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In recent weeks, America has honored four of her citizens who have enlarged her knowledge of the cosmos. Gus Grissom and John Young received medals and heroes' parades for their gallant two-man Gemini flight which told us something which we had not previously known about man's capacities in space. The Reverend James Reeb and Mrs. Viola Liuzzo were given heroes' funerals for their ventures into that heart of darkness which we so persistently forget lies at the center of our fallen world.

Seldom before have we seen the Psalmist's question, "What is man?", put so sharply. Grissom and Young — these are men, subject to the same fears, the same love of life as are all of the rest of us, and yet men who are willing to risk their lives to increase an area of man's knowledge which we hope — but can not be sure — will enormously broaden the frontiers of the human spirit and ultimately break man's confinement to this planet. And the nameless men who killed the Reverend Mr. Reeb and Mrs. Liuzzo — these, too, are men, men who were willing to kill their own kind so as to maintain a system which binds one out of every ten Americans to a subhuman existence. Between such extremes, what does it mean to be human?

Perhaps the best answer is the answer of the demoniac in the New Testament: "My name is Legion, for we are many." Not only among us, but within each one of us, the star-seeker and the hooded Klansman fight it out. To know one's self is to know that, given certain circumstances, he could fit with equal ease into the astronaut's suit or the Klansman's robe and that there is never a moment when the issue is not before him for choice.

And the choice which is before us as individuals is before us as a nation. We think that President Johnson spoke for the overwhelming majority of the American people in his eloquent address to the Congress in which he asserted that the Negro cause "must be our cause, too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really it's all of us who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And — we — shall — overcome."

It is impossible to imagine a column of "comment on the significant news" which does not include some mention of the war in Viet Nam. But what is there to say? And if there is anything really significant to say, why hasn't the President said it?

Probably the most basic question is what we are doing in Viet Nam in the first place. It happens that most senators and congressmen whose judgment we have relied upon in the past think that we ought to get out of Viet Nam. And yet we can not buy that judgment, for our involvement there is more than military. It is moral. We are attempting, among other things, to enforce an agreement, negotiated several years ago, which provided that the North and South Vietnamese would let each other alone. As one of the guarantors of that agreement, we are, we think, obliged to see to it that it is lived up to.

What bothers us, as it appears to bother a great many other people, is that our government does not seem to have made up its mind whether we are there to win, or to hold, or to set the stage for a graceful withdrawal. And until that decision has been made and has been announced there is bound to be a great deal of frustration abroad in the land.

Meanwhile, in recent weeks, the whole problem has been muddied by the issue of our use of vomit gas. There can be little doubt that our use of this gas outraged opinion which, for all sorts of reasons, we need to keep favorable to our cause. But the fact of the matter appears to be that, as weapons of war go, this gas is a remarkably humane thing. It is not lethal and (so we are told) does no permanent damage to its victim. But the very word "gas" took on such a hideous connotation in World War I that it has, in effect, been outlawed, leaving field commanders to choose among such more "humane" weapons as flame-throwers, napalm, artillery shells, and possibly tactical atomic weapons.

The one valid criticism of our use of vomit gas seems to be that our use of any gas might be taken by the other side as an invitation to retaliate with gases more violent, possibly even deadly, in their effects. And, of course,
we have played into the hands of Communist propagan-
dists who have claimed, as did India's pro-Communist
New Delhi Patriot, that we decided to use it in Vietnam
"because the people concerned are Asians, not Euro-
peans or Americans." This is a lot of bunk, of course,
but, as The Patriot goes on to point out, "Asia will never
forget that Americans used the atom bomb only against
Asians." The chickens insist on coming home to roost,
and right at the moment Viet Nam seems to be their
favorite roosting place.

The Second Mile

Eleven states have now abolished capital punishment
and at least seventeen other state legislatures are expect-
ted to consider the question in their current sessions,
among them New York, where there seem to be fair pros-
pects of passage.

The argument which is most commonly raised against
abolishing the death penalty is that it serves as a deter-
rent to heinous crimes and that its abolition would greatly
increase the number of such crimes. This argument
 gains no support from Myrl E. Alexander, director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, who describes capital punish-
ment as "the last vestige of old barbarity practiced thou-
sands of years ago" and who has long favored its aboli-
tion.

It seems to us interesting, and possibly significant,
that, with the possible exception of Michigan, the states
which no longer hang, burn, or gas their citizens are states
where there are comparatively few Negroes in the
population and therefore little fear of the white man's
self-created stereotype of the Negro as some sort of wild
animal who can be kept in check only by the threat of the
rope or the chair.

Execution statistics will, we think, support this sus-
picion. In most states, for all practical purposes, middle-
class white people are not executed. Once in a while,
some poor unfortunate who is classified as "poor white
trash" gets the chair. But the great majority of persons
executed are Negroes — so that there is some justification
for saying that, in our society, the death penalty is
reserved almost exclusively for poor Negroes.

Another observation: abolition of the death penalty,
while it is a long step away from barbarism, still falls
short of the moral imperative to "do justice and love
mercy." To save a man from death only to doom him to
the brutal, meaningless life of a prison which is equipped
to do nothing more than keep him confined is neither
justice nor mercy. It may, indeed, be a more brutal form
of punishment than the relatively quick death of the
chair or the gallows or the gas chamber. What we need
to do is listen to our best penologists, men like Mr. Alex-
ander, who are unanimously agreed that the prime pur-
pose of every prison should be the rehabilitation of its
inmates — including men who have been sent there for
life terms. To do such a job of rehabilitation takes high-
type, professionally trained personnel paid salaries com-
parable to those which they could command in other
kinds of professional work. Are we willing to go that
second mile? Or do we prefer to continue to pay the high
social costs of prisons which are often merely graduate
schools in crime?

Medicare

One of the most frightening hazards of old age — the
danger of falling victim to a bankrupting illness — will
become practically a thing of the past when the Medi-
care bill is passed sometime this Spring.

The bill which is presently under consideration is real-
ly a combination of two bills — the one an Administra-
tion-supported plan to be financed by increased Social
Security taxes and the other a Republican-fostered sup-
plementary plan which would provide additional cover-
age financed by individual contributions.

Under the combined bill, Social Security would take
care of hospital care, nursing home care, home nursing
care, and out-patient service — all subject to certain
broad limitations. The additional coverage which would
be available to those who pay individual premiums of
three dollars a month would include physicians' care,
mental hospital care, home nursing care, and health ser-
"vices such as X-rays and laboratory tests — again sub-
ject to certain generous limitations.

For those of us who are under sixty-five, the Medicare
proposal amounts to prepaid medical insurance, collect-
able after we reach the age of sixty-five. As such it in no
way replaces whatever individual or group medical poli-
cies we may presently have. It is expected, however, to
enable the companies sponsoring these policies to keep
their premiums at a more reasonable level since these
private companies will no longer have to carry the rela-
tively high expenses of medical care for the elderly. This
should be good news to those of us who have seen our
health insurance premiums rise year by year to the point
where it is becoming almost prohibitively expensive for
many of us to insure dependent children who have passed
their nineteenth birthday.

The bill which is presently before Congress has bi-
partisan support, although it is probably fair to say that
more Democrats are enthusiastically for it than are most
Republicans. It has not yet won any widespread support
from the nation's doctors, although they have been con-
siderably less vociferous in their opposition to this bill
than they were to past medicare bills. Indeed, the doc-
tors seem to have accepted the principle of medical as-
sistance to the aged, even to the extent of having come
up with a proposal of their own which has, so far, won
little acceptance.

To us, the Medicare bill seems nothing more than a
logical extension of a commitment which we made as a
nation thirty years ago when, in the original Social Secu-
rity Act, we made it a matter of national policy that old
age should not be a thing of dread but a time of ease and
fulfillment. We are happy to see that both parties are
now ready to give practical effect to that policy.
Bonjour, Tristesse

When even Ben Heineman, president of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, says that he sees "no future for the railroads in the intercity passenger business," we old railroad buffs have to start steeling ourselves for the inevitable — which means the advent of a day when there will be no more Empire Builder or Broadway Limited or Super Chief, or even the GM & O Midnight Special which threads its uncertain way between Chicago and St. Louis.

But before we turn the traveler over to jets and buses, we might pause for just a moment to consider what we are abandoning. There is, as Dr. Jaroslav Pelikan pointed out in the pages of this magazine several years ago, a considerable difference between traveling and merely going places. We do not question the fact that one can get from Chicago to Portland, Oregon, faster by jet than by the Empire Builder. But on a jet one does not have two days of isolation from the telephone, leisurely dinners of Rocky Mountain trout, slow sunsets over the Dakota plains, and the stop for leg-stretching at Havre, Montana. And as for buses, any mule reeking of diesel fumes could provide as fast and as comfortable a ride.

We know and sympathize with the problem of the railroads. We passengers are liabilities, pure and simple. We can read that fact in their profit and loss reports, we can sense it in the reception we get when we show up, ticket in hand, demanding to be taken from wherever we are to wherever it is we are planning to go. We are a nuisance to the main office, where each one of us is another nibble at the net profits, and we are a nuisance to the conductor and trainman, who sometimes find it impossible to conceal their distaste for us. Probably all up and down the chain of command the question arises: "Why do these people insist on going by train? Why can't they find some other way of going wherever they are going?"

We can't pretend to answer for the whole train-traveling public, but we can try to explain our own annoying and eccentric preference for the train. We like the privacy of the roomette with its comfortable bed and its door securely locked against the whole outside world. We like the landscape unfolding outside our window at a speed which we can assimilate. We like reading in a parlor car. We like having the time to make the psychological adjustment from where we have been to where we are going. We like traveling through mountains. We like people-watching at the stations along the way.

But, of course, the world cannot wait upon our likes and dislikes. If the train must go, so be it. But when the train goes, scratch one potential traveler. For us, getting there has always been half the fun, and we are still stubborn enough to think that the railroads could find plenty of hedonists like us if they really wanted to keep their passenger business.

Gaudeamus Igitur

While we are confessing the qualms and quaverings of middle age, permit us to add our tremulous voice to that of Dr. William C. DeVane, recently retired after twenty-five years as Dean of Yale College, who says that students and young faculty people are lacking in gaiety these days.

In a speech to (perish the thought!) the Harvard Club, Dr. DeVane observed recently that "the young people are all so serious. They go around in those clothes to show the democratization of everything. You see girls on campuses in dungarees and jackets and their hair mussed up, trying to look as dirty as possible. You want to grab them and say, 'You are supposed to be charming.' When they dress for a prom, they still talk about academic things." As for the men, "We used to make up [nonsense verse]. We had things then that most undergraduates miss today. We had privacy. We had leisure. We had that gaiety." Even in graduate school, he recalls, "we had fun. We did a variorum edition of Humpty Dumpty in Old Norse and all sorts of languages. We preserved the amateur spirit. It's all much more professional now."

Professional? Maybe. But much of what we know now we owe to generations which spent their undergraduate years climbing the rooftops of Oxford and Cambridge, pinching policemen's helmets on Boat Race night, and dueling. The great scholars of the past were once young men who took with proper seriousness the exhortation of the old student song, "Gaudeamus igitum juvenes dum sumus." In our own undergraduate days, there was still time for hikes in the country (the Freudians had not yet succeeded in convincing us or our elders that two young men hiking and talking were "gay" in the modern sense of that once-happy word). And even today, an occasional throwback to the great tradition discovers Herrick or Suckling despite the best efforts of counselors, advisers, and the university newspaper to keep his eyes firmly fixed on Today's Cause.

We have a suspicion that those who have never learned to laugh can never really learn to weep, that those who have never been taken by the liquefaction of Julia's silks will be less inclined to stand by Julia when her loneliness fades, as it will. We think that real philanthropy is impossible for any man who has not, early in life, learned the meaning of friendship, and that the deepdown tragedy of life is hidden from those who have never known the promise of its early joys.

So bless you, Dr. DeVane, for reminding us that iuven­tus ought to be iucunda. Semper sis in flores!
A social service agency in Chicago, which serves the impoverished and the derelict, requires its workers, I understand, to spend a week among the unfortunates whom they plan to serve. They spend this week, dressed in old clothes and with very little money, which forces them to eat in soup kitchens and live in flop houses. The purpose of this training is to give the social workers firsthand knowledge of the problems they will face. A minor experience I had a couple of weeks ago leads me to believe that if I were put out in the street under these circumstances, I would be back whimpering at the headquarters door and begging for admittance long before the sun set on the first day.

