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Needed: A New Doctor

Our recent editorial observation that, "one way or another, we must get out of Viet Nam" has made some of our readers wonder whether we have been transmogrified from a hawk into a dove.

We like to think that we are not, and never have been, either. Indeed, we think that all of this talk about hawks and doves is for the birds. What is needed is not imagery but a reasoned policy based upon some set of defensible moral principles and related to the realities of the situation not only in Viet Nam but in this whole small world of ours.

If we had such a policy to suggest, we would most certainly suggest it. That we do not have one does not, however, disqualify us from criticizing the present policy. A man may not know what treatment he needs for an illness, but he is capable of judging whether the treatment he is getting is helping him any. And if it isn't, he has the right to change doctors.

On that analogy, it is our view that if President Johnson — for whatever reason — can not get us out of Viet Nam, it is time to try another doctor.

This seems a harsh, even cruel thing to say, and we don't mean it that way. A President, for all his power, is still a limited human being. And in the pursuit of particular policies he may well find himself so committed to a particular line of action that it is no longer possible for him to double back and make a fresh start. It can even happen that he becomes so much the symbol of his policies that the only way to change them is by replacing him.

Something like that has, we fear, happened to Mr. Johnson. At least some of his recent utterances have caused us to wonder whether he has not abandoned the search for reasonable options in favor of a strategy of bulling it through. If that is the case, it is certainly understandable. But is it in the best interests of the country?

There is, unfortunately, one strong reason for not changing doctors, and that is that no other would-be doctor is suggesting any more hopeful treatment of the situation. Except for Senator Hatfield, none of the President's critics have come up with anything better than vague mutterings about the war and even vaguer hints about how they would go about extricating us from it. No one of them is prepared to say what we suspect someone will have to say one of these days: that there is no way of winning it short of escalating it into a war against China — a course of action which we fervently hope no one will seriously propose. And the reason no one is going to say that is pure, stubborn pride — a pride that may yet drive us to pay more to "win" this war than it would cost us to "lose" it.

Good Man

The departure of Secretary of Defense McNamara from the cabinet, understandable as it is after seven years of sixteen-hour days, is nevertheless an occasion for regret and concern.

Secretary McNamara is the first Secretary of Defense who has actually been able to run our swollen, rivalry-infested defense establishment. He brought to his office a combination of brilliance and toughness which made it exceedingly difficult for the high brass and their Congressional allies either to outwit him or out-maneuver him. As much as any man could have these past seven years, he kept the military power subordinate to the civilian. This is an accomplishment for which we all have reason to be grateful.

And it is just for that reason that his retirement causes us some concern. We do not share the view of some extremists that the military leaders are a bunch of crypto-fascists bent on setting up a government within the government. But men whose calling it is to send young men into battle do not, if they have any trace of conscience, take their responsibilities lightly and it is possible for them, in such circumstances, to lose their sense of proportion and balance. War is, as Clemenceau said, too important to be left to the generals precisely because it is the proper
(but limited) concern of generals to win as quickly and
decisively as possible with the least loss of life while larger
and longer-range considerations may dictate a policy
of more limited engagement with proportionately higher
loss of life. Such considerations may even suggest with­
drawal from a war which, in the overall picture, is not
worth additional commitments of lives and resources.

Secretary McNamara, more than any other man in
high office, has shown a remarkable capacity for keep­
ing the big picture in focus. His voice has been one of cau­
tion and restraint, supported by the kind of cold rati­
onality which is seldom appreciated by superiors or sub­
ordinates who set greater store by intuition or emotion.
Perhaps it was only his massive integrity that allowed
him to survive as long as he did in the murky waters of
Washington.

We wish Mr. McNamara all the best in his new respon­
sibilities as president of the World Bank and we hope that
his successor, whoever he may be, will take courage from
his predecessor’s example to carry on the tradition that
the military is respected and consulted on all matters of
military strategy, but not at the cost of sacrificing civi­
lian control over national policy.

DeGaulle and the $2.40 Pound

One does not have to be of a mean and suspicious na­
ture to see behind the devaluation of the British pound
the fine Gallic hand of Charles DeGaulle. Years ago, he
expressed the hope that he would someday see Britain
nude, and what le grande Charles wants he has a way of
getting. Of course much more lies behind so moment­
ous an event than the vindictiveness of one old man. The
productivity of the British economy has been held far
below the level of its potential by many factors, es­
pecially by uninspired management, by myopic trade unions,
and by successive governments which have let Britain
drift while reassuring her people that they never had it
so good and that things would work out somehow or other
one of these days.

But the fact remains that to Britain’s internal econo­
my:DeGaulle, for all of his capacity for pettiness,
has always had one great gift going for him: a remarkable
ability to see the obvious. In our judgment, he is quite
right when he insists that Britain is not European and
is neither willing nor able to enter the Common Market
on the same terms as its continental members. Econom­
ically, Britain looks away from Europe toward the United
States and the nations of the Commonwealth. Cultu­
rally, Britain’s attachment is to the English-speaking world.
Politically, Britain is not, we think, prepared to give up
its special relation to the United States for the sake of join­
ing the Third Force which DeGaulle dreams of creating
between the United States and the Communist countries.

There comes a time when it is wise to give legal status
to a happy common-law marriage. Perhaps that time
has come for the British. At least it may be time to tell De­
Gaulle that she has had enough of the role of the spurn­
ed suitor. He’s about due for a bit of a set-down anyway.

A New Frontier?

“Unfortunately, college kids don’t even dislike Amer­
ican business. They just ignore it.”

This apathy bugs the Olin Company and it has been
taking full-page ads in the magazines to do something
about it. The ads are very thoughtfully written and they
are not, as might be expected, critical of the young folks.
They are directed rather at the business community which,
Olin maintains, has not done an adequate job of convinc­
ing young people that they can find in business careers
the same challenges and responsibilities that they hope
to find in teaching, public service, and government.

“What’s the answer?” Olin asks, and its reply is: “To
recognize that today’s student is no longer interested in
the old lures of salary, pension and profit sharing alone. . . .
He wants to help solve the great social issues of our time
—ignorance, poverty, race relations, and a dozen others.”
Precisely. And that is why, as Olin says, “if any com­
pany is having trouble attracting students, it ought to
take a new look at itself.”

We have the great good fortune to hale from Colum­
bus, Indiana, which the national magazines have recently
been playing up as “the Athens of the Midwest,” chiefly
because of the merit of its post-war architecture. We
have therefore been able to observe at first hand what
intelligent, far-sighted, and imaginative business leader­
ship can do to improve the quality of our common life.
A man like Irwin Miller — Esquire’s candidate for Presi­
dent — is worth a dozen government agencies when it
comes to directing the energies of a community toward
constructive ends. And from what we have seen of the
business world there are places for any number of men
like Mr. Miller in companies which are fully aware of their
responsibilities to society.

One thing Olin was gracious enough not to say, and
that is that the young man who passes business up because
he thinks that he will have a better chance to help solve
the social ills of our times in teaching, public service, or
government may have quite an unpleasant surprise in store for himself. Education today is, for all practical purposes, an industry and it is at best only peripherally concerned with the gut issues of our day. Government, even in those agencies and departments that are supposed to be dealing with these great issues, is so bound up in its own red tape that it takes a magician to accomplish even the most modest objectives. And many of the public services are not much better.

So maybe business is the place where the young man who wants to do something constructive stands the best chance of doing it. At least it's worth looking into.

Good-bye to Pelagius

If, as some of our critics allege, we have not been sufficiently critical of the alleged excesses of the younger generation, it may be because we remember how the generations of their fathers and grandfathers were oppressed by legalisms which cost some of them their faith and drove others from our fellowship into other church bodies.

Our grandfathers, in case we have forgotten it, were told that it was a sinful exhibition of doubt in divine providence to invest in life insurance. They were also told that a Christian could not accept any evolutionary theory of the development of organic life. And they were told that engagement is tantamount to marriage, so that a broken engagement was, in effect, the same thing as divorce. We have not, as a church body, repented of these skandala (Luke 17:1) or laid seriously to heart the cost in souls of our insistence upon teaching them as the Word of God.

Our fathers were told that they could not pray with fellow-Christians of another denomination and were, indeed, discouraged from associating with them. We provided them with every imaginable institution and society to insulate them from the world around them and kept them so busy running these ghetto structures that they had little time to bring any Christian witness to their generation. And we continued to discourage them from any active involvement in the intellectual life by demanding that they reject a priori the theories and hypotheses of the sciences. We have not, as a church body, repented of this unwarranted denominational exclusivism or of the unnecessary burdens which we laid upon the consciences of that generation.

Our generation, as we recall it, was cast in the role of a generation of sex maniacs. If we learned nothing else, we learned to distrust our emotions. Dancing, we were told, would send us straight to hell. And so we were encouraged to play drop-the-handkerchief and to bob for apples. We were also solemnly warned that birth control — whatever that was; we weren't supposed to know where babies came from — was against the order of nature and, indeed, a form of murder. We have long since forgiven those who, no doubt from the best of motives, made our adolescence one long succession of self-accusations, but we have no intention of putting our own children through the same neurotic experience.

Against this background of seeing the letter kill three generations, we are disposed to give the Spirit a chance to make alive the generation of our children. We hope that, without falling into the heresy of antinomianism, we will be given the grace to use the Law as a preparatio evangelti rather than a code of conduct by which men can be saved. Our theology is Augustinian, not Pelagian, and we are quite prepared to endorse Augustine's maxim: "Love God and do what you will."

The Uses of the Law

What purpose, then, do laws, codes of conduct, and ethical systems serve?

"They were added," St. Paul says, "because of sin." The man or woman who has the mind of Christ may be trusted to do the will of God without having it spelled out for him. He may, indeed, in particular circumstances find it necessary to violate a law or a code or a system in order to do the will of the Father.

But the man who does not have the mind of Christ cannot handle freedom responsibly. He will invariably use his freedom irresponsibly and become a menace both to himself and to other people. And so, for most men, ordinary civil peace and order depend upon adherence to some sort of accepted code which rewards conformity to it and punishes departures from it.

The trouble is that it is very hard indeed to draw the line, for Christians, between the freedom which they possess as those who have, in some measure, the mind of Christ and the restraints which they need to have imposed upon them because they have not yet been made perfect in love. One of the functions of the Church is, therefore, to provide at least for its own members guidelines which will help them find their way through those vast areas of ambiguity where we are unable to discern clearly the will of the Father.

But the important thing to remember about guidelines is that they are only that and can not, in their nature, be more. This means that one has to be very careful about passing judgment on a fellow-Christian who behaves differently in a given situation than one would himself behave. And one must be very careful not to assume that guidelines which were useful and perhaps even necessary for one generation are, like the laws of the Medes and the Persians, unchangeable through the generations.

As for those who profess no obedience to Christ, the Church ought to be cautious about addressing them as it would address its own children. It may be questioned whether it is any part of the business of the Church to serve as "the conscience of society." Certainly the institutional Church has not, in the past, shown any great aptitude for speaking wisely or constructively to the problems which have plagued and still plague our society. Indeed, in far too many cases it has sanctified the status quo and defend-
ed, in the name of morality, what was really nothing more than the mores of a particular society or socio-economic class or generation.

Does this mean that the Church is not to proclaim the Law? Not at all. But the law which it proclaims is not its peculiar possession. The peculiar treasure of the Church is the Gospel, and it is finally only the Gospel which can create what God is interested in creating — not nice people or even morally good people, but sons and daughters bearing a family resemblance to their Father and Brother.

Postponing Death

It is really rather hard to believe that within a few years the remarkable heart transplant operations which have been performed in Cape Town and at Stanford may become as common as other forms of organ-transplant operations. And since we have not yet digested the seeming miracle of such an operation, we find it hard even to speculate about its implications.

There is, of course, the fact that for the overwhelming majority of us life is dear. Our immediate, off-the-top-of-the-head reaction is, therefore, one of joy over any prospect of its prolongation. And certainly no one would question that it is the duty of the professional to explore every possible way to lengthen the span of life. (The intolerable alternative would be that it would let nature take its course, and that course tends always towards death.)

