IN THE JANUARY CRESSET - - -

IN LUCE TUA

AD LIB.: THE LOUDEST NOISE

SAINTS AND SCHOLARS

A DEFENSE OF THE FELIX CULPA IN PARADISE LOST

TOWN OF A THOUSAND VIOLINS

VATICAN COUNCIL HEARS PLEA FOR A NEW ATTITUDE

TOWARDS SCIENCE

THE THEATRE: VITAL PROBLEMS AND A NEW THEATRE

FROM THE CHAPEL: LIGHT FOR OUR DAY

ON SECOND THOUGHT

THE FINE ARTS: THE WINDOWS OF THE VALPARAISO CHAPEL

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TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE

WORTH NOTING

POEM: KARMA

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THE PILGRIM

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Dona Nobis Pacem

The issue in 1965 is peace.

For the world, this issue was long ago clearly stated: one world or none. No one nation is strong enough to impose peace on the rest of the world and no one nation can hope to enjoy peace in a world in which local squabbles can escalate overnight into major wars. The principle of unlimited national sovereignty belongs no longer to the political scientist or the statesman, but to the historian. Man is free to judge that life and civilization are no longer worth preserving on this planet, but he is not free to insist that they must co-exist with the autonomous national state. The mushroom cloud hangs over the evil and the good and drops its fallout on the just and on the unjust. We have come to that moment of truth toward which history has been moving, the moment when even the blindest must see that the alternative to love is not hate, but death.

For the Church, the issue was stated just as clearly, and even longer ago: “By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.” There is, ultimately, no other sure mark of the Church — not pure doctrine, not the historic episcopate, not missionary zeal, not social activism, certainly not success, but the love which one Christian has and demonstrates toward the other. It is time to quit talking about the unity of the Church as a goal to be achieved and to recognize it as the central fact of her existence, even though it is a fact often obscured by the failure of all of her children to make it operative in their dealings with one another. As 1965 begins, let us not sit in judgment on denominational leaders who carry on their endless negotiations with their counterparts in other denominational headquarters, but let those of us who are already “of one mind, at peace with every brother” not be shamed or coerced into denying that unity and its practical consequences of common worship and united action.

And for the nation, the issue is also clear: there will be no peace until we are what we claim to be — one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. The President whom we shall inaugurate this month has summoned us to the building of what he calls “the Great Society.” We have learned from painful experience to be distrustful of slogans, but more and more of us have come to recognize that it really is within the range of possibility to build in our land a kind of prototype of the kind of world men have been dreaming of for centuries. We have the resources, the political institutions, and the leadership to do it. The question is: Can we reject, once for all, the demagogues of the right and of the left who see their opportunity in setting class against class, race against race, employer against employee, liberal against conservative?

The issue in 1965 is peace, as it was in 1644 when the Thirty Years War was raging and the Peace of Westphalia was still four years off. In that year, Matthaeus von Loewenstern wrote these words, which sum up our hopes and prayers at the beginning of this new year:

Grant us Thy peace, Lord:
Peace in our hearts, our evil thoughts assuaging;
Peace in Thy Church, where brothers are engaging;
Peace when the world its busy war is waging.
Calm Thy foes’ raging.
Grant us Thy help till backward they are driven;
Grant them Thy truth that they may be forgiven;
Grant peace on earth, or, after we have striven,
Peace in Thy heaven.

Stanleyville

To the long list of those who by their death have glorified God must now be added the name of Dr. Paul Carlson.

Dr. Carlson died, as so many good men have died, trying to bring the word and fact of reconciliation to a situation where the most natural and understandable reaction would be a “plague on both your houses” attitude. He died in Stanleyville at the hands of Congolese rebels whose wounded he had stayed on to serve in a village
appropriately called “The End of the World.” His death came after rebel leaders had spent days trying to drive a blackmail bargain for his life.

The circumstances of Dr. Carlson's death provide an almost perfect illustration of church and state operating at their best within their divinely-ordained spheres. Dr. Carlson heard and obeyed the call to stay and serve, to find his life by losing it, to follow his Master all the way to the cross. The state, represented in this case by the Belgian and American governments, accepted its responsibility to wield the sword in the cause of justice. It is to be hoped that the firm, resolute, and timely action which President Johnson authorized in the rescue of the Stanleyville hostages will set a precedent for action in future situations of this sort.

Meanwhile, one further thing needs to be said. It is easy to see the tragedy and the absurdity of the situation in the Congo where half-savage “generals” and “presidents” such as Christophe Gbenye wage their revolutions and counter-revolutions while the “nation” falls apart. It is easy for some of our racists to see in all of this “about what you could expect from a bunch of niggers.” But the full dimensions of the tragedy in the Congo can not be understood unless one sees it, first of all, as the exception to the rule in Negro Africa, where the newly-founded nations have made a remarkably peaceful adjustment from colonialism to self government and, secondly, as the almost inevitable fruits of Belgian misrule through the whole long colonial period. Dr. Carlson died at the hand of “President” Christophe Gbenye, but Gbenye is a creature of Belgian colonialism — and so we are all in this thing together, black man and white man, Christian martyr and airlift commander. And our calling is not to assess blame but to do the thing that belongs to our calling under God — as Dr. Carlson did by dying, as President Johnson did by responding to blackmail with overwhelming force.

**Good Man**

There is always joy in watching a real tough cookie operating in a good cause, which is one reason why we have for some time been a member of the Robert S. McNamara Fan Club.

McNamara is the first civilian head of the national Defense Establishment — not the first Secretary of Defense, but the first civilian to run the department. His predecessors — all of them able, patriotic men — were no match for the generals and the admirals and their Capitol Hill buddies. McNamara is. He is tough, sharp, and crafty, and a bug on efficiency. He runs the Department of Defense.

A great many people, in uniform and out, do not like the way he runs it. This is understandable. National defense is the nation’s biggest industry, the source of jobs and wealth for many communities and even whole states that would otherwise be derelicts in the economic doldrums. The disposition of defense installations has, therefore, been motivated as much by political pressures as by defense requirements and, until 1961, it was a kind of rule that once a community succeeded in landing one of these installations it had it more or less in perpetuity.

Secretary McNamara began to change this situation shortly after he took office in 1961. Between January, 1961, and November, 1964, he closed 574 installations occupying 1,083,978 acres, employing 85,834 people, and costing us $576,800,000 a year. The announcement in November that he would close down another ninety-five installations will mean the elimination of another 63,401 jobs and annual savings of $477,000,000. Thus, in the four years of his first term as Secretary, Mr. McNamara will have eliminated almost 150,000 supernumerary jobs at annual savings of just over a billion dollars. And even his severest critics do not seriously contend that these economies are being achieved at any risk to the national security.

This kind of “taut ship” administration is what the country is entitled to expect at every level of government. What chiefly prevents our getting it is the fact that it is usually politically suicidal. Secretary McNamara knew what he was doing when he held off the announcement of these latest economy moves until after the election, for the reaction was fully predictable: screams of outrage from the pols and barely a peep of appreciation and gratitude from the taxpayers. A letter of commendation, addressed to the President with a copy to Secretary McNamara, might help to strengthen the Secretary's hand and to encourage the President to demand similar performances in the other executive departments.

**Dr. Conant's Recommendations**

Dr. James B. Conant, in his recently published book, *Shaping Educational Policy*, finds that the nation's public educational system is a “chaos”: that the spirit of reform which was sparked by the first Soviet Sputnik in 1957 has given way to inertia as state departments of education “have become once again overly sensitive to political consequences”; that the majority of the nation's state education departments are politically dominated and under the thumb of the professional educators' “establishment”; and that, as a result of all of these factors, the nation's industrial capacity and security are endangered.

