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THE CRESSET is published monthly September through June by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana, 46383. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana. Subscription rates:

One year—$2.00; two years—$3.75; three years—$5.50. Single copy 20 cents.

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Comment on the Significant News by the Editors

Gloria in Excelsis Deo

"Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace among men with whom He is well pleased." What connection is there between God in the highest and peace on earth? There is no obvious answer. We may be sure of one thing this Christmastide: No matter where the high God is, harshness, death, and brutality are on earth. It does not help to say that if only men would with one heart and one accord glorify God in the highest we would have peace on earth.

The obvious readings of the Christmas message about the high God coming to earth as man will always be misleading, for its meaning is not obvious but oblique. The church here proclaims neither an ideal nor a truism, but a fact of immense personal and political significance. The message is not a hope to be achieved but the marking of an epoch and the beginning of renewal. The Holy One has slipped into history; "God in the highest" and "men on earth" have been mysteriously joined together in Him.

People in and out of the church have always had trouble in relating the realms of heaven and earth. Is the one high, religious, and idealistic, while the other is human, earthly, real? Must men finally choose one or the other? Shall men strive for the highest and therefore neglect the lowest; or shall they concentrate their energies on the earth, make that their highest, and leave the other to the religious?

He who wants only the highest or the lowest has neither. The kingdoms of this world with their provisional meanings for men do not endure, and the process of decadence in cultural life and individual endeavor contrasts with the thirst for life and a meaning beyond the prison of space and time. The human spirit rightly resists the limits of space and time, as well as the presence of death, for we belong to a kingdom that is not of this world, but which reaches into and encloses this world.

"Glory to God in the highest" and "peace on earth among men with whom He is well pleased" are not disparates to be co-ordinated by an ideal or religious "and." They are the same action of God the Father through His only-begotten Son to shatter the bondage to wrath, death, and decay. As many as believe on Him are become sons of God, partaking of His life and glory. The Christmas message is the invitation to men to be united with each other by returning to the heavenly Father through the peace offered in the Cross of His Son, to take their place in God's glory and to "intend their lives" with God's intention.

God's glory is the splendor of His suffering love, the relentless determination of His will to bless the life of men who are under the curse of death, by receiving into Himself the hostility and fear of men against God and against each other. To men who love their own glory, God's glory is hateful, competitive with their strivings; to participate in it threatens each man's security system.

Of the secular celebrations of the season we have to say with the Latin Christian Tertullian amidst all the pagan celebrations of the Roman Empire: "In your washings you seek our baptism and in your feastings you seek our eucharist." Cannot we discern in the secular celebration of Christmas a genuine yearning for a life and peace which the world cannot give?

To sing the song of Christmas is to sing the song of life in which the highest and the lowest are joined in Jesus. To celebrate Christmas as something other than the birth anew as God's sons is to cling to death rather than life. Such a celebration may indeed have a "spirit" but it is a deluding, sentimental spirit, an illusory ideal; it is frivolous pottering with spirits that prove to be nothing but spooks of the past, wraiths of the old songs of death. Such a celebration may soothe some people and cheer others. Ultimately its effect is seasonal and superficial.

The strange peace of Christmas inaugurates a struggle carried on in the conscience, the church, and the nation. The darkness seeks to overcome the light. The path to the future is the way of the cross where the highest and the lowest merge and the Form of a Servant trails God's highest glory.
Albert Schweitzer, 1874-1965

In the decade after World War II, a world numbed by a Dresden, an Auschwitz, and Coventry came to see in Lambarene, in the Congo, a sign that grace and promise had not fully disappeared from Western Christendom, then reeling from the wrath which had been visited upon it. In the Protestant seminaries during that period, no figure had so stirred the imagination and so generated a sense of mission as Albert Schweitzer.

Protestantism does not ordinarily employ the kind of theology of sainthood which can adequately take the measure of such a disciple of Our Lord. Whatever reservations we may have had about his theology or his paternalism, it would be well to ponder again at the end of his life that haunting conclusion which he wrote for his first distinguished theological work, *The Quest For The Historical Jesus*:

He comes to us as One unknown, without a name, as of old, by the lake-side. He came to those men who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word: “Follow thou me!” and sets us to the tasks which He has to fulfill for our time. He commands. And to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience Who He is.

William Stringfellow

William Stringfellow has become a man of considerable prominence in the United States and certainly is not unknown in foreign circles.

In our editorial opinion he deserves this reputation even if the reader wisely takes into account our personal respect for him, established after only a few meetings with him, and our basic enthusiasm for the work he is doing.

If the occasion demands it, he is able to present a number of credentials although he gets along very well with only the presentation of himself as a person. He authored *My People Is The Enemy, A Private And Public Faith*, and *Free In Obedience*. His educational credentials are as reputable as they can be: Bates College, the London School of Economics, and the Harvard Law School. Dedicated to the Christian witness, he is an Episcopalian, a lay-theologian, and, because of these credentials, is well-known in ecclesiastical circles. Sometimes ecclesiastical circles do not appreciate his sterling qualities. Almost a decade ago, as he tells it in *My People Is The Enemy*, he “came to Harlem to live, to work there as a lawyer, to take some part in the politics of the neighborhood, to be a layman in the church there.” As you see, he also presents the credentials of a practicing lawyer. Harvard to the contrary notwithstanding, legal circles sometimes do not appreciate his sterling qualities.

We heard this man recently speaking to an assembly of law professors and law students on the occasion of one of his visits to Valparaiso University.

With a quiet firmness and an obvious concern for the human predicament, Stringfellow spoke to this proposition: The health and the maturity of the legal system, and of society for that matter, depend on whether the extremities of society are represented in the legal system. According to Stringfellow, the under-represented people at the extremities of society are the poor, the ideologically unpopular, and people of different races, colors, and creeds. Said this practicing lawyer: “They are not really represented at all. That’s been true for generations.”

Speaking in most instances from his experiences as a lawyer in Harlem, he suggested that the now and then sensational cases hardly do more for the under-represented than to remind them that they are badly represented in all the little things of life like bread, home, and clothing and certainly in the halls and courts of justice. The sensational events tell them things they already know. Though these “great events” are quickly forgotten by the general public, they solidify for continuous recall the memories the poor and the depressed have of all the little, but repeated, incidents of legal injustice in their lives. Their memories will not let them forget. As far as the majority of these people is concerned, all of life has become a series of these little and minor injustices perpetrated upon them by police officers, justices, judges, and lawyers — only punctuated now and then by the injustices in the grand manner.

In domestic relations cases — in divorce cases, to give a for instance — the poor people have more difficulty, much more difficulty, than the more fortunate people in the upper and middle classes. In New York divorce may be granted on grounds of adultery. To establish adultery costs two or three thousand dollars, not an unreasonable fee, for substantial investigation and trial. The poor in New York are not in the position of the New York Rockefellers who are able to move around, geographically and otherwise, until they find the right jurisdictions and evidences. Evasion of the law is not always an obstacle to some of these people in the procurement of a divorce. Said Stringfellow, the critic: “The law is always responsive to those who can afford it.”

In citing a second for instance, the Harlem lawyer referred to a facet of the housing dilemma in Harlem: “Winter is coming on — there will be a flood of cases involving families whose tenement rooms are inadequately heated.” Under New York law, persons in such circumstances are permitted to file claims on their own. But this is not as easy as it sounds or appears. To file the claim requires a day off from the job and the loss of a day’s pay complicates the life of a poor family. The tenant is unable to pay a lawyer’s fee, an obligation that hardly costs any effort for the landlord. If the poor tenant wants to ride herd on his own case without the help of a lawyer, he will weaken his case and will be forced to give up more days on the job and the accompanying wages. If finally the landlord should be fined by one of those miracles of fate and history, he can afford the
So December 1965

er interests of

chusetts where the police and the community were bas­
cially friends. The police were very seldom forced to deal with controversia1 and provocative matters. Now, on the basis of my own experiences in Harlem, I have to say that there is sadism, racism, and flagrant discrimination against the Negroes on the part of the police. In my mind, my view has shifted to the other side.” Other things happen, said Stringfellow, “some police chiefs and officers make a policy of not informing people, especially Negroes, of their constitutional rights.” To inform them, it is alleged by the New York police, inter­feres with police investigation and their work as cops.

When the marginal people “get into trouble,” it is a matter of the cop’s word against theirs and it always seems to be a battle lost for the poor. It is hard to get witnesses, even the witnesses of the poor for their own kind, for they fear the law, the police, and the courts. Anyway, no matter how many witnesses testify for a poor defendant, they are really never believed. Said Stringfellow, a quiet but angry man: “There is no reason for the law to be respected. For them the law is something that has always stood against them.”

Making his points strongly at the end, Mr. Stringfellow suggested that the police function in many places is being transformed into a military function. In the face of some muffled bristling on the part of some members of his audience, he went on to say again that the cops are acting like a local militia. Military tactics are being taught to the police on occasion and the general public, moreover, advocates this role for the police. Concluded Stringfellow after all this, a man who can stay on focus: “So in sensational cases, these people check the registry of their memories. For them the law is something that stands against them. The fundamental structure of society, like the quasi-military function of the police, will have to be changed. The health and the maturity of the legal system is at stake. We are interested in this not only to save the poor but to save all society. The legal profession cannot evade this responsibility. Lawyers have been in the habit of serving the larger and the richer interests of society.”

At the end we were reminded of Stringfellow, the Christian who wrote My People Is The Enemy: “For a Christian to be poor and to work among the poor is not conventional charity, but a use of the freedom for which Christ has set men free.”

Indonesia: The Assertion of Islam

Former Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard P. Jones, was both succinct and wise when he stated in an interview (prior to the attempted coup of September 30) that Indonesia was not Communist but nationalist and Islamic.

In order to understand the coup, countercoup and anti-Communist aftermath, one must grasp the historical significance of Islam in Indonesia. Islam has been the dominant religion in Indonesia since the thirteenth century. Its identity in the world arena was as a part of the Islamic Empire and its domestic identity was that of an Islamic Theocracy. The Dutch attempted to destroy this identity after their takeover in the seventeenth century by setting up a division among the Moslems, pitting the secularists against the theocrats. This divisive policy was followed by the Japanese during their short control of Indonesia and then again by the Dutch after they had regained control during the latter part of World War II. The internal conflicts between the secularists and the theocrats continued within the domestic scene, causing a bitterness that kept the groups separate until 1945 when they were able to effect a relative cooperation in order to declare and secure Indonesian independence. This relative cooperation lasted until the sovereignty of Indonesia was realized in December, 1949. Following independence, the Masjumi (Moslem Fellowship) and the P.N.I. (Party Nationalist Indonesia) became locked again in a struggle for power — the Masjumi advocating a mixed economy and pro-Western foreign policy while the P.N.I. advocated a state-controlled economy and an anti-imperialist foreign policy though both groups were dominantly Moslem and strongly nationalist. President Sukarno’s position in favor of an open market place of ideas effected a balance between the two groups, with the army supporting Sukarno and the middle road toward peace. According to Professor Donald Hindley in his book, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963, this balance was upset with the revival of the P.K.I. (Party Kommunist Indonesia) under Mr. Aidit, leader until his recent post-coup flight to China. A P.K.I. coup in 1948 had been foiled and the Communists had been massacred at Madiun, relegating them to minor positions on the Indonesian stage. On assuming leadership of the P.K.I., Mr. Aidit was able to negotiate an agreement of mutual support and non-harrassment with the P.N.I. which so greatly enhanced the prestige and political drawing power of the P.K.I. that it grew from approximately five thousand members in January, 1951, to over three million by September, 1951, according to Professor Hindley. Mr. Aidit’s party stressed the nationalist socialism to the P.N.I. and played down the inherent conflicts between Communism and Islam, between atheism and theism. The Army, in order to maintain a safe balance on the domestic scene, moved closer to the Masjumi, thereby protecting the Masjumi, but creating some dissonance in its own ranks among the

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anti-theocrats. Sukarno was again able to balance the factions under his new "guided Democracy" (keeping the major power in his own hands but allowing representatives from the various groups to hold governmental and parliamentary posts). With Sukarno's public stress on neutrality and non-alignment in world affairs, he was able to satisfy the Masjumi and thereby forestall the inevitable clash that was to come.