But we have lived long enough by now to appreciate the wisdom of the Preacher's statement: "To everything there is a season... a time to be born and a time to die." We have known friends and relatives to whom death came not as "the last of foes" but as a friend. And already from the vantage point of middle age we can see that the mere prolongation of life is not necessarily an unmixed blessing. We have no great desire to be the last leaf on the tree, clinging to a bough long since forsaken by those who, in this early afternoon of our life, gave it meaning and purpose and joy.

And yet we may be faced some day with the necessity to decide whether to submit to an operation which could very possibly give us a few more years of life or to refuse the operation and thus choose to die. In the past, we have defined death by one's own deliberate choice as suicide. The traditional view has been that it is man's duty to do all within his power to prolong his life — short of denying his Lord — and to accept death only as an act of obedience to the will of God. But it seems almost as though God were telling us now that He has laid yet another responsibility upon us, the responsibility of choosing (within limits) whether we can serve Him best by staying around a while longer or by recognizing that the time has come to die.

It is a decision which we hope we will never have to make. But for allowing man this additional measure of freedom, God be thanked.

Walter A. Hansen

When Walter A. Hansen died last November 28, The Cresset lost one of the three or four people who were chiefly responsible for making it what it is. One of its founding editors, Professor Hansen served for almost thirty years as its music critic and as a member of the editorial board, always with faithfulness and with a high sense of professional responsibility.

Professor Hansen was one of a vanishing breed of men. He believed that the life of the mind has its own validity and requires no utilitarian justification. He did not look upon his work as a scholar, translator, and critic as a subtle means of foisting his religious or political convictions upon the unwary. Rather, he was content to accept it as the kind of work God had created Walter A. Hansen to do, and he did it as well as he could, trusting God to use it in His own way for His own purposes.

To our readers, Professor Hansen was best known for his monthly music column. It had a loyal readership — some because they agreed with him and rejoiced to find someone who could put their feelings into vigorous language, some because they got the same perversive sort of satisfaction from it that one gets from biting down on a sore tooth. In all of our years of association with him, we saw no evidence that Professor Hansen was swayed in his judgment either by the approval of those who agreed with him or by the angry reactions of those who found him stuffy, opinionated, and pedantic. He was his own man, and he invited one and all to take him or leave him as they found him.

To those of us who were his colleagues, he was unfailingly kind and generous. In our worst years, when it was hard to find writers and when we never knew from month to month whether there would be funds on hand to get out another issue, he kept encouraging us to stick it out and wait for the better days which, he was convinced, would surely come. On those rare occasions when illness or the press of other obligations made it necessary for him to ask for an extra day or two to get his column in, he was as apologetic as a school boy who had failed to turn in his assignment on time. And when at last he felt it necessary to give up his column, he allowed us to continue drawing upon his counsel as a consulting editor.

Yes, he could be crusty. And no, he was not much of a glad-hander. But he was a man of monumental integrity and the kind of friend who will tell a man the truth as he sees it.

To Mrs. Hansen, who for many years served The Cresset as movie critic, the editors extend their Christian sympathy, comforting ourselves as we comfort her with the lively hope of a joyful reunion with Walter in God's own good time.

The Cresset
While trapped in a Laundromat a few days ago, I was forced to read a number of women's magazines. I was waiting for the never-ending "dry" cycle of the machine to be completed, but after staring into that round hole for what seemed like an hour, I became convinced that if it is true that a watched pot never boils, it is equally true that a watched dry-cleaning machine never stops. To give the machine a chance to stop and my eyes a rest from watching the twirling clothes, I began to browse through the magazines on a nearby table.

The stack of magazines was huge, but most were far from current, giving the impression that magazines in Laundromats are collected from doctors' offices. The age of some was such I had the feeling if I went deep enough in the stack, I might find a few copies of Liberty or The Literary Digest. The only recent publications were women's magazines and so I gave in to Fate and sat down to read a few.

This was my first experience with women's periodicals in some eight or ten years and at that time I remarked in these pages on certain features common to most of these publications. As I recall, I had a few things to say about the sterility of the model rooms and homes all of them featured. Every model room had the appearance of a museum piece and none of them looked at all livable. No one would dare walk into one of those fancy rooms without first removing his shoes, and no one would sit on one of those colorful sofas or chairs unless he were wearing a linen duster.

Another story common to women's magazines ten years ago was the "How We Completely Rehabilitated an Old Home on $576." If I remember correctly, the remodeling cost was so low because, while cleaning the basement of the old but newly acquired house, the couple always came across $50,000 in gold pieces, or something else of value, which some previous occupant had stored there and forgotten. The title of those articles was slightly dishonest, but who is going to read an article on how to rehabilitate a house for $50,576?

After ten years not much has changed in the housing and food sections of the women's magazines. The model rooms look as stiff as ever, and the fancy foods and pastries have a look of such perfection that one wonders if they are not made of plastic.

But there has been one major change in the contents of women's magazines and frequently, while thumbing through several of them, I had to refer back to the front cover to make certain I was not reading a medical journal. Years ago, Dr. Spock was the only M.D. writing for women's journals. He may still be doing so when not involved in sit-ins or languishing in jail. But now every women's magazine has one or more M.D.s writing on what appears to be a regular basis, and every issue contains articles on family health, the new drugs, and medical guides.

The favorite subject in the medical section is The Pill. While I had known the subject of birth control was controversial, I had no idea so much controversy existed on this aspect of it. And after perusing a number of articles, I believe I know less about The Pill than I did before. I am under the impression that in any one women's magazine in a particular month a doctor pronounces The Pill unsafe, conducive to varicose veins and premature aging, and in the next month, another doctor refutes these unjust claims. I fail to see how this type of journalistic schizophrenia could be of help to any woman.

In the early part of 1967, the women's magazines appeared to be almost exclusively composed of pictures of Twiggy, but her frail figure disappeared as the year went along. Features on paper dresses appeared sporadically throughout the year, but I got the impression even the editors were not overly enthusiastic about this type of women's wear.

Should the women's magazines join in a contest to choose "The Ideal Couple" or the "Mr. & Mrs. of 1967," I know who would win in a landslide — Mr. and Mrs. Richard Burton (her maiden name was Taylor). None of these magazines went to press more than two months in a row without an article on the Burtons and, in every case, the writing was of the grand and gushing movie magazine style. I must admit I had not known the Burtons were such an ideal twosome, that she was really shy and highly intellectual, or that he is the masterful head of the house. Quite frankly, I never felt the need to know the Burtons that well, but I gather most women must want to.

For the benefit of any male readers who have been relying on me for a review of women's magazines every decade, I must warn you that, hereafter, I plan to be prepared by carrying a paperback whenever I can anticipate being trapped in a place where only women's periodicals are available.
Discussions of business ethics tend to become impaled on the horns of the dilemma of the Christian imperative, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and the efforts to concretize ethical decisions in the form of the Ten Commandments. As one takes the former course, one must apply the Christian ethics to the businessman in the same way that one seeks to apply Christian ethical functions and behavior to any other Christian in our society. Here the guiding principle of ethical behavior is agape love. But as one tries to amplify the meaning of love, one is left without much guidance to direct specifically towards the businessman. Love is that which is a characteristic of a Christian, and a Christian, simul justus et peccator, meets the demands of love imperfectly. The result is either no guidance or all, or rather the guidance of the situational ethic in which that which is good is what a good man does as he tries to apply agape love in action.

The other alternative, of trying to apply the Ten Commandments to the business situation, departs from a peculiar Christian concern and ethics, and ends up with a form of legalism and chauvinism. As one tries to apply the meaning of "Thou shalt not steal" or "Thou shalt not kill," one theorizes legalistically, and the end is not very edifying. Applied to a business system, legalism often leads to answers which are either unreal or fictional because of the many variables involved. Is a machine which can cause injury permissible in a factory? Is it right to take interest, as in the consumer goods industry? Is it permissible to deprive the obviously incompetent man from a livelihood by firing him from his job?

Both applications end up with either a simple assertion that the Christian ethic as applied to business demands only love or the other alternative, that business ethics is nothing but the application of the Ten Commandments; or as someone has said, "ordinary face to face civility." The results of both of these dilemmas are not very edifying, as peculiarly business related, for they are merely applications of individual ethics to the business situation. It does not say very much of what is distinctly related to business or the businessman. It rather leads to the imperative that the Christian in business act and conduct himself as a Christian.

However useful the application of individual ethical principles is in application to the professions, where there are face to face individual relationships, another dimension enters when one discusses business ethics. A distinctive feature of business ethics is that many people perform a management function. They are engaged in individual contact with employees, fellow managers, and superiors, where individual ethics applies. There is the other dimension which concerns the relationship to the organization as a manager and a representative. The manager administers goals, objectives, policies, and plans which he has often had no part in establishing. When we speak of business ethics we often refer to two different things. One refers to the individual ethics of the businessman, while the other takes a macro view of the problem and talks about the role of business in relationship to society as a whole. The question, "Is it right for 'business' to do so and so?" manifests something of the dimension of the business society problem. In dealing with the individual aspect of the problem, one can talk about the application of individual personal ethics to all aspects of our relationships. The other dimension of business-society relationships is much more complex, since the total impact of the business of which one is a part may be affecting society adversely.

The "Soulless Unit"

At the root of our concern is the recognition that the greater part of the total business activity is conducted by great aggregations of people called corporations. It is not the individual who conducts affairs in his own name, or produces products; rather, goods and services are produced by a "soulless" unit which is partly a social organization, partly a little society, and in any case operated collectively by a professional group of managers. The people working in such an economic unit not only act in a representative capacity, but are also directed towards an end over which they have no control. The worker on the production line is very much a part of the productive process, yet the goals and ends are not determined by him. His part in the entire process is such that only through management can his efforts be made productive. He does not produce a product, he produces a part of the product. The corporation, as it brings together various divisions of labor, produces the total product.

Although one can talk about Christian individual ethics in the dimension of the worker to his job, one can find little relationship between the worker and the final
product, and the worker in relationship to the total impact of the corporation on society, or the disposition of the final product. The question really is, "What is the ethical behavior required of the corporation in society?" The other dimension of the problem of business ethics is a macro view of the corporation, in which one asks the question, "What kind of ethical behavior is expected of the corporation, and of business units in society?"

We can dismiss this entire problem by assuming ethical neutrality for the corporation and asserting that the corporation, as a corporation, is not concerned with morality and ethics. The corporation exists for the production of goods and services. Such production is ethically neutral — the ethics derive from the use of these products. This begs the question, for the corporation is more than a producer of goods and services. It provides the means of access to status and employment; it helps form the environment in which it operates; it determines income distribution and provides a source of differing satisfactions for people. Chester Barnard has asserted that the Protestant ethic of personal behavior does not form a valid criterion for moral behavior in business.

We can ignore the dimension of the problem of the managerial revolution by saying that the corporation is a product of free association of people for some purpose. As such it has no life apart from the ones who established the business. The study by Berle and Means dismisses this argument, for they show the clear separation of ownership and control. The corporation tends to become autonomous, independent, and self-motivating. It is more than a fictional person before the law, as the Supreme Court assumed.

The corporation has become an autonomous unit in our society, and thus its very autonomy creates problems in the use of power, the use of economic resources, the disposition of men, and of access to positions and employment. The corporation does exist, it does perform many of the functions of private property and it does affect the lives of people. Peter Drucker points out the problem when he talks of the corporation as the representative of business. When we talk of business ethics we are often talking of the ethics of the behavior of the corporation.

The operators of the corporation are managers performing a management function. The corporation does not exist apart from its management, and in this respect it is similar to many other organizations, whether private or public, whether profit-oriented or non-profit. The peculiarity of this responsibility is that unless the management does its job the enterprise cannot exist. As managers do their job, they support the corporation. In maintaining the enterprise, which a manager must do, he protects his position, status, and wages, as well as the ability of the enterprise to produce goods and services. The better the manager does his job, the better the corporation may accomplish unethical behavior. The professional manager does not own the business; he occupies a position in the enterprise. The corporation is what the management collectively determines it will be. In terms of internal ethical relationships, the ethics are those of community. In terms of external ethical relationships, the analogy with the individual ethics of private property fails.