Dr. Conant is not one to shoot off his mouth. He was, for many years, president of Harvard and, later, high commissioner to Germany. For the past decade he has been intensively studying the problems of public education. He is a devout believer in free, public, and secular education — so devout a believer that we have, in the past, had occasion to criticize him for trying to make the public school a kind of synagogue of American Shinto. He is, in other words, a critic such as any institution should be grateful for — intelligent, sympathetic, utterly loyal.
Dr. Conant's report recommends, as steps to be taken immediately to remedy the situation, 1) the reorganization of state education departments so as to provide for strong boards of education free of domination either by politicians or the educators' "establishment"; a first-class chief state school officer in each state; a well-organized state staff; and good support from the legislature; 2) the development of statewide master plans for higher education so as to obviate the danger that unplanned action by legislatures under political pressure might lead to the upgrading of too many junior colleges into four-year colleges and universities; and 3) the establishment of an interstate commission for planning a nationwide educational policy.

It will be interesting to see what comes of Dr. Conant's recommendations. Undoubtedly, since education is one of the matters constitutionally reserved to the states, his proposals will get every kind of reaction from a serious hearing in some states to a complete brush-off in others. Whatever the reaction, there is likely to be precious little action. With rare exceptions, elected superintendents and commissions of public education are disinclined to rock any boats. The educators' "establishment," dominated by the National Education Association, can hardly be expected to look with anything less than parental pride upon programs and curricula which are largely its creations. Parent teacher organizations exist to receive, ratify, and carry out the policies of the educational "establishment," not to challenge them. And the average citizen couldn't care less.

All of which suggests that the salvation of public education may continue to lie, as it has lain in the past, in the existence side by side with it of a vigorous system of private schools which are forced, for the sake of their own survival, to experiment, to innovate, to challenge old ways of doing things and try new ways. Dr. Conant has not, in the past, been particularly sympathetic to the private school, which he apparently sees as a divisive influence in our society. But for the future it may prove the goal to public education which Dr. Conant has sought in so many of the expected places and has not yet found.

Time for Radical Measures

This is the month when Republican leaders from all over the land are scheduled to gather as a coroner's jury in Chicago to determine whether the Grand Old Party is dead or sleepeth. Living where we live and associating with the people we associate with, we can assure them that it is not dead. But it is pretty sick.

The party's rank-and-file has been disturbed by the fact that their national ticket picked up only about 31% of the popular vote in the November election, a figure which could be interpreted as casting the G.O.P. in the role of a permanent minority. But we would suggest that this figure, like a systolic blood-pressure reading, is much less significant than is generally supposed; it fluctuates within very broad limits in reaction to momentary stimuli, such as the mood of the country on a particular election day or the popularity of a particular candidate. What is much more significant, and what should be of major concern to the party's leaders, is the "diastolic reading," that is, the size, strength, and loyalty of that permanent cadre which is prepared to support the party through thick and thin, in good days and bad.

The permanent cadre of the Republican party has consisted of people who have "arrived" or who at least thought of themselves as people who have arrived — businessmen, bankers, newspaper publishers, college presidents, and the like. People of this sort are almost by definition conservative, and when they constitute the permanent cadre of any institution — whether it be the Republican party or the Lutheran Church — they give that institution a conservative cast. But a cadre which does not build a larger institution around itself becomes, before long, a mere clique. And to build that larger institution the cadre must be willing to accept some reasonable dilution of its convictions. Thus, in the political area, it is the moderate liberal and the moderate conservative that can hold the cadre together and attract those extra, uncommitted votes that are needed for victory in an election.

What happened in November was that a candidate claiming to speak for the conservative cadre in the Republican party not only repelled the uncommitted voter but shattered the cadre itself. People who had never before deserted the Republican party in a national election voted for President Johnson. This is what party leaders have to worry about and this is why so many of them have insisted that nothing less than radical treatment, involving the repudiation of the 1964 leadership of the party and the re-writing of its 1964 platform, can set the party on the road back to health.

For the Republican party the November meeting is, therefore, crucial. But it is just as important to the whole country, for the health of our political institutions demands a strong two-party system. We shall never have that under the present Republican leadership. Charles Percy is, therefore, right: the present leadership can serve its party and its country best by getting out of the way so that new leadership can prepare the party for 1966 and 1968.

Successes and Reverses

In the quest for outward unity among Christians it is to be expected that there will be both successes and reverses. The recently concluded third session of Vatican II provided both. On the success side, the two decrees, De Ecclesia and De Ecumenismo, open up some surprisingly broad areas of potentially fruitful discussion between Roman Catholics and Protestants — De Ecclesia by suggesting a line along which Rome might proceed to soften Vatican I's dogmatic statement on the power and nature of the primacy of the Pope, and De...
Ecumenismo by encouraging interconfessional conversation and enlarging the area of freedom within which it may be carried on. In addition to these two decrees, a provisional declaration absolving Jews as a people of responsibility for the sufferings and death of our Lord is important not only for what it says but for the change in attitude which it represents.

It has to be said, though, that this third session of Vatican II created some anxieties among Protestants. Some of these will, perhaps, disappear as we come to know more about the ideas and policies of Pope Paul. Or — and this is the chief occasion for these anxieties — we may have increasing cause for concern if Paul moves along certain lines which he seems to be drawn to. We can, for instance, understand why the Pope might have considered it politic to delay a vote on the schema decreeing that all men are free to follow the religious dictates of their own consciences; after all, he has to live with the Curia conservatives who find the whole idea obnoxious. But it is hard to understand why he denied the petition of progressives for a vote so summarily that he seemed to be using the occasion to repudiate the concept of collegiality which is stated in De Ecclesia. And for Protestants, who feel that Marian devotion has already become so excessive that it threatens to create an unbridgeable gulf between themselves and Rome, it was a deeply disturbing thing that the Pope did when he pronounced the Blessed Virgin "Mother of the Church" after the Council had declined to add this title to her many other honors. What the cause of Christian unity does not need at this moment is a reincarnated Pius XII who holds authoritarian views of his office and exaggerated notions of the glory of the Blessed Virgin.

The encouraging thing, of course, is that neither Pope nor Curia can long resist the spirit that is at work in this council. Too many loyal and thoughtful sons of the Church have tasted the freedom which was possible under one of the greatest of the popes to be silenced by a lesser pope or his bureaucracy. And Paul, who is still new in his office, may yet capture the spirit of the majority of his colleagues in the episcopacy. Meanwhile, for Rome and for all of Christendom, these are days of agonizing re-examination of many things which were once held fixed and immutable. Which is merely further evidence that the Creator Spirit is still creative.

Reason for Delay

It is rather difficult to see why we are making such an issue of the NATO multilateral nuclear force. General DeGaulle has passed the word that he might pull out of NATO if we force it through, and the British government has let it be known that it does not agree with us on this issue. The Russians are apparently genuinely alarmed at the prospect of the Germans getting their fingers on nuclear weapons. So that leaves only us, the Italians, and the Germans who are really for the MLF.

The merits of such a force are not, at the moment, the chief consideration — although it would seem that we can defend ourselves and our allies as well without it as with it. What ought to concern us is that we have not been able to persuade most of our allies, including our best friend, Britain, that such a force is desirable. And we ought to face up honestly to the reason why our allies are against it.

