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THE CRESSET

February, 1973
Vol. XXXVI, No. 4

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The Aftermath of the Truce

Could the responses to the truce in Viet Nam have been any more mixed? Although the responses are far less shrill than were the objections to the war, the same confusions about the war appear in the responses to the truce, differences of opinion before the truce continue after it.

It was to be expected that scepticism would be pervasive, for hopes had been aroused and dashed frequently enough. Doubt about the reality of the truce infected the thinking of many of the common citizens who were not privy to details of the negotiations. The patience of the negotiators was maddening to some and caused suspicion in others. Apprehension about the parties keeping the truce was experienced by many, and expressed for us all in the questions of the newsmen during the interview with Dr. Kissinger.

Among the people where I live there was more of a sense of relief than there was jubilation and celebration. The mixed responses produced their own confusion. The official end of the fighting and the terms of the truce nourished in some the criticism that the same end and equivalent terms could have been reached sooner: some argued that it could have been four years sooner. The absence of any sense of celebration of the truce nourished also the guilt about such a response. Restraint in the celebration has become a quasi official style for response to the returning prisoners.

This is not to say there was or is no joy and thanksgiving about the truce, about the return of prisoners to their homes. The doubts and confusion did not destroy that rejoicing, especially for those who were living on a trust, however fragile, and who were engaging in expectant prayer with the God who judges nations, who uses one nation to knock down another nation, who breaks the weapons of war and gives peace.

The most pathetic responses were from those who have made the war in Viet Nam the juice and energy of their cause. Living in the hope that the worse it was for our country in the war the better it was for their revolution, they suddenly find themselves without a cause. It is not that there are not enough problems, locally, nationally, and internationally; it is that the oversimplified slogans about many of the other issues will not serve to galvanize the attention of so many people.

We have not seen the end of the search for a cause, a search to be distinguished sharply from a real and concerted attack on real problems. One element in that search for a cause will be in the form of using the category of “guilt” as the way to examine the Viet Nam involvement. I am suspicious of the use of guilt as a political category, largely because there are no political ways to pronounce absolution. The cry of guilt, aimed at making some one guilty for the evil done, achieves the end of making people guilty (without any means for dealing with the guilt).
or drives them tenaciously to continue in the same course in order to prove they are right, not guilty. What is needed is a change in the course of action, a change of direction. Least effective for such change is the category of guilt. If it does not paralyze a nation in despair, such a category can drive the nation to use its new actions or new programs as acts of atonement.

Return and Reconstruction

The returning prisoners of war may furnish us with a kind of parable on the larger scene of return and reconstruction. Preliminary reports indicate that generally they are in “good” condition. Maybe this is a surprise but it is a good surprise. In addition to the care they received which contributed to that “good” condition, there are some remarkable stories about their care for each other, about their discipline, their development of a community in which each contributed to and received from the others. They themselves—at least through their spokesmen—have expressed their delight to be home, their gratitude to the American people and to the President. On any scale of values they have suffered more than we. And the strain on them will be as much as any of the rest of us will endure. They will be rebuilding relationships with spouses and children. They will be reconstructing their life of work and community. We think their delight and gratitude is a good first step. We hope their families and friends, their pastors and counselors, their employers and political authorities will join them and be joined by them. We bespeak our good will to their neighborhoods and local communities as they receive these people back into their lives.

Isn’t this kind of return and this kind of reconstruction the kind that needs engagement by everyone? The delight and gratitude, the discipline and respect, and the mutual learning and teaching, offer more prospect of reconstruction of family, work, and community than do the guilt-ridden accusations which turn all our efforts into the use of other people as scape-goats, as instruments for atonement for our own wrongs.

How can we use the memory of our suffering and grief, or shall we forget it and become merely brutish? We will need to be reminded, and for that reminder there should be enough help. The missing will be missed; the maimed in body and mind will recall the suffering. The inability of some to reconstruct lives will never let us forget the size of the task ahead. But it will still be possible to become mechanical in our care, sentimental in our slogans, and self-atoning in our restitution.

Death of a Broken Heart?

Is it possible to die of a broken heart? This question has been on my mind as I have reflected on the life, work, and death of former President, Lyndon B. Johnson. Was Johnson’s bruised and torn heart a bodily index to far larger bruises and rippages? As I have often mused on the strangeness of the death of Abraham Lincoln on Good Friday, so I have mused on the strange timing of Mr. Johnson’s death, shortly before the Viet Nam truce was signed. The direction of the country in the task of reconstruction certainly took a different shape after Lincoln’s death. The question about the country’s direction after the death of Mr. Johnson is foremost in the minds of many in our country. Reconstruction after Lincoln reversed much for which he had stood and it was carried out without the benefit of the judgment of his tempered mind. Will the reconstruction after the Viet Nam war and Mr. Johnson’s death take a direction against his policies, contrary to the cast of his mind?

Lyndon B. Johnson was a man of enormous proportions. He seldom desired or hoped, spoke or planned in a small way. The same can be said for his action. His was a restless energy, coupled with enormous skill for legislative action and a network of long cultivated contacts to insure adequate support for effecting such legislation.

If Mr. Johnson died indeed of a broken heart it is both wise and compassionate to reflect on his work as a way to seek understanding about our own place as a nation and our own grief. The work of reconstruction after the truce will call for continued reflection.

The former president loved to say that he (like every president) wanted to do the right, but the problem was to know the right. This way of setting the dilemma is consonant with desires and hopes so large that they go beyond human capacity to perform. This way of stating the problem of the president (or any person) reflects the underlying anxiety of man: the longing to be right in decisions and policies, in choices and conduct, both for the protection of one’s own name and for the benefit of other people, lies so deep in the human heart that only that knowledge which approaches omniscience will satisfy the longing. A person can, of course, become frivolous and indifferent. Mr. Johnson could not take that route. He was caught more and more by the passion to effect freedom for every one, especially for those citizens in our country who did not have freedom or were impotent to effect it for themselves.
But I think the issue in choices must be stated in the opposite way: the problem in our not doing the "right" is not that we don't know it but rather that we do not always want to do what the right demands us to do in a given situation. Obviously, in such a statement, there is the assumption that we do not know all the answers. Such lack of omniscience, and such curtailment of the longing to be omniscient, is precisely the key. The crave for omniscience is itself one of the evasions of the human heart, an evasion of the terrible judgment that falls upon us when we must make a choice.

**Choices and Consequences**

We have no vacation from making choices. Our choices, unless they are revised or interrupted by another will that changes our will, are always in conformity with our own nature, our own desires. Similarly, we have no vacation from the consequences of our choices, unless one moves into the exchange and substitution of another One for us. But that is grace, not politics; that is mercy, not morality. The consequences of choices about military involvment in Viet Nam pressed Mr. Johnson into a course of action in which he chose not to make the either/or choice about the war and about domestic programs.

In this respect it was not a lack of knowledge about the right; it was a choice of wanting the good against the good. It was deemed necessary for the good to continue the engagement in Viet Nam. But that "good" in his choice was hostile to another "good" in the hopes for domestic action. Such a course of action involved the former president in a course of unwitting deception. That is, it was not a deception nursed on a simple meanness to trick people; but with one "good" set against another, the deception became a way of action, where the war could be neither won nor stopped.

Mr. Johnson's drive to get legislation for the downtrodden, the poor, the disenfranchised, was matched with a skill that made it an unprecedented amount of paper promises. But the labyrinth of programs, devoid of a policy other than slogans, fell short of the hopes it engendered. Hopes, fired by promises that are not kept, and cannot be kept not because of a malicious intention that does not want to keep them, but because they rest on the presumption of near omnipotence or omniscience, are the raw material for heart break. Such grief that breaks the heart does bring death, and death brings the hopes crashing down around it.

There are many people in the country who suggest from that grief. In their number are more than his family and friends. There are also those who hoped to be the benefactors of his hopes. In fact, the entire country shows symptoms of the grief of heart break. Some frantically want to keep the shattered hopes; others are numb and stolid; still others keep grabbing for what little they can get of the whole; and still others live with an anger that lies just below a placid surface.

The days of reconstruction are going to be as monumental for the country as they were after the death of Lincoln. The necessity to chastise hopes, whether they are in the form of greed or idealism, conforming them to the realities of political, legal, and economic capabilities so as to rebuild respect for persons and offices; the skills to reshape family life in chastity and fidelity; and the process of reestablishing pride in work along with a place to work, call for legitimate grief and for a new course of action. The healing of the broken heart, when the resources are in the political, legal, and economic realm, calls for more discipline on our desires, more restraint on our promises, more steadiness in our service, and the courage to leave behind the hopes that have deception built into them.

We should be able to understand the pain of his broken heart; we can also share the grief of his family and friends. But we do better by his memory when we learn the task of reconstruction.

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*Footprints in the snow...*
*A cold and limping rabbit...*
*His message chills me.*

*February, 1973*
THE PRINCES ORGULOUS

Nay, if we talk of reason,
Let's shut our gates and sleep.
-Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida

In *Troilus and Cressida*, that strange, puzzling "problem play" which is neither comedy nor tragedy, Shakespeare is dealing with the ways in which a mistaken concept of honor leads to disaster in both the public and private spheres. "*Troilus and Cressida*," says David Horowitz, presents us with a world in which there is an unbridgeable gap between fact and value, between actual human behavior and the principles that men take to be binding upon their actions. The play is set in the Trojan War, whose related episodes and myths functioned in the Greek canon as a kind of Genesis, not least because they engage, as themes, the central values that bind men's private and public lives. These themes are love and honor: the one redeems the lust for bodies, which men share with the beasts, into something richer and more lasting, and thus "humanizes" man's intimate relations; the other transforms his lust for power into service, and thus channels his brutish energies into avenues of noble actions.¹

As Shakespeare writes in the Prologue,

In Troy there lies the scene. From isles of Greece
The princes orgulous, their high blood chafed,
Have to the port of Athens sent their ships,
Fraught with the ministers and instruments
Of cruel war. Sixty and nine that wore
Their crownets regal from the Athenian bay
Put forth toward Phrygia, and their vow is made
To ransack Troy, within whose strong immures
The ravished Helen, Menelaus' queen
With wanton Paris sleeps, and that's the quarrel.²

Despite the princes' vows, however, Shakespeare makes it clear at the outset that, after seven long years, the war has lost much of its urgency for both sides. The everlasting bloodshed has become a drag. Love-sick Troilus, the Trojan prince, asserting that his passion for Cressida is more compelling than doing battle, asks why he should fight "without the walls of Troy/That find such cruel battle here within," and condemns the fools on both sides. The tediousness of the war, its lack of morality and transcendent purpose, have also left their mark on the Greeks, camped outside the Trojan walls. Achilles refuses to take up arms, preferring instead to sulk in his tent and make "scurril jests" with his "masculine whore" Patroclus, while Patroclus enter-

The themes are love and honor: the one redeems the lust for bodies; the other transforms lust for power into service.