The Free Association Theory

There has developed over the history of business a body of theory for the corporation as an extension of personal ethics. In this theory the corporation is an extension of the concept of the individual and private property in its relationship to society as a whole. This concept united the classical system of economics, scientific management, and private property into a unified whole. Based upon the concept of private property and the right of contract, the free association theory of the corporation provided a control over the corporation which assured ethical behavior.

The control device over the corporation was the competitive market situation. Where this existed income would be distributed in an equitable and fair manner, employment opportunities would be protected by the operation of the law of demand and supply, and the result would be the freedom of, and the protection of, the individual. The concept of consumer sovereignty protected freedom for the individual within society. Adam Smith's invisible hand explained the operation of the market in such a way that the self-interest of the individuals would be constrained in the national interest and for the welfare of all. This invisible hand was competition. Private property was protected in the interests of the economy as a whole, and it was possible for each individual person to choose whether he would offer his services or not. This individuality was automatically guarded.

The role of the manager in this understanding of ethical and corporate relationships was clear. His responsibility could be comprehended under the direction of responsibility to the shareholders who owned the corporation, and at the same time to the maintenance of competition in the market place. The management responsibility consisted of increasing and maintaining efficiency within the corporation, combining resources in their most efficient manner, and applying the principles of scientific management to the firm as a whole. Oriented to the maximization behavior found by the individual within the market place, the management could rest secure in the solace that its maximizing behavior was directed to profits. As the manager sought to maximize profits, he was acting for the welfare of the enterprise, but, at the same time, producing and helping to support the welfare of all.

Business ethics could be comprehended under the term of individual property ethics, and the manager entrusted with the operation of the business firm took
solace in the concept of stewardship. In meeting his responsibility to the enterprise he was at the same time contributing to the support of ethical wages, ethical income distribution, and ethical values in society as a whole. The general problems of society were best handled by the government. General problems would demand general solutions for the government had the responsibility to protect the general welfare.

This type of ethical dimension of business ethics received support both from classical economics and also from social Darwinism, which proposed competition or survival of the fittest as the laws of God for human society. The ethics of private property was rooted in the concept of stewardship.

As long as such a view of the corporation existed, based upon the right of the freedom of men to associate together, and as an extension of the right of private property, business ethics could be compared to the ethics of Christian stewardship. The manager within such an organization could be comprehended under the analogy of the directions of the individual ethics of duty to one’s masters, and individual responsibility to employers. The ethics of society’s problems could and would be handled by the government itself. The control mechanism against unethical behavior was the operation of the competitive market which, as long as it operated, would promote freedom, protection for private contract, and the security of the individual. Such a system and theory provided an ethical justification for the profits of a corporation. The market had ruled out unethical firms by consumers rejecting them in favor of others. Profits were the reward for risk, for private property, i.e. the shareholders, and for ethical behavior. Such a theory combined together in one unit the two aspects of business ethics — individual ethics and also macro ethics — for the support of the former provided the basic mechanism to arrive at the latter. It answered simultaneously the two questions, “What does society expect the ethical behavior of a business firm to be?” and “What is meant by an ethical businessman?”

**Weaknesses in the Theory**

Our modern understanding of the corporation and of society has shown conclusively the falseness of many of these premises. The market is an inadequate control device for business behavior. The existence of profits is not prima facie evidence of ethical behavior. Individual freedoms need to be guaranteed and protected by legislation and law. Private property and the right of contract are not absolutes, but have been interpreted in different ways by the courts. The consumer sovereignty concept does not guarantee ethical behavior for the welfare of society as a whole.

The result of these investigations has shown that the corporation exists as a power in our society, which has required countervailing power of anti-trust and other power groups to control. It has cast doubt upon the concept that one can guarantee ethical behavior by competition in the market. We have come to recognize the corporation as possessing economic, governmental, and societal power. But we have no guides to this type of ethical behavior.

The modern corporation is something other than an expression of private property. The manager operates the company and fulfills his function with obligations to many interests of which the shareholder is only one. The separation of ownership from control is not quite absolute, but rather badly shaken. The control of the corporation is exercised by factors other than the invisible hand of the market place. The ethical dimensions of the management function are broader than the concept of owner-employee responsibilities. The corporation exists in a pluralistic society. The corporation is the productive unit — not the individual. Management has been referred to as a “balancing of interests.”

The dimensions of the ethical problem now change with the new view of the corporation and its management. Service in the corporation is not a service to private property. The ethics of the management function are partly individualistic and community related, but partly related to the society in which business operates. The questions then are: “What kind of ethical behavior does society expect from corporate management?” and “What are the ethics of representative behavior within the corporation?”

The changing view of the corporation and the concern for a different structure and way of talking about business ethics, have come from a changing philosophy of our society and the way in which things are to be done. A simplified understanding of pragmatism has led to a recognition that our environment is plastic. We see things as problems and are prepared to solve these by direct action. American ingenuity has led to the rejection of solutions based on preconceived dogmas to an understanding of relationships and power. The establishment of a structure, i.e. the competitive market, is inadequate for an activist approach to our problems. Pragmatism has replaced social Darwinism and with it the emphasis has moved from a consideration of the preservation of a structure, i.e. competition. The absolutes of private property, and of free association which formed the backbone of the modern corporation, have given way to a relative consideration of something called the public interest or the public welfare. We have moved to an active role for government, as over against the determination of an environment for business. It is also asserted, without question, that the environment of business is partly self-determined.

**The Ethics of Management**

Together with individual ethical concerns we now need to ask the question concerning the macro section of business ethics. What kind of ethical behavior can
we expect from management? The question is a demand­ing one, for it implies, in its very answer, that ethical behavior as a manager is meant to be a conscious concern for the businessman. The ethics of business behavior demands more than efficient production of goods and services and the maintenance of competitive behavior. Business has already recognized the question by talking about the social responsibility of business. Social responsibility has been criticized as unethical behavior, as anti-business, and as anti-profit motivated. Yet I think there are some guidelines which are basic to the ethics of corporate management operating in a pluralistic, democratic society. It appears to me that these are over and above whatever individual ethical considerations are involved and refer to the manager as a manager.

1. The manager needs to observe the ethics of the democratic resolution of disputes within a pluralistic society. The ethics of power demands that business, in its external relationships and its consideration of society, assume the posture of a participant in the resolution of problems where the solutions are going to be arrived at by compromise, adjustment, and discussion. Business management cannot ethically use its power, as it has done in the past, to assert its position and use its economic strength to resist those kinds of goals agreed upon in a democratic society. The kind of ethical behavior asked of businessmen is that through the democratic process they become participants in the solutions of problems which confront society and in which the government and people are concerned.

Corporation ethics are something other than a by-product of the competitive structure; they are to be consciously pursued as the corporation adopts the ethical posture of a corporate power group within society as a whole. It remains for the manager to exercise the ethics of power — whether governmental, economic, or societal — by accepting those other groups with power. The corporate manager thus accepts the way in which disputes are to be resolved, and does so by accepting other groups as they are. Business is only one power group among many. Another way of stating this proposition is that business management must accept the ethics of expected participative behavior in society as a whole.

2. Management needs to observe the ethics of the support of society’s values. The allocation of resources, the distribution of income, and the determination of society’s values are decided upon partly in the political process. Management cannot afford the luxury of rejecting those values which have been selected by society for its own welfare and its own benefit. I am referring here to the ethics of support for universal values. Some of these are civil rights, security, eradication of poverty, and general education. Management, in its responsibility to the corporation, should not ignore its responsibilities to these values as well. We have recognized that the protection of individual rights and of freedom are not by-products of other activities. The corporation and its management cannot ignore the ethics of the use of its influence to be supportive of these values.

3. Management within the corporation must observe the process of constitutionalism and the preservation of individual freedoms by the recognition and support of due process. This is the ethics of the preservation of the individual, not by refusing to hire or fire, but rather by preserving his freedom from the exercise of arbitrary power and the use of the influence which management commands. Basically this is the ethics of governance in which the modern corporation is involved internally. Due process is the way for the preservation of freedom and individualism within the large corporation. These are basically Christian ethical concerns as well as society’s values.

4. Management must recognize that it must be the innovator of goods and services for the welfare of society. The ethical dimension here is the ethics of its function in society as an innovator and producer of goods and services. Business has a function to produce goods and services. This ethical imperative is not directed by its responsibility to private property, but to the ethical imperatives of its function. If management fails in its obligation to produce, to innovate, and to create goods and services, it will cease to provide an increasing quantity of job opportunities, affect the standard of living, and fail in its obligations to the community of man. Management has an ethical imperative to do its business well. This process of innovation is the ethics of seeking to turn knowledge, science, and human ability to the creation of new and better things for the welfare of mankind.

5. Management has the ethical responsibility to survive as an organization and as a corporation. The ethics of survival is the ethical demand to exist. This existence is constrained by the democratic process, the support of society’s values, and the concept of due process. As it survives, business will perform its ethical functions of providing employment for people, of producing goods and services which people want, and of making it possible for people to find in the organization some of the psychological and social values which they need.

The ethics of management is then something more than individual ethics. There are ethical dimensions of the use of power, or responsibility, and of representative behavior.

These guidelines provide a structure for the manager which replace the competitive market place. The manager operates within the limits of due process, undertakes this in a democratic arrangement with the union representing the workers, and supports society’s values. Where these structures of behavior are preserved and observed and kept, there is provided a framework within which individual ethics can operate, and the total community can be served. Within such an overriding concept of ethics for management, it is possible for the good man to exercise agape love. It is then possible for the
discussion to get away from the problem that ethics should come from the economic structure of society. We move to the recognition that management operating in a pragmatic society can undertake decisions and choices as it observes the ethics of decision making and of management behavior. These guidelines provide the ethics of the behavior of management whose decisions affect society and whose actions support or destroy other values.

In this way, I think we can get off the horns of the dilemma — either agape love or legalism — and move towards the ethics of management behavior in reference to the total community of man. The question of business ethics then is the second part of the total issue — How ought a manager to behave ethically to support the welfare of society? The answer does not lie in the structure of competition, but rather in the conscious effort to observe the ethics of a representative function. Another way of stating the issue is that business ethics, in one of its dimensions, is the ethics of process and method. This section of business ethics can be consciously examined for it concerns the ethics of behavior for the heart of management — decision making.

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**On Second Thought**

**By ROBERT J. HOYER**

The Spirit of God fills the church. The Spirit is God in and through the church. What the church does is God's act, by His decision of grace. The Spirit may at times even decide in and through the church what the church shall do. But it does not follow that what the church decides to do is the decision of God. On the stumbling stone of that distinction the church may founder, as the kingdom of Judah once founder and sank.

When the church decides to do something it is the decision of men. We have forgotten that and we are in peril. The Holy Spirit does not blow whither a majority vote listeth, not even when that majority is moved by the Spirit to shout Hosanna in the streets or kneel in fervent prayer.

We have a record of God's acts which has been given to us, which we have confessed as our sole source and norm of teaching. Whenever, in that record, some kind of community decision was necessary it was reached by non-human means. Aaron's sprouting rod, not the decision of the people, vindicated the Levite's priesthood. Urim and Thummim—whatever that was—determined the course of conquest for Israel's army. Saul was chosen by lot. Gideon's army was reduced by the arbitrary choice of one method of drinking water. Matthias was chosen to succeed Judas by lot.

There were exceptional cases. Once Korah assembled a vote of 250 leaders against Moses. Decision was reached when the ground opened up. The people voted to censure Moses for that decision, but a plague cancelled their vote. When King Ahab called for a vote among the prophets concerning a war with Syria, they approved by a majority of 400 to 1. But God spoke through the one. The Apostolic Council in Jerusalem decided on a course of action. But the decision was man's judgment following another man's testimony, and many years of conflict followed before the action of the church made the decision the will of God.

