equally puzzling. The authors of A Statement "reject the view that Holy Scripture, both within and between its various books and authors, presents us with conflicting or contradictory teachings and theologies." Surely the authors of this section are not unaware that teachers in the Missouri Synod have always been free to agree or to disagree with Luther's conclusion that James contradicted Paul when James asserts that "a man is justified by works and not by faith alone" (James 2:24). Yet A Statement would condemn Luther's clear and forceful comment for asserting that authors of some of the twenty-seven books comprising the New Testament have contradicted each other. Luther may have been wrong, but we know of no responsible Lutheran theologian who has a priori refused to consider the possibility that Luther was right.

The final sentence in section G implicitly denies the validity of the Augsburg Confession. It rejects the view that there may be contradictory theologies in the New Testament, such as Luther thought to find between Romans and James, on the ground that such a view makes it "impossible for the church to have and confess a unified theological position that is truly Biblical and evangelical." If true, that would be a most serious condemnation of the Augsburg Confession. That confession was written and accepted by theologians who disagreed with one another about whether James contradicted Romans. And even though Melanchthon and others disagreed with Luther, they still tolerated Luther among them and even honored him as a competent theologian, just as they co-operated in publishing and distributing Bibles in which Luther's comments about James appeared (LW 35, 395-398). If A Statement is correct, the Augsburg Confession could not represent "a unified theological position" or could not be "truly Biblical and evangelical."

H. Old Testament Prophecy

Since the New Testament is the culminating written revelation of God, we affirm that it is decisive in determining the relation between the two Testaments and the meaning of Old Testament prophecies in particular, for the meaning of a prophecy becomes known in full only from its fulfillment. With the Lutheran Confessions, we recognize the presence of Messianic prophecies about Jesus Christ throughout the Old Testament. Accordingly, we acknowledge that the Old Testament "promises that the Messiah will come and promises forgiveness of sins, justification, and eternal life for His sake" (Apology, IV, 5) and that the patriarchs and their descendants comforted themselves with such Messianic promises (cf. FC, SD, V, 23).

We therefore reject the following views:
1. That the New Testament statements about Old Testament texts and events do not establish their meaning (for example, the claim that Jesus' reference to Psalm 110 in Matthew 22:43-44 does not establish either that Psalm's Davidic authorship or its predictive Messianic character).
2. That Old Testament prophecies are to be regarded as Messianic prophecies, not in the sense of being genuinely
predictive, but only in the sense that the New Testament later applies them to New Testament events.

3. That the Old Testament prophets never recognized that their prophecies reached beyond their own time to the time of Christ.

THERE ARE TWO STRENGTHS IN THIS SECTION. The first is that it lays down the important principle that the meaning of a prophecy becomes known in full only from its fulfillment. This principle, however, is not allowed to have its full effect in the Lutheran Confessions, though *A Statement* does not properly draw out its theological implications. Consequently, despite its potential strengths, *A Statement* not only does not identify troublesome issues in the Synod, but it again fails to offer clear guidance for the Church's theological instruction. And the theology which it does implicitly exhibit must be judged defective by both scriptural and confessional norms.

When the thesis lays down the important principle that the meaning of a prophecy becomes known in full only from its fulfillment, it thereby introduces the concept of meaning into the discussion. That is a useful concept, because it raises such necessary questions as these: Meaning for whom? Meaning when? Meaning under what circumstances? But those ramifications of the concept of meaning do not receive adequate attention in the thesis. At best they are only implied, for the thesis states that "we (emphasis added) recognize the presence of Messianic prophecies about Jesus Christ throughout the Old Testament." This must then be understood in the sense that we who are Christians, we who live in the period of New Testament fulfillment, and we who have come to faith in Jesus Christ, are the ones who recognize Messianic prophecies about Jesus Christ throughout the Old Testament. That recognition would not be true of those who are not Christians; nor of those who, though believers, still lived in the period of Old Testament expectations; nor of those who, though living in the time of the New Testament, do not possess faith in Jesus Christ.

That these implications are perhaps to be regarded as a part of the theology of *A Statement* may be surmised also from the antitheses. Antithesis #2 makes it plain that *A Statement* wants to protect what it calls genuinely predictive Old Testament Messianic prophecy prior to the New Testament conditions for the recognition of the meaning of a prophecy. Antitheses #2 and #3 make it plain that *A Statement* wants to assert that the Messianic meaning of a prophecy may be known at least in part, though not in full, prior to its fulfillment.

The problem of section H, however, is not merely that the reader is left to guess its theological implications; it lies also in its careless reading of the Lutheran Confessions. The Lutheran Confessions, both in the citation embodied in the thesis as well as in those appended in the Study Edition, consistently distinguish between Messiah to come and Christ who has come. Following that lead we would do better to make a similar and compatible distinction. On the one hand, both the writers and the readers of the Old Testament, even before New Testament times, expected a Messiah. This is easily confirmed by a reading of Rabbinic commentaries. Every serious student of the Bible, even one who employs a critical method, recognizes this. Who, therefore, is the target of the allegations in antitheses #2 and #3? On the other hand, the New Testament proclaims that the expected Messiah has come, and that his name is Jesus of Nazareth. *A Statement* does not properly draw in support of its thesis comes from the New Testament. Antithesis #2 and #3 are not only does not identify troublesome issues in the Synod, but it again fails to offer clear guidance for the Church's theological instruction. And the theology which it does implicitly exhibit must be judged defective by both scriptural and confessional norms.

