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ABOVE: The pre-Columbian god Quetzalcoatl.

COVER: Eero Saarinen, Gateway Arch, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis, Missouri. 630' high, 630' span, stainless steel.
WHOSE CHILD IS THIS?

IF WE WERE IN A POSITION to confer an honorary doctorate for contributions to the field of elementary education, Albert Briggs, Superintendent for District Nine of Chicago would be our prime candidate. Any college or university would do itself proud to confer such a degree.

He is the man who announced last year that no eighth grader in his schools, who could not read at the sixth grade level, would have his diploma signed. Simultaneously, he announced that this year the eighth grade students would have to read at the seventh grade level (!) if they wanted their diplomas signed. Briggs, an ample, restrained man, simply noted that the decision had to be made some place, at some time. Now was a good time.

About 600 students were not given signed diplomas. And the furor was great—especially from teachers, Board of Education members, professional educators in the city and state, from every side, one might say—except the parents. Many of the parents knew perfectly well that if their children were crippled in the use of their mother tongue, they had no competitive chance in other areas.

And—wonder of wonders—with no big grants, no public relations program announcing a new program, by August more than 300 hundred of those students were competent to enter the ninth grade. It was estimated (at that time) that another 200 hundred would reach that level in another four weeks. What is this? They had been in school, with some of the same teachers, for eight years and could not read at that level, and yet, with a summer program, quickly arranged, they achieved that goal. Isn't that amazing!

With that simple decision, and with some simple implementation, “a new mood of excellence” has been established.

Naturally, there is a new summer program for this year in the Chicago system. At least twelve million dollars will be spent in special reading programs! What will come next? A multimillion dollar program for remedial reading in the freshman, sophomore, and junior classes in college?

It was surprising (and disappointing) to me that the vocal criticism came from the professional educators. Perhaps it is time to draw some conclusions from the state of affairs reflected in this situation.

Schools are contrived institutions of civilization. They are not native to the human condition. They are limited in what they can do—and they ought to be limited to do what the parents and the society invented them to do. They are not the family; nor are they the native soil for vocation of an enduring nature—except to the professionals. They are not the health center, the mental health center, the clothing center, the local restaurant, and the transportation arm of the society. Increasing aggrandizement in these areas—so ably advocated by the people who benefit from them—leads to incompetence in the main and chief task in geometric proportions. And what an incredible burden such encroachment puts upon the teaching staff! What a field for cancerous growth of cells gone wild for non-teaching people to be added to the staff—at salaries almost invariably higher than that of teachers!

The task of educating the children is given to the parents. Do they care about their children? Or, in relation to the children and the schools are they to be seen only as “taxpayers” whose show of care about their children is to be manifested chiefly in paying larger amounts of money to have “intermediate parents” tend their children in every area—except education? If the parents, in fact, do not care for their children, there are other agencies in the society that could aid or compel them to do their duty. The church has a wide range of options; the courts and police could be used for pressure; if the family is really in such deep difficulty, establish a legal agency for family life. But schools and social welfare agencies ought not be the ones who, without legal power, play at parenting.

There seems to be a disease, call it “high-schoolism” if you will, that administration in education is the place to be if one wants to be an “educator.” There, in administration, lies the prestige and honor, the money and the secretaries and offices, the clout, the decision-making forum, the “inner-ring” of the people who really “know” how children are to be educated. There, in the administration, the information is controlled; there the money is gathered and managed and spent. And now, teachers’ unions have learned how to join with the administration of the schools to put the pressure on the “taxpayers”—almost as if these “taxpayers” were no longer parents. It is time for parents and teachers to form a coalition against the teachers’ unions and the administration in order to nurture the delicate (and artificial) task of the teaching and learning appropriate to the school. One way to foster this teacher/learning task of limited scope is to tie the cost of living increase (and the increments in salary that award good teachers) to the performance of the pupils. Athletes have to perform in public; so do the musicians and drama students. Why should the student competence in skills of language and mathematics, the appropriate competence in the functions of citizenship?
and vocational skill escape such demands?

Part of the process of returning the education of the children to their parents (and to those teachers who, with the parents, will to educate the children) is returning the schools to a neighborhood enterprise. But how can that ever be done? Will our addiction to petroleum and our difficulty in enduring scarcity collide to reshape our thinking? If the amount of money spent on transportation were spent in buying books and equipment for local schools, they might not be caught with such outdated materials and limited facilities. And if the parents were engaged in the school process, the books and materials might more appropriately be filled with less clumsy language, with more exposition and less advocacy.

Now is the time for parents and families to bite into the first business of the schools: training a mind and a spirit to use the simplest and most basic tools of a civilization, its language, its work, and the mechanics of its life together.

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR'S NOTEBOOK

Valparaiso University is preparing itself to say farewell to Dr. A. G. Huegli, President, and to welcome Dr. Robert V. Schnabel as its sixteenth President. Dr. Schnabel has been the Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the Faculty at Wartburg College, Waverly, Iowa. He will assume the duties of President on 1 August, 1978.

The Cresset has a particular interest in this farewell and this welcome. Since taking over as President of the University, Dr. Huegli has served as the publisher of The Cresset. As with other affairs at the University, Dr. Huegli has persisted with a steady determination that The Cresset continue its existence and that its footing rest solidly on quality work and financial solvency. When days were bleak and many were advocating a decent burial for The Cresset, Huegli was tenacious. He wanted the magazine to be of service to other colleges and universities; he wanted high school faculties and students to have it at hand; and he wanted to serve the authors, poets, and artists by furnishing them a forum to address others. In this respect, he manifested toward The Cresset the same determination he manifested toward the University.

In the days of student and social unrest, declining student population, and economic fluctuation, he determined to consolidate the University financially and academically, and to make it a forum for informed opinion. The Cresset, its readers and writers, express a rightful gratitude to Dr. Huegli and wish him and his wife well in their new life.

As with the rest of the University, The Cresset awaits the arrival of the new President and welcomes him heartily.

"TOO SOON OLD and too late smart" is the way the editor feels about the resignation of Dr. John C. Gienapp, editor of the Department of Science and Technology for The Cresset. Dr. Gienapp has taken a position as Assistant Director for Graduate Medical Evaluation with the American Medical Association in Chicago.

On the one side, it is a pleasure and satisfaction to all who know Dr. Gienapp that he has found a position where he will put into practical use that sound learning and good judgment which are his. He was one of those who was left without employment when Concordia Senior College, Ft. Wayne, Indiana was transferred to Concordia College, Ann Arbor, Michigan. It must be traumatic for an established scholar and teacher to be cut adrift in such a manner. To my knowledge, he carried the burden with grace, befitting a man of faith.

On the other side, it is a distinct loss that his new position does not afford him time to do the kind of work for The Cresset that had begun to grow and blossom. Although the period of steady production for our journal was short, he had begun already to build an enthusiastic and loyal readership.

We are glad we could publish him in our pages and thereby assert publicly how highly we valued his work. We wish him well in the new position—and still hope to have materials from him from time to time.

THOSE SUBSCRIBERS WHO recognize even a bargain's bargain and thought to subscribe to The Cresset at the new rate (beginning with 1 September 1978) of $2.50 for two years, must learn (sadly) that the apparent bargain was nothing more than a printing error. The new rate, as indicated in the announcement below, is $8.50 for two years.

ANNOUNCING AN INCREASE IN SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Beginning with 1 September 1978, the subscription rates of The Cresset will be as follows: one year subscription, $5.00; two year subscription, $8.50; student rates, per year, $2.00. To this amount must be added $1.00 per year for foreign (i.e., overseas) subscriptions. While we have no pleasure in raising the price of The Cresset, we note how long the subscription rate has been held steady. We trust also that the reader concurs with our opinion that The Cresset still represents a bargain.
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS IS NATURALISTIC IN
that it derives the moral notions of good and duty from
natural functions. It is non-naturalistic insofar as Aristotle
believes there is a principle which discriminates between
natural functions, establishing that some are more
valuable than others. The naturalism of Aristotle’s
ethics, I shall maintain in sections 1 and 2 of this paper,
is unjustified and incoherent. I shall also consider, in
section 3, Aristotle’s claim that reason is the best
function; and in section 4 I shall deal with the tension
between this claim and Aristotle’s naturalism. In a final
section I shall relate these matters to the teaching of
virtue.

i Natural Functions and “the Good”

THE UNDERLYING CLAIM OF ARISTOTLE’S
ethics is that good is “that at which all things aim”
(1094a). The supposed justification for this claim is that
if actions did not have a final end, the desire for the end
“would be empty and vain.” This argument does show
that purposive action has an end; it does not show that
the end is good.

Aristotle does not justify his derivation of morality
from nature. Further, it is very plausible that natural
goals of things are opposed to the good. In the cases of
animate nature in general, of particular species, of
communities, and of individuals, natural functions
seem often to aim at something which is not good.

The function of nature in general seems to be the
“unconscious process of selection”1 for survival of those
creatures which are best adapted to their environment.
Insofar as this process is unconscious, “the course of
nature will appear to be neither moral nor immoral, but
non-moral.”2 But with respect to humans—conscious,
rational, and a part of nature—this process can easily be
viewed as immoral (if happiness is a moral goal). The
survival of the fittest, which is nature’s goal, necessitates
suffering and death for creatures, both human and non­
human. The result, however, that the fittest survive, is
of no moral significance. “It is an error to imagine that
evolution signifies a constant tendency to increased
perfection”3 even in the Aristotelian sense of a better-
functioning organism; the only function that nature
selects for is survival in a particular environment.