It is easy for us to act as though we know what we are doing. That in itself should be enough to warn us of danger. It is almost as easy for us to prove that we are doing the right thing. That is proof of danger. The Christian church has accomplished some truly devastating evil in full confidence of its own rectitude. What we accomplish in the next years will be the act of God, by grace—if and only if we do not insist that God must follow where we decide to lead. It would be both wiser and safer for us to reach our major decisions by tossing coins than by convention vote. They may not be better decisions, but we will not be tempted to lead our God by the hand, to speak as though our decisions are His will.
The Problem of Abortion Law Revision

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The belated recognition of the population problem has included the legalization of abortion as a partial answer to demographic control. The American population alone, for example, numbered less than four million persons in 1790, seventy-five million in 1900, and over two hundred million in 1967. The growth between 1990 and 1960 was twenty-eight million persons, a figure nearly equal to the combined 1960 populations of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand. At current birth and death rates the American population will reach an estimated 222,533,000 persons by 1975 and 273,265,000 individuals by 1990. The fear that an enlarged population will result in a lower standard of living has led some persons to encourage voluntary population control through forms of contraception, sterilization, and abortion. Although contraception and sterilization, attempt to prevent the occurrence of pregnancy, abortion is an operation directed to the removal of the fetus after the conception has occurred.

The Debate Over Abortion Law Revision

State laws do not offer uniform grounds for legalized abortion. In thirty-two states abortions are lawful only if they are necessary to save or preserve the life of the mother. More liberal grounds are permitted in fewer than ten states (including Colorado, North Carolina, and California) and the District of Columbia. The Model Penal Code, proposed by the American Law Institute in 1959, suggests the redefinition of legal abortions to include the discontinuance of pregnancy where there is a substantial risk that either the child or the mother would suffer grave and irremediable impairment of physical or mental health, or where the resultant pregnancy occurred through forcible rape. Under this proposal legal abortion would become an acceptable alternative in situations involving a major possibility of fetus defect and/or physical or psychological impairment, provided such conditions were certified by two or more physicians. Although many reform committees have expressed interest in revision, fewer than three states have enacted these changes. Because the issue is so laden with theological-moral overtones and vested interests, reform attempts have generally been stymied. A recent recommendation of the Committee on Human Reproduction of the American Medical Association, calling for legal reform of abortion laws, was referred back to the Board of Trustees by the House of Delegates for depth discussions with other interested groups.

One vested interest group is the Roman Catholic Church. Defending the rights of the mother and the unborn child, the Catholic Church has historically argued that the abortion of a fetus is the actual taking of a life of an unborn person. Episcopal Bishop James Pike, a former Catholic, denies, however, that there is any life until the fetus asserts itself in the womb (hear heartbeat, feel kicks). Therefore, he argues that birth control practices and early abortions cannot be termed murder since no person yet exists. If the fetus does not have life until it asserts itself, abortion is really nobody's business. However, if life exists from the moment of conception, as held theologically, the ethical pros and cons must be weighed to determine whether abortion is desirable. Others stress that a person exists only when digitation (forming of fingers on the fetus) is recognizable. The confusion surrounding this issue leads some parents to name, baptize, and hold funerals for the partially developed fetus while others simply request the hospital to dispose of the conceptus as it would the residue of any other operation.

Part of the American confusion arises from value conflicts resulting from more liberal foreign abortion laws. The Japanese Eugenics Protection Law of 1948, which resulted in a decline of live births per 1,000 population from 33.2 in 1949 to 17.0 in 1962 and issued in a legal abortion increase per 1,000 from 3.0 in 1949 to 10.4 in 1962, has made hospital abortion available to Japanese women upon request for a minimal cost of eight dollars. Scandinavian countries have legalized abortions upon the recommendation of hospital abortion boards. Although Communist countries differ in practice, where abortion has been liberalized the birth rate has declined as more women choose to terminate pregnancy. The publicity given the thalidomide controversy in Europe (seen in the United States in the attempt of Mrs. Sherri Finkbine to gain a local abortion), the effects of the American measles epidemic, the general dissatisfaction with the lack of allowance of legal abortions in cases of juvenile
rape or incest, and the general public recognition that large numbers of abortions are being committed with or without the support of law have resulted in an open discussion of the question.

The central issue of abortion, suggests Dr. Kenneth Ryan, is whether problem pregnancies can best be remedied by the sacrifice of the unborn child. At present most accredited hospitals maintain review boards of committees to certify abortions allowed by existing laws. Elements of society, however, have been demanding broader guidelines which include the possible termination of the pregnancy where potential birth defects, illegitimacy, rape, incest, life-threatening conditions, complex social and economic factors, or challenge to the mother's mental or physical health may be involved. In January, 1965, the New York Times reported that 87.6 per cent of the obstetricians responding to a study of the New York Academy of Medicine favored the liberalizing of the abortion laws.

Medicine must recognize that the health services available to the family, the planning of family size, and even the outcome of pregnancy depend upon socio-economic factors. Future abortion laws, says Ryan, should consider the total context of community health needs and a wide range of medical and social problems. Whereas society currently condones abortion by reputable physicians for its own convenience so long as it does not have to assume the moral responsibility for justifying it, it has failed to face the issue at hand. Medically, the conceptus does not have full legal status until it has reached a term of twenty weeks. A prior birth is considered an abortion rather than a delivery and is not listed on the mother's parity record. The situation is ambiguous, however, since injuries to the fetus at this early stage may result in legal action to redress such damage. Because Western culture emphasizes the traditional right of the individual, attempts to transform the rights of the fetus and allow for free abortion will continue to meet with societal indignation.

The suggestion that the pregnancy should be interrupted when the possibility of a fetal defect exists fails to recognize that in most cases exact knowledge of the defect is not available before the actual birth occurs. Although statistical evidence may indicate that a specific proportion of fetuses will be damaged, the specific fetus cannot be identified by any statistical method. In a study of 227 children born to mothers contracting rubella (measles) during pregnancy, the incidence of mental retardation was comparable to that found in the normal population. An abortion committed in such cases is, in fact, an abortion committed for the family, and not for the child himself. Ryan suggests that if the fetus were asked how it would like to be born deformed, it might simply reply: "If it is a choice of that or no life at all, I might choose life."

The Case For Revision

Proponents of abortion law revision, including attorney Zad Leavy and physician Jerome Kummer, suggest that the peremptory restrictions of current abortion laws force desperate women into the hands of the unskilled criminal abortionist and result in 5,000 to 10,000 abortion deaths per year. Therapeutic abortions, they argue, must be allowed in order to remove the current compromising limitations borne by both the pregnant and the medical doctor. Although prohibited by state law, many pregnancies are terminated by reputable medical practitioners in licensed hospitals, generally with the approval of the hospital's abortion committee and under the supervision of several consulting physicians, for reasons other than for the preservation of the health of the mother. A late 1950 study by the Stanford Law School found that three-quarters of the reporting California hospitals allowed induced abortion in circumstances directly violating state prohibitory statutes.

The tension between pressed morality and personal desire, Leavy and Kummer believe, encourages hypocrisy when dealing with the question of personal desire for physical relief. Although induced abortion has existed since early history, its particular acceptance or rejection has depended upon the social characteristics of the particular community. Nations seeking population growth have severely penalized persons destroying the embryo or fetus. Societies more sensitive to personal choice have minimized restrictions when the safety of the woman was endangered. Although Protestant Christianity has generally relaxed the strict Judaic legal interpretation of abortion, Roman Catholicism continues to prohibit any induced abortion. While American courts propose to protect the mother, they in effect perpetuate, Leavy and Kummer argue, the early Judeo-Christian belief that the termination of pregnancy is a crime against nature. Although the debate over abortion law change has centered in the demand to preserve the life of the fetus, modern law suggests that abortion laws are designed to protect the physical and mental health of the mother. The majority view in the United States, Leavy and Kummer note, is that the woman engaged in the abortion is not an accomplice to the offense but a victim of the abortionist. She is rarely prosecuted and is usually granted immunity from prosecution since her testimony is generally needed to convict the abortionist. If the primary goal of abortion laws, they argue, is to prevent the death or injury of the mother, the current debate over the right to terminate a pregnancy remains somewhat spurious.

Scandinavian countries allow the termination of pregnancy if 1) it endangers the mother's health, 2) it resulted from rape or incest, or occurs to a very young girl, 3) it may result in the birth of a deformed child, or 4) it is warranted by socio-medical conditions. The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute suggests provisions similar to those found in the Scandinavian countries as the basis for American legal revision. The organized opposition of Roman Catholic leadership, however, has effectively restrained any attempts to modify abortion laws in most states. While legal modification may alleviate many unsanitary and coercive conditions surround-
ing the large number of abortions completed each year, it will not eliminate criminal abortion. While reform will offer important changes, more significant preventive measures, Leavy and Kummer argue, must be enacted. Consultation centers staffed by competent professionals should be made available for persons facing decisions pertaining to abortion. Sex education and continued contraception research should be included in carefully planned comprehensive programs which include the dissemination of information on planned parenthood, birth control and abortion.13

The Case For the Status Quo

Although physician A. C. and professor-attorney Norbert Mietus deplore the yearly deaths of 5,000 to 10,000 mothers through illicit abortions, they also suggest that their critics ignore the alleged one million or more unborn children that are sacrificed yearly in the abortion process. The right to birth, once conceived, should not be terminated without reference to counsel, trial, evidence, jury, or judge. The embryo and the later fetus, they argue, is a form of human life which cannot be ignored.13 Since the fetus, organically attached to the body of the mother, contains all elements essential for independent life, it should be preserved. The umbilical cord remains intact even after birth until severed. A fatal blow or stab, they note, administered while the infant’s body is connected to the mother, would be a form of infanticide.14

Present laws, the Mietuses contend, are suitable and flexible enough for the present day without the necessary revision as contemplated by pro-abortionists. The responsible position of a hospital board of licensed physicians should not be diluted by the popular desires of the community. Since no human being is perfect, parents or doctors should not possess the right to determine whether imperfect children should have the right to life. If abortion laws are liberalized, moves to legalize euthanasia, they suggest, will logically follow. New life, the Mietuses argue, emerges at the time of fertilization and conception. The propagation of the child obligates the eventual birth of the child. The moral and legal issue involved in the destruction of an unborn child’s life cannot be simply passed off. Although Judeo-Christian tenets have historically rejected artificial methods of birth control, prevention of conception is preferable to the destruction of the already-conceived child. The life of both the mother and the child are equally sacred. Public authorities do not possess the right to decide the destruction of the new life. The innocent fetus has the right to emerge in human form.15

Rape or incest does not automatically involve the conception of children. Permissive laws enacted to allow personal abortion decisions are extreme responses to the posed problem. Other alternatives might include the attempt to improve the moral climate of the community through alleviating poverty and by providing fathers of dependent children with adequate living wages. A basic need remains to encourage a more charitable attitude toward the unmarried mother and to improve the legal status of the illegitimate child. Creative provisions should include income tax relief for parents or alternative forms of child subsidy, together with provision for foster home care or freer adoption procedures where necessary. “In large measure,” A.C. and Norbert Mietus write, “the medical and legal professions enjoy public esteem because they are devoted to the protection of life. So be it always.”16

An Empirical Evaluation

Although much heat and some light have been generated concerning the problem of abortion, few attempts have been made to gather empirical evidence. In December, 1965, however, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) asked 1,484 adult Americans under what conditions a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion. Given six alternatives ranging from impairment of the mother’s health to a desire for no further children, the respondents indicated that legal abortion should be possible if the woman’s health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy (71 percent), if she became pregnant as a result of rape (56 percent), or if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby (55 percent).17

The data, according to Alice Rossi, show minimal religious group difference when Roman Catholics are compared with Protestants. In fact, the majority of Catholic men and women favor legal abortions where high probability of fetus deformity or pregnancy following sexual assaults exists. In both instances the sanction of official Catholic doctrine regarding abortion remains insignificant. Although Protestants are slightly more liberal than Catholics, the variation rests in differential church attendance rather than in specific religious affiliation. Frequent church attenders in both groups are more likely to take a conservative position. The actual difference is traceable to the greater church attendance among Catholics (74 percent) than among Protestants (51 percent). Although increased education results in a Protestant liberalization of abortion attitudes, Catholics do not indicate the same tendency. Persons with liberal political orientations or independent of party membership seem to possess the most liberal attitudes toward abortion (51 percent). Liberal (47 percent) and conservative (46 percent) Republicans, and liberal Democrats (42 percent) compose the next greatest level of support for abortion law revision. The least sympathetic remain the conservative Democrats (36 percent) and other persons who are either uncommitted or apolitical.18

While there is clear support among religious and political groups for revision of abortion laws involving the health and life of the pregnant woman or the major risk of a deformed fetus, this support is withdrawn where economic situations, illegitimacy, or unwanted children are the reasons for abortion. Only 21 percent of the respondents support legal abortions if the family has a very low income level and desires no further children. Eighteen percent accept abortions if the female is not married and
does not desire to marry the male. Only 15 percent believe that abortion should be available to a married woman who seeks to limit the number of children in the family. The data suggest that Americans generally reject the idea that abortion might be used effectively to control population growth or family size. Although family planning through use of contraceptive techniques seems to meet with public approval, the American populace rejects abortion and encourages the acceptance of the pregnancy once it has occurred. Male and female opponents of premarital sexual relations are more likely to oppose reform of abortion laws even in cases involving maternal health or sexual assaults. However, among those persons holding permissive views, men are more inclined than women to support abortion as a form of birth and population control.