Due to a more aggressive leadership and financing from Peking, the power of the P.K.I. eclipsed that of the P.N.I., creating minor power disturbances within their axis. However, due to the rise of Communist Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and the declining popularity of the United States, the P.K.I. was able to gain Sukarno's ear enough to persuade him to cut off relations with the United States. Aidit and Subandrio, foreign minister, then declared more strongly in favor of closer Indonesian-Chinese ties, at the same time accusing the Masjumi and the army of hindering the progress of the Indonesian state. The tension between the Moslems and the Communists continued to grow. A crucial point was reached when the P.K.I. declared that Islam had no necessary place in the future of Indonesia. This position was a volatile one because Islam had long been identified with Indonesian nationalism — the only dispute with Indonesia had been the place of Islam, that is, should Indonesia be a theocracy or should Islam be a state religion within a secular state. The tension was now heightened by reports filtering into Indonesia through Moslem diplomats and through various newspapers reporting atrocities against the Moslem population of China. Nevertheless the P.K.I. became openly more anti-Islamic and sought the concurrence of President Sukarno. Sukarno declared himself anti-Western but would not declare himself anti-Islamic. The P.K.I. then attempted its coup, forcing the people of Indonesia to choose between the Musjami army high command, representing Islam and nationalism, or the P.K.I. (including dissident factions of the army), representing Peking-style Communism and atheism. The people asserted their Islamic heritage and have continued to assert it in student, adult, and army demonstrations almost daily since the abortive coup; in street fighting, in the burning of the P.K.I. building in Jakarta, and in the refusal to heed the early commandments of Sukarno to cease attacks on the Communists. Islam is not likely to rest until it has annihilated the anti-religious, neo-imperialist body of Communism in Indonesia.

Perhaps the place of Islam in Indonesian politics is analogous to religion in the U.S. civil rights movement, an undeniably important factor, the magnitude of which is difficult to assess.

A Matter Of Principle

A favorite parlor game of political pundits is reading national trends from local elections. The November elections around the country stimulated the usual amount of this sport. We pass no judgment here on the value or the validity of such an enterprise generally. We wish merely to raise an objection to an assumption implicit in almost every analysis of the New Jersey results.

Governor Richard Hughes soundly trounced a Republican opponent who had grounded his campaign on the necessity for rooting out Communist and other subversive influences in the state. Republican challenger Wayne Dumont had called specifically for measures of suppression and retaliation against those on state-college campuses who had been demonstrating against American policy in Vietnam.

His defeat was widely interpreted as a setback for conservatives. Perhaps it was. It was certainly not a setback for conservatism.

Respect for the fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights and a passionate opposition to any government interference with the political opinions of citizens are doctrinal pillars for American conservatism. Should contemporary conservatives refuse to admit this; should they prove willing lightly to dismiss the right of free speech; should they finally come to view with equanimity government efforts at thought control, they will prove what we have long suspected. There is very little that is conservative in modern American conservatism. Little that is liberal, either.

Free Enterprise

In the course of running about a great deal, and being nosey in the bargain, the editors of The Cresset are sometimes struck by the subtle humor of life. By nature unusually mischievous, you may say, we are prone to smile about these subtly comic events.

Not too many moons ago, the great sweep of history brought us into contact almost simultaneously with several sets of parents with more than the usual amount of children, at latest count ranging in cases from sets of five to a set of eleven. This naturally takes us back a little, especially us whose quivers are not nearly so full.

One of the fathers remarked to us that he had been having some difficulty purchasing a house large enough for his well-mannered family of seven or eight (I think). With the bravado of fathers of two or three, we suggested: "Why don't you buy a hotel or, at least, rent one for the time being?" Not at all taken back by our cutting edge, he promptly related the story of taking his family to a hotel for a night's lodging. This was a family plan hotel, that is, all children under twelve free. He was asked about the age of his children and replied casually with the experience of having answered this question a million times before: "All seven of them are under eight."

This, of course, brought the hotel clerk to pause. His not to reason why, however, his but to do and die — and hitching up his Tennysonian britches — this agent of American ingenuity cleared a banquet room and put up our friend and his family in the inn. There, flanked by all the paraphernalia of banquet rooms (tables, chairs,
lecterns, and public address systems), they resigned themselves to the arms of Morpheus.

But we are not at all surprised, especially not in the Christmas season, for this is the way it is with the American free enterprise system.

They Also Write

In answer to our editorial in the April, 1965 issue of The Cresset ("Viet Nam Again"), we received the following comment from Richard John Neuhaus, pastor of The Church Of Saint John The Evangelist, Brooklyn:

Your "Viet Nam Again" (April, 1965) is indeed disappointing.

You assert as fact that "our action in Viet Nam right now is an attempt to force her northern neighbor to live up to agreements negotiated in the past." I would suggest that Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska is closer to the facts in saying, "We say that we are doing what we are doing (in Viet Nam) because the other people cannot be trusted. But we have violated three different treaties... After you have been bombing villagers with napalm, it's going to be very difficult to persuade people that you are their friend." Is it necessary to rehearse the indisputable facts that the existence of a separate South Viet Nam is recognized solely by American policy makers; that America, in the name of democracy, supported the Diem dictatorship that was never popularly elected because it could not have won a free election; that the Vietcong insurgency has greater popular support than the American-supported military junta which effectively controls only a fraction of the southern region?

Many concerned Christians will take vigorous exception to your statement that "we have elected him (Mr. Johnson) as our President and... we have committed ourselves morally to back him up, whatever may be the policy line which he finally adopts." Can you really mean this? I happen to have worked and voted for Mr. Johnson's election and still have the highest hopes for his administration, but as a Christian I cannot resign my moral responsibility to evaluate critically his actions. To excuse my resignation of responsibility by saying that I do not have access to all the facts is the logic that spells death to the democratic process. None of us has access to all the information on any question. It is our moral responsibility to study carefully the information that is available and to arrive at, as much as it is within our power, honest and objective decisions. If the government defaults on supplying information, it can make no just claim for support "on faith."

I am reminded of Gordon Zahn's conclusion in his German Catholics and Hitler's War. He says that the German Christian who looked to his Church leaders for guidance about participating in the war received precisely the same answers that he would have received from the Fuehrer himself. I do not, of course, suggest a comparison between Hitler and Lyndon Johnson. I do suggest the frightening parallel between the logic of the German bishops (who also pleaded lack of information) and that of your editorial.

Again, the editorial is only disappointing because it appears in a review which I respect so highly. I would urge that the editors take courage to fulfill their responsibility to evaluate American policy in Vietnam. I do not need to read a journal to be told "my country, right or wrong."

Unhappily, many of the findings of this study will prove disturbing to men of every faith — Protestants, Catholics, Jews, humanists, and positivists alike. We all tend to believe, or want to believe, that our own group is superior to other groups in every way. Yet systematic research invariably reveals glaring discrepancies between the idealized image which we form and hard reality. I take no pleasure in challenging cherished illusions, but at the same time I feel that this can prove beneficial.

There was a time when it was illegal to celebrate Christmas in America, and ever since, Americans seem to be trying to make up for that quiet period with an overabundance of what passes for Christmas spirit. Several major groups of colonists objected to Christmas celebrations and the New England Puritans were especially hostile toward such observances, so much so that on their first Christmas in this country, December 25, 1620, the Puritans worked on the erection of a building in “studied neglect” of the day.

Later on, in 1659, the Puritans enacted a law in the general court of Massachusetts to punish those who kept Christmas. In part, that law read, “…anyone who is found observing by abstinence of labor, feasting, or in any other way, any such days as Christmas, shall pay for every such offense five shillings.” However, there must have been some department store owners among the Puritans because the law was repealed in 1681. It is possible that if there were Puritans around today to see what we have made of this season, they might regret ever having repealed the law.

I do not consider myself a present day Scrooge, but I do object to having general ebullience classified as Christmas spirit. Beginning early in December and continuing to, but usually not through, December 25, there is a great increase of good spirit on the part of the populace. Walk down the street in December, and you will be met with smiles and cheery greetings of brotherhood. Charities long ago discovered that December was an ideal month for fund raising.

In December the air is filled with anticipation. What is it that so many are anticipating that puts everyone into such a good mood? Perhaps it is the trimmings which surround Christmas celebrations, the wreaths, the holly, the Christmas tree, the bells, and the candles. It could be the thought of giving or receiving gifts raises the spirits. For some, it may be only that December 25 means a day off work. It could be the sound of carols, though their endless repetition in stores and on the street has a tendency to be more annoying than uplifting.

Perhaps for many this anticipation stems from their hope that on this Christmas they will relive Christmas past. Every year many hold to the forlorn hope that this year they will know again the same breathless anticipation, the same uncomplicated joy they experienced in the Christmases of their childhood. And every year those who try to go back again are doomed to disappointment.

Whatever causes this better spirit, this greater interest in one’s fellowman, I am in favor of, but I draw the line at calling it Christmas spirit. It is, to be sure, a spirit that comes at Christmas time, but it could, given the same build-up, be generated at some other time of year. My reason for stating it is not the true Christmas spirit is that, for a great many people it does not survive December 25.

If several days after Christmas you should meet many of those persons who were so cheerful a few days before, you will get none of the hearty response you may have expected, few of the smiles, and almost none of the donations. What you may get instead is complaints about receiving the wrong gifts, about overeating on the 25th, and about people who are still playing carols on the day after Christmas. What you will not get is any particular expression of good will.

What happened to that fine spirit, that eager anticipation? I am afraid for many, the spirit was out of focus, based on things temporal which have a tendency to disappoint or at least fail to live up to expectations. The spirit was looking inward instead of upward.

It is fine at Christmas time, or any other time for that matter, to extol and to practice the virtues of brotherhood, kindness, charity, and generosity, but this is not enough. The only spirit that can be classified as the true Christmas spirit is one that is generated by the anticipation of celebrating once again the birth of the Christ Child. To call any spirit settling for less than this the Christmas spirit minimizes the true spirit. Those who focus on the Gift at Bethlehem do not experience disappointment, their anticipation is realized. Those who celebrate Christmas in the true spirit know the celebration goes on long after December 25. It may be quickened and renewed each year, but it has no end, for the true hope of Christmas is eternal.

May your Christmas this year and every year be blessed with the true Christmas spirit.
Work, Time, and Leisure

By HAROLD A. GRAM
Dean, The College of Business Administration Valparaiso University

Our age has been called a "leisure age," and many of its social problems are felt to arise from the misuse of leisure. Attracted by the challenge of a leisure society, the Twentieth Century Fund appointed a Leisure Study Research staff which resulted in Of Time Work and Leisure, by Sebastian de Grazia; the distinguished American Academy of Political and Social Science held a conference on Leisure in America in Philadelphia in 1963, and the Department of Evangelism of the National Council of Churches appointed a Leisure Time Witness Study Committee. The latter resulted in a book, Religion and Leisure in America by Robert Lee. A discussion of leisure and work is attracting anew the interests of theologians, academicians, and labor and business leaders. Many discussions, however, are clouded by semantics, afflicted with circular reasoning, and ignore a distinction between leisure and free time. The duty and goal of work is accepted without question. Leisure has been confused with recreation and retirement. A classical definition of leisure, as developed in Greek thought, sets it in antithesis to work. Leisure time and time free from work are not identical, as I will endeavour to show in this discussion. Leisure has no relationship to time, nor to utility or usefulness. Leisure time is not recreational time, or a preparation for labor; nor is it something which has to be earned and re-earned. This paper will examine the development of the ideas and work of leisure and discuss some of their implications.

Leisure Time and Free Time

A forty hour work week in manufacturing and paid vacations in most industries is common. The thirteen week vacation in the steel industry is as yet unusual in manufacturing. As one compares these with the twelve hour day, the six day week, and no vacations in the middle of the last century, it would appear that a leisure society has arrived. In 1890 the average work week was sixty hours. The average American workingman of 1965, with the exception of the professions, the executive, and isolated occupations, enjoy a work week which has fallen by 4.2 hours since 1929. Simultaneously, the standard of living expressed by average gross national product, and built upon advances in productivity, has risen. Between 1874 and 1954, the average per capita income rose from $370 to $1,860 in 1947 prices. Between 1929 and 1964 the average per capita disposable personal income rose from $1,273 to $2,248 in 1964 prices. The median income of all families in 1963 was $6,175 and in 1962 prices, a rise from $4,117 in 1947.