What happened to me was far from this drastic but it did make me think what it must be like to be penniless in a large city. For some reason I had underestimated the probable expenses of the trip I was on and I ended up with too little ready cash. I arrived at O'Hare airport in Chicago early on a Sunday afternoon. Since trains run infrequently to our town on a Sunday, I planned to take a bus from the Loop. By the time I paid off the airport limousine, I had $2.85 in my pocket. Lacking sufficient funds for cab fare, I lugged my suitcase and briefcase the half mile to the bus station.

After purchasing the $2.00 bus ticket, I had eighty-five cents left and I knew that after the bus trip, I needed ten cents for a phone call and that if this didn’t produce a ride, I would need seventy-five cents for cab fare. I had no money to spend and two hours to wait.

The bus station was not the most entertaining place to wait. I had run out of reading material and the station had no news stand even if I could have afforded to purchase a magazine. While I was not particularly hungry, I had a strong urge to eat a hamburger and drink a milk shake. On a week day and within a block of the bus station, I could have found a number of friends who would have stood me to so modest a meal and who would have loaned me money. But on a Sunday they were all in their suburban homes. I had credit cards on me, but who ever heard of trying to buy a magazine or a milk shake with a credit card?

Normally with a two hour wait, I would have walked the streets and window-shopped, but on this Sunday I didn’t, not only because a raw wind was blowing, but also because I wanted to avoid the temptation to buy something I couldn’t afford. The thought also crossed my mind that if I were picked up by the police for some reason unknown, I could be booked for vagrancy since I didn’t possess the $2.00 which is the police standard between having and not having money. The possibility of panhandling occurred to me, but I was the best dressed person in the bus station and I was positive that if I had gone around trying to cadge a quarter for a milk shake, I would have been turned in as some kind of kook.

The two hours seemed interminable since the only pastime available consisted of joining my fellow passengers in observing every customer who came into the station. Whenever a new person came into sight our eyes would follow him, our heads turning in unison, until he had purchased a ticket and sat down. It would seem to have been an ideal time for introspection, but unfortunately, the ticket seller was enjoying a visit from an old crony, and he had a voice so penetrating it covered the entire waiting room.

I had no difficulty analyzing my feelings, however. I felt insecure, almost helpless. My self-respect seemed to be fading. Strange, isn’t it, that we should equate money in hand with security? But I gather this failing lies in the natures of most of us. The amount of money makes little difference so long as it is sufficient under the circumstances, though the very rich do seem to speak with more assurance than others.

But if a minor incident like this can make one feel insecure, imagine what the continually impoverished must experience most of their lives. A man who has been poor for a long period of time must lose his self-respect completely and he must feel totally insecure. The rehabilitation of such a man is an overwhelming job, for giving him money is not enough, since money will not remove the mental scars his experience has given him.

Brief as it was, I learned something from my own minor experience and I hope it increased my understanding of my less fortunate brother. I also learned that it is advisable to follow the practise initiated by women, that of carrying “mad money” with me when I take a trip.
The Seven Deaths in Hamlet

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Of the many theories of Hamlet which have caused generations of Shakespearian scholars to wax desperate with imagination, none has been more neglected than that which interprets the play as "a drama of integration, the struggle of man against his own attributes" — an interpretation which seems doubly worth examining when one realizes that its acceptance automatically disposes of two major enigmas of Hamlet criticism, Hamlet's procrastination and his "madness." Although Shakespeare's treatment of the story was undoubtedly influenced by the Eastern thought, mostly neo-Platonic, which spread through Italy and into the rest of Europe during the Sixteenth century, the plot itself is best described as one of those archetypal ideas which, according to Jung, subsist from time immemorial in the racial Unconscious, projecting themselves whenever they are needed to restore equilibrium among conflicting elements of the psyche — i.e., to correct an imbalance on the part of the conscious by some sort of compensatory activity. This characteristic of the Unconscious may be cited to account for the otherwise inexplicable appeal of the play in an age which, to say the least, is not notable for its religiosity.

I first encountered this theory of Hamlet some twenty years ago in Claude Bragdon's More Lives Than One, a delightful account of his experiences as architect, theatrical designer, author, and student of the occult; it came to him in a letter from a total stranger, evidently a woman of intuitive gifts, who had been prompted to seek a "deeper meaning" in Hamlet by reading a book of sibylline communications by Mrs. Bragdon. This unidentified correspondent saw Hamlet as "a drama of initiation," the struggle of man against his own attributes, which must be overcome by the protagonist before he can achieve the liberation or identification with the Higher Self which to most of the world's great religions represents salvation. Polonius, the "prating Knave," is worldly wisdom; Ophelia, illusion; Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are pride and conceit; Laertes is ambition; Gertrude, the psychic or emotional nature; and Claudius, the final adversary, is the rational intellect, which man ordinarily identifies with his ego or sense of selfhood. (I myself do not find in the play sufficient evidence for the identifications provided by Mr. Bragdon's correspondent for Laertes, Rosencrantz, and Guildenstern — to me these characters remain mere tools by which Claudius attempts to divert or frustrate Hamlet — but the significance of the Ghost, Claudius, Gertrude, Polonius, and Ophelia seems clear enough.) "Spook stuff!" the scientifically conditioned reader may snort at this point. Let him be reminded that spooks are by no means infrequent in Shakespeare, that we are all such stuff as dreams are made on, and that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy.

The nature of these things is set forth for the modern reader in two conveniently available sources, both of which deserve far more attention from literary scholars than they have received: the works of Dr. Jung, particularly those dealing with alchemy as a medieval exemplar of the psychological process of integration, and The Gnostic Religion by Hans Jonas, an extremely valuable book which amply fulfills the publisher's claim of bringing to the layman a wealth of material hitherto not known except to the specialist and frequently overlooked even by the historian. However different in purpose, these writings may be said to complement one another in that Dr. Jung's psychological commentary adds a whole dimension of meaning to the overview of Gnostic thought provided by Professor Jonas. As Jung puts it, "The idea of the pneuma as the Son of God descending into matter and later freeing himself from it, in order to bring healing and salvation to all souls, bears the traits of an unconscious mental content projected into matter ... an autonomous complex leading an independent existence, divorced from consciousness, in the psychic non-ego, and projecting itself ... whenever it is attracted by analogies to external things." The "external things" herein to be discussed are, of course, the elements of the Hamlet story.

"Eternals" and "Immortals"

Although Gnostic literature presents a bewildering set of variations, often contradictory in detail, the main outlines of the thought are as clear as can be expected in a body of work which aims at nothing less than a knowledge of what is essentially unknowable. Generally, the Gnostic systems seem to begin with a concept of "pure" consciousness, unconditioned, undifferentiated, containing in potentia all things, absolutely transcendent, standing above all works of creation. The subject-object relationship — the distinction of mind from its content (thought) or of awareness from that of which it is aware — necessarily involves the idea of a falling away, incompleteness, imperfection, in the same sense in which the total (potential) content of the reader's mind (the sum of the things he might conceivably be thinking about) is infinitely greater than the thought which happens to be in his consciousness at a given moment. Although any separation or differentiation from the One is in a sense a "fall," there seems to arise at this point a distinction between what Professor Denis Saurat has called the "Eternals" and the "Immortals" in that the former remain in the heavenly realm as true and faithful representations of God whereas the latter descend into matter
and have to find their way back, as in the story of the Prodigal Son.

According to Gnostic speculation the world (the physical cosmos, including man's mental and emotional attributes derived therefrom — his ego or illusion of separateness) is not the direct expression of the divine will, but the result of a precosmic fall of part of the divine principle. This fall is represented in various ways: as a dispersion of the Light; its theft or forcible abduction; a narcissistic "drowning" of Mind (the masculine principle) in Thought (the feminine principle which brings the creations of Mind into manifestation) or of Thought in her own offspring, which in turn appear to have inherited reproductive powers; a "capture" and "devouring" of some of the Powers of Light which have been sent forth to do battle against the Powers of Darkness (with the ultimate result that the latter will sicken and die because of the Light within them); and so forth. However things came to be as they are, the Gnostic systems agree in regarding physical existence as a prison in which the pneuma, forgetful of its divine nature, lies enchained — or, to use another figure, as a cross of matter upon which the divinity in man hangs crucified. Salvation, then, lies not in token acceptance of a vicarious atonement, but in a recognition by the Son (the divine spark or pneuma) of his true nature, and a return to (at-onement with) his Father. The seven Archons or Planets (rulers of the material world), "knowing" that they cannot exist without the divine force which they have misappropriated, work with demoniacal ingenuity to detain the Son — to keep him in ignorance and to divert or discourage him from his redemptive task.

Earth-bound man, therefore, finds himself "numbed, asleep, or intoxicated by the poison of the world"; a contributor to and a victim of collective irrationality, seeking "the good life" in endless exploration of the labyrinth of the senses (the physical universe and its mental and emotional derivatives) without dreaming that the escape for which he longs must be achieved through the conquest of a new dimension. He is oppressed by insecurity, disgust, loneliness, alienation. At the depth of his misery a call from the Father slips through "the sentinels of the mind," a "message" reminding him of his sonship and of his duty to reclaim his divine heritage.

The remainder of the redemptive drama consists in his response to the call and his overcoming of the psychic forces which would restrain him. (At this point Professor Jonas calls our attention to a curious dichotomy in the moral attitudes of the Gnostics, some of whom shunned worldly temptations for fear of being drawn back into the vortex of sensual pursuits, while others adopted an antinomian libertinism as a means of showing their contempt for the snares of the flesh. Hamlet, of course, chooses the way of renunciation — "And thy commandment all alone shall live / Within the book and volume of my brain / Unmix'd with baser matter.") The work, as we are told in the Rosarium Philosophorum, "necessar-ily surpasses any other" — i.e., demands one's total energies to the complete exclusion of other interests. Once the mind has become aware of the illusory, misery-breeding quality of even the highest kind of temporal existence (in Hamlet's case, the comforts and diversions of the court) there inevitably follows a reversal of values, a divine sanity which appears as madness to the unenlightened. Truly, the wisdom of God is foolishness to man.

**Claudius as Intellect**

The theme of the play is suggested in the King's first speech to Hamlet, "How is it that the clouds still hang on you?" and is rendered more explicit by the Queen: "Do not for ever with thy vailed lids / Seek for thy noble father in the dust." Speaking from their earth-bound point of view, Claudius and Gertrude cannot know that clouds hang upon them also, and that their own lids are even more veiled than Hamlet's. The message from his father not having been received as yet, the Prince at this point can scarcely be thought to grasp in full the double meanings of the words of the King and Queen, but his reply, "I have that within which passeth show," hints at an intuitive perception of his true state of being. The identification of Claudius as intellect or ego is borne out by his argument for a rational acceptance of things as they are: death and change are in the nature of existence; it is "impious" and "unmanly" to rebel against the inexorable laws of heaven, the universal fate which rules the world and, in its psychical aspect, "aims at the enslavement of man." Having achieved his ambition for temporal power, Claudius seems to find ample purpose for life in statecraft, wassails, and amorous dalliance with his queen. He is, on the whole, rather like modern man: except for his uneasy intimations in the prayer scene, higher worlds scarcely exist for him. Jung tells us that "the intermediary realm of subtle bodies ceases to exist as soon as one seeks to investigate matter in and for itself, apart from all projections, and it remains nonexistent as long as one believes oneself in possession of final knowledge about matter and the soul." Hamlet, however, already views the world as "an unweeded garden that grows to seed" (perpetuates itself) and possessed only by "things rank and gross in nature." To him Denmark is a prison, not in the physical sense ("I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space") but because of his bad dreams: that which he has within, like the Prodigal Son's remembrance of his father's house, causes him to perceive the earth as a sterile promontory, the majestical firmament as a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours, and to find no delight in man — nor woman either.