It may very well be our moral duty to work against
this cosmic struggle for existence. Instead of approving
of and participating in the suffering and death involved
in the survival of the fittest, perhaps we should work
toward “the fitting of as many as possible to survive.”4
There is no reason to call the inhumane struggle for
existence “good” or even acceptable just because it is
nature’s own.

In the case of particular species, too, the natural goal
may be survival and well-being, and this may not be
good. Homo sapiens, in the quest for its own survival
and well-being, has subjugated and in many cases
exterminated, other species and parts of the environment
itself. If we were to encounter other rational species
whose extinction would enhance our well-being and
chances for survival, our aggression might be rationalized
on grounds of “natural, manifest destiny of the race.”
Such success might, in fact, be the natural function of
any species, yet be morally wrong since it involves
injustice and unnecessary suffering.

Communities, too, may be said to aim at survival and

1 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (New York: New
American Library, 1958), Chapter XV.
2 T. H. Huxley, “The Struggle for Existence in Human Society,” in
T. H. Huxley: Selections from the Essays, edited by Alburey Castell
3 Ibid.
from the Essays.
well-being (Aristotle says “self-sufficiency”). This may be the real goal of political states, but it is not necessarily the moral good for them. The interests of different states will conflict and the good for one would be incompatible with the good for another. The good for a community may also be incompatible with the good for certain of its citizens, since they may have to sacrifice themselves for the state in one way or another.

If Freud and the psychologists of egoism are correct, each person naturally aims at self-pleasure. It just happens to be the function of a person to do this, motivated by the id. Again, however, this pleasure is not necessarily good, and might be morally bad when, as often happens, it interferes unjustly with the rights and happiness of others. Freud himself thought the natural functioning of a person was not morally good or even prudentially effective, since various functions in people work against one another.5

These examples show there is reason to doubt that the natural goal of something can be equated with the good. The natural goal of animate nature in general, of species, of communities, and of individuals appears to be self-centered survival and well-being. Not only is there no justification in equating natural goals with moral goods, but there is sometimes reason to consider such natural goals as moral evils.

IN ADDITION TO THE UNJUSTIFIABILITY OF the naturalistic derivation of moral goods and duties, such naturalism could not offer a coherent moral system without some way of evaluating various functions. There may be many natural goals at which a thing aims, but which are conflicting. To sort out the “real,” “true,” or “highest” good of a thing, some non-naturalistic principle would have to be employed.

For example, a person aims at activity in accord with virtue, and this is that person’s good (peculiar to that person). But there are other functions of a person which aim at different and incompatible goals. As well as aiming at virtuous activity, a person is a part of nature which has the overall goal of survival of the fittest. A person is also part of homo sapiens, and thus seeks the predominance of humankind. And a person is part of a community which also strives for its own well-being. As a member of these different groups, and as an individual, a person strives for various conflicting goals. Which is the true good and goal for a person?

When it is a matter of the functions of a person as an individual, Aristotle clearly says that the rational function is the best function rather than the vegetative or appetitive function (this will be considered further in section 3). But this cannot help us with respect to the present problem of the hierarchy of functions of a person as a member of different groups. A person’s function is rational activity—but this does not inform us as to which area of rational activity has priority. Should my rational activity calculate the means toward the goal of the political state of which I am a member or toward my own virtue as an individual? Or should I be willing to forsake both my personal virtue and my obligation to my community if I see a way of furthering the goal of all of humanity which is incompatible with these? My duty to a group of which I am a member may be prior to my duty (if any) to myself. Aristotle himself might agree with this, particularly in the case of an obligation to the state. Since he conceives that state as prior to the individual and the goal of the state “the most sovereign of all goods,”6 the individual citizen may have to forego personal good for this higher good. For example, the soldier may have to endure the rack to keep a military secret, and Aristotle specifically claims that a person cannot be happy on the rack.

In addition to these functions, a person performs the individual functions of life—perception, memory, calculation, and contemplation. How can we decide which good is “most sovereign” here? Naturalism can only give us a multiplicity of goods—from a multiplicity of functions—incompatible with one another but each just as “natural” as the other. To choose the highest duty and good from among such natural goals, an additional principle must be invoked to discriminate between goals. Nature itself does not give such priorities, it just reveals what is. The derivation of moral goods and duties from natural processes, then, creates confusions in moral judgments as well as being unjustified in the first place.

The Moral Virtues

ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF THE MORAL virtues is consistent with his view of the good as the natural process and goal of a thing. Hence it suffers from the same defect as his ethical theory in general; it is unable to show why a natural function is a moral good.

The significant functions of a person, according to Aristotle, are reason and the appetites. Reason is supposed to be the truly human function of a person, but the appetites must be accounted for as well. A person should satisfy appetites (because desiring is a natural function), but their satisfaction should follow a rational principle (since reason is the best function).7 Such ratiocinative desire and satisfaction is, in Aristotle’s view, moral virtue. Moral virtue is the good for a person with respect to both functions, reason and appetites, since it is the natural goal of their proper integration.


7 This implies that certain “bad” appetites will not be satisfied at all.

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Practical wisdom is the aspect of reason which calculates the means to the morally virtuous end of appetites. The morally virtuous end, which is the good for a person, lies in a mean between the extremes of excess and defect. With regard to my hunger, then, there is the proper amount that is good for me, and there is the possibility of eating too much or too little. On the basis of many factors, practical wisdom will then determine how to achieve this proper amount. The conclusion is that I should not eat as much as Milo (1106b).

But why should we consider this a moral good? Certainly I should not, prudentially, eat as much as Milo. But this is for the sake of my health, not morality. Of course, Aristotle wants to claim that health is a part of morality, but there is no justification provided for this connection. I could be strictly pursuing my own overall well-being, yet it would be meaningful to ask "am I doing right?" Even if we make the equation of virtue with proper functioning, there exists the insoluble incompatibility of certain natural functions.

ARISTOTLE MAKES AN ANALOGOUS MISTAKE in determining particular moral virtues. Supposedly practical wisdom should judge the proper feelings to have and actions to take, but Aristotle relies on social norms, not practical wisdom, in deciding particular excesses, defects, and means. His mistake here is to claim that the way some people feel and act in living the good life is how everyone should feel and act in order to attain a state of well-being for themselves.

For example, many people live a good life which in part is based on "wealth, gain, victory, honor" (1148a) and "good and pleasant things of this sort" (1147b). Part of their well-being is that they have achieved these things. But Aristotle makes the further claim that these things are "by nature" worthy of choice "in themselves." "Men are not blamed for ... desiring and loving" these things, "but for doing so in a certain way, i.e. for going to excess" (1148a). Supposedly someone could desire these things defectively (too little), but this would be at least prudentially bad since no one could really be happy without some wealth, victory, honor, and things of this sort.

But what can Aristotle bring forward to support the position that these are worthy "in themselves"? On his own view, moral virtues are those things that are good for a person. How can any pleasure be worthy of choice in itself? At best, Aristotle could claim to know an invariable appetite among people for such pleasures and that these pleasures are uniquely fulfilling. But in fact these appetites are not invariable. In the centuries following Aristotle, the Epicureans, Stoics, and Christians all claimed to live the good life without desiring wealth, gain, victory, and honor at all. Epicurus even shunned sex to achieve his good life, whereas Aristotle says sex is one of the necessary pleasures.

What will Aristotle say to these people—that they are deceiving themselves—that they are not really living a good life because they are not fulfilling their natural functions? Aristotle does not claim a priori knowledge about the good for people; he observes the good lives of people around him to determine human functions and goals and therefore human goods. If we do the same now, observing the evidence available, most of Aristotle's moral virtues must be abandoned as guides to the good life for all persons.

In the considerable advances of psychology and anthropology of the last 2,000 years, we have learned of an indefinite number of ways in which people can live fulfilled lives. Although people everywhere are still generally concerned with the same kinds of virtues and vices of which Aristotle speaks, almost every culture has a different mean with respect to temperance, liberality, ambition, good temper, etc. And some cultures, as mentioned above, declare certain "essential" passions and actions (e.g. wealth, honor, victory) immoral and debilitating to whatever extent they are loved. Conversely, other cultures consider as good some actions and passions which Aristotle declared are "themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them" (1107a). For example, theft was a virtue for Spartan boys; adultery is a virtue for Eskimos; shamelessness concerning bodily functions is a virtue among certain South Pacific and Southwest American Indian cultures.

Aristotle thus makes the mistakes of (1) deriving the moral "ought" from what is and (2) deriving the prudential "ought" from what is.

iii Vegetative, Appetitive, and Rational Functions

ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE, THE GOOD FOR a thing is its goal—its proper functioning. An individual's functions are vegetative, appetitive, and rational, yet Aristotle wants to claim that reason is a person's "true," "proper," and "best" function. Therefore, according to Aristotle, "the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle" (1098a). And "human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with [the best and most complete] virtue[s]," i.e. rational virtues.

I do not wish to argue that reason is not the goal and the good of a person. I do want to object that Aristotle has no grounds for so claiming. I shall consider and rebut four reasons that are or might be given by Aristotle to show that rational activity is the true function of humans.

(1) It might be argued that reason is the most pervasive function of humans. This is simply false. The appetitive function is more pervasive. Usually when we are being rational, it is ratiocinative desire; only when we are being purely contemplative is the reasoning functioning without the appetitive function. And very often the appetites are functioning without the reason.
The vegetative function is still more pervasive. Our bodies are always in the process of some metabolic functioning, even while we are asleep or unconscious and thus when we are not appetite or rational.

But even if reason were the most pervasive function, this would not make it the “best” function. We would have to take into account our predominantly rational natures in order to live a good life, but this would not make vegetation and appetite less valuable functions.

(2) Reason is the pleasantest function. This is perhaps true, but it does not follow from this that reason is the true or highest function. If reason is good because of the pleasure it gives, reason would be an extrinsic, not an intrinsic, good. Aristotle’s claim would then amount to the equally unjustifiable “pleasure is a person’s true function.”