If we agree with Dr. Marion Clawson that leisure is the amount of time beyond the existence and subsistence time, then we are in a leisure age — a leisure age associated with affluence and more consumption than at any other time. More dramatically expressive of the amount of leisure time is her estimate that the American people had 177 billion hours of leisure in 1900; 876 billion hours in the year 2000. The amount of free time available can be illustrated from other statistics which show increased expenditures for sports (both participative and spectator); recreational activities; and a myriad of other activities demanding free time. Leisure as it is measured quantitatively in relationship to the time necessary to earn a living has risen in the past fifty years, and shows every expectation of increasing in quantity.

America has leisure with affluence. An affluence generated by a rapid increase in economic development, a high rate of capital investment, and substantial investment in human capital. This free time has come together with a structural change in the source of income. Agriculture as the predominant industry in 1820, employed 71.9% of the working force, in 1950 it had fallen to 12.1%, and approximately 5% in 1964. Free time has come as we have moved from an agrarian society to an urban community. It has been accompanied by the full in the number of entrepreneurs, independent farmers, and people living off accumulated wealth. Free time has accompanied the rise of the working man, and the executive. There have been men and women of leisure throughout history. The significant mark of our age is that free time has been given to the workingman. This is shown in the statistics of employee compensation. The total national income arising from employee compensation was 50% of total income in 1870-1880, in 1964 it had risen to approximately 70%. Income from dividends and interest has fallen from 15.8% in the same period to about 11%. An increasing share of national income is being received by those working, and an increasingly smaller share by entrepreneurs, and dividends and interest. Our rise to an age of affluence has been accompanied by the rise of the working class with free time, and not the rise of a leisure class, without work.

This increase in affluent free time, although essentially consumption-inspired, has not been accompanied without an increase in cultural activities. Even though much free time is spent in idleness, prosimiscuity, drunkenness, and vice, there has also been an increase in "de-
sirable” activities. It is estimated that in 1960 Americans spent three billion dollars on cultural activities such as art, museums, concerts, and the performing arts. The number of orchestras in existence rose 50% between 1950 and 1960. The rapid rise in the number of art galleries, museums, theatres, and cultural activities indicates that not all of the free time created has gone to activities traditionally beyond the pale of culture. Even though much free time is used by workers to moonlight, to watch TV or to “waste it,” there appears to be some effort for people to develop themselves through recreation, cultural activities, amusements, and study.

It is obvious that we have large blocks of free time interspersed with work. But free time is only potentially leisure time. The free time secured is a reward for work accomplished. It almost appears as an interlude in the circularity of work towards which America is dedicated. President Johnson has stated: “The unfinished task of prosperous Americans is to build a Great Society.” The way to reach this is by a goal of full employment — everyone working. It has been asserted by many that free time is tolerated since it is an opportunity for consumption, led, encouraged, and furthered by advertising.

Many have felt that the leisure problem is simply a “use of time problem.” A leisure problem arises because of the waste of time, and the abuse of free time. They have suggested that there is a need for instructing people on how to use their free time, or to have the government and the public provide programs to solve the abuses of leisure. The problem, however, is much deeper than a use of free time. Sebastian de Grazia has pointed out that much free time is an illusion, because of the commitments of commuting, moonlighting, and house and home maintenance. Americans have free time in relationship to work, but even this is committed time and is devoted to useful endeavors. We have created a society in which free time is tolerated and urged as a reward for work; an opportunity for consumption, a time of recreation, and an interval in the circularity of work, free time and work. The problem is to be found in our attitude to work, and our goals as a society. We have reached a life without leisure. We have free time as a fruit of a technological and clock orientated society, but not leisure in the classical sense or as the Greeks understood it.

Classical Leisure

Leisure as it was understood by the Greek was a state of living free from everyday necessity. It was a life lived apart from work. Leisure was not understood as a respite from the circularity of work and free time, but was considered a time free to cultivate the free mind. Aristotle could write, “...in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants...” 4 To modern man only through work can a person pursue happiness. To the Greek it was only through not having to work that a man could pursue happiness. Leisure was the highest state of man, for being free from the necessity of labor, he could develop his mind, and soul in the contemplation of the good and beautiful. The benefits of leisure are those things which are ends in themselves; i.e. creativeness, truth, and freedom. Such people, when dedicated to the cultivation of the ideals, would on occasion become active in political life for the welfare of society. Their contribution was the contribution of ideas and ideal without which society could not progress intellectually, morally, or spiritually. Bertrand Russell recognized their role when he wrote, “Without the leisure class mankind would never have emerged from barbarism,” and in another place “leisure is essential to civilization.” This leisure was a state of life which neither demanded nor expected results. The Greek conception of leisure was a life lived in time but without the conception of time used by the workingman. Indeed it was a life of leisure, as distinct from a life of work. From men of leisure came ideas, political activity, and the development of philosophy.

Leisure of this type was not simply idleness. The man of leisure was fulfilling a natural function. Leisure was not a relief from work, there was no work dedicated to the securing of necessities for the man of leisure. This leisure was not for everyone, for it was given to a few within an aristocratic society. Leisure was really part of the entire division of functions for... “that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary but expedient...” 5 Plato in the Republic establishes the philosopher-kings who are supported by the labors of many, and have a state of leisure. Socrates abhorred work although he was interested in talking with the workingman.

Leisure was understood without reference to time. When time was spoken about it was time as duree — that time restricted to the arts and artists. The worker also had time which was a function of space and was circular.

Leisure was not defended by the Greeks on the basis of utilitarian considerations, or as a reward. It was “right” that a citizen had leisure. There were also no defenses based on the necessity that this must be used for education or study although the word school derives from the Greek, Schole, meaning leisure. Leisure was not something to be had at the end of eight or ten hours of exhausting work, but was an absence of caring for the necessities of life for the complete man. Leisure was justified in and of itself, and was good in itself.

Work

Our society is not built on a goal of leisure, but an ideology which glorifies the necessity of work.

We cannot ignore the necessity of work; someone has to grow food, make clothes, build houses, and provide goods and services. Even Aristotle and Plato recognized this in their societies with a leisure class. The revolution of the modern work ideology arises from a faith that all must work; leisure is immoral except it be earned; and utility and usefulness must justify uncommitted
time. Before we examine leisure we must examine the development of these ideas.

The philosophical foundation for our modern doctrines concerning work do not arise from the Greeks. It is one thing with the Greeks to say that a man becomes truly a man in leisure, and quite another thing to turn work into a right and establish as a national goal full employment in which there will and must be work for everyone. Our current outlook on work is supported by many seemingly conflicting sources. I will try to identify but a few.

The church has on occasion justified a doctrine of work on the grounds of God's condemning punishment for man's sin. "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread." Jesus' early life was presumably spent in a carpenter's shop. St. Paul, the tentmaker, rose to the defense of labor on the basis of justice — he who does not work neither shall he eat." John Wesley could admonish his followers that they should "work all you can, pray all you can, give all you can." Luther could compare with admiration the labor of a housewife as superior to that of a priest.

The clearest statement of which I am aware embodying these ideas was passed by the Executive Board and the Board of Social Missions of the U.C.L.A. in 1946. This statement contains the following affirmations: 6

1. It is the duty of all men to work.
2. It is the duty of every man, and every man in a Christian social order should have the opportunity to choose his work in keeping with the abilities which God has given him.
3. It is the duty of every man to provide an adequate living for himself and his dependents.
4. It is the duty of every man to acquire and preserve the fruits of his industry against present and future needs.

These basic tenets which are four of twelve were justified theologically by asserting a series of basic principles of which four are significant:

1. God's moral order recognizes no class system. In his sight all men are of eternal worth. He is no respecter of persons. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28).
2. In God's sight every calling, however, high or humble, which contributes to human welfare, is sacred and has His blessing. "Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant" (Matthew 20:27).
3. God ordained work for all. "If any would not work, neither should he eat" (II Thessalonians 3:10). Sloth is a sin against God and Man. Every able-bodied person should be engaged in some useful work and society should be so constituted as to make this possible.
4. God has abundantly provided the resources of the earth primarily for human benefit. Possessions are a sacred trust to be used not for selfish materialistic ends, but for human betterment today and in the future generations.

One searches in vain for any theology of leisure or claim for rest or free time in all the statements of the U.C.L.A. made between 1918-1962. The only statement pertaining to leisure or rest is found in a 1934 statement7 "That to deal constructively with the modern problem in increased leisure, we call upon our clergymen, and other leaders, particularly in the field of religious education, to create and promote the best possible parish and home programs for the worthy use of leisure; and thus positively contribute to the development of the richest attainable life experience for our people."

In 1963 a prayer for labor Sunday provided by the Department of Church and Economic Life of the National Council of Churches supported the imperative to work, the dangers of idleness, and the necessity of labor. This prayer said in part: "Help all of us to work at our best that we may not be parasites living in idleness on thy good resources and the labor of others. O Christ, enable us to follow thee and seek for every person the right to work at the job to which thou hast called him." Statements of other churches have arrived at similar ends, particularly as the concept of a calling has been used. However, they have often not distinguished between work performed from necessity, work related to increased consumption and motivated by greed and avarice, and work for the sake of work. They have not placed work in the context of a theological view of time as compared to a Christian view of time. Nor, on the other hand, have they accepted readily the idea that a state of leisure may also be a vocation. The final remnant of leisure is the clergy who are provided for their temporal support, given a life of leisure freed from the necessity of labor as the world knows it, in order that the clergyman might devote himself to the service of God.

These sentiments regarding work, of which the U.C.L.A.'s 1946 statement is an example, accord with some of the philosophical foundations and the results which accrue to classical economics. Harry K. Gervetz, in From Wealth to Welfare, asserts that the motivation for work of the classical economic system was built on the following foundations: a person has the right to the fruits of his labor; people must be free to work where they want; and no one should have access to the fruits of labor without toiling. 8 The Poor Law of 1834 was meant to put an end to those who received something for which they did not work. These foundations have appeared in the right to work which is justified by a claim to the due share of the fruits of industry.

The classical system of economics was based upon a psychology that man seeks his own welfare. The Austrian school propounded the theory that work was pain, and had disutility; pleasure is happiness, and possessed utility. A person would work only so long as the pain of work was not greater than the pleasure to be derived from not working. Man would work only for his self-
interest in which reason would limit all excesses. Adam Smith, basing his system upon this idea, asserted that it is not from charity but from self-love that one secures bread from the baker, or meat from the butcher. As each one pursues his own self-interest, he furthers the welfare of all. The limitations upon naked self-interest is reason, and ultimately marginal satisfaction as expounded by the felicific calculus of Bentham.

The classical economists, who justify an economic system of enterprise, were seeking to build a system of distribution or exchange and production. Within this system competition, work, and the pursuit of one's own interests by reason, would automatically guarantee an equitable distribution of wealth and provide a just distribution of the annual product produced, and also increase the national product. Not only was such a system "fair," it was also natural and conformed to the laws of nature. The wage which would accrue to the worker was equal to the value of his marginal product in a free enterprise competitive economy. Since his wage was equivalent to the value of his output such wages were fair and just. A person was being paid equivalent to his contribution to society, measured by the value of his work. In such a system, one would have progress, development, and also the maximum welfare of all. The role of the state was to be limited for it interfered with the effective operation of the competitive system, and the natural order.

Darwin's Origin of Species provided further support for the classical system since it propounded a doctrine of natural selection, survival of the fittest and struggle for existence. It appears in America from Herbert Spencer, and is popularized by William Graham Sumner. Richard Hofstadter says of Sumner that he brought together three great traditions of western capitalist culture: The Protestant ethic, the doctrines of classical economics, and Darwinian natural selection. His philosophy preached the application of Darwinian struggle to society, the necessity of work and labor; limited government interference; a moral basis of work and thrift; and the analogy of animal struggle and human competition where success is the reward of virtue.

Millionaires which appear in such a system are a product of natural selection. The struggle for survival is universal, and all must work or perish. Each one must, through competition, gain his fair share or die. Every man must be sober, industrious and prudent if poverty is to be abolished. John D. Rockefeller could proclaim that the problem of modern business is merely a survival of the fittest. If some small companies are overcome in the struggle it is part of the law of nature and a law of God.