Consider what can happen when the Old Testament is read in this way and what richer possibilities open up than that proposed in the myopic view of antithesis #1. New Testament texts are said to establish the meaning of Old Testament texts. Antithesis #1 then chooses Psalm 110 as an illustration of *A Statement*'s contention that the New Testament establishes the predictive Messianic character of Old Testament passages. Now, if the implication is that Psalm 110 had no predictive Messianic character in Old Testament times, *A Statement* is once more fighting straw men. Biblical scholarship knows that pre-Christian Jewish rabbis already regarded this psalm as a Messianic prophecy, although admittedly not uniformly so. Furthermore, in choosing a New Testament reference to Psalm 110 to establish its meaning, the antithesis singles out Matthew 22:43-44. It completely ignores the fact that this psalm is employed in a Messianic sense, directly or indirectly, at least eighteen times in the New Testament, emphasizing alternately that Messiah Jesus is both David's Lord and Son (Matthew 22:43-44), that Messiah Jesus is absolute victor over all enemies (e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:25), or that Messiah Jesus is a unique high priest after the order of Melchize-
dek (Hebrews 5:6). But A Statement offers no example of the predictive Messianic character of Psalm 110. It simply insists on its Davidic authorship. Such a passion for certainty about authorship belongs at best to a footnote on the amusing, yet tiresome, eccentricities in the history of Christian polemical thought. If it is axiomatic that the meaning of a prophecy becomes known in full only from its fulfillment, then A Statement has surely selected a most unpromising avenue to reach the wealth of the New Testament testimony on the rich meaning of Psalm 110.

IT IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, to identify the running theological dislocation of A Statement as it appears in this section. The basic question may be formulated thus: What is involved in the notion of fulfillment, so that it makes known the full meaning of prophecy? Or to put the question more precisely, how does one, from the vantage point of full recognition, perceive the relation between prophecy and fulfillment? A Statement employs the scheme: predictive prophecy/subsequent fulfillment, and assumes that their fundamental relationship is purely quantitative. The prophecy is less clear; the fulfillment brings full clarity. God reveals more and more until the earlier and more incomplete predictive data have grown to full clarity once the last piece of the puzzle has been put into place.

But the biblical evidence simply does not yield such a conclusion nor support its basic frame of reference. When Jesus appeared, it was not at all self-evident that he was fulfilling Old Testament prophecies, even though he announced that he had come to fulfill the Old Testament Scriptures (Matthew 5:17). His contemporaries for the most part accepted Messianic prophecies and lived with a lively sense of hope for the future Kingdom of God. Yet they massively rejected him as a Messianic pretender. Even his own disciples, by the admission of their later apostolic testimony, finally abandoned him, their initial hopes having been thoroughly shattered. To be sure, they eventually employed the theological scheme prophecy/fulfillment, but it was no longer a simple quantitative framework. They rehabilitated the prophecies and tailored them to fit Jesus. And in some instances it became possible from the viewpoint of fulfillment to create earlier prophecies of Jesus.

The most obvious example of such re-tailoring can be drawn from any confirmation class. Jesus indeed fulfilled Old Testament prophecy, the instruction goes. The Old Testament predicted a coming King, and Jesus was that King. However, Jesus did not set up an earthly kingdom; his was a spiritual kingdom. That apologetic is as old as John 18:33 ff., but it illustrates the point. A reading of such Old Testament passages as Isaiah 9:2-7, Isaiah 60, 2 Samuel 7, and Psalm 89, to mention only a few, leads any reader to expect an earthly Son of David, ruling in the capital city of Jerusalem, with Gentiles streaming into the seat of political power and spiritual authority. But Jesus did not fulfill those expectations. He specifically rejected such proffered royal status; the Christian mission went out from Jerusalem, never to return to it as a capital city; and the New Testament allegorizes upon Jerusalem as the heavenly city, whose Builder and Maker is God. If the kingly Messianic expectations concerning the Son of David are nevertheless retained by the early Christians as Old Testament prophecies, then we at least ought to be sufficiently aware in our teaching and preaching that this does not fit into the mere quantitative scheme: predictive prophecy/subsequent fulfillment. It is not a matter of the gradual transition from less clarity to full clarity. It is rather a qualitative alteration from one kind of expectation to another kind of fulfillment. The scheme of prophecy and fulfillment can be retained only if the requisite modifications are made so as to conform to the reality that confronts us in Jesus as the Christ. But that in turn implies that faith in Jesus as the Christ is theologically prior to this meaning of Old Testament prophecy, that it is a meaning for us who are Christians, and that the insistence on predictive prophecy, without any clue as to the connotation of the term, is not at all helpful to a church in theological agony.