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The Cresset
Since all things, all classes of existence, possess degree, therefore, each entity, from the meanest insect to the angels, has its place in a great chain of being stretching from the earth to the heavens, up to the *ens perfectissimum* itself. In the state, for instance, justice is the highest virtue, the virtue around which all other virtues revolve. In a sixteenth-century woodcut showing Elizabeth presiding over the spheres of state, justice is shown as *iustitia immobile*, with its satellite spheres such as clemency, religion, and fortitude in the outer orbits, bound together in the gravitational field exerted by justice. Justice is likened to the sun, the center of the solar system. Justice is the supreme and all-encompassing virtue. If justice is supreme, then honor must needs be lower. Honor is contained in justice, but justice cannot possibly be contained in honor, for the simple reason that the lesser cannot contain the higher. There is an "innate aristocracy" which assigns honor to a lower degree than justice.

After Ulysses has stated the case for order and degree, we are in a better position to see why the Trojan idolatrous worship of honor is the pivotal point in the play, as becomes clear in the debate in the Trojan council as to whether the war shall be continued.

As he opens the deliberations of his council, King Priam reveals that the Greeks have offered to call off the fighting if Helen is restored to them. Hector argues that inasmuch as the war has already cost a tenth of Trojan manpower, he can see no reason why Helen should not be given up. At this point Troilus, roused from his dream of love with Cressida, flares up and attacks Hector. "Nay," he says, "if we talk of reason/ Let's shut our gates and sleep. Manhood and honor/ Should have hare hearts, would they but fat their thoughts/With this crammed reason. Reason and respect/Make livers pale and lusthoo deject." (II, ii, 46-50.)

The hierarchy of values serves as a standard by which the misuse of honor is viewed and judged. For the Elizabethans "degree creates hierarchy; . . ." All things that exist have their rightful places. In the state, justice is the highest virtue.

Troilus, then, rejects reason in favor of honor. In modern parlance we would say he has found his rationale for continuing the war. The rationale is honor. It is a characteristic response, Hector reproves him, as one of those unfit to hear moral philosophy. On a more pragmatic basis, Hector then appeals to Troilus on the grounds that Helen is not worth what it costs to hold her. Troilus' rejoinder is that nothing is worth anything except for the price we put on it. Not so, says Hector; value lies in intrinsic worth. "'Tis mad idolatry," he says, "to make the service greater than the god." Having been bested on this point, Troilus then counters by saying that Helen has been chosen, as a man chooses a wife, and honor demands that she be kept. "We do not turn our silks upon the merchant when we have soiled them."

He points out that the Trojans, Hector included, were quick enough to encourage Paris to capture Helen, so why do they change their minds now? If Helen was valuable then, is she any the less valuable now? To admit guilt at this late date is to confess that the entire enterprise has been sick from the beginning and that the Trojan deaths on the battlefield have been meaningless. Honor demands that the war continue.

At this point mad Cassandra bursts in, raving her prophecies of doom. Hector then asks Troilus whether Cassandra has not aroused uneasy feelings in him. Or is reason totally lost on him? Has he thought of the consequences of continuing the war? Troilus replies that the consequences do not determine the justness of an act and that Cassandra's brainstump raptures cannot cast a pall over ventures to which Trojan honor is so deeply committed. Paris, on his part, says he does not favor yielding up Helen on terms of "base compulsion." He considers it a mark of degeneracy even to think about it.

Then follows one of the most disconcerting scenes in all of Shakespeare. The sagacious Hector, summing up the debate, says that his brothers' arguments for continuing the war "do more conduce to the hot passion of distempered blood/ Than to make up a free determination/Twixt right and wrong." Morality, he points out, obliges the Trojans to return Helen to her husband Menelaus. To persist in wrongdoing aggravates the offense, rather than lessens it. The longer the war continues, the more immoral it becomes. Nevertheless, Hector's final decision is to go along with his brothers and keep Helen because, as he says, "'Tis a cause that hath no mean dependence/ Upon our joint and several dignities."

And so Hector, after citing all the arguments for discontinuing the war, chooses to continue it. Trojan honor weighs more than justice or morality. After a long period of apathy and cynicism, it is honor, not justice, which galvanizes the warriors into action. Hector's capitulation is hailed by Troilus as evidence that Hector has finally seen the light. "She [Helen] is a theme of honor and renown," Troilus says, "a spur to valiant and magnanimous deeds." (II, ii, 199-200.)

The self-deception among the princes orgulous, reaching downward, has malignant consequences on the fortunes of Troilus and Cressida, as the private tragedy of the two lovers will later affect the conduct of the war. By a decision at the highest levels, Cressida, after a single night of lovemaking, is wrenched from Troilus' arms and deposited in the Greek camp in exchange for the Trojan Antenor held captive by the Greeks. The lovers have no say in the matter; it is a question of polity. The Greeks owe a favor to Calchas, Cressida's father, who has defected to them, and the
Trojans are only too glad to get Antenor back at so cheap a price. At the Greek camp, Cressida, in a scene often cited as an example of her incorrigible wantonness, is free and bold with the Greek warriors, allowing them to kiss and fondle her and eliciting Ulysses' condemnation of her as a born harlot.

_Fie upon her!
There's language in her eye, her cheek, her lip—
Nay, her foot speaks, her wanton spirits look out
At every joint and motive of her body._

(**IV, v, 54-57.**)

Despite Ulysses' reproach, the important question is not whether Cressida is or is not a wanton but whether her trifling with the Greeks is in any way related to the Trojan council's trifling with reason. Although it is Agamemnon to whom Ulysses refers when in his speech on degree he says,

_When that the general is not like the hive
To whom the foragers shall all repair,
What honey is expected? (I, iii, 81-83.)_

he might just as well have referred to Hector. What honey is expected when the people lack wise leadership? When rulers stoop to folly, so do the ruled. The "specialty of rule" has been neglected not only among the Greeks, it seems, but among the Trojans as well, for it is the responsibility of princes not only to rule but to rule wisely.

As for Cressida, she has little cause to be happy, or, for that matter, to be true to Troilus. Separated from Troilus by a decree of state (a decree, by the way, which is the responsibility of princes not only to rule but to rule wisely.

Through the results of a trade, in other words, Cressida is made an enemy of her homeland. Her loyalty is now to be pledged to the Greek cause, and her erstwhile lover, Troilus, is now her foe. Neither at this point can have a moral claim on the other. Through Troilus' stubborn refusal to consider the consequences of continuing the war, the two lovers are divided more effectively than East German is divided from West German. "One of the morally intolerable aspects of war," says John C. Bennett, "is that it not only turns people into destroyers of their neighbors on the other side of a conflict but in many other ways renders impossible truthful human communication and personal relationships."

The ignominy which had taken place in the public sphere, during the Trojan debate on whether the war should be continued, is now to be duplicated in the private sphere. That is to say, the betrayal of reason is to have its correlative in the betrayal of love. Not a single night passes in the Greek camp before Diomed, Cressida's self-appointed protector, is laying siege to her. Although Cressida strives to be true to Troilus ("Tempt me no more to folly," she pleads), Diomed is fully aware of what has gone on between her and Troilus and he is in no mood for dissembling or coyness.

After spying on the harrowing exchange between his mistress and the Greek Diomed, Troilus is so deeply shaken that he cannot believe his eyes. Could the woman who pledged fealty to him only hours earlier now so crassly betray him? Is it really Cressida he has seen? "This she?" he inquires in torment. "No, this is Diomed's Cressida." And that is exactly the point. Victimized by a decision over which she has had nothing to say, Cressida, her integrity broken, is no longer herself. She has been sold, as it were, to Diomed. Her pledge to Troilus crumbles against the threat of an empty universe, just as reason had already crumbled against a spurious concept of honor. In a world torn by strife and turmoil—worse, in a world lacking an overarching principle to bind it together, a world governed not by design but by caprice—one casts about desperately for security. Since there is nothing certain in life, it does not matter how one behaves, since values are but sham and pretense. As Troilus and Cressida are driven apart, so reason and madness are brought together as though they were one. In a world where men's actions are consonant with their expressed loyalty to principles of conduct, reason and madness are as far apart as heaven and earth. But by the acts of orgulous men reason and madness have been wedged together so tight that nothing can be driven between them.

One of the ironies in a play that is replete with ironies is that Cressida's seduction by Diomed makes Troilus an agonized voyeur at the scene of his beloved's faithlessness. What Shakespeare is doing in this scene is showing that when folly destroys the civil faculty by which men should be governed, nothing is sacred. All things suffer when men make the service greater than the god. It is one of the achievements of this extraordinary play that the private and the public have been so skillfully interwoven that only _Anthony and Cleopatra_, of all the plays, seems of equal subtlety.

_The ignominy which had taken place in the public sphere inevitably continues in the private sphere. The betrayal of reason is to have its correlative in the betrayal of love._

The seduction of Cressida by Diomed goes to the very heart of Shakespeare's play. In it the poet shows what happens when the hierarchy of degree has been violated and chaos takes over. For the full significance of Cressida's submission to Diomed, it must be played in the open, as it were, it must be subjected to a blanching, pitiless light. In the good society some things ought to be kept private, and sexual intimacy is one of them. Instead, when community is destroyed, even the closest
relationship can claim no sanctity and the exchange between Diomed and Cressida becomes a public business, publicly witnessed and degraded to the level of the marketplace.