The majority of women seeking abortions simply do not want the child. Abortion is the court of last resort when birth control has either failed or been ignored. Because this attitude flies in the face of traditional female-mother roles, society, says Alice Rossi, refuses to face this issue. But to wax sentimental over a fetus is to ignore the three hundred or more ova which are never fertilized. Women do not grieve over the loss of the fetus, but over the loss of maternity and the potential child. Where the child is not wanted, maternal joy is hardly present. Abortion decisions, therefore, should be governed by civil control and health standards rather than remain violations of the criminal code.

Only limited alternatives are open at present to an unmarried pregnant woman. In some cases marriage may be quickly arranged under the tensions of family pressure and personal guilt. Although the “shot-gun” marriage may temporarily succeed, these tensions often become the grounds for divorce at a later date. Such marriages remain “high risk” marriages when the couple feel cheated of dating opportunities, preparedness for marriage, adjustment months, and strained family relations. The later fear of having the child discover that his parents were married after the conception occurred, too, remains a subtle reminder of the abnormal situation leading to the marriage.

Rather than marry, some persons simply complete the pregnancy and place the child for adoption. While this offers a ready solution, many mothers never overcome the sense of guilt resulting from both the illegitimate conception and the later denial of the child. While the rights of the child to be born are recognized in this alternative, the corollary right of the child to have parents is cared for only through full development of foster and adoptive home programs. If the mother, however, chooses to raise the child while single, she and the child face the full social stigma of illegitimacy. In addition, she faces the major hardships of breaking the circle of poverty while attempting to keep the family together. Under these circumstances her children may often suffer from outright neglect and later become statistics of juvenile and criminal courts. The final, and generally last sought, solution rests in illegal abortion, and its attending risks. 

The Line of Probable Solution

Marriage is a legal contract between consenting partners. Although possessed of moral and religious implications, marriage remains an act of individual consent. Under current laws, however, children born within the private marriage contract become concerns of the state. Once the marriage is consummated, the stability of the marriage, the rights of the unborn child, and the social effects of illegitimacy become basic concerns of the state. Delinquency, crime, poverty, mental health problems, divorce, and even social hopelessness may have their genesis in the birth of an unwanted child.

Although there are those who argue that any woman should have the right to an abortion upon her own request in a hospital serviced by a recognized professional doctor, American values suggest that prospective legislative reform will stop short of this goal. Only in recent years has birth control information become readily available to the financially-limited lower classes which have maintained a generally high birth rate. The move toward family planning encouraged by the population threat will probably issue in some abortion law reform along the lines suggested earlier. It remains unlikely, however, that criminal abortion laws will be radically changed in the process. Just as society has refused to legalize prostitution to overcome venereal disease, it is doubtful that major revision will be undertaken which will allow free individual decision concerning the termination of pregnancy.

Footnotes
7 Ibid., p. 425.
8 Ibid., p. 429.
9 Leavy, op. cit., p. 52.
10 Ibid., p. 53.
12 Ibid., p. 55.
15 Ibid., p. 927.
16 Ibid., p. 928. Also refer to Granville Williams, The Sensibility of Life and the Criminal Law (New York: Knopf, 1957).
17 Rossi, op. cit., p. 9.
18 Ibid., p. 8.
19 Ibid., p. 7.
Those who have read Peter de Vries’s novel, *Reuben, Reuben*, will know what I am talking about if I say that Herman Shumlin’s adaptation of this novel brought Mr. de Vries’s characters in three-dimensional form on stage. While reading the book they may have had their private laughs—but now they can have them publicly in the theater—at such remarks as Spofford’s, the hero of the book, that romantic confusion, once the privilege of the few, has now been made available to all; or at the remark of the widow Pert Kelton that “people who have everything lack something;” or at the situation when Miss Kelton would like to marry Spofford and give him a home and he replies: “I consider the home an invasion of privacy.”

Mr. Melvin Douglas plays the Connecticut chicken farmer who searches for his own identity and finds out more about the mores and foibles of the commuter set than about himself. But *Reuben, Reuben* turns out to be a gentle and warm comedy about the social dilemma of our time and the crazy evils of suburbia. The comedy is a triumph for Mr. Douglas but also for the wry, deadpan humor of Mr. de Vries, who shows us the insanity in what we consider sane and ordinary.

In his endeavor to relate Shakespeare to our times and to make a contemporary out of the Bard, Joseph Papp, who has done so much for Shakespeare as the Elizabethan writer he undoubtedly was, went far too far in translating Jan Kott’s idea of “Shakespeare Our Contemporary” and came up with a naughty schoolboy’s idea of how to draw a moustache on Mona Lisa.

Unfortunately, he even went beyond the moustache. The play opens with Claudius and Gertrude in bed and with Hamlet seemingly naked and certainly handcuffed, trapped in a coffin. This might have been a good beginning for a beguiling satiric treatment related to our theater of the absurd. But the three figures start fighting over the blanket and the sophomoric nonsense begins. Later we see Hamlet selling peanuts, the ghost of Hamlet’s father appears as a comedian, and the whole thing deteriorates into nonsense without any depth or meaning and finally becomes unfunny and untheatrical.

Oh, where are the good old crazy days—were they in the ‘20s or ‘30s?—when the daring idea of playing Hamlet in tuxedo had gotten a hold on most stages in Europe, including the staid Old Vic?!

Not too long after Shakespeare’s death — I mean his actual death and not Joseph Papp’s unnecessary reburial of the Bard — John Aubrey was born, an English antiquarian of some fame who, like Samuel Pepys later, recorded his impressions of his time and contemporaries. He lived through the Puritan period and died in 1697 when Cromwell had become a fading memory. His “Brief Lives” turned up as a one-man show. The amazing British actor Roy Dotrice played this genius of a gossip, an old man who talks to us from his seventeenth century room and viewpoint, telling us trifling scandalous stories. What he achieves is a little miracle in recreating the image of a whole period, the feeling of timeless time, the sensation of opening a dusty old volume and reading in it at random, wondering about life that was and is. Aubrey’s eccentricities made for a wonderful show, and Roy Dotrice’s chatter has the amusing quality of good theater.

The Repertory Theater of Lincoln Center had opened its season with a restaging of *The Little Foxes* with a star cast and a star director, Mike Nichols, who has the gift of not failing in whatever he touches. The discussion about this play was rather lively, but not so much about the play, which may have already moved into the state of becoming a period piece with all the flaws of period pieces, nor about the cast which, with such people as Anne Bancroft and Margaret Leighton, could hardly be bad; but about having another company doing the job for the Repertory Theater. Director Jules Irving’s action is defensible as a necessary step to gain time for his own work.

Now the company has given us its version of G.B.S.’s *Saint Joan* with Diana Sands in the title role. The huge cast needed for this play is not quite even, but this may be asking too much. It is, under John Hirsch’s direction, one of the best, if not the best, productions of the group. This may have something to do with the choice of the play and Shaw’s genius. His *Saint Joan* remains the most outstanding play of the twentieth century. It has enough of Shaw’s wit and ability to debate vital issues on stage and it is emotional enough, a quality not always as readily noticeable in most of his other plays.

Much depends on what the leading actress brings to the play. With this role Diana Sands established herself as one of America’s great actresses. She has the necessary earthbound simplicity, the stubbornness of the fighter, the belief of the person whose destiny is inevitable, the touch of an other-worldliness which does not understand the ways of the world. She was convincing in all phases of this difficult part. When she took her bows she laughed and cried over her triumph. Only then was I reminded that Diana Sands’ skin is somewhat darker than mine.
Mary and the Ground Hog

By THEODORE R. JUNGKUNTZ
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And when the days of her purification according to the law of Moses were accomplished, they brought him to Jerusalem, to present him to the Lord; (as it is written in the law of the Lord, Every male that openeth the womb shall be called holy to the Lord;) and to offer a sacrifice according to that which is said in the law of the Lord, A pair of turtle-doves, a sacrifice according to that which is said in the law (the womb shall be called holy to the Lord;) and to offer him to Jerusalem, to present him to the Lord; (as it is waiting for the consolation of Israel: and the Holy Ghost was upon him. And it was revealed to him by the Holy Ghost, that he should not see death, before he had seen the Lord's Christ. And he came by the Spirit into the temple: and when the parents brought in the child Jesus, to do for him after the custom of the law, then took he the Lord's arms, and blessed God, and said, Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word; for mine eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast prepared before the face of all people: a light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of thy people Israel.


But the law of Moses would attach a highly significant word to the law of nature and by this “ensecularized” word remind every man born of woman of his inevitable participation in a community of sinners. Thus Mary’s secularity (i.e., her participation in the laws of nature) can permit ground-hog-Lutheran-Protestantism to hear an important word addressed to it on February 2 on a subject other than the weather—it is caught up in a community of sin along with the rest of creation.

But where in the above-quoted Scripture is there any hint of Christian talk about a ground hog? Honesty demands that I admit that even a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek can’t transform turtledoves or pigeons into ground hogs. But theological imagination has no difficulty in seeing an analogy. It’s time Lutheran Protestants take their ground hog seriously and see it as more than a weather prophet. The ground hog in all its secularity can serve to remind the Christian of the equally secular turtledoves or pigeons referred to above. And these in turn serve to remind us of the sacrifice of the Lamb of God for the sin of the world. The secular and the sacred cross in the cross—the sacrificial cross of Jesus Christ.

A second feature of the pericope deserves consideration and that is the concept of “present.” Joseph and Mary brought Jesus to Jerusalem to “present him to the Lord.” It is this act, of course, which lies behind another name given to the Festival of the Purification of Mary, namely, the Festival of the Presentation of our Lord.

But in this instance too the February 2 ground hog tradition serves a purpose. It can remind us that the Presentation of our Lord is just so much talk unless it touches us in our own secular, ground hog existence. Mosaic law demanded that Joseph and Mary present their first-born son to the Lord (Ex. 13:2; 12) and they complied. The infant Jesus was presented to God for God’s service. And the fact that theologians are able to characterize Jesus as “the man for others” bespeaks his servant role. But until we find ourselves included in the “others” Jesus’ presentation can mean little to us.

In our baptism the sacred and the secular cross once again. The presentation of Christ becomes our presentation. In the baptismal liturgy we pray:

“Almighty and Eternal God, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, we pray Thee, bestow upon [name] here
presented for Holy Baptism, Thine everlasting grace through regeneration by the Holy Ghost . . .”

The Apostle Paul teaches us that in baptism we “put on Christ” (Gal. 3:27) and thus the Apostle can also write:

“I appeal to you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice . . .”

(Rom. 12:1a)

A celebration of the Presentation of our Lord is meaningful, therefore, only in the context of our own secularity, and if it takes Ground Hog Day to remind us of this, so be it.

As a church festival February 2 goes by yet a third name—Candlemas. It was Pope Gelasius who in 492 established Candlemas Day as the time for blessing candles in the churches. The Scriptural point of departure is obvious in the words of Simeon who greets his Lord with the words:

“... a light for revelation to the Gentiles . . .”

