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Above: Tintoretto (Jacopo Robusti), 1518-1594, Venetian. \textit{Behold the Man}, oil on canvas, 11 x 8 3/4". From the Chesrow Collection, exhibited in February, 1973, at Valparaiso University.

Cover: N. Daniel Dolle, St. Meinrad, Indiana. \textit{Paul in Chains} (7' high detail), 1972, fabric, metal, and macrame banner. 9' x 3 1/2'. Shown in the Fifteenth Annual \textit{Art for Religion} Exhibit sponsored by Bethlehem Lutheran Church, Indianapolis. This exhibit is presently on tour in Indiana and was displayed in February, 1973, at Valparaiso University.
Lent: Work, Fatigue, and Meditation

Although the practice of meditation during Lent may be strange to many (even most) of us, we can still tolerate the idea of being exhorted to meditate during Lent. But what is far stranger to us is linking meditation (all life long, not only during Lent) to our work and fatigue.

Many of us share assumptions about meditation and work. We think meditation is a matter of temperament, taste, and preference. It is not difficult for most of us to conceive of meditation as part of the life of the "monastic," the person who has a place apart from the hustle and bustle of family, city, and work. In this assumption, the "monastic" may not be strictly in an ordered community, behind walls, etc., but the "city" and "monastery" as geographical entities furnish a model for the rhythm between work and meditation. If one does not happen to be constituted in that way, or if one does not live in that situation, meditation is not for him.

Related to these assumptions is the notion that meditation is for the leisured. In our university life, as in the life of families and workers everywhere, the most common assumption is that we have no time for meditation. That is true: we have no time. That fact, and that fact in all its bleakness, may be the most burdensome curse upon our lives and work, precisely because we do not meditate. Not taking time to meditate may be the reason we have no time. Time and work are distorted when there is no meditation.

The Craving, Restless Heart

Meditation is not a hobby. Meditation is not only for people of leisure. Meditation is not something one does in place of work. Meditation is a mode of ordering time and work, indeed one's life, in a way that comes to grip with some of the deepest and most troublesome aspects of life and time and work.

So many of us know so little about the art of meditation that it is as difficult to read and think about it as it is to write about it. For this reason we can be glad that the church, like a good mother teaching her children the deepest manners and orderliness about living, sets aside time for the special practice of meditation.

Although many of us know little about meditation, we all know a great deal about the frenzy of our lives, the sensation of being pushed or pulled by our work, the boredom of our work or lack of work. If the frenzy does not hit us at the point of our work, it hits us at the point of trying to figure out how to have fun in our leisure time. The frenetic pursuit of fun may signal our lack of joy; that is, leisure itself is as threatening as work because we lack that interior "sabbath," that coming to rest in both work and leisure which is the heart of meditation.

The modes of expressing the restlessness of our lives and the cravings of our innermost beings vary from time to time and with different people. There are, however, some common factors in our time. The factor of boredom in life and work is one such factor. The driving search
for "meaning" is another. These factors signal a life that is unbuckled from itself, a life whose anchorage is either unclear or unable to carry the weight of the life hanging on it. The lazy, unoccupied person who wants to float episodically from one escape to another, who wishes to save his life by the absence of work, is caught in the same circle as the man driven by egocentric exaltation of his work, where his work is not an expression of his life, but the expression of using work to save his life, to make it right and good and valuable. These two different styles of living are not equally valuable to society, but in terms of the inner craving and restlessness, they are two sides of the same coin. Likewise, they are equally defeating, for both find the anchor point for life to be the self who is living the life. If the craving of life is the self-fulfillment of that life, then finally the emptiness of that life is that it is full of nothing but the self. Time, work, and other people, become instruments for the service of that self. If the fullness is emptiness, how great indeed is that emptiness.

**Meditation: the Pro Nobis to the Pro Me**

The heart of the message of Lent is the heart of the message of God to people whose lives are unbuckled from life, to self-lovers who passionately have God for their enemy. The message of Lent is the message of the will of God done for us, the work of God in the midst of His created world, the work of God done in and through His only begotten Son. That message for us is the work of God in death, the death by crucifixion through which our mistrust of God, our hatred toward people, and our antagonistic use of the created world are killed — and buried. The message of the work of God is the message of the resurrection from the dead — not merely the cyclic return of new life, but resurrection from the dead. The work of God is the perfected work, for us; it is perfected in the crucifixion and the resurrection of Jesus Christ for us. In that that work is perfected, it is the great sabbath, the great rest, not in the fact that God goes on vacation, but in the fact that in Jesus Christ the will of God toward us is the good, the holy, the perfected life, always new, always completed.

Meditation is the art of moving from the "for us" to the "for me." Meditation is the movement into stillness in which I suffer, that is, I allow, the great sabbath rest for the people of God to become the perfected shape of my will with His will. Meditation is not a warm-up for doing the good in a frenzy of achievement; it is the practice of suffering the good to be done to me in and through Jesus Christ, in and through life, time, and work. Meditation is the great undoing as well as the great redoing. It is as much pushing out, blocking off, denying, refusing place to certain fears and passions and crowdedness, as it is drinking in to myself the good will toward me and the will for good to me that comes from God our Worker and His Servant, Jesus Christ.

Meditation and obedience are linked closely to each other. But obedience is not merely the frenetic doing of all that is to be done (especially when we think it is our good) and determinedly refraining from doing those things we are not to do (especially when we think they are bad). Certainly, these are elements in our obedience; let none of us belittle such action. But more deeply down in the center of our being, the obedience in meditation is willing our wills to be under His will, to be in His will.

**Come to Me all you who labor and are heavy laden**

Both fatigue and hope accompany work. Our times seem to generate more fatigue than hope. Rarely is the fatigue the healthy kind, the kind many of us have experienced in play or in a delightful hobby. It is the fatigue of tension, pressure, and the sense of prostitution: we have worked for fame or wealth or power and our work was only the means to an end. In that fatigue there is also the shame of a disappointed hope. Work has in its own hope. We hope to get, to buy, to achieve. When that hope fails the disappointment is the bitter end of the "years of the locusts," the wasting of a life, hanging life on an anchor that gives way under the weight. It is this awareness of the loss of hope that makes work boring.

Jesus' invitation to such workers, such laborers, is an invitation precisely to people who are driven by the compulsion to work as the way to save their lives. The burden they bear is not their work. It is not even the tiredness they feel because of their work. Their burden is the work (and its fatigue) done in a life outside and apart from the "rest." Striving after the perfected work and always falling short of the perfection turns the work into a savior, thereby making the work more than it is. That is: the work becomes a burden.

As work has in it the future (and the hope), and as work itself becomes the means of defeating that hope, so Jesus calls us fatigued laborers to Himself with the promise of rest. This rest, this "sabbath," is also hope. But it is the perfected hope; it is the restful hope. Having been perfected, it cannot disappoint. Such rest is more than the absence of work, although it is the absence of "labor." It is, rather, the activity that arises out of the perfected labor, the way God rested from His labors on the seventh day. The weariness of such work is more like the fatigue we experience after strenuous play. Such fatigue is different from the tense, nervous exhaustion we often experience.

Jesus invites us to Himself for rest for our souls. He uses images that do not call for an end to activity; rather, the images portray a radically new kind of work. "Take my yoke upon you and learn of Me," He says. And He describes His yoke as easy and His burden as light. The yoke is itself a heavy instrument for joining together two oxen or other work animals. It is itself a "burden." But any one who has driven oxen or horses at work and who himself has worked at the same task with them (such as ploughing) will know what devastating exhaustion can come to animal and to man when the oxen are not yoked to each other. And even after they have exhausted themselves, there is less work done, less joy in doing. There is only frustration and aggravation. The yoke, itself a "burden," is light and changes the work. The rest Jesus promises is not grounded on the absence of work. It is rather a work done in union with Him Who is the perfected rest of God given to us human.
beings. He is Lord of the sabbath rest. Yoked to Him the work is an expression of life, not the activity done to achieve life. The work is liberated to be what it is in itself; it is free to be used for whoever needs its service.

And now, practice

To be united to Christ is to enter that rest. To meditate is to have the rest enter us. Meditation is an integral activity for our lives, constituting not merely an alternative to work (although there is validity in speaking of work and meditation as the rhythm between activity and withdrawal from activity), but meditation is engaging in a different way of working. In contrast to being caught in our work and worn out by it, seeking leisure and rest as the escape from work, meditation is letting the sabbath rest enter our souls so that singing we “drop into our work anew.”

We ought to take time, especially during this Lent, to practice meditation, to the end that it becomes integral to our daily life. Start with setting aside a quiet time in the morning (even if it means getting up earlier) or evening. Begin with fifteen minutes. Let the reflection be on the will of God for us in the promises He makes and keeps in Jesus Christ, our Brother and Savior, particularly as that will for us becomes the will for you. Then explore the day, its work, and its people, with the will to have the good will of God encompass your will, to become your will, your good, your joy. This meditation is not merely “planning” the day or “reviewing” it, but plans and reviews will be part of the meditation. The point is to link the plans with the will to will God’s will, and to link the “rest” with the work thus planned. Finally, exercise that gracious rest in the midst of the tensions, pressures, activities, and people of the day’s work. It may be we will learn anew what it is to hallow our work in union with the holiness of Him Who works for us day and night, without slumber or sleep.

REPRINTS FROM
THE CRESSET

From the October 1971 issue of The Cresset there is now available a handsome 12-page reprint of

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SOMEWHERE MALCOLM COWLEY REMARKS in print on the modern literary critics who serve a pastoral function for their little flocks of readers. One reason for this phenomenon is that books "about literature" are often really discussions that we might classify elsewhere in our libraries: Arnold's sociology, Coleridge's metaphysics, all those twentieth-century lectures on psychology, mythology, and politics disguised as belles lettres. Probably the 2-for-1 bargain aspects appeal to our modern shopper of a reader.

For the critic, the obvious problem is that his book may never reach its proper audience, those who would be stimulated by it, since with "literary criticism" as its official rubric, the review copies won't be going to the sociologists, political scientists, or, in this case, theologians that the author obviously had in mind. This assumption about potential 1973 readers for Empson's *Milton's God* (1961; 2d ed., 1965) is my pretext for another critique on his study of Milton's epic; in terms of dealing with Empson's argument, there's no question the original 1961 edition was inadequately reviewed, if not ignored, by the professional Miltonists.

We begin at the end, with conclusions of *Milton's God*, for the simple reason that automatic reactions to them diverted many reviewers from proper attention to Empson's chain of thought. Milton's "God," says Empson, improved on the original Deity of Genesis. He's not a debasement of the Biblical concept by a patriarchal Puritan. In His few genial moments, it's true, the Old Rascal (to Empson) seriously considers retirement from His activist tyranny into the status of the Hindu Absolute of British late-Victorian metaphysics; His son will inherit the throne. Of course, Jesus must prove himself (Arian small-"h") out in the field, specifically by taking on a dirty little ritual-sacrifice job for Old Dad out in the Palestine colonies. Here and elsewhere, there's a good deal of biographical argument in *Milton's God*, both from Milton's life and from Empson's. The God-Jesus relationship that Empson detects in *Milton's God* is meant to be analogous to that of Milton's boss, the Protector Cromwell, with his son and heir, Richard.