To cite even more dramatic examples of such a qualitative change in the scheme of prophecy/fulfillment, we might consider St. Matthew. In 2:15 he quotes Hosea 11:1 as a prophecy fulfilled in the return of the Holy Family from Egypt. But if one reads Hosea 11:1, it is obvious that the prophet Hosea is in that passage not even looking forward from 740 B.C., the approximate time of his ministry. He is rather looking backward across the centuries and recalling the day when God called his son, the people of Israel, out of their Egyptian bondage, according to Exodus 4:22. Yet Matthew calls the word of Hosea a prophecy. If we want to retain the language of prophecy—and there is every good reason to do so—then we have to recognize that some prophecies do not fit into the mono-dimensional concept of predictive prophecy. Matthew 2:15 is an example of how, from the viewpoint of the recognition of prophecy, the fulfillment creates a prophecy out of a prophetic word which is not predictive in any apparent sense. In fact, in his eagerness to employ the scheme of prophecy/fulfillment, St. Matthew in 2:23 announces the fulfillment of a prophecy for which no Old Testament Scripture passage can be found. Yet the only guide A Statement offers for the study of the Scripture is the highly misleading reductionist principle of predictive Messianic prophecy. It does not even seek to cover some of its deficiencies with the traditional concept of typology, except in study question #2, where it is appended without perceptible relation to the resources of the thesis, the antitheses, or the numerous passages from the Bible and confessional documents. A Statement simply fails to recognize the qualitative difference which fulfillment in Jesus as the Christ makes for our understanding of
the meaning of the variety of Old Testament Messianic prophecies.

**THIS FAILURE IN TURN RESTS ON THREE underlying and interrelated theological defects.** The first defect is that *A Statement* habitually departs from the Lutheran Confessions' preference for speaking of the *promises* of God. The Confessions ordinarily speak of the promises of God in the Old Testament; *A Statement* speaks of Old Testament prophecy understood in an exclusively predictive way. The Confessions speak of Old Testament believers comforting themselves with God's promises of salvation—future salvation, to be sure. But the emphasis lies on the consolation of a gracious God, who by his promises evokes their response of faith. A promise by its very nature evokes in the trusting heart an anticipation of the future. And the trusting heart is prepared to be surprised by a divine largesse that its small-minded, prediction-oriented, information-bent curiosity could not anticipate. The Confessors' emphasis, even and precisely in the quotations supplied by the Study Edition, was on the continuity of God's gracious address; repeatedly and under a variety of circumstances, he showed himself a God of steadfast love, whose fidelity exceeded the calculations of feeble minds and hearts. Indeed, when Jesus passed through the climactic moments of fulfillment in his passion and resurrection, even he had to reinterpret the Scriptures for his doubting disciples in the light of the surpassing splendor of the final act in the drama of salvation. And the doxology of the now-believing disciples was not in praise of predictions come to pass; they were quite alterable. Rather they rejoiced to know the love of God that passes knowledge. What faith now saw was not more, but a different kind of fulfillment.

The second theological defect exhibited by this thesis and its corollary antithesis is that its discussion of Old Testament prophecy is restricted completely to Old Testament *Messianic* prophecy. Its generic concept of prophecy, therefore, again not only renders any serious exegesis of individual passages impossible, not to say unnecessary, but it also aborts the Lutheran, and scripturally necessary, distinction between the Law and Gospel in its consideration of the topic of prophecy. The plain fact of the matter is that Old Testament prophecies are not only Messianic, by which term *A Statement* presumably means God's gracious Old Testament promises. The Old Testament also contains prophecies of judgment and condemnation. We need only think of passages such as Micah 3:9-12 and 4:9-13, where the prophet announced the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of its inhabitants more than one hundred years before the fact. His contemporaries may have dismissed him or may have thought he was speaking only metaphorically. But the tragedy of 586 B.C. made fully known the literal destruction and exile God had inflicted, if indeed that was its final fulfillment. Both Old Testament and New Testament prophesy the final, unimaginable apocalyptic destruction of heaven and earth.

The omission of such prophecy from *A Statement*'s discussion of the topic must be seen as a theological flaw. It cannot be defended simply as a self-conscious limitation of the scope of the discussion; for without the context of the threat of punishment and its fulfillment, the Messianic, presumably salvific, prophecy loses its proper character. The consolation of the Messianic prophecies is a word of gracious promise in the face of an equally strong and valid word of condemnatory "promise." The gracious promise is offered in the face of threatened judgment. Hence the word of promise always wants to evoke a faith—nevertheless! The message of the prophet Micah is a good example of this character of Messianic prophecy. But nowhere is this principle more dramatically and vividly portrayed in the Bible than in Romans 4, where St. Paul recalls how Abraham, despite the verdict of God's Law of sin and death, was given the divine promise of begetting a son—nevertheless; and how, in the face of the obvious NO, Abraham said YES—nevertheless. The grace of God's promise does not lie in its capacity to supplement man's ignorance of the future; it lies rather in its sovereign power to overcome all opposing obstacles, even if the hindering force be God's own verdict. Faith rejoices not in God's ability to know a foreordained future, which he may or may not share with men, but in God's promise to recreate the future out of the shambles that men have made and that God has decreed to be their proper lot. Old Testament prophecy is not a matter of God's predicting an event while men anxiously wait to see whether it will come to pass. It is rather God's threat and sentence in the midst of which God Himself promises salvation—nevertheless, so that men may learn from the word of promise to trust God—nevertheless, with a hope in God that shall not be put to shame.