Put another way, the private takes on the worst characteristics of the public, and the good is betrayed in the same way it has been betrayed already in the public sphere. Cressida's pledge of loyalty is broken not because Cressida is a cold-hearted, concupiscent bitch, but because pledges of loyalty are weak reeds when self-deception and delusion become the controlling elements in the social order. As reason was betrayed in the open, for all to see, so will love be betrayed in the same way. Therefore Cressida's sordid pact with Diomed is witnessed not only by Troilus and Ulysses, both of whom comment on the action as it unfolds, but also by Thersites, Shakespeare's most scurrilous character, who comments derisively on the comments. Finally, filtered through the prism of all three, it is viewed by the audience itself. The total effect is like a closed loop of common complicity in evil. It would be difficult for the hardiest relationship to survive exposure of this kind, and Cressida's relationship with Troilus has been none too pure to begin with. Thus the human community, the purpose of which ought to be to unify men and mitigate their follies, is travestied into a mocking chorus of the rupture of community.

In this dark, bitter play Shakespeare is saying that honor cannot redeem a war which is essentially dishonorable. When honor is true to itself it functions to raise appetite from a brutish level to a human level. Honor does for appetite and thirst for power what love does for lust. But to do this honor must be in the service of a higher good. Without these overriding controls, humanity will prey on itself. Even love cannot know itself when reason and restraint have given way to irrationality. Because the Trojan War is no longer a war to free the captive, to bring about justice, to right a wrong or redress a grievance—basically, because it has none of the attributes of a "just" war—men fall into error when they attempt to equate it with honor. Thus the princes orgulous bring about the downfall not only of themselves but of others.

In Troilus and Cressida the violation of degree leads to the loss of a world. The destruction of the good society is multi-dimensional. The princes orgulous are driven by self-deception, not by reasoned judgment, and, not unexpectedly, their choices are not those of men who understand the workings of the cosmic order. With poetic justice Hector, the epitome of honor, is dishonorably slain by Achilles, and Troilus, the romantic lover, is turned into a wild animal running berserk. And Thersites presides over the wreckage with a commentary of mockery and derision. "War and lechery! Nothing else holds fashion!"

Parallels between Troilus and Cressida and the war in Southeast Asia would not be hard to find. Americans have claimed they wanted and now announce a peace with honor. But was honor abstracted from its dependence on higher values and made into an end? Only if justice is paramount can there be an honorable peace. The function of honor, as Horowitz says, is to transform lust for power into service. Honor must labor for an end higher than itself or we come to resemble the princes orgulous in Shakespeare's play.
Now when Jesus came, he found that Lazarus had already been in the tomb four days. Bethany was near Jerusalem, about two miles off, and many of the Jews had come to Martha and Mary to console them concerning their brother. When Martha heard that Jesus was coming, she went and met him, while Mary sat in the house. Martha said to Jesus, "Lord, if you had been here, my brother would not have died. And even now I know that whatever you ask from God, God will give you." Jesus said to her, "Your brother will rise again." Martha said to him, "I know that he will rise again in the resurrection at the last day." Jesus said to her, "I am the resurrection and the life, he who believes in me, though he die, yet shall he live, and whoever lives and believes in me shall never die. Do you believe this?" She said to him, "Yes, Lord; I believe that you are the Christ, the Son of God, he who is coming into the world."

John 11:17-27

You're watching TV, enjoying one of your favorite programs. There for the umpteenth time is still another pause for a message, which you know very well means at least four commercials. There's the humorous one, and you can tolerate that one. It's as though the advertiser has a silent understanding with you that it really is all rather silly, but we may as well all get a laugh out of it. Then there's the deadly serious one, complete with
quasi-scientific jargon and doctors' recommendations
that there is nothing better to relieve your pain and
tension than "our" brand of aspirin. And so through the
dreary parade of tooth pastes and razor blades, automo-
biles and bras. Maybe it is true that we Americans are
victims of an endless list of aches and pains, insecurities
and deprivations. Those are easy enough to identify
and identify with. But that they should all have such
easy cures? And always basically the same one! It's never
Brand X; it's always "our" product! Buick may be some-
thing to believe in, but the land of TV commercials has
already made skeptics of us all.

And so you're set up for the kill. Along comes another
one, spoken almost convincingly against the visual
background of fun and daring adventure: You only go
around once in life, so you've got to grab all the gusto
you can. Well, maybe you don't go out immediately
and buy a six-pack of Schlitz, but you do buy in on that
message — or at least you're tempted to. What could be

"It looks at first like a gospel, some good news, but it turns
sour very quickly. For it says that you can count all your
tomorrows on the fingers of one hand and then the tomor-
rows run out."

more relevant to the technological age of leisure than
such a cool gospel. Go around once in life — grab all the
gusto you can. Such advice puts aches and pains in per-
spective, fortifies us in our insecurities, and teaches us
that we need not be totally deprived.

Of course, even high school students know that this
"you-only-go-around-once-in-life-so-grab-all-the-gusto-
you-can" bit is today's counterpart of the ancient hedon-
istic maxim: Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we
die! And by the time you've studied in college even for
a while, you have learned to see that such an attitude,
while initially attractive, is really an expression of
deep despair. It looks at first like a gospel, some good
news, but it turns sour very quickly. For it says that you
can count all your tomorrows on the fingers of one hand
and then the tomorrows run out. It says that what you
are doing really leads nowhere finally, that soon we all
run into a stubbornly unyielding brick wall, and when
that happens you've had it, and it's all over. And if that's
the case, you may as well enjoy the one shot you've got
at grabbing a bit of gusto — Schlitz or otherwise. If that
be gospel, it's pretty grim news.

For some time now a style of theology has enjoyed
quite a vogue. It was — and still is — a type of theology
which belittled traditional Christian theology for its
accent on death and the resurrection life hereafter. It
accused such preaching of not being serious about the
here and now, of too easily providing an escape from
present responsibilities and cares. And there was a lot
of justification for such criticism. The person who looks
only toward heaven will not only miss the genuine joys
on earth, but will also ignore the earthly plight of his
neighbor. So there developed a whole host of "here-and-
now" theologies, which tried to sing a "the future is
irrelevant, the present is where the action is" song. These
excuses may have run their course, for now there
are many voices calling for a more sober and balanced
view.

Christian people have every opportunity for realistic
expectations and joyful faith, both for life here and
life hereafter. Death is a grim reality — and more. It
is a menacing and heartless tyrant. The knight in Ing-
mar Bergman's Seventh Seal discovered that you cannot
win at chess with Death; he always checkmates you.
Death ends life and thereby calls it severely into ques-
tion. It's shadow darkens our joys and clouds our per-
ception of life's meaning. There is good reason for be-
ing a gusto-grabber, if death indeed has the final, irre-
vocabile word.

You cannot win at chess with Death. He always check-
mates you. But Christ's death and resurrection for you
means that when Death checkmates you, you have God's
promise of a final, eternal tomorrow.

The widow at Zarepheth, however, learned differ-
cently. Drought and famine were Death's scepter and
crown in the days of Elijah, yet God stayed death's
hand. And when Death did claim her son's life, God
revealed His power to overcome the otherwise unchal-
 lenged sway of Death's might. Through his prophet
Elijah he restored her son to life. And this was but the
sign of yet greater things to come. For God sent his Son
Jesus Christ to die for our sins according to ancient
Scripture, as St. Paul testifies: he was buried, and on the
third day God raised him up again. The power of death
is so invincible, because death is God's own sentence
upon our forfeit lives. We therefore dread death with
good reason. The really good news is that we need no
longer fear even death, for Christ died for us, broke
death's power and was raised to life everlasting. Death
does not have the last word; God's last and decisive
Word is embodied in our risen Lord Christ. You are set
free to overcome death by following him through death
to resurrection life. That means that on your deathbed,
when Death checkmates you, you have God's promise of
a final, eternal tomorrow. And that prospect makes all
the difference in this world, here and now. That's what
Jesus was getting at in his word to Martha: he who be-
lieves in me, even though he dies, yet shall he live. And
whoever lives and believes in me shall never really die.
We don't have to create our own lives; they are given to
us, through Jesus, the Resurrection and the Life. We are
liberated to pass it along, to share it. In short, we are
freed from panicky, frenzied gusto-grabbing. You see,
God really has a better idea.
A THEOLOGIAN'S USE OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM

Paul Pruyser

THE EDITOR HAS REQUESTED A "PERIPATETIC" REVIEW. I interpret this as the assignment to select a book that I frequently think about while I am walking around: a book that improves with rereading and that seems even more important to me now than when I first read it. This is such a book. Having lived with it for more than four years, I find it increasingly interesting and stimulating. And it has repeatedly provided me with conceptual tools and a frame of reference that have greatly facilitated my own thinking about the relationship between theology and psychology. I choose it for review at this time because I feel that many of our readers may not yet be familiar with it and with the hope that it will prove as helpful and stimulating to them as it has been to me.

In this essay, I shall attempt: 1) to describe some of the more significant features of this book; 2) to make some comments on its structure that may help the reader find his way into it more quickly; and 3) to report on ways in which I have found Pruyser's method useful and stimulating in my own thinking. I shall not attempt to summarize the general content of the book; rather I shall consider this review to have achieved its purpose if it motivates the reader to read Pruyser for himself.

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Robert C. Schultz is a professor in the Department of Theology, Valparaiso University. The editor has asked the review editors for theological and general books to present once each year a "peripatetic" review, a treatment of a book (or books) which has engaged their attention and shaped their thinking. Dr. Schultz's is the first offering to readers of The Cresset.

This work has furnished me with conceptual tools and a frame of reference that have greatly facilitated my own thinking about the relationship between theology and psychology.