Social Darwinism held a firm belief in liberty and democracy. It was democracy conceived of limited governmental interference. It reaches its popularity in 1900 with the passing of the Gold Standard Act. DeTocqueville early observed that "no men are less addicted to reverie than the citizens of a democracy," and America's business being business could not tolerate either a leisure class or leisure. All men are equal, and this equality demanded that all share the burden of progress, through increased output and work.

If one joins together the religious motive of duty to work with a just system of distribution under a classical system, and expounds it as scientifically based on the natural order of Darwin, one arrives at a work ethic. The continuing work ethic remains rooted in the conservative sector of American thought.

If the only fair and just way for a person to secure foods and services was by work, and it was just and fair that all have equal access to this world's goods, then it was necessary for someone to provide that person with work to do. Upon this basis arose the right to work philosophy. It is unjust that one receive that for which he has not labored. If one has a right to enjoy the things of this world, then full employment must become the goal of an expanded state function and responsibility. President Johnson in the Economic Report of the President in January, 1965, could state the philosophy succinctly: "American prosperity is widely shared. But too many are still precluded from its benefits by discrimination; by handicaps of illness, disability, old-age, or family circumstance; by unemployment or low productivity; by lack of mobility or bargaining power; by failure to receive the education and training from which they could benefit."

The switch has been complete. Where the Greeks could find happiness in the absence of work, America has adopted a philosophy of happiness only through work. Work is a necessity, but something alone which provides dignity, worth and importance to man. Even more, it is only by work that one contributes to a good society or a great society. In this kind of society and ideology the Greek idea of leisure is both foreign, strange, and out of place. We are left with nothing but free time and a theology of work.

The U.C.L.A. statement of 1946 could well be approved by William Graham Sumner and praised by the advocates of a democracy holding to the equality of all people. Even though the motivations may be different, the results are the same; it is unjust that people receive that for which they have not worked; it is the right of every man to work in order that he has access to the resources of this world; it is the duty of every man to work since it is natural. Then and only then will there come progress.

The Idea of Calling and Vocation

The Protestant ethic as the motivational force for work has been examined often by many scholars. Essentially it is the idea that people serve God both in work and through work, such work demands both diligence and thrift. Work is, however, more than a service; it is an evidence of faith. Laziness becomes a sin, and work a good work. In support of the Protestant ethic in its various forms, the Protestant churches have allied themselves with a work ethic. Yet many times individuals
and the church have confused calling and vocation. The question is fundamentally, does the concept of calling demand that a person work? Does the Christian faith call a man to labor or is work an expression of faith and part of the worldly obligation demanded as a citizen? Do we find justification for work in the law or the Gospel?

If the duty to work is Gospel and is to be undertaken as necessary for salvation then one’s work is part of a message of salvation by good works. The Christian is not called to a life of work but rather to a life of loving service. Too much of our work ethic is motivated and supported by something other than securing the means to give to others. Luther in searching for a definition of work and leisure could write, “Christ on the last day will not ask how much you have prayed, fasted, pilgrim-aged, done this or that for yourself, but how much good you have done for others, even the very least.” 

Often there has been a confusion of vocation and calling, as they have identified with labor. Cannot a life of contemplation and prayer, which the world would call leisure, also be a calling? Is not vocation first being a Christian, then doing what you will? Is not the Christian ethical imperative to show agape love? Vocation needs to be rescued from work. “Luther’s concept of vocation, like a coin, has two sides to it — but it is one coin! On one side he conceives of vocation as Gospel, as a call to life in Christ and in His body, the church; on the other side he conceives of vocation as law, as a call to obedience and service.”

The meanings of vocation in the New Testament are: “(a) God calls men into the church through repentance and faith in Christ; (b) within the church he calls certain individuals to perform special functions; and (c) he calls all members of the body of Christ to a holy life in all their relationships.”

The conclusion is to be drawn — one does not need to work in order to be saved; work is a part of the kingdom of the world, not of the kingdom of God; and work is part of a life of necessity not of the Gospel. Rome has taken the position, as George Forell has stated, that work is an evil but a necessary evil, while Geneva said work is the activity which gives life meaning and zest. Luther’s contribution to vocation was to give a sense of calling to other than priests. In his view of work and leisure he appears somewhere between Rome and Geneva.

The questions which arise demand negative answers. Does one need to work in order to be a Christian? Is leisure as a state of man wrong? Is one’s salvation tied in with the occupation pursued? To what is the Christian called, and the answer which Dr. Heiges gives is to glorify God by service to all men; to make the best use of the gifts God has given him; and he equips him by grace to be instrumental to God in realization of his purposes for the whole creation.

These things need to be asserted before one can establish leisure in its proper place. The Christian concept of vocation does not call to a duty to work for itself, a duty to private property, or a duty to struggle: such motives come from a different source.

Work and Economic Society and Time

Our present economic society cannot exist without work, and labor for it is the very basis of progress. The motivation for work does not lie in the Protestant ethic, nor the concept of a calling, but rather in consumption-oriented drives supported by a philosophy of economic society. Work itself is, even in spite of this, often considered as something distasteful. The Lynds found this to be true in Middletown. The transition from an agrarian to an urban society is marked by the appearance of classical liberalism and its doctrine of work, and a rationalization of the factors of production.

If leisure is a desirable goal of man, it must be rescued by an understanding of time. Time in the Darwinism world is circular. It is repetitious activity without purpose. Epstein tried to illustrate this with a statue of Christ. This statue, found in a Wales Cathedral, places the cross of Christ on a cylinder. Time in this world is circular, it is repetitious, and it is money. The phrase “time is money” implies a limit to that which is available. Thus the development along with social Darwinism of the piece work, the rise of scientific management, and the inevitable stop watch. Modern industrial society cannot exist without a rationalization of men’s efforts to the clock. The result of this interval between work is not idleness, nor is it leisure — it is recreation time, refreshment time, and free time. The Greeks understood leisure as that which was necessary to provide a man with dignity, and significance; now it is the gospel of work which has taken over.

Time, as one part of labor, is set against a background of value. The economic concept of value is based upon price set by demand and supply in a market. Something is said to have utility if it is demanded. For a thing to be demanded it must have utility. If something is not demanded, or is in abundant supply, it can have no value. The price of something is its value established in the marketplace. In an industrial society, dedicated to production, time connected with work becomes valuable, but leisure in which no output is produced has no value to that goal. Value is set by the marketplace. If it has no price, it has no value. The clergy and the leisure class are both opposed by the socialists as valueless. Rest is justified only as it is related to relaxation, rest, and preparation for more work. The service of the clergy has no “value” in this sense, since the price is not set in the marketplace, and they do not have utility. The clerical call recognizes this distinction when it says “for your temporal support we are authorized to provide you etc.” A clergyman is not hired, he is called. A clergyman is freed from necessity, thus he has a life of leisure. One must look for the value of the services of a clergyman on a different basis than a work ethic, and a utilitarian concept of value.
No one, not least of all an economist, would deny for a moment that industrial society does not need work in order to create goods and services. But is there not something wrong when we equate an increase in gross national product as output, and the putting of people to work as progress? Is there not something wrong when we seem to be redeeming the existing spatial time with greater and greater machine output, which demands more work, so that we can consume more? Is there not something wrong when value and price are identical? The circularity of time has brought with it a circularity of progress.

We produce more, to consume more, to clutter up the countryside with greater and greater piles of discarded automobiles. If Butler's criticism of Darwin is correct that he has banished mind from the universe, it might also be said that we have banished mind from progress and from development.

The significance of the concept of leisure for an industrial society does not lie in free time, but rather in its importance to man, as someone of mind and soul. It was at one time believed that the only way to control men was to keep them working. Within industrial society must come a better measure of man than efficiency, and a higher evaluation of him than his contribution to output. The concept of time as something significant for greater output, must be replaced by a concept of time as something which belongs to men of minds. With animals there is no time.

Leisure and Work — A Re-examination

The Greek ideal of leisure and understanding of work, placed the latter in the area of necessity. Leisure for the development of the mind, and the soul was a gift to free men. Leisure is for the citizen. Work was reserved for the slaves. The denouncement of leisure begins with the rejection of the break-up of medieval society, and the institution of the modern. It was attacked as a class distinction, and not as a something belonging to human beings generally. The Greek understanding of leisure was that not all people could use it, and not all wanted it. Leisure as freedom from necessity to pursue the life of the mind is to the Greek good in and of itself.

The classic remnant of this ideal is found in the university. One of the oldest human institutions is the university as a community of scholars who are free from the pressure of necessity in order to concern themselves with truth, justice, beauty, and reason. The universities were custodians of the liberal arts as the humanizing arts. Among the scholars time went on without limitation, set by the clock. The scholar may well be the last leisure man left in society. The modern university has, however, been invaded by the concept of utilitarianism, where research and inquiry must be useful, and profitable for economic development. There is something unnerving about the consideration of education as investment in human capital and as our most profitable investment. When education is valued for its economic benefits, one of the last bastions of leisure sought out by the Greeks is gone.

We too often train people to be useful, i.e., work-oriented citizens, in businesses dedicated to useful education, in order to pursue useful lives, in time which is to be put to the best use. Then we complain that people demand that free time be filled with activities, which have value for them, in their useful lives. The modern concept of work moves it from the area of necessity, and places it in the arena of the way to happiness, something done for the welfare of society as a whole. No one denies that certain people work for the satisfaction of their artistic interest, enjoyment, and to feel worthwhile and significant. There may well be some therapeutic value to work.

But work and production feed on themselves. John Kenneth Galbraith has written: "Production only fills a void that it has itself created." We produce goods which have to be sold to people by advertising. People produce more goods to get other goods, and spontaneous consumers' needs become something other than the motive for consumption.

It appears to be significant that the argument for leisure is something other than idleness. The defense is for the preservation of the dignity and importance and worth of man. It is an argument for freedom for the life of the mind and of the soul against the machine society. It is an argument for returning time, which is life, back again to the one who has it, the individual.

An argument might well be raised at this point. Do you want to let everyone free from work in order that they can spend their time in idleness? Where will we be then, if no one wants to work? This is not the question. Work must always be done, and there appears to be always people who want to do it. The question is whether the PROCESS, the METHOD, work itself is so important, in and of itself, like the Darwinian struggle, that to reduce it is to destroy the basis of life, and of existence. It is a question again of whether the method is of more importance than the end and the significance of man.

The base of our foundations of work society are open to some searching questions. The absolute right of private property, embodied in a concept of natural law has been eroded repeatedly by various supreme court decisions. A corporation exists by the legal authority granted by the state, private property has given way to a concept of the general welfare, yet the doctrine of work remains. Is it right that all people should work? Does equality demand equality in the method, or equality on some other basis? There is no acceptable absolute standard, yet work has been applied as one. Are citizens equal because they all participate in the same struggle for existence? Is leisure so valuable that it cannot be offered to all, to develop a life of the mind?

Towards Leisure

Too many arguments, either for or against leisure,
December 1965

start at the wrong poles. Leisure is necessary for the
development of the life of the mind and soul — note the
previous reference to school and schole. Work is neces-
sary to build consumption, an increase in national out-
put, and great and greater things. Work is evaluated by
efficiency and utilitarianism. Many of the discussions are
those concerned with the misuse of leisure, and in-
volve the creation of something opposed to leisure. Some-
one in England recently suggested a ministry of leisure.
Some people in this country would have free time
organized by recreational directors. I suppose the goal
would be to exercise people by push-ups rather than lift-
ing garbage cans around the house. The leisure time
problem, says Dr. Paul Weiss, can be solved by encour-
aging or compelling people to learn to like things they
presently dislike. A paper entitled, "A comprehensive
plan for the wise use of leisure," contained the sugges-
tion by Paul A. Douglas, and Robert W. Crawford,13
that an action agenda lies in the lap of the career
professional recreators. The point is that leisure cannot
be organized without destroying it. It cannot be com-
pelled, or it is no longer free time. In many suggestions,
there is again the utilitarian concept of time — it must
be useful, and that means recreation, play, or something
for the welfare of the person himself.

There can only come leisure as we are prepared to put
work in its proper role and place. It cannot come, by
talking about the wise use of leisure, nor the necessity
of taking a new attitude towards free time. Free time
we must have in order to enjoy the benefits of leisure.
To establish leisure and its goals in modern society, I
think we need to examine a series of propositions.