The early church showed wisdom when it did not abstract Jesus, the “light of the world” (John 8:12), Jesus, “who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light” (1 Peter 2:9b) by the light of his word (2 Peter 1:19), from the realm of the secular but instead imitated the Roman Saturnalia in the use of candles by which the divine light of heaven was symbolically seen to fasten itself upon the secular, which thereupon participated in the sacred light of heaven. This symbolism the church carried out in its practice of lighting candles at the reading of the Gospel. Unless the sacred and the secular cross, unless Jesus as the light through the word “enlightens every man” (John 1:9), man, secular man, man who lives a ground hog existence, will not see light.

But unlike the ground hog tradition which has this creature return to his burrow for another six weeks of hibernation should he see his shadow due to the light of the winter sun, the Christian who lives by virtue of the light of the world, Jesus, does not retreat in fear from his own shadow but permits himself instead to become a reflector of that light into a world which when left to its own devices evolves ever further from the light into the blackness of death.

So whether we celebrate February 2 as the Festival of the Purification of Mary, or as the Festival of the Presentation of our Lord, or as the Festival of Candlemas, we are robbing ourselves of its benefits if we don’t celebrate Ground Hog Day as an expression of the secular which is touched by the sacred in the cross of Jesus Christ, in our baptism, in the enlightening word of the Gospel.

Vietnam 1968

This is the year of the Great Serpent
and the astrologers continue to dream in black:
the only possibility in clouds lies
in swamps, between propellers, twisted
and indiscriminately splashed with red;
the only possibility in the sun is disturbed
with spiders, twisted and indiscriminately
stretching death and the moon;
perhaps one should believe in more than
astrologers and snakes,
but the weeping of our children
continues,
drowning the lament of our women.

—H.S. Hamod

February 1968
“Art should be an affirmation of life... not an attempt to bring order out of chaos nor to suggest improvement in creation but simply a way of waking up to the very life we are living...”

John Cage

One of my intentions in these columns is to examine some of the major directions in recent art. The art of Assemblage, from which evolved the “Happenings” and Pop art, is one of those directions, and Robert Rauschenberg’s art was and is one of its key forces.

From the mid ‘50s through the early ‘60s a number of young artists began rejecting the private calligraphies and theories of Abstract Expressionism then dominating the world art scene. These young artists took a different direction and confronted again the concrete objects of the world of everyday life outside themselves. In raw and direct ways they displayed not so much organic objects from nature but rather the bits and pieces of man-made artifacts (in all stages of attrition) that surrounded them in our massive urban environments. These artists felt that because of the overfamiliarity brought on by life’s daily routines, most ordinary objects had in effect become invisible. These artists also felt that the rich visual complexities and contradictory eventfulness of life, in which of course these objects participate, were largely hidden from most of us by expectations of order and meaning that were too simple.

In the visual arts, one of the main innovators of these ideas was Robert Rauschenberg (b. 1925). In the summer of 1952, at Black Mountain College, Rauschenberg became well acquainted with the composer John Cage. At that time Cage’s musical ideals were changing from those of self-expression or of theme communication (“Spring,” “War,” etc.) to those of impersonal revelations of “nature’s manner of operation.” From Cage’s point of view, “nature’s manner of operation” was strictly indeterminate and random, and any projection of personal taste or order into the composition interfered with the goal.

Therefore Cage explored the use of systems of chance (dice, coins, elaborate chartings) in determining pitch, duration, etc. Or, using random dialings, a technique he described as “fishermen catching sounds,” he invented a work called Music for 12 Radios. An even more dramatic fishing expedition was his piece called “4’33””, which was four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence during which the audience was to attend to the sounds of “life” with the same kind of care as they would give to a conventional piece of music. In a similar vein, Rauschenberg made an all-white painting which Cage described as an “airport for lights, shadows, and particles.”

Rauschenberg’s sensitivity to the richness of the visual world and his openness to any aspect of it has led him to combine diverse objects from life within arbitrary, relatively impersonal systems or frames of space. He has said of his approach: “I try simply to obtain the maximum presence possible of the world, with the most diverse objects, and I attempt to make them function in the most alive way possible.” Or “I consider myself successful only when I do something that resembles the lack of order I sense.” Or “I’ve always felt as though, whatever I’ve used and whatever I’ve done, the method was always closer to a COLLABORATION with materials than to any kind of conscious manipulation and control.”

Superficially, the art of Robert Rauschenberg doesn’t look much like “art.” If anything, it looks as though he just gathered a little junk and dabbed a little paint and so produced one of those party-decoration parodies of modern art. But if the beholder suspends for a while his preconceptions of what art should be, and genuinely tries to “enter” into the world of the work, what would his experience be? I tried to do this with the work called Lincoln which I studied at the Art Institute of Chicago.

My first inclination was to examine closely each part. However, there didn’t seem to be any particular place to start. Although the parts are strikingly different in size, shape, color, and texture, in the end it is clear that each item has about equal weight, equal independence. On the left at the top are trickles of yellow paint; down in the middle of the left border is a crayon mark of pure pale blue. This left border whitewashes its way around the veiled, filmy grey photograph of a sculptured portrait of Lincoln, the whole presenting a somewhat disheveled fragment from the traditional world or art. However, the muted dignity of the realistic Lincoln dreamily fading back into his grey rectangle paradoxically seems less real than the aggressive “abstract” trivia also in the painting. That thick roll of white paint on the top right with the juicy blood red stains behind it; the dark-grey, brush-streaked rectangle just below; and the shiny metal tag with the punched letters pull one up short from any associational reveries about the seated Lincoln. Then again in contradiction to this rawness is the refined intricacy of the fragment of old brocade.

All along this right side the general tone is relatively warm and heavy. Almost the whole bottom half of this section is formed by a rectangle of Kraft wrapping paper. It forms something of a parallel to the Lincoln photograph although it is not nearly as unified or isolated. Prominent on the wrapping paper are the seemingly accidental markings of black and red, white and blue paint, and also the fragments of a penciled listing of
letters and numbers from somebody's personal code system. Finally, among the smallest objects in this assemblage is the textbook (?) reproduction of a photograph of rock formations. This panoramic scene was placed on its side, dislodged from its context like all the rest of the fragments in this painting; its overwhelming scale seemingly no more significant than the small accidental markings of man.

Stepping back for the overall view it is apparent that a rich mix had been achieved. Placed on the same level are the noble, the trivial, the large, the small, the systematic, the accidental, the past, the present. Each quality seems independent and random; each seems to serve nothing more than its own existence. But is the result just chaos? Poetically, it comes very close to it. Any unity it might have does not come from rational connections. Yet there is an indirect, overall unified aura representing a truce between the mellow past and the rawness of the present that, at least for me, gives a slight advantage to the past.

On the other hand, in abstract visual terms the unity is more obvious. This unity can be easily seen in the accompanying reproduction, for underlying all these unrelated parts is a strong interlocking right angle structure of lines and rectangles.

In general, however, I would say that the accent in this approach to art is on diversity, on an impure order, on a difficult unity. It is when the unity isn't there, when the unity is too easy, and when the combinations seem contrived that this art does not achieve its goals.

February 1968
The habit of analysis that is a mark of this age spares not even ourselves. It is not enough that we probe for an understanding of our ancient relatives; we self-consciously contemplate the persons we were only yesterday. We are much like the animal who must sniff about the place where he lay last night before getting on with the business of today.

Critical processing of the musical materials from the 1920's and 1930's has produced a new edition of a book first published in 1934. A by-product—and more valuable than any sort of historical peep-show—is the realization that a perceptive mind may deliver itself of artistic verities even while voicing sensitive fears that time has proved unnecessary. October House of New York gave us in 1967 the first American printing of Constant Lambert’s trenchant and witty book written in 1933 and subtitled "A Study of Music in Decline." In his introduction to the new edition Arthur Hutchings puts the evaluation nicely: "Many of us who were [Lambert's] contemporaries, now wise after events since his death [in 1951], are less surprised that we often disagree with verdicts in Music Ho! than that the passage of thirty years has turned many of our own verdicts towards reluctant concurrence with Lambert's."

That’s the remarkable thing. A capable practicing musician (Lambert was composer and conductor) is knowledgeable in every important musical work of his time and possesses the literary skill and courageous spirit to raise unfashionable questions about the course of art which remain as cogent today as they were thirty years ago.

Lambert had the self-assurance of one who knows a work well enough to allow himself judgments such as these: Debussy’s Pelleas is “one of his weakest and most mannered works.” “Behind [Schoenberg’s] most revolutionary passages lurks the highly respectable shade of Mendelssohn.” “During the seventy years that separate Russian from Le Sacre du Printemps there is less real advance . . . than there is in the thirty years that separate Beethoven’s first symphony from his ninth.”

Three trends in music—noticeable in 1933 and still discernable today—Lambert scorned. They were, in his estimation, cheap compromises instead of perseverance in the "logical development towards complete self-realization" which is the obligation of every creative artist.

The pasticheurs, forced by Impressionism’s "vastly speeded up facilities for space travel in music," have turned giddily to borrowings from music of all times. "Stravinsky, at one time the globe trotter par excellence, can no longer thrill us with his traveler’s tales of the primitive steppe and has, quite logically, taken to time travelling instead."

The nationalists fail to realize that there is no “genuine spiritual or social background” to warrant building a style on folksong and patriotic sentiment. “Music being the most instinctive of the arts is more than any other art susceptible to the purely mechanical differences of civilization in so far as they affect our emotional life . . . If the composer imagines that he can treat present-day Surrey with its charabancs, filling stations, hikers, road houses, dainty tea rooms, and loud speakers discouraging cosmopolitan jazz, in the way the Elizabethan composers treated the ‘woodes so wilde’ he is living in a narrow world of escape, incapable of producing anything more than a pretty period piece.”

As for the impact of machinery on the art: “We live in an age of tonal debauch where the blunting of the finer edge of pleasure leads only to a more hysterical and frenetic attempt to recapture it. It is obvious that second-rate mechanical music is the most suitable fare for those to whom musical experience is no more than a mere tickling, just as the prostitute provides the most suitable outlet for those to whom sexual experience is no more than the periodic removal of a recurring itch. The loud speaker is the street walker of music."

"What we require from the composer," writes Lambert, "is an expression of musical personality free from deliberate pastiche—which is escape—or from mechanical revolution—which is submission."

The title of this remarkable little book appears in the quotation on the fly leaf:

All: The music ho!

Cleopatra: Let it alone; let's to billiards.
(Shakespeare - Antony and Cleopatra, Act II, Scene V)

What first seems to be Spenglerian despair, however, takes another turn by the last paragraph of the book: "The artist who is one of a group writes for that group alone, whereas the artist who expresses personal experience may in the end reach universal experience. He must not mind if for the moment he appears to be without an audience. He has no right to complain if Cleopatra prefers billiards. There is always the chance that she may become bored with billiards also, and when she returns to the musician his song will be all the more moving for having been written to please not her but himself."
Mrs. Sallie McFague TeSelle’s recently-published book, *Literature and the Christian Faith* (Yale University Press, $6.50), probably evokes a strong response from all who give it attentive regard. After first reading the book, I reacted with unqualified enthusiasm. After rereading it some months later — although I find my response tempered — I still recommend it as one of the most valuable studies to appear in the general "religion and arts" area just because it does not treat the "general" religion and arts area. Urging her reader to remember that her primary concern is not with "what Christianity can do for the arts nor what art can do for Christianity but what literature can do for the Christian life," Mrs. TeSelle approaches her subject experientially and with care. Her task depends primarily on a sharp distinction she makes and maintains between the autonomous "truth claims" of literature and the independent claims of the Christian life.