Pruyser's book is important because it shows how we can use a psychological frame of reference to separate theology and the psychology of religion from each other. This enables us to evaluate each independently without either denying their coincidence in experience or transgressing on their integrity. Theology — and particularly Lutheran theology — has been struggling with this task for a long time. Eighteenth century Pietists are good examples of the results of establishing psychological patterns of religious experience as the basic criteria of theological truth. Ludwig Feuerbach reversed the process in the nineteenth century. He used Luther's theology as the primary example of his assertion that theological statements are simply the projection of subjective human needs on to a non-existent God. And in the present, Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther — or John Osborne's inadequate version of it in his play Luther — have caused many to ask if we can be Lutherans unless we have bowels like Luther or at least recapitulate his psychological experience. Questions such as these require us to separate the psychology of religious experience from the whole Menninger Foundation. From this psychoanalytic perspective he brings special insight into the nature of religion as a problem-solving process as well as into the role of conflict in religion. For many, the association with psychoanalysis will recall encounters with analysts who were in principle opposed to religion. However, as Pruyser points out, Freud's basic description of religion as an "illusion" does not presuppose the truth or the falsehood of any specific religious belief. And Pruyser's own work demonstrates that the use of psychoanalytic insights and techniques in studying psychological dimensions of religious beliefs does not necessarily result in a negative attitude toward religion (e.g. pp. 7-8; 324-328).
question of its religious truth. Pruyser can help us do that.

Seward Hiltner has described Pruyser’s book as breaking “new ground in the same sense as did William James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience*.” And one way of describing Pruyser’s book is to point out that he both builds on the conclusions of James and goes beyond them. He has summarized the basic conclusions reached by James:

He [James] made some excellent propositions: (a) that religious phenomena are continuous with other psychic phenomena; (b) that in religion as everywhere else, the sublime and the ridiculous are two poles of a continuum with many ordinary, drab and hackneyed happenings in between; (c) that in religion, as in other human endeavors, feelings tend to be more important than thoughts; (d) that there is not one single psychic wellspring for religion in the form of a special instinct, sentiment, or disposition; (e) that religion has a human and a divine side and that psychology can study only the former; and (f) that people do not simply have a God but that they use their God and that religion is known by its fruits in behavior (p. 3).

Pruyser accepts these six basic conclusions. He also suggests that points (d) and (f) above deserve to be taken even more seriously than James did. Pruysers points out that we now know a great deal more about how people use their gods than James was able to know. Those who find the idea of people using their gods a bit strange are reminded that this concept is not too far removed from Luther’s discussion of what it means to have a god (*Large Catechism*, First Commandment). There Luther defines a man’s god as whatever he sees as his source of all good and his help in all time of trouble. And as Luther’s explanation of the commandments indicates, there is a distinct relationship between the gods we fear, love, and trust and our behavior.

Pruyser also agrees with James’ fourth assertion that all psychological processes (for example, the senses, thinking, feeling, etc.) may participate in religious experience. However, James was not able to move beyond this to a discussion of the “holistic, integrative character” of religion. Pruysers suggests that as a result:

Since James, the term “religious experience” has become an expression for a somewhat cagey way of dealing with certain aspects of the psychology of religion. Its premises seem to be: (a) some people have subjective experiences, of one sort or another called “religious”; (b) psychology, as an empirical science, deals with the experiences of people; therefore,

(c) the psychology of religion, if it is to be empirical, deals with the subjective experiences of people called religious (p. 4).

Pruyser does not find anything wrong with this common approach to religious experience except that it is too narrow. Its one-sided concentration on feelings “cuts down on the importance of cognitive states, decisions, and acts — on the very things in which systematic and moral theology is interested.”

This limited focus of the James school makes it all too easy to describe the capacity for religious experience as limited to certain people rather than as part of the common human experience. It also encourages a preoccupation with neurotic and psychotic forms of religious experience rather than with religious experience as a normal healthy part of human life. In contrast, Pruysers (p.19) proposes to address two basic questions to the whole range of human experience: “Which are the significant data of religious experience (and thus a sure ground for the psychology of religion)? and, Which data of experience are of religious significance (and thus an imaginative challenge to the psychology of religion)?”

One result of these two questions is that the reader cannot assume that he is dealing with material outside himself. Our own experience becomes a part of the data and we cannot study the psychology of religion without simultaneously examining and revealing the psychological dimensions of our own religious experience.

Some implications of this broader focus can be seen if we compare key words in the chapter titles used by James and Pruysers. James’ categories are quite religious: “The Reality of the Unseen”; “The Religion of Healthy-mindedness”; “The Sick Soul”; “The Divided Self”; “Conversion”; “Saintliness”; “Mysticism”; “Philosophy.” Pruysers on the other hand uses psychological categories: He devotes six chapters to perceptual processes, intellectual processes, thought organization, linguistic functions, emotional processes, and the motor system. All these categories provide perspectives for the identification and examination of the data of religious experience. These are followed by three chapters in which Pruysers discusses the integrative processes in religion in terms of relations to persons, to things and ideas, and to the self. Pruysers basic perspective is so psychologically oriented that the same outline could be applied to other areas of life by simply changing the word “religion” to its appropriate counterpart. In addition, Pruysers can deal with his material without attempting any definition of religion other than Rudolf Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy*. 

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Even the definition of religion in the last chapter remains open-ended.

HAVING MADE THIS TRANSITION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES, Pruyser presents a psychology of religion quite different from that familiar to most of us. He identifies it as a “dynamic” psychology of religion. And an understanding of his book depends on remaining aware of this transition to a dynamic approach and a persistent focus on its implications. This is one of Pruyser’s major contributions to the subject. I therefore recommend that the reader give careful attention to the “orientation” to the subject in Chapter I and supplement this with a rather careful study of the material on pp. 201-208, before plunging ahead into Chapter II. In this way he will have a much clearer sense of the scope of the book. The reader’s attention is particularly drawn to the discussion of the relationship between “part” and “integrative” processes and to the role of the person, or ego, in relationship to both.

Pruyser’s distinction between “part” and “integrative” processes is based on a structural model of personal functioning. Two kinds of demands are made on the ego, or person. Some demands are made by the “drives and needs which are derived from a person’s basic biological equipment.” Other demands are made by the world outside the person. In order to survive, the person must respond and adapt to both kinds of demands, must keep them in a dynamic balance, and satisfy both kinds of demands without either retreating from reality or sacrificing his own integrity.

In short, the part processes of the ego signal the needs that are felt within, as well as the opportunities and pressures that are present outside. In thought or action the synthesizing capacity of the ego brings person and world together for the satisfaction of the person’s needs and in respectful homage to the world, which contains millions of people constituted just like this person, some of whom may look at him as “outside world” and “satisfier” to their own needs. To the individual, reality contains three large groups of parties with which transactions must be made. All three groups are potentially “objects” or “satisfiers” to the individual’s needs. More specifically, all three are objects of love and objects of hate, in some proportion. They are: (1) other people; (2) things and ideas; (3) the self. With all three the ego must engage in relations, on the one hand because these three groups are forcefully demanding recognition in their own right since they form the major aspects of reality (p. 206).

The ego thus serves varying roles in relationship to the “part” and to the “integrative” processes as it strives to maintain a dynamic balance between the demands of the inner drives and the reality of the outer world. It selects from the organism’s wide range of drives and needs and focuses their demands on the outer world. In this process, the ego becomes part of the outer reality which the drives confront in their search for satisfaction. Simultaneously, when the ego itself confronts the outer world it functions as the representative of the inner drives. In this double role, the ego preserves a high degree of autonomy and independence. The inner drives preserve its autonomy over against the outer world and the involvement in the outer world preserves the ego’s independence of the inner drives. This autonomous independence is preserved in the very processes by which the ego serves and is dependent on the inner drives and on the outer world. The ego’s role alternates between being an agent seeking fulfillment of the drives and being a representative of outer reality setting limits to the drives.

Once the importance of constant reference to this model of the dynamic interaction between the ego and the inner drives (the part processes) and between the ego and the outer world (the integrative processes) is recognized, this book becomes an excellent way of thinking about religion within the context of these life processes, which we confess to be God’s good creation. And attention to the shifting function of the ego makes it possible for us to identify a variety of forms of moralism as well as a variety of points of contact between the person and the gospel.

One common form of legalism imposes external demands on the part processes: certain liturgical styles, emotional experiences, and even styles of theology are established as the criteria of valid religious experience. The most common name for this is “pietism”—but its manifestations are legion. Such limiting pietisms become moralistic because they demand a uniformity as the price of truth, uniformity which contradicts the richness of God’s good creation. The external world sets artificial limits on the inner drives and thus robs the ego of its freedom. The ego is enslaved to certain patterns of worship, of emotional experience, and of theological thought.

THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH describe the kind of insights to which I have been helped by reflection on Pruyser’s description of the part-processes in religion in the light of Lutheran theology. Pruyser describes the broad range of psychological part-processes which participate in the experience of worship, especially the perceptive processes. There
is no common pattern to the perceptive processes and thus no common liturgy that will be satisfying to all. Some require a luxuriant flooding and stimulation of the senses. Others are best served by an ascetic focus on one of the perceptive senses to the relative exclusion of others. There is a wide range of pattern of needs and of acceptable satisfactions—and the church acts legalistically when it imposes one particular style on all as the only acceptable form of worship. That recognition has made it easier for me both to accept the validity of liturgies which I personally do not find satisfying and to feel quite comfortable about my inability to participate in them.

A similar insight develops out of the careful analysis of emotional processes in religion. It is of course a theological truism that the pietistic demand for certain patterns of emotional experience as the condition of true religion is a form of legalism or moralism, and emotional works-righteousness. Reading Pruyser has helped me conclude that, since all the emotional processes can serve as vehicles of religious expression, any demand for the exclusion of certain emotional processes from religious experience as well as any demand for a single pattern of emotional experience in religion is a legalistic demand. On the one hand, such a demand denies the goodness of God's creation by asserting that certain processes or patterns of processes are not acceptable to God. On the other hand, it imposes eternal patterns on the ego in the name of God which God himself does not impose. Thus there is nothing more Christian and less pietistic about the demand for "joy" and "peace" and dancing in the aisles than there is about the demand for quiet meditation and gravity, no more virtue in singing loudly than in quietly listening to the choir.

Since my own field is systematic theology, I am particularly excited by the insights which develop out of Pruyser's survey of intellectual processes, thought organization, and linguistic processes in religion. I can speak as bitterly as anyone about the legalism of dead orthodoxy, but must confess that I did not really understand its dynamics.