Both the literary and the religious arguments about *Paradise Lost* have their origins first in Empson's own published work of the thirties, but also in continuing critical wars carried on with North American Christian litterateurs during the actual composition of *Milton's God*. His passage on George Herbert's Crucifixion poem, "The Sacrifice" (concluding chapter 7 of his epoch-making *7 TYPES OF AMBIGUITY*, 1930), involuntarily began a continuing passage of arms with the excellent American medievalist and Miltonist, Rosemond Tuve. After a preliminary duel between them in two (1950) *Kenyon Reviews*, Miss Tuve developed her side into the 80-page "Part One" of her *A Reading of George Herbert* (1952). This section devotes itself entirely to the conventional (technical term) and typological background of "The Sacrifice," and criticizes the historical readings of subjective modern critics.

Empson was still trying to pick out this burr in the third edition of *7 TYPES* (1953) and now in *Milton's God* his counterattack on Christians like Miss Tuve is that the real underlying historical background of "The Sacrifice," of *Paradise Lost*, and of the Christian story...
in general, is a primitive human-sacrifice rite. In the “nice” Christians (presumably Miss Tuve qualifies here) this ritual blood-lust remains in stasis. But it exists as dry tinder for church bureaucrats or the ignorant masses to light up—under the witches of Milton’s period, for instance. So for adult, intelligent Christians, like Herbert or Milton, the Biblical stories exist in tension with their own criticism of what they initially believe. Obviously this argument demands that Empson drop the (old) New Critic’s belief in the autonomous work of art. He does, explicitly. Milton’s private life is freely splashed about the whole of Milton’s God. One of Empson’s major references is the posthumous religious notebook, Milton’s “Arian” De Doctrina Christiana (only discovered 1823; the long magazine review of its first publication created the reputation of the young Thomas Macaulay, a Victorian Liberal like Empson).

II

HERE ARE SOME OF THE COMPLICATIONS built into Empson’s project as he advanced it; they are a partial justification for the reviewers' failure with Milton’s God.

(1) Empson employs a chatty style, adapted from commons-room talk—literate and quite distinct from the slop-prose of American academics attempting a cozy intimacy in print. This style assumes a shared reader-writer educational background. It may appear “ingroupy” and snobbish, even when styled as expertly as Empson’s. Milton’s God, now in print, was contradicting North Americans, chiefly; two literary lifestyles, not only two sets of critical ideas, were opposed over Milton’s fair white body. Empson’s choice of style, incidentally, raised problems even in his home territory; the fairly sympathetic review of Milton’s God in the London Times Literary Supplement (29 Sept. 61) detected and quoted some lazy patches of writing where the coziness blurred clarity of exposition.

(2) Technically, the protagonists of Paradise Lost, whether secular or sacred, are “characters” in a fiction. So to many (infidel) reviewers, Empson’s explicit animus against the historical God of Western Christianity seemed irrelevant to a critique of Milton’s “God.” This reviewer’s argument I find wrong; Empson seems to me to integrate the literary-theological argument clearly enough, whether you agree with him or not. With Milton’s God there was another reviewer’s problem that Empson also endured with his earlier books of the thirties. This was the suggestion that (good or bad) his ideas represented one individual’s unscholarly quirkiness, with no critical tradition behind any of them. Actually, poets like Blake and Shelley invented Empson’s position in Milton’s God, and many of the pre-war “literary” attacks on Milton assume it.

(3) Now a little sociology about American campus scholarship, based on my own filial-graduate school experiences: first, keep in mind that the older colleges were our first ex-urbs, deliberately removed from the give-and-take of the metropolis. Aside from this deliber-
phlets, and the campus scholars over here. As elsewhere in Milton's God, part of the argument is derived from Empson's experiences, not Milton's. During World War II Empson did Milton's kind of propaganda work in England, twisting news items or arguments on behalf of the "good guys" (as they both would see it). So the second edition of Milton's God carries a 33-page appendix on a famous piece of suspected Puritan-governmental forgery connected with the licensing of a popular goodnight booklet supporting Charles I's piety, hence his political cause. For a literary critique of Milton's epic, this outsized appendix, really an extra chapter, seems irrelevant. But Empson, borrowing his case from Phelps Morand's 1939 political study of the poet, is trying to show that biographical pressures make historically impossible the lofty, simplminded paragon of the scholars: Milton's propaganda job, the tense first marriage into a Royalist family, his support of different kinds of Calvinist attempts to overthrow the Anglican settlement in church and state. Milton's God argues that as a plot source Genesis put this same kind of complex pressure on the poet's mind.

"Empson is challenging our theology, not simply sneering at the Mosaic God of the Bush and one-goat sacrifices."

Therefore, the "evidence" that Milton's God detects in the poem—that Satan has a moral case, that Eve's taste in fruit is logically justified, that God trapped and framed both Satan and Adam—is not due to some Freudian subconscious revolt against God, but Milton's propaganda-trained mind developing the dialectical possibilities of the situation in Eden. Here Milton's God ran into three defenses in depth, all confusingly titled: "I don't believe it!" This first means that Empson's arguments were unconvincing; secondly, that Eden is only an outdated fiction, and third, more subtly, that there is a conflict between a complex theology and a "humble" folk tale. (See Winters' argument below.)

But all thought, certainly all "problems," exist in the concrete (which is not to say all truth can be verified). If a Christian will not deal with the situation of Personal Omnipotence on Eden's grounds, let him choose another case. There will arise the same difficulties for him as a "subject" of the God of his theology, just as they arose for Satan, Eve, Milton, and Empson (who provide four different solutions to the problem). This common, shared ground explains why Empson's emotional identification with the protagonists of Milton's fiction carries over to the historical Chapter 7 on non-fictional Christianity.

As in his earlier books, Empson's Milton's God operates by a kind of mental judo on the serious scholarship of his subject to alter its conclusions. Many of the book's ideas are those of C.S. Lewis' 1942 Preface to Paradise Lost, given a different focus. Lewis set out to destroy the "noble rebel" critical tradition on the poem, a Victorian orthodoxy, and in effect to reclaim the poem's author for the Anglican Settlement. So Lewis devastates the moral pretensions of Satan and Eve. Empson says that in the context of the story, their faults are really their Omnipotent Creator's. That is, the free will-omnipotence argument is revived, but in a detailed, carefully argued manner. Empson is challenging our theology, not simply sneering at the Mosaic God of the Bush and one-goat sacrifices.

III

I HAVE TRIED TO INDICATE ABOVE SOME points for adult discussion in Milton's God. What occurred in 1961 seems to me childish. Some of the childishness was Empson's. Note, for example, the beginning of Chapter 3 of Milton's God how he counterattacks a rather wobbly attack on Paradise Lost by the American poet, Yvor Winters. Winters' argument concerns the origins of Milton's Christian divinities in the gods of classical mythology. Empson seems to suggest that this premise is eccentric. Yet all Milton's more ambitious poems combine an element from classical literature (usually "formal") with another from Christian traditions (usually "content"). It's the way his imagination worked. In the same way Milton will often labor to make a given line scan classically (quantities) and "our" way (stresses). Outside Paradise Lost, take Sonnet XX, "Lawrence of virtuous father virtuous son." Both in meter and content this doubles as a Renaissance pentameter sonnet and a Horatian classical poem.

Certainly Paradise Lost's "God" is Zeus, just as Adam is Virgil's Aeneas (lured from his sacred mission by the much-loved "pagan" queen, Eve-Dido; another Mary Powell, the seductive Cavalieress wife tempting the older Puritan scholar from his stern revolutionary duties of abolishing king, High Mass, maypoles, and marriages based on generation, not conversation).

That the author of 7 Types overlooks such simple double-references as these, is a bad lapse. For the Miltonist reviewers, it damaged Empson, not Winters. Now they could mumble in their notices about "shoddy scholarship." Such a slip, made to shore up a very minor argument, is much more damaging to the cogency of Milton's God than Empson's acceptance, against the specialists, of the Morand-forgery theory. Here Empson and the Miltonists are disputing from two different preconceptions about the poet's mind and character.

Reviewers of Empson's work (especially those in North America) complained that Empson forgot he was arguing about a story. But these reviewers (many of them professing Christians) "proved under pressure less interested in the book's religious issues than was the infidel author." The reviewers complained, unfairly, that Empson forgot he was arguing about a story. They could more seriously have criticized him for forgetting that Milton, the most professional of our poets, worked consciously in historical genres which had developed their own conventions and symbolism. Technically, Empson's most brilliant book, Some Versions of Pastoral (1935), is the study of the pastoral genre. But Empson showed that there was a kind of pastoral psychology among authors, which superseded any single literary
form. In the same way, for Empson the point of Milton’s epic form is psychological; the reader can assume the most sublime possible motivation for each character, including the “demons.”

But Empson’s lapses and the general stylistic brevity of Milton’s God must not mislead us about the moral issue between him and the more staid North American reviewers. These reviewers, many of them professing Christians, proved under pressure less interested in the book’s religious issues than was the infidel author. Milton’s God is a detailed, emotionally sober treatment of the actual political problems of the theological subjects of an absolute, divine ruler. To say that either Genesis or Paradise Lost is “only” a story, becomes a convenient rationale for avoiding Empson’s challenge. Milton’s God is meant to come to grips with the demanding Western God of the missionaries, the cathedrals, and the camp-meetings.

The tendency of American “conservatives” to avoid intellectual confrontations, public defenses of their official values, has often been remarked. The tolerance-concept provides a useful cop-out here, incidentally.

“Milton’s God is a detailed, emotionally sober treatment of the actual political problems of the theological subjects of an absolute, divine ruler. This work is meant to come to grips with the demanding Western God of the missionaries, the cathedrals, and the camp-meetings.”

I have a selection of experiences of my own, supporting Empson’s moral anger at modern Christianity (not his orthodox liberalism nor his belief that post-Christian governments have been conspicuous for their gentleness). Here is the closest fit I can give to Empson’s challenge in Milton’s God to the modern believer.

On two or three separate occasions I have made some pretext to quote Einstein’s public statement after the first official news of the atomic bomb. He said the experiment’s success invalidated the New Testament miracle of the Ascension. (A technical point in physics is involved.) The professing Christians of these little trials always laugh it off, of course. But none of them ever asks for Einstein’s proof-point. The general issue of the invasion of immanence by transcendence is never raised over our polite cocktails. Unfashionable thinkers like Einstein and Empson, you see, mistakenly believe that these campus sophisticates are ready to defend their beliefs against reasoned opposition; you know, squares like Milton, Luther, or the cloistered, academic Newman tackling Victorian anti-Catholic mobs in Manchester.

Using Empson’s book as my text, I have tried to identify some of the chemical elements in the general fog that surrounds adult controversy in our country. Perhaps unfairly (but generalizing at least from my own experiences), I regard the ecumenical movement in practice as only a minor contributing pollutant. The Christian critics disputed in Milton’s God, politely or nastily, are probably invulnerable to the moral criticisms made in Milton’s God and by me: Miss Tuve, Hugh Kenner, C. S. Lewis. But the general run of 1961 reviewers seem to have found an emotionally serious discussion of religion outside their own experience.

Books by William Empson; (dates for London 1st eds.)
1930 7 Types of Ambiguity (S eds.: 1930, 1947, 1953)
1935 Poems
1940 The Gathering Storm (poems)
1951 The Structure of Complex Words
1961 Milton’s God (2d ed., 1965)

Some Reviews of Milton’s God
Nation 16.6.62. (K. Burke)
New Statesman 29.9.61. (A. Alvarez)
Time 10.8.62.
Times Literary Supplement 29.9.61.
Yale Review 6/62

Some References
Tuve, Rosemond. A Reading of George Herbert (Chicago, 1952), pp. 19-99. Miss Tuve had more to contribute to a discussion on 17th-century poétique than any male listed here; if she had been French instead of Anglo-Saxon, she would have been less cautious about openly theoretical discussions.
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FORMULA OF CONCORD?