**Gertrude - Sophia**

The figure of the Queen is rather more complex, and again we turn to Professor Jonas for help. Gnostic thought, he tells us, commonly employs "two different
symbolic figures to represent in their fate the divine fall, the male Primal Man and the female Thought of God," the latter usually known as Sophia ("Wisdom") and "conceived as God's helper or agent in the creation of the world." Jonas describes Sophia as an "ambiguous figure encompassing the whole scale from the highest to the lowest, from the most spiritual to the utterly sensual (as expressed in the very combination 'Sophia-Prunikos,' 'Wisdom the Whore')." Whether willfully yielding to temptation or mistaking for reality the reflected image of her divine spouse, she suffers estrangement from him, loses her way, and becomes the plaything of the Demiurge. Her shock and perplexity "pass over into the form of definitive states of being, and as such ... can become the substance of the world. This substance, then, psychical as well as material, is nothing else than a self-estranged and sunken form of the Spirit solidified from acts into habitual conditions and from inner process to outer fact." "Earth [is formed] according to the stiffening of terror; then water, according to the movement of fear; air, according to the flight of grief; and fire [is] inherent in all of them as death and corruption, just as ignorance is hidden in the three passions." Of the several possible applications of these ideas to the Hamlet text the most obvious lie in Hamlet's comparison between his father and his uncle in the first of the great soliloquies, and in his urging (Act III, Scene 4) of abstinence upon the Queen ("For use almost can change the stamp of nature") as the first step for her in the redemptive effort — a difficult and conscious reversal of the process of her degradation. If Gertrude is taken to represent the psychic or emotional nature which draws the pneuma into incarnation in the lower world, the analogy between the role of Hamlet in relation to his mother and that of Christ in the cosmic drama scarcely needs to be pointed out.

The Two Hamlets

Although this particular detail may be nothing more than one of the "external things" upon which an autonomous complex from the Unconscious can project itself, it is of some interest that Hamlet and his father bear the same name. Characteristic of Gnostic thought, according to Jonas, is the "strong suggestion of an active-passive double role of one and the same entity. Ultimately the descending Alien redeems himself, that is, that part of himself (the Soul) once lost to the world, and for its sake he himself must become a stranger in the land of darkness and in the end a 'saved savior.'" Jung is equally explicit in stating that "man is the one to be redeemed as well as the redeemer. The first formulation is the Christian one, the second the alchemistic. In the first case man ascribes to himself the need of salvation and leaves the work of salvation ... to the autonomous divine figure; in the last case man takes upon himself the duty of carrying out the work of redemption, and ascribes to matter in general the state of suffering and the need for redemption." The suggestion that Hamlet is a drama of redemption rather than revenge is borne out by Horatio's description of the Ghost, "A countenance more / In sorrow than in anger." Hamlet's recognition ("Hamlet, / King, father; royal Dane") is instantaneous and unquestioning, and its effect is so powerful that Horatio's perfectly logical objection that the Ghost might "assume other, horrible form, / Which might deprive your sovereignty of reason / And draw you into madness" is brushed aside with the impassioned "My fate cries out ... Still am I call'd. By heaven, I'll make a ghost of him that lets me!" — a promise which is to receive a seven-fold fulfillment.

What appears to be an ambiguity between the Ghost as divine agent and as the earth-bound spirit of the late king can be resolved only by thinking of the redeemer and the man to be redeemed as two manifestations of the same entity. The father-spirit is the projection of Hamlet's own pneuma, his prison-house is Prince Hamlet's own flesh and blood, and his purgatorial fires are the sufferings which the Prince must undergo in divesting himself of the "envelopments" or "garments" (described by Jonas as "substantial though immaterial entities") contributed by the Seven Spheres to the soul as it sinks into incarnation.

The Ghost's account of his murder is of great significance, especially since it represents, so far as we know, one of the major changes wrought by Shakespeare upon his source materials. He is asleep (in incarnation) in his orchard (garden?), the murderer is described as a serpent, and the deed is accomplished by poison poured into the ear. These details, to which might be added the prior seduction of the Queen, closely suggest the Biblical account of the Fall; but there is a difference, of emphasis at least, between Gnosticism and "orthodox" Christianity: "The serpent that did sting thy father's life / Now wears his crown." Furthermore, "the whole ear of Denmark" has been "rankly abus'd" by a "forged process" of the King's death. Now, if we take Denmark (as in some of the later speeches — e.g., "Denmark's a prison") as standing for the physical world, does the statement really mean that the currently accepted account is not the true one and that the world is ruled, not by a beneficent king of rightful succession, but by an arrogant and deceitful usurper? In other words, is the symbolism of the play intended to embody the "heretical" doctrines of Gnosticism?

The Ghost's description of the "most instant tetter" which "bark'd about, / Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust / All my smooth body" has many parallels in Gnostic literature. Jonas tells us that the body "is eminently the 'house' of life and the instrument of the world's power over the Life that is enclosed in it," and is often referred to as "an impure garment" or "tomb." The seduction of the Queen ("O Hamlet, what a falling-off was there!") has already been dealt with. There is, of course, an anomaly in the fact that so wise and virtuous a king should have had for brother an incestuous and adultrate beast, just as there is an anomaly.
in the presence of evil in a world made and ruled by a god who is reputed to be both all-good and all-powerful — or, for that matter, in a human nature which is reputed to be fundamentally good.

It is noteworthy that although revenge is commonly supposed to be the theme of the play, the Ghost issues only one explicit call for vengeance, and even this has a curiously impersonal tone, as though its object, however loathsome, were a sort of automaton doomed to play out its sorry part in the cosmic drama. A similar tone is evident in the injunction "Taint not thy mind, not let thy soul contrive / Against thy mother aught." All necessary instructions (a fact not lost upon Hamlet, as evidenced by his threefold repetition of the words in his response) are implicit in his father's parting words: "Adieu, adieu! Hamlet, remember me." Seeking a parallel in Gnosticism, we find: "It must be noted that in the Valentinian system [unification] is ascribed to gnosis on the plane of universal being where the 'restoring of Unity' and the 'engulfing of Matter' mean no less than the actual dissolution of the lower world, i.e., sensible nature as such — not by an act of external force but solely by an inner event of mind: 'knowledge' on a transcendental scale." And again: "What liberates is the knowledge of who we were, what we became; where we were, whereinto we have been thrown; whereto we speed, wherefrom we are redeemed; what birth is, and what rebirth." The only vengeance that is demanded, then, is Hamlet's remembrance or gnosis of his father, with gnosis to be understood as Jonas defines it, "not just theoretical information about certain things but ... as a modification of the human condition, charged with performing a function in the bringing about of salvation." Illusions cease to exist as soon as they are perceived to be illusions, just as error cannot exist in the presence of truth. The violence of the various deaths simply represents the difficulty of the psychological process of integration.

Hamlet's contact with his Higher Self (the Ghost) makes plain to him what had previously been an incomprehensible state of affairs and discloses for the first time the full extent of the perfidy of the Intellect or Ego ("So, uncle, there you are.") It is precisely this seeing of things as they are that gives rise to Hamlet's "madness." Horatio and Marcellus rejoin him almost immediately; he has to tell them something and would like to tell them the truth, but dares not. Even here he transformed standard of values gives double meaning to his "wild and whirling words" — "There's ne'er a villain dwelling in all Denmark / But he's an arrant knave," and "I hold it fit that we shake hands and part; / You, as your business and desires shall point you. / For every man has business and desire / Such as it is." He relents, however, to the extent of assuring his friends that "It is an honest ghost," and entreats their secrecy "How strange or odd soe'er I bear myself," knowing that one no longer bound to earth by business and desire must appear mad to those who are so bound. Browning, in "An Epistle," has depicted the risen Lazarus as a "madman" because of the disparity between his standards and the world's; and if a more remote comparison is not amiss, Hamlet's outcry "The time is out of joint" almost inevitably recalls Melville's passage on "Chronometricals and Horologicals" in Pierre.

Polonius, Worldly Wisdom

Polonius (Worldly Wisdom) does exactly what a person who fancies himself wise in the ways of the world would be likely to do — seizes upon the most obvious explanation in attributing Hamlet's "madness" to the pangs of dispriz'd love, and holds tenaciously to his theory despite the King's misgivings. Claudius (Ego or Intellect), far more perceptive and intelligent, is none the less limited to such knowledge as can be abstracted from the material universe, and "cannot dream of" what has put Hamlet "So much from th' understanding of himself." According to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hamlet "does confess he feels himself distracted" (which in the literal sense of the word he is), but "with a crafty 'madness keeps aloof / When we would bring him on to some confession / Of his true state." Polonius, shallow as he is, recognizes "method" in Hamlet's "madness." Hamlet's arraignment of Guildenstern — "Do you think that I am easier to be play'd on than a pipe?" — is far from insanity, and he later tells his mother that he essentially is "not in madness, / But mad in craft." Hamlet's direct "admission" of madness in his scene with Ophelia (Act III) is a violent emotional utterance provoked by the effort of renouncing Illusion, and no more a confession of madness than the modern "You're driving me crazy."
Ophelia, of course, reacts exactly as personified Illusion might be expected to react — exactly, one might add, as a “normal” individual would react to Von Hartmann’s suggestion that the human race, if it were sufficiently enlightened, would stop breeding and bring to an end the whole pointless spectacle of human folly and suffering. A further speculation may be fanciful, but it is not inconsistent: of the several figures used by Ophelia in describing Hamlet, why does she instinctively bring her catalog to a climax with one which expresses the subject-object relationship — “The glass of fashion and the mould of form, / The observ’d of all observers?” The idea, common to the major religions, is generally expressed in the formula: the One fell asunder, that He might contemplate Himself.

More shrewd than Ophelia is the eavesdropping King, to whom “what he spake, though it lack’d form a little, / Was not like madness.” Even before Hamlet declares himself through the play, Claudius senses in his nephew’s conduct a peril to himself; but being, as has been said, limited to such resources as can be abstracted from the material universe, he can think of nothing more than “seas and countries different,” “variable objects,” to bring the Prince out of his brooding melancholy. Not until the play and the death of Polonius have forced upon him the irreconcilable nature of the conflict does the King feel Hamlet raging “like the hectic in my blood” — just as the “Sons of Darkness” in some of the Gnostic teachings are poisoned by the “Sons of Light” they have devoured — and determine upon his death.

It is a curious fact that in the early portions of the play Hamlet and the King appear reluctant to acknowledge each other as antagonist — curious, that is, until one accepts the allegorical interpretation of the drama as the struggle of man against his own attributes. Claudius is prepared to tolerate Hamlet, even to love him as a son and to make him his heir, exactly as the materialistic forces which rule the world are prepared to tolerate and even in a sense to cherish religion for the social good that it can do, so long as it does not set up a painful dichotomy between things mundane and things divine. The devil, be it remembered, offered Jesus all the kingdoms of the world in return for His worship. As for Hamlet, what most disturbs him is the inconstancy of his mother (Emotion); although in Scene 2 of Act I he compares his father and his uncle (“Hyperion to a satyr”) it is only after his encounter with the Ghost that he comprehends the extent of his uncle’s villainy and fixes his enmity upon him. But there still arises the question of the need for the play: if Hamlet believed, as he evidently did, that the Ghost was “an honest ghost,” why did he not act at once? Why was he later beset by doubts which caused him to resort to the elaborate mechanism of the Mousetrap in order to prove his uncle’s guilt? To attribute the procrastination solely to the exigencies of dramatic suspense is scarcely enough: in Belleforest’s pre-Shakespearian version of the story the King’s guilt is public knowledge.

The Order of Death

Dr. Jung tells us that the greatest human fear is the fear of losing one’s personal identity. There is, for our allegorical interpretation, great significance in the order in which Hamlet’s adversaries are disposed of: Worldly Wisdom (Polonius) is the first; Illusion (Ophelia) without the practical restraint of common sense goes mad and destroys itself; Pride, Conceit, and Ambition (in the persons of Rosencrantz, Guildenstern, and Laertes) rapidly follow the loss of Illusion; then ensues the purification (“Assume a virtue, if you have it not”) and death of the Emotional Nature (Gertrude): only when these have been conquered is the protagonist ready for the final sacrifice, the surrender of the sense of personal identity. Hamlet, in the fullest possible sense, is Everyman: however deeply he may loathe the rational intellect (here equated with the personality or lower self) for its treachery, its “damned defeat” upon the life and property of his father (his spiritual nature), and for giving the lie to his dimly sensed consciousness of the divine pneumonia within him, he cannot, without further prompting from the Ghost and without the aid of circumstances which seem to be almost providentially arranged, bring himself to the fatal act of renouncing his own sense of selfhood. Suicide, in fact, would be a welcome alternative, except that he realizes himself as an immortal essence and knows intuitively that mere physical self-destruction would only prolong his suffering.