On the one hand, Pruyser's discussions have given me a renewed sense of the dynamic importance of doctrine in the life of the religious community. People do think, do organize their thoughts, and do express them—and the religious community needs to help its members satisfy these needs in the context of religious experience in ways which are satisfying to them. On the other hand, there is no basis for selecting one style of thinking, organizing, and expressing one's thoughts as the only acceptable one—or even for making it the only one available in the community. That is an externally imposed limitation which contradicts the freedom of the Christian. Pruyser's analyses make it clear that various styles of thinking, various levels of conceptualization and abstraction, various styles of organizing and expressing thought are part of the richness of God's creation. People think in different ways; some are more literal, others more symbolic; some by nature think in concrete terms, others are more imaginative and think in symbolic terms; some use one type of language, some use another. To impose one style as the only acceptable one is to impose a legalistic lifeless orthodoxy which requires slavish conformity.

This suggests the necessity of clearly distinguishing doctrine and theology. And it recommends the discipline of refraining from controversy unless the doctrinal issue can be clearly identified and stated in the context of the theologies involved. For example, Lutherans are generally agreed on the doctrine of the gospel. The theology in which that doctrine is stated should be an adiaphron. Lutherans may theologize in various ways; we may follow the model of Luther or Melanchthon, of Quenstedt or Schleiermacher, of Barth or Tillich, etc. Difference of theology does not presume difference of doctrine. And similarity in theology ought not obscure doctrinal disagreement. In practice, however, we often ignore this distinction. Conservative Lutherans often feel closer to evangelicals and fundamentalists than to fellow Lutherans who express Lutheran doctrine in a different theology. And Lutherans who use a modern type of theology similarly feel more sympathetic to non-Lutherans who share their theology but not their doctrine. This leads to bitter controversy among Lutherans in which the doctrinal issues are not clarified because the real problem is that one finds the other's theology psychologically unsatisfying. None of this denies the possibility of real doctrinal differences even among Lutherans. However it would be helpful if we would practice stating issues in terms of all the theologies involved in a controversy. Otherwise, we will eventually fall into the trap of agreeing on—or arguing about—theology and ignoring the real doctrinal issues.

AS A LUTHERAN, THEN, I FOUND PRUYSER'S DISCUSSION of the role of part processes in religion to be particularly helpful, for example, in understanding the dynamics of liturgical, emotional, and theological legalisms. The part processes cannot be assigned integrative tasks; nor can they be limited by externally imposed patterns, not even by the person himself.

A second point at which I find Pruyser's work stimulating arises from reflecting on the dynamic function of the ego in relationship to the nature
of sin, and to the working of the law and of the gospel. If we agree with Paul and Luther that the law was never given as a way of salvation, then it follows that the primal experience of man as creature in relation to God is a relation of trust, of faith and not of works. Sin then is the condition in which the ego as representative of outer reality ("Satan") turns on itself and denies the right of trusting God to itself as the agent of the inner drives (cf. Romans 7). Once the integration of man with God is broken through distrust of God, the basis for the functioning of all the integrative processes, that is, the basis of our relationship to ideas and things, to other persons, and of course to ourselves, has been damaged or destroyed. It can only be restored by the recreation of the ego as the dynamic center of our being. The law then identifies the breakdown in integration with the outer world (sin) and heightens the increasing failure of such an ego to provide adequate satisfaction for the inner drives (sorrow and contribution). The gospel as the power of God is an ongoing dynamic intervention on the part of God into human life in order to create a new dynamic center of trust in God (rebirth or the new creation). This new center of trust exists as God's work independently of the malfunctioning of the other integrative processes (through faith alone) and also becomes the source of new integrative processes (works follow faith).

"Reading Pruyser has helped me conclude that since all the emotional processes can serve as vehicles of religious expression, any demand for the exclusion of certain emotional processes from religious experience as well as any demand for a single pattern of emotional experience in religion is a legalistic demand."

The preceding paragraph is not intended to be a model for, but an example of the kind of theological thinking which Pruyser's dynamic model stimulates in me. I find it useful because it helps me to maintain the continuity between my psychology and my theology, without requiring me to identify the two. As a theologian, I add an integrative process to Pruyser's list: Relation to God. Pruyser's psychology of religion is complete without it because the reality of God is not available for psychological investigation. But my theology is impossible without it. Pruyser's description of the integrative processes provides an essential and necessary point of contact between my psychological and my theological understanding of man without injury to the integrity of each.

A third point at which I find Pruyser's analysis of the integrative processes helpful develops out of his discussion of the relation to self in the context of religion (Chapter X). Such a psychological analysis indirectly confirms the reality of sin in human experience. Man's relationship to self is always anxiety-generating. That anxiety takes different forms: Sometimes it is experienced as shame and self-doubt, the inability to accept myself. Sometimes this anxiety appears as the anxiety of guilt and fear/need of punishment. And at other times, it is the anxiety generated by my failure to live up to the ideal which I have set for myself.

Unfortunately, many theologies and many pastors are able to respond to only one or two types of experiences with a pertinent formulation of the gospel. Lutherans sometimes speak only in terms of justification and overlook the fact that Luther in formulating the gospel for the common people in the Small Catechism, chooses to express it in terms of redemption. He knew that genuine guilt is not the most common experience, it requires far more spiritual growth than many people achieve in this life. When we forget this, we offer a gospel of forgiveness that requires our people to convert all of their spiritual anxieties into guilt. If they come with other forms of spiritual anxiety, such as shame or alienation, they must assume a foreign mode of expression—just as we once required the English to learn German and now require the Germans in this country to learn English as the condition of hearing the gospel.

As Pruyser points out, the psychological dynamics of our experience of anxiety in relation to ourselves change. They are influenced by our pattern of personality development, as well as by the dominant spirit of the time and place in which we live. But each man has his own personal patterns and mixture. And the church has the capacity for a flexible response to each man. The gospel in terms of redemption speaks directly to the experience of our bondage to the "demonic" forces of life. The gospel as atonement and acceptance speaks to our sense of alienation and to our shame. The gospel as justification and forgiveness speaks to our guilt and to our perverse need to punish ourselves. The gospel as conformity to Christ by sharing in his sonship and in his servanthood speaks to our failure to live up to our self-chosen ideal or to reach our self-assigned goals.

The work has been helpful also in reflecting on the dynamic function of the ego in relation to sin, and to the working of the law and of the gospel.

The pastor who understands correlations such as these is equipped for flexible response to his people as individuals. He is not limited to a few formulas. And because he can respond, he does not need to be afraid to hear what his people are
really saying. Such a pastor is well on the way to distinguishing law and gospel in each pastoral encounter—not merely in the safety of academic theology but in the real world in which ministry happens. Luther used to say that the distinction between law and gospel could be learned only from the Holy Spirit in the school of experience.

Pruyser is not the Holy Spirit by any means, but his book is as useful an orientation to the school of religious experience as anything I know. As ministers of that gospel which is God’s dynamic power of salvation (Romans 1), we can only profit from knowledge of the dynamics of the people to whom we minister.

Alice Is Crying

She stares at her face in the glass,
Surrounded by a thousand lights; blisters.

Backstage, she removes the Masks of Pretend
As Cinderella, Alice in Wonderland; she whimpers.

The stage is bare as she walks through the curtain,
And stares at the faces; were they ever there; she wonders.

Streetlight, be kind to a face she’s created,
Made middens ago while ten years, aging.

Cry for her moon through the city sneering,
Beg a smile for her Beggar Man, drooling.

Taxi Man, grab her before she dies walking;
Walking into Midnight Symphonies of Nightmares.

She played with professional men of steel and men of milky ways,
Tripping away after the fall; not long in coming, it never was.

Alone, touching in beds of broken teddies, smiling Dawn,
Breaking into silver before the sun of dirty yellow; she was pure.

She walks through the park wrestling in the breeze,
In a swing, watching puppies make love, she pretends, it is beautiful.

Spin her a life, Clown Man with your top,
Let her feet never leave the stage playing happy.

Hey, fellow Actor Man, whistle along, touch the air,
Was the kiss too cold, too bad for Alice, too bad, for you.

LeEta Barber

February, 1973
EPIPHANY IN RENAISSANCE AND BAROQUE ART

From February, 7-28, 1973, the students and faculty of Valparaiso University, and the residents of the surrounding community had the rare opportunity to live in daily contact with thirty Renaissance and Baroque pictures from the collection of Colonel Frank W. Chesrow, a distinguished Valparaiso University alumnus. The subjects of these pictures were mostly Biblical: the infant Jesus and his parents; events in the life of Moses, Joseph, and David; and pictures of Christ in his ministry, and of the disciples and saints. The portrayal of these subjects was not through flat, abstract symbols, but rather, through illusionist images of the visible world, a type of imagery new at that time to mankind. If the word epiphany means bodily manifestations of something, these illusionist pictures are epiphanies of Biblical people and events, raising the beholder's consciousness of the idea that Biblical people physically existed and Biblical events actually took place.

But the word epiphany is usually taken to mean a bodily manifestation not of just anything, but of deity. Some pictures from the Chesrow collection are also illusionist portrayals of such epiphanies, epiphanies of God's power used for man. In Guercino's David with the Head of Goliath (cover) a convincingly physical David placed in a somewhat softly veiled atmospheric setting appears as a tender youth turning away from the head of Goliath with an air of some distaste and detachment, almost as though Goliath's death had happened without David; had happened by the power of God.

In the impressive Caravaggio paintings, the physical presence of an assisting angel in St. Peter and an Angel (inside cover) and the arresting light of Christ in St. Paul in Ecstasy (opposite) are dramatic illusionist revelations of beneficient divinity. Finally, in the pictures reproduced on this page, both Dolci and Rubens portray the divine Christ helping man. Dolci portrays Christ as a self-assured, perfect human being giving blessings to lesser men. Rubens portrays Christ as using his power over nature to Provide food for men. However, in contrast to Dolci's portrayal, Ruben's full-bodied and vital Christ and disciples are also shaped by the struggle and sweat of raw, imperfect life.