The reason is Germany. We, with our short memories, think of Germany in terms of Adenauer and Erhard, of Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt, of the hard-working Ruhr and gallant Berlin — and these are all elements of the real Germany. This is the Germany which we do not hesitate to allow a finger on the nuclear trigger. But our European allies — and this is true also of the Soviet Union — remember another Germany: the Germany of Bismarck and von Moltke, of Wilhelm II and Hindenburg, of Hitler and Rommel, of the Drang nach Osten and the Reichswehr, of unrestricted submarine warfare and the gas chambers of Buchenwald.

They remember that as recently as twenty years ago this Germany bestrode Europe from Normandy to the Ukraine — arrogant, cruel, a Moloch devouring its own children and reaching out for the children of its neighbors. This Germany was physically reduced to a smoldering ruin in the last months of the war. Twenty years is not long enough to tell whether the legion of evil spirits died with the body which they had so long tormented. From time to time there are hints that they still brood over that contradictory land, waiting for the hour when the German wearies of playing democracy.

Please God this will never happen, but our European allies are aware, as we are not, of the fact that Germany is a danger, real or potential — a danger which prudent men do not toy with.
What would you say is the loudest sustained man-made noise? Could it be a boiler factory at peak production? Or might it be the blast of a rocket at take-off, or the sound of air hammers on a street repair project? No, my vote is not for any of these but for something closer to home — the sound of a cocktail party in full swing.

Nothing quite approaches the noise made by a group of people chatting over cocktails, and it makes little difference whether there are eight or eighty present in the room. The noise of voices raised in conversation or laughter is penetrating and sustained, which leads me to believe that cocktails have the effect of enlarging one’s vocal cords. It seems as though everyone were talking at once and they probably are. If cocktails relieve inhibitions, we can suppose that, if none of us had inhibitions, we would all be talking constantly and in a rather loud voice.

The noise is not noticeable to those who arrive on time, for the average cocktail party starts quietly and it is only after about fifteen minutes that the first wave of sound hits the kitchen. Knowing this, most guests arrive on time, because it is a shattering experience to arrive late and have that shock wave hit you as you enter.

Cocktail parties are a peculiarly American custom and they are given for a variety of reasons. For one, it is a good way to repay obligations to a number of people at one time. It is also a good technique for mixing people and allowing them to get acquainted. Business and industry use the cocktail party to win friends and influence people. When you get right down to it, the main reason for them is that most people find it an enjoyable manner of entertaining and being entertained.

It is undoubtedly true that people mix more easily at a cocktail party than in most other circumstances and some say lasting friendships are often made at such events. This seems a little unlikely for there is a tendency for most people to have difficulty recalling the next day.

I have heard persons maintain that a cocktail party, by relieving inhibitions, reveals us as we really are. I don’t buy this either. It is questionable whether we would all talk so steadily and loudly, or laugh so frequently with so little provocation if our inhibitions were constantly overcome. And how about that clown over there wearing a lamp shade? I would have difficulty believing it is his secret desire to wear a lamp shade every day of his life if he had the opportunity.

The types who are revealed at a cocktail party are fairly standard and could, I suppose, be classified. However, to classify them would require a man with great fortitude, a slight case of deafness, and the personality of a spoil-sport who could sit quietly in a corner of the room, pad and pencil at the ready. To date no serious students of this American phenomenon have studied the cocktail party, probably for the reason that most scholars who might be interested in the subject would lack the objectivity because of their inability to escape involvement.

Every host does recognize certain types, however. For example, if the host offers a cocktail to a lady who reacts by throwing up her hands in horror and then condescends to “have a little of the red,” he can be sure he has a good customer for refills on his hands. And most hosts can recognize at a glance whether a man is leaning against a wall for reasons of comfort or support.

At no other function, business or social, is so much energy expended, so much togetherness engendered, and so many good ideas expressed as at a cocktail party. The first practical expression of both idea and togetherness is normally made by some man shouting over the din, “Let’s all pile in three cars and go to the Blank Restaurant (usually ten miles away and serving Italian food) for dinner.” This is followed by a suggestion from one of the husbands present who shouts, “No, why don’t you all come over to our house for bacon and eggs?” Momentarily, both ideas sound good, but no one is disappointed when nothing comes of either suggestion, not from the first because it conflicts with other plans and not from the second because by this time the wife has located her hospitable husband on the other side of the smoke-filled room and has moved over and kicked him in the shins.

As the party wanes, ideas become more grand, but they do not require personal involvement. And toward the very end, a cocktail party resembles a meeting of philosophers. Anyone who does not realize that deep down every man is a philosopher by nature has never stayed until the end of a cocktail party.

There is one depressing moment at such a party but it is experienced only by the host and hostess. That moment comes when, turning from the door where they had bid the last guest farewell, they face a deathly quiet, smoky room laden with sticky glasses and overflowing ash trays.
The question about the relation of saints and scholars is not always asked in the same way. Indeed, for some it is not a true question at all, but rather merely rhetorical. As such, the question is really an indirect form of statement. The danger with rhetorical questions, at least when they replace answers, is that these answers tend to be accepted uncritically. Thus, they not only go unquestioned but are also assumed to be unquestionable. In this case, rhetorical questions reflect opinions and bias rather than ideas, emotion rather than thought. For this reason, the answers expected are diametrically opposed, for we may assume that saints and scholars have either “everything” or “nothing” to do with one another.

Those who assume that “everything” is the answer to be given are apt to view one concept in terms of the other and to expand an implicit emphasis upon similarity into a claim for identity. The relationship between the two becomes a sort of one-way street which makes one a master and the other a slave. On the other hand, when we expect the rhetorical question to be answered negatively and thereby assume that the two have “nothing” to do with one another, we place the saint and the scholar in such widely separated and different realms that they are distinct not only conceptually and sometimes but also materially and always. They are incommensurate and have no overlapping concerns which allow of discourse between them, no intersection even when one man is both. When we treat these concepts in this way, we have something akin to two masters, each absolute and autonomous in his own bailiwick. So long as the two do not infringe upon one another there is not too much difficulty, but when they do, we have no theoretical means of accounting for this fact. What is more, we have no practical basis for choosing between them. Thus we seem to be in a sort of Machiavellian “either-or” situation: we may have to choose between them, but our choice must be either arbitrary or based upon the ability of one to overwhelm and dominate the other.

Fortunately, we need not ask the question about the relationship of saint to scholar in a merely rhetorical manner, nor must we choose between answers so extreme in their one-sidedness as those of subjugation, head-on collision, or isolation. The question can be a true question and has been one, for Christians in particular. In taking it so, we indicate not only our awareness of the distinction between these two ideas but also our willingness to seek for a common ground between and even within them. Asked in this way, the question about saints and scholars often becomes a question about Christian education or about the Christian scholar. This particular approach seems to acknowledge the possibility that the two may be related in an intimate and even integral manner. It suggests, too, that the Christian faith demands, and apparently also asserts, that its adherents can achieve some positive form of relation short of subjugation and tyranny.

Within this broad general framework of agreement, however, there is ample opportunity for genuinely different answers.