Her initial argument, consequently, dilates on a critical premise: the only really fruitful form of literary criticism is that which does not proceed from other than literary criteria. Regrettably, Mrs. TeSelle observes, most current criticism in the theology and literature area rests on criteria not strictly literary. As a result what often emerges on the contemporary critical scene is a kind of brotherly but Christian imperialism that borders, as one man has suggested, on academic incest. Theologio-critics repeatedly threaten to violate their literary sister in a number of ways. They do it first of all through caricature him — for he has, sometimes through literature, the religiously amiable discriminator. If one may caricature him — for he has, sometimes without merit, been made a whipping-boy ever since he appeared in the guise of such studies as Randall Stewart’s *American Literature and Christian Doctrine* — he walketh about as a roaring systematic theologian (though he may not be one), seeking to devour his literary sister with a set of static doctrinal or moral truths (original sin being the favorite touchstone). Unfortunately, his predatory truths are often very partial formulae ineptly imposed upon the mystery and opacity of human experience and even less adroitly imposed on the literary work. This critical approach, even when it is done well, too often illuminates the Christian life or the Christian message and ignores the integrity of the literary work.

A third type of practitioner Mrs. TeSelle takes issue with, though not as severely, is the Christian thinker who writes about Christian aesthetics. Too often the writers of the Christian aesthetic have remained remote, abstracted from the specificity and concreteness of the aesthetic object. And too often the suggested aesthetic gets turned into a prescriptive formula, a formula sometimes "overprotective of the Christian soul."

The general problem is that each of these positions derives from a subtle Christian condescension which never really enters with radical openness into an intimate and honorable relationship to the literary work. The practitioners use the work of art for their own Christian sake, and in so doing vitiate the wonder and insight and pleasure the literary work offers us if we meet it with its own imaginative curves and angles, its peculiar style. Not that the theologian shouldn’t be interested in literary criticism. Mrs. TeSelle places a nettle in the theologian’s hand when she says: The theologian ought to prod literary critics into doing the sort of criticism that has always been the glory of the profession — the criticism that dares to guess what a work says through the way it says it. And the theologian ought then to take these results as directions for his theology of culture, as indications for the sort of comment and critique that the Christian faith will make to "the spirits" of the times. (pp. 52-53)

That is why, according to Mrs. TeSelle, a healthy "theory of literature," though it may be generally informed by Christian presuppositions, need not be intimately dependent on Christian doctrine at all. Rather an adequate approach to the literary work will account for the phenomenon of aesthetic experience, the experience of actual literary works, and an understanding of the function of literature in the total human enterprise. And these free floating elements are accessible to all human beings, Christian or otherwise.

Using a phenomenological methodology and her familiarity with the modern novel as takeoff points, she carefully elaborates on her approach and patiently concludes that effective literature disrupts the dull stereotypes and the ordinary continuum of human experience. It arrests our concentration in moments of absorption and wonder. It carries us through the nooks and crannies of the limits and possibilities of human destiny, leads us through the pressures and complexities and ambiguities of self-definition, presents us with a simulacrum of reality and points us to a higher reality by serving the special role of "awakening our faculties of perception and of revising our ways of looking at things."

Mrs. TeSelle’s conclusion about the final and special role that literature fulfills in giving us "new sight" is not new, nor is her use of careful critical literary method. What is fresh and valuable about her line of reasoning is the way she uses her sustained arguments in a single unfolding context to place continual pressure on the Christian in his humanity to develop adequate literary criteria for evaluating a novel or poem or play.

In the second half of her essay, Mrs. TeSelle attends to the relationship between literature and the Christian life, confining herself to a treatment of the Christian life from a perspective derived largely from her own immersion in and response to the New Testament. Her angle of vision sees the Christian life from four vantage points: the events that precede and give rise to the Christian life, the quality of the Christian life itself, the dilemma the Christian faces in realizing the Christian life in his own experience, and the possibility for guidelines for realizing the Christian life through literature. Reminding her reader once again of her primarily existential thrust, Mrs. TeSelle strengthens her basic argument by reinforcing her earlier distinction between literature and the Christian life. If the key idea in the first half of the essay is "literary wonder," the key idea in the second half is "Christian love." God’s love making its claim upon man, man’s love responding in discipleship to God. In our human experience the literary work brings us the possibilities for aesthetic action, for wonder, contemplation, knowing, and insight. Religious experience in the world brings us the possibilities for Christian love.

But because there is no necessary causal relationship between knowing and doing, the Christian can appropriate the insights he gains from aesthetic experience only by acting on the decisions he makes with the insights he has gained. Aesthetic experience, illuminating as it may be, may not contribute a single notion to the Christian disciple in the actual work of ethical decision and moral action. Why literature then? The Christian desperately needs the insights of the literary work lest his response as Christian in the modern world appear shallow or superficial.

Mrs. TeSelle urges us to understand: The New Testament, though an ample guide in terms of motives for discipleship, paradigms for action, and forms of instruction, does not provide us with a concrete, intricate, contemporary knowledge of the powers of the world and of the
Study of a Hero and Martyr

The name Hugo Distler, though not usually included among the greatest of 20th-century composers, is nevertheless very well known to choral conductors, organists, and church musicians, particularly within the Lutheran tradition. Hence Larry Palmer's new book, Hugo Distler and His Church Music (Concordia, $5.75), is most welcome; it is the first study of his life and work to appear in any language.

Judged by the worth and extent of his music alone, Distler would have a secure place in the history of the music of our time. He produced a large quantity of choral music, the best of which appears in the repertoire of the leading choirs of Germany, Scandinavia, and America; his modest output of organ music, from the easy 30 Spielstuecke to the virtuoso partitas on Nun komm, der Heiden Heiland and Wachtet auf, are perhaps the most original and idiomatic music for that instrument to come out of Germany since Reger; and his works include piano music, chamber music, and a concerto for harpsichord and orchestra which, in the judgment of William Austin's Music in the 20th Century, "may well transcend both time and place."

But Distler's claim upon our interest is strengthened by the tragic circumstances of his life and death. His strong sense of vocation as a church musician inevitably brought him into difficult times in Hitler's Germany of the late 1930's and early 1940's. As the state's oppression of the church grew more intense, Distler's sensitive disposition made him unable to find a tenable modus vivendi. In 1942, at the age of 34, he committed suicide. To the musicians who recognized his genius, and to the churchmen who saw in him the promise of a new golden age of church music, rooted like that of Schuetz and Bach in the Word of God, Distler after his death became a martyr and a symbol. Knowing the composer's fate, who can resist investing a choral work like Ich wollet, dass ich deheine weber with a measure of poignancy? Thus Distler, like Alain in France, also a World War II casualty, is for many not only a great creative spirit but a hero as well.

Dr. Palmer has undertaken this biographical study with great thoroughness. While a graduate student he became interested in Distler's music and decided to make it the subject of his doctoral dissertation at the Eastman School of Music. In the course of his research he travelled to Germany, where he interviewed Distler's widow and examined Distler's papers and other items in the Distler archives in Leu-beck. There seems to be little reason to doubt that the picture given here of Distler's life is accurate and comprehensive.

The portion of the book devoted to Distler's music covers only his organ works and his sacred choral works. Though one cannot criticize an author for not doing something he never intended to do, it does seem unfortunate that Distler's secular choral music, especially the excellent Moeurke-Chorliederbuch, and his small instrumental output could not have been included in this study, in order to give the reader a comprehensive survey of the composer's work.

Palmer's treatment of Distler's music is descriptive, rather than analytical or critical. One may justifiably raise the question of the relative value of this approach in writing a study of a composer's works. A brief example of the author's descriptive style, chosen at random, follows:

The instrumentation for this work [the cantata Nun danket all' und bringet Ehre] dispenses with winds, and utilizes four strings (with an optional contrabass) and organ. The first, third, and fifth stanzas of the chorale, all set to the same music, are printed in hymnbook fashion, one under the other. After a brief, 2-page prelude, the first stanza is sung. The second stanza, for soprano solo, is accompanied by the organ, the first violin, and the cello, which serves the function here of a basso continuo instrument. . . . (p. 132)
panied by the organ, the first violin, and the cello, which serves the function here of a basso continuo instrument. . . (p. 132)

Two types of reader will read this description: the musical layman, who lacks the background to understand what a piece of music thus described would really sound like, and the musical initiate, who, though he can grasp something of the externals of the piece of music under discussion, soon finds that such descriptions read too much like a catalog to regain his active interest. Since most of Distler's chorale and organ scores are readily available, it seems unnecessary to describe them all in detail. Of greater interest, perhaps, would have been a topically-arranged analysis of Distler's musical idiom and his text-setting. Comparisons with other composers' works would have added depth to the study. Not that these features are totally absent from the book; analytical comments and comparisons are made, but they are buried under a mass of description, and it is rather difficult for the reader to pull them together into a cogent impression of Hugo Distler's style.

That the salient features of Distler's music have not evaded the author, however, is clear from the summary which appears near the end of the chapter on chorale music, a statement which could hardly be improved upon:

As has been repeatedly shown, Distler's art was definitely a vocal one; further, his life and work were inseparably bound up with the destiny of the church. He was more than a musician in his sacred music: he was a preacher of the Gospel, a tonal composer. The tonal language he employed, the mixture of impressionism, archaic influences, the pentatonic scale, his predilection for pedal points, for rhythmic subdivision, the Baroque-flavored embellishment and ornamentation — all this combined gives his music something individual and recognizable. Distler remains Distler, and none of his contemporaries or successors has achieved the earnestness and ecstasy, the jubilation of his melodies and the spiritual depth of his text settings, or the idiomatic uses of the human voice that Distler achieved. (p. 147)

In his final chapter, "Distler's influence in Europe and America," Palmer wisely does not try to push his point too far. It is interesting that, almost simultaneously with the publication of this book, an interview entitled "Recol­lections of Hugo Distler" appeared in Church Music 67/2, in which a Distler pupil, John Bend­er, states: "But in respect to composition I do not believe that there are any 'successors' of Distler in the United States." Richard Win­horst, one of the composers cited in this final chapter, did not become familiar with Distler's music until comparatively recently. Yet some of his earlier works strongly resemble Distler's style. Wien­horst's music of the 1960's has moved into a style rather far removed from Distler's: what, one wonders, might have been Distler's style of the 1960's, had he survived?

Of unusual interest is the listing in an appendix of the programs of 38 musical vespers services at the St. Jakobikirche in Luebeck during the time when Distler was organist there. Many of Distler's works received their first performances in these services. The literature performed, largely German but ranging from Renaissance to modern, gives the reader an excellent overview of the type of musical fare which nourished Distler's creative powers.

There are many fine features in this very readable book. Though it still leaves room for further critical study of Distler's musical style, it is a valuable document for the student of church music, and a volume which Distler's many admirers will receive with keen interest.

PHILIP GEHRING

WORTH NOTING

Modern German Literature, The Major Figures in Context

By Henry Hatfield (St. Martin's Press, $6.95)

In the space of 149 pages Professor Hatfield endeavours to sketch out the course of German literature from the 1880's to the present day, to analyse some of the major authors' works, and to show something of the philosophical, social, and political background of the period. The scope and variety of the literary movements covered within this relatively small book and the sheer number of authors, philosophers, and critics mentioned (294 indexed names) make one wonder whether the project was not over-ambitious for a volume of this length. The encyclopedic quantity of detail offered both in the text and in the notes in the back of the book suggests that the work was intended for the person who has more than a passing interest in modern German literature.

It is apparent that in organizing his material Hatfield struggled with the problem only too familiar to any professor who has worked out contemporary literature. They recognize the difficulties and dangers of a marriage where the adjustment of religious beliefs and practices must be added to the many other adjustments that have to be made in marriage. Nor do they minimize these difficulties and dangers. They especially warn against the danger of resolving the religious difference by settling for religious indifference.

This is, in the best sense of the term, a "how to" book. It gets down to such practical matters as how to cope with the problem of relatives who didn't approve of the marriage in the first place, compromises that have to be made in the home, the touchy matter of birth control, and the almost equally touchy matter of the religious training of the children of a Protestant-Catholic marriage. There is an appendix of prayers acceptable to both Protestants and Roman Catholics.