The problem of procrastination is usually assumed to center upon the fact that even after the play has trapped the King into a convincing disclosure of his guilt Hamlet rejects the opportunity to kill him praying in his closet. Here we find the dilemma that still faces modern man and furnishes the theme for the most significant literature of our time. However abhorrent the fact may be to his higher self, Hamlet’s sense of personal identity is bound to the earth-derived rational intellect, which cannot ultimately co-exist with the supra-rational or mystical principle. (“He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.”) The fundamental nature of the conflict between these opposites is gradually revealed as the drama unfolds, until it becomes clear that the survival of either demands nothing less than the death of the other. The result is of course foreordained — witness the disclosures of modern physics as to the immateriality of matter —, but if this were fully realized there would be no drama, and perhaps no human race. One might conjecture that Hamlet’s final temptation is the temptation of humanism — the proud assumption that humanity can be perfectible, that the human mind and its products are worth saving, and that the King (the rational intellect or ego), having put himself in the proper state through the proper technique, can “go to heaven” (attain happiness), whereas the infinitely nobler Ghost is still compelled to purge himself of his crimes committed in his days of nature — i.e., to remain in incarnation until the effects
of all the causes set in motion by his self-determined acts have been worked out.

The King, however, has no illusions about going to heaven. The reason he cannot pray is that he has nothing to pray to—no values outside himself except those earthly effects for which he did the murder. (Incidentally, Claudius' reference to his offense as having "the primal eldest curse upon't, / A brother's murder" points strongly to the Gnostic teaching on the overcoming of the Sons of Light by the Sons of Darkness.) He knows that pardon is impossible to his unchanged nature ("O limed soul, that struggling to be free, / Art more engag'd"). His tragedy is the tragedy of what Herbert Agar has called "an abstractly rationalizing self-destructive element" in the human intellect, which begins by questioning the instinctive affirmation of life essential to its culture, proceeds to the discovery of its own inability to arrive at truth, and ends the cultural cycle in skepticism, nihilism, relativity, and despair. The purely external forms of the King's piety have no efficacy; as Hamlet says, "This physic but prolongs thy sickly days.

After the conflict between Hamlet and Claudius is disclosed as irreconcilable, the plot moves swiftly. The order in which the "attributes" disappear has already been commented upon; it remains to note that all of the deaths except the King's are incidental, if not accidental, to the overcoming of the principal antagonist, and that the deaths of Ophelia and Gertrude are neither by Hamlet's hand nor by his contrivance. Have we here, as in Hamlet's protest to Laertes of the measure of his love for Ophelia and in the Ghost's injunction with respect to Gertrude ("Leave her to heaven") an adumbration of a special relation between the fallen Sophia of the Gnostics and her divine spouse?

"Naked and Alone"

On the question whether Shakespeare "knew what he was doing"—had the conscious intention of treating the Hamlet story as "a drama of initiation"—there remains one interesting sidelight which came to my attention quite by accident and which I am, unfortunately, not in a position to resolve. It is my understanding that the phrase "naked and alone" occurs in one of the initiatory rituals in Freemasonry. There would be, perhaps, no particular significance in "High and mighty. You shall know I am set naked [stripped of lower attributes?] on your kingdom"; but the repetition of the word "naked" by the King and the addition in a postscript of "alone" seem calculated to place these two ideas in juxtaposition and to force them upon the attention of the listener to whom they may have a familiar ring.

An equally tenuous but to me irresistible observation concerns Shakespeare's "weakness" for punning. Horatio's "Goodnight sweet prince, / And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest!" is poetry so sublime that rational analysis of the lines seems a sacrilege; but what of the line "The rest is silence?" In the Beginning the speaking of the primordial Word set in motion the forces of vibratory creation; Jonas tells us of "the noise of the world," which has as its object "to drown out the 'call of Life' and to deafen man to the voice of the alien Man" (redeemer).

Although it cannot be affirmed that Hamlet's final words refer not to the untold portion of his story (which he has previously begged Horatio to tell) but to the state of unconditioned Being which he is about to enter, we do know that Shakespeare customarily extracts the very essence of meaning from the words that he uses. If he is punning here, the pun is the most magnificent in literary history.

A final word is needed with respect to Hamlet's solicitude for the proper reporting of his cause and the clearing of the "wounded name. / Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me!" Although we have been told that Hamlet is "lov'd of the distracted multitude" and that he is greatly sensitive in points of honor, there has been nothing to indicate that he is particularly concerned with public opinion or with hopes for succession to the Danish throne — the motive most likely to be assumed by the populace for the "unnatural acts" which have taken place. And if the occasion for these acts had been a mere unsuccessful revolt, would not Horatio—of all men the closest friend to Hamlet—be suspected of inventing an unprovable story to give sanction to the enterprise? But the provable alternative — the misreporting of the whole series of events as the purposeless strivings of a madman—would cause the meaning of the redemptive drama to be lost to the world—a matter of the gravest and most selfless significance. Is it not therefore probable that the cause for which Horatio is asked to "Absent thyself from felicity a while / In this harsh world draw thy breath in pain" is of more than temporal import?

For the purpose of playing, as Hamlet says, "Both at the first and now, was and is, to hold, as 'were, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure." Surely the struggle of man against his own attributes is of the very age and body of our time.

3. Quoted by Jung, p. 216.
4. Jonas, p. 43.
5. Jung, p. 223.
8. Ibid., p. 189.
12. Ibid., p. 56.
13. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
15. Jonas, p. 35.
16. Ibid., p. 73.
Neoclassical and Renaissance Pastoral

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A common approach to criticism in recent decades has been to emphasize the differences between English Renaissance and English Neoclassical poetry rather than their similarities. A corollary has been to seek the origins of English Neoclassicism in the school of Ben or in French literature rather than in the mainstream of English Renaissance literature. Consequently a sense of the continuity of Renaissance and Neoclassical poetry and an awareness of the contribution of English Renaissance to Neoclassical poetry have been gradually obscured.

In exploring the Renaissance background of Neoclassical poetry, the present study seeks to contribute to a renewed awareness of this neglected mainstream of literary influence. Because of the primary concern of the Neoclassical age with imitations of the classics, I plan to limit my paper to the pastoral, the first of the classical genres of intermediate length cultivated with distinction in the Renaissance, a genre much discussed and imitated in the Neoclassical age. Without ignoring their differences, I propose to examine the indebtedness of Pope’s Pastorsals (1709), that high-water mark of Neoclassical pastoral, to Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender (1579), long recognized by virtue of its freshness, variety, lyricism, and imaginative power as the first fruits of English Renaissance pastoral.

Without suggesting that the Shepheardes Calender contains all the variety of English Renaissance pastoral, one may yet insist, with W.W. Greg, on its pre-eminent influence on subsequent English pastorals. “In the Shepherd’s Calender we have the one pastoral composition in English literature which can boast first-rate historical importance. There are not a few later productions in the kind which may be reasonably held to surpass it in poetic merit, but all alike sink into insignificance by the side of Spenser’s eclogues when the influence they exercised on the history of English verse is taken into account.” That the influence of the Calender on Pope’s Pastorsals constitutes no exception to this generalization will subsequently be shown. According to Professor J.E. Congleton, moreover, the Pastorsals bring the Neoclassical pastoral to full flower.

As modern scholarship and criticism illustrate, it is the divergences from Spenser’s pastoral art, not the similarities, that generally impress the contemporary reader of Pope’s Pastorsals. Pope shows himself to be well aware of these differences in his “Discourse on Pastoral Poetry,” prefacing the 1717 edition of his works. In the first place, his Pastorsals are composed according to a plan that led to fewer and shorter pastorals than Spenser’s. Some of Spenser’s eclogues are satirical, strictly allegorical or even realistic; none of Pope’s is. Spenser employs a great variety of rhythms and metres, Pope only the heroic couplet. Pope eschews the archaic, obsolete, “low” and dialectal words that enchant Spenser, but in his turn employs one form of poetic diction, the stock epithet, to an extent unprecedented by Spenser.

But at the same time one recognizes these important differences, one sees that Pope, as well as echoing Spenser in a number of lines, adopts with modification his innovation of a chronological framework. He substitutes the seasons for the months because, as he explains, “the year has not that variety in it to furnish every month with a particular description, as it may every season.” Nor does Pope fail in his “Discourse” to express his high regard for Spenser’s invention: “The addition he has made of a Calendar to his Eclogues is very beautiful: since by this, besides the general moral of innocence and simplicity, which is common to other authors of pastoral, he has one peculiar to himself; he compares human life to the several seasons, and at once exposes to his readers a view of the great and little worlds, in their various changes and aspects.” And Pope quotes with approval Dryden’s opinion that Spenser’s achievement is the “most complete” in the mainstream of pastoral since Virgil.

In addition to praising Spenser’s pastoral art, Pope acknowledges in the Pastorsals his indebtedness to the elder poet. Beginning “Summer” with a slightly altered quotation from the first line of Spenser’s “January,” he shortly thereafter declares himself to be Colin’s (Spenser’s) successor, even as “Colin” had once claimed to be Tityrus’ (Chaucer’s). And indeed, as its recent editors have observed, this eclogue, despite its reminiscences of Virgil and Theocritus, is more closely related, by virtue of its “melancholy self-absorption,” to the Shepheardes Calender than to either of its other principal literary ancestors.

The Calendar Motif

Pope’s debt to Spenser, then, is large, larger than to any previous pastoral writer except Virgil. It is so large, in fact, that one is tempted to look beyond Pope’s natural bias on behalf of an English pastoralist, past Spenser’s general literary excellence as a model, to seek a special reason for Pope’s admiration. We find it in Spenser’s calendar motif, which undertakes to impose a greater degree of order on a series of eclogues than the classic composers of pastoral had ever attempted. It is this “rage for order” that most clearly distinguishes Pope’s pastoral art from that of his classical predecessors, and it is Spenser’s groping for a new kind of order that chiefly endears him to Pope and prefigures Pope’s Neoclassical art.

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Having pointed out the principal way in which the Shepheardes Calender anticipates the Pastorals, one must nevertheless observe that Pope's work is sharply differentiated from Spenser's by his further development and more ostentatious use of the chronological motif. In addition, Pope employs more subordinate devices to achieve order than does Spenser.

Spenser develops fewer chronological correspondences in his eclogue than does Pope, and develops them less thoroughly. By direct statement, astrological reference, or allusion, only five of Spenser's twelve eclogues assigned to the months are evidently intended to be made peculiarly appropriate to the month assigned them. In "April," Hobbinoll weeps like April, the month of showers. In addition, the subject of praise in "April," Elisa (Queen Elizabeth), is appropriately associated by Thenot's and Hobbinoll's emblems with Venus, whose astrological house is in lusty Taurus, the zodiacal sign for April. These emblems, "O quam te memorem, virgo?" and "O dea certe" are quoted from Virgil's Aeneid (I, 327-328). They constitute Aeneas' amazed response to his mother Venus' beauteous appearance in the guise of one of Diana's maidens. Taken by Spenser's friend and editor E.K. to represent Thenot's and Hobbinoll's responses to Elisa, they not only associate her with the beautiful goddess of love, but hint that her role as the Virgin Queen is a mere disguise to be cast off in favor of her proper role as a mother to princes. Spenser's description of Elisa, emphasizing the red as well as the white of her attire, adornment, and complexion, supports by color symbolism the suggestion of these emblems, as does the inclusion of violets (Venus' flowers) in her coronet, and the reference to "coronations, and sops in wine, / Worne of paramoures," with which Elisa is decked.

In "May," Palinode tells Piers that he has observed "a shoule of shepeherdes" going to the forest to bring in May. In the ensuing controversy over the propriety of such celebrations, Palinode associates Maytime with innocent pleasure, Piers with worldliness blameworthy in a good shepherd. In "July," the poet refers to the Lion, the zodiacal sign for this month. In "November" Spenser refers to the sun as being in the sign of Pisces, whereas the sun actually passes through this sign in February. How Spenser could have made this elementary error has never been satisfactorily explained; whatever the explanation, he seems to have intended to associate the "November" eclogue with the astrological sign of the month. Finally, in "August," Willye appropriately observes that his mazer might well adorn a harvest queen; August in the almanacs is the traditional time of harvest. In the rest of the eclogues, monthly correspondences are lacking.

Largely by comparison and contrast, the remaining seven eclogues, with the probably exception of "September," are related to the appropriate seasons of the year.

In "January" the icy storms aroused by Colin's unrequited love are compared with the winter's cruel rages, but his youth is contrasted with the aging year. In "June" attention is drawn to Colin's advancing age; "December" summarizes the correspondences between his life and the seasons. But unlike the harvest of the advancing year, Colin's flowers of hope have withered and his fruit has rotted before it is ripe. Cuddie in "February" compares old Thenot to the old year, and himself to the lusty spring ahead. In "March" Thomalin, following a description of the springtime, appropriately tells of his exchange of arrows with the God of Love. In "October," Cuddie is compared to the grasshopper with nothing stored for winter. But the poet's reference in "September," to the western wind

That nowe is in his chiefe sovereigntee
Beating the withered leafe from the tree.