FAGERBERG'S BOOK WAS ORIGINALLY written in Swedish. It reflects the situation of the Swedish church, which has its own edition of the Augsburg Confession and often considers documents such as the Formula of Concord as secondary interpretations. Given this context, it is not surprising that Fagerberg tries to resolve questions created by the early Lutheran Confessions in a different way than the Formula of Concord does. His solution has many attractive characteristics, for it bypasses the bitter controversies among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession after Luther's death. Whether Fagerberg thereby also misses the depth of insight which the authors of the Formula of Concord gained from passing through these controversies is a question which the reader must decide.

This is the context of Fagerberg's "new look at the Lutheran Confessions." Fagerberg defines this new-ness by comparing his work to the two major contemporary studies of the confessions by Friedrich Brunstaudt and by Edmund Schlink. In contrast to them, Fagerberg feels that he (1) works out of a "more distinctive historical orientation"; (2) enters into conversation with the scholarly literature; and (3) does not include the Formula of Concord in his study (pp. 11 f.).

Fagerberg makes helpful contributions at all three points. He draws our attention to the Roman Catholic Confutation of the Augsburg Confession as the background of Melanchthon's Apology, he identifies many points of contact between the Confessions and other theological work and controversies that engaged the Reformers during these years, he helps clarify the relationship between Melanchthon's psychology as expressed in his treatise on the soul and the language of the Confessions, and he suggests points of tension between Luther and Melanchthon that are reflected in the Confessions. Fagerberg also reports on and comes to terms with the work of other, mostly Swedish, scholars.

However, the primary source of Fagerberg's "new look" is his omission of the Formula of Concord. He works on the basis of the Ecumenical Creeds, the Augsburg Confession, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, the Small and Large Catechisms, the Smalcald Articles, and the Tract on the Power and Primacy of the Pope. The reader will need to remember this in interpreting Fagerberg's frequent references to the Confessions, for example, his announced intention "to provide a summary of the theology of the Lutheran Confessions" (p. 11).

Fagerberg thus works with the Confessions which were accepted by the theologians of the Formula of Concord as the basic documents on which they needed to establish concord. Fagerberg explains the omission of the Formula of Concord by saying that it "reflects its own problems and demands separate consideration" (pp. 9f.). That is true of the historical background. At the same time, however, Fagerberg deals with many of the same problems that are discussed by the Formula of Concord. Fagerberg, for example, devotes a great deal of attention to determining the relationship between Law and Gospel and to deciding whether the Law should be preached to Christians and for what purposes. These problems are also dealt with in Articles V and VI of the Formula of Concord. Article V of the Formula of Concord decides in favor of a clear and consistent distinction between Law and Gospel and thus takes its place in a tradition of Lutheran theology that runs from Luther...
and Chemnitz through John Gerhard to C.F.W. Walther. Walther quotes Gerhard as saying that "the distinction between Law and Gospel must be preserved at every point" and adds his own commentary: "Mark well—at every point. There is not a doctrine that does not call upon us rightly to divide Law and Gospel." (C.F.W. Walther, The Proper Distinction Between Law and Gospel, W.H.T. Dau, ed. [St. Louis: Concordia, 1929], p. 37) Fagerberg presents us with a different description of the relation between Law and Gospel. He would respond to Walther that there are a number of doctrines that do not involve the distinction between Law and Gospel (pp. 38f.) and, for example, he asserts that it is "meaningless" to look at the Christian's vocation in terms of Law and Gospel (pp. 288). This last assertion also presupposes a different position on the third use of the Law than that found in Article VI of the Formula of Concord. Fagerberg's "new look at the Lutheran Confessions" thus also constitutes an alternative to the Formula of Concord.

Fagerberg provides an excellent summary of his basic concern and of the topics of his study:

The Confessions often claim to represent a Biblical theology in harmony with the earliest church fathers. Characteristic of their point of view is the more definite distinction between Law and Gospel. Our first three chapters seek to clarify their attitude toward the Scriptures and tradition, as well as to determine what the frequently used but often unclear expressions "Law" and "Gospel" really mean. The goal here is to establish, if possible, the content of these concepts, in order thereby to lay the foundation for our analysis of the theology of the Lutheran fathers. Our approach does not claim, any more than do the Confessions themselves, to be an epitome of dogmatics and ethics, but it does raise questions of significance to their theology. Chapter Four discusses the doctrine of the Trinity, which was of great importance to Reformation theology. Chapter Five, anthropology, and Chapter Six, justification. The next three chapters, which all relate to the very heart of Reformation theology, the proclamation of salvation by faith, deal with the sacraments, penitence, and the ministry. The consequences of justification for the church are set forth in Chapter Ten, and for the Christian life in Chapter Eleven. The final chapter provides an eschatological vision and summarizes the foregoing presentation (p. 13).

Fagerberg begins with a chapter on "the basis of the Confessions." He discusses the Bible, its function, and its interpretation. Fagerberg gives us little historical orientation at this point. He bypasses the question, for example, as to whether there are significant differences between the understanding of Scripture among the Reformers, the authors of the Confutation, and the Enthusiasts. He simply tells us that "when the Confessions were written, the authority of the Bible was not a problem; its authority was recognized on both sides of the confessional line of demarcation" (p. 15). Nor does he expand on the observation that the Confessions could quote the apocryphal books of the Old Testament as "God's Word" as easily as they could quote the Old and New Testaments themselves (p. 15). Fagerberg moves rapidly over such historical questions because he is anxious to establish a systematic doctrine of the authority of Scripture even though the Confessions under discussion "do not provide us with an analysis of this" (p. 16). They do however quote the Bible, and they do speak about God's Word. So Fagerberg suggests that although "the highly diversified use of the term 'God's Word' can create complications and make it hard to state clearly what is meant in one case or another. But an attempt to be as precise as possible must be made" (p. 17).

Fagerberg concludes that the Scriptures and God's Word are sometimes "virtual equivalents" (p. 18), but he also recognizes that nothing more can be said than: "The formula 'God's Word' always has some connection with the Bible." This may be as tenuous a connection as the Creed, the work of private absolution, or something else "not specifically included in the Bible" (p. 19). On this basis, Fagerberg concludes that "the Confessions never lend their support to an uncritical Biblicalism; . . . neither do they allow any emancipation from the Bible." Fagerberg does not clearly define the meaning of "uncritical." Is he advocating historical critical method, or grammatical-historical-critical exegesis, or some form of critical Biblicalism? In any case, Fagerberg can speak of the Bible as the "guarantee of the promise of the gospel" (p. 31).

FAGERBERG EVENTUALLY SUMMARIZES ten confessional rules for the interpretation of Scripture (p. 42), but I must admit that the way in which some of these rules are to be applied remains less than clear to me. However, Fagerberg is clear about his concern to establish as close a connection as possible between "God's Word" and the Bible. In order to achieve this, the distinction between the spoken word and the written word is reduced as much as possible (pp. 28-33 and 91-93). This permits Fagerberg virtually to identify God's Word with the Bible (including the Apocrypha). Fagerberg also says that God's Word gives us information about God's will. God's will

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is expressed in commands; and God’s commands are thus found in Scripture (p. 20). The Latin term for command is *mandatum* and it is a very important technical term for Fagerberg. An understanding of its meaning is essential to an understanding of Fagerberg’s work.

Article XIII of the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession* defines a sacrament as a rite which has God’s command, *mandatum* and promise. Fagerberg tries to establish that this usage of *mandatum* separates the command and promise and that this distinction is the consistent pattern of usage of this word elsewhere in the Confessions. On this basis, he concludes that “what is decisive for a *mandatum* is its direct or indirect connection with the Bible.” A relationship to the promise is not necessary, although sometimes “mandatum” appears to be virtually identical with Gospel. Even here, however, the validity of the *mandatum* does not depend upon the Gospel or on its intrinsic content but on its relation to the Bible (p.22).

Fagerberg grounds his assertion of disagreement between Luther and Melanchthon on the Lord’s Supper on the separation of “command” (mandatum) and “promise.” As command the words of Institution are addressed to the elements, bread and wine; as promise, these words are addressed to the people.

Fagerberg identifies three different categories of such *mandata* (commands): (1) Some refer “to the activities which the Christian man carries on as the result of his faith”; (2) others are “connected with worship services and ecclesiastical usage” — here command is virtually identical with the Gospel; (3) another usage of *mandatum* identifies God’s command as “the same as his gracious command; God’s will is His mercy as revealed in Christ (AP IV 345). The Gospel and *mandatum* are very closely related here. It might seem plausible to combine them and give them the same meaning. But this would be done in defiance of the Confessions’ explicit statements upholding the tripartite usage of *mandatum*” (p. 23).

Fagerberg draws an explicit parallel between this ambiguous usage of *mandatum* and the similarly ambiguous usage of “gospel” in the *Apology* (p. 24). Like the *Formula of Concord* he reports that “the word ‘gospel’ is used in a wider and in a narrower sense — in the former case referring to Jesus’ entire proclamation about penitence and the forgiveness of sin in the New Testament, in the latter case pointing only to the grace of God.” Fagerberg acknowledges the difficulty of determining the sense in which “gospel” is used in specific places in the *Apology*. In addition to these two usages, Fagerberg asserts a third which follows the tradition of Roman canon law and of the Roman Catholic *Confutation* and uses “gospel” in the sense of the Four Gospels or the New Testament.

Speaking of this third sense of “gospel,” Fagerberg says:

“In the Confessions, therefore, the Gospel became a critical authority in questions of church order, used in opposition to all that disputed the New Testament and its central meaning. The critical function of the Gospel became predominant in this area (p. 25).

I am at a loss to understand what he means when he then goes on to say that the “Gospel does not provide us with instruction related to civil life, but it does contain direction concerning, e.g., the work of priest and bishop” (p. 25). Nor does he clarify the sense in which he calls the gospel a “norm” (p. 96) or the ninth of his ten rules on Scriptural interpretation which asserts that “those Biblical injunctions which cannot be identified as *mandata* lack significance for the Christian” (p. 42). In all this he seems to be laying the foundation for later describing the Christian’s vocation in terms of *mandatum* rather than Law or Gospel (pp. 39 and 288).

**THIS LEADS TO THE DISCUSSION OF** another ambiguous term in the Confessions: *ius divinum*, divine right. Fagerberg says this term is often used interchangeably with *mandatum* and Gospel, and although “the Confessions themselves do not explain what they mean by “divine right” (p. 25), Fagerberg concludes on the basis of the German translation (!) of the *Apology* that Scripture is *ius divinum* in the true sense of the term (pp. 25-27; although Fagerberg recognizes that the translation is itself a commentary, a “paraphrase” [p. 9], he here and elsewhere still cites the German translation of the *Apology* as though it were definitive).

If Fagerberg’s analysis is correct, all three of these terms: *mandatum*, Gospel, *ius divinum*, are sometimes used in the narrow sense of the grace of God in Jesus Christ, but are also frequently used in the broad sense of the New Testament. Apart from their agreement with Scripture, they have no intrinsic authority (see p. 26, for example) in any sense. However, not everything in Scripture is authoritative. For example, Scripture is authoritative in matters of faith and of church order but only gives guidance, not “fixed rules,” in matters of ethics (p. 27).

Fagerberg now confronts a problem which also faced the theologians of the *Formula of Concord*: The earlier Confessions use terms such as Gospel, *mandatum*, and divine right without adequately clarifying their meaning. Terms such as these always stand in some relation to God’s Word, to
the Bible, and sometimes are related to the promise of grace in Jesus Christ.