It seems, just from these few fine examples, that the naturalism of Renaissance and Baroque art can achieve illusionist epiphanies of Biblical events, epiphanies that can raise the Christian's awareness of God and his powerful acts for man.
PROFESSIONAL CARETAKERS
OF THE POOR

Lucille Turner lives on Chicago's near west side, a grandmother in her 40's, dependent on public welfare for her food and public housing for a place to live. Occasionally Mrs. Turner attempts to cross the power gap by explaining her situation to college students or seminarians — the sons and daughters of the solid suburban burghers whose worn-out land she has inherited.

Her own social analysis leads her to conclude that "Welfare is one of the programs designed to keep other people in power. Without poor people there wouldn't be millionaires."

Nor, she might have added, would there be a whole class of people paid to administer her poverty.

The historical story is familiar. Once the family or clan was dependent only upon itself. It raised the food necessary for each member, provided its own shelter. It cared for each person during illness, and when individual tragedies occurred, help was available. The division of labor was based on physical ability, age, and sex.

To ask whether some of society's members were "poor" in the earliest of times is to reveal how modern and Western the term is. Perhaps food was scarce and the winters uncomfortable. But the problems of survival were shared by all, and an individual or group could not have been identified and set aside as "poor."

In time, however, the mastery of the environment became easier through technological advances, and society therefore became differentiated according to the ability to control the technology. Power and wealth flowed to those best equipped to invent, to communicate, to explore.

No one task could be comprehended by all, nor was it necessary that this be so. So the number of tasks needed or wanted to run a society approached infinity, and each one became so narrow and obscure as to be invisible or unintelligible, or both.

So the same process which produced the poor and troubled also generated a category of people whose initial task it was to work with and help the poor. The progressive institutionalization of help has in recent years given rise to an aspiring profession, social work, and to a formal organization, the social welfare agency.

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the formation of Charity Organization Societies in major cities. A historian of social work, Helen Witmer, observed:

The leading ideas of that organization at the time of its initiation were these: the giving of doles should be stopped, relief giving should be coordinated, and each applicant for assistance should be carefully studied to determine what he needed to put him on his feet. The Charity Organization Society's particular part in the work would be to interview the applicants, draw up a plan for the treatment of their social disabilities, and secure the needed funds from already established organizations. Historians generally agree that in this scheme lie the beginnings of the present system of organized social work activities.

But if charity was being organized into "social work activities," something else was happening among social workers, a metamorphosis seen also in other occupations. Professionalization was afoot. The impulse to help was not enough. Educational standards were raised. A bachelor's degree wouldn't suffice.

Through accrediting activities and educational requirements the profession exerted control over channels of recruitment and training, and thereby deterred the entrance of "untrained" workers into the field. As Henry Meyer (the University of Michigan School of Social Work) has put it:

Such restrictiveness is seen at best as a misguided attempt to enforce dubious standards of competence, and at worst as a simple trade union attempt to monopolize a labor market.

As the ticket of admission to the profession became more expensive, it paid less and less attention to the Mrs. Turners of society. Social work in Jane Addams' day viewed its major mission as standing between the advantaged and the disadvantaged, protecting the latter from the exploitation of the former. It gave help where problems were the greatest and resources the least.

But the profession has progressively "abandoned the poor" as Richard Cloward has put it. There has been an upward shift in the class composition of social work clientele. The middle classes began
to demand their own special brand of services, which social work was only too pleased to give as it continued to be concerned over its professional status and prestige.

The dilemma is that there is little public esteem attached to an occupational group which serves those generally defined by society as lacking virtue, ambition, money, and self-reliance. As Cloward puts it "the search for prestige may have set in motion pressures to upgrade our clientele."

Into the vacuum surrounding the poor rushed a host of public programs of income maintenance. Initially public welfare and other plans were viewed as short-run solutions for the deserving poor who, through no fault of their own were on hard times.

The result, however, has been a permanent system of social control over generations of lives, a source of despair and dependence, the only conceivable way of life to millions. The poor are tempted by the invitation to possess the dominant life-style, yet kept, like Tantalus, from acquiring the tangible fruits of the American environment. A legislature and bureaucracy stipulate a monthly budget which ensures that dignity is always just out of reach.

The public system of handling the poor has remained remarkably immune to reform. Proposals for guaranteed incomes, negative income taxes, and the like have been advanced with vigor by academic economists, welfare-rightists, presidential candidates, and by Richard Nixon himself.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan has chronicled the current president's attempt to overhaul welfare in his The Politics of a Guaranteed Income.

The system's implacable resistance to change has many roots. But most interesting is Moynihan's observation that the most conservative voice heard in defense of the existing arrangement was that of the welfare lobby itself. Deeply entrenched in state, local, and federal offices, the welfare industry fought desperately to maintain the current structure of social welfare and, Moynihan suggests, their jobs.

Lucille Turner may not have studied economics, read Theobald, or reviewed Moynihan. But when she points out, on behalf of her sisters and brothers, that their condition keeps others powerful, she also reminds us that the view from the bottom can be more precise than we sometimes suppose.

---

**WINTER HAiku**

Snowfall in the night . . .  
Covers earth's  
sleeping bosom . . . .  
Is the blanket warm?  
Snowstorm in the night . . . .  
On the bare and  
sleeping shrubs . . . .  
Behold! white blossoms.  
Snow falling this night . . . .  
These tiny bits  
of moonlight . . . .  
Melting on my face.  

Bird, feathery ball . . . .  
Why do you fluff  
yourself up?  
Oh, to warm your feet!  
Garden full of birds . . . .  
From just a handful  
of seeds . . . .  
Feathery flowers.  

Flickering candle . . . .  
Reflects on  
frosty window . . . .  
Thousands icy flames.  
Round frosty window . . . .  
In the chill, black  
wall of night . . . .  
Full moon looking through.  
Freezing rain last night . . . .  
Today, sunlight  
on the trees . . . .  
A crystal forest.  

Jack A. Hiller

*February, 1973*
NECESSARY AND RELEVANT TO WHAT?

Mr. Hein's reply to my critique of Dr. Preus' Statement suffers from a double weakness. In the first place, he either failed to understand or carelessly read my critique; and, secondly, his own counter-proposal shares the same weaknesses of the Statement he undertakes to defend.

The purpose of Scripture (to make men wise unto salvation through faith in Jesus Christ) may not serve as a license, he asserts in echo of the Statement, to question or deny the historicity of biblical events. I was not aware that I had done so; nor do I know any LC-MS theologian who in the name of the Gospel presumes to raise a question regarding the historicity of biblical events.

The fact of the matter is that the debate about the historicity of certain biblical events is a given of today's theological climate. In its modern form it was raised by the Enlightenment in a denial of the Gospel that masqueraded under a variety of rationalistic guises. Once the question is raised, however, it cannot be silenced simply by calling attention to its bastard birth. It requires an answer. Were Adam and Eve genuine historical persons, and if so, in the face of the cumulative evidence to the contrary supplied by literary analyses and comparative religious factors. What makes that effort worthwhile? What value is being protected?

I have suggested that this particular issue has become a case study for the reliability generally of the Scriptures as the Word of God, with the concept of reliability now nuanced toward guaranteeing the historicity of Adam and Eve. Adam and Eve were historical because the Word of God says so, and therefore it must be so. Their historicity is important not so much for Adam and Eve, but for the reliability of the Scriptures generally, for if it should prove historically unreliable at this point, then we have no assurance that it will be historically reliable where admittedly it counts in a primary way. The unspoken premise of LC-MS piety is that Adam and Eve must have been historical for the sake of the reliability of the Scriptures, for the reliability of the Scripture provides the foundation for faith in Jesus Christ. Put in simplest terms, my faith in Jesus Christ is undermined if Adam and Eve are not regarded as being literal historical persons.

I cannot say that the distinction between the Law and the Gospel will answer the question as to whether Adam and Eve were historical, but that distinction releases me from the burden of having to say that Adam and Eve must have been historical. They may have been; from the viewpoint of the distinction between the Law and the Gospel the question of their historicity is an indifferent matter.

Mr. Hein charges me with postulating unscriptural a priori theological opinions. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He evidently did not notice the numerous scriptural allusions in my article. Let me make them explicit. It is not just "somehow" that "an historical event must ground the Gospel"; that is the uniform witness of the New Testament, most explicitly in 1 Cor. 15:
14-17. No comparable insistence can be found in the Bible upon the historicity of Adam and Eve. That man is the crown of God's creation is frequently affirmed in the Bible—without any grounding in Gen. 1-3, as for example in Psalms 8 and 139. That man is a fallen creature and under God's condemnation is the running testimony of the Bible quite apart from Adam and Eve's fall; indeed, St. Paul grounds man's culpability in God's continuing disclosure of His power and deity and men's persistent perversity in exchanging the worship of the Creator for service to a creature, Rom, 1:18 ff.

Mr. Hein is correct in quoting the Lutheran Confessions' assertion that "the chief articles of our Christian faith constrain and compel us to maintain a distinction" between man as God's good creation and man as fallen creature. He errs in appealing to 16th century historical assumptions as a valid reply to 20th century questions. Perhaps his a prioris are showing. Luther can say with all of Christendom that God has made me, and that he has redeemed me, a lost and condemned creature, without once linking my creation and fall to Adam's and Eve's.

Mr. Hein's defense of Dr. Preus' Statement shares in the weakness of that study document. If the unspoken premise is that Adam and Eve must have been historical to insure the reliability of the Scriptures as a foundation for faith in Jesus Christ, then there has been a shift in the theological center of gravity. It interprets the attack upon faith's certainty as deriving from our inability to have certain historical knowledge. That is not only a species of rationalism, but it also sidesteps the more central issue of alternative beliefs as the masks of unbelief. That would also explain why he assigns the task of upholding faith to a foundation that in the last resort cannot sustain it, and that moreover bypasses the foundation of faith recommended by the very Bible under discussion; namely, the proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ for salvation through faith in him alone: 1 Cor. 2:2; 1 Cor. 3:11; 2 Cor. 11:4; Gal. 1:6-9; Luke 10:41-42; 2 Tim. 3:15 and 16.

Mr. Hein is curiously silent on the principal challenge I addressed in my original article. Dr. Preus' Statement clearly rejects the view that the Gospel makes the historicity of Adam and Eve irrelevant. Positively stated, their historicity is relevant. But to what is it relevant? And why? And how? These are the hard theological questions, and they receive no hint of an answer, either in Dr. Preus' Statement or in its defense by his young protege.