(3) “Reason more than anything else is man” (1178a). That is, reason is peculiar to humans and so the virtue that is peculiar to humans will be rational activity. This may be so, but it is still legitimate to ask why our true and highest good is the one that is peculiar to us. People have a function that other creatures may lack, but this does not entail the superiority of that function. What principle determines vegetation and appetite as lower functions simply because they are shared with other organisms?

(4) Reason is the best part of a person. This may be true also, but it only begs the question a little more directly than #3 above. Why is reason the best part of a person if goodness is determined by a thing’s function? The principle that proper functioning is goodness can never, by itself, assign a priority in value between two functions. If people are vegetative, appetitive, and rational, then a naturalistic moral philosophy such as Aristotle’s can only tell us to do all these things well in order to live a good life. It cannot consistently ignore or subordinate certain functions—such as vegetation and appetite—which are just as natural, and even more pervasive, than reason.

Aristotle does, however, maintain the supremacy of reason. The naturalism of Aristotle does not allow—and even forbids—priority of one natural function over another, but the clear tendency of Aristotle throughout the Ethics is to invoke a covert, non-naturalistic principle which exalts reason as a person’s best function. And not only is this the best function, but the other functions, however natural, are to come under the jurisdiction of reason. Thus, with a minor but recurring qualification (that virtue must involve personal well-being), Aristotle believes that human good is not, strictly, natural functioning, but “activity of the soul in accordance with [the best and most complete] virtue,” reason alone.

The naturalism of Aristotle’s ethics is unwarranted and incoherent. There is, however, this other rationalistic tendency in Aristotle which is at least equally strong and stands in opposition to his naturalism. This emphasis on rationality is less objectionable than the naturalistic element.

DESPITE THE EMPHASIS ON REASON, ARISTOTLE’S reluctance to completely abandon naturalism is manifest in his conviction that morally, the most praiseworthy life will be the happiest (this includes the agent’s prudential well-being). The man on the rack cannot be happy (1153b). Aristotle clings to this notion despite his overwhelming emphasis on reason as the highest function in a person. To consider happiness and virtue, let us compare the virtuous person with the continent person.

The virtuous person does not just do acts of a certain kind, the agent must be in a certain condition. Namely, the agent must choose the acts “for their own sakes,” from a rational principle. Also, “his action must proceed from a firm character.

The continent person has “strong and bad appetites” (1146a) and so cannot be, strictly speaking, virtuous, since the person is not completely happy. It is understandable that the continent person is not prudentially happy; this person has to struggle against desires which are felt and which get in the way of happiness. Thus the continent person would be able to restrain himself from hitting someone in anger, but life would be a little less pleasant since he has to deal with this passion. Supposedly, then, the continent person’s actions, although just, do not proceed from a firm character; the continent person must rely on some device to control passions (such as choosing to emulate virtuous people, or “forcing oneself to be rational”).

But if the continent person over a long period of time comes to habituate himself to acting by his rational principle, is not this then his character? He is, after all, abiding by the result of his rational calculations. Despite his inclinations, he is a good person. Of course, if he continues to have to struggle against bad appetites, his life is going to be more difficult—and thus not as happy—as the “virtuous” man. But the praiseworthiness of his life lies in doing the right thing for the right reason. This may even be seen as action “from a firm and unchangeable character”: the continent person may be said to have a firm and unchangeable continent character.

Aristotle might contend that beyond causing unhappiness, strong and bad appetites are partially blameworthy. To the extent that reason can alter the appetites themselves, the continent person can be blamed for having bad inclinations. But built into the concept of the continent person is his adherence to the calculations of reason. And reason would instruct him to change his bad appetites insofar as he is able. Insofar as he cannot change bad appetites, the continent person may be unhappy, but he is not therefore blameworthy.

9 “It is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue” (Ethics 1144b).
The virtuous person and the continent person are thus the same, morally, even in their deciding from character. Doing the right thing for the right reason, in character, they are both praiseworthy (perhaps the continent person is more praiseworthy in that he is working harder to do right). The only difference between them is non-moral: the virtuous person is lucky in not having bad appetites which could not be changed, the continent person is unlucky in having such bad appetites.

The continent person is thus not morally or even prudentially blameworthy for his unhappiness, and the “natural goal” of happiness seems unrelated to moral matters.

If Aristotle is to remain true to his belief that reason is the highest and best function, he will have to abandon his demand that prudential happiness is a necessary part of virtue. Reason may command, for example, that a person undergo suffering to serve the state. If reason is the best function, the person will be fulfilling the best function, and thus will be morally the happiest, when he is being rational. Subordinating his prudential concerns to reason, the man on the rack has achieved what is for him the highest possible harmony of functions. It may sound like “nonsense” to “say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good” (1153b), but he must have the greatest satisfaction if reason really is the best thing in us and other natural functions are to be subordinated to it.

V Teaching Virtue

ARISTOTLE SAYS THAT “IN EDUCATING THE young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain” (1172a) and thus mold their appetites and actions. Since “to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on character,” we can simply associate pain with bad appetites and get children to hate them, and associate pleasure with good appetites. Supposedly in later life they will begin to do these things on their own without having to be rewarded and punished.

Many people do in fact continue in later life what was earlier habituated, but this does not reveal virtue. After the actual reward and punishment has ceased, a psychological association of pleasure or pain with “virtuous” activity will remain to guide them. This shows conditioning; it does not show virtue.

The person may even be able to articulate the motive of “doing it for its own sake” or “just because it’s right.” This does not necessarily reveal virtue either. Much conditioning of children and citizens is accompanied by the verbalization “because it’s right.” Often the child or citizen is conditioned to repeat this rationalization unthinkingly, without deliberation and without virtue.

Virtue of character includes the “presence (and use) of the right rule,” and this cannot be taught by habituation.

A person can be informed of the appropriate rational principle for an action, but beyond this information, reward and punishment are useless in attempting to teach virtue. Virtue implies choosing for the sake of reason, the highest function, not for the sake of the pleasure or pain that may come to be associated with rational choice.

In agreement with this, Kant makes the claim that “morality must have more power over the human heart the more purely it is presented.”10 Not only is morality not acquired through habituation, but habituation by reward and punishment actually hinders the will from doing something for the right reason. If a child is rewarded for some action, the child will be more inclined to repeat that action. The incentive, however, is the desire for the pleasure involved, not because it is a right act. If the child or citizen is ever to acquire virtue and do the right thing because of a rational principle, he will have to ignore any pleasure or pain which has come to be associated with the choosing. The stronger the habituation has been, the more difficult it will be to dissociate the pleasure from the choosing. Although steering the young by the rudders of pleasure and pain is a convenient way to handle moral education (and at first necessary to control the rowdy and degraded11), “all admixture of incentives which derive from one’s own happiness are a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on the human heart,” as Kant says.

What, then, can be done to aid a child or citizen in learning to act from the right rule only? Other than non-emotionally explaining and discussing the right rule for the situation in question, we can only seek to avoid influencing the person with pleasure and pain.

“The mind should be left undisturbed till its faculties have developed. . . . Therefore, the education of the earliest years should be merely negative.”12 “Teaching virtue” amounts to creating a favorable environment in which the natural potential for rationality can manifest itself.

Very likely, it is fear of human nature as greedy and aggressive which causes us to steer the rudders of children and citizens with prudential reasons to get them to do right. This fear must be abandoned before rationality can emerge and guide peoples’ wills. Whatever “perverseness of human nature” may exist, we must believe there is in a person “an even greater disposition to become master of the evil principle in himself”13 so as not to disrupt the development of reason and virtue with rewards and punishments.

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11 Ibid.
FOR ANN CLOKEY: IN MEMORIAM
1974

We move backward
the circles our days make are broken—
we count breaths as if we could sell them—
the clocks have stopped—
yet now you have moved us
as Detroit or G.E. has not;
our eyes are loose in their sockets—
we hear your name
as we hear the final call—
we would pull away
but you hold us fast;
we would like to eat
but you devour us with aching—
we would call you "problem"
but our mouths are locked;

there are no words to cry out for you
there are no smiles to give away—
we are shattered by your going,
too fast,
too final,
before we could say "Ann . . ."
but racing, now, you
split the stars
pierce the roots of every Oak,
and pass over seas pressed against dark mountains—
and we sit with straight backs
easing our breaths into ourselves
like frightened birds—
we do not see you
breathing through Aspen trees;
we need to look!
catch the glint of your knowing
on the moss-smooth stones
in the bottom of the stream—
while all the ages gather together in you
we wait for the second hand to count
our days;
you are the air
we breathe;
you are our fingers as we reach for strength—
you are that infinite mark of self . . .
and a God we thought impossible
suddenly lives . . .
suddenly lives. . .
WHAT IS THIS TOUCH?

what is this touch
deep inside the bones
that runs like air
through the most secret part of me?

what is this tracing of hair
along the hollows
that catches at the star-glint
and fires me into a new person?

what is this sound that presses me against
some greater part or being
that marches here beside me
and will not let me be
will not let me alone
will not leave me . . .

what kind of life is this
that cannot do for itself
but must constantly constantly be reminded
that honey and locust is fare
for us all?

what is the purpose of these great talons
gripping my head
the wings beating above me
wrenching me
always moving, directing me
—ENOUGH IMMIGRANT GOD!