JOHN STRIETTELMEIER

Protestant-Catholic Marriages Can Succeed

By Paul and Jeanne Simon (Association Press, $3.95)

One can hardly quibble over the title of this book. If a thing has happened, it obviously can happen. And anyone who has enjoyed the hospitality of the Simon home down in Troy, Illinois, knows that it is not only a happy home but one where, in the words of the old hymn, "Jesus Christ is all in all." The authors thus speak with authority. And what they have to say can be both comforting and instructive to that growing number of young people who have found that love will not be bound by denominational lines. They recognize the difficulties and dangers of a marriage where the adjustment of religious beliefs and practices must be added to the many other adjustments that have to be made in marriage. Nor do they minimize these difficulties and dangers. They especially warn against the danger of resolving the religious difference by settling for religious indifference.

NOTE: Concordia Publishing House has published a collection of fifty brief meditations on Biblical texts by John Strieltelmeeier. The title is Off-Keyp Praises. The price is $1.75.

February 1968
Early in December one of our Milwaukee newspapers reported that a Milwaukee alderman had “favored open housing but he rejected a legislative approach to it.”

Actually the alderman’s statement is a kissing cousin of the favorite expression thrown about so loosely by so many opponents of fair housing: “You cannot legislate morality.”

In assuming that fair housing is a moral matter, the anti-fair housing people who exploit this phrase are really saying that morality is a matter of the heart.

The average citizen likes to hear this phrase, especially if he is against fair housing, because it does have a kind of halo above it. How can anyone deny that true morality is a matter of the heart?

Preachers and religiously oriented people like to talk about this morality that resides down deep in the heart where it counts. Often ministers in Milwaukee have risen to the defense of their anti-housing friends with passages from the sacred literature. There are passages that sound good at this time. For example, there is Matthew 6:7: “And in praying do not heap empty phrases like the Gentiles: for they think that they will be heard for their many words.” Or Matthew 8:21: “Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my father in heaven.”

I too believe that true morality resides in the hearts of men. I too believe that these passages amount to an encouragement to fix morality in man’s heart.

Except this is not what we are talking about when we deal with fair housing legislation. We are not talking about the City of God on the Hill where true morality does prevail.

On the contrary, we are talking about the City of Man in the Valley where true morality does not prevail. In this arena where good and evil wrestle for the heart of man in a real world, and where evil so often wins the victory, the leaders of society, like our Milwaukee aldermen, must be interested in regulating the external behavior of man in spite of what man thinks in his heart. Perhaps society through its agents must resort to such legislative regulation of fair housing, as it must with so many issues, because society simply dares not trust man to act morally of his own volition.

Because of the potential for evil and for self-interest in man, because of man’s proclivity to demonstrate little interest in the plight of the disadvantaged, the agents of society, like our aldermen, must force man to act according to at least the minimal standards of justice.

But suppose we take this proposition seriously for the moment: “You cannot legislate morality.” Suppose I apply it seriously as a universal to other aspects of man’s economic conduct. For example, I am about to buy a house. In negotiating for this house I am very serious about contractual agreements. When the real estate man sells me the house and I agree to pay him for the house, I expect both of us to keep this bi-lateral agreement. I think that contract ought to be honored. But since I am not in favor of legislating morality, I am not for contract law. Let the matter be decided in our hearts where true morality resides.

The same goes for zoning laws, laws against vandalism and the destruction of property, provisions for garbage pick-up (a big item in Milwaukee), and for the payment of debts.

As a matter of fact, why do we need legislation or legislators at all? Let true morality rule.

Granting that there are areas that legislation does not reach in the private domains of man’s inner life, surely these people must admit that a society that relies on the presence of true morality would not be run very well. The only basic issue can be: what kinds of restrictions will the alderman cited above hold still for?

It is possible that our Milwaukee alderman thinks easily and quickly of legislative control when he thinks of protecting property. It is also possible that he thinks of true morality as the legislator when he thinks of the rights of man.

Our alderman ends up really becoming a constitutional problem: he has become an obstacle to the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment: “No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Strangely enough, and this might come as a surprise to the Milwaukee alderman, the Constitution (that is, constitutional morality) does not enforce itself, especially not in a contrary community.

Maybe it boils down to this: for some reason or another, our Milwaukee alderman bucks at legislation that prevents discrimination based on race, color, creed, national origin, and national ancestry.
The Mass Media

The Play's The Thing

By DON A. AFFELDT

Jackie, it seems, has tired of Lord Harlech. The details of the rift are still somewhat obscure, but they say it happened near Angkor Wat, when the noble twosome was doing the Cambodian scene. And so dies—perhaps—the hope once nourished in many a commoner's breast of an eventual merger of the New and Old World royalty. But then, there's always that handsome, fatherly Spaniard waiting in the wings for the nod of the American Queen.

If Jackie's peregrinations and incipient romances are watched most carefully by millions of people around the world, those millions of people are not engaging in an unaccustomed activity. Most of us have a lively curiosity about the lives of people who seem important to us for whatever reason. One might generalize the point and say that for each of us there exist any number of people about whom we are desirous of obtaining as much information as possible.

But that generalization, I think, needs qualification. We want to know lots of things about the private lives and emotions of lots of people, but it makes a difference to us how we get the information. No piece or kind of information is unwanted (about certain people), yet we do not care for the information unless it is gotten in a certain way. All of which suggests, of course, that it is not knowing about certain people that is of interest to us, but rather finding out about certain people. The chase is all-important; the quarry, once cornered, is killed without excitement.

The thrill of the information hunt does not obliterate the sporting instinct in most of us. There are rules, after all, and these rules function as much for the pleasure of the hunter as for the protection of the hunted. Accordingly, when the information we would be pleased to get in other ways has been gotten for us in unsportsmanlike fashion, we genuinely feel that we'd have been happier not to have gotten the information at all. For example, the day after the Silver Bridge disaster in December, a CBS television crew invaded the hospital room of one of the survivors for "an eyewitness account." OK; we want to know just what happened, and perhaps even how it felt to one who has lived through it and come out on the other side. But when the camera lingered too long, and when the interviewer felt constrained to inquire about the whereabouts of the wife and young daughter in the car with the man, and when, confronted with lights, camera, microphone, and millions of eavesdroppers, the man was driven to answer, "They're still at the bottom of the river, I reckon"—then we cry out against the disgusting taste of an interviewer and his editors who parade this man's personal anguish through our living rooms as if his suffering were the performance of a trained animal. We cry "Foul!" just because the man is at the mercy of the television news team; he hasn't a chance to protect the privacy to which we think him entitled.

But it would be a mistake to conclude—from our unquestionably genuine disgust at the spectacle of a man's personal grief being trivialized by forcing him to speak of the cause of his anguish—that we are highminded defenders of some selfless principle of personal privacy. For the fact of the matter is that we would have been very interested indeed to read of this man's agony were he to have written it up for Life magazine. The whole history of popular interest in biography, autobiography, and revelatory writings of one sort of another attests to the general lack among the populace of principled beliefs in privacy. And if our desire to know the depths of other people is not sated by finding out about the lives of interesting living and dead people, we turn to books and stories about people who never lived, fictional subjects, and consume with avidity the most intimate details of their activities. But to say that our curiosity about these matters is not bounded in extent is not to say that our curiosity knows no bounds. We do not want to know about a man's anguish if he does not want to tell us, and if he gives no indication of wanting to tell us. Our snoopiness stops when the other party does not want to play the game.

Jacqueline Kennedy does want to play the game, though she makes some animadversions about it every so often. She sometimes judges badly, and not uncommonly wants to eat her stroganoff and have it too. She wanted, for example, to have a book written about her husband's murder, but when she decided to give her cooperation to William Manchester her decision fell victim to second thoughts on the matter. As a result, the American public quite properly lost some respect for Jackie, because she obviously had a hand in the enterprise and yet claimed, at the end, that she had not wanted to say some things which once she clearly did willingly say. She called the tune, and we were right to call her down when later she wanted to change the tune. If she had really wanted to keep all the details of her grief to herself, we'd have respected her privacy. But it's very hard indeed to respect the privacy of one who repeatedly betrays herself as a person who would be quite unhappy if she were a truly private citizen.

The play's the thing. If we find out the crucial fact about the king-for-the-moment, we rest content. But if the king has done nothing to entice the play, we'll let him alone with his facts about himself.
Cum Christo in Pace

Any ringing of the telephone before 8:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m., I have learned, is to be heard with foreboding. . . It always brings bad, unusual news . . . and too often my first echo of the rustling of the wings of Death . . .

It happened again this morning. . . At 7:40 the telephone rang: “Walter Hansen died last night. It was sudden and unexpected. The funeral will be on Friday afternoon.” I found myself staring at the clock on the wall . . . . Another friend had moved beyond the tyranny of time . . .

Few people know Professor Walter A. Hansen well. . . . Shy, quiet, a remarkable classical scholar, a competent musician, a first-rate critic of music and books, he lived his life in a cycle between classroom, study, and concert halls. . . . From 1937 until 1966 he had been the music critic of The Cresset and had written of men and music with unfailing charm and grace. . . . Our readers quite regularly disagreed with him, but none ever questioned the thoughtfulness and discernment of his judgment. . . . In our uncritical and tolerant age he could spot a phony two miles off Broadway or Michigan Avenue in every direction. . . . If the term “Renaissance man” were still viable in our day of knowledge explosions many of his friends would have applied the term to him. . . . His appraisal of the world around him — in literature, the arts and public affairs — was always in depth and breadth . . . .

These obsolescent qualities made him a member of an almost vanishing breed — not the pedantic nit-picker who counts the adjectives in the Iliad or establishes the nature of Falstaff’s drinking habits (although the latter task would have intrigued him) — but a man whose consuming interest was man in all his wisdom and madness, the strange bewilderment of horns and pipes and cymbals which man calls life . . . .

And so Walter Hansen embodied the strange and rare fusion of the artist and the scholar. . . . His translation of Werner Elert’s monumental Die Morphologie des Luthertums (The Structure of Lutheranism) was not only accurate but also a sensitive recreation of the thought of the great German theologian. . . . I well remember one rainy November night when he told a few of us of the trials of a translator. . . . The great difficulty in translating, he said, lies in the fact that the translator knows well the nuances, the undertones and overtones, of a word in the original, but can find no possible equivalent in the language of the translation . . . . That particular evening he was worried (that’s the exact word) over translating one of Elert’s key phrases “der evangelische Ansatz”, he himself had examined and rejected a dozen different renderings and had finally translated it “The Impact of the Gospel”. . . . Walter’s scholarly modesty and agony are reflected in the fact that he places the original “Der evangelische Ansatz” in parentheses behind the translation and then writes a long footnote to apologize for a possible mistake. . . . This is the scholar at work. . . . a relentless embodiment of the passion for truth . . . .

It was in music, however, that Walter found his highest joy and greatest fulfillment. . . . He listened to it, in concert hall or at home, with all his mind and heart. . . . Many of us must be content with an emotional reaction, a passivity which permits Bach or Beethoven to flow around us and lift life momentarily a step nearer the choir of angels . . . . For him it was also that — but in addition he had the intellectual joy of knowing why Bach suddenly changed the key of a prelude or Beethoven introduced a series of inverted chords. . . . That joy is not for the dilettante . . . .

It is good to inquire why some of us who knew Walter Hansen were drawn to him so strongly and warmly. . . . One reason I have indicated here — he was like a voice from another world now lost in the winds of the world’s confusion and pain. . . . By living and working as he did he showed that even today it is possible for a man to live culturally and intelligently with God. . . . He was (to use a worn term) a thoroughgoing Christian humanist. . . . In the modern and post-modern world this is now, lazily and contemptuously, considered impossible. . . . “Christian humanist” — to give both words equal weight creates a contradiction which provokes flight in either direction. . . . either to a stupid faith or to a stupid culture . . . .

Men like Walter Hansen prove that this is not true . . . . The true child of God can live securely in the temples of art . . . . In fact, when he does, he brings to life and history a new dimension . . . . a touching of the region which can be traversed only by a fusion of the inward and the outward which leads finally to the ancient peace which only they can know — and none can understand . . . .

And this alone explains the “Cum Christo — in pace” at the head of this “Nachruf”. . . . The last sum of Walter’s life was “Cum Christo”. . . . and we who hear dim music now can know that he hears it too — in the full and final ecstasy of God . . . .