1. It is not the duty of every man to work. So per-
suasive has become the doctrine of work that we can
equate the absence of a job with some imperfection in
the person. We look upon the person without a job as
being a misfit in society, and at worst, a rebel, often
without any particular reason. Children are, however,
our newest leisure class often to the age of twenty-five.
The concept of the Christian calling does not demand
that one fulfill his vocation solely by work, nor does it
demand that only in the contact with the material world
does one develop one's dignity and worth as a human
being. The latter is Hegelian, not Christian. Our pre-
sent concept of duty to work is based upon the Hebraic
concept that the worker is rewarded and the laggard
punished. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
There is nothing meritorious in work in and of itself
which demands that it be done by everyone. The use of
work to cure vice, and crime, is in reality a fiction. The
way to solve this problem is through education, the
development of culture, and Christianity. These are moral
problems, work must be placed in the area of necessity,
not in the area of divine imperative.

Work for the Christian, in the sense of the calling,
always is part of the kingdom of the world, and not of
the Kingdom of God. The confusion of the two has re-
sulted in many Christian sermons sounding like evolu-
tion being preached to the masses. The urge for people
to work, and provide for their own, is in the area of
the law, and not in the area of the Christian Gospel.

2. Every man has a right to the use of his time. If a
person chooses to take this in leisure, or devote it to
work, this is his time to use as he sees fit. Time is that
which a person owns, not something which society can
command. As soon as something controls a person's
time, it controls that person completely. It is of the
essence of leisure that a person ought to be free to use
that time in the way that he sees fit within the confines
of the mores and laws of society. Brooks Atkinson has
called leisure a form of private enterprise. If everyone
has a right to his time, and is not compelled to work,
how shall the things of the world be produced? This is
not an idle question, it troubled those concerned with
the reduction of the work week in the past, and it con-
cerned business leaders even now with the talk of the
thirty-five or thirty-two hour week. How will we then
progress? Certainly there may not be progress in the
terms of gross national product. Is GNP the only way
that one measures the progress of mankind? Can we
assume that there will not be people who will choose to
work?

It is perhaps this argument which has given leisure
a bad name. The militarists of every age, first talk of
expansion and an increase in output, then of war. Leis-
ure is the way to peace, not to war.

3. The Christian church needs to reject the Hebraic
foundation of society, that he who does not work,
neither shall he eat. This is part of the law, and is the
foundation of the assessment of deserts. In a way it is
also the foundation of the classical economic system —
one receives the blessings of prosperity only by offering
work, and receiving in return income by which one can
purchase goods and services. However descriptive this
may be of economic society, it is something else again
to propound this as a law. It is significant that many
fundamentalist Christians are also the strongest sup-
porters of extreme right wing economic organizations.
The sentiment is the same, and the motives identical.

There are other ways for a Christian to receive and to
have the things of this world apart from work. The orga-
nization, and use of Christian charity demands the
sharing and the provision of LOVING service to those
in need. The current role of the state accepts this same
kind of philosophy — to share with those who have not.
It is a most strange Christian prayer which pleads for
absence from living on the resources of others. Many
people live off the physical output of others. Each
scholar in a university, if he never publishes a book,
and never teaches a student, is a man of leisure. Such
a person would probably be occupying an endowed chair.

4. There is need for a restatement again of that which
is needed in order to provide dignity to men. The work
ethic states that dignity is secured only through labor,
and that happiness is found for society as a whole, only
in work. In defense of humanity, and of the worth and
importance of man, this needs to be rejected. Man develops his dignity in the consideration of those things which provide for the development of the mind, and of the soul. Perhaps we can refer to our problems with free time as leisure problems because we have not made a distinction between the worth of man, and the work of man. We have taught people the necessity of work, but not the things which make for humanity. The Hobbesian concept of man, as someone moved solely by selfish interests, must be replaced by the understanding that man is moved by ideas, and ideals. Economic man, which has been destroyed by modern psychology, has not died in the economic society of which we are a part. We need to get rid of the evolutionary concept of man without purpose and without a goal and a guide. Mind must be restored again to the universe, and to man.

The dignity and worth of man demands that the machine be employed for the use of man, and not man's life organized to the machine. The rationalization of human endeavour is one part of the problem, but it is something else again to rationalize the totality of man's life.

5. Time must be freed from utilitarianism. The circularity of time expounded by the evolutionists is entombed in economics by saying that time is money. Time given to an individual does not need to be evaluated in the scale of values of whether it is, or is not useful. Free time as something useful for society, as a time for consumption, as a time for recreation, and as a time for happiness has no place in a theory of leisure. No such utilitarian concept of time is found in the Christian concept of time as both telos and finis. One's use of time does not determine one's eternal salvation. Time is measured in the scales of eternity, and here time is endless. A man can sit and do nothing, for that in and of itself is good. Freeing man from the burdensome obligations of work is good in and of itself, it does not need to be justified by any standards set outside itself. Leisure, as uncommitted time, is a worthy good. It requires no external justification.

Leisure For Everyone?

It is obvious that not everyone can have a life, or a state of leisure free of all work. There are necessities of life to be provided. One's leisure is limited by his necessity to work to earn a living and provide for himself and his family. Aristotle and Plato conceived of leisure for a particular class, in an aristocracy. The creation of a total society of leisure people is a chimeraical hope and unrealistic. People would starve to death in the midst of the means available for their livelihood.

A fundamental question concerns the distribution of goods and services. How would goods and services be distributed? Would each receive of that produced according to his need, or his ability? There have been many utopian schemes directed towards this problem. The utopians like Sir Thomas More thought that one could create more leisure for everyone by changing the distribution of income. The Socialists and their push for efficiency shared the same emphasis. The Socialist proposals have been instrumental in destroying the last remnants of a leisure class precisely on the matter of distribution. Work provides a criteria of distribution which, although it may not be perfect, is at least the best that we have at the present.

The problem of the maintenance and distribution of leisure becomes the hub upon which much of the problem hinges. How does a man of leisure support himself? Does he need property, income, a rich aunt or uncle, or something equivalent to it? Plato and Aristotle accepted as a fact that the man of leisure would be provided for — perhaps not in luxury — but at least he did not starve. It is also assumed that society would produce such a surplus of goods and services that one could support a leisure class.

How is leisure to be gained and distributed: Is it to be secured at the bargaining table in some kind of power struggle? Will a democracy tolerate an order where there is inequality of leisure?

The assumption that work provides the best, and only method of distribution ignores the fact that if all men are equal, they are certainly not paid equally. The argument for leisure is not based on the premise that one substitutes another basis of distribution for work. It is rather against the idea that all men should work; work is the end, and not a means to an end; and through work alone can happiness be secured. Because some people choose work rather than leisure is insufficient grounds for asserting that thus democracy is being destroyed, injustice is being created, and progress is stopped.

The state is currently involved in the distribution of goods and services, through its effect upon income. A defense of leisure does not involve the substitution of an alternate economic utopian society. A huge leviathan allocating resources would be repugnant to our concept of democracy, and our sense of values.

Dr. Lee, I am sure, wrestled with these problems in Religion and Leisure in America. He concluded that leisure is a state of mind. One is at leisure by feeling that one is. Leisure is secured by changing one's attitude to work. A thing is not work if we do it willingly. Yet this doesn't really solve the problem. Leisure must have a quantity of time available. If we measure a leisure society in our modern age by the free time available we have the quantity. We cannot, however, convert free time to leisure until there is also a quality to society. Such quality cannot come until there is a change concerning the attitude towards work, time, and human dignity. Jacques Maritain points out that friendship required a great waste of time, and much idleness; creative thinking requires a great deal of idleness. It is one thing to want to engage in some activity, it is another thing to be forced to. Leisure is marked by a different state of mind, but also a quantity of time.

Leisure is always the state of a man who is freed from
necessity, who has the dignity of a human being, whose time is his own, and is not under the compulsion of ideals or ideas that he must work. He engages in whatever activity he desires, for its own sake and its own sake alone. It is one thing to demand in the name of justice, democracy, social order, and progress that a person work. It is quite another thing to provide opportunity for work in which a person might engage if he chooses. It is quite one thing for the Christian church to insist upon labor and work, as necessary to Christian faith and conviction, it is another matter to respect contemplation as a vocation.

Leisure in a democracy is a goal for everyone. If by leisure we mean the time in which a man might do as he chooses, our society is rich and wealthy enough to make this possible. If we mean time for the individual to develop his mind, and his soul, then we have the quantity — free time — in which to accomplish it. I think we are making a step towards a leisure society if we insist that it is not the duty of all men to work; a man's time is his own; free time must be freed from utilitarian concerns; man's dignity is found both in work, as well as apart from work; and the Hebraic order of justice is really a technique of production and distribution and should be considered as such. We will have made a step towards the leisure society, when we have removed the religious, moral, and economic stigma attached to leisure.

Conclusion
Leisure is not idleness, when one has the necessities of life provided for oneself, and for one's own. Leisure is not indolence when there is no penalty attached to its enjoyment. Work becomes service, when it is removed from the area of compulsion, and made something which is done willingly. Work for work's sake has no benefit or merit. Its justifications lies in its purpose and reason. Alvin Hansen, the great Harvard economist, is perhaps right, we have learned how to make a living; we still have to learn how to live. One of the ways to learn is to examine work, leisure, time, and their relationships.

On Second Thought
There was this younger son who had wasted his substance in riotous living. He was deserted by his friends in a famine stricken land. He found a job feeding pigs. In his gloomy despair, ridden by guilt, he began to think. "The servants in my father's house have more than I. I will return and ask to be taken on as a servant there — God knows I have totally failed as a son."

So he returned. His father met him, and he said: "Father, I am not worth being called a son. I've botched it. Make me a servant. Set somebody over me so that I can no longer destroy things. Give me orders, set bounds around me, control me. Keep me obedient and faithful under law. Let me know exactly what I can and cannot do."

But the father said, "No, son. You are a son. Your mistakes do not count against you, because I am a father and not a boss. But you cannot escape being a son and free. I do not need an irresponsible slave. I need you as a responsible son. Put on the robe of sonship, take again the ring of authority, and live in grace with me. You will make mistakes again, but you are still my son."

The older brother disagreed. "That's dangerous," he said, "No man who has once been faithless can be trusted again. You should have dismissed him from our fellowship. You should at least set boards and committees over him to discipline him, so that no error ever proceeds from this house. All these years I have been faultlessly true, but it's for him that you prepare the banquet of grace!"

The father replied: "You do not understand. This son has been lost — and may be lost again. But he is my son and now he is found. The grace has always been there for you, had you wanted it. It is there for all my sons. But I will not control them as though they were slaves. I can forgive failures but I cannot prevent them. I have called you sons so that you might be free. It is only in freedom that the banquet of grace may be held."

Does this go beyond the parable? Perhaps. But if you go somewhere and find the spirit of discipline and control and the fear of error, it is probably not the father's house to which you have returned.
“And it came to pass in those days - -” Luke 2, 1
And it came to pass in those days just as it still comes to pass in our days. The Russians come up with some new achievement and the stock market all but falls out of its own bottom. The great men of the world meet in special conference and we know in advance that the results are not going to be confined to the meeting but will most surely touch us where we live. And so you learn to live with it that way because things do come to pass, things over which we have no control, but things which have a tremendous effect upon our lives. Surely it comes as no great revelation from God when we are told that something just comes to pass.

Well, what was it that came to pass in those days? With a flourish of the pen befitting a veritable god, Caesar Augustus signs a decree into law. Now it needed only to be proclaimed in the world over which Caesar ruled and men would-learn again that they don’t shape their own destinies. There are always others in control and the best you can do on occasion is wonder why the control should be given into the hands of such fools.

Where should we look for the immediate effects of Caesar’s decree? It’s Christmas now, so we are directed to a little village called Nazareth. And we find that even back there in the hill country of Galilee people are affected by what is done in Rome. At least one couple is packing for a journey that they would rather avoid.

Travel is none too good at its best in that part of the world, but it was worse for the poor. And Mary and Joseph were the poorest of the poor. Worse still, Mary would soon give birth to a child. Better by far if she had stayed at home, better except for one thing: Caesar’s decree. So it came to pass that Mary and Joseph started out for Bethlehem against their own better judgment, certainly against their own personal desire. Caesar had spoken and so they went to be counted in the city of their birth. Caesar’s decrees don’t allow for exceptions.