Seems more appropriate to the late than early fall, as Professor Botting has pointed out.11

Neil Dodge in his edition of Spenser long ago observed that Spenser also links some of his eclogues by balancing them on two centers, "June" and "July." "June," one of Colin's complaints, is the center upon which Colin's "January" and "December" complaints are balanced. The symmetry of these three is accentuated by the fact that "January" and "December" are monologues employing the same six-line iambic stanza not used elsewhere in the Calender, "June" a dialogue in eight line stanzas not elsewhere employed. Reflecting a similar but not identical arrangement, "July," devoted to ecclesiastical satire, serves as a fulcrum to the other two ecclesiastical satires, "May" (the second preceding month) and "September" (the second following month). Like the other trilogy, "May" and "September" employ the same rough accentual couplets, "July" employs a ballad measure.12 (But in contrast to the first trilogy, each eclogue of the second group is in dialogue form; and whereas the ballad measure is employed nowhere else in the Calender, accentual couplets are also employed in "February."). Here, as elsewhere in the Calender, one fails to find the strict regularity of development that Pope's Pastorals almost everywhere reveal.

Finally, seven of Spenser's twelve eclogues have similar endings that by the rhetorical device of chronographia call attention to the coming of night and the need to wend homeward with the flocks.13

**Seasons and Human Life**

Pope carries the chronological motif further. In addition to naming his four eclogues after the four seasons, he consistently develops Spenser's occasional comparisons of the seasons of the year to the life of man: he treats in "Spring" the period of hopeful love, in "Summer" the time of burning, frustrated passion, as Spenser does in "June." In "Autumn" he treats the period of absence and unrequited love, prefiguring the temporary despair of "Winter," which brings death followed by the hope of eternal life.

Pope further extends the chronological motif by establishing correspondences between the seasons and the
times of the day, by bringing in parallel settings, descriptions, and rural activities appropriate to the seasons or the times of day, and by introducing references to the weather or time of day as each pastoral ends.

Linking devices not directly related to the chronological include the dedication of three of the eclogues to Pope's patron or close personal friends, and the imitation, beginning with a slightly altered quotation or a translation, of a distinguished pastoralist in each eclogue. The first and third begin with translations from the first lines of the sixth and first eclogues of Virgil, whom Pope reveres as the greatest of pastoral writers, the second and fourth with an altered quotation from Spenser's "January," as mentioned above, and the fourth from Theocritus' first idyll. Finally, the consistent use of the heroic couplet tends to link Pope's four pastors.

Partly because Spenser's development of the chronological motif is less consistent than Pope's, his use of it is less conspicuous. Indeed Spenser's scheme is so sketchily developed, and handled with such variety where it occurs, that one scholar has argued it must have been superimposed on the poem after the individual eclogues were substantially complete. Nor does Spenser make any attempt to forestall such a criticism of his work. He seems quite content, in fact, to let his readers make what they can of the Calendar, to the point of actually concealing from them its "general drift and purpose." Even E.K. professes not to be privy to the "special purpose and meaning" of a few of the eclogues.

To understand why the poem's structure is so loose, we need not accept either of Botting's almost equally unpalatable alternatives that the Calendar, with all its excellencies, is a product of immaturity or unconscionable haste. In the first place, we should recall that Spenser was attempting to enrich pastoral by a modification which, strictly applied all of a sudden, might have gone far toward revolutionizing or destroying the venerable pastoral tradition. Second, Spenser may have concluded with some color of justice that the occasional recurrence of several devices subordinated to the chronological motif might properly be substituted for the repetition in every month of the motif itself. (There is no eclogue in the Calendar that fails to include at least one of the devices listed above as relating to the calendar scheme.)

Third and most important, Spenser seems to have conceived of a much more vital partnership between writer and reader than Pope. Spenser is not much concerned with demonstrating either by strict consistency, close repetition, or direct statement, the unity of his Calendar. Instead he wants his reader, by the exercise of his imagination, to fill in the broad outlines of the poetic canvas as best he can, thereby making his own contribution to the poem.

Pope, unlike Spenser, evidently feels obliged at least by 1717 to demonstrate the unity of his pastorals. His concern everywhere in the "Discourse" is to underline the rational element controlling his poetic structure. Even when he departs from strict consistency of development, as when he confesses to introducing in his Pastoral rural activities appropriate merely to the season or the time of day, he undertakes to impose a factitious unity on his work by the conciseness and logic with which he sets forth these alternatives. Of the other devices of unification mentioned above, all but two are clearly utilized in all four eclogues. No explicit reference to "rural employments" is made in the fourth pastoral, although one may assume that the lamenting shepherds are watching their "sleeping flocks." The fourth eclogue, "to the Memory of Mrs. Tempest," contains no dedication to a personal friend or patron, as do the other three. As the poet's recent editors observe, however, this eclogue might well have been dedicated to the poet's close friend Walsh, who had particularly requested a poem on the subject of Mrs. Tempest's death, had not Walsh himself died before the poem was published. The unforeseen circumstance of Walsh's death, then, adequately explains Pope's departure from his dedicatory practice in the other three pastorals.

Turning now from the "Discourse," one notes that the Pastoralstemselves develop the chronological motif conspicuously. Their strictly parallel, not to say repetitious, titles, dedications, opening lines of quotation (two quotations from Virgil, for whom Pope's reverence is the greatest, one each from Spenser and Theocritus), and eulogies of the dedicatees or chosen subjects of the pastorals, all help achieve this effect.

**Summary**

Summarizing, we note that although Pope's Pastoralst are significantly fewer in number, deliberately more artificial and more idiomastic than Spenser's, they reveal an important indebtedness to the Calendar in their adaptation of its chronological framework. Pope's eager seizing upon this device reveals his almost obsessive concern with order, a concern that Spenser also feels, but much less strongly. For whereas Spenser is content to shadow forth two chronological correspondences in his Calendar and two subordinate devices of order, Pope, reducing the number of eclogues in his series in order to concentrate their effects, extends the number of chronological correspondences to five, plus three subordinate linking devices. Moreover, Pope develops these devices much more thoroughly, even ostentatiously. And while Spenser, far from demonstrating the unity of his Calendar, apparently hides part of its meaning even from his close friend E.K., Pope is everywhere concerned, at least in the later editions, to demonstrate his imposition of order dictated by reason upon the recalcitrant materials provided by fancy and artifice.

Surely these differences cannot be fully explained in terms of Spenser's immaturity as an artist or his alleged haste to publish. Professor Botting himself admits that Spenser's mature work The Faerie Queene exhibits some of the same anomalies of structure that bother the modern reader of the Calendar.
The differences between the Calender and the Pastoral, besides reflecting the much less firmly established tradition of English pastoral when Spenser was writing, reflect an important difference in Spenser's and Pope's conception of poetry, and of the proper relation of reader to writer. Spenser conceived of poetry as involving the reason much less than did Pope. Consequently he is not as much concerned as Pope with its adherence to a rational plan of development. The success or failure of Spenser's poem does not hinge as much upon his reader's seeing the order in it, consistently worked out, as upon what we must still call, for want of a better word, its imaginative power, its power to evoke a human response involving but still transcending the fanciful or rational element in man's nature.

Secondly, poetry for Spenser involves a much more creative role for the reader than Pope would allow. Therefore Spenser, far from attempting to make everything in the poem clear to the reader, undertakes to take him on a voyage of discovery with the poet as pilot. Hence Spenser's desire to conceal rather than to demonstrate the full significance of his poem. He wants to point out possibilities of poetic response, not exhaust them.

Pope left much less to the reader's imagination, gave firmer guide lines, within and without the poem, to his reader's responses, especially his rational responses to a poem.

Most important to note here, though, is not that Pope adhered much more rationally and clearly to his plan than did Spenser, but that Spenser anticipated, by his groping for a new kind of order in pastoral, a development that was not to reach its full flowering before Pope. Spenser, though undertaking to achieve a much less rigid order by more imaginative means, none the less shows himself, by his innovation of the calendar, to be in one important respect a forerunner of Neoclassical as well as a representative of Renaissance taste and poetry.

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**You**

You stuff my mouth  
with bits of chocolate  
and buy me scotch  
at Dixie's bar

You draw me home  
for dinner  
you civilize  
my bed

Your patient evening  
washes about my head  
pulling my sands  
to a warped sea.

GEORGE CHAMBERS
Civil Disobedience
By JAMES S. SAVAGE
Professor of Law
Valparaiso University

Some Reflections on the Recent Inter-Lutheran Consultation on Church-State Relations

There is in the United States today a trend toward differentiating between "law-breaking," on the one hand, and "civil disobedience," on the other. The assumption appears to be that in the former the act is done to accomplish some base, selfish, personal motive — and thus should and does receive the complete disapproval of the community. In the latter, the assumption seems to be that the act was committed to serve some "higher end," or "noble purpose," and is therefore "justified" — and should, accordingly, receive the approbation of the community. The state, or political subdivision thereof, whose laws are so "breached" tends not to observe this distinction, choosing to treat all such acts as violations of the law calling for punishment without regard to motivation.

It has become popular recently to think that there is nothing inherently wrong with civil disobedience as such, and the criticism most often heard is that it is sometimes used where it would not be effective.

The current belief in the "goodness" of civil disobedience stems in great part, if not entirely, from the fact that "civil disobedience" and "Civil Rights" have become synonymous. In addition, a good many acts of civil disobedience have been committed by clergymen of many faiths, and by individuals who assert that they have been motivated by "Christian" or "religious" principles. This tends to give to civil disobedience a religious overtone so that it sometimes appears that to be against such disobedience is like being against religion. One can not quarrel with those persons who sincerely believe that the "application" of religion in this day and age calls for support of a movement to secure — to a race long denied them — the economic and political freedom and equality granted to them by the Constitution. In addition, there are many persons who do not regard civil disobedience, in this context, as differing greatly from the disobedience that resulted in the Boston Tea Party, or the disobedience that became the great weapon of Gandhi. There is also recognition that when civil disobedience is considered a "group" activity, as opposed to an act by a single person or several persons, there is present a neutralizing quality — "all these people," or "all those clergymen" must have a point.

For whatever reason we must now live with some civil disobedience, and it appears extremely likely that in the years ahead there will be not less but more. Professor Monrad G. Paulsen of the Columbia University School of Law noted at the recent consultation that he believes this country faces a half-century of unrest, protest, and civil disobedience. The relatively short period of time since he stated this last November affords considerable evidence of the soundness of his prophecy. This poses and will pose a very real problem for the people of this country and for its various governments.

Significance for Lutherans

This concern becomes particularly significant for those members of the Christian community who are members of Lutheran churches, because of their unique historic and traditional positions on the role and function of the church and the state. This may well be true also for other churches, but these particular reflections are concerned with the problem as it is or will be presented to the various Lutheran bodies in this country.

The first problem that must be met by the church is the recognition that as a corporate body it has a voice, and that it can speak directly to the state, although it is difficult to conceive of it doing an "act" of disobedience. The church can also speak directly to its members who are, in the last analysis, the ones who may be disobedient. The church can of course elect to say nothing at all, though it must be recognized that saying nothing in this context amounts to saying something about civil disobedience. Having recognized this, the serious problem then arises of what to say about civil disobedience. For what a church says about civil disobedience it is in effect saying about the state. If it tolerates or encourages civil disobedience by its members it is putting itself, to this extent, in the role of critic of the state. If it disapproves, if it refuses to tolerate civil disobedience by its members, simply because it is civil disobedience, it is, to this extent, putting the state above criticism. If it elects to do neither then it is, to this extent, saying that the state is of no concern to the church.

In November of 1964, some forty representatives of the three major Lutheran bodies in this country, the American Lutheran Church, The Lutheran Church in America, and The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, met in Minneapolis to discuss some current developments in church-state relations. As the consultation progressed it became evident that one of its major concerns would center on the problem of civil disobedience. No such group — composed as it was of clergymen, theologians, church administrators, educators, and lawyers — could gather for a church-state discussion without touching, however briefly, on such matters as prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, federal aid to
parochial education, federal and state aid of church institutions, and Sunday closing laws. These are the familiar areas of the so-called church-state "tensions."