Some of us have approached the concept of Christian education more or less theoretically, but have focussed upon the differences between the community of saints and the community of scholars. Thus, although they agree about the importance of the distinction between these communities, the answers they give vary widely according to their focus. Some tend, therefore, to see the problem of Christian education in a more or less exclusively Christian sense. For them, this term has to do with instruction in the truths of the faith — be these Biblical, doctrinal, or historical — and perhaps with those apologetic and polemical positions that can be developed on the basis of this fundamental, Christian subject matter. Others, however, are more concerned with the academic community as it exists apart from the Church. For them, Christian commitment and belief have little or nothing to do with concerns that are integrally academic or intellectual. An exaggerated and even crude way of putting this has been to say that they want nothing to do with something called “Christian chemistry,” “Christian sociology,” or, for that matter, “Christian education” when it goes beyond the realm of catechetical instruction or perhaps theological training. Such men prefer to speak of a Christian scholar. For both groups, Christianity, whether it is understood exclusively or not, demands that we honor the integrity of the world as well as of the Church. Thus, to confuse or combine the two in an integral way is to do an injustice to both. For this reason, Christianity as such has — or should have — little or nothing to say on intellectual matters, and the Christian scholar is therefore subject only to the demands of excellence imposed perhaps by his faith but certainly defined by his field of specialization. Intellectual or academic merit, then, constitutes the content and the fulfillment of this scholar’s responsibility to his faith.

When the question of Christian education is asked in the somewhat more practical way of those who assume that being a Christian has to do primarily with ethics, we get a different approach. Here the Christian recognizes the difference between the roles of the scholar and the saint, but he tries to bridge — or mitigate — this gap by virtue of his personal relationship to others in the
academic community and to judge the actions of this community in terms of the loving ideal of the saints. Here, we must admit, the insistence upon the importance and even completeness of disjunction has begun to give way. Nevertheless, grateful as we must be for those who approach us with love and treat us with compassion, we must add that this position, while it may well be necessary, is by no means sufficient. Its mode of relationship is integral for the saint, but not for the scholar. Human relations, however charitable, have little or nothing material to say about academic problems or approaches.

Fireworks at the Crossroads

Although all of the questions and answers mentioned have undoubtedly been put forward at one time or another, none seems particularly adequate for a place where the confrontation of the scholar and the saint has been unusually total and muscular. When their paths intersect in an intimate and even potentially integral way, there has been a peculiarly dramatic, concrete, troublesome, and yet creative way of posing the problem and of answering it. The assumptions underlying the figure of the crossroad or the intersection point to the duality of our commitment, to be sure, but they point also to the possibility of dialogue, overlapping concerns, and even fusion. Here Christian education is the crossroads where the saint and scholar meet, speak with one another, and sometimes become one.

Real confrontation and dialogue often imply not only conversation but also the fireworks that attend conflict. Those of us who have been members of this community — or one like it — are likely to be all too aware of the tensions and pressures that arise here. Indeed, for those who retain a disjunctive, or even extrinsic, notion of the nature and relationship of these terms, the crossroads may come to look more like a collision or an explosion. As a result, many of us have emerged feeling that we were like nothing quite so much as an overburdened and much-abused rope in some gigantic or even cosmic tug-of-war. To be sure, we were ourselves, somehow, the connecting link, but connection and relation do not have such a comforting sound. I am afraid, when the terms thus connected are conflicting. Under the circumstances, we seem caught in an impossibly dualistic and even dissonant situation. What is more, we have few or no means at our disposal for giving voice to our equally real and pressing commitment to the unity implied in the concept of intersection and sensed in experience. Paradoxically, perhaps, the more we insist upon the intersection and the confrontation, the more acutely aware we become of the opposing and outward forces of disintegration that can be unleashed there.

Here, then, the problem of Christian education is not so much a question about its nature — this has already been defined in terms of the intersection itself — as it is a problem that arises out of that intersection. Viewed in these terms, however, it is a problem for which there seems no solution. What is more, since the problem is, in a sense, caused by our faith, this faith itself becomes disruptive and offers neither a solution to the problem nor a means of living creatively and joyously with it. Perhaps, therefore, we need to go back and look once again at our presuppositions and our one-sided insistence upon the problem as a problem rather than as a key to a solution or itself the embodiment of that solution. Certainly we seem to have lost something of Luther's joy and freedom and to have lost as well his conviction that it was the Gospel which accounted for this joy.

How, then, does our approach differ from Luther's or, for that matter, from the Gospel's? In the first place, Luther seems to have viewed his relationship to the church and to its version of orthodoxy somewhat differently than we do at times. Being Luther, he was, I presume, a Lutheran, but a Lutheran only in depth. That is, his Lutheranism did not cut him off from his Christian responsibility. Indeed, it was Luther's firm claim that his first loyalty belonged to the Christ of Scripture and not to his church — in his case the Roman Catholic Church. Fidelity to the church depends upon the church's fidelity to Christ and not the reverse. It is this, I take it, that justifies the word Reformation when it is used to point to the results of Luther's break with his church. It may even be one way of describing what it means to be Lutheran.

The disciple, however, is always tempted to accept answers rather than questions, to reverse the order of secondary and primary principles, and to insist upon content to the detriment and even the exclusion of form. When he yields to this temptation, he cannot allow us to be Lutheran by virtue of our questions or our way of asking them, nor can he allow us to be Lutheran by virtue of the grounds of our thought or the dynamics of our thinking as well as by our conclusions. It is not what we think from or how that is taken into account but only what we think to. Conclusions alone become the criterion of orthodoxy. At worst we may look only for verbal assent and semantic agreement.

If we reverse this process and look instead for the basis of Luther's thought — for a formal principle in terms of which his work has its coherence, consistency, and comprehensiveness — we may be able to discover what it was that Luther had and that we do not. We may be able to see what it was that made the Christian faith a joyful and creative way of life and thought for Luther and not simply a set of beliefs, a submission to authority, a set of problems, or a sorrowful burden.

Most of us have heard about Luther's Christocentricity — his insistence upon the centrality of the doctrines of Christ and of redemption — but few of us are aware of how fully Luther not only asserted but also dramatized, or embodied, this principle in his thought. For Luther, the revelation of and in Christ was a revelation of mercy and forgiveness and one that leapt over, broke down, and denied the validity of all those barriers which we can set up to separate us from God. For him,
redemption thus understood was not merely a fusty doc­
trine, a remote event, or a sterile concept but rather
something that was at once immediate and abstract, and
it provided him with a principle in terms of which he
could organize his thinking. It was an idea that formed
and informed all that Luther subsequently said and did.
In these senses, then, redemption was not, for Luther,
something that merely took place in history and long ago,
but it was also a redemption of history and now.

One implication of such a view of redemption is the
belief that Christ was a Word of refusals as well as a Word
of mercy and of forgiveness. This is true because, in this
Word, God refused to allow of an absolute rift between
the human and the divine, between nature and grace, be­
tween the sacred and the profane, between the religious
and the secular. In his person and his work — because
he was what he was and did what he did — Christ is seen
as one who redeemed the world and even the worldly
when these are understood substantively. With Christ it
became clear that, on the one hand, there was no un­
bridgeable or substantive split between Church and
World and, on the other, there was no safe way of separ­
ating them too categorically.

No Neutral Corners

This brings us back — somewhat circuitously per­
haps — to the question of the relation of saints and
scholars. This question, too, can be asked and answered
in terms of the relation between nature and grace, a re­
lation defined by and in redemption. Further, our
excursion into historical theology has pointed, rather
clearly, to the defect in our initial approach to our prob­
lem. We had in fact been thinking in terms of definitive
and substantive difference and of conflict. Theory and
practice were at odds, for the notion of intersection
scarcely allows of an extrinsic notion of the nature and
relationship of the intersecting elements. What is more,
if my analysis has been correct, neither Luther nor the
Christ he saw in Scripture would have viewed the prob­
lem in this way. Both were aware of differences and of
the dissonances that arise out of them, but neither was
willing to allow these differences alone to be determina­
tive nor dissonance to be the only outcome. Indeed, for
both, the very effort to separate life too categorically and
to seal off the parts thus isolated is itself sinful and even
a way of describing the very nature of Sin.