How are words such as Gospel, mandatum, divine right to be understood in the earlier Confessions? Article V of the Formula of Concord describes two senses, a broad and a narrow, and Fagerberg recognizes the validity of this pattern (pp. 24 and 93). There are now two possibilities. One is to see the narrower sense of these terms as playing a determinative role and recognizing that there are some general usages which refer to the Scripture as the Four Gospels. Then we will refer to the narrow sense of Scripture as the appropriate sense and identify it as the essential element of the broad sense. This makes the task of distinguishing Law and Gospel the central theological task. Clear definitions are given for each term. On this basis Law and Gospel must also be distinguished in the broad sense and in the Four Gospels. This is the solution of the Formula of Concord.

One can also do what Fagerberg does and identify the broad sense of “gospel” as the determining sense. This presupposes that the “proper” or “narrow” sense of “gospel” and its distinction from the Law is important only in relation to the problem of faith and works. As a result, Fagerberg reads the Apology’s assertion that “All Scripture should be divided into these two chief doctrines, the law and the promise” (Ap IV 5) as saying nothing more than Apology IV 185, which says we should interpret passages dealing with “law and works” in terms of Law and Gospel. Fagerberg’s interpretation limits the general rule to one specific application.

This is the perspective in which Fagerberg reads the earlier Confessions (p. 89). He thus limits the significance of the distinction between Law and Gospel for theology:

But even if Law and Gospel do not constitute a general principle to which even clear and obvious Bible passages must conform, they are important enough when related to that problem which the reformers considered the weightiest of all theological problems, viz., how can man be freed from sin and become righteous before God? (p. 64)

and

... the confessional statements on Law and Gospel do not contain any general orientation for the interpretation of the Bible; Law and Promise serve a different, clearly limited purpose (p. 63).

Within this context, Fagerberg summarizes the earlier Confessions’ description of the Law as always accusing man of sin and of the Gospel as offering salvation for Christ’s sake through faith without the works of the Law. Unfortunately, limitations of space make it impossible to detail concerns over Fagerberg’s definition of forensic justification in terms of innocence rather than guilt over his consequently limited response to the classical question raised by Loofs (pp. 150 ff.) and over his failure to note Brenz’ concern about the content of Article IV of the Apology, as well as over his difficulty with the relation of faith to the sacraments (p. 171).

Fagerberg makes this same separation between command and promise in the Christian vocation. Thus, in treating the matter of marriage, it is difficult for Fagerberg to include marriage in the vocation of the Christian.

FAGERBERG HAS DIFFICULTY WITH the Law. He can say both that “There is no definition of Law in the Lutheran Confessions” (p. 64) and that “the Confessions clearly define their concept of Law” (p. 71). For Fagerberg is painfully conscious of the tension generated by the ideas that the Law is the expression of God’s will and that the Law also always accuses man as sinner. The latter function seems to leave no room for the positive function of Law as God’s will. The problem is, of course, more difficult for Luther than for Melanchthon, since “Luther and Melanchthon had differences of opinion concerning the Law” (p. 80). Fagerberg sees these earlier Confessions as resolving the problem by using mandatum, not Law, “to designate the positive, normative will of God” (p. 82). Luther and Melanchthon view the law as having two uses (restraint and accusation) — this is the only position that appears in these Confessions (p. 83). These Confessions do, of course, also presuppose “a positive, normative function of God’s will, applicable also to the Christian” (p. 85). However, they do not “say directly that the Law is to be preached to Christians, nor do they assume the same position as FC VI (Article VI of the Formula of Concord) with regard to the third use of the Law. But they do presuppose that God’s will is mediated to us in the Ten Commandments and that the Christian is to live in accordance with them” (p. 86).

Fagerberg works out his alternative to Article VI of the Formula of Concord on the third use of the Law in Chapter Eleven on the Christian life. The Christian vocation is not a matter of Gospel or Law or even the third use of the Law, but of mandatum (p. 288; cf. pp. 86 and 96). The works that the Christian does in fulfilling his vocation may be known from nature, but they must have specific confirmation from Scripture. This protects the Christian from doing works for workrighteous purposes, but also guarantees that these works should be done (pp. 287-289). He uses marriage as an example (pp. 289 ff.). Fagerberg does not ask whether the biblical mandatum approving...
marriage requires every Christian to marry or not. Nor does he describe how such a \textit{mandatum} could be known from Scripture to apply to some and not to others.

Many other matters are related to this basic concept of \textit{mandatum}: for example, Fagerberg concludes that the reformers misunderstood the nature of the church as a “community” of believers (p. 254); he says that the Confessions rightly do not put as much emphasis on the universal priesthood of believers as Luther does (p. 247), but rather conceive of the ministry as a divine institution: the universal priesthood has the power to choose ministers, but does not thereby empower them (p. 247 f.). (It is worth noting that Fagerberg feels that the confessions reject the concept of the invisible church, p. 258.)

\textbf{To understand Fagerberg’s work and the intention of his book, it is important to understand his use of a technical term, \textit{mandatum} (command).} “Mandatum is a central concept . . . and appears in almost every chapter.”

\textit{Mandatum} is a central concept in Fagerberg’s work and appears in almost every chapter. Fagerberg bases his distinction between \textit{mandatum} (command) and promise on Article XIII of the Apology where Melanchthon describes the sacraments as “rites which have the command of God and to which the promise of grace has been added.” Baptism, communion, and abscolution are described as the genuine sacraments. Fagerberg apparently wishes to exclude private absolution from such a list on the grounds that it does not have God’s command (p. 221; cf. p. 174), presumably because there is no way of knowing whether this particular act is commanded by God.

It is an historical fact that Melanchthon in later years disagreed with Luther on the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper and that he and Luther had serious conversations about their views in relation to the sacramentarian controversy and the Marburg Colloquy with Zwingli. Fagerberg feels that the Confessions themselves reflect disagreement between the \textit{Augsburg Confession} and the Apology, written by Melanchthon, and the Catechisms and \textit{Smalcald Articles}, written by Luther. These documents all “teach the real presence” but reflect “a distinct difference of opinion” on “the actual meaning of the Real Presence” (p. 190). The Confessions reflect disagreement between Luther and Melanchthon on the importance of the elements in the sacrament (p. 191). Fagerberg’s assertion of such disagreement is based on the separation of the command from the promise in the words of institution. About the \textit{Large Catechism} he says “the words of institution are first of all divine command, not promise” (p. 187). The command first brings about the Real Presence separately from the promise (pp. 188, 282). And the Catechisms are interpreted as emphasizing the importance of this command much more than the promise (pp. 186-188). The promise is also contained in the words of institution, but the promise is effective after the Real Presence has been brought about by the command (p. 197). “The Word of promise therefore includes no assurance of the real presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper, but on the basis of the presence of Christ’s body and blood in the Lord’s Supper promises us forgiveness” (p. 196). The words of institution as command are “addressed to the bread and wine”; as promise, they are addressed to the communicants (p. 195).

This separation of command from promise in the words of institution is a misinterpretation of Luther’s Catechisms. Because of it, Fagerberg is critical of Luther’s doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ (pp. 187, 194 f. Cf. \textit{Formula of Concord}, Solid Declaration, VIII, 80-84). He also does not merely note that Roman Catholics have since changed their position, but is somewhat uncertain as to whether the Reformers really understood the Roman doctrine of the mass (pp. 199-205), and concludes that we now have a “greater understanding of the sacrificial motif in the Lord’s Supper” (p. 201) than the Reformers had.

Fagerberg, however, also needs to separate command and promise in vocation. His prime example of this is marriage, which has the commandment of God but not the promise of grace. At this point, Fagerberg simply is not able to make a convincing case for the \textit{mandatum} of marriage as a specific biblical command (pp. 288 ff.). Melanchthon is very clear (Ap XIII 14) that marriage is instituted not in the New Testament but in creation. That, however, makes it very difficult for Fagerberg to include marriage in the vocation of the Christian because of a specific biblical command. Melanchthon also recognizes that God has given certain promises in connection with marriage, even though they are not promises of God’s grace in Christ. He is even prepared to concede that marriage and a variety of offices as well as government, prayer, and almsgiving which are commanded by God and have his promise could be called sacraments if the promise is not defined as a promise of grace. Melanchthon is, of course, reluctant to extend the usage of sacrament in this way. However, his reluctance is not due to any deficiency in the command or to the absence of a promise attached to such matters. Fagerberg’s polemic against Wilhelm Maurer’s assertion that “the divine \textit{mandatum} is always a word of promise” both misinterprets Maurer as saying that \textit{mandatum} must “stand in an absolute relationship to justification” (p. 20) and separates command
from promise in a way that the Apology does not (pp. 20-25).

THIS IS MORE THAN A SCHOLARLY technicality. Fagerberg needs to disprove Maurer's understanding of mandatum because he wants to establish the authority of the ministry as the Bible rather than as the Gospel. The church's ministry, therefore, like the Christian's vocation is not a question of Law and Gospel but of mandatum (pp. 38, 226-250). One obvious effect of such a distinction is to remove large areas of the church's ministry from the pastoral concerns represented by the distinction between Law and Gospel. Mandatum designates a third area that is related to Law and Gospel but not subsumed under either. In these areas, then, the church is not governed primarily by pastoral concerns but by the concern to conform to the biblical commands. This simplifies the tasks of ministry, particularly in the areas of administration and of counseling.

There is no more difficult task in pastoral ministry than properly distinguishing Law and Gospel in relationship to specific people. It is always easier merely to inform people about God's will as revealed in the Bible. It is easier because the pastor can speak about God's commands and forget that these commands are also the Law which "always accuses us" (Apology IV, 166). It is no simple matter for the pastor to decide when someone has heard the Law and that now is the time to speak the Gospel. It is difficult to choose the appropriate imagery in which to present the Gospel. The pastor who can at some point define his ministry in terms of quoting Bible passages and giving information about Biblical commands has a much easier time of it. Fagerberg's understanding of Law and Gospel and his establishment of a third category of mandata make that more relaxed style of ministry possible. In effect, Fagerberg creates a "free space" for ministry outside of Law and Gospel. Ministry in that free space is also much less of a risk. For the pastor who deals with his people in terms of commands rather than in terms of the Law is not in much danger of hearing the Law himself. And the pastor who preaches the Gospel because the Bible commands people to believe does not need to run the existential risk of "I say it because I believe it - Lord, help my unbelief." There is much less risk in saying, "I'm only telling you what I read in the Bible."

Among the areas included in this free space under the mandata are the Christian's vocation (p. 39, 288), the Lord's Supper, the ministry, and good works (p. 38). Fagerberg also relegates the discussion of such matters as the number of sacraments, the sacrifice of the mass, the distribution of the wine in communion, purgatory, pilgrimages, the worship of saints, relics, indulgences, celibacy, and monasticism to the free space of the mandata outside of the distinction between Law and Gospel (p. 39). The decisive question is what God has commanded in Scripture. These are not matters of Law and Gospel. Indeed this free space is identified wherever Fagerberg introduces the concept of mandatum. He calls it the "mandatum rule of interpretation" (p. 39).

To the questions arising among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, Fagerberg offers resolutions differing from those of the Formula of Concord.