The third theological flaw is this, that without a concept of prophecy as both threat and promise the necessary understanding of the fulfillment in Jesus Christ is badly damaged. Jesus fulfilled not only the prophecies of promise, but he came to fulfill, even to the last jot and tittle, the law and the prophets by drinking to its last bitter dregs the cup of God's threatened wrath. His sufferings did not lie outside the scope of his authentic Messiahship, nor were they peripheral to the salvation which he effected. His suffering was the fulfillment of God's threatened wrath, so that in his own person the overcoming love of God might also be graciously fulfilled. Such suffering was inherent in his messiahship and in his saving work. St. Peter's attempt to divert Jesus from his way of the cross received a rebuke as a satanic subversion of the mission he performed because it is written. Any effort to remove Jesus' suffering in fulfillment of the Scriptures from, or minimize it in, an understanding of his Messiahship and his saving work
is to offer a stone in paternal response to a filial request for bread.

ONE FINAL OBSERVATION MUST YET BE made on this section to expose its atrophied theology of prophecy and fulfillment. It lays down the axiom that the meaning of prophecy becomes known in full only from its fulfillment. Yet A Statement does not in its thinking go beyond the time of the New Testament. But since it deals with the question of knowing in full, it must go beyond the New Testament if it wants to be scriptural and confessional. It will therefore not do to stop even with the death and resurrection of Jesus, for the Gospel promise of God is a promise for you. Hence its fulfillment must also include our incorporation in Jesus' death and resurrection in baptism. That in turn is necessary also because the promise is known only from its fulfillment. The baptismal union with Jesus Christ and the rhythm of the baptismal life of repentance and absolution are not simply optional exercises in our attempt to know; they are the necessary conditions of our knowing Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of God's promises, at least in any scriptural sense of knowing and being known.

For this reason it ought not to be surprising that each successive generation of the church rediscovers older, forgotten insights into the Gospel or even that it learns to know the meaning of the promises in a new way. Fulfillment is not confined to the past, not even to the past recorded in the pages of the New Testament Scripture. So, for example, what it really means that Jesus is both David's Son and David's Lord as a Messianic promise for us must be discerned and known by us who would claim him as our Lord.

And even beyond that, because A Statement speaks of the promise of God being known in full, we must also include the fulfillment that will yet come in the End. Until then even the baptized know only in part, seeing but through a glass darkly. But then, when we shall have died and been raised bodily with Christ, we shall at last know fully as we have been known. For, as A Statement itself says, the meaning of a prophecy (better, promise) becomes known in full only from its fulfillment.

1. Historical Methods of Biblical Interpretation

Since God is the Lord of history and has revealed Himself by acts in history and has in the person of His Son actually entered into man's history, we acknowledge that the historical framework in which the Gospel message is set in Scripture is an essential part of the Word. Furthermore, we recognize that the inspired Scriptures are historical documents written in various times, places, and circumstances. We therefore believe that the Scriptures invite historical investigation and are to be taken seriously as historical documents. We affirm, however, that the Christian interpreter of Scripture cannot adopt uncritically the presuppositions and canons of the secular historian, but that he will be guided in his use of historical techniques by the presuppositions of his faith in the Lord of history, who reveals Himself in Holy Scripture as the one who creates, sustains, and even enters our history in order to lead it to His end.

We therefore reject the following views:

1. That the question of whether certain events described in the Scripture actually happened is unimportant in view of the purpose and function of Holy Scripture.
2. That methods based on secularistic and naturalistic notions of history, such as the following, may have a valid role in Biblical interpretation;
   a. That the universe is closed to the intervention of God or any supernatural force.
   b. That miracles are to be explained in naturalistic terms whenever possible.
   c. That the principle of the economy of miracles may lead us to deny certain miracles reported in the Scriptures.
   d. That the doctrines of Holy Scripture are the result of a natural development or evolution of ideas and experiences within Israel and the early church.
   e. That the message of Scripture can be adequately measured by laws derived exclusively from empirical data and rational observation.
   f. That man's inability to know the future makes genuine predictive prophecy an impossibility.
3. That our primary concern in Biblical interpretation is not with explaining the meaning of the primary sources, namely, the canonical Scriptures, on the basis of the sources themselves.
4. That if the use of historical methods leads to conclusions at variance with the evident meaning of the Biblical text, such conclusions may be accepted without violating the Lutheran view of Scripture or our commitment to the Lutheran Confessions (for example, the claim that it is permissible to deny the existence of angels or a personal devil because of literary, historical, or theological considerations).

A STATEMENT HERE INTENDS TO INSTRUCT the church on the continually knotty problem of techniques of biblical interpretation, specifically on the use and abuse of "historical" methods of interpretation. At different times in the church's existence, various methods of biblical interpretation have been used—allegorical, typological, literal, historical grammatical, historical critical—and all of them have also been abused. Quite rightly, A Statement is concerned for proper biblical interpretation. Quite properly, A Statement recognizes that historical study of the Bible is appropriate because, as it says, the Bible itself invites historical investigation. Also quite properly, A Statement suggests a criterion for the proper use of historical methods: it insists that "the Christian interpreter of Scripture cannot adopt uncritically the presuppositions and canons of the secular historian, but... will be guided in his use of historical techniques by the presuppositions of his faith in the Lord of history." So far so good! But how shall that happen? What, specifically, are those presup-
positions, and how do they guide the Christian interpreter? On these matters, where guidance is surely welcome, *A Statement* is inadequate as an expression of the Lutheran view of Scripture. In the following paragraphs, we shall discuss this inadequacy.