The most important matter for the consultation, in the opinion of this consultant, came when the group turned to a consideration of "...[the] task ahead in terms of current and emerging social, political and legal trends, and the key issues needing special attention." These key issues were identified as the definition and function of the church and state. This in turn focused the attention of the group on the problem: can the church in modern times judge the state and, if so, how? This of course is at the very heart of civil disobedience. It should be noted at this point that the problem involved in judging an action of the state, or the state itself, is not confined solely to churches, though it is in this context that the problem of civil disobedience is being here discussed. The age-old controversy between "positivism" and "natural law" — a controversy that has again become an active one among legal philosophers — becomes relevant in any discussion of civil disobedience from a legal standpoint. From judging the state it is but a short step to judging the law. The positivists insist that this can not be done, while the advocates of natural law insist not only that it can be done, but must be done, and are ready and eager to supply a basis for the judgment.

To return, however, to the consultation, each of the major bodies, either officially or unofficially had, within the year before the meeting, issued various statements concerning the relationship between church and state in this country.

The Commission on Church and State Relations in a Pluralistic Society of the Board of Social Ministry of The Lutheran Church in America had issued, in 1963, a monograph entitled Church and State, A Lutheran Perspective. The American Lutheran Church had met in assembly in October of 1964, and a number of proposed resolutions and statements were submitted for the consideration of the group. A statement on Church-State Relations in the U.S.A. was commended by the Convention "to its members." The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod was represented by an unofficial volume published in 1964 entitled Church and State Under God (Concordia Publishing House). This book was written by thirteen persons within Missouri under the direction and editorship of Dr. Albert G. Huegli of Valparaiso University.

The L.C.A. monograph had the advantage of a certain amount of Lutheran ecumenicity since the Commission has two members who belong to T.A.L.C. and one from Missouri. The T.A.L.C. statement had the advantage of having been considered by that church in convention assembled, and thus has a "quasi-official" tone. The Missouri book, while not official, has the advantage of being the most comprehensive (in considering the usual church-state tensions) of all the presentations.

Each of the consultants had been expected to familiarize himself with these materials before the consultation gathered. As a prelude to the general discussions each of the bodies, through a spokesman, reviewed the statements of at least one other body, all of the critics seeking to point out areas of agreement and disagreement for the discussions to follow.

It is interesting at this point to note the statements of the three bodies that possess some relevance for a consideration of civil disobedience.

In the L.C.A. statement, A Lutheran Perspective, appears the term "sacred secularity" and the statement notes:

It is crucial that Christian citizens distinguish their sacred secularity from godless secularism. (33)

The statement then continues with the development of the thought that there is an institutional separation between church and state on the one hand, and a "functional interaction" on the other. Turning then to the mission of the state under God, and after asserting that the state's power is delegated to it by God, it continues:

It is delegated by God to be used responsibly for the attainment of beneficial civil goals. This means that no state is worthy of the Christian's uncritical loyalty and unquestioning obedience. (39)

Obedience to political authority is therefore seen as obedience to God, an obedience which is refused only when the authority demands something contrary to the will of God. (31)

Dr. Huegli in commenting on the L.C.A. statement noted as being "especially valuable" the following things: One, the concept of "sacred secularity"; two, the assertion (noted above) about "uncritical loyalty and unquestioning obedience" as being something new in American Lutheranism; three, the acknowledgement of the church's contribution to the civil consensus which supports the state; four, the church's work of "championing the human and civil rights" of all citizens.

The position of T.A.L.C. is stated in a somewhat different fashion:

Loyalty to the Lord Jesus is of course the overriding loyalty for Christians. They have to live in two realms, that of Caesar and that of God's Son. They are in this world but may never be identified with it. The time can come for all of us when we must learn to obey God rather than men. (440)

In this volume, in a chapter headed "Scriptural Concepts of the Church and State," Dr. Martin H. Scharlemann felt called upon to face this matter in more detail:

As the herald of God's Word the church must at times become critical of society and of the state. In this respect it has fallen heir to the spirit and message of the ancient prophets of God. The church must stand like a watchman, condemning injustice wherever it occurs. In this capacity it must often show the prince how to wear the sword, to borrow a phrase from Luther. It is especially bound to alert the state to its temptations to become demonic, constantly reminding governing authorities of their
functions and destiny under God. (35)
Further on he notes the existence of the real "conflict" (to use his term):
That no contradiction of Rom. 13 is intended can be seen especially from verse 10: "If anyone slays with the sword, with the sword must he be slain." These are words that echo a statement of the Lord Himself and serve as a strong reminder of the limitations placed on resistance even to the totalitarian state." (39)
And yet we must resist those demands of the state which invade the sphere that properly belongs only to God and His church. (39)
In commenting on the Huegli volume a member of T.A.L.C. thought that the matter of civil protest and resistance, and the ways in which Christian concern for justice can create problems in church-state relations received "insufficient attention." Professor Paulsen of the L.C.A. in commenting on the Missouri volume indicated that he was in accord with the T.A.L.C. spokesman noting, according to the unofficial minutes of the consultation:
The Scharlemann essay emphasizes "obedience" rather than "citizenship" and seems less certain as to the role of the church in judging or resisting a state. (7)
In commenting on these remarks Dr. Huegli indicated that it was his belief that Missouri and T.A.L.C. differ from the L.C.A. in emphasis with regard to civil protest and resistance.

A Common Lutheran Bond
In the discussions that followed these critical presentations the only matter upon which there was general agreement, in the area of civil disobedience, is the proposition that both church and state are "under God." That this common Lutheran bond is in opposition to the so-called Anabaptist-Quaker view that there is no sacred secularity but only a neutral secularism. In this view the state is man-created and man-judged, and there is no occasion for the church to speak to the state. All agreed that under this view the matter of civil disobedience is not one for religious concern. It hardly seems necessary to state that the consultants did not even begin to reach an answer to the problems raised by Lutherans by civil disobedience. However, the discussions on this point did reveal a need for an investigation into the relationship between the church and state, with a view to answering the question of the how in "How shall the church judge the state?" There were several suggestions or intimations that it might be time for Lutherans to consider a theory of natural law. These suggestions were passed over rather rapidly though not without mention of the possibility of a Lutheran position on natural law that would be in accord with Lutheran orthodoxy. The fact that these suggestions came near the close of the consultation precluded a lengthy discussion of this possibility, but, and perhaps even more important, there seemed to be a realization among the consultants that a Lutheran position on natural law could not be discussed fruitfully without a great deal of re-assessment within the various bodies of Lutheranism.
There was agreement, however, that further consultations should touch on, among other things, some empirical research of what goes into the church-state relation, and the proper role of the church in stimulating and guiding effective political action. It is certainly unarguable that such consultations should be held — and soon — in order that Lutherans — with their insights into "the sacredness of the secular" — might be able to serve the need in this country for genuine prophetic criticism. Certainly more is needed than the action of a congregation — as reported to the consultation — which, when asked by its pastor if they objected to his engaging in acts of civil disobedience in connection with a civil rights activity, answered that he had the consent of his congregation but that he should not expect the congregation to reimburse him if he were penalized by a fine!
Since the close of the consultation the L.C.A. has made available copies of its Statement on Race Relations as adopted by the Second Biennial Convention of the Lutheran Church in America.
This statement, which is rather lengthy, concludes with the recognition that it is permissible for the agencies and churches within its structure, as well as its individual members, to peacefully demonstrate in support of repeal or invalidation of laws believed to be in basic conflict with "...the moral law of God." The statement then continues:
If and when the means of legal recourse have been exhausted or are demonstrably inadequate, Christians may then choose to serve the cause of racial justice by disobeying a law that clearly involves the violation of their obligations as Christians, so long as they are:

a. willing to accept the penalty for their action;
b. willing to limit and direct their protest as precisely as possible against a specific grievance or injustice;
c. willing to carry out their protest in a nonviolent, responsible manner, after earnestly seeking the counsel of fellow Christians and the will of God in prayer. (3) (emphasis supplied)
In all of this, we are guided and supported by the normative teachings of the church in Article XVI of the Augsburg Confession "Christians are obliged to be subject to civil authority and obey its commands and laws in all that can be done without sin. But when commands of the civil authority cannot be obeyed without sin, we must obey God rather than men (Acts 5:29)." (3)
This statement clearly demonstrates that some of the differences between L.C.A. on the one hand and T.A.L.C. and Missouri on the other, as noted at the consultation, are very real differences indeed!

May 1965
The difficulties in building up a repertory theatre were discussed here last time, and a final word about the failure of Kazan and Whitehead at the Lincoln Repertory Theatre will close this chapter. Messrs. Blau and Irving from the San Francisco Workshop are taking over what has been a two-year fiasco despite Arthur Miller's close cooperation with this group. Whether the administration's impatience with Kazan's trials and errors was justified only the next seasons under the new directors will prove.

One may need a couple of years to get the right feeling for a repertory theatre. The Association of Producing Artists, led by Ellis Rabb and now successfully doing for the Phoenix Theatre what its two directors, Hambleton and Houghton, were unable to achieve for years, took its time in preparing for its success while touring the country. It is not only their choice of plays which shows balance and skill, it is also the good taste and craftsmanship in their execution which makes this enterprise so worth while. Their latest addition to their repertoire was Jean Giraudoux' "Judith," one of the more eloquent and mature plays on a Biblical theme, full of sparkling irony in its 20th-century approach to the subject, in which the killing of Holofernes is not done out of hatred but love in fear that a unique feeling of exaltation cannot be repeated. Rosemary Harris does very well with this sophisticated, taxing part.

The Phoenix Theatre decided to move to a bigger theatre and to raise its status from off-Broadway to Broadway. As long as it remains a financial question and one of giving more people a chance to see good theatre, there is no objection to this plan. Particularly — and this is the question — if Ellis Rabb and his group will be able to withstand the corrupting pressures of a frantic theatre atmosphere in which Mammon under-studies Melpomene and Thalia.

Among the last two offerings of the Repertory Theatre of Lincoln Center was Molière's "Tartuffe," which had a few things to recommend it, but one major flaw with which Kazan has come to be identified and which director William Ball repeated. The play in its excellent translation by Richard Wilbur was jazzed up as if Moliere could not be trusted to hold our interest.

The other play was Arthur Miller's long one-acter, "Incident at Vichy." It deals with an assortment of Nazi victims waiting for the verdict: to be freed or doomed depending on their being circumcised, or not. The cry of anguish is mixed with bitter skepticism about man's future. Again, it is the eternal question so frightfully important in our time: Am I my brother's keeper? which Arthur Miller tries to answer.

There cannot be any doubt about where he stands, and yet I have great difficulties in finding his solution satisfactory. He needed a hero to prove that man is able to sacrifice himself for his fellowman, the only light that can give us hope that man will survive himself despite of himself. Everything in this play hinges on the choice of the hero, the symbol in which we can believe. That Miller chose an Austrian aristocrat to perform the supreme sacrifice was a serious mistake. It is not believable on stage as it is not in the historic light of the past events since Hitler's rise to power, nor in the eyes of those who are very familiar with the local scene.

How important this choice was became more obvious when the Russian papers, desperately trying to praise the play, had to tell their readers that the only decent heroic person ready to act — is a worker. Arthur Miller's protest against this distortion of the truth must have sounded — if they ever heard it — as unconvincing to the Russians as his real choice seemed to me. When dealing with symbols, the dramatist's licence is as unlimited as it is restricted dramaturgically by the fact that it must carry universal meaning. How are we supposed to respond to a stirring, well written play with a vital message when, at the very end, we can't believe in the hero?

True, in life as much as in the theatre, the mirror of life, we must be able to forget and forgive. But Miller's hero becomes even less convincing at the end after you have reluctantly accepted that the German officer who supervises this devilish game of life and death and is a stand-in for the bigger antagonist in this play, is depicted as a man torn between his duty of doing business-as-usual and his tortured conscience suffering with his victims. When you leave the theatre you cannot help being impressed by the "decent" German officer, by how these eighty million Germans must have suffered killing and ravaging as they did, and by the "heroic" Austrian aristocrat who, as a symbol, has become an operetta figure even in the eyes of the Austrians. And this is certainly not what Arthur Miller wanted to achieve.