I say enough—

get your clean hands away from me . . .
take your robes and magic and go!
leave my mind whole or fragmented as it will
without your meddling

there is no peace
there is no peace
there is no peace
I cannot see ahead
I cannot hear words
I cannot find peace
I cannot
I cannot
I cannot . . .
help . . . YOU, GOD
YOU DELIVERER

YOU PEACEMAKER
YOU SALVAGE MENDER
YOU PLASMA BRINGER
YOU OAT SHAKER
YOU DRINKER, EATER, LIVER, THIRSTER, DRINKER
LOVER, DOER, YOU YOU YOU YOU

ENOUGH

the pulse runs slower
the arms lie perfectly await
the eyes see grasses move
and the breeze rises again . . .
WHAT IS THE SECRET OF YOUR LIFE?
What are you about, what are you after, what are you for?
If the truth of that were to be told, what would people learn about you?

Yesterday we suggested, on the basis of the second chapter of I Peter, which we are reading together in its entirety this week, that Easter is calling us to march to the beat of a different drummer.
That is to say, there is a hidden discipline to the Christian life. St. Paul says, Your life is hid with Christ in God.
Oh, if only that were the secret of our life. If only his drumbeat could be steadily in all our hearts.

Some of what that would be like is what this third chapter of I Peter is about.
Listen again, and dream a bit:
Wives, let the adornment of your hearts be of greater concern to you than the adornment of your bodies.
For what is very precious in God's sight is the hidden person of the heart.
Husbands, live considerately with your wife and honor her.
All of you, love one another as brothers and sisters.
Be kind and humble with one another. Do not repay evil with evil, but retaliate with blessing.
Keep from speaking evil. Strive for peace with all your heart.
Be zealous for what is right, even if you suffer for it.
In your heart reverence Christ as Lord, and do not fear suffering.
Keep your conscience clear.
See what beautiful lives Christians are called and enabled to live!

AND WHAT IF SOMEBODY NOTICES?
What if somebody says to you, Please, tell me the secret of your life.
Be ready, Peter says, to give an answer to anyone who asks you for an intelligible account of the hope that is in you.

Yes, what matters from now on is not your luck or your cleverness but your hope.

BAPTISM IS THE SIGN OF OUR HOPE.

It is our Noah's ark.
For baptism, both years ago and again this morning, is how our lives get hid with Christ in God.
Baptism is our appeal to God for a clear conscience.
We are baptized into the resurrected one, into the different drummer,
Jesus Christ, who died for sins once for all so that he might bring us to God.

What a precious secret!
What a beautiful life!
Happy Easter!

Thirteen can't be divided by six.
Leave the riddle of the world, go and wash a beggar with your own hands.

The first poem I wrote was about the sea, the strongest force that I knew.
Now I write of the human heart, stronger by far than the sea.

The boys picked a snow-white dove—a male.
In the bushes they cut off his feet.
It happened quickly, and the screaming stump-leg dove shot off to the blue of the morning!
Now he was sentenced to his wings.
When he finally tired to death, he tried to alight, many times! but the earth burned like fire.
It took a long time.
He died while flying, at night, and fell on a wet cliff.
I think, if all the cruelties of the heart were incarnate in doves—they would darken the light of the sun.

At the seashore you can't turn your back on the sea.

The heavy rain of darkness has gone to the bottom of the spring.
The little village sleeps.
I too will go to dreams to meet myself.
PUBLIC ART FOR TODAY’S PUBLIC

THE IDEA OF ART as a pivotal experience for a culture, society or community is not new. The sun temples and mortuary complexes of the Egyptians contained outdoor sculpture to command the attention and awe of their viewers. The Greeks sprinkled the Acropolis with statuary of mythological gods and heroes and adorned other public and private sites with images of politicians, thinkers and others who could afford to pay for their likenesses.

Our native Americans in pre-Colombian times built huge architectural sanctuaries to the plumed serpent god Quetzalcoatl, and their craftsmen gave him a sublimely terrible shape to visibly represent the invisible.

Today American artists continue to attempt to communicate the invisible and intangible through the creation of works of art. Many such works appear in our communities, laced with meaning and messages, harboring the artist's intentions and desire to communicate with us, yet failing to provide the hieroglyphics that frequently accompanied Egyptian wall paintings. In the past, understanding of a community's art was ensured by the existence of a society which shared the same religious, political, and socio-economic beliefs.

The great puzzle of Stonehenge, for instance, was no puzzle to the audience of its day, which worshiped the sun and understood the value of the giant stones in furthering that worship. Why, then, do artists today confuse us?

To begin with, we do not all share each other's convictions, tastes, and understandings. We come from different races, hold different and varied beliefs and values, and disagree about whom we vote for or where we go to church.

Because of what we are and who we are, we are critics of ourselves, of our neighbors, of the journalists who can't "speak plainly" and of the artists who can't "art plainly." The critical thinking in America that has surrounded the mounting of large-scale, frequently non-representational art in our communities, is one of the most positive intellectual exercises our society has undertaken in recent years.

The public has joined the ranks of the critics to express their own aesthetic and tastes, their views of the public good and public rights.

Often, as with art critics, public evaluation is negative. The critics' negative viewpoint, however, stems from the chic of knowing, the public's often from the fear of not knowing.

The sculpture erected on Fountain Square in downtown Cincinnati, Ohio in 1973 is a good example of how a community with varied tastes and thinking views and reacts to being graced by, or in some cases, subjected to, artistic efforts on behalf of their community.

West German Barna Von Sartory's sculpture bears a resemblance to the megaliths at Stonehenge, but her work of carved stone and man-made reflecting chrome is no contemporary sundial. "Law and Society," a 13-foot-high, 35 ton sculpture is referred to by some as a "masterpiece," by others as a "monstrosity."

It was the Fountain Square Sculpture Fund which decided to commemorate the 100th birthday of the Cincinnati Bar Association with a suitable work of art. Numerous sculptors competed for the commission. And some of the best judges of sculpture in the country went to Cincinnati to select the entry that best illuminated the theme of Law and Society.

At the time of its installation, several prominent Cincinnatians and the public were interviewed to investigate the divergence of opinion. Their comments run the gamut of sophistication, humor, pride, politics, and unadulterated confusion.

William J. Keating, U.S. congressman, said "Its true meaning is not readily apparent, Aesthetically, it isn't much. However, when one understands the purpose of the commission and the sculptor's intent, a greater appreciation is realized. The rough form of society supported by the solid, clearly defined base of law is an image which provides one with much food for thought."

"From this standpoint, it is a very interesting work."

A prominent Cincinnati attorney said "as a provincial lawyer, not
schooled in the arts, it would be arrogant for me to give my opinion."

One secretary asked, "Did the artist get his money in advance?"

A corporate executive asked, "Can they depreciate it?"

And a local artist stated, "I'd have done it for $12,500."

Whether a community can accept the artist's integrity of artistic expression and meaning is as complex a question as "Whom does the artist 'art for' in the first place—himself or his audience?"

Regarding that question, the very special art of Beverly Pepper stands out. The audience's feelings and hers are married in point and counterpoint. Her monumental outdoor sculpture Alpha emphasizes trust and retreat into space as the means of introducing experience into sculptural space and form to the viewer.

Pepper says: "I think I have found now what I really want, and most of it has come just recently from watching people participate in my work."

She knows some feel threatened by her huge sculptures, but others are comfortable with them. In Amphisculpture 1974-1975, she created from the existing natural landscape and human environment a sculptured work that would not only be an aesthetic experience for people living and working in the area, but one which would give added dimension to man in his perception of nature and his environment.

Pepper feels that working with sculpture for public places can be somewhat limiting, in that all of her excitement, questioning and creativity may be subordinated to the architect's building in the background for the piece or contradicted by the perceptions of the public.

Christo chooses to involve people in a totally different way than does Pepper. To focus on public controversy, taste, and level of public understanding, consider Christo's famed work, Running Fence.

Running Fence was the name given an 18-foot-high, 24-mile-long white nylon fence which Christo and his crews stretched through the hills of northern California, ending in the Pacific Ocean at Bodega Bay. But the fabric didn't go up without a few things being ironed out first—two court decisions, 17 public hearings, nine lawyers, $87,000 spent on permits and three years of dealings with ranchers and state and county officials who had trouble accepting a functionless work done for its own sake.

The role of art in society, historically and now, is the search for it. Artists consider the role of the viewer with varying degrees of sensitivity. Does not the viewer owe the artist some consideration of his artistic merit and concept as well?

Exploration and the desire to experience are the unique marks of an aware and intelligent society. Art, more than any other dimension of civilization, is the embodiment of humanistic values.

Manifest within it is the pulse of time, human thinking and the experiences which cut across the fabric of everyday existence.

Some accept the view that art can exist only as society's ornament—that it must be a pretty addition to all things which are essential. Art can never be merely life's "ornament," because it is the cumulative and real experience and thinking of a community—a community which today often represents a cross-fertilization of people, their ideas, and their critical inquiries into meaning, like, love, order, and existence.

What is the criterion for determining the legitimacy of housing and supporting a work of art in one's community? If we could reorganize society into neatly labeled little boxes, each full of like-minded people, perhaps the criterion could be "aesthetic unanimity." However, we have diverse tastes.

We can accept in our community the expression of someone else's artistic values, as we expect someone in another community to tolerate our values there.

"Critical inquiry" is therefore a much more valid criterion: in our pluralistic society we should support each other in the mutual quest to understand who we are.

This, too, has its historical artistic manifestations—and wouldn't the Greeks, the Egyptians, our native American ancestors, and the builders of Stonehenge, all be proud of how far we've come and how well we've done!
ANNOUNCING

OCCASIONAL PAPER: III

CONFESSION AND CONGREGATION

Edited by David G. Truemper

CONTENTS:

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   b) Robert C. Schulz, "Therapy and Absolution: Issues of Heali
   c) William H. Lazareth, "The Foundation for Ethics and the Question of the Third Use of the Law" (to study paper "c");
   d) Walter R. Bouman, "Piety in a Secularized Society" (to study paper "d");
   e) Robert W. Bertram, "Confessional Movements and the Formula of Concord Article Ten" (to study paper "e").