*A Statement* uses the terms "history" and "historical" in two or three different senses without distinguishing between them. Thus *A Statement* sometimes uses the word "history" to mean the course of events in the world, the things that have happened in the process of human existence; this is a broad, neutral, non-technical sense of the word (we shall refer to this as sense #1). However, it also uses the word in a narrower, technical sense; the word is used to refer to the record of events, the chronicling and interpreting of events in human experience (we shall refer to this as sense #2a); and it is used to refer to the critical judgments made by the historian about those records and those events, to determine among other things whether a given event did or did not take place (we shall refer to this as sense #2b). This second set of meanings is the province of the professional historian in his work of understanding the past, examining records and interpreting their validity, accuracy, and importance. The historian operates with certain criteria for determining the truth, and historians debate among themselves regarding the propriety of this or that historian's work. We point this out in order to advise the reader that the historian does make judgments about the "historicity" of events that are reported to have taken place, and that not all historians are agreed in the judgments that are made by their colleagues. Thus we applaud *A Statement*'s concern that the presuppositions of faith in the Lord of history guide our exegesis, for we share its fear lest a secularistic notion of history rule out the possibility that events which are crucial to the faith "actually happened."

Let one example suffice. The thesis says, "we recognize that the inspired Scriptures are historical documents written in various times, places, and circumstances" (sense #1). It continues, "We therefore believe that the Scriptures invite historical investigation (sense #2a) and are to be taken seriously as historical documents" (sense #2b or possible #2a). The first antithesis paraphrases sense #2b with the words "actually happened." Reduced to a syllogism, the logic of *A Statement* looks like this:

**Major Premise (assumed):** Data of human history can properly be examined by a critical historian.

**Minor Premise:** The Bible came into being within the course of human events, at various times and places; it is "data of human history."

**Conclusion:** All events described in the Bible actually happened. Clearly, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; this *non sequitur* is possible only because *A Statement* fails to observe the necessary distinctions in the meaning of the words "history" and "historical."

It owes the reader a clearer logic and a more precise use of terms.

We concur with the emphasis of this section of Article IV on the importance of maintaining that the Gospel is a message about actual events in human history (sense #1). We share this concern; we, too, do not wish to see the Gospel reduced to a religious myth or pious ideology or fairy tale. God is Lord of history, who in the person of Jesus of Nazareth acted in our history to secure our redemption. We share *A Statement*'s anxiety lest the Gospel be reduced to a timeless narrative, without basis in human history. But we object to the essentially rationalistic, non-theological way in which it uses that historical basis. *A Statement* does not show how saving faith in the truth of the Gospel is aided by its insistence that "certain events described in the Scripture actually happened."

We agree that it is important and necessary to affirm that certain biblical events "actually happened" but which events? And how are they necessary? Are all biblical events equally necessary, equally important parts of that "historical framework" of the Gospel? Is the floating axe-head of 2 Kings 6:6 needed in the same way as the cross and resurrection of Jesus? By what principle do we decide that it is or that it is not?

*A Statement* fails to show, as a Lutheran document of this sort should, that not all biblical events are needed in the same way by the Gospel message. St. Paul himself weights certain biblical events as being more important, more necessary, than others. The birth, suffering, death, resurrection, ascension, and session of Jesus Christ, as the ecumenical creeds enumerate them, are needed—they must have "actually happened." If these did not happen, there is no Gospel. The raising of the son of the Shunammite, the floating axe-head, the swallowing of Jonah, and others are a different matter: whether or not these events actually happened, the proclamation both of God's Law and of God's Gospel remains equally valid. This is not to say that these less important events did not happen, or even that their happened-ness is a purely indifferent matter; it is, however, to say these important theological reasons for affirming that the creedal events actually happened, which are not present in the case of other events, where historians may judge their "historicity" without the same burden of theological necessity. Thus *A Statement* misses its own objective of instructing the church when it insists that "certain (emphasis added) events described in the Scripture actually happened," without saying which events it means or showing why they are so important.

We also concur with this section of *A Statement* when it maintains that "the Scriptures invite historical investigation" (we assume, in sense #2a or #2b). We agree that such historically-oriented study of the Bible is of great importance in properly understanding the biblical message. Apart from such historically-oriented study, the Thessalonian letters could, for example, be read as if they were a full and rounded presentation of the faith...
comparable to the letter to the Romans. From that kind of reading one might conclude that the Christian message is primarily concerned with sexuality and with expectations of the end-time! However, we do know that the apostle was addressing particular people with particular problems at a particular time. And we use that realization as a criterion for understanding the Thessalonian letters “historically.” We all in fact do that kind of historical criticism of the biblical documents, and it is good to see that procedure recognized and endorsed by A Statement.

As we have noted, A Statement quite properly insists that the Christian interpreter of the Scriptures “will be guided in his use of historical techniques by the presuppositions of his faith in the Lord of history.” The question then is not whether historical methods are to be used, but rather about the presuppositions which determine the way in which historical methods are used. However, beyond rejecting “secularistic notions of history,” as enumerated in the second antithesis, A Statement fails to instruct the church on what these necessary “presuppositions . . . of faith” might be.