Christians have known for centuries that there were
no neutral corners in existence which are — by nature —
simply non-religious, neutral, or a matter of indifference
to God or to His people. They have known also that,
conversely, there are no safe little pipelines where we can
go in order to come automatically into contact with
something guaranteed to be grace. They have seen that
to set aside one area of life for God or as God’s, even
when this area is called religion, or faith, or the church,
is to shut God out of His own creation and to misunder­
stand not only God but also the world. Further, the at­
tempt to isolate God in or to confine Him to the Church
is, in effect, to shut him out of it and to profane the very
notion of the sacred.

Today, when we speak of chopping up life into airtight compartments which have little or nothing to do
with one another — which have no express relation to
one another or to a whole apart from that of co-existence
and juxtaposition, and which cannot admit of a dialogue
between them — we speak of “fragmentation” and “com­
partmentalization.” This process of separation, division,
and disjunction has been a major motif in Twentieth cen­
tury thought. Indeed, to deprecate fragmentation has be­
come something like cheering for virtue. Still, the de­
nunciations have sometimes had a somewhat hollow
ring, and it is time for some of us to ask whether or not
we have renounced this process as well as denounced it.

If we have renounced this point of view, why is it that
the propriety of a dialogical concept like Christian educa­
tion is questioned far more than our often only implicit
assumptions about its nature? If we have, why is it that
recent efforts to oppose academic and intellectual frag­
mentation with so-called general education or humani­
ties courses have so often only foreshortened and exag­
ergated the very defects they were designed to solve or
even leave behind?

I am not attempting to denounce either the humanities
approach or the more traditional forms of curricula. I
am suggesting, however, that a change in such matters,
while it may or may not be necessary, is certainly not
sufficient. Without a correlative and radical change of
intellectual heart and approach, we have little reason to
expect success. Before we can responsibly consider cur­
rricular changes and assess their usefulness, we must
attempt to be more precise about the nature and extent
of our problem as well as about the nature of our goals
and methods of reaching them. We cannot, therefore,
well or long afford apathy with respect to a theory of
education or resolute neglect of the fact that theory and
practice, belief and action, can — and often do — con­

We have spoken of the nature of fragmentation and
pointed to instances of it throughout this discussion, but
we have pointed only indirectly to the extent of its in­
fluence and the scope of its implications. Certainly it is
tempting to under-estimate the power of this approach,
especially its power over us. Thus, we have often failed
to see that we ourselves were exemplifying the very thing
we were wont to deplore verbally. As Christians we have
done this, for example, every time we have insisted too
one-sidedly upon the uniqueness of the Church and the
otherness of the world. We have also done it when we
did not allow for a genuine tension between and ac­
knowledgement of all of the elements in our tradition, a
tradition which demands that we take into account not
only the doctrine of the Fall, for example, but also the
document of Creation, not only the doctrine of Original
Sin but also the doctrine of the *imago Dei.*

In a somewhat different context we have committed
this same kind of error when we have deplored fragmentation but have viewed it as something imposed upon us from without by some vague but comfortably alien and external "other" called mass civilization, technology, or what have you. (The names of the devil are legion, but are often external and are therefore themselves devilish.) It is easy enough to oppose sin when it is located somewhere outside us. It is not quite such a simple matter when sin ceases to be a thing and becomes an action and a relation, for we cannot so easily separate ourselves from them. Even then, I suppose, we often try to save something of our self-respect by positing a small kernel — the innocent and lovable "I" that dwells inside all of us — and by separating this "true" self, this "good" self, from its own actions and from an active sense of relation. Wherever we place it — within ourselves, between ourselves and the world, or within the world — this act of separation which only we, as humans, can perpetrate is itself the sinful act, the act of fragmentation. At the moment we try to break away and to pretend that we have immutable essences untouched by history or by will, essences that can be somehow disengaged from the very acts they commit — at this moment we renounce not the fragmentation we deplore but rather our freedom: our capacity to choose and our ability to change. We renounce, in short, our humanity and become mass man incarnate. Thus, we renounce our humanity in an act that is uniquely human, and we become sinful in the very act of trying to escape full responsibility and capacity for sin, in the act of trying to save some part of ourselves that can go untouched by what we are and what we do, and, in this sense, in the act of upholding virtue.

Perhaps this is too personal and too universal a context for a discussion about something as concrete and particular as the community of saints and scholars. After all, communities are more than a simple aggregate of the individuals who compose them. What is more, we can and do sin communally not only in our notions of community but also in our actions as communities.

**Fragmentation and Isolation**

How, then, might the academic community be said to have fallen prey to fragmentation? The ways, I know, are all too familiar. Most generally, this point of view has been embodied — whether consciously or not — in an approach to learning which thinks primarily or perhaps solely in terms of differences and divisions. Fragmentation in education means, for example, that the various fields of specialization become isolated from one another and from any whole of which all are parts — and this on principle. It is not that such divisions are, in themselves, deplorable. They are not. Nevertheless, we err if we allow them to become barriers to communication, when we allow them to thwart or even deny the validity of dialogue and of cooperation, when we treat them as ends in themselves, or when we treat them as parts isolated from the whole that gave them their meaning not only in relationship to one another but also in themselves.

If we were to point to academic fragmentation in a thoroughly homely manner, we could point to the way in which we sometimes picture ourselves and our lives in school. For many, courses represent isolated islands of information, methods, and requirements. The student becomes a sort of glorified coal-bin into which lumps of inert material called facts are poured. The solidity and passivity of the lumps and bin alike are seldom, if ever, called into question. What is more the bin seems to be unchanged and unchanging. Its shape remains the same whatever the amount of types of lumps dumped into it. Just so, the teacher is a sort of neutral conveyor belt that simply passes the lumps along — from one bin to another, as it were. The only difficulties that arise in this neat world come into being when the bins cannot take in as many lumps as the conveyor is delivering or when they cannot get the proper lumps out on the Pavlovian examination signal.

Finally, scholars — be they students or teachers — can attempt to shut themselves off not only from ideas and-opinions that may conflict with their own pet presuppositions but also from one another. Christianity is not only a way of thinking but also a way of living. Intellectual confrontation includes the daily give and take of everyday life in all areas and, at its best, involves the attempt to live and to think on principle. Yet how often have we failed to analyze the form of an argument, the skill and validity of its development, and to this degree its content as well and done so on the theory that, since we know nothing about the topic or field being discussed, we have no responsibility over against the manner in which it is being discussed? How often have we kept silent either because we had no principle to apply or because we were afraid in the face of a real or an imagined threat to our jobs or our grades? How often have we hidden behind the fragile walls of past performance, rank, or specialization in order to hide our shortcomings and our failures? How often have we tempted others into the use of false criteria by using whatever non-intellectual forms of power we have at our disposal simply in order to get our own way and, worse, to get it merely because it is our own?

I have, I know, spoken more about what Christian education is not than I have about what it is. I do not want to give the impression that this concept and the thing to which it points can only be defined negatively after the manner of mystics and some literary critics. On the contrary, my criticism has, I trust, come from a central and coherent "Yes." Belligerent and grumpy as I am, I take no pleasure in the sort of scattergun negativism we can encounter on occasion. If I seem to have been remiss, it is, I think, the outcome of my concern.
with a mode of relationship more than with the elements related, with a way of thought more than with its results, and with a formal and formative principle more than with the materials it can organize.