THEATER — WALTER SORELL

Creativity Or Other Business

The question is one of The Creation and creativity. It is not easy to filch a spark from the Creator and ignite a thought, a theme, a scene. The propelling momentum may be there. But many elusive, intangible elements have to be conjured up, parts must become a coherent entity, ecstatic gestures of Dionysian intensity must find their way into a form-fulfilled frame in order to give dramatic and poetic Gestalt to whatever we want to create. That things may go wrong in our creative enthusiasm is a foregone conclusion. It is a truism to refer to every creator's right to fail.

Arthur Miller, intrigued by the failure in the Genesis of the Creation, apparently wanted to find out all the reasons for its having gone wrong and who is really to be blamed for it. In trying to find a solution to this eternally puzzling problem, he wrote a play which he called The Creation of the World and Other Business. In doing so he himself failed. The reason for his failure is already revealed by the choice of the title which has a nonchalant, folksy tone with a tinge of irony, promising anything from cute to diverting entertainment. It was that other business that worried me before the curtain went up. That phrase has a Neil Simonic touch to it, and it indicated that the otherwise serious-minded, often pontifical author went on an excursion into the comic. The way this play was presented seemed to brush the burlesque.

I am always on edge when a program bill announces the appearance of God, Lucifer, a trio of angels, and a quartet of the most famous, and often referred to, first cast of our tragic beginning. Most playwrights feel somehow awed by, and uncomfortable with, putting God on stage. Since we were created in his image, they feel justified to have God appear in our image, and by giving him human shape they escape into a folksy visualization. To assume a comic, childlike stance, however, is no guarantee for overcoming the feared embarrassment.

The Green Pastures was rather successful in bringing God and the other business on stage because it was done in the pre-nuclear era, and Marc Connelly chose the setting of Negro folklore and the atmosphere of the blues. Today, I suppose, it might be taken as an insult to the black race. Clifford Odets' The Flowering Peach came very close to
being a failure with its weak second act. The story of the Biblical Noah is told in the idiom of the New York Jewish middle-class. There, jargon words, such as Nebbich. When, after God's command to leave the Paradise, an argument arose, it was settled with the remark: "He said it in plain Hebrew!" When Lucifer visits Adam and Eve again, he looks around and says: "Every time I come up here they've got more junk." Still in Paradise there are several jokes of high school caliber, mainly referring to sex. The worst and most childish fun was Eve's question, while pointing at Adam's penis, whether this will still grow on her. There was much more humor in Miller's The Price, and it was quite effective because it emerged from within the character. Here, the humor sounded artificial, un-Millerish.

There was much kitsch in the setting of Boris Aronson who is a fine craftsman. I disliked the opening scene with God, dressed like a guru in white linen, stepping out of a circle of blinding light. I don't know whose idea it was to have God awakening Adam in an exact facsimile of the Michelangelo pose. It worked like a teaser and set the tone for the whole production. It was too cheap in its obviousness. I also felt uneasy about Eve giving birth to Cain on stage. Many more things were in line with all that happens East of Eden, with one exception: the final fearful embrace of the two first lovers, a gesture which was the best of all the stage ideas brought about by the folksiness. This gesture was accompanied by Lucifer's curtain line: "God is only what ought to be and I am what is."

Somehow this sentence came as a relief, as one of the better statements in the play, even though it is neither new nor profound. It may have come as Miller's final sigh since he could not find a satisfactory answer to his initial question On The Human Dilemma. Each of the three acts poses a question. First, why did God make Lucifer? Since God is good and made everything, Miller seems to think this work must have been a slip of his creative hand. Lucifer is an ambitious angel, he wants to rule with God, leaving love to the Master and knowledge to himself. The greater the people's awareness, the more they would praise him. If he had something to say, there would be no sin, no friction, no guilt. God rejects the offer for emotional reasons when he answers: "I don't love you!"

Now Lucifer is out to be loved by man. He kisses Cain at his birth, claiming him as his own. In accordance with Lucifer's first-act argument that he is for harmony, awareness, knowledge—he tries to prevent the first murder, but fails. Thus, all blame for getting man off at a wrong start is laid at God's doorstep.

In an interview in The New York Times Arthur Miller maintained that this is "a play with an enormous amount of interpretive theatricality." Maybe so. I share his opinion that "these are mythological figures that require a certain style." Although I think that he still is one of our great playwrights, probably the greatest next to O'Neill, I disagree with him that the play needs to be staged again to show his critics "what the play is about." On the other hand, I feel that, if God made Lucifer, Arthur Miller has the right to have made a bad play.

**BOOKS**

**A GOD WITHIN.**

By Rene Dubos, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972. $8.95.

Dr. Dubos has written considerably more into this badly-named volume than man and his environment. He ranges broadly and critically over the history of man on this planet and, although he feels the term is too limited, over "human ecology." Having read many essays and articles on man's problems with his environment, I have read none which presents as far-ranging and thorough a review of man and nature interacting. Dr. Dubos discusses those conditions in which nature shapes man and those where man has shaped and reshaped nature. Being a medical scientist he does not fail to keep the basic biological nature of man close to the front in his various arguments—without losing the uniqueness of man as an individual, a free agent with his perceptual limitations, a biological being of great sensitivity and unmatched power.

In Chapter 2, entitled "A Theology of the Earth," Dr. Dubos states, "A truly ecological view of the world has religious overtones." He sees man as leading an enduring existence on this planet only if he engages himself in the interrelationships of all of nature rather than continuing "the crude belief that man is the only value to be considered in managing the world and that the rest of nature can be thoughtlessly sacrificed to his welfare and whims." He suggests that we begin seriously to follow the directive of God given to man in the Garden of Eden, "to till it [the earth], and keep it" (RSV Gen. 2:15). It is almost as if this word were the eleventh commandment for the purpose of maintaining an environment of high quality where man can really live in his potential humanness.

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The author does not accept the thesis that man in the last two hundred years has become more ruthless to the planet than in any of his previous history. The greatest disruptions of the natural ecosystems occurred over a period of thousands of years as man pushed back raw, unspoiled nature to develop agriculture on the most fertile lands. Much of the land has been shaped and reshaped as man has adopted improved methods of farming. Although some of this land (i.e., Japan and Western Europe) has been under rigorous cultivation for thousands of years, other regions (i.e., the Mediterranean basin of the Ancient world) have been carelessly managed over many centuries and have become worthless for agriculture. Man's ecological mismanagement has been disastrous in the past. Certainly this is a warning that our current environmental problems can have very serious consequences. But Dr. Dubos remains optimistic: since man in the past has also had great successes in preserving a quality environment, he can solve his current problems “by pointed human effort.”

Chapter 8, “Franciscan Conservatism versus Benedictine Stewardship,” offers a rebuttal to Lynn White, Jr.'s famous essay, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” (Science, 1967). White's article has been widely quoted and reprinted in a number of compendia of environmental subjects. Basically his thesis is that the selfish exploitation of the earth's resources with its concomitant spoilage of nature did not seriously begin until the Judeo-Christian religions shifted man's attitude toward an anthropomorphic God. This view, it is argued, then placed man above nature. White suggests that man needs to adopt the attitude of St. Francis of Assisi who believed “in the virtue of humility—not merely for the individual but for man as a species” and who “tried to substitute the idea of the equality of all creatures, including man, for the idea of man's limitless rule of creation.” He proposed “Francis as a patron saint for ecologists.” Dr. Dubos makes a case that men, throughout their existence on this planet, have “pil­ laged nature and disturbed the ecological equilibrium,” due generally to ignorance but often to short­sighted selfish goals. And, rather than accepting St. Francis' “absolute identification with nature,” he proposes that man's place in the environment should be modeled after the teachings of St. Benedict which have led to our understanding “that true conservation means not only protecting nature against human behavior but also developing human activities which favor a creative, harmonious relationship between man and nature.” Since I cannot see man not using this planet's resources or not managing nature, St. Benedict is more acceptable to me as the patron saint of ecology. Dubos concludes the chapter by saying that “Reverence for nature is compatible with willingness to accept responsibility for a creative stewardship of the earth.”

The environmental movement of the past decade has too often gyrated between oversimplified extrapolations of existing damage and impending crises expressed by one alarmist or another. Some of these deadlines for catastrophe have passed, while others are rapidly approaching; and since the predicted disasters have not occurred, people are questioning the credibility of environmentalists in general. Dr. Dubos is not an alarmist, although he admits that public attention is quickly aroused with unexpected sick and dead human beings. However, he raises more fundamental questions concerning the degradation of our environment and its subtle effects on man's humanness, on his spirit, on his quality of life. In short, is this environmental mess created by man the environment in which man can exercise his unique human nature?

I have searched for a contemporary book of moderate length which can set the problems of the environment into a historical perspective and into a thoughtful attitude of love and care for nature's gifts which I could recommend to students in my environment course. Dubos' A God Within is that book, and I submit that any person with an interest in the environment will appreciate the author's concern and responsibility for this planet as I expect my students will.

ROBERT J. HANSON

EVERYDAY LIFE IN BIBLE TIMES.
National Geographic Society, n.d. $9.95.

Although this book came out several years ago I believe it is still the most scintillating volume I know of on the world of the Bible. The National Geographic Society has dealt with ancient discoveries for long enough time now to know how to put a story together. This is beautifully done in this volume. The numerous photographs of ancient sites and discoveries, of modern villages and modes of life illustrating the Bible, are almost always brilliant, and often breath-taking. Artistic imagination plays freely in recreating biblical scenes and events, but is always knowledgeable of the many things we now know about that strange and important world. The text is wholly reliable; how could it be otherwise with clear and exciting contributions by some of the best scholars in these areas of study — Samuel Noah Kramer on ancient Mesopotamia, John Wilson on Egypt, and G. Ernest Wright and Roland de Vaux on the Holy Land itself during both Old Testament and New Testament times.

I cannot think of a nicer volume as a gift to a friend, a family, or a church library.

WALTER E. RAST

SPEARPOINT.