Nor does the Study Edition offer any help, even when it seems to try; for example, consider these study questions:

7. Can the historical-critical method (as normally defined and understood in contemporary scholarship) be used with Lutheran presuppositions, or is that a contradiction in terms?
8. Identify the proper "Lutheran presuppositions" for Biblical interpretation. What determines whether such presuppositions are "Lutheran"?

Those questions merely tease us. Question #7 implies that the answer is apparent and obvious, as if the second half of that question were merely rhetorical; and question #8 implies that the reader will know what such “Lutheran presuppositions” are and why they are Lutheran. Neither the Study Edition nor A Statement itself teaches the church about what “Lutheran” really means when applied to biblical interpretation. C.F.W. Walther knew better than A Statement; recall his fourth thesis on the Law and the Gospel:

The true knowledge of the distinction between the Law and the Gospel is not only a glorious light, affording the correct understanding of the entire Holy Scriptures, but without this knowledge Scripture is and remains a sealed book.

And the Formula of Concord is equally clear:

The distinction between Law and Gospel is an especially brilliant light which serves the purpose that the Word of God may be rightly divided and the writings of the holy prophets and apostles may be explained and understood correctly (SD V, 1; Tappert, p. 558).

A Statement, by contrast, as we have been showing, says nothing of this!
the reliability and historical validity of the biblical account as such.

Comment on the Confessional Citations used in Article IV, Section I of the Study Edition

THE STUDY EDITION COMPOUNDS THE deficiencies we have noted in A Statement. As we pointed out in our earlier review essay, there are some serious limitations which severely frustrate its purpose of instructing the church in the difficult theological issues before her. These limitations are perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the citations from the Lutheran symbolical books which the Study Edition provides in this section. None of these quotations plainly and directly addresses any of the points touched on in this section. We urge our readers to examine all of these quotations from the Confessions in their proper context in the Book of Concord, so that they can judge for themselves whether these references say what the Study Edition implies about them. In the following paragraphs, we shall examine the references to the Confessions which are provided by the Study Edition in support of Article IV, Section I of A Statement, on “Historical Methods of Biblical Interpretation”; many of these references are quite frequently cited, both in earlier sections of the Study Edition and in previous statements on Scripture produced in the Missouri Synod.

The first citation from the Book of Concord is a paragraph from the great article on the Person of Christ, Article VIII of the Formula of Concord (SD VIII, 25-27; Tappert, p. 596). Here the authors of the Formula are stressing the union of human and divine natures in Christ as the reason for his ability to perform miracles, both during his ministry and after his exaltation. The Study Edition uses this paragraph to support A Statement's second antithesis in Article IV, section I, rejecting “secularistic and naturalistic notions of history” which a priori rule out the possibility of miracles. We have, the reader will recall, already agreed with A Statement that such notions are improper for Lutheran exegesis (although we trust that we have done so on better theological grounds than A Statement does); thus we question the propriety of using this paragraph from the Formula of Concord as if it addressed the problem of secularistic and naturalistic notions of history. Properly to teach the church, the Study Edition would have to show by what logic it has used this paragraph and implied that it addresses the questions before us in this section of A Statement.

The second reference, “God's Word is not false, nor does it lie” (FC, Ep. VII, 13; Tappert, p. 483), is part of a long quotation there from Luther's Great Confession concerning Christ's supper, on the need to pronounce the words of institution at the celebration of the Holy Communion. It says nothing about the Scriptures as such, neither about the assertion that “certain events described in the Scripture actually happened,” nor about methods of interpretation which yield results “at variance with the evident meaning of the Biblical text” (as Antitheses #1 and #4 assert). The Study Edition's use of this quotation depends on equating Scripture and Word of God in a manner which neither the Scriptures nor the Lutheran Confessions authorize.

The third confessional reference is equally inappropriate. In the Large Catechism (V, 76; Tappert, p. 455) Luther says, again in the context of the Lord's Supper, “If you cannot feel the need (for the sacrament), therefore, at least believe the Scriptures. They will not lie to you, and they know your flesh better than you yourself do.” The Large Catechism is stressing the infallible, unerring way in which the biblical Law does its diagnosing and exposing of the sin of the old Adam. To use a statement about the unfailingly accurate operation of God's Law in support of a statement about the historical accuracy of the biblical text is simply not appropriate. By what logic does such a pastoral statement as Luther's about the effectiveness of the biblical Law get used to support a contention that “certain events (emphasis added) described in the Scripture actually happened”? How will the reader, when his pastor uses that biblical quotation properly, when his pastor uses that biblical Law properly to convict him of his sin, then be helped by A Statement to repent, come to the sacrament, and be forgiven? The reader may now see how the Study Edition's style of confessional interpretation easily leads to a perversion of pastoral care, to trivializing both Scripture and Confessions, and to the serious detriment of the faith of pious Christians.