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POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE PRESS:

An Interpretive Essay on the Milwaukee Journal

THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL has ranked among the best ten newspapers in the country in every major listing in the last fifteen years. Yet those who read the newspaper regularly are aware that, besides its uncontested strengths, it has outstanding weaknesses. Both the strengths and the weaknesses are related to the political culture of Milwaukee and Wisconsin. The purpose of this essay is to explore the relationship between the paper and the political culture and, in particular, to show that the relationship is symbiotic, the paper and the culture each nourishing and sustaining the other. The Milwaukee Journal is one source of Wisconsin's unique political culture. But the political culture also helps to account for the strengths and weaknesses of the Journal.

The political culture of an area consists of the politically relevant attitudes prevailing in it. Two major themes prevail in the political culture of Milwaukee and Wisconsin. One is good government; the other is popular political participation. With respect to good government, Wisconsinites expect a high level of public service and are willing to pay for it; they expect honesty in government; and they dislike partisan politics and political patronage because of the incompetence and dishonesty which they believe party politics and patronage entail. With regard to popular political participation, Wisconsin affords its citizens frequent opportunities to vote: local elections are conducted at different times from national elections, and wide use is made of the primary election for local, state, and national office. Examples of the manifestation of these themes include the widespread employment of professional civil servants rather than patronage appointees in municipal and state offices; the facts that until recently the City of Milwaukee removed ashes from citizens' basements, and that to this day some suburbs plow residents' sidewalks in the winter; the fact that, like California and Michigan, both of which are much wealthier, Wisconsin maintains one of the three most highly regarded state universities in the country; the nonpartisan nature of local elections and the fact that, in order to prevent any political influence whatever, partisan or nonpartisan, on the Milwaukee Police Department, the Chief of Police is appointed for life; and the existence of spring primaries and fall primaries, spring general elections and fall general elections.

No doubt Wisconsinites take these facts for granted. Some of the phenomena, however, strike the newcomer as new and different. Indiana, for example, is like Wisconsin in that both states were parts of the Northwest Territory. But the political culture of Indiana is vastly different from that of Wisconsin. To cite one major difference, the Governor of Indiana has at his disposal several thousand patronage appointments, many of whose recipients contribute 2 per cent of their monthly salaries to the treasury of the Governor's party. Indiana is very likely an extreme example of a state in which partisan politics is important. Nonetheless its political culture is rather typical of the states of the East Coast and the Ohio watershed.

THE STATES OF THE EAST and the lower Middle West were originally settled for the most part by persons or the progeny of persons who had come to America from Great Britain in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. British politics at that time was the epitome of political patronage. It was not partisan in the contemporary sense, for political parties as they are known today did not begin to emerge in Britain until after the Reform Act of 1832. But the wheels of government were lubricated by patronage dispensed by the Crown and by local notables; elections were frequently bought; and members of Parliament often felt bound to look out for the interests of local patrons who saw to their election. One's sense of honor required loyalty to one's patron. Patronage politics with an

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May, 1978
element of honor, this was the heritage of the East and the Ohio watershed, and it has informed their political cultures to this day.

The foregoing is not to suggest that Wisconsin has had no experience with patronage politics. Covering the State Legislature as a reporter for the Milwaukee Sentinel in 1875, Lucius W. Nieman, who was to found the Milwaukee Journal seven years later, had ample opportunity to observe the influence of powerful lumbermen, railroad men, and bankers in the state capital. Yet two factors combined to produce a political culture in Wisconsin different from that of states to the south and east. Wisconsin was, in fact, severely exploited by these interests. Editor Nieman had found the represented in the exploitation Legislature. So great was the exploitation that a powerful impetus toward reform developed in the state, represented by the Progressive movement. The aim of the reformers was twofold: first, to clean up politics and place it in the hands of the people. The second aim, turning politics over to the people, gave Wisconsin Progressivism its populist cast. The other factor that contributed to Wisconsin political culture—besides exploitation and reform—was the cultural heritage of the people. Many persons who came to the state from Central Europe in the last half of the nineteenth century were accustomed to a professional civil service; one had been established in Prussia, for example, already in the eighteenth century. They came from a culture in which partisan politics was frowned upon as inconsistent with the public interest. Their views contributed to the desire for good government in Wisconsin.

WITH THIS BACKGROUND IT is possible to acquire a better understanding than otherwise of both the strengths and the problems of the Milwaukee Journal. First a word will be said about the Milwaukee Sentinel, the city's other daily newspaper; the rest of the article will be devoted to the Journal, which will be viewed in the light of the preceding discussion.

The Journal Company purchased the Sentinel from the Hearst Corporation in 1962; the paper had been losing money, and a strike in 1962 prompted Hearst to stop publication and offer to sell it to the Journal Company; the Journal Company accepted in order to keep a morning paper in the city, even though, by its own admission, it would as soon not have acquired the Sentinel. Hearst had already given the Sentinel a noteworthy typographical facelifting; the Journal Company gave it a respectability which it previously had lacked. The Sentinel retained its moderately conservative editorial policy and thus continued to counterbalance the Journal's moderate liberalism.

The Sentinel's major problem is that it has never been encouraged to be the paper it could be. The result is that, with the exception of its editorial page and complete stock-market quotations, the morning Sentinel contains little to distinguish it from the afternoon Journal. The division of labor which has proved feasible in some cities with two newspapers and a common ownership has never been effected in Milwaukee, because the Journal comes out in the afternoon, and is also the more prestigious paper. Like other afternoon papers, the Journal has an especially large circulation in its metropolitan area. Were the Journal a morning paper and the Sentinel an afternoon paper, the Journal could concentrate on national and foreign news and the Sentinel on local news. But because the Journal is an afternoon paper and the more prestigious paper as well, it feels obligated to cover the city thoroughly, even while reporting news of the nation and the world. In fact, it covers the metropolitan area so well, and is so unwilling to increase the space it devotes to news, that national and foreign news tend to be short-changed.

The Sentinel, meantime, is unable to increase its national and world news. It is doubtful whether the problem of adequate national and foreign coverage in Milwaukee is insoluble, although it would be easier to solve if the Journal were a morning and the Sentinel an afternoon paper.

With respects to the Journal, no reason exists to doubt its recurrent ranking among the country's ten best. Good journalism, as represented by the Journal, developed in Milwaukee as good government and popular political participation grew in Milwaukee and Wisconsin. The Journal took on the task of guardian and informant which newspapers must perform if democracy is to function as Wisconsinites believe it ought to function. Its role is traceable to its editorial policy, and its editorial policy and the political culture of the state exist in a relationship of mutual reinforcement. Much as the paper may have differed with Progressive politicians on specific issues, its sympathies clearly have lain with the principles of good government and popular participation.

Yet the Journal has problems, and these are partially, and indirectly, owing to its absorption of Wisconsin's commitment to "progress." Immediately, the problems are due to (1) a lack of competition; (2) a tendency on the part of the employees to view the paper as a business; and (3) general attitude. But these last two factors are traceable in turn to the belief, so long and so firmly held in Wisconsin, in the desirability and the inevitability of moral purification in politics and, by the extension, in reporting and commentary on public affairs.

The lack of competition produces a reluctance to change. The point can be illustrated with two examples, though others could be cited. The examples are included largely for reasons of human interest, though it is possible that the second helps to account for the continued uniqueness of Wisconsin political culture. When the author of this article arrived in Milwaukee nine years ago, the Journal was making headline references to the West German government as the Reich, even though the Federal Republic of Germany had been in existence for nearly twenty years. The reason was not sympathy with the former German Reich; the paper's position had been strongly Anglo-American since the First World War.
The reason was very likely a slowness to change. A letter from the author may or may not have been the stimulus, but shortly afterwards Journal headline writers began referring to West Germany by the shorter and more accurate "Bonn."

At that time, too, the Journal still continued its long-standing policy of refusing to publish syndicated columns, its reasons being that it had a responsibility to develop by itself the opinions it published—not entirely by itself, for its editorial writers read the columnists; but it would not publish them. The editor told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1951: "... we wouldn't trade one experienced reporter for all the syndicated columns that we could crowd into the editorial page of the Milwaukee Journal." When it finally became clear that much of the best writing on politics was being done by columnists, the Journal created an op-ed page, on which it prints a variety of columnists, including the conservative James J. Kilpatrick, to counterbalance its own liberalism. The result would be commendable if the reform had been carried out with firmer resolve. One still gets the impression that material is being filtered through the Journal's editors, for many columnists are virtually never published. Thus one may find oneself asking, Why, of all that James Reston has written in the last month, is this the item the Journal decided to publish? (The same sense of mind control is created by the practice of WTMJ-TV, the Journal Company television station and NBC affiliate, of showing "Meet the Press" at new and unusual times on Sundays, sometimes late in the evening—another modest change for the better. There were Sundays several years ago when one of the network's Sunday interview programs was to be seen in Milwaukee at any time, apparently because of scheduling conflicts and the station's assessment of viewer interests.)

THE EXISTENCE OF A TENDENCY on the part of the employees to view the paper as a business is unproved but highly probable, especially in view of the Journal's employee-ownership plan, instituted gradually beginning in the 1930s as the acme of progressive newspaper management. Today a large number of units of Journal Company stock are in the hands of employees. The Journal's advertising revenues have to be immense; the paper no longer ranks first in the world in advertising lineage, as it did in the early 1950s, but it still publishes a huge volume of advertising. Thus there may be a connection between the employees' attitude and the modest size of the news hole. If the Journal had more news space, the editors would not have to reject and trim news reports—especially background and interpretive pieces from the New York Times and Washington Post services—to the extent they do, and the Journal might stand a chance of ranking among the best four or five papers in the country, and not merely in the best ten. More generally, one is led to conclusions about the advantages for quality journalism of a single publisher with a large amount of stock and a commitment to excellence.