We still haven’t gotten beyond what we read in our own headlines. Curious, isn’t it, that certain very ordinary and basic experiences should be so very similar throughout history?

But as we read on in what came to pass according to St. Luke’s record, we find real indignation welling up within us and thank God that even governments can hardly get away with what came to pass in those days. If no one else, social workers would scream bloody protest. Wherever they tried to find room, there was no room for Mary and Joseph in Bethlehem. Even if there had been room, there would have been no room for them. Good money is to be made when lodging is at a premium, and obviously, Mary and Joseph didn’t have that kind of money. And so, while soldiers drank their toasts and business men lamented what they were losing by having to stay in this hick-town for even one night, Mary and Joseph prepared to put themselves up for the night in a stable. Not that this was like our smelly barns, necessarily. But it still was a shelter that was used primarily for animals.

Now we know how it came to pass that Mary was in Bethlehem: Caesar had gotten his bright idea at just this time. Now we know how Mary came to be in a stable this fateful night: there was no room for them in the inn. And so it was, the story proceeds in good story form, that while they were there, the days were accomplished that Mary should be delivered of her child. If death had been there, we would have all of life in a nutshell: birth and taxes and death. Perhaps it should remind us that we are all born into a world of government, a world in which men even determine your birth. If we project some thirty years, we can also see that men have the power to say when and how you shall die, and that in the very one who was born in a stable because of Caesar’s decree.

What do you do when you are trapped by such adverse conditions? You make the best of it, especially if you are accustomed to being poor. “Humble,” people call it. “Knowing your place and staying in your place without too much complaining.” So the Babe was born in a stable because things were what they were and Mary had no other place to go at the time. The best that could be done was done for the lovely Babe. He was wrapped as babies were wrapped in those days and, since there was no baby bed, they laid the Babe in a manger. It’s touching, but under the circumstances, what else? Caesar’s decree from Rome — inhospitable and unfeeling and crowded Bethlehem — the full course of nine months pregnancy completed: that’s how it all came to pass. So it was.

But it’s Christmas now, so that right now we had better find God’s meaning in all this or live with no meaning to anything. What we have so far is literally what any scientific or historical or just plain nosy investigation would uncover. But that is always the world without God and Christmas without Christ. If ever we should be reminded of our fatal limitations at discerning what is really involved in anything, it should be here. The highest that we can be brought to here if we go it on our own, is a clucking sympathy and a noble resolve that we
won't let anything like that come to pass in our day. But it's Christmas now and if we will but listen, we will hear what God makes known to us.

We go out of Bethlehem a little way, almost as if we must draw back somewhat to get the proper perspective. And if we can bring ourselves low enough, off those terrible pinnacles of our own expectations and off those heights of our personal evaluations, we will suddenly find ourselves on the ground. A brightness fills the sky that rivals the noonday sun. Who wouldn't be terrified by something like that in the middle of the night? But a calming voice comes out of the terrorizing brightness and produces what it says. "Fear not!" And only such a voice from God Himself can quiet our real fears, the fears that we are bound to know unless God tells us that we need not fear. And now everything that we have seen from our human vantage point is rehearsed as it is seen in the light of heaven. In the very matter-of-factness of what came to pass, we are able to find the Good News of God to ourselves and to all people.

It's Christmas now, for unto you is born this day in the city of David, the Savior, which is Christ the Lord! Well, what do we need to be saved from? Surely, if the story has meant anything so far, we must see how badly we need to be saved from the meaningless of daily occurrence over which we have no control. The Savior is born at Bethlehem, not because Caesar sent out his decree, but because God had so decreed before Caesar was every born. It's Christmas now. That means that there is nothing fortuitous about life, nothing left to haphazard and unfeeling chance, nothing fully turned over to men, high or low. God is God and God keeps His promises, even if He must turn the whole world upside down to do it. God's purposes are being accomplished right now even as they were accomplished then, over the dusty, tiresome road; through the streets that had no welcome, all the way to the stable: God's own Son is involved here and God's own sons are involved to this day. It's Christmas now: God cared for His Son and God cares for us. We can trust Him above and beyond the decrees of Caesar. We can take Him at His Word above and beyond the appearance of things. God is still God and God loves us. We know, because it's Christmas now. God's Son is born the Savior for us.

It's Christmas now! Only be sure that we let God have it His way. We find the Savior wrapped in swaddling clothes and lying in a manger. It wasn't merely that Bethlehem was money-mad: God wanted us to know the Savior of the lowly in the lowly stable, to recognize our Lord with no higher authority than the swaddling clothes, to honor our Christ on no greater throne than a manger. Here all reason to fear and despair is taken away, otherwise we have not gotten the implications of the swaddling-clothes and we will still think that the Savior was laid in a manger only because there was no room for Him in the inn. Above and beyond that of which men can easily tell is that which only God can reveal to us.

It's Christmas now! It's no different now with all the news accounts which tell us of what we are involved in. It's no different at all, if we can look into a manger, see Babe wrapped in swaddling clothes and still kneel and worship our Savior who is Christ the Lord.

Divine truth is truth in itself. It is independent of the men who serve it. It cannot be permanently twisted by them, for it is their judge. With this principle in mind The Cresset hopes to point the way toward a new fusion of the intellectual and spiritual life, the unity of which is predicated on the absoluteness of spiritual truth and the relativity of intellectual activity. Truth in every field of human endeavor must constantly be referred to the divine Word.

"I hear the scream of Nature." — Edvard Munch

In 1908 a young German, Wilhelm Worringer, wrote *Abstraction and Empathy*, his doctoral thesis, in which he described two opposite approaches to expression in the history of art. One approach was that of abstraction, in which man — for instance, primitive man — created works of art that were pure geometric designs, or stylized, simplified representations of objects. Through losing oneself contemplating these abstractions man experienced a sense of the permanent, the changeless, the absolute; and this brought reassurance and rest in an otherwise fearsome and seemingly fortuitous world.

The other approach to visual expression was that of empathy, in which man — for instance, the classical Greek — created works of art that were representations of the natural, organic vitality of an object corresponding to man's own sense of the natural and organic. Through losing oneself in contemplating this expression man experienced a feeling of heightened vitality reaffirming a confidence in and reverence for the external world.

In 1910 Worringer wrote *Form in Gothic*, in which he developed the idea that the "Gothic will to form" involved a combination of the above two approaches. The art of northern European man was described as a "vitalized geometry." For instance, the endlessly interlacing, abstract lines of barbarian Germanic art, or, more familiar to us, the feverish rhythm of the upward surging lines of the Gothic cathedral overpower the viewer with an unnatural energy and bring him release in an exalted sense of the infinite . . . the infinitely small, the infinitely active, the infinitely distant, etc.

Then turning to his own day, the beginning of the twentieth century, Worringer saw the combination of emotional vitality and abstract form being taken up in an individualistic way by some of the artists around him in northern Europe. These artists we now call German expressionists.

In Dresden in 1904, four young architecture students turned to painting and printmaking and worked and lived together to form a new art expression. They called themselves *Die Brücke*, the bridge into the future. They were dissatisfied with the overrefined, technically correct, dry, mechanically classical painting then prevalent in such grandiose paintings as "Christ on Mount Olympus." Nor did they feel that the sweetly pretty impressionist style then in vogue among the more liberal German artists could be used to express their reactions to the tragic and joyous of contemporary life. Instead they were inspired by the fifteenth century German religious woodcuts and paintings. They also saw in the art of the African sculptors, and other primitive art, a directness in the use of materials and abstract shapes that carried great power.

The German expressionist prints here reproduced are of the same subject, yet each pictures the scene differently. Obviously neither artist illustrated the "actual" scene; neither artist followed closely traditional Christian symbolism. Instead each spontaneously used materials to express his own feelings of the moment about the subject.

In the Schmidt-Rottluff the sharp angular black and white shapes with the many short ray-like lines; the jarring, squeezing forward of the figures gives the effect of a stunning, crackling light coming from in front of the Kings, yet between them and the viewer, and so forcing the viewer to participate in this ecstatic reaction to the birth of Christ. Although the figures each have individual character, they cannot be identified with any cultural group. This print takes full advantage of the unique qualities that a knife cutting unconventionally into the grain side of a block of wood can give.

The print by Nolde was impulsively drawn on a block of stone with crayon and brush and reflects the fluid effects more natural to these materials. The effect is that one is a spectator to the solemn gestures of a mysterious ritual or drama. There is a mood of complete absorption and commitment by rather unheroic people.

In such works the German expressionists have, in this age of abstraction, opened the way towards a highly personal, emotional expression of faith.

December 1965
The Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center

One can easily find faults with the production of Georg Buechner's "Danton's Death" with which Herbert Blau and Jules Irving opened the new Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center. And the critics did find faults ranging from uneven acting — which was undoubtedly true — to a belated panning of the play, written in 1835 and first produced about seventy years later. But whatever one can say against the production, its shortcomings are due to our long short-sightedness as to the necessity of a subsidized repertory theatre. Real estate alone cannot bridge this gap overnight or over a season, and in this connection it must be said that the new Vivian Beaumont Theatre is one of the most beautiful and perfect modern theatres I have seen.

Blau and Irving who established their reputation with their Actor's Workshop in San Francisco are facing a challenging task. They have not yet proved their ability except through the choice of this play and a repertory program ("The Country Wife," Sartre's "The Condemned of Altona," Brecht's "The Caucasian Chalk Circle") which shows good literary taste, integrity and theatre knowledge. Whether they will be able to translate their intentions into the reality of good theatre is another question. But in contrast to the slick, Broadwayish approach of their predecessors, Kazan and Whitehead, they aim at a program that has literary substance and meaning in its relatedness to our time. We had one good repertory theatre, the APA, and out of no justifiable reasons this company which had proved itself through two seasons at the Phoenix Theatre, was unable to receive a foundation grant to continue its work. Messrs. Blau and Irving must be given at least two years to prove themselves, to find actors who can speak and act (contrasting in their homogeneity), to direct their plays with less reliance on technical devices in which this new stage abounds and which are treacherous in their temptations.

These are the major weaknesses. Particularly "Danton's Death" cries out for a good ensemble which through its unevenness undermined all good intentions. The electronic music by Morton Subotnick was uncalled-for whenever heard, especially during the guillotine scene; it added nothing and murdered the mood. Herbert Blau, the director, misunderstood — as some critics did — Buechner's dramaturgy. Danton's antagonist is only seemingly Robespierre. In fact, it is the Parisian mob. But one can't fill a large stage with a handful of people. They always looked pitifully unreal, trying to represent the masses which are the driving force.

The main theme of the play is not that power, in the mantle of righteousness, cannot help turning into terror. It is one of the themes. The 21-year-old Buechner wrote this drama after having become a disillusioned revolutionary. In spite of it, he remained a revolutionary romanticist, imbued with liberal idealism. In 1834 he founded the "League of Human Rights." He nurtured no hope that the intellectual or the bourgeois would rise against Metternich's police state. He turned to the penniless peasant and wrote his inflammatory pamphlet, "The Hessian Courier." But the "people" were indifferent or frightened and handed the pamphlets over to the police. The revolutionaries were tracked down. Betrayal among themselves and cowardice did the rest. Life had taught Buechner a bitter lesson. His study of Thiers' "French Revolution" added to his disillusionment. In less than five weeks he wrote the play in his father's private laboratory. He heard the marching boots of the police, reports of new arrests. Twice he was cross-examined and sent home. But he knew only too well that they were out to break his spirit, and he fled to Switzerland where he died at the age of twenty-four.

He had experienced Robespierre's blind and relentless terror against weakness and resistance, and more than this he went through the inner terror of Danton and his psychotic feelings. In "Danton's Death" his disgust with and contempt for the common man for whose freedom he fought, is obvious. When Robespierre disappears from the second half of the play, it is not a dramaturgic weakness or flaw. Buechner sees in the non-presence of Robespierre a frightening kafkaesque void. The more the accused Danton demands to be confronted with his enemy, the stronger becomes Robespierre as the growing shadow which, in turn, becomes identified with the irrational mood of a depraved and half-witted mob.