In 1963 a very provocative book appeared: Teacher, by Sylvia Ashton-Warner. Who is Sylvia? A
teacher from New Zealand, evidently an unusually successful teacher, one with deep understanding of young children and remarkable insights into the learning process.

This author with the compound name had a simple message: teaching should be organic, not plastering something on the child but, rather, unfolding something from the inner world of the child's feelings. Thus the child should not be given a primer to learn how to read someone else's words; he should grow his own primer from words that have an intense meaning for him. Seeing the child as a volcano with two vents—one for creativity, the other for destructiveness—Ashton-Warner sought to direct every subject to the creative vent. She undeniably succeeded in producing not only learning but also joy in learning. Then she wrote about her teaching trenchantly, avoiding the current educationese. Thus Teacher was born.

Readers were impressed with Ashton-Warner's book, but some said: "That's what life can be like in a Maori infant school. Wonder what she'd do with my third graders in Gary? Would she survive in a real, live American school?"

After visits to schools in England, Israel, and Asia, Ashton-Warner did come to the United States—to an experimental school on top of the Rockies. Spearpoint is the account of that experience.

In Spearpoint, Ashton-Warner is still concerned with organic teaching: releasing the native imagery of the child and using it for working material. But she finds it much more difficult to get at the native imagery of our children. She's baffled:

Not that I find any hatred here in our new kind of school, not a sign of it. I find quarrelsomeness, discontent, unwillingness and rudeness to a degree I've never encountered before, but I do not sense hatred. I've known far more naked hatred in small children in other parts of the world. But I don't sense love here, either. What's happened to the dynamo of feeling? . . . Why don't they think and do things, rather than loll on the floor between the knees of teachers; why don't they want to do things, why can't they grow, why don't they go?

She wonders what makes the children as they are. Has the imagery of American children been extinguished by television's overstimulation, "the house of the mind gate-crashed and occupied by invading nonliving imagery"? Worse yet, have teachers themselves broken into children's minds, routed out the native images and brought in housefuls of alien images belonging to the teachers?

Simultaneously the teacher takes over occupancy of the other houses in the street, the minds of the other children in his class, so that now we have the same kind of imagery in every one of the houses, all copies of the teacher, in a street named Conformity. As for all the former native occupants of the houses, now deceased, it's what I call murder of the imagery. Spiritually speaking, millions of children are murdered annually.

As a result, Ashton-Warner wonders, are all teachers now expected to entertain rather than to teach? The people who started the free school in Aspen, Colorado, didn't want death an at early age for their children's minds. They wanted a freer development for their children, and they thought that organic teaching might be an answer. Thus they invited Miss Ashton-Warner (who's really Mrs. Henderson) to join their venture. Soon both the inviters and the invitee learned that they attached different meanings to freedom.

What is this thing, freedom, supplied to the children in overspilling glassfuls, in tankards, in brimming kegs? Must glorious freedom mean all this? Is this, indeed, freedom? If it is, what good is it? How long is the equipment going to last. . . ? And, as equipment, how long will I last?

I'm impressed indeed by what they call freedom among the incoming children, but less impressed by the freedom for teachers. . . I'm already learning that children are the lords of creation whose desires and whims are law.

Equality . . . appears to mean inverted authority. There's authority here but not from me.

The author pleads for structure, for routine which will give shape to the day. "This doesn't happen to be freedom as it is; it's intoxication." She chuckles at attempts to substitute "guidance" for a bad word, "discipline." "The wannadawanna has nothing whatever to do with freedom of the mind . . . and everything to do with its shackles."

The whole day can be a large shapey vessel made out of order, into which we pour all we've got. A shape contoured by benign routine which helps to stabilize, which in turn engenders responsibility. For in making a new kind of school, stability and responsibility are major requirements for freedom of the mind.

Perhaps this is the most valuable contribution of this work: the insistence that a structure for learning is compatible with—in fact, essential to—the freedom of the mind.

Our schools are as they are because our society is as it is. How does the author evaluate our society? Very highly, in some respects: she speaks of having come from the tail end of civilization to its spearpoint. However, there are dangers. She tells us that the enriched may really be the deprived.

Affluence is one of our troubles. The thing about deprivation is that it makes you dream, and a dream is a germ of living and exercises the imagery. This is the main aim in organic work...
Ashton-Warner is concerned about our children.

I do ponder . . . on the story the K.V. (Key Vocabulary) tells me of this particular society, the post-industrial, advanced-guards point of it; why it varies so from the norm of a happy child.

. . . Our children may be victimized by overstimulation, the attention span concertinaed, the third dimension [emotion] erased and the vision fragmented.

These are thought-provoking words, which make the book a valuable prod to complacent minds. All in all, this is a significant book.

. . . The weaknesses, however, are incidental: they don't destroy the larger contributions which the author makes in helping us understand children, the learning process, and our culture. Of course, there are those who now will say that, in going to a unique free school in Aspen, Ashton-Warner still hasn't come to American schools: "I still wonder what she'd do with my third grade in Gary!"

Ashton-Warner's visit was of limited duration and restricted area. Therefore she does not presume to pontificate about the ills of American schools. She does, however, raise disturbing questions. As de Tocqueville and de Gurowski have shown, visitors from other lands can help us see ourselves as others see us. The danger is—to use a simile from James—that, having observed ourselves in a mirror, we go away and forget what needs attention.

BERNARD HILLILA

FREE SCHOOLS.
By Jonathan Kozol.

If you have a name in the free school movement and a desire to make money for the cause, then write another book. That this was the motive of Jonathan Kozol in writing Free Schools should become apparent to the reader prior to the author's confession to the fact on the last page of the book.

The bulk of Free Schools is devoted to such revelations and advice as: disease, drugs, and starvation exist in the ghetto.

people in free schools should not fight among themselves all adults involved in free schools do not care for kids in order to get money free schools can either work for it or get it from charity hassles from authorities can be expected

To label such as a "handbook for survival" indicates more put-on than naivete. But even the name Kozol and a title so inclusive that no one dared use it before is not enough to sell put-on pap. So an early five and one-half pages are devoted to criticizing types of free schools that do not fit Kozol's current model of a valid alternative. What he advocates is good, but he should note that the title of his book suggests a plurality of forms.

To state that alternatives within the system are bound to be ineffective because they are accountable to the flag is to ignore that most institutional change is brought about by inside rather than outside forces.

Comparing the upper-class rural free school with a "sandbox for the children of the SS Guards at Auschwitz" is probably valid. However, this analogy either ignores that there is as great a need for the liberation of rich whites as there is for poor blacks or denies that the means of liberation may differ. Being in the sandbox may lead to more truth than being in school under the domination of the sisters of the SS Guards.

Although this book could give some comfort to the skill-pushers, it is probably harmless. If you want to be confronted with the real issues facing free schools read John Holt's Freedom and Beyond instead.

LEONARD KOCHENDORFER

February, 1973
BEYOND THE NEWS

Newspapers and television are frequently criticized for publicizing the nasty and the bizarre, and passing over the good news, the stories of everyday courage and kindness and nobility. The result, their critics say, is to present an unbalanced view of the world, a view which fails to take into account all of the dimensions of man. And surely there is good reason for such criticism, although the criticism would come with better grace from a reading public which actually supported quality publications in preference to the sensationalist press.

In any case, this column is an attempt (which will probably not come off very well because there is really nothing very colorful or dramatic about the story I am going to tell) to redress the balance by relating what may be, under the eye of eternity, one of the great stories of recent years—at least one which has had profound repercussions in the life and thought of those who are close enough to the principals to feel some small sense of participation in their remarkable adventure in faith and courage.

Ralph was a student here at the university ten years ago—bright, active, a promoter, an organizer, and a leader. We became friends and we frequently talked about Ralph’s future. Like many especially talented young people, he was having some difficulty deciding which of the many interesting things open to him he should concentrate on professionally. The question was complicated by a desire to marry the lovely and talented young lady he was dating and whom, as a matter of fact, he married while still in college.

From my point of view, at least, it did not seem terribly important what career Ralph chose to pursue; it seemed to me that he could hardly fail to make a success of almost anything that he might settle on. And when, eventually, he went into business, I was not surprised to hear, after a year or two, that he was doing very well. But business did not satisfy his intellectual curiosity or his craving for the company of people who shared his interests in literature and the arts. So when an opening developed in our admissions office, he returned to the University as an admissions counselor.

And then, quite without warning, the blow fell. He had hardly settled in his new job when he learned that the tired feeling he had been experiencing was an early symptom of lupus erythematosus, a disease which is still a mystery to medicine but which is inevitably fatal, usually within a very short time. So there were Ralph and Linda, with two very small children and no prospects except crippling expenses to fight an illness which, in the long run (and perhaps not all that long, at that) was sure to prevail.

There is no point to rehearsing the long and involved clinical history of Ralph’s affliction—the bad times, the occasional apparent remissions, the painful experiences with the dialysis machine, the kidney transplant, the whole long battle under the direction of a brilliant and sympathetic physician-friend to stave off the inevitable. More important than the battle for physical survival was the struggle to keep the faith. This struggle, too, had its ups and downs, its moments of near-ultimate despair and its moments of profound joy in the realization that it is those whom the Lord loves that receive His chastening.

Now, journalistically, what can you do with a story like that? There is really no way of conveying to anyone who has not experienced it the radical meaning of despair, and there is even less possibility of even suggesting the full meaning of joy in Christ. And in between these peaks and troughs there is only the day-to-day business of holding on—on the physical level to each new hope that medicine offers, and on the spiritual level to the promises of God, which often offer little hope or comfort to the weary flesh. And yet, for many of us in our small community, Ralph and Linda have become something like prophets, opening up to us insights into the ways of God with man and shaming all of the pettiness of our lives which, by comparison with theirs, have been singularly free of any real grounds of complaint.

At this writing, Ralph is in hospital again and, as usual, does not know what God has planned for him. He is beyond the need of any man’s sympathy, but not, perhaps, beyond the capacity to accept a friend’s gratitude, admiration, and affection—all of which go with him as he enters once more behind the veil where he is involved in the secret workings of God, a little of whose reflected glory he brings with him each time he comes back to us.