As for attitude, there is twofold cause for concern. First, it would be possible for the Journal's attitude toward current problems to be more constructive than it is. Every Progressive reform possible has been made in Wisconsin, and people are no happier than they were before. One thus detects a note of cynicism in the Journal. On a recent Sunday the Journal played up an article pointing out that the incidence of cancer in Milwaukee County is higher than in most parts of the country; the headline across the top of Page 1 read: "A City's Woes: Crime, Poverty and Now Cancer." It is as if the Journal, in its frustration over current problems, were shocking its readers as punishment for conditions they can do little about. One thing the Journal might do differently—in addition to avoiding such headlines—would be to emulate the Louisville Courier-Journal (that model of excellence in regional journalism) and publish a weekly page on developments in environmental protection and control.

Second, the Journal seems to be quite certain of its own quality and rectitude. One result is that it is less open to criticism than it ought to be. Its "reader-contact editor" writes a weekly column based on complaints from readers, but his task appears to be largely that of interpreting the paper to its readers. Another fact attributable to the Journal's attitude is its quarrel with the Mayor. Simply put, the Journal and Mayor Henry W. Maier are not on speaking terms. He is reluctant to answer its questions at news conferences, and it prints as little news of the Mayor's Office as it reputably can. The quarrel has several causes, but in part it seems to be a case of quality and rectitude in government confronting quality and rectitude in journalism. Were each side to approach the matter with good will and a willingness to recognize its own errors, the city might be spared more of what has become a municipal embarrassment.

In short, all is not well in utopia. The irony lies in the fact that, of all the states, one might expect Wisconsin to be the least morally perfectionistic in its demands on politics and journalism. After all, the two leading religious denominations are Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism, each with a strong element of Augustinianism, and neither under any illusions about the moral perfectibility of man. But is is hard to imagine a state whose political culture is less reflective of its religion. The explanation is not hard to discern. The people of Wisconsin, far from being populists of the anti-intellectual kind, have traditionally demonstrated a marked respect for the opinions of Progressive intellectuals, be they in politics, the state university, or journalism. And Lutheranism, never a religion to be concerned much with affairs of state, found its introspection reinforced by the wave of anti-German feeling in the state during the First World War. The result is two cultures, a religiously informed realism and a political Progressivism, with the people partaking to a large extent of both.
BERTOLT BRECHT would have celebrated his eightieth birthday this year. He died twenty-one years ago. Despite the tremendous publicity for Brecht's work on this occasion, no one will deny that a certain Brecht-tiredness has become noticeable, even with the most ardent Brecht followers. Many stage directors—let alone the public—are satiated with those Chinese and Indian parables and No playlets, full of folksy wisdom. Some of his better plays, such as Mother Courage and Galileo, have been seen too often. Literary critics who were once certain of Brecht's political prudence, now seem to recognize the sheep in wolf's clothes.

Brecht's influence on many writers was unquestionably great. Max Frisch, for instance, admits the tremendous influence Brecht had on him: “Brecht is the greatest theatrical talent in the German language, the most significant, most individual and consistently developed genius.” He wrote this after he had met Brecht in 1948. I wonder whether he would not tone down his eulogy today. Thornton Wilder also acknowledged Brecht's influence on him as a playwright. On the other hand, his trade mark, the “alienation effect,” has never quite worked on stage. Theoretically, it sounds convincing, and wherever Frisch adhered to it too slavishly, as in his play Andorra, it is dramaturgically ineffective. Brecht's Mother Courage works best where its emotional and not its epic message is strongest.

particularly Brecht's simplified, black-and-white political concept seems to be outdated. He always maintained that a play is a blueprint only. It may become necessary to apply this attitude towards his own plays and to rewrite them quite a bit. However, what holds out amazingly well are his poems. They still have the same power and freshness as in the twenties and thirties when they were written. It's a pity that Brecht is not known for his poetry as much as for his plays.

IT IS AS AMAZING as it is frightening to consider how quickly writers fall out of fashion, especially immediately or soon after their death. I remember quite a few writers of great stature who were read and loved and discussed when I was young and whose names are meaningless to any young person today.

Writers like Hemingway and O'Neill are no longer in the foreground of literary interest. I had to think about how fast the semi-classical dramatist O'Neill became a name of the past when I saw his More Stately Mansions in the Schauspielhaus in Zürich, an unfinished play that he did not wish to see on stage, but which his wife permitted to be produced in Sweden after his death. There were O'Neill fans in Stockholm where all of his plays were done; some had their world premiere there. Ragnar Gierow, the director of the Stockholm Theatre, cut about half of the play, and this is the version of the produced play which O'Neill conceived as one part of a long cycle of plays dealing with the fate of the family Harford lusting for power and losing their dreams and the dignity of life. A Touch of the Poet is the only drama of this cycle worth our while to stage and to be seen.

More Stately Mansions is a parable about greed, ambition, and power, about possession corrupting man. It is a dark, tragic picture of human disintegration. A young man romantically dreaming of a better world turns into a ruthless business tycoon.

Posession begins to possess him. It is no longer profit which interests him, it is just the feeling of having to have, a madness widening to the need of having to “possess” his wife and his mother who become two interchangeable figures. This is material for a great classical tragedy. However, only its first rough draft can be produced, with its long monologues, its often cryptic, sometimes redundant dialogues. It was well staged and acted at the Schauspielhaus, but it remains a clumsy, heavy-going drama whose magnificent gesture must be accepted for the final greatness that is inherent in this play.

OUR CONTEMPORARY stage directors seem to look at plays as mere blueprints waiting to be tampered with. No classic dramatist is any longer safe. Recently the theater in Stuttgart staged a new version of Molière's Tartuffe. Boos and bravos greeted the performance. One is now used to nudity, and the seduction scene between Tartuffe and Elmire was acted in a rather raw manner. The last act was full of political
innuendoes reflecting the present-day scene. Some time ago the director was branded as a sympathizer of the terrrists since he had collected money on their behalf.

With Molière's help the director hit back at the right-wing government which subsidizes the theater. Biting remarks prepare for the final scene which was pretty much changed. Tartuffe is not arrested, as envisioned by the playwright; he is rewarded for the locating and unmasking of a dangerous sympathizer of the terrorists.

The theater as moral—also political?—institution, the immediacy of the stage—these notions can be interpreted at will. It is tempting to use a classical stage vehicle with which to hit a contemporary target. Molière may have even nodded his approval for the twisted ending. But he could not have tolerated other aesthetic sins in the name of modernization.

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MAN'S SURRENDER to inhumanity is the main theme of the twentieth-century writer, a theme treated of course by writers of varying artistic temperaments. On the other hand, the socio-cultural temper of our time often causes us to resist what a writer has to say. The resistance is, in fact, less to what he has to say than to the way he says it. Our general state of anxiety is psychologically fertile ground for extreme reactions to works of art. There have always been violent critics of contemporary artistic creations as there have been blind followers. But in this century the artist's critical attitude toward society and the state of the world has been most conspicuously expressed in negative terms.

The image of the little man who, defeated by life, has the courage to survive the day and to go on toward an uncertain tomorrow has lived with us since Charlie Chaplin's tramp became a universal success in the twenties. Humor and hope—and there is nothing more liberating than laughter—are as necessary for survival as bread and water. We have learned to accept joyfully the most negative attitudes—man's masochistic tendencies have grown with his despair—but we still get the most out of a creative work—even if we do not want to admit it—that permits us to hold on to hope through humor.

We need badly to laugh. But laughter—particularly the innocent kind of laughter—has become a rare commodity on stage. Even the humor has become rather dark. We need more and more comedies, but apparently can no longer write them. At the least, it has to be grotesque or tragicomic. Let us not forget: Comedy believes in the eternal flow of things, knowing that change has rarely changed things. In this sense "comedy presents the vital rhythm of self-preservation," as Suzanne Langer says, simply by recognizing and throwing inflammable laughter at corruption and evil, at the discrepancy of things as they are and as they ought to be. We may see, with Henri Bergson, an act of social correction in laughter. But we must realize that despite the important role played by the satirists, the muckrakers, the bitter and less bitter comedy writers, and comedians in correcting the errors of their contemporaries, the same, similar, or other errors take their place, probably on a different level and arising out of different reasons. Perhaps it is not that history repeats itself, but that man remains the same in his weaknesses and foibles.

In comedy as in tragedy we fight against and struggle with the same elements that are the essence of life. In comedy we learn to see, as Robert Graves intimated, the "incongruous elements as a part of a scheme for supralogic necessity." We are fully aware of the oddness of man and of the comically helpless and helplessly comic gestures with which he protests his way of being in a life that is not of his choosing, though certainly of his making.

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**HISTORY OF REASON: AQUINAS TO THE MODERNS**

Evil is nothing. So, by wit,
Nothing is evil, and man bit.

R. L. BARTH
A FILM OF 1939 HAS TO BE considered a historical document. Seeing it again in 1978 confirms this fully as far as cinematography is concerned. But there is something more to it which captures the viewer's mind as much as it must have done decades ago when it became, rightly so, a success acclaimed world-wide.

This film is truly a work of art and hardly could be called simply entertaining. It reaches far beyond that, and its impact has not lost anything of its former strength. It is interesting to observe how today's students, members of a generation very different from Steinbeck's, react to it: they are utterly tense watching the screen, from the first to the last picture.