**SUCH IS THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE Formula of Concord which Fagerberg offers as a resolution of the questions arising among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession. I personally prefer the Formula of Concord. This does not mean, however, that Fagerberg is simply to be rejected. As a theologian of the Augsburg Confession, he shares our common rejection of medieval Catholicism and our affirmation of the Gospel of salvation for Christ's sake through faith without the works of the Law. It is regrettable that he does not see the basic continuity between the earlier Confessions and the Formula of Concord, particularly with regard to Articles V and VI. And I share the concern of the Formula of Concord that the limitations which Fagerberg places on the distinction between Law and Gospel will "easily darken the merits and benefits of Christ, once more make the Gospel a teaching of Law, as happened in the papacy, and thus rob Christians of the true comfort which they have in the Gospel against the terrors of the law and reopen the door to the papacy in the church of God" (Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, Article V, 27). However, I also know well that many Lutherans who confess the Augsburg Confession have lived in that danger for years and even generations without fully losing the Gospel. It seems to me, however, that Fagerberg offers less protection against that possibility than does the Formula of Concord.**
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM has never, to put it mildly, been known for richness and subtlety of intellectual attainment; if it would be unfair simply to dismiss modern conservatives as constituting John Stuart Mill's "stupid party," neither can it be denied that they have contributed precious little to American political thought. The reasons for this are varied (and in fairness would have to include the conservatives' objection that the problem is not theirs but the society's: they have spoken, but because of the hegemony of liberalism over the American mind they have never really been heard) and are in any case perhaps irrelevant.

Much of the point of political conservatism lies in its distrust of the left-wing proclivity for rationalistic systems-building. The man of the right is typically less interested in political theory than in governing of men; his bias is toward a highly particularistic approach to life and politics. He wants simply, in the words of one historian about Theodore Roosevelt, "to maintain a viable situation." The conservative intellectual is preoccupied with the mystery, complexity and tragedy of history, and the lessons he learns there are seldom orderly or regular enough to translate themselves into systematic political thought.

This being the case, an inquiry into the nature and prospects of Richard Nixon's conservatism might seem an exercise in insubstantiality, particularly since he, like most practicing politicians, has no apparent concern with abstract political theory. Still, the actions and rhetoric of the President do contain—sometimes explicitly, sometimes not—the outlines of an ideology, in however rough or even inconsistent a form.

The conclusion which seems to arise from analysis of the Nixon record to date is mixed: though he is essentially a conservative in the American tradition—which means that he is, above all, a champion of possessive individualism—Nixon nonetheless retains the occasional capacity to surprise, to transcend the usual limits of American conservative orthodoxy. (The latter point is most obviously true in the area of foreign affairs, but my concern here is with domestic policy.)

To believe, as I do, that the President's departures from traditional conservatism (e.g., the Family Assistance Plan, partial economic controls) tend to be not only the most interesting but among the most beneficial of his policies is not necessarily to condemn out of hand everything associated with the American conservative tradition. Such values as hard work, discipline, personal responsibility and concern for order may not be fashionable in intellectual circles, but it is difficult to imagine any society functioning successfully for long without them. There is nothing intrinsically reactionary or anachronistic in Nixon's recurring defense of the work ethic.

The same sort of observation can be made on the level of overall policy, where the President seems entirely correct in his traditional emphasis on the overriding importance of general economic growth to the nation's well-being, however conceived. For far too long liberals have ignored the enormous debt that American economic and political reform owe to national prosperity. Those who question this might ponder the example of England, which indicates clearly that a comprehensive welfare-state apparatus lacking a supporting context of economic growth produces not public felicity but economic disaster and social disaffection. Concern about spiritual poverty and social meanness is the fortunate luxury of a materially successful society.

This being said, there still remains, at least for this philosophical conservative, the belief that the American conservative tradition has been fundamentally barren in principle and practice, and that Richard Nixon's philosophy retains too much of the Hoover-Taft-Goldwater influence to serve as a fully satisfactory alternative to the manifest inadequacies of modern American liberalism.

The American conservative tradition has been fundamentally barren in principle and practice, and Richard Nixon's philosophy retains too much of the Hoover-Taft-Goldwater influence to serve as a fully satisfactory alternative to the manifest inadequacies of modern American liberalism. The negativism, extreme individualism, and general failure of social imagination which have all-too-pervasively characterized the American right continue to imbue, though in an attenuated form, the actions and rhetoric of the President.

JUST WHEN THE PRESIDENT shows signs of breaking with the old dogmas, he suddenly retreats, as if in fright at his own audacity, to the safety of traditional language and policy. Thus the sad fate, at least to date, of the Family Assistance Plan. When this program for a guaranteed

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minimum income was initially proposed in the early days of the Nixon Presidency, it fully earned Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s description of it as the most important piece of domestic legislation since the New Deal. It also reflected just the kind of bold creativity so lacking in American conservatism yet so characteristic of enlightened conservatism in Europe at least as far back as Bismarck. (There are those who see a foreign model for Nixon in Disraeli. It required no more than Prime Minister Edward Heath’s look of astonishment at the very suggestion to indicate the fanciful nature of that comparison.)

One appreciated the political necessity behind Nixon’s early insistence that the plan was not what it really was; given the general public’s aversion to welfare, his emphasis on the “workfare” aspect of FAP was easily understandable. Yet in the end the Nixon rhetoric worked too well; the constant deference to the old pieties convinced not only Middle America but apparently the speaker himself that substantial modification, in any guise, of the principle of rugged individualism merited at best a very low legislative priority. This may be unfair to the President, but the evidence is strong that he bears a substantial share—though not the full burden—of the responsibility for FAP’s defeat prior to the election. And the plan seems, if not forever dead, at least temporarily moribund. Meanwhile, the President’s speeches since November recall the old conservatism with a vengeance.

Let me not be misunderstood as indulging in “Ripon Republicanism,” i.e., as suggesting, as critics of American conservatism so often do, that it heal itself by becoming liberalism. The Democratic party is the liberal party in America, and the Republicans need to revivify and redefine their conservatism, not to abandon it for their opponents’ philosophy. Consensus, non-ideological politics has its considerable uses, but it also has its limits; John Lindsay belongs in the party of which he is now a member.

It is precisely because neither modern American liberalism nor traditional American conservatism have served the country well in recent times that both the need and the opportunity are so great for Nixon to make some creative transformations in the nation’s political thought and practice.

THE PATH OF POLITICAL opportunity and success seems wide open to a politics characterized perhaps most simply as “reform without sentimentality.” Such a politics would assiduously avoid any suggestion of New Left, McGovernite influences: there would be no moralistic rhetoric or gestures, and few righteous denunciations. It would be based on the assumption that politics has to do not with the creation of Peaceable Kingdoms but with the peaceful reconciliation of

The politics of reform would be characterized most simply as “reform without sentimentality.” They would not be the politics of moralistic rhetoric or a few righteous denunciations. Such politics would assume that politics “has to do not with the creation of Peaceable Kingdoms but with the peaceful reconciliation of legitimately differing interests and beliefs among individuals and groups.”

It would recognize that there is nothing wrong with middle class values, that, indeed, such values need to be preserved and nourished in the best interests of a stable and productive society. It would respect the distinction between the proximate and ultimate ends of man and acknowledge that politics is normally and properly concerned with the former, not the latter. It would recognize, simply, that those seeking absolution or transcendence should consult their priests, not their congressmen.

This new conservatism, while avoiding the use of politics as surrogate religion, would at the same time have a genuine commitment to that gradual and continuing process of reform required in any society to adjust to change and to satisfy the majority of the citizenry that basic social arrangements are such as to provide at least a minimal approximation of rough justice.

One does not have to sentimentalize the nature of the poor or invent crude theories of the essentially exploitative nature of society to make legitimate the need of many at the bottom for help from those farther up the social and economic ladder. At the most pragmatic level of analysis, it is clear that the society is rich enough to provide a basic minimum for those who, for whatever reason (including simple lack of ability), cannot do so for themselves, and that it can accomplish this without demanding great sacrifices from the more wealthy and without insisting on substantial redistribution of wealth.

It is time enough in America that conservatives demonstrate that compassion need not be inconsistent with realism about the nature of man and the limits of social policy. So long, however, as conservatives, including the President, continue to insist on upholding individualism over any and all competing social values, they will leave themselves open to charges of moral obtuseness. Lowered profiles and even benign neglect can be defended in certain circumstances, but they do not by themselves constitute a sufficient social policy.

SURELY THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE appears conducive to movement in the directions here suggested. The old Democratic coalition, wounded grievously by the McGovern candidacy, appears wide open to wholesale raids on its
A Valparaiso engineering professor speaks candidly in this issue about the problems of urban transport past and future. Those problems are not simply technical nor even merely fiscal. Here is an engineer to remind us that the provisions we make for urban transportation reflect the images we form of ourselves and of the city. RHL

THE CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY is in serious financial trouble. It is trying to pay all its operating costs out of the money it collects in the fare box and is not able to meet its current bills. This is an old story.

Mass transit (something that for years was the only form of urban transportation for the majority of a city's inhabitants) has never been very healthy financially. While the cartoonists have always pictured the transit owner as a typical robber baron in top hat and Chesterfield coat, most of the people who invested their money in street railway, elevated or subway stock ended up with less than a respectable income from their investment and often lost their savings as well. For every Charles Yerkes or Samuel Insull there have been hundreds of widows and old folks who lost all they had saved when one transit company after the other went broke.

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Having recently read the early (1909) reports of one of the CTA's predecessors formed in Chicago's first transit merger, I do not blame the financial troubles of the Chicago Railways Company, The Chicago City Railway Company, the Calumet and South Chicago Railway Company, and the Southern Street Railway Company on the private automobile alone. Some of these financial failures were due to poor planning, inefficient operation or even financial chicanery. There were other failures caused by excessive and unrealistic demands written into transit franchises. Most transit companies were required to remove the snow, not only from their tracks but also from the adjacent traffic lanes of the streets. They were required to sprinkle the streets to keep down the dust and the blowing of the pollutants deposited by the horses. Often the companies were required to build and operate lines into undeveloped areas of the community or to operate all night "Owl" service on lines where the crews' main problem became loneliness. Since there were a lot more patrons than stockholders, the companies were convenient whipping boys and holding the fare down became a favorite vote-getting project for the local politicians.

While wages and power costs increased with the years, fares remained comparatively constant. When one views the busses, trains, tracks and depots of a modern transit system, it is difficult at first glance to realize that a transit system is a labor intensive system. A quick check of a typical transit system's
operating report will show how much money is paid out in wages. A good example is Boston's MBTA. This system is subsidized with about 57% of its operating income being contributed in the form of grants from the communities served and only 38.2% coming out of the fare box. When we examine the expense side of the balance sheet we find that salaries and wages account for 54.5% of the operating expenses. With transit employees well organized and well paid (operators on most large systems receive over $5.00 an hour) transit operating costs are very sensitive to the spiraling inflationary pressures.

The private car is also convenient, but its convenience has become a self-defeating function. Congested buran areas furnish ample testimony to the reversal of convenience into inconvenience when each wants to drive his own car. The congestion also underscores the cost in the amount of land needed for automobiles: a 300 foot-wide expressway requires 36.36 acres of land for each mile of highway; attempting to visualize the sort of parking lot required for a major commercial center, such as Chicago's loop, staggers the imagination. And certainly the cost in energy consumption makes the automobile an unwise drain on our sources of energy.