The greatness of the play lies in the dramatization of Danton's self-defeat, in his existentialist feeling of futility. Danton is the first passive hero. He is the epitome of disgust with the world and himself. True, he himself was a mass murderer. Buechner, as the ideal liberal, felt that man could not progress without revolution, without those cataclysmic eruptions of nature. He saw the badly needed progress for which he could not help fighting, misused. He felt with Robespierre: "Away with the clique that has stolen the lives of the dead aristocrats and inherited their sores!" And he felt with Danton that he'd rather be killed than go on killing. It is the dilemma of the liberal left off center at that time and today, his need to fight for a cause without being able to communicate with the masses whose cause it is.

"Danton's Death" is about the most contemporaneous problems written in 1835. This makes it so fascinating a play and so difficult to produce.
Two salient facts impel me to devote another column to the late Albert Schweitzer, who was one of the truly great men in history. In the first place, I must stress the unmistakable sincerity of purpose that characterized his whole life; in the second place, I must give emphasis once more to the undeniable honesty that pervaded his performances of music from the pen of Johann Sebastian Bach.

Although I do not propose to descant extensively on Schweitzer’s convictions in the field of theology, I consider it important to point out that this man actually lived the religion he professed. You and I may question some of his conclusions, but would we have the hardihood to doubt his sincerity? He was neither a coward nor a Pharisee. He was humble and utterly unselfish. To him his religion was infinitely more than lip service or ostentatious display. He knew that Bach’s music, when properly performed, stands on its own feet and needs no cheap expressionistic crutches. Schweitzer’s playing was straightforward and to the point. Anything smacking even faintly of mawkishness was always conspicuous by its absence. The great master never failed to pay careful and loving attention to the wonderful structural aspects of the music.

Many years later Nies-Berger collaborated with Schweitzer in an edition of some of Bach’s organ works. His father and Schweitzer had been close friends. Both had been enrolled at Strasbourg University at the same time, and both had studied the organ and its literature under Ernest Munch, father of Charles Munch, who is one of the foremost conductors of our age. At that moment I do not know how Charles Munch and Schweitzer came to be related by marriage, but Munch himself told me that he and the great Bach authority were relatives. Ernest Munch was a highly respected exponent of the music of Bach. I think of this whenever I listen to recordings of some of Bach’s works as played by the Boston Symphony Orchestra while it was under the leadership of Charles Munch.

Now I shall say a few words about the honesty of purpose and accomplishment that characterized Schweitzer’s performances of Bach’s organ music. But I must preface my remarks with the statement that I can speak of his readings only on the basis of the recordings he made.

Schweitzer’s big heart overflowed with kindness. But this did not induce him to overlay his performances with vapid sentimentalism. His keen understanding of Bach’s music, founded as it was on intensive study and on sterling musicianship, prevented him from indulging in the slushy expression-mongering that characterizes much of the Bach playing that assails our ears today. He was neither a ritardando fiend nor an organist given to what the Germans call Effekthascherei, which means theatricality or ostentatious display. He knew that Bach’s music, when properly performed, stands on its own feet and needs no cheap expressionistic crutches. Schweitzer’s playing was straightforward and to the point. Anything smacking even faintly of mawkishness was always conspicuous by its absence. The great master never failed to pay careful and loving attention to the wonderful structural aspects of the music.

Now I shall dwell for a moment or two on something which to my knowledge has never been adequately stressed by those who have undertaken to discuss Schweitzer as an uncommonly learned Bach specialist. Will you bespatter me with mud or black venom for suspecting that the music of Richard Wagner may have played a significant role in Schweitzer’s development as a scholar who spoke and wrote about Bach’s music with unquestionable authoritativeness? Do as you like. I do not care a fig. Early in his long career Schweitzer became interested in Wagner’s music. He was on friendly terms with Cosima, Richard’s widow, and with Siegfried, the son of Richard and Cosima. His interest in Wagner’s tonal symbolism may have had much to do with his contemplation of the tonal symbolism employed by Bach. If you consider this a ridiculously farfetched surmise on my part, I shall be the last person in the world to question your right to do so.

On more than one occasion Wagner baters have asked me, “How can you think highly of Wagner’s music and at the same time venerate Bach as one of music’s major prophets?” They have never had to wait long for an answer. “Wagner,” I reply, “as well as Bach was a great prophet. Besides, I believe with all my heart that Bach, with his ingeniously devised chromaticism and his deftly employed symbolism, actually forshadowed Wagner.”
In Memoriam: Paul Tillich

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Sometimes I have said, rather facetiously, that it is my business, as a historian of Christian doctrine, to deal only with dead theologians. But twice in the last month that overly clever bon mot has taken its revenge on me: first, with the death of Albert Schweitzer, whose significance for the history of Christian thought I assessed briefly in an article for Saturday Review on September 25; and now, in a much deeper sense of personal loss, with the death of my friend and mentor, Paul Tillich, on October 22.

It was just one year earlier, in October of 1964, that I had published my book, Obedient Rebels: Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle in Luther's Reformation, which I had the privilege of dedicating to Professor Tillich with the words: "I am grateful to my professors and to my colleagues, many of whom read portions of this monograph and gave it their constructive criticism. I dedicate this book to one who was neither my professor nor my colleague, but who is none the less my teacher, the theologian who taught me to speak of 'catholic substance and Protestant principle.' Paul Tillich."

He taught me a great deal more; and in ways that it may take all of us the rest of our lives to discover, he affected the thinking of an entire theological generation. This he did not by recruiting disciples — for there are very few "Tillichians," while there are many "Barthians" — but by compelling all of us to come to terms both with our Christian tradition and with our contemporary responsibility, just as he spent his own life on the boundary line between the heritage and the task, between Gabe and Aufgabe. Thus he called forth from each of us who learned from him an authentic statement of the tension we knew between the forms of orthodox Christianity and the demands of this time and place.

It was typical of the man, and significant for his own sense of vocation, that he often found it easier to explain himself to "the cultured despisers" than to the devotees of the temple. To attend a public lecture by Paul Tillich was to see elements of the city whom one never saw at any other academic, not to say religious, gatherings — the questing, the doubting, the secret believers, the novelty-seekers, and more than a few kooks. Tillich knew that he attracted these motley audiences. At a time when theology was being beguiled into becoming something inner-kirchlich, the private language of a cozy little club rather than the translation and mediation of the revealed reality to the minds and lives of men, he sometimes seemed to be almost alone in speaking to those on the outside and in listening to them patiently, appreciatively. He was more patient and appreciative in listening to questions (often the same questions he had been asked countless times before) than any other virtuoso I have ever watched. Almost invariably he would thank the questioner sincerely for raising the point — and then often go on to ignore the question as he expatiated on the point. And almost invariably the questioner was satisfied, even though his actual question frequently was not.

Yet the energy of his participation in discussions with the young and the mesmeric effect of his very presence on both the young and the old may have obscured how much he drew on the thought and the faith of those who had gone before him. The classical Orthodox theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he said in 1953, "always was and still is the solid basis of all coming developments, whether these developments — as was mostly the case — were directed against Orthodoxy, or whether they were attempts of a restoration of Orthodoxy." Anyone who is familiar with classical Lutheran and Calvinistic theology will find implicit references to it throughout Tillich's writings, but in America he addressed his thought to theologians, anti-theologians, and would-be theologians who knew not Joseph and who therefore did not recognize the quotation marks in his lectures and books. Nevertheless he reached those who were alienated from any church, just as he reached those of us who, after many wanderings and hesitations, had found ourselves at home in the Church Catholic.

One outcome of this was that Tillich was more orthodox on many points than his radical language suggested, more heretical on others than his use of traditional concepts seemed to indicate. For example, his essay on "Nature and Sacrament" echoes the deepest insights of Christian sacramentalism more faithfully than does a lot of conventional theology; but when he has finished delineating all that he means by "sacrament," the plenitude of his vision threatens to engulf the particularity of Baptism and the Eucharist in a universe of symbols, and their special place in the life of grace is lost. The same is true, it seems to me, of Tillich's idea of "the latent Church," which eventually comes closer to being the true and visible Church than can any assembly gathered by the proclamation of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments. And finally, even his doctrine of Jesus as the Christ stood in constant danger of evaporating in the universality of Being and its Ground.

That very danger has hung over other theologians as well, notably over Origen and Schleiermacher, to each of whom Paul Tillich bore deep affinities. It is a counterpoise to the danger that was present in the theology of Luther, as it seems to me to be present in that of Karl
Barth: the danger of concentrating so single-mindedly on Jesus Christ and on the salvation He has accomplished that the contemplation and service of the full mystery of God is obscured or postponed. Both dangers are clear and present in this age of the Church’s history; both can jeopardize the fullness of Christian witness and obedience. But at a time when the menace of secularism and the temptation of romanticism make many of us seek security in a sectarian conversation with ourselves, Paul Tillich has had the courage and the imagination to summon Christian thought to take its chances and to find its fulfillment in an engagement with the best and the worst that contemporary culture can produce.

For this courage and imagination, and for the grace with which he bore them to the end, we who knew him and loved him shall always be grateful.

**Books of the Month**

**Mumford, Salad Oil, and Fatigue**

Lewis Mumford turned seventy this fall. and we have received the birthday present: a paperback edition of *The Human Prospect*, essays and excerpts selected and edited by Harry T. Moore and Karl W. Deutsch (Southern Illinois University Press, 1965, $2.45, 319 pp.)

As nearly as we can recall, Lewis Mumford has never enjoyed a vogue. Perhaps his titles have been too austere (*Technics and Civilization, The Culture of Cities.)* More likely, no author nowadays can hope to catch the fancy of a wide reading public without some gimmick, a system or a slogan, a handle that will permit appropriation without comprehension. But the thought of Lewis Mumford cannot be captured in this easy way. To enter his thought, one must read him. This edition of his writings provides an excellent opportunity, and those who have not yet made his acquaintance owe themselves the pleasure of an introduction.

No one surpasses Mumford when it comes to describing the subtle interplay between the forms of technology and of culture. "The Monastery and the Clock," "The Imperial Facade," and "Re-birth of the Family" are choice examples, each from a different angle casting a different light. "Monumentalism, Symbolism, and Style" is a piece of architectural criticism distinguished simultaneously by profundity and common sense, by itself worth the price of the book. The excerpt from his *Monastery, Monastery, Monastery*, written before Mumford was thirty-five, still shines like burnished gold among the millions of words that have been written in explanation of *Moby Dick. "The Kitchen — What Went On There" is only four pages, a brief reminiscence from the biography of his son Geddes, killed in World War II; no one will read it without altering his view on what constitutes a livable house. The essay on "Surrealism and Civilization," despite its age (1936), and its brevity (six pages), is distilled illumination.

Not all of Mumford's arguments are equally compelling. The political and economic analysis underlying some of the concluding essays leans gently toward utopianism: asserting that it must be because it ought to be. But Mumford's utopianism is still infinitely preferable to the wishful thinking that so often passes for analysis today.

An excellent collection, an excellent man. Lewis Mumford is himself a heartening testimonial to "the human prospect."

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Norman C. Miller, current chief of the *Wall Street Journal 's Detroit News Bureau*, was working as a staff reporter in the New York office when Anthony De Angelis jumped into the headlines. His coverage of De Angelis' incredible machinations earned him a Pulitzer prize. Now he has put the whole story together in a fascinating book, *The Great Salad Oil Swindle* (Coward-McCann, 1965, $4.95, 256 pp.)

Miller is a good reporter and an able writer. In addition, he knows the complicated world of finance in which De Angelis operated well enough to make its workings clear to those who don’t know it so well. But the chief recommendation for the book is that it tells an intriguing story, and tells it well.

How was it possible for this little man with a checkered background to sustain a multimillion dollar swindle for as long as he did? And where did the proceeds of the swindle finally go? In so far as these questions admit of any answers at the present time, Miller provides them. And in the process he presents some disturbing (as well as some reassuring) facts about the way our economic system functions.

It functions to a surprising extent on trust: on the assumption that pieces of paper are what they claim to be and that commitments once given will be honored. De Angelis took full advantage of that.

But the system also fails, in crucial ways, to pinpoint responsibility. A lot of people suspected that De Angelis was pulling a fast one; but apparently no one in a position to act felt that it was his responsibility to tug hard on the rug. "Too many of these people had an economic interest in going along and hoping for the best. De Angelis also took full advantage of that.