Basically, "Incident at Vichy" is a morality play and, though it is laudable that Miller wanted to avoid a black-white painting, he leaned too far over in his endeavor to be tolerant, to be understanding, and the Devil has a good time at not really knowing on whose side he ought to be.
Forgive Us Our Churchmanship

By RONALD G. GOERSS
Campus Pastor
University of California, Los Angeles

"Hear, O my people, while I admonish you!
O Israel, if you would but listen to me!
There shall not be among you a strange god,
And you shall not worship a foreign god."
Psalm 81:8-9

There is little chance that the average American church member is tempted to worship a Nigerian juju, the Hindu’s Shiva, or the ancient thunder-god Thor. The average churchman also is unlikely to be particularly concerned about deep philosophical problems concerning God’s existence. He couldn’t care less either about what Paul Tillich means when he talks about “the ground of all being.” There is a system of beliefs, resting on Scripture and the Confessions, which undergirds the solid position of a given congregation. It says so in the congregation’s constitution, in that article which is unalterable along with that other article that says the former is unalterable.

The professional is expected to know the system of belief. He was trained in all that religious jargon. It is important to the lay churchman, too. However, it is not something to get too excited about when there are so many practical matters at hand. When is the theology of a Church important? When vital decisions are made? When new members are received into a congregation? When a pastor is called? When a new idea is suggested? When a parish has personality problems? When there is work to be done of, by, and for the institutional Church?

If the evidence which comes from the Church’s loving and unloving critics is correct to any degree, then the institutional Church of today needs help. Above all it needs forgiveness and a renewal in its identity. One definition of a churchman is “an adherent or devoted member of a church, especially of an established church.” This focuses on the precise problem. A person’s loyalty to the established institution can become idolatrous. When the Church is experienced as affiliation more with like-minded churchmen (or at least with people with whom I choose to associate) and less with the people of the living God, then our cry must be, “Forgive us our churchmanship!”

Someone has asked pointedly, “If Christ is nailed into an institutional coffin, how can there be a resurrection?” The critics cannot be brushed off easily who view the contemporary Church with challenges and barbs which approach contempt. There is too much evidence that they are right. When people are structured into any organization there can be problems. The Church is no exception. On the other hand, the witness of Scripture provides help which transcends that of nature alone. It is a Word from God which is an enabling Word. It enables us to examine our churchmanship honestly, to confess our institutional sins, and to renew the empirical Church in its mission to the world.

Comments such as the following are heard frequently among people who belong to the institutional churches across the land.

“Tillich means when he talks about the evidence which comes from the Church’s loving organization there can be problems. The Church is no exception. On the other hand, the witness of Scripture provides help which transcends that of nature alone. It is a Word from God which is an enabling Word. It enables us to examine our churchmanship honestly, to confess our institutional sins, and to renew the empirical Church in its mission to the world.

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Comment
tion. Disagreement leads to slander and schism. Keeping the club rules is more important than sharing nourishment as the Body of Christ. Membership is viewed as voluntary affiliation with a compatible group until such membership is voluntarily terminated or transferred for less than healthy reasons. These sins of institutionalism can strangle the life of God’s people. They can stifle the acceptance of people toward one another and stunt the creativity of those seeking to determine and do God’s will in the world and for the world.

We do not need to pursue strange or foreign gods, when we can make our own. The Church can be transformed into the kind of institution that gets in the way of God and becomes an idol itself.

Our meditation does not end with lamentation. If it did we would be denying the hope and power of the resurrection. If lamentation was all we could share, then a lot of us would head for the nearest Ethical Culture group (if we liked the people). We would try to find some workable ideals to carry us through everyday living and decision making. We would trade in one institution for another. The new one might have less pretensions, if this is only an organizational consideration.

Self-examination is crucial. Repentance is necessary and liberating. God’s Spirit renews us. Like it or not (and because we are sinners, we won’t always like it), we are united with all sorts and conditions of people in the church, both locally and at large. The Gospel and the sacraments build the Church, creating and renewing it. Where the Gospel is preached and the sacraments administered, there is the Church. It is this Word of God to us churchmen, lay and clergy, which continually calls us back from crass organizationalism. It calls us forward to vital life as Christ’s Body in the world. We need this continual renewal of reformation. This is another way of saying that churchmanship without forgiveness isn’t worth the trouble.

When the emphasis is on God and His initiative, it is where it belongs. God works to build His Church in the world. When we fashion the Church along the lines of an institution we run risks. These risks emphasize our need for repentance and renewal. We are God’s people gathered around the Word and by the Word from place to place. Celebrating the presence of the Word, we move out into the world where Christ meets us coming back in the life and concerns of our neighbors. God’s people are forgiven and forgive. They are blessed and bless. They are loved and love. They are cared for and therefore they care about. Because we are such people, we forgive, bless, love, care.

Churchmanship in the biblical sense always means servanthood. In our baptism each of us died with Christ and rose with Him to newness of life, the life of servanthood. The love of Christ constrains us to be for the world. We have a precedent. When Jesus had the chance to take over the religious corporation of His day, when He could have been chairman of the board and main stock-holder of an institution, He refused. He chose the lowly road of servanthood. This crushes us and our many brands of churchmanship. Our personal churchmanship can blind us to the world’s plight. The successful institution is often successful precisely because it is irrelevant to its world. If it touches people deeply with the Word and moves them along the way of the world’s sorrows and deep needs, it could die as an institution. What is the real business of the Church? Is it simply to get bigger and better as a successfully organized moral enterprise? Is the institution an end in itself?

Individuals face “identity crises” in our modern society. “Who am I?” is a crucial question facing many individuals. The organized Church likewise has an identity crisis, whenever its institutionalism or churchmanship distorts its worship and witness. The cross meets our identity crisis. God addresses us. As we hear His Word of judgment and mercy, we know who we are. Our churchmanship is forgiven. We are God’s own people dependent on the forgiveness of sins. From the point of repentance and renewal the Spirit of God calls the Church — us — to be God’s people in spirit and in truth.

Me

I stumble
on your lash
feeling
what I cannot say

when I begin
to shake inside
I pick your body up

where could I hide
this sack of blue?

GEORGE CHAMBERS
A long time ago I listened with openmouthed curiosity as one of my teachers declared that the four greatest poets of all time were Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Although I wondered why this man, by whose learning and perspicacity I set great store, limited the number to four, I took his word. Who was I to question what he told his classes? Later on, however, I scratched my head in doubt and perplexity whenever I considered the somewhat categorical pronouncement that the greatest of all poets are only four in number. I thought of some of the Old Testament poets. What about Job? What about some of the prophets? What about Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles? What about Heinrich Heine and others?

But away with these heretical thoughts of mine! I acknowledge the towering greatness of Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe. And Dante is the stepping-stone to what I propose to discuss in this column.

Like all famous poets, this renowned Italian exercised a wide-reaching influence on music. Poetry and the tonal art, you see, are related by what Cicero called a common bond.

I shall not dwell on the fact that the sonnets, the canzoni, and the madrigals of Dante, like those of Petrarch, were used as texts for much fine music. Nor shall I discuss Beethoven's admiration of Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe. At this writing I shall focus my attention for a few moments on a Hungarian composer named Franz Liszt and a Russian composer named Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky. Both owed much to Dante. Why am I choosing these two men? Because it has become fashionable in some critical circles to besmear them with the mud of asinine disparagement.

The Dante Symphony, for orchestra and female chorus, is one of Liszt's finest works. Yet it is seldom performed nowadays. I wonder why. I know that some of this famous composer-pianist's works contain a large amount of fustian. Liszt was a showman. But he was infinitely more than this. He was a trailblazer in the art of playing the piano and in the field of orchestration. Pianism would not be what it is today if there had not been a Liszt, a Chopin, and a Debussy. When I consider how much we owe to Liszt, I can easily pardon his rather frequent use of firecrackers and syrup.

Liszt, whose vivid imagination was as quick as his fingers, contributed much to the exciting development of what is known as the symphonic poem. In fact, he gave us many fine works of this nature — works that are models of orchestral wizardry. He was a great painter in tone. One cannot invalidate his outstanding ability in this domain by saying that the miraculous chorale preludes composed by Johann Sebastian Bach foreshadowed the colorful and exhilarating evolution of the symphonic poem.

Nowadays one must listen to tons upon tons of new music. All too often it becomes necessary to expose one's eardrums to the unspeakable balderdash which many composers of our day are inflicting on their long-suffering fellowmen. How I long for the unity, the coherence, and the deftly devised emphasis characteristic of Liszt's symphonic poems whenever I am constrained either by duty or by politeness to give patient ear to the rubbish which some concocters of tonal messes have the effrontery to call music! Would that there were more men like Liszt today! But real prophets are always rare. And Liszt, believe me, was a prophet in the true sense of the word. Although I hold no brief for his morals, I do know that music would lack some of the richness it has today if he had not bestridden the scene with the magic of his genius. Beware of trying to laugh him off!

Nor should one join the ranks of those who scorn Tchaikovsky. Of course, some of his music is trite, and some of it is maudlin. But I do not hesitate to call Tchaikovsky a great melodist who was extraordinarily skillful in the field of orchestration.

 Portions of Dante's The Divine Comedy inspired one of this Russian master's finest works. I am referring to the exciting fantasia called Francesca da Rimini. This is vividly programmatic music. In spite of the fire and brimstone, the screaming of the damned, and the howling of the winds in those parts of the composition that have to do with the terrors of hell, I do not consider Francesca da Rimini a bombastic work. It is scored with remarkable ingenuity. Naturally the instrumentation is radically different in more than one respect from Richard Wagner's way of writing for the orchestra. It does not remind one of Richard Strauss, Ottorino Respighi, Maurice Ravel, or Claude Debussy. No, it is Tchaikovsky as he lived, moved, and had his being.

How anyone can scorn Francesca da Rimini after studying it with conscientious care is beyond me. Why should one resort to the captious and completely gratuitous criticism which states from the abysmal depths of know-it-all wisdom that it is inferior to what Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, Brahms, or Wagner have done? Every student of music with even a modicum of substantial learning knows that Tchaikovsky cannot balance the seesaw board with any one of these men. But this does not mean that the Russian represents what some are inclined to refer to as "the quintessential extract of mediocrity." We must thank Dante for Tchaikovsky's Francesca da Rimini.
Cote D'Azur

By ADALBERT RAPHAEL KRETZMANN

Cezanne, Renoir, Chagall, Leger, Matisse, and Picasso have made the south of France into a special center for modern art and the Mecca of thousands of tourists. In June of 1964, one of Paris' famous art dealers, Aime Maeght, founded an Art Museum not far from the Matisse Church.

The Fondation Maeght can boast of a most unusual collection of the masters of modern art. In Paris the walls of his gallery in Rue de Teheran are adorned with the works of Calder, Chagall, Braque, Chillida, Miro, Bonnard, and Kandinsky. Numerous works of these same artists have now been brought together in his new museum at Vence. The Fondation has become the center of a thriving little colony in which artists and authors from all over the world have been invited to live and work. Plans call for regular gallery exhibits as well as seasonal expositions, concerts, lectures and discussions. An Art Library, as well as a photo and film depository, are also in prospect.

The new building was designed by Jose Luis Sert of Harvard, together with the artist colony of Vence. There are three distinct buildings connected by glazed-in passageways. One section adorned with a roof-garden and a facade-mosaic by Chagall contains offices and a salesroom, besides the large exhibition hall. The opposite wing contains individual rooms dedicated to the works of individual modern artists. The third wing is a Chapel in honor of Maeght's son. Sert has achieved a remarkable setting for this memorial chapel. In the surrounding area are exhibits designed for outdoors by Calder, Miro and others.

The ordinary observer might have some second thoughts about the architecture and its setting. Its style seems already to have been outdated. It is, strictly speaking, not attuned to the landscape of the Provence at all. It looks more like southwestern America. Even the interior light leaves something to be desired.

It is wonderful to see that something new has been developed for modern art and its discussion. It gives a new focal point to the visitor in the south of France.

On Second Thought

By ROBERT J. HOYER

Every congregation, formed of disparate social units, has the problem of achieving consciousness of the unity which binds us together in love. The Sunday morning worship service is a powerful force to that achievement. We decry the necessity for multiple services because "they separate us, we never get to see everyone." Beside this, the average congregation holds social affairs — dinners, picnics, bazaars — and forms social clubs — for the women, married couples, and the youth — "so we can get to know one another."

But in most congregations there is no real rapport at all on the social level. We become an artificial society, knowing that something unites us but carefully hiding it from one another. We achieve a superficial unity in terms of the affair itself or in some extraneous interest. The kitchen committee is united by the work. Bridge players gather with bridge players, baseball talkers with baseball talkers. Mothers are bound together by motherhood, and teen-agers by the common knowledge that no one else understands them. We kid ourselves that we express our one-ness, until some major problem splits the whole group into warring factions and we wake to the shattering realization that we have had no practice at all in giving and receiving ourselves. We do not know how to understand one another because we have touched only lightly on the surface of our beings.