WHAT FORM OF TRANSIT do I envision for the future city? I see a balance between the automobile and a mass transit system serving the major centers of commerce and employment in the city. Only when a transit system can operate on its own right of way, separated from the conflicting movements of the private automobile, can the system compete in terms of speed and convenience. Along with transportation authorities, I see a rail mass transit system forming the backbone of tomorrow's transit system in the major cities of the nation. This rail network, combined with feeder bus systems, park and ride lots, and "kiss and ride" points where a spouse may deposit his or her mate and then have use of the car for the rest of the day, will serve those concentrations of employment and shopping that can become paralyzed with automobile congestion. The rail network could also serve those nodes of intercity transportation, such as airports, that are becoming increasingly inaccessible by car. The systems that we will see within the foreseeable future will not be the exotic "Sunday supplement" variety but will result from evolutionary development of equipment available, especially developments of advanced propulsion and control systems.

During the next decade, rail transport systems will follow two modes of development. The first will be an extension of the elevated-subway systems now in use in our major cities. Trains of cars will operate under automatic control, be air-conditioned, and accelerate smoothly up to speeds of 70 MPH. While San Francisco's BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) system has received the greatest amount of publicity, both good and bad, the automatic operation of both Philadelphia's Lindenwold line and London's Victoria line have also proved both safe and efficient. The trains start as soon as the operator closes the doors, accelerate smoothly to the proper speed, slow down for curves and finally come to a smooth stop at the exact berthing position without assistance of the operator. Air-conditioned cars are becoming more prevalent and only the destructive Depression of some of the patrons prevents the installation of more comfortably upholstered seats. Lighting in these modern cars is of high intensity and glareless so that reading is not difficult.

New techniques will reduce the cost of underground construction, but track at grade or above grade will continue to be less expensive. One of the most efficient uses of land and structures is the sharing of right of way by a transit system and an expressway. Chicago's Congress, Dan Ryan, and Jefferson Park lines are prime examples of this sharing of facilities. With the addition of parking facilities, the CTA's Jefferson Park Terminal could be the prototype for tomorrow's intermodal terminal providing connections between cars, city busses, suburban busses, intercity busses, commuter railroads, airport links, and the L-subway system.

Where an elevated structure is required, it will not be the Victorian lattice of steel spanning a street or alley and creating a tunnel of gloom. The newer elevated structures are of concrete with simple "tee" columns and ballast deck track structure to reduce the noise. Where they do not share the right of way with a city street, the area beneath the tracks will be landscaped to provide a linear park with gardens, walks and playgrounds. There are some excellent examples of this right of way treatment along the BART system. While a romantic may regret the loss of the older stations with their Victorian gingerbread, best exemplified by the older Boston stations or some of the closer-in stations on Chicago's Lake Street line, the newer open design stations with a great deal of glass and radiant heaters for the winter months prove more practical. The newer columnless subway stations, such as the new Logan Square station of the CTA, are both functional and attractive. It is distressing, however, that fear of and protection against vandalism and mugging has become the governing criteria in design.

The crying need is for a balanced system, combining both the automobile and mass transit systems serving major centers of commerce and employment in the city.

The second form of development that rail mass transit will take is that of the tram or light rail system. In this system the cars or short

March, 1973
trains operate in the median of a road in the outer part of a city, stopping at each corner for passengers and often for traffic lights. In the newer systems, the traffic light system is set up to give the transit car the right of way. When the tracks enter the more congested portions of the city, they duck into "During the next decade, rail transport systems will follow two modes of development." 1) An extension of the elevated-subway system; 2) the tram or light rail system.

relatively shallow subways to cross to the other side of the town or to loop and return. While the concept of such a system originated in the United States, most of the newer systems of this type have been developed in Europe. Several of the Dutch systems are used as examples of modern versions of the tram system. Older examples are the trolley subways in Boston and Philadelphia.

A similar system is the Shaker Heights Rapid Transit Line in Cleveland. Here the inner portion of the line shares right of way with the Penn Central and Norfolk and Western Railways. The San Francisco Muni's street car system will become a tram system when the new Market Street subway is completed, permitting the cars to run express from the Twin Peaks Tunnel to the Old Ferry Building. Boston and San Francisco have co-operated in the design of a Standard Light Rail Vehicle and it is expected that 230 of these articulated, air-conditioned cars will be ordered in 1973.

I have refrained from mentioning the monorail as an important part of tomorrow's transit network. While most laymen think of monorail as something new, the longest operating common carrier monorail system was built before the beginning of this century. This line, the Wuppertal line in Germany, is locally known as the "Schwaben Bahn," which conveys an idea of the dynamic stability of the system. While the monorail is touted as a high speed form of transit, conventional bi-rail systems operate at much higher speeds than either the Tokyo or Seattle monorail systems. If the monorail is judged on purely practical grounds, it comes out a poor second in the design phase because of a much higher initial cost. A look at Seattle's monorail will show that its structure has no esthetic advantage over a modern concrete bi-rail elevated structure.

THE PROBLEMS OF ESTABLISHING a new rail mass transit system are great. Transit systems are no longer able to attract risk capital from the private investor. Capital costs, therefore, must be obtained from municipal bonds or outright government grants. In the crowded urban areas where such systems are most needed, right of way is at a premium. Space along an expressway, an unneeded railroad right of way, even an unused canal bed have provided a transit right of way. If surface right of way is not available, a subway must be constructed.

The problems of establishing a new rail mass transit system are great: attracting private capital; acquiring and using economically the space; protection against vandalism and muggings, are only some of the problems.

A second major problem is the protection of the system and its patrons from damage by less considerate members of the community. Vandalism has included slashing seat cushions, throwing rocks at windows, painting graffiti on cars and stations, and even attempts to derail a train. Muggings and murders have occurred often enough on our major systems to discourage the faint-hearted. Anti-social behavior on public transport makes it all the more difficult for transit authorities to attract the numbers of people required to justify operation and remove the automobiles from the street.

With all of the problems that transit systems are encountering in meeting their operating expenses, one would assume that vultures are circling over the cars as they approach their last terminal. This is not the case, for planners and governmental groups are beginning to see that there is a definite need for balanced transportation systems, including buses, rapid transit, commuter railroads and the private automobile. The prospect of traffic strangleation in certain metropolitan areas looms as a major threat to their vitality, to the services they give, and to the jobs that they provide.

Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Montreal and Toronto all have major extensions either under contract or in the advanced planning stages. Atlanta, Baltimore, and San Francisco have new systems in advanced planning or under construction. In addition to 230 light-rail vehicles, almost 1400 rapid transit cars will be ordered in 1973. Seven hundred and fifty cars will be ordered by New York alone. Two "state of the art" rapid transit cars testing the latest developments are now touring the systems of the country under DOTUMTA sponsorship. The techniques are available, the need is real, and the passengers are available. Governmental groups are beginning to release the brakes and place the controller in the first notch. Soon the public will benefit.

It has always appeared to me that a city's subway system conforms to the images and stereotypes of the city it serves. The Monumental station of the Moscow system, the noise, hustle and confusion of the New York system, the Parisian ambience of Montreal's Metro, or the artistic treatment of the new BART stations are typical examples.

Nowhere, perhaps, does a subway system conform more to a city's stereotype than the little-known subway system of Glasgow, Scotland. The track consists of a simple double track loop no more complex than a child's toy train set under the Christmas tree. There are no switches or crossovers between tracks. There is not even a siding leading to the repair shops. Frugality and sound engineering prevail, and when the cars must be removed to the shop for their regular inspection and repair,
they are lifted up by an overhead crane into a shop building which straddles the tracks. The tubes are only eleven feet in diameter, housing a four-foot track gage. The cars, purchased in 1896 for the original cable operation, were electrified in 1936, and still form the backbone of the city's rolling stock. Since one

“It has always appeared to me that a city's subway system conforms to the images and stereotypes of the city it serves.”

track is used only for clockwise operating trains, the other only for counter clockwise operating trains, and since station platforms are placed between the tracks, the canny Glaswegians finish paint and letter the cars only on the left-hand side.

Modes of urban transport, in the end, reflect the image citizens have of themselves and their city.

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THEater — WALTER Sorell

THE CASE OF SEAN O’CASEY

THE IRISH UPRISING OF 1916 was of course different from the one of today, but the difference is only one of locale and method. The senseless dying is the same, the quarrelsome, stubborn, and poetic Irish are the same. Unpleasant similarities prove that these endearing people have learned nothing during the last fifty odd years, and this is probably what prompted The Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center to put Sean O’Casey’s play, The Plough and the Stars, on stage again. One other reason for it would be to find out how O’Casey fares today with a play written in 1926.

It was one of his earlier plays, but it was conceived after The Shadow of a Gunman and Juno and the Paycock. O’Casey was never known for being interested in the tight structure of a play. There is plenty of realism in his plays, but he broke away from it all the time in order to revel in symbolic lyricism. I wonder why so many reviewers were surprised to find that the four acts of The Plough and the Stars are only loosely held together, if this was O’Casey’s way of writing. He was the master of the loose form. Each act is a one-act play in itself, and all are kept together by the repeated appearance of the characters and a major idea. The characters usually do not change or grow, even though a lot of things may happen to them. Each act is a vignette illuminating the idea, being different in mood and often even in style. Imagination is all that ever mattered to him: serious or comic imagination, but all the tragic and comic moments are only alive because of the playwright’s poetic imagination.

Everything in his plays is full of real life painted in miniature, every character a bag full of idiosyncracies, every word and gesture anchored in realism but floating above the prosaic concerns of daily existence. It is their sense of humor that saves his characters from losing themselves in despair and pessimism. O’Casey’s love for glaring colors, the big gesture, and the miraculous magnificence of nature is reflected in his use of vivid language. But make no mistake about it, he is really, almost compulsively, concerned about what is happening to his characters.

When and where he failed, he failed because of the heat with which he wrote. Our theater — trivial, confined to neat construction of the predictable, or abounding with absurdities running amuck with non sequiturs — is a theater of small feeling and little passion. O’Casey was a Dionysian writer, and in the sweep of his imagination he was not always a clear thinker, nor was he necessarily consistent.

THOSE WHO CANNOT ACCEPT these premises should not see his plays. I do not think that The Plough and the Stars has aged, and
not because of its renewed reminder of the strife in Northern Ireland. No, he is still the same old O'Casey, who does not mind letting Nora, who is trying to save her husband from committing the ultimate folly of dying for an illusion, break out into a propagandistic speech: "There's no woman gives a son or husband to be killed—if they say it, they're lyin', lyin', against God, nature an' against themselves!" And when she says it in a moment of despair, her fiery feelings have no time to deliberate whether her suffering hides behind a poster-like announcement. O'Casey feels like shouting it into the world and makes Nora his spokesman. No, he is still the same old O'Casey able to give up a moment of dramatic reality for a poetic alliteration—how else could he have dedicated The Plough and the Stars "To the Gay Laugh of My Mother at the Gate of the Grave."

Perhaps this is all that the play is about. Perhaps more than in his other plays O'Casey's laughter is a redeeming factor while he makes us watch man's stupidity and how his false feelings for honor and country vie for our full attention. Admittedly, it is a difficult play, daring in its sequential non-structure, with its last act surrendering to melodrama, with the heroine going mad in the finest Shakespearean fashion, with the main action taking place in the background while the actors have to mirror the resurrection of the Irish people.

O'Casey does not make life easy for his stage directors, and Dan Sullivan created impressive pictorial images on stage, but with quite a few flaws in his direction of the acting. There were some wooden scenes and awkward moments, particularly in the third act, the street outside the Clitheroe apartment. Nora wrestling with her husband to keep him from going back into the fighting zone in order to help a wounded comrade, was poorly staged. When there is realism, with O'Casey it must transcend into poetic realism. The wrestling and the sight of the bleeding soldier remained stagey and visually ineffective. But those few instants of missing a heightened intensity were offset by a gallery of fine portraits and some imaginative scenes.