The Study Edition next quotes from the discussion of infant baptism in the Large Catechism (IV, 57; Tappert, p. 444): “Because we know that God does not lie. My neighbor and I—in short, all men—may err and deceive, but God's Word cannot err.” The Large Catechism is here speaking of the divine command to baptize and the divine promise to work saving faith also in an infant; it is not addressing the question of the “facticity” of miracle accounts or the inerrancy of the Scriptures (as the Study Edition implies in study question #1, page 33). Words and sentences have their sense and meaning in their context, and responsible scholarship must not place them into an alien context.

The next quotation, from the Preface to the Book of Concord (Tappert, p. 8) includes the phrase “in accordance with the pure, infallible, and unalterable Word of God.” The Study Edition quotes it here (p. 40a) and also in the section on infallibility (p. 32b), as if this were the main point of this section of the Preface. The first impression is that it proves that A Statement is really confessional. Read in its larger context however (Tappert, pp. 8-9), this quotation has quite a different meaning. It is a response to the argument that Melanchthon's various editions of the Augsburg Confession meant the Lutherans were always changing their doc-
of the Law or in promises of the Gospel; their thrust is radically different from that of A Statement. A Statement wants to insist on a literal/historical reading of the Bible as a matter of principle; the Confessions, in each case, take biblical statements "just as they read" for the sake of their message of the Law and the Gospel.

It is unfortunate that we must argue at such length with A Statement and its Study Edition, but we believe it to have been necessary in order to show how badly A Statement serves the church in this matter, and how misleading the Study Edition is in its use of the Confessions. These weaknesses, as we have tried to show, are only symptoms of its basic confusion on the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel, with the resulting lack of clarity about saving faith.

A CONCLUDING WORD

We have now finished our analysis of A Statement. Time after time we have found it inadequate as a guide both to understanding the "theological and doctrinal issues" facing the church, and to "applying Holy Scripture and the Lutheran Confessions to those issues." There is no need to recapitulate our analysis. We have found A Statement inadequate because it fails properly to distinguish the Law and the Gospel, because it effectively confuses saving faith with historical faith, and because it replaces the scandal of the cross with a variety of scandalous theological opinions—scandalous because they place unnecessary obstacles in the way of trust in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior.

We have stated in detail our reservations about A Statement. Pastors and congregations should understand that their acceptance or rejection of A Statement is a very significant decision. Each such decision will have long-range significance for the life and work of the church—for her pastoral care, her teaching and preaching, and her worship.

In our judgment A Statement goes too much of its own way, leaving unused the rich confessional heritage of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. It would be ungrateful to rejoice so little in mercy by forgetting so much. This is not a time for theologians and teachers, whatever their viewpoint, to keep silent about A Statement. We deem it a mis-"Statement of Scriptural and Confessional Principles."
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October, 1978
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The matter of authenticity in the performance of older music has been receiving increasing attention over the past few years. And rightly so, for only when a work is performed according to the ideals and methods of its own time do we begin to experience the wide variety of sounds and styles that is our heritage from the past. Such an objective is especially important when a series of works is presented as a historical set to illustrate the development of style in the history of music, such as the Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft Archive Production and the new series started by Vanguard under the auspices of The Bach Guild, entitled Historical Anthology of Music.

The two records under consideration here deal with works of four composers whose lives cover a span of approximately three hundred years (from ca. 1200 to ca. 1500). The musicological and technical problems involved in bringing these works into a living performance are indeed formidable and require the successive and joint efforts of a large number of scholars, musicians, and scholar-musicians (the three categories are, unfortunately, by no means synonymous). Consequently it is not surprising that, between the notation of, say, a thirteenth-century manuscript and its performance by a twentieth-century group of musicians, much may be lost in the way of authenticity on the one hand and in the way of a musical and esthetically satisfying performance on the other.

The oldest of our four composers, Perotin (the younger of the pair of famous Notre Dame composers known to every undergraduate student of music history), has had particular difficulty in getting onto twentieth-century phonodiscs with any degree of satisfactory results from either the standpoint of authenticity or musicality. It is of interest to compare this new recording of Perotin's renowned "Sederunt principes" (Gradual for the feast of St. Stephen) by the Deller consort with the older recording in the Archive Production done by the Pro Musica Antiqua under the direction of Safford Cape (ARC 3051).

Both performances are totally unsatisfactory, but for diametrically opposite reasons. Despite the implications in the notes on the record jacket of the Archive Production recording, the performers of the Pro Musica Antiqua give the impression they have never heard of the rhythmic modes—the very basis of the Notre Dame style—which set up a rhythmic swing that gives the music shape and a sense of direction. In this performance the music only occasionally begins to approach the rhythmic feel associated with the modes. Time and again the motion grinds to a near halt, with no justification whatsoever (apart from an apparent fidelity to a published transcription by Rudolf von Ficker that imposes Romantic notions of tempo and dynamic changes on this majestic, Gothic music).

Tonally and vocally, however, this performance is reasonably satisfactory. The same cannot be said for the Deller consort, which in this work sounds like some misplaced Wagnerian Heldentenor. The quality and intonation is so bad that one can scarcely recognize the typical sonority of the open fifth and octave that is the mainstay of the Notre Dame harmony. But the Deller Consort has indeed heard of the rhythm-
mic modes—with catastrophic results. For these singers are not content to "swing" through the rhythmic modes, they have to pound them out unmercifully. I first played this record at home, and my daughter characterized the music better than anything I could say: "It sounds like pogo-stick music." This performance is typical of the possibly disastrous effect of applying musicology without musicality.