What has Steinbeck really accomplished here? First of all (and that was his immediate intention), he wanted to write an exciting novel of "J'accuse," Zola style, indicting the Government of his time of irresponsibly handling human beings like merchandise. The mismanagement and mistreatment of dispossessed farm people desperately struggling for the beginning of a new life on an unknown soil is perhaps no longer that much of a problem in our country. Yet the problem of the migrant farm workers still exists to a certain extent, as one can clearly see: "There is a federal housing code for migrant camps matched by codes in 32 states, but their enforcement is pitifully slack because of the growers' local political connections. Thus, migrant farm workers are the worst housed group in the nation, according to a New York Times article, November 27, 1971. The end product of miserable working and living conditions is severe health problems for the farm worker" (Chicago Sun Times, 1972).

This proves the accuracy of Steinbeck's "J'accuse" more than thirty years later, and so it is important and valuable that this film was shown again, not only for its artistic high quality but even more so for its profoundly special and humane presentation of the problem.

But there is still more to this movie. What Steinbeck achieved here is part of a timeless human tragedy. In this movie not only do underdogs flee from an unjust society within an immature and imperfect social system, here man flees from mankind, from his fellow man as a fallible creature. If it were a film of the "J'accuse," Zola style, only, it might not fascinate today's audiences any longer, almost forty years after it was shot. But this film has a touch of the great classical epic, let's call it Homeric without praising it beyond merit. Even though the technical side of the film may appear somewhat old-fashioned to the contemporary viewer, to me as a member of Steinbeck's own generation even the outdated technical features of it add to its value and greatness. Certain scenes, lengthy as they may appear to our young people, performed grippingly by great actors, make the film even more explicit and convincing. It should be kept alive for a long time.
TO AN ORANGE NEIGHBOR

There is that stretch of pine
between us
growing taller, stronger.
But also, orange.

At times there's nothing I'd like better than to tear your orange curtains down. Does that make sense? Well, let me put it this way: Pines are penetrable.

The problem isn't there but rather I am choking on an orange that never dies, shuts down or answers questions strung on that all night and day light from your orange kitchen window.

Why orange? Why not some less hot-hate shade of white or even neutral blue? The color sky was once before your signals started.

Why not green like pine and signs of growing? Life.

Orange must be important or you wouldn't use it so hysterically.

THE SWIMMER

Always the feeling of breath whipped thick Like cream Mother saved for holidays, and some giant hand lifting me high on his shoulders. Always the same confrontation with treasure, poised on the dune with the west wind sweeping the breast of the lake, pulling its sweet savage brew, rolling it over and over from teal into silver, crashing to gold at the beach underneath.

Always the same wringing, blood-letting, strength-sapping pleasure of song so exquisite, angels alone must be held, I am sure, responsible.

Then the power of a magnet conspiring on target with eagles. Invisible, soundless. Sucking me down to the surf amid drum pounding merged with the beat of a thousand wet wings for that moment, always the same, that first stunning slap against skin. Then ice transformed kindly from needles to velvet bearing me out through that chorus of tom toms, that steady wild beat against silver of wings, away from the roar against gold sand and out where omnipotence waits.

There, no more self-conscious, afraid of shadows in alleys or land-grounded giants, my arms become wings, my body a streamlined swift bird with such power my cry becomes instantly song of both purged and the purger. That song waves rush over in laughter.

LOIS REINER

May, 1978
CATCHING FIREFLIES

On hot August nights, the sky a lyric black, I dart after the blinking lights. Circling away from other children, their summer-night voices calling back and forth from the nearby lawns and sidewalks, I reach out—the blackness stippled with the pale beckoning lights. Their glow soft, like a gesture.

The dogs stretching, wheeling, and sniffing each other, children racing in the dark under skyward-spurting garden hoses, buttonballs falling from the sycamore trees, the moist air smelling of lawnmowed grass.

I reach out, my small hand closing around a tickling delicate shape. The insect lies quietly brown on the floor of my hand. It crawls up, struggling over the bulge below my thumb. Oh the soft bristly-brown creature, the scrunching as it walks up my wrist, its wings breathing against my hand like eyelash-kisses. Then it pauses—the small brown neat bug, wings folded back pensively, the pale flame hidden beneath.

I take each one to the milk bottle on the step where I am storing light. Dumped into the bottle the creatures begin blinking again till my bottle-galaxy is pulsating—but never as wild as I want.

And not as bright as the orange light in my dream, the light from the crack in the sidewalk in front of Dr. Sussman's house down the street. Under the sidewalk I saw bears, moving gruffly, brownish-black in the orange light—they were speaking like people.

I crouch beside the milk bottle, mesmerized by my captives. But when I go to bed I leave the bottle uncovered and beating, and always in the morning it is empty.

HARRIET FEINBERG
MESSAGE FROM INLAND

I am clothed
in the seamless
garment
of fog.
No gulls cry.
No nervous horn
sounds
another ship.
No fragrance
of kelp stirs,
no wind of
sea change.
Red mud slips
like a secret
beneath
my feet.
I know
what happens
to seamless
garments.
I have lashed
a riding
light
to my heart.

SISTER MAURA

May, 1978

Books

GREAT COOKS AND THEIR RECIPES.

Great Cooks and Their Recipes is not intended for the person looking for a conventional cookbook or for the admirer of convenience foods or a Big Mac.

It is a tribute to some of the famed chefs of France, Italy, England, and the United States since the early fourteenth century. Some of their names are legendary, such as: Escoffier, hailed as the chef of kings and the king of chefs; Carême, whose skills in the art of fine cooking probably best represent the haute cuisine which Catherine de Medici introduced to France (when she left her native Florence to marry the future Henri II of France); Boston born and bred Fanny Farmer, the invalid to whom we are indebted for precise measurements. Thanks to her, recipe amounts are no longer given in terms of butter "the size of an egg" or "a wineglass" of liquid. Some of the chefs in this book are less well-known and more exotic. Frequently a description of the origin of a dish accompanies the recipe. In some cases it might be somewhat difficult to find ingredients away from a large city, the coast, or an ethnic neighborhood. Where can one find nettle leaves or fresh eel in Valparaíso? In general, though, the ingredients listed are available in a well-stocked supermarket.

Recipes are given in the English version of their original forms in italics, and in a modern adapted version which includes recipe quantities given in metric and U.S. standard measures. The author states that all dishes have been tested using U.S. ingredients.

This is a most attractive book with excellent lithographs and many historical illustrations collected from a number of well-known museums, art galleries, and libraries. However, it should be noted that the style of type and the simulated texture on green paper does not make for easy reading. The bibliography offers a definite contribution to the individual who is interested in the historical development of interesting foods.

While the book is not likely to be found in the New York Times list of best sellers, it would find a welcome place on the shelves of anyone to whom the preparation of fine food is truly an art and a pleasure.

ANITA MANNING

SECOND MARRIAGE:
The Promise and the Challenge.

In her book Second Marriage, Darlene McRoberts attempts to deal with some profound social, psychological, and theological issues surrounding divorce and remarriage.

The book begins with her own singleness and how she meets a nice guy, Marv, whom she finally marries.
Mary meets all her requirements: he (1) is a Christian, (2) would be willing to join our church, (3) loves children, (4) likes camping, and (5) is an avid reader.

She treats the profound issues of remarriage, stepchildren, pre-remarriage counseling, couple interaction, what the theology of remarriage is all about, adultery, love, and forgiveness with the same trite, unreal naiveté as the criteria she uses to select a mate. Second Marriage offers no new or profound insights into a second marriage. For the life of me, I cannot understand why Augsburg published it.

RICHARD BENNETT

SONG OF SOLOMON.

Toni Morrison's Song of Solomon is a magnificent novel. Stylistically it is exquisite, particularly with the richness of its metaphoric language. Thematically, it is brilliant. (These seeming superlatives in judgment have been buttressed by the recent choice of Solomon as winner of the National Book Critics Circle award; first place for fiction."

Ostensibly, the novel is about a wealthy Black middle-class family in Michigan. The family name is Dead-literally and symbolically. (The first Dead had his name chosen for him by a drunken Yankee soldier during Reconstruction; the soldier placed erroneous information on a registration form. Once removed from their African heritage by slavery, the Dead became twice removed by the false information; their true name dies and the life of the Dead begins.) Macon Dead, the father, is a driven, dominating, greedy real estate dealer whose harshness in his dealings with his own family is as calculated and self-serving as any of his business arrangements. Ruth, his wife, is a sexually stunted and frustrated woman—she's endured forced celibacy for twenty years. Her major "crime" seems to be misdirected love—first for her father, then for her son. Their children are Magdalene, called Lena, First Corinthians, and Macon "Milkman" Dead. Milkman is the principal protagonist (on an Alex Haley type journey he goes South and discovers his "roots"); but other characters, particularly Morrison's women, are so vividly sketched that they almost overpower him. Pilate Dead, Milkman's aunt, dominates these portraits. Due to the circumstances of her birth she is without a navel (a fact which makes her "unnatural" and therefore terrifying to superstitious folk); she strides through life with her smooth stomach and a brass box looped to one ear. The portrait of Hagar, Pilate's granddaughter and Milkman's cousin, is an almost painfully drawn etching of a woman so consumed by her love for Milkman that she tries to kill him regularly when he spurns that love.