Still, there are, perhaps, a few things that can be said here without legislating particulars. Certainly the dissonance and the conflict of the crossroads position need not imply merely fear, anxiety, or the agonized immobility of scepticism, and at its fullest it does not. For some, the crossroads and its fireworks have been a matter for rejoicing. To them, the sound of dissonance has all of the immediacy and vigor of life as it is being lived in an existential and dramatic present. For others — more serene in spirit — the tensions of the "both-and" and of dual commitment are resolved in a higher unity. For still others, the intersection and the dissonance become themselves a positive principle: not simply a problem nor yet a solution, but rather a way of thinking and one that insists upon both the dissonance and the negative lyricism to which it can give rise. For all, however, the roles of the saint and scholar can and sometimes do intersect. When they do, saints and scholars are never the same. The roads that lead out of the intersection are no longer quite the same as the ones that led into it. Sometimes, the two become one, and we have the Christian scholar — a scholar who insists upon thinking and acting like a saint.

It may seem to many of you that I am asking for the impossible. Perhaps — but I do not ask more of you or of myself than has already been asked of us by our faith. I have tried not to ask less. I have, I admit, been speaking about what Auden might call my "great good place." In doing so, it seems to me that I have accepted one obligation which we have over against the academic community, namely, to define — as best we can — our versions of this "good place" and to take responsibility for them. Nevertheless, if my version of the Christian academic community makes it seem that its saints are nothing short of angels or that the place is not to be found this side of heaven — if this were only idyllic and not ideal, a wish instead of a dream — I would be wasting your time and mine. I do not believe I have done so, because the dream I dream is that such a community is at least partially within our grasp. We share a redeemed world: those changes in the human condition that the dream presupposes are already available to us. This, I take it, is what keeps the Christian not only realistic but fruitful; what makes of the Church, not a fortress against the world, but a way into it; and what makes this way the way of the servant.

A Defense of the "Felix Culpa" in "Paradise Lost"

By DAVID V. HARRINGTON
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Though this is a late date for a rejoinder, a few years back Pastor Enno Klammer presented a provocative argument in The Cresset (June, 1960, pp. 13-14), in an article entitled "The Fallacy of the Felix Culpa in Milton's Paradise Lost." It is a tribute to the calibre of learning in the Lutheran Church that one of its pastors can approach such a specialized problem concerning a Protestant but very un-Lutheran poet with cogency and detailed scholarship. The occasion for the argument was what he termed "the nearly universal acceptance of the theory, and the fact that Milton himself never states the term in the epic." Actually the idea that Adam's fall was "fortunate" has been the subject of a fair amount of lively debate, though most scholars seem convinced of its existence in the poem, and, like many paradoxes, it is not capable of easy solution. It is a paradox, however, which has had a long and distinguished history, finding positive expression in the writings of the most famous of the church fathers, including Augustine, Ambrose, and Gregory, as has been pointed out by the late Arthur C. Lovejoy in an essay entitled "Milton and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall," originally printed in ELH, IV, 1937, but perhaps more conveniently available in Lovejoy's Essays in the History of Ideas. It is hardly appropriate to review all of the ramifications which the problem poses; however, in the article by Pastor Klammer, there are several assertions which seem to call for a more comprehensive view of Milton's theological argument and the dramatic structure of the poem. A reexamination of these assertions might contribute to a clearer and more appreciative understanding of some aspects of the idea of the felix culpa in Paradise Lost. And one could argue that the idea is sufficiently interesting in itself to warrant consideration by those who are not intimately acquainted with the poem.

Quite fairly, Mr. Klammer quotes six well-known passages in Paradise Lost which might support the existence of the idea in the poem and offers his interpretations, which are intended to dismiss the validity of the passages as actual expressions of Milton's personal intentions. But he makes a concession which should not be dismissed lightly:

Of these six statements which supposedly state the felix culpa theory, only one stands uncontested — the commentary of Milton himself in 1, 216, ff. He, however, refutes the idea in the rest of the poem.

Though many have disagreed with Milton's major arguments in Paradise Lost, no one should reject hastily the kind of evidence which implies a contradiction in the
basic structure of Milton's poem. Milton is considered by many to be the most deliberate and systematic of English poets. And one could contend that the arguments used to refute the existence of the idea in other passages are indecisive. But there is at least one statement uncontested, and, in reality, any of the frequent assertions in the poem pertaining to God's intention to make good use of evil are in harmony with the idea of the felix culpa.

The idea of the felix culpa, literally the “happy sin,” is basically that good comes out of evil. In Paradise Lost, the sin of Adam, to some extent at least, contributes ultimately to a fortunate situation for man, as it provides the occasion for God's granting eternal salvation. When one looks at the problem broadly, one could think of the evil activities of Satan and the other fallen angels contributing to good results as one aspect of the idea. In this connection, at least one quotation not cited by Pastor Klammer should be noticed, where the narrator comments upon the evil intentions of the angels in Hell:

... But their spite still serves
His glory to augment. (II, 385-386)

But perhaps it would simplify the issue to restrict the application of the theory to the fall of man.

To review briefly his presentation, it appears fair to say that Mr. Klammer's case rests upon his rejection of most of the passages in Paradise Lost commonly interpreted as part of the idea of the felix culpa: upon his assuming that man's condition before the fall, as Milton represented it, was incapable of improvement; and upon believing that the idea implies that the fall itself was not serious. In support of these assertions, he compresses within the space of a short essay a considerable number of references and quotations from the poem.

As the result of these findings, he denies several assumptions held by many students of Milton: that Milton believed in the idea of the felix culpa, that the idea appears in the poem, and that the idea is of value. The major effort here will be directed toward defending the first two assumptions and toward pointing out how the idea functions in the total fabric of Milton's poem.

Man's "Far More Excellent State"

That Milton believed in the doctrine of the fortunate fall, at least at one time, need hardly be questioned; we can find explicit expression of the concept in Milton's personal confession of faith, The Christian Doctrine, near the beginning of Chapter XIV:

THE RESTORATION OF MAN is the act whereby man, being delivered from sin and death by God the Father through Jesus Christ, is raised to a far more excellent state of grace and glory than that from which he had fallen.

Such a statement as this involves none of the ambiguities or dramatic uncertainties one finds in the poem. If one wished to quibble, he could argue that the passage in The Christian Doctrine was either written later than Paradise Lost or enough earlier so that Milton could conceivably have changed his mind. There is controversy over its date. At any rate, what remains to be demonstrated is the existence and function of the idea in Paradise Lost.

Most decisively, the defense of the felix culpa in Paradise Lost must rest upon answers to three questions Mr. Klammer asks:

1. What was man's condition before the fall?
2. What condition can he hope to achieve via grace?
3. Is the fall really serious?

To start with the first question, which leads imperceptibly into the second, all readers should agree that man's condition before the fall was perfect; but one must add "perfect for man on earth." One need not assume that no state could be preferable to that in Eden. In Book V, we are told Adam's thoughts on viewing Raphael:

... whose excellence he saw
Transcend his own so far, whose radiant forms
Divine effulgence, whose high power so far
Exceeded human, .... (V, 456-459).

This passage which reveals Adam's recognition of a higher, and, one could fairly add, a more desirable kind of existence, in this case as an angel in Heaven, is followed by Raphael's lecture on the scale of beings, starting with the premise that God "created all/ Such to perfection," but conceding that some are "more refin'd, more spiritous, and pure/ As nearer to him plac't or nearer tending." One can properly infer from this that the state nearer to God is preferable to that in Eden. And, though it is sinful to envy those in preferred positions, one can recognize that preferred positions exist.