I doubt that O'Casey has aged. If we cannot appreciate him, then the difficulty lies with us who have lost any sense for the poetry of life. And without it, O'Casey's cadences of verbal warmth, his cascades of rebellious alliterations, and the grace of his gaiety pass us by.

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**FILM — RICHARD LEE**

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**Quotable Movies and other Academic Matters**

'LATELY IT'S A BALLOONING fashion, like pleated pants, to quote old movies in new movies.

If you listen fast to They Might Be Giants you hear "Thank you, Mr. Rathbone" said to George C. Scott playing Sherlock Holmes. In Gunsmoke Albert Finney fantasizes himself as Sam Spade in memory of the old Hollywood policier noir. Contributions to Casablanca run through Woody Allen's Play It Again, Sam. The Projectionist is one long film quotation, a delightful movie about movies and little else. The brutal "Singing in the Rain" sequence in A Clockwork Orange is an ironic reference to one of the last Hollywood studio musicals.

Peter Bogdonovich cites Bringing Up Baby, The Caine Mutiny, and many another old movie in What's Up, Doc? Even pornography is touched with nostalgia; High Rise, the equally revolting companion piece to Deep Throat, is studded with grand DOM's from old movies, notably W.C. Fields and Groucho Marx.

Exceedingly nostalgic films like Tomorrow, A Separate Peace, and The Last Picture Show quote the several cinematic styles of the 30's, 40's, and 50's in which their stories are set. Bad Company subtly stylizes 20's silent picture piano accompaniment on its sound track. And on and on, backward. Anyone who still sourly sighs "They don't make movies like they used to" hasn't been to the movies lately.

A choice stylistic quotation occurs in The Great Northfield Minnesota Raid, one of the best comic westerns since Cat Ballou. As Jesse James rides by a wilderness church in Centennial 1876 the lovely voices of the present St. Olaf College Choir sing out "Christus Natus Hodie!" Impeccably pronounced Latin, too, from the massed choir squeezed into that tiny immigrant church! I will award a complimentary subscription to The Cresset to the first reader who writes me the right source of that film quotation. I promise I'll never tell.

Most of the new film quotations are fully intended as quotations; they are not plagiarisms and only rarely parodies. The latter, of course, are as old as the movies. Film parody runs from Chaplin's 1915 Carmen (a burlesque on both DeMille's Carmen and Theda Bara's Carmen of the same year) right up to the latest "Underground" spoofs of commercial films and filmed commercials. Plagiarism starts further back, nearer the turn of the century, when Edison duped Melies's Trip to the Moon and sold the copies under his
own titles. Actually remaking your competitor's movie, thus starting a film cycle, was something of a moral advance - but no relation to the film quotation. The current Mafia movies, for example, do not quote each other, however much the whole cycle may help some Americans who now desperately crave ways to approve brute force and the amorality of success at any cost.

There are devices related to the film quotation which use the actual footage of old movies. The footage is "framed" by the new movies and used for period decor and historical comment. The Last Picture Show, The Summer of '42, and They Might Be Giants are, in part, exegeses of the old movies their characters are watching. In THX-1138 one was about to laugh at the programming on the "roommate video pacifier" of the future when his breath failed in the realization that those lurid coming attractions and distractions were very like the programs now at home on his TV. The film-within-the-film in A Clockwork Orange is used similarly to show film "conditioning and deconditioning." As the cinematic past can be used for comment on the present, so can the cinematic present be used to comment on the future.

Perhaps the nearest and easiest example of the use of old footage in a new movie for aesthetic purpose can be seen in Young Winston. As the film ends, the screen suddenly turns black and white and documentary footage of the real and aged Churchill fades out the movie. It is as if a footnote and flashforward were cut in to say "This is the real life source of our fiction and this is the revered old man the unlikely young Winston becomes."

What do the new film quotations mean, if anything? I do not discount the fact that some are fond tributes from young directors to older directors. Certainly that was the case when the film quotations began a little over a decade ago during the French "New Wave." In 1959 Truffaut titled his The 400 Blows after a 1906 Melies film classic and Godard dedicated his Breathless "To Monogram Pictures," American B-movies from which the "New Wave" learned too much and sent backwasing over us. Such sincerity of tribute was also the case in the exhilaratingly metaphorical last sequence of Lindsay Anderson's If . . . in which he quotes Zero for Conduct, "taking courage from Jean Vigo." And Bogdonovich has answered questions about The Last Picture Show evasively, but respectfully, by simply saying "Orson Welles told me to shoot it that way."

**MOVIE QUOTATIONS PAYING tribute to the past are signs that the movies, "the youngest of the arts," are aging gracefully. Quotations begin as soon as there is a long enough tradition in any art and enough young artists and audiences to appreciate and appropriate the tradition. The movies are little older that one man's three-score-and-ten, but it is fitting and touching that the young honor their fathers by quoting them. This is at least better than the middle-aged repeating themselves. Many of the current film quotations are, of course, simply for fun - inside jokes for younger directors to exchange with one another or fluff for film buffs to Monday-morning-quarterback. "Did grand old George Cukor make that inexplicably trashy Travels With My Aunt for the sake of those flashbacks to old Ruritanian romance? Or did he . . . etc." Some of the new film quotations are not unlike Bob Hope of yesteryear quoting one Road picture in his next Road picture. And not, I think, unlike Hitchcock merrily quoting himself from movie to movie by appearing briefly in each one as his own source!

All of the new film quotations mean very little in themselves, and I have probably bothered or possibly entertained my reader with gobs and dollops of trivia. Some of the film quotations, however, are the bubbles and froth on top of deeper currents in films today. I refer to the new formalism in American movies, and I mean every cinematic device now used which reminds the audience they are looking at a movie. I contrast these new movies with movies which give an illusion of realism by avoiding formal devices which call attention to themselves and to film as film.

A film quoting another film uses a minor formal device for turning the audience away from what the movie is about and turning them toward the movie as a movie. The major devices are (1) camera-conscious shots which remind the viewers they are looking through lenses far more mobile and distorting than the human eye and (2) bravura film editing which reminds the spectators that a movie is bits of film stuck together from a point of view other than any eye ever sees.

Even the slickest box office smashes today have interludes in which the camera and editing stick out and break the illusion of realism. A lyrical montage of super-impositions occurs in Fiddler on the Roof, overlaying one celebration of the Jewish sabbath with another and another until every family in the village is seen at sabbath almost omnipresently. This is a translation of "One holy sabbath celebrated everywhere" in the most academic of cinematic terms, and masterfully done. Or in The Godfather there is the equally masterful, rapid cross-cutting of the Christening with the killings. This is a deftly academic way of saying "There is more to this baptism than meets either the eye of faith or the eye of natural man." None of these artifices is new, but their more frequent, momentarily jarring appearances in many commercial films are new. Our only warning is usually a swelling of a theme song on the sound track.

Multiple sources - TV commercials, "Underground" films and "Expanded Cinema" experiments, certain European films, and often the distant history of American films themselves - are feeding formal devices into American films today. Since the 40's and 50's, the high times of American film realism,
the movies have happily declined into a minority medium and are more at liberty to be both an art form and more formal.

REALISM IN FILMS, of course, is always a relative matter. The audience at the most realistic film today in fact accepts dozens of artifices which shocked our grandmothers—formal devices which are now so commonplace they are part of the illusion of realism. Close-ups were once dizzying, for the audience felt which shocked our grandmothers—

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That, I think, is often all to the good.

One of the most unjustly neglected areas of American musical heritage is the music of the New England singing schools. If the jaded choir director is seeking a seldom used source of religious musical expression he would do well to obtain this recording. Using American psalm books as a source for texts, the compositions find their form in the shape of anthems, hymns, psalms, and fuguing tunes.

Moreover, the texture of the music has a unique flavor for the soprano and tenor lines (the tenor having the melody) are doubled at the octave. In the early nineteenth century, the influence of folk art upon the New England style produced a new repository of religious music in the Southern folk hymn.

The two sides of the record are co-ordinately introduced by the plain tune Bunker Hill and the revival song Washington. They are both a mixture of the patriotic and the religious and are appropriately accompanied by fife and drum. This is but a small sample of the excellent programming and planning that are evidenced in the production of this record. The two outstanding numbers on the first side are Judgment Anthem by Justin Morgan and O Praise the Lord of Heaven (Psalm 148) by William Billings. Both of these anthems are cantatas in miniature, containing expressive devices of various kinds. Words like trumpet, rolling, and wail are treated in a programmatic manner, and the texture is varied in the English Anthem tradition by alternating solos with ensembles. Three other examples from the New England

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him for this. I think his songs and shorter pieces are more effective than his longer works. After all he did inherit the romantic tradition and his longer works do have a tendency to ramble on at great length.

The Piano Sonata #1 is a case in point. It has form and structure but the themes are difficult to hear because of the thick pastiche of the romantic writing. Ives depends on the snatches of thematic ideas and the quotation of gospel hymns and tunes to make it hang together. At one point in the sonata he uses a figure in an ostinato manner for what seems to be at least twenty bars when four would have done the trick.

"Redemption through Repetition" is a rather spurious doctrine in the arts, at least it is much of the time in music, because it gets very old in the ear; for example, Ravel's Bolero.

For the Ives lover, however, this recording is a very good one and the pianist Noel Lee is a fine artist. He is certainly faithful to the score.

The recording is technically excellent and if you want an example of one of Ives' longer works this is a good example.

W. H. KROEGER

JOHANN SEBASTION BACH: TOCCATA & FUGUE IN D MINOR, S. 565; TOCCATA & FUGUE IN F, S. 540; PRELUDE & FUGUE IN E MINOR, S. 548; PASSACAGLIA IN C MINOR, S. 582.


Here are four major Bach works, recorded by the organist who presently holds the position Bach applied for and failed to get (supposedly because he wouldn't offer a large enough bribe to the church officials). Bach wanted the job because of the splendid Schnitger organ, larger and better than any he ever presided over as regular organist. The organ, restored and kept in top condition, fortunately remains substantially as it was in Bach's time.

Wunderlich's playing is forthright and technically impeccable. The tempos are somewhat ponderous, even for the spacious and reverberant acoustics of the ancient Jakobikirche. The style comes through as highly objective; through his slowish tempos and almost complete inflexibility of rhythm, Wunderlich seems to place each note into audible space, leaving it to the listener to connect the notes into motives and phrases, and to connect the phrases into a significant musical experience. This is a style which will please some Bach lovers, but it is not to this writer's taste. Another small but important carp: Wunderlich begins his trills (e.g., those of the F-major and E-minor fugue subjects) on the main note and does not carry fugue-subject trills throughout the fugues, thus undoing the harmonic and rhythmic flavor these ornaments ought to contribute to the music.

Registrations are well chosen to give the full effect of the fine old 17th-century organ. The recording seems to be acceptable technically; there is no evidence of unwarranted dial-twisting, even in the full-organ passages, where the organ is not always in tune with itself.

The Schnitger sound, which under even the best conditions is much diminished by the recording and playing-back process, is not sufficient reason to recommend this disc. I would look for more Geist on the part of the performer.

PHILIP GEHRING

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THE GERMAN HARPSICHORD. BACH: CHROMATIC FANTASY AND FUGUE, THREE TOCCATAS, PRELUDE AND FUGUE IN A MINOR.
Igor Kipnis, harpsichord. Angel S-36055.
LOUIS COUPERIN. FRANCOIS COUPERIN. PIECES DE CLAVECIN.
Albert Fuller, harpsichord. Nonesuch H-71265 (Stereo).