Actually, however, the novel is not so much the tale of the present-day Dead as it is a blend of folklore, cultural anthropology, and history to tell the tale of how the Dead came to live. Ritual saturates the family history. All names but that of the first born son are chosen blindly from the Bible. Milkman has heard Pilate singing "Sugarman, done fly away" all of his life. On his odyssey he learns the origins of her song while observing a children's game ritual. The children's song, "Solomon done fly away, Solomon done gone. Solomon cut across the sky, Solomon gone home," is both an oral history of his family tree and is part and parcel of an Afro-American folklore cycle about slaves who could "fly away home" to Africa when the time was ripe for them to leave. With a very deft touch Morrison weaves Milkman back into the texture of his heritage—his only ambition as a child had been to fly; when that ambition was crushed he had had little to replace it with. At novel's end, however, he is able to realize his dream and so, magically, he soars.

Although the Dead family history has some peculiarities (most Black Americans are the descendants of slaves; few, if any, can claim the ability to fly is in their genes), the present-day family shares the social, economic, and political realities of any number of Black families. Part of the family is "economically unstable" and so survives by the proverbial whatever means necessary. The children of Macon Dead must endure intraracial conflict due to caste and class perceptions. Milkman must learn what it is to shape his own life. He does so by actively participating in forbidden street life on one level, and on another by recognizing that the agenda adopted by a close friend for redressing racial wounds is one he will not accept. Unlike his childhood mentor, he cannot kill just any white to avenge the death of any Black murdered by whites.

In short, the Dead face the problems of all the living. There is love and lovelessness; there is pain and pride, sorrow and joy in their lives. They've built, had it taken away, and they've rebuilt. As a family unit they have their weaknesses but they most assuredly have their individual strengths. I'll stand by my original contention; Song of Solomon is an exquisitely executed brilliant novel. Its range covers the mundane, the mythic, and the mystical.

SANDRA Y. GOVAN

YOUR GOD IS ALIVE AND WELL AND APPEARING IN POPULAR CULTURE.

In 1950 David Riesman, along with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, published The Lonely Crowd, a study which was essentially a cultural psychoanalysis. Since that successful publication appeared there have been a number of books published which fall roughly into that genre and which employ a similar
type of specialized jargon. Professor Nelson's 1976 publication belongs to that genre.

The very special quality of Nelson's book is that it boldly attempts to link assumed ritualistic religious impulses of the great multitude with the highly developed types of art found in such mass media categories as movies, television, and popular music. His book opens with a discursive Introduction, which in turn gives way to a first chapter called "American Cultural Religion," and it is in these two sections that the book's main problems appear. Since the book is intrinsically theological we expect and get theological terms, e.g., "eschatological," "apotheosis of character," and many others; but along with these we get slang, e.g., "my long time buddy," "rip-off." And these lexical extremes are the prelude to an unevenness which characterizes the book in its entirety. There is a needless repetition of certain words such as "mythical," and words are used awkwardly, "quintessentially," all of which has a bothersome effect on the narrative. While his book should help many people to self-understanding, some may politely ask how the ideas about mass ritual have any real bearing on personal salvation, or how Jesus Christ the moral hero can be equated with the western movie hero.

The book is rich in categories and, as a result, certain parts (like chapter one) need to be studied to really grasp fully the complex ideas that are developed through the use of these categories. But Nelson's sentence structure and use of metaphor are not always the best and his grammar is often faulty, as two examples may show: "Small wonder that such an event raised an aching question into the context of a simple faith" (p. 88); "John McCabe and Mrs. Miller is obviously not far from Jesus Christ and Mary Magdalene" (p. 73). Punctuation errors abound: "As a direct result of the problem of societal imbalance in the Travis McGee novel, personally distraught and ravaged human beings appear in dire need of the restoration of their individual health and life spirit" (p. 178).

These errors of a technical nature and the general unevenness of the narrative notwithstanding, this is a significant book which possesses considerable scope and one which will not be duplicated easily. In the chapter on detective fiction the narrative reaches nearly literary heights, "No one can be trusted—all social roles are poses, shifting like shadows, stretching reality to fit the focused light. The end tables of this world are dusty, the rugs are dirty, and the lighted neon signs have a letter burned out" (p. 164). Frequently, too, Nelson ends his paragraphs with a wry quip that clarifies and enforces a point, "Body contact beats holy water and incantations any day!" (p. 97)

There are many brilliant insights in this book and it should enjoy a wide readership, especially as a textbook in various university courses and as ancillary reading for ecumenical study groups. Notes and bibliography in the book are excellent.

JOHN K. COWGER

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO SCIENCE FICTION.

If you were hoping this would be science fiction's answer to The Gospel According to Peanuts, forget it. What it is, is a debunking of the Chariot of the Gods Bermuda Triangle nonsense of von Däniken and Berlitz and their soul-fellows. If you are still wondering if maybe Ezekiel really did see a spaceship (goodness, I hope not!) then thumbing this book should settle the matter for you.

On the other hand, the book is not particularly well written. It gives the impression of being a long college term paper, replete with substantial quotations from other authors. If you really want to study the kind of thinking the von Däniken/Berlitz crowd represent, I suggest you use this book to find out who the original writers on the subject are, and then go read them.

The book is profusely illustrated with pen and ink "etchings." I get the feeling that Allan handed the manuscript to his buddy, and Burke just fantasized with his pen, paragraph by paragraph. Some of the illustrations are not too bad. There is a full-color poster attached to the inside back cover which some college students might conceivably put on their walls.

Then again, they might not.

W. R. RIEDEL

Perspectives in Education
(concluded from page 28)

Furthermore, when the values are clarified, what then? Information doesn't automatically produce reform. Morally sensitive Paul confessed: "I can will what is right, but I can not do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do." In his exemplary morality, Paul did not achieve a self-actualized state of impeccability, but was content with self-examination, confession, and faith in God's grace. For all of us who are simul justus et peccator, the dimension of grace is essential: the conviction that the Author of all values accepts and forgives those who have had clarification of their sinful choices. That dimension is not found in values clarification.

In our secular public schools, however, in many instances, values clarification may well be the best option available in teaching a particular value. We can be grateful that values are currently given a greater degree of importance in public instruction. In our pluralistic society, the theological framework of values decisions must be secured outside the public schools.
PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION

IV. Values Education

SOME DECADES AGO “VALUE-FREE EDUCATION” was advocated. Promoters of the point of view considered values a private matter. The teacher’s values shouldn’t even show; surely they should not be inculcated upon others.

That era is long gone. We know that values will out. They can’t be hidden. Even advocating value-free education expresses values; hiding one’s commitment may reveal the valuing of neutrality or secrecy or eclecticism.

The current discussion of values generally covers a broad range, including economic, political, social, esthetic, health, intellectual, and religious values. After all, a value may be redundantly defined as anything which is valued: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, literacy, democracy, financial security.

There is, however, a readiness in this post-Watergate era to focus much discussion on specifically moral issues. Moreover, schools are being directed to take a more central role in values education. According to Gallup pollsters, an overwhelming majority of our citizens now favors instruction in morals by our public schools. As a nation, we have thus returned to the earlier assumptions that moral values are to be part of education.

Education in moral values has, of course, always been found in schools of all nations. Teachers not only have revealed and modeled values; as an inherent part of the teaching role, they have also taught values: “You are not to look at your neighbor’s paper.” “John, you shouldn’t fight with Bob on the playground.” “It’s bad to eat all that junk food instead of your school lunches.” “Thus we see that overpopulation, pollution, and wasting of energy are current evils which lower the quality of life.”

Convinced of the inescapability of values in the educational process, many of us are pleased that currently educators are by and large willing to acknowledge openly the values of their own frame of reference.

However, having accepted values as a part of the curriculum, the educator must then make many difficult decisions regarding what is taught, what the goals of instruction are, and what methods are appropriate. Each teacher operates from some framework, with certain assumptions regarding the nature of the learner, the operation of the learning process, the characteristics of the good society. The teaching of values will flow from the context of the instructor’s own complex of commitments. The behaviorist, the humanist, the existentialist, the Thomist will each teach honesty from his own frame of reference.

AN INCREASINGLY POPULAR approach to values education these days is values clarification. Building on Louis Raths’ basic statement, Howard Kirschenbaum, Sidney B. Simon, and others have developed an extensive theory. Advocates of the values clarification approach claim that other values teaching methodologies are inadequate: indoctrination often does not become internalized; laissez-faire learning from experience is chancy; modeling has overwhelming competition from other models; Kohlberg’s moral reasoning approach does not inevitably lead to moral action. Therefore, it is suggested, let us articulate values, discuss and share our opinions with a group, testing the adequacy of our values decisions.

Thus, in an earth science class, values level questions may relate to strip mining practices or policies regarding grassy areas in cities. An art appreciation unit may ask questions related to support of artists in our society. Discussion of values is being included in chemistry and mathematics classes as well as in the more obvious social studies, literature, and speech courses.

The assumption is, that as a person articulates his value decisions and hears others articulate theirs, the individual will have to think critically about various positions, tending to move toward better choices.

My reaction to the values clarification approach is ambivalent: as a total program for teaching values, I find it deficient; as procedure in public schools I consider it commendable.

For many, values clarification procedures sound great: finally we have a non-authoritarian, yet structured, means for teaching values. Discussion rather than pontification is the style for our democratic age. Moreover, many of our problems are so complex that we should look with suspicion on any easy answers; perhaps the best we can do is to clarify the issues and the options. There is also an attractiveness to setting various values side by side to compete for the allegiance of the human heart: if Christ’s choices are set adjoining ours, are we not tortured by the difference and attracted to a new life?

However, merely clarifying the values involved doesn’t satisfy me. Ewald B. Nyquist, Commissioner of Education for the State of New York, has spoken eloquently of the inadequacy of “American no-fault morality.” I personally find values clarification a value-able exercise, but without the dimension of judgment I’m a ship without a rudder. At the risk of sounding “undemocratic,” I conclude that all moral judgments simply are not created equal. We cry out for a standard.

(continued on page 27)