Indeed, a passage which makes more explicit the fact of a greater potential for man, though it complicates our accepting the idea of the felix culpa, is in Raphael's outline, before man's fall, of various future possibilities:

And from these corporal nutriments perhaps
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit,
Improv'd by tract of time, and wing'd ascend
Ethereal, as wee, or may at choice
Here or in Heavenly Paradises dwell;
If ye be found obedient, and retain
Unalterably firm his love entire
Whose progeny you are. Meanwhile enjoy
Your fill what happiness this happy state
Can comprehend, incapable of more. (V, 496-505).

The last three lines state clearly enough that man's state, though earlier described as perfect, should be deemed perfect only for man as man. We could refer to this potential scheme, which never was given a chance, as the "old plan."

But later in the poem, immediately prior to Adam's joyful expression of the felix culpa in Book XII, Milton again makes unmistakably clear that the condition to be achieved via grace is more desirable than life in Eden.

Referring to the Last Judgement, the angel Michael, certainly an authoritative figure to speak for Milton, describes the reward for the faithful whom God would
receive into bliss:

Whether in Heav'n or Earth, for then the Earth
Shall all be Paradise, far happier place
Than this of Eden, and far happier days.  
(XII, 463-465).

When one looks at the context of Adam's expression of the felix culpa, a statement which immediately follows Michael's assurance of "far happier days" as a result of the fall for those who accept God's grace, it hardly seems right to dismiss Adam's judgement at this moment in the poem in Mr. Klammer's terms:

What Adam marvelled at after the fall is not necessarily indicative of what he may have considered so extremely glorious before the fall, especially when one considers that Adam was very personally involved in this matter.

We must return to this point a little further on.

Paradoxical Consequences

As for the third question, "Is the fall really serious?" it is entirely just to say that the fall contributed to much that is unfortunate. No one of Milton's readers can be unaware of the existence of evil and suffering in the world. Within the poem itself, as Mr. Klammer makes clear, Michael, in his prophetic revelation to Adam, surveys the hardships and injustices Adam's descendants must bear. And, as Mr. Klammer says, the fall makes man liable to "vicissitudes of fate." But the point of the paradox is not that all men are made more fortunate as a result of the fall. Indeed, as God the Father says to the Son:

Happier, had it suffic'd him to have known
Good by itself, and Evil not at all.  (XI, 88-89).

Here, we can assume that God is speaking of men in general. Later, when Adam is told by Michael of the plan of salvation, it is clear that only those who willingly accept the fact of man's redemption through Christ, that is to say, only those who "the benefit embrace/ By Faith not void of works" (XII, 426-427), can appreciate the idea of the felix culpa.

With this understanding, Adam's state of mind at the moment of his excited utterance of the felix culpa is appropriate for the acceptance of the idea;

O goodness infinite, goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good;  (XII, 469-471).

At this point in the poem, we are near the end of Michael's revelation of the future of man, a period of instruction during which we can see the regeneration of Adam as a rational and faithful man. He is certainly not now a person deluded by possibilities of personal gain, but one who is honestly impressed by the miraculous grandeur of God's scheme for man's ultimate salvation.

It seems that Milton makes clear enough in Michael's statement to Adam that man's ultimate salvation will be a condition happier than his life in Eden. He does not, however, compare man's future state under the new plan with his potential state which Raphael spoke of (V, 469-505) under the old plan, prior to man's fall. Since Milton makes no explicit reference to the old plan in the latter half of the poem, any explanations must be exceedingly hypothetical. But, for one thing, Raphael did explain the old plan in what could be termed a conditional sense, saying "Your bodies may at last all turn to spirit/ Improv'd by tract of time." Or perhaps the old plan, though it presumably would have led to the same end as will the new plan based upon Christ's sacrifice, could be considered more difficult as the improvement in man's condition is dependent upon obedience. The new plan, with the gift of grace, is more permissive. However, it would be more in accordance with Milton's own tendency in such matters to assume that the old plan is too much a speculative concept to deserve elaborate attention.

Still one other point deserving consideration relates to the place of the idea of felix culpa in the total structure of the poem. Much critical discussion in the literary journals has been devoted to the problem of whether Milton has succeeded aesthetically in convincing his readers emotionally to accept man as being better off or worse off at the end of the poem, depending upon how they interpret the felix culpa. Unfortunately, in order to judge this question decisively, one must distort the poem. Milton's real objective is to "justify the ways of God to men," not to decide whether man is better off or worse. Man sins and he must be punished; but the punishment is followed by an act of Grace for all who will accept Jesus Christ as their Savior and Lord. Milton was not writing a comedy with a happy ending or a tragedy with a sad ending; but a large-scale, historically conceived justification of the relationship between man and God as a consequence of original sin. His aesthetic objective is to stimulate in us an emotional acceptance of the idea that God has dealt justly and generously with man, in view of man's propensity to sin. When one looks at the poem from this point of view, he should see that the paradox, though still a mystery, is a form of consolation.

SOME RECENT STUDIES OF THE
FELIX CULPA IN PARADISE LOST


Town of a Thousand Violins

By RODOLFO CALTOFEN

Mittenwald, a tiny village near Garmisch-Partenkirchen in the Bavarian Alps, has been a center of violin-making for three hundred years. The beautiful little market town spreads out in every direction in a long, narrow valley overshadowed by the peaks and crags of the Karwendel mountain range. The gaily-colored paintings on the fronts of the old houses and their old archways date back to the Wessebrunn artists' guild and the golden years (1487-1693) when Mittenwald served as a trading center for the merchants of Venice.

Just at the end of this period, when Bozen was replacing Mittenwald as a trading center and the little town was threatened by poverty, it happened that a son of the town returned home — a man who had learned in the Tyrol and from Master Amati the art of violin making. Matthias Klotz, born in Mittenwald on June 11, 1653, started making violins in his home town. The first to buy them were the music-loving monks of the neighboring monasteries. But before long people from Mittenwald with their heavily-loaded wooden carrying baskets became familiar figures at every fair. About the end of the Eighteenth Century, the verlegers appeared on the scene — wealthy violin makers who maintained stocks of wood which they cut up and furnished to home workers. (It must be borne in mind that in addition to the delicate manual skill of the violin maker the most essential ingredient in a great violin is well-seasoned wood. Violin wood must be seasoned at least twenty-five years; for a master violin at least a hundred years of seasoning is necessary.)

Hard maple wood is used for the bottom and the sides, soft white fir for the top. The hard wood reflects the sound which then vibrates the top. There are no recipes or instructions for working the bottom; only the master's feeling can tell him whether it has the proper thickness. This is also true of inserting the sounding-post, a small round pin of white fir which is stuck in between the bottom and the "e" chord; it must not be glued on or it would not conduct the vibrations.

For the neck, the violin makers use ebony from South America, which is also the material of the bow. One hundred and twenty horsehairs are required for the bow. In the past these came from Russia. Nowadays other sources have to be tapped. About 130 hours of work are necessary to make a violin, so the production cost can never be less than fifteen dollars.

The violin-makers' school, which was founded in the time of Bavaria's King Ludwig I (1858), now has thirty students, among them quite a few foreigners who will help to spread the fame of the Mittenwald violin all over the world.
Vatican Council Hears Plea
For a New Attitude Towards Science

By NORMAN TEMME
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Article 22 of the schema on "The Church in the Modern World" deals with present day culture and the Church's stance over against it. It afforded the 2,500 prelates of the Roman Catholic Church seated in the third session of Vatican Council II in St. Peter's in Rome opportunity to plead for less suspicion and closer cooperation on the part of the Church with modern science. This opportunity did not go unaccepted.