These two recordings indicate that we are making progress in the reconstruction of the Baroque principles of performance practice. Albert Fuller is playing an instrument made by William Dowd (Boston) patterned after instruments of Pascal Taskin, French harpsichord builder of the mid-18th century. Igor Kipnis is performing on an instrument made by Rutkowski and Robinette (New York City) along the lines of the instruments made by the Hass family of Hamburg. Appropriately enough, Fuller is playing French music on a French-type harpsichord, and Kipnis is playing German music on a German-type harpsichord. (One might wonder how soon we will get to the place where any harpsichordist worthy of note will have to own and maintain three or four instruments in order to remain true to the style of the music he wants to perform—a rather discouraging prospect for some!)

Albert Fuller has taken still another step in reviving historical performance practices and tuned his harpsichord to a lower pitch level that he has found to be more compatible with the Taskin instruments. More importantly, he has tuned his instrument according to the "mean-tone temperament" widely used in the baroque period. The result is a "sweeter" sound that comes from the pure thirds of mean-tone tuning as opposed to the harsh over-sized thirds of modern equal temperament. Fuller even changes the tuning to suit the tonalities of the pieces he performs, an adjustment necessary in mean-tone tuning that would be impractical in a live recital but is no obstacle in making a recording.

As to the performances per se,
both harpsichordists demonstrate sound musicianship, complete command over their instruments, and a grasp of historical principles of style that represents a notable improvement over most releases of a few years ago. Yet both fall short in some ways of what we can hope for in the future as the principles of Baroque style become more widely understood.

Kipnis has made a significant contribution in his performance of the Bach works in what I call the "quality of movement." He plays the fantasy sections with great rhythmic freedom, with a full awareness of the bold dramatic element in this aspect of Bach's style. Still more unusual, he manages, even in contrapuntal sections, to bend and manipulate the rhythm in such a way as to avoid the monotonous "sewing machine" effect that we usually still get from harpsichordists and organists raised on the historically incorrect notion that rhythm in Bach must be strict and unyielding, even relentless. My only complaint is that his playing at times lacks repose; there is an uncomfortable restlessness that comes from hurrying a passage a bit too much here, or from failing to make the most of a dramatic pause there, or to stretch an expressive line or cadence in still another place.

Albert Fuller's playing, on the other hand, is lacking in the pliability that is part of the French tradition. True, from time to time he makes a slight (but self-conscious) gesture in the direction of notes inégales by dotting notes that are written even, but this does nothing to break down the sense of mechanical evenness that can be so deadly on the harpsichord and that Couperin himself warns us about. The extremes he does well: the obviously free improvisatory style of the unmeasured prelude by Louis Couperin, the strongly marked rhythm of the "La Pantomime" that closes the 26th ordre of the Francois Couperin Pieces de Clavecin. But he seems to be insufficiently aware of the pliability in rhythm associated with allemandes, of the true expressive intent of the notes inégales, of what makes a pavane a pavane or a courante a courante.

Both performers reveal a knowledge of ornamentation that is commendable. They know the formulas; they know the meaning of the signs; they know where to add ornaments and which ones to add. Yet both are still lacking in some of the niceties in the performance of the ornaments — niceties involving such things as the appuy, the point d'arrêt, the note de liaison in the performance of the ubiquitous cadence trills. The ornaments on the whole still sound too much like twitches, they too often intrude on the melodic line instead of becoming a part of the line; they are often too fast and too inflexible to accomplish their intended purpose.

Despite these weaknesses, however, both of these recordings have much to commend them and will probably give hours of listening pleasure to harpsichord buffs.

NEWMAN W. POWELL

THE WILD BULL.

The WILD BULL is the second of four electronic music compositions which Morton Subotnick wrote on commission from Nonesuch Records specifically for the long play record audience. The other works in the series include: SILVER APPLES OF THE MOON and TOUCH.

THE WILD BULL must rank with Stockhausen's GESANG DER JUENGLINGE and Xenakis' ORIENT-OCIDENT as one of the major works of the 1960's. Listeners who are expecting to hear the electronic music sounds of Walter Carlos' SWITCHED ON BACH will be disappointed since none of Subotnick's works uses traditional musical practice as a point of departure. This music has been realized on a Buchla Synthesizer—a synthesizer which does not use a keyboard trigger mechanism. Thus Subotnick does not limit his tonal resources to the frequencies of the twelve tone system of the keyboard; instead, he uses all sound and noise possibilities within the range of audibility. The result is a work which redefines the possibilities of music. Traditionally oriented electronic works such as SWITCHED ON BACH rarely alter the tonal material of the original work but merely add new timbral possibilities by means of filtering, envelope variants (changing the attack and decay characteristics of a tone), ring modulation (tonal distortion), or voltage control (tonal sweeps). Such music may discover new timbral possibilities, but it does not realize the potential inherent in the electronic music medium.

Subotnick says that he had completed the first side of the record when he discovered a Sumerian poem THE WILD BULL which dated back to 1700 B.C. He felt there was an affinity between the poem and the composition although he claims there never was an attempt to portray the poem. Subotnick writes "The first three notes of the work seemed to me a kind of human/wild bull moans. . . . and later I added a human breathing sound to one of the notes. It became harder and harder for me to dissociate myself from the pathos and restrained cry of personal loss which spoke to me from such a distant point in time." The entire text of this unusual poem is quoted on the record jacket. I find the work to be a little long. This might have been due to the fact that Subotnick and Nonesuch Records felt compelled to fill both sides of an LP disc. Recordings are a new performance medium; but, unfortunately, every medium has limitations. A rigid time span for each work may be an almost insurmountable limitation.

RICHARD WIENHORST

The Cresset
This slender volume by the inventive and well-known graduate of Valparaiso University’s Youth Leadership Training Program is subtitled “Prayers for Youth and Other People.”

Those who know Bimler will expect hilarity; those who don’t know him will soon meet the pixy spirit in the surprising turns of ideas. He notes that the Table of Contents was furnished by the young people of Trinity Lutheran Church, Mission, Kansas, where Bimler is directing youth ministries and Christian education.

Prayer is both being and action, says Bimler. It is the life and action of one loved by God, one who loves God. Thus, the “Hoorayness” of the life of faith is the hallmark of the life of prayer.

The book is interesting in its composition, including the blank pages (here and there). Bimler did not run out of things to say; he wants the reader to have a chance to say something.

If we still had young children in our family, I would like to try this book for prayers and for discussions about the big (and little) themes included in it.

KENNETH F. KORBY

March, 1973

FORGIVE OUR FORGETTINGS, LORD:
REFLECTIONS ON GIFTS AND PROMISES

It’s one thing to “sing along with Mitch.” It’s quite another to “pray along with Karl.” And the difference is not that Mitch’s songs are catchy whereas Karl’s prayers are not. To the contrary, Karl’s prayers have a catch—that’s why they’re hard to “pray along.” The way of the cross is never easy, as anyone who has tried to pray along with Jesus in Gethsemane well knows. The season of Lent recalls us to that way and Karl recalls us to the meaning of Lent when he invites us to pray along with him, “Forgive Our Forgettings, Lord.”

It’s the cross we would like to forget, but Karl (executive secretary of the Lutheran Human Relations Association of America, and my colleague in the theology department at Valparaiso University) won’t let us forget. He provides no detour which will let us escape seeing and feeling our neighbor’s cross. We feel in a very contemporary way his loneliness, his hunger, his misery, and our own sin. We tend to grow cross as Karl lays cross after cross upon us. My God, Karl, must you crucify us? Be a masochist if it makes you feel better but lay off the sadism!

But Karl is no neurotic breast-beating, garment-rending, ash-strewing distorter of Christian repentance. He’s not “into repentance” simply because it makes him feel so much better but because that’s how he feels as he stands before the cross of Calvary on which “the Lord of glory died.” That’s how he feels as he stands before the “little ones” for whom Christ died and for whom we are so reluctant to die.

Yes, praying along with Karl is a killing undertaking, that is, unless you share Karl’s faith in the risen Lord Jesus who takes up our cross, transforms it, and returns it to us as a yoke which is easy and a burden which is light. Jesus’ Easter victory is the key to Karl’s prayer life as it is to ours, so pray along with Karl this Lenten season and celebrate “the feast of victory for our God, for the Lamb who was slain has begun his reign.”

THEODORE JUNGKUNTZ
REFLECTIONS ON THREE PRESIDENTS

I am writing this column on the morning after Lyndon Johnson’s death. Three days ago, Richard Nixon was inaugurated for his second term in the Presidency. The flags are still at half-staff in mourning for Harry Truman. It is an unusual moment in our national history; for only the fourth time in our history, we have no living ex-Presidents.

It is also, perhaps, a good time to reflect on the character of the American Presidency and more especially on these three men who are so largely in our thoughts at this particular moment.

We have been an exceptionally fortunate nation in many ways, not least in the thirty-six men who have served as our chief executives. A few of them were not too bright, two or three were possibly lazy, a couple of them were overly-indulgent of disreputable friends, but not a one of them was a crook, not a one of them was a tyrant, not a one of them attempted to hold onto power when his term expired. If that sounds like nothing to get excited about, examine the records of almost any other country over a comparable period of time and you will see what a remarkably exceptional record it is.

And the record is the more remarkable in view of the astonishingly slip-shod way we have of choosing Presidents. It is only as one looks back and sets Mr. Nixon’s war record against the background of his tremendous body of compassionate and humane domestic legislation that one begins to see that his Presidency was not really a betrayal, but a tragedy. He was trapped and destroyed in the same quagmire into which he led his people.

And so I am cautioned by the experience of the past against making any premature judgments of Richard M. Nixon. I would presume that the President, who has been an intense partisan and a harsh critic of others, will concede to those of us who oppose him the right to be harshly critical of him. And I must confess that it is a right which I exercise with relish. I honestly do not think that it is irresponsible to criticize his saturation bombing of North Vietnam as comparable in its immorality to some of the policies of Nazi Germany. And if there is a just God in heaven, I would have to expect that some day we will be required to pay for this wanton killing of our own blood. But I am willing to concede that President Nixon is honestly able to justify those stern measures to his own conscience and is willing to have them read into the record of his Presidency. In the case of elected Presidents, they must have been chosen by an anachronistic institution called the Electoral College which may or may not reflect majority choice. In any case, we are a long way from choosing any kind of philosopher-king to rule over us. And yet our Presidents can stand comparison with any list of thirty-six national rulers, from any period of man’s history. Indeed, I cannot think of any other nation that could list among its chiefs of government men as gifted with both theoretical and practical wisdom as Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and perhaps Harry Truman. Even the Prime Ministers of England—and I cheerfully confess to being an Anglophile—are not as impressive a lot as the Presidents of the United States.

But the odd thing is that our Presidents do not, with rare exceptions, look at all that impressive while they are in office. I voted against the re-election of Harry Truman because, in 1948, he looked to me like a small-time courthouse politician who had stumbled into the presidency simply because the politicians had not taken FDR’s mortality seriously. Long before he died, I had come to recognize that he was, indeed, a man of vision and courage, perhaps one of our greatest Presidents. Similarly with Lyndon Johnson. I felt, especially towards the end of his Presidency, that he had betrayed the American people by carrying out in Vietnam policies which had been espoused by his opponent, Senator Goldwater, and which had been rejected in the Presidential election of 1964. It is only as one looks back and sets Mr. Johnson’s war record against the background of his tremendous body of compassionate and humane domestic legislation that one begins to see that his Presidency was not really a betrayal, but a tragedy. He was trapped and destroyed in the same quagmire into which he led his people.

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