Jesus used the social affair as a means of gathering men together. It is amazing how often the fellowship of His followers was found in the sharing of food. But Jesus wasted no time at all before He sought a deeper level of relationship. In a polite evening visit, He said, "You must be born again!" At a formal dinner, "Simon, whoever loves much has been forgiven much." In a chance meeting at a well, "If you had known me you would have asked for living water." At breakfast on the beach, "Simon, son of John, do you love me?" And at the festal meal celebrating Israel's deliverance, "This is my blood of the new covenant, shed for you."

Jesus is our unity, and we have no other. We can't achieve it; it has been given to us. Somehow when we meet together the one-ness of His Word of grace must be expressed, or we have nothing in our togetherness. He is the instant rapport of Christian knowing Christian in their common judgment and the unending grace of God.
Eruptions of student dissent and rebellion have triggered much discussion and dialogue about the current campus generation and have caused many people to insist that “once again the kids are going to the dogs.”

At Stanford University students belligerently demanded changes in the administration’s judicial procedures, in the social regulations dealing with the behavior of female students, and in the attitudes of administrators toward academic freedom. This Stanford belligerency was compounded seven times over in the case of the student demonstrations at the University of California (Berkeley) where sit-ins and concentrated student demands created consternation across the land. The sophisticated environs of Princeton University, traditional and Ivy League all the way, were disturbed by campus riots, and, of all things, by less than subtle requests for the admitting of women students. At other places, it seemed for a time as if women, students or not, were becoming permanent fixtures in men’s dormitories. At other schools, the argument raged over drinking, apartments, censorship, student publications, and student evaluation of faculty members. According to reports, students at the University of Michigan were demanding campus democracy now. The students, it seems, are having their say and their day.

And all this rebellion is going on at a time when education is improving. It is fair to say that many faculty members and administrators “are gunning like a bunch of hot-rodders” to create and establish good education programs, to provoke the good students into unusual achievements, and to make education a truly rewarding experience and adventure. Without question, we can say with some warranted assertability, that better prepared teachers are teaching better equipped students according to more adequately constructed programs.

So, if this is so, what is the uproar all about?

In a paper addressed to a session on student pressures at a recent conference on Higher Education (sponsored by the National Education Association), a Stanford dean, Mervin B. Freedman, asserted: “Faculty members and members of the administration in colleges and universities have become more humane in the last few years, that is, more interested in the needs and development of individual students and less concerned with certain abstract academic and administrative ends. Yet students seem to be more dissatisfied than ever.” Why? Perhaps things are not moving fast enough. But Freedman sees this as hardly the total story.

Students are being pushed by some other pressures. Freedman feels that “students are responding to three strong societal and cultural pressures” while they “are preparing for a future in which there will be different human conditions.” Under the pressures and compulsions of looking to the future, they are looking for a unifying principle, insisting upon social service and the ethics of charity “as a force or motive of great power in life,” and are hoping to make of the university a viable community. Dissatisfied with compartmentalization and specialization, a larger share of current student bodies in the United States is looking to philosophy, literature, and company for the principles and ideas that will reorder and unify what they know, what they are, and what they do. With a casual glance, or even with a longing glance, at the Calvinist ethic of profit and materialism, they are becoming involved in civil rights demonstrations, Easter Egg hunts for under-privileged children, in the Peace Corps, inner-city projects, and sundry forms of social work and. I might add, with hardly more than a passing glance at the professional eight to five charity workers. Freedman believes the students “were not only protesting against political restriction, but also against the sense of isolation and estrangement that pervaded the campus.” They want “an end to conditions that separated students from one another and that separated students from faculty.” Students and professors, according to many campus leaders, should work together in the university’s enterprises.

Administrators might take judicial notice of the fact that in many of these so-called rebellions faculty members and students found some common grounds in similar complaints about the way universities and intellectual enterprises are being handled in these latter days. In the Sturm und Drang of arguing similar positions it was, said Freedman, “as if these faculty members were looking for something to remind them forcibly that the community of their university and its student constituents were actively in need of their attention.”

In some way — if we are really reading the future in the present campus generation — we will be forced to make of the university’s intellectual enterprise a shared and meaningful experience.
A Worthy, But Unsuccessful, Attempt

By ANNE HANSEN

Through the centuries the story of Jesus of Nazareth has had a tremendous impact on the art forms. Some of the world's most sublime music, many priceless paintings and sculptures, and a wealth of fine literature were inspired by a life which began in a stable at Bethlehem and ended on a cross on Golgotha. Great cathedrals, with their magnificent stained-glass windows and their treasured symbols of faith, stand as eloquent testimonials to the man whose words and deeds so changed the course of civilization that the history of mankind is divided into two eras — before Christ and after Christ.

Motion-picture producers have been reluctant to attempt to translate the life of Christ to the screen. Several years ago George Stevens, a veteran producer and director, undertook the challenging task of filming Fulton Oursler's *The Greatest Story Ever Told.* Mr. Stevens knew full well that any film based on the Bible — especially a drama which purports to portray the life of Christ — is sure to be highly controversial.

At the very outset the well-known director said that he was determined to avoid the errors and distortions that characterized earlier attempts to dramatize the coming and the ministry of the long-awaited Messiah. In *The Greatest Story Ever Told* (Cinerama, United Artists) he hoped to create a film which would be accepted as definitive and "would still be shown" in the year of our Lord 2000. Has he succeeded? It is entirely possible that this picture may still be shown at the beginning of the 21st century, but in my opinion Mr. Stevens has not given us a definitive portrait of Christ.

I realize that reaction and response to a religious film tend to be subjective. I can merely point to the things which I found not only disappointing but in some instances disturbing. There are errors, distortions, and, in some cases, curious omissions in the screenplay. Often the omissions alter the meaning of, or completely nullify, the significance of the action on the screen. Much of the invented dialog is awkward and commonplace. The appearance of so many film celebrities in bit parts is distracting and cheaply theatrical; it detracts from the solemnity and authenticity of the picture.

Pictorially the film is magnificent. But here again one must question Mr. Stevens' decision to make *The Greatest Story Ever Told* in Utah and Arizona instead of in Palestine. Photographed in Ultra Panavision 70 and Technicolor, the towering grandeur of our great west becomes a vast canvas — a backdrop so overwhelming that it dwarfs and overshadows the players. In defending his choice of locale Mr. Stevens said, "I saw the story in a concept of physical grandeur." No one will dispute me that this has been achieved at the expense of warmth, intimacy, and the full impact of the personalities of the principals in the drama.

Having stated this side of the case, I hasten to report that the picture also has moments of beauty, poignancy, and compelling drama. Max von Sydow acquits himself with distinction in the taxing role of the Christ, even though he has not fully captured the warmth, the humanity, and the magnetism which drew multitudes to the Teacher and Preacher from Galilee and won for Him many devoted followers. Others among the principals are excellent, and the crowd and mob scenes are handled with skill and dexterity.

Someday a really definitive film about Christ may be made. If it is, I dare say that it will be made by a director who has the sensitivity to understand that it takes something more than a big budget, a big screen, big-name players, and big *everything* to tell the story of a simple man and His message of love, justice, and peace. After all, these are things of the heart and spirit; they cannot be written into a cost sheet.

Here are two films which offer us a fascinating study in contrasts. *Seance on a Wet Afternoon* (Allied Film Makers, Robert Aldrich) is a penetrating study of a neurotic woman and her meek, self-effacing husband; and *Hush . . . Hush, Sweet Charlotte* (20th Century-Fox, Bryan Forbes) is a preposterous concoction of violence, horror, and gore. *Seance*, an English film, is noteworthy for the superb acting of Kim Stanley and Richard Attenborough as well as for the masterful manner in which Richard Aldrich makes use of drab black-and-white settings and seemingly quiet and ordinary men and women to create and sustain an aura of suspense — qualities that are completely lacking in its gaudy and flashy American counterpart, *Hush . . . Hush*. I know, of course, that *Hush . . . Hush* is supposed to be "just for laughs." But who's laughing — other than those who "laugh all the way to the bank?" Films of this type have nothing to recommend them to any intelligent person.

Here are other recent releases: *Strange Bedfellows* (Universal), a tasteless bit of froth; *Love Has Many Faces* (Columbia), which attempts to convey a serious message but fails to do so; and *Those Calloways* (Buena Vista), a Disney film which tends to become cloying.

I dare say that almost every American was an invisible passenger in Gemini 3 at lift-off from Cape Kennedy on March 23. And who was not fascinated by the achievements of Ranger 9 or, for all that, by the Russian cosmonaut's spectacular walk in space? Would anyone really still turn up his nose at that "monster in the living-room?"
A hurried look at the calendar this morning tells me that another birthday is galloping over the horizon. The sudden recognition of this fact brings me up short. If life were a single day, this birthday would be about four o'clock in the afternoon. (It could, of course, be later, but normally at this particular point in life I should have a few afternoon hours left before the shadows fall and the good dusk falls.) Clearly, it is a time for reflection and meditation.

Four o'clock in the afternoon is not a very good time of the day. Everyone seems to agree, at least in our time and age, that it is an hour for refreshment of some kind. There seems to be an afternoon sag. The day has been long and busy, and the pressures of the few remaining hours become greater. There appears to be, too, a sharper awareness of time and work. One suddenly realizes the magnitude of things undone. Surely four o'clock is not the best time of the day for thought and meditation. And yet at this time the sun lies longer and warmer on the floor of the room, and the shadows beyond the window reach across the street and up the walls of the white houses. Perhaps there is a little parable here. Sun and shadow are inevitably a part of four o'clock in the afternoon. I must see them both and use them both, as God would have them used, for thought and a little learning and the long peace which He alone can give.

A few moments of my birthday will be devoted, as they were this morning, to a thoughtful conversation with Stephen. Somehow I like to talk to him when no one else can overhear. There is a detachment and a purity of heart about his approach to life and living which is good for anyone who has reached four p.m. This morning he told me a story which he saw on television yesterday. It was a very simple story of good cowboys and bad cowboys. For the time being, at least, television is encouraging him to see life in terms of black and white. There are only good people and bad people — no gray people. From the dubiously superior wisdom of four p.m. I listen with care and attention. Behind his words I hear something else — “out of the mouth of babes.” I realize that he has simplified his life too much and that I have complicated mine too much. It is perfectly clear that the truth lies somewhere between us. Life is neither as simple as he has made it nor as complex as I have made it. What I need at four o'clock in the afternoon is Stephen’s approach, but with the additional remembrance of a wise and patient Voice: “Except ye become as little children.”

Stephen grows tired of our conversation and returns to his usual horizontal position with a book. My thoughts begin to wonder. I suddenly remember again that much of the wisdom of life rests in the proper approach to recurring endings and beginnings of time. In fact, the good handling of beginnings and endings is an amazingly important factor in our continuing quest for wisdom and grace and dignity and courage and peace. It is now four o'clock, and I remember that I am so constituted that I think of much of life in terms of beginnings and endings. Of course, I am not alone in that. All of us speak of milestones, remember birthdays, celebrate anniversaries. We divide our days into morning and evening and hours. We must do that because life and time change. There is nothing static about them. We never stand still. As a consequence there must be these artificially created moments when we suddenly become aware of the fact that something old is past and done and something new has begun. At all other times we may (and perhaps must) live under the illusion of sameness as hour follows hour and day comes after day. There must, however, be these birthdays and anniversaries to bring us to thought and to measure the way we have come and peer into the veil that hangs before us.

Is it perhaps true that one legitimate and valid division of humanity would be between those who see life and history continuously and forever in terms of endings and those who see them constantly in terms of beginnings? Perhaps that divides us definitely more than anything beyond the great gulf between faith and unbelief. There are those who linger regretfully over the ashes of the past, and there are those who look hopefully for a new and flaming dawn, no matter how dark the night and how bitter the circumstances of the present.

Perhaps it is more necessary for me than ever before, now at four o'clock in the afternoon, to remember that life under the Cross must be lived in terms of constant beginning. I must believe that all experience is an arch wherethrough gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades forever and forever as I move. This is of the essence of wisdom. Wisdom is not found — not even at four o'clock in the afternoon — in inevitable proportion to the number of facts I may have stored in my head or the number of books I have read. Wisdom lies in the proper handling of all these things — in seeing life steadily and seeing it whole, in seeing the end from the beginning, in a constant striving toward a goal which, please God, I may never reach, in walking with God in the peace and the power of those who have learned what it means to walk with Him.