The Machaut mass (from 1364?) fares somewhat better, though the effect is still rather harsh and, if not pounding, at least "bouncy." There is an over-use of staccato in voices and instruments alike in direct contradiction to the ligatures of the original notation which, according to a centuries-old practice lasting until 1600, were an indication to perform the notes bound together into the ligature in a legato manner (the two words obviously even have the same root).

The masses by Dufay and Obrecht performed by Viennese groups under the direction of Hans Gillesberger are much more satisfactory. Here the sonorities have a delightful blend of voices and instruments that is not only pleasing but probably not too far from the fifteenth-century tonal ideal (Klangideal). My only major criticism of these performances is the failure of the conductor to understand or to apply the function of the tactus as a control over tempos. Ironically, when the speed of the tactus is varied from one subsection of the mass to another, the difference in the tempos written into the notation is to some extent negated, so that instead of getting some subsections that are slow and others that are lively, we get a monotonous uniformity in the movement not intended by the composer.

Admittedly, though, the whole problem of the tactus is difficult and still under controversy by musicologists. Despite this particular defect in "authenticity," this performance is at least musical and esthetically satisfying.

NEWMAN W. POWELL

BOOKS

OBSCENITIES


Michael Casey's poems are smudged on my fingers. A deep whirl of anger is inked and splashed across Obcenities. Somehow, even though it is all rather grimy, one can still read of this well-torn subject and feel as if it has finally all been said quite well. These are not the careless blots of a fifth-grade composition book; neither are they the tear-stained blots of some gothic hero. They are not sentimental war poems. And they are not the angry, overwrought platitudes of protest a few of my composition students confidently have presented to me. Casey has a direct and active approach. In "A Bummer" he advises,

If you have a farm in Vietnam
And a house in hell
Sell the farm
And go home

The volume is easily read—a good gift for an "un-poetryed" friend, although one probably would not present his volume to the lady next door who bakes such great cookies. There is a great deal of profanity here, but it is not obscene. In fact, the book's title refers to much more than short syllables breathlessly uttered. Casey realizes that the impact of individual words is much less than his words in context. Similarly, the impact of individual poems is much less than the total impact of the volume.

These are honest, natural snitches penned by a man deeply enmeshed in a war which seems to involve only the defender and the defended. The enemy is that which degrades and dishonors the human body and spirit. Casey notices the corpse by the side of the road, "Flies all over/It like made of wax" and comments that it won't matter then to me but now I don't want in death to be a Public obscenity like this.

These, then, are the real obscenities—coarse, disgusting, repulsive, but very real in the experience of the American G.I. in Vietnam.

Casey demonstrates his intimacy with this life in his skillful use of language of the barracks and his capture of rhythm in the speeches and descriptions of Bagley, Boston Booboo, and Sergeant JohnJohn. Furthermore, he has a peculiar ability to peel an experience down to its bare skin.

Probably the best way to read Obscenities is to pretend it is a novel. The poems read in sequence gain in intensity. Casey draws the reader into the book until finally there is no escape. So don't skip any poems. And don't look for sterling cadences. After reading Obscenities, one realizes that poetry does not have to be beautiful to be good.

JILL BAUMGAERTNER

The Cresset
A GIRL

and wood
with smiles, laughing, racing now,
and happiest—
then
quiet—soft the touch
as
the mirrored face reflects
the girl-like eyes of this, her own—
to bake for—
sew,
love—
comfort and watch grow—
while
seasons glide with grey streamers
of clouds running through the golden mists
of color near the sun... 

and
the peaceful shade of Oak or Elder
brush the restful hours
and
cold water drunk deeply
from dark wells
close
to earth,
to know earth
and the blooming wisteria
curling tendrils
toward the sun...

to touch the wind—
and God...
sure of the sound—
knowing the worth of the song.

J. T. Ledbetter
In my moments of fantasy, I like to imagine that somewhere out there an old bachelor, worth something on the order of two hundred million dollars, hears about Valparaiso University and is captured by the dream and puts us in his will as sole heir of his estate. It is a pleasant fantasy, but that is not the way it has been and that is not, very probably, the way it will be. Valparaiso has been built by thousands of us, each contributing his small share. Many of these people I have known. Many of them are still giving their best to the University. I consider that these people have a right to ask of me whatever they think they need from me, even if it means my temporary interruption of teaching and writing.

Which brings us, by a very circuitous route, to the topic sentence of this column. As a writer, I have been absolutely free to say whatever I had on my mind. The only censorship I have ever known on The Cresset has been self-censorship. But now I discover that, like the man who was surprised to learn that all his life he had been speaking prose, I cannot as a vice-president publish any private views of mine without speaking policy. The vice-president stands over my shoulder exhorting and cautioning the columnist. I—which is to say we—cannot go on this way. So this will be my last column until I have completed this tour of administrative duty.

I am very grateful to the four editors of The Cresset for whom I have written these past twenty-four years, to my fellow staffers with whom I have passed many a jovial and even convivial hour, and most of all to those faithful few who have read my musings from month to month. It was a good way to spend what are supposed to be the best years of a man's life, and I wouldn't have had it any other way.

The Cresset