*The Great Salad Oil Swindle* would be an excellent choice for winter night reading. It may also contribute to some necessary hard thinking and re-evaluation in the business community.

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Paul Tournier is a Swiss physician, a dedicated Protestant layman, and the author of numerous books relating psychiatry and the Christian faith. Now he has edited and contributed to a new Chime Paperback, *Fatigue in Modern Society* (John Knox Press, 1965, $1.00, 79 pp.) The word *gem* should be used sparingly by reviewers. But it is the word that kept coming to mind while reading this book.

Tournier has a brief preface explaining the origin and rationale of the book. Then there follow three essays: Tournier's own "Fatigue in Modern Life," "The Treatment of Fatigue" by Andre Sarradon, and "Fatigue and Rest According to the Bible" by George Crespy. A graceful translation from the French has been provided by James H. Farley.

The essays are quite different from one another. Upon first reading, and without further reflection, the essay by Sarradon does not even appear to belong in the book. It is a statement by a physician to other physicians urging caution in the prescription of drugs, sprinkled with terms that will be completely unfamiliar to medical laymen. But beneath appearances it is more a theological than a medical essay. In simple and eloquent language, Sarradon reminds physicians (and us who are privileged to listen in) that physicians and patients are persons. Not health dispensaries in the former case, but an aggregation of organic functions in the latter.

The essay by Tournier is almost devotional in style and content, a quiet yet powerful plea for giving reflection, meditation if you will, a prominent place in the schedule of modern life. Fatigue is a signal that life is out of order, he urges, a signal that must be listened to especially amid the insistent demands of modern activism. The essay is itself a powerful antidote to fatigue, communicating to the reader in a remarkable way Tournier's own quiet strength and repose.

The concluding contribution is an exegetical study centering on Jesus' words in Matthew, "Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." The Biblical notion of rest is shown to be much more than cessation of toil. It is an active state, more recreation than relaxation, and it is in the deepest sense a gift. Conferences on the problem of leisure are beginning to multiply. Crespy has much to say to anyone occupied with the question.

PAUL T. HEYNE
In the past several weeks we have heard many conversations about the role of the United States in Vietnam. Some of these conversations amounted to hysterical outbursts and psychological explosions with considerable name-calling. Always there were different points of view.

Point of View I — Obviously one group of persons in these conversations has been defending our role, military or otherwise, in that narrow, small, and seemingly insignificant strip of territory on the edge of the Chinese Communist world. To the anti-Vietnam demonstrators and draft-card burners, the pro-Vietnam people insist, in spite of their own self-declared aspirations for peace, that war is necessary and inevitable and fits the intractable realities of this world. Billing themselves as being as sincere about peace as anyone else, certainly as sincere as the “Vietnik crowd” (courtesy of Time), they mark themselves down as the realists who must always work with things as they are, and not with things as they would like them to be.

In this kind of world power must be employed for even the achievement of minimal peace whether at home or abroad. Justice, they argue, seldom comes by peaceful persuasion. Paraphrasing a line or two from the late President John F. Kennedy and others, the realists are able to talk eloquently: We will and can wield power, and might happen if the Vietnam skirmish is escalated at the suggestion of some prominent men who want to drop bombs, not now but yesterday, and want to blow the Communists off the face of the earth.

If we are living, moreover, in a pluralistic world of nation-states in varying degrees of strength and growth, and since the United States is dedicated to freedom and self-determination, what grounds do we intervene? There is little sense in acting contrary to our ideals of freedom and self-determination, against our ideals of pluralism, discussion, persuasion, and debate. The United States would brook little interference from an occupying power. People in conflict, especially in international conflict, should try as long as it is humanly possible to be creative and imaginative enough to “merchandise” pro-life, pro-love, and pro-human points of view. To put it in a paradox, the United States must learn, must teach other people by example, how to wage war and conflict by non-violent means.

We have been doing it in the American party system for years.

Point of View III — Asks another set of persons: How can the people who are so dubious about our presence in Vietnam be so certain that the policy makers who committed us to this are not men of clear conscience and good will? Why always think the worst about the intentions of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and company?

It is possible for men to commit us to military action with the best of intentions. Under the direction of moral imperatives, we are able to wage minimal war in Vietnam to prevent the achievement of Communist intentions, to force at least a change in the goal-patterns of the Communists, to develop techniques and procedures of controlled conflict, and thus to create a healthier world community where nuclear potentials will be employed for useful non-military purposes.

The Americans are able to handle power of this nature under the thrust of ethical directives with intelligence and rationality and have the “savvy” to do it in a pluralistic world without really imposing their wills on other peoples.

In doing these things we will, without question, make a lot of mistakes. This is the way it is. In previous conflicts we have bombed the homes and villages of peoples and nations who were our friends. But where would our friends be if we had not entered these wars?

The idealists are right, a nation ought to examine its conscience in these matters. The idealists are wrong in assuming that men of conscience cannot commit themselves to military action.
The Critic’s Concern

Not long ago I heard Howard Taubman discuss his new book *The Making of the American Theater*. Since I have great respect for this veteran critic’s evaluations, I shall read his book just as soon as our household has been restored to order after the chaos that is part of moving. Mr. Taubman expressed deep concern for the present lowly state of the theater. He pointed out — as others have done — that “commercial is the word.” First and foremost, a playwright and a play must be right and his judgment must not be influenced by the staggering costs of mounting a production, the financial risk involved, the amount of hard work which precedes any Broadway opening, or the fame and prestige of the players. The theater should — and, at its best, actually does — reflect all the aspects of life. Unfortunately, “all too many offerings are not only phony but downright meretricious.” Mr. Taubman reflected ruefully that since real talent is as rare as it is precious, the theater probably will always be “a fabulous invalid.”

Reviewing movies sometimes pays unexpected dividends. When the pressure of getting ready to move became too great during the past month, I could always convince myself that duty impelled me to hie myself to the theater. Even the long bus rides were more tolerable, since I could rest my weary bones en route.

*Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines* (20th Century-Fox, Ken Annakin) proved to be an excellent antidote to the cares of the day. This delightful comedy, loosely based on the early history of aeronautics, takes us back to the days when many solemnly affirmed, “It can’t be done. If God had wanted us to fly, He’d have given us wings.” But now, a little more than a half-century later, we are planning to explore the surface of the moon!

*Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines* is lighthearted entertainment. It is fascinating to see authentic, full-scale facsimiles of the frail vehicles which, incredible as it may seem to us, actually carried pioneer aviators into and through the air. A cast of international celebrities was assembled to carry out the shenanigans of a zany plot which has to do with a fictional air race from London to Paris. Mr. Annakin’s direction is both sensitive and imaginative, and the Todd AO color photography is magnificent. This is a film one can endorse.

*Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines* points up the almost incredible advances man has made in science and technology. *The Pawnbroker* (M-G-M, Sidney Lumet) brings us down to earth with a thud as we realize that Robert Burn’s familiar statement that “man’s inhumanity to man makes hundreds thousands mourn” is as applicable today as it was when he penned this horrible indictment of society. Only today Burns would have written “millions” instead of “thousands.”

It is unlikely that the full horror of Hitler’s infamous concentration camps will ever be told. In his novel titled *The Pawnbroker* Edward Lewis Wallant has told the story of a gentle, kindly man who had been a respected professor at a German university and of the lacerating sense of shame and guilt he feels because he could not save his family from torture, degradation, and death. Sol Nazermann, haunted by agonizing memories and literally devoid of any human emotions, refuses to permit himself to become involved in the lives of the tragic and pathetic human derelicts who visit his pawnshop. Rod Steiger portrays the tormented pawnbroker with superb artistry. This is not a film for children or young adults. It is grim, ugly, and often sordid. But it is only fair to point out that in this viewer’s opinion *The Pawnbroker* is not just another cheap sex picture. Far from it! Unfortunately, Mr. Wallant’s novel has suffered at the hands of the script writers and does not carry the full impact of the book. Besides, it often strays far from the text.

When Katherine Anne Porter was asked whether the movie version of her book *Ship of Fools* would be faithful to her work, she replied, “Hollywood is going to make a total mess of it. I have seen and heard enough of it to know that it isn’t my book.” Isn’t it a pity that an author sells her brainchild with the knowledge that this is sure to happen? I suppose that once again “commercial” is the word. No doubt the price was right.

*Ship of Fools* (Columbia, Stanley Kramer) takes us on a rather tedious journey from Vera Cruz to Bremerhaven. Miss Porter obviously intended her novel to be allegorical. The German liner *S.S. Vera* represents “the ship of this world on its voyage to eternity.” The passenger list — from the first-class cabins to the refugees huddled below deck — encompasses practically every stratum of society. Unfortunately, the film and the book are melodramatic rather than dramatic and profound.
Upon the Midnight Clear

The old story — the Child, the Mother, the shepherds, the stars, the angels. Once more I remember them as one remembers a forgotten thing or a song whose words have become faint: the hills which had stood ready in silent obedience from the moment of their creation, the manger which was to become the haunt of the world’s devotion, the inn at the end of the road for tired minds and weary hearts, the cry of the Child. What, after all, is Christmas? What came into the world on Christmas night?

Perhaps the first sound that reached the ears of the Child in the manger was the song of the choirs over the hills of Bethlehem: “Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of good will.” A prayer, this, and a prophecy — a prayer that the hands of the Child, so soon to be torn by nails, would take hold of the hearts of men, and a prophecy that those who would bring their hearts to Him would have peace. Tonight, as the eyes of Christmas turn toward the manger, that prayer has become more anxious and immediate. It is still possible for men to have peace through Him who ended the war between God and man. The world may have lost peace, but God has not lost it. It has come back into the world over the strange road of the manger. So it was peace that came into the world that first Christmas night.

With the Child, complete and perfect holiness came into the world of men for the first and only time. God did not become man to make us content with the world; He came to make us discontent with the world which now is. He came to give us the final revelation of the world to come. He came to talk about a pearl of great price, a wedding garment of incomparable beauty, a fair and real hope on our black horizon. Listen for a moment as the Child become man prays on the night before His death: “And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they themselves also may be sanctified in truth. Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also that believe on me through their word; that they all may be one; even as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that Thou didst send me. And the glory which Thou hast given me I have given unto them; that they may be one, even as we are one; I in them, and Thou in me, that they may be perfected into one; that the world may know that Thou didst send me, and lovedst them, even as Thou lovedst me.” Note the constant repetition of that word “one.” We have been made one with God through faith in the redeeming work of Him who lay in the manger, who came to bring us into the sunlight of His holiness, to make us His family, and to take us to live in the eternal Bethlehem. So it was holiness that came into the world that first Christmas night.

When the Child came into the world, it was among the dumb beasts that He was born. As the world turns now toward the worship of power I must remember that the first worshippers of the Incarnate Word were not the great and mighty, not the rich and noble. Oxen and sheep were His company and the shepherds His congregation. No power He had, no sword, no bombs, no guns, no books, no money. The mysterious lowliness of God! I remember a story which Heywood Broun told in his last column before his death. It was about the Wise Man who halted and delayed the richly laden caravan winding its way out of the East on its journey in search of Him who had been born King of the Jews. He came hurrying back to his impatient companions holding in his hand a long-kept, paint-scarred, tin, tumbling, tiny toy. “But we have gifts fit for a King!” his companions protested. “You have gold, frankincense, and myrrh for the King,” answered the Third Wise Man. “This is for the Child at Bethlehem.” It was the divine lowliness that came into the world that first Christmas night.

Lowliness, yes — but also Power! The first infant cry of the Child was the battle challenge of the Prince of Peace. A few years later four men wrote the story of the hundred days about which God decided to tell us something. They are the most memorable days in the history of man and their remembrance remains the most precious possession of the human heart. More than 717,000 days have passed since the first Christmas — but not one on which somebody would not have died for Him! This is the ultimate power in the universe. Hunted from the cradle to the grave, stoned and tempted, rejected by His people, betrayed by His disciples, scourged and mocked and spat upon and crucified. He stands today before the heart of the world as its last hope, its only Savior, and its everlasting King. The hundred days of His recorded life came and went quickly, but the endless days of His resurrected life give meaning and hope to time and to eternity. This is the power that came into the world that first Christmas night.