Several speakers took the floor to confess the past sins of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to its attitude toward science and to lament the obscurantism which has plagued the Church as a result. Archbishop Leo Elchinger, Coadjutor of Strasbourg, France, said that a new attitude on freedom of scientific research "is absolutely essential if we are to maintain any worthwhile dialogue with modern science." Such a new attitude, he claimed, would prevent the reoccurrence of a situation like the condemnation of Galileo by his Church four hundred years ago. He called upon the Council to "raise its voice to make reparation in the name of the Church for the miserable and unjust condemnation of this great scholar."

Another scientist's name mentioned as frequently as that of Galileo has been that of Father Teilhard de Chardin, the French Jesuit of this century whose studies on evolution have been questioned by the Church. Bishop Otto Spuelbeck of Meissen, a diocese in East Germany, said that "while some in the Church would still exclude Teilhard de Chardin as an enemy," Roman Catholic laymen in the scientific world acclaim him because, as they say, "He speaks our language; we believe that he also has understood our problems and we therefore look to him for help in the religious questions that come up in our studies."

Bishop Spuelbeck, who holds a doctorate in natural science, pointed out that, in contrast, "experts and specialists in the natural sciences are greatly distressed if they speak with us [the clergy] about their problems. For we use a language that is rather old-fashioned, dating back to antiquity, — one that is inept and strange to their world, if I may not even say false with regard to the problems that these specialists have to solve.

"The concepts of matter, cause, substance, finality, and life have actually become so modified in the scientific world, that it is high time to examine theologically and with an open mind these new advances and concepts, which have been evolved by laymen with such sincerity and effort. But unfortunately we have no answers for them at all, or our answers are insufficient... The distress and anxiety of many theologians still unfortunately blocks the way to the desired progress of the Church in this field."

The bishop emphasized that this attitude of treating science and scientists with suspicion presents a real danger for his diocese, which is under the power of Marxist atheism. "Being aggressively controversial, atheism makes known our inept and unscientific manner of speech and so tries to disturb even men of good will and make them ridicule ecclesiastical doctrines," he concluded.

Another advocate for a declaration of full liberty in scientific investigation was Bishop Manuel Talamas Camandari of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. His remarks were summarized for the press as follows: "We must show that scientific investigation can be useful in penetrating the meaning of doctrine, the meaning of Sacred Scripture, etc. If research comes up with something which at first sight seems to be a contradiction of Revelation, the first reaction of the Church should not be to issue a condemnation or to demand a retraction, but rather to display an attitude of readiness to allow full investigation. No one should restrict the liberty of discussion on certain points, such as discussion of the evolution of the body as permitted by Pope Pius XII in 'Humani Generis.' Teachers should not be removed for such reasons. This open-mindedness will prepare the way for synthesis between science and philosophy which is so greatly needed. It will make for greater, richer collaboration between the Church and science. Although the Church cannot be expected to accept all scientific hypotheses, she must be ready to allow full investigation in order to achieve ultimately a fuller knowledge of the truth."

The text for "The Church in the Modern World" was returned to the responsible commission for thorough revision. When it is returned to the Council Fathers for vote at the fourth session, it is expected that the new Article 22 will incorporate the thoughts and emphases suggested by these and a half dozen other Council Fathers.
The Theatre

Vital Problems and a New Theatre

BY WALTER SORELL

Two plays of more than passing interest opened on Broadway and closed after a short run of a couple of weeks. Neither the playwrights' stature nor the theme of their plays is slight.

Duerrenmatt's "The Physicists" hide in an insane asylum to save mankind from their own scientific inventions which, in the hand of politicians and profiteers, would mean the end of homo sapiens. Only love, symbolized by three nurses, penetrates the masks of the physicists and sees the human being behind his fatal cleverness. That all three nurses are strangled only goes to show that in the name of insanity sanity — or vice versa — must extinguish love. The play's message is that finally all precautions and pretentions of the leading physicist, whose new theory must ultimately spell death with capital letters, are of no avail. No thought is one man's property; science marches on into its own doomed existence.

One may say that the destructive will of man, his death-wish, is as strong as his creative ability and mind-in-progress; that, in contrast to the simplicity of love, the calculating, hate-born frigidity in the hunch-backed psychiatrist outwits man's hope to turn the tide which his own brainstorms unleash. There is no way to the next emergency exit. The powerless powerlessness of those who cannot prevent their genius from becoming the corrupted flame in the hands of others is demonstrated with unmistakable obviousness in the play. Zeus seems to have known why he punished Prometheus.

From the grotesque comedy about the sickness of our time we come to the dark comedy on the meanness of man at any time of history as presented in Jean Anouilh's "Poor Bitos." History repeats itself because man does not change. A little prosecutor in a French town ten years after World War II is still mercilessly hunting down collaborationists. He acts with the same relentlessnes as Robespierre once did — Robespierre who knew no charity and whose own unhappy littleness was hiding behind the self-righteous feeling of doing nothing but his duty. Anouilh is a master in theatrical trickery. His dazzling way of proving a point by going to the past and revealing his real people through historic figures is a dramaturgic tour de force. Bitos is no longer poor Bitos — no longer a nasty little man, son of a washerwoman, beaten as a boy, eaten up by the ambition to become powerful in order to get even with the world. The shadow dimension of Robespierre lifts his being from its littleness into the eternal arena in which power politics has always played its gruesome game because man thrown into a hostile world needs to assert himself.

Bitos is invited to a masquerade arranged by a rich man in town who has always loathed this little ambitious man. Other guests play the roles of other French revolutionaries, and the skilful interweaving of reality and make-believe of past and present heightens the scathing scorn with which Anouilh shows the meanness and hypocrisy, the cruelty and smallness of man in all social layers. It is an angry indictment which also asks the question: When and where do we draw the line and stop hating our enemies? The play alludes to the question of collective guilt and man's vindictiveness in his inability to separate his personal involvement from the principle of right and wrong which, thusly, in his eyes becomes a right or wrong.

That both plays failed on Broadway — though they were world successes — proves a number of points, among them that our public is show-minded, not theatre-conscious; that we are neither ready nor willing to accept a play that deals with vital problems; that our critics fail the playwrights and, in the long run, the theatre and its potential public; that the creation of a new theatre, such as the American Place Theatre, is a necessity and a blessing for all those for whom the theatre has meaning beyond entertainment.

Theatre emerged from ritual, and the American Place Theatre is church and theatre rolled in one. The Reverend Sidney Lanier, with his artistic director Wynn Handman, has created a heaven for the playwright who, removed from the harassment and artificial necessities of Broadway, can see his work grow to full ripeness with a final production which has the polish of professionalism. The poet Robert Lowell was the first to see his plays performed there. Probably no commercial producer would have dared to put on "The Old Glory," two one-act plays with one unifying theme. Based on Hawthorne and Melville stories, these plays investigate ideas similar to those of Duerrenmatt and Anouilh.

The American Place Theatre has set itself a high task. With a sizeable grant from the Ford Foundation, it has the means to fulfill it. All it needs is humility and strength, awareness of the dangers that lie in the mere fact that spiritual power is put into the hands of a few who are only human, and vision to see the light between the lines and the poetry between the spoken words. The theatre demands heightened reality of unreality. God gave man his creative ability so that he might add meaning to his life.
Then spake Jesus again unto them saying, I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life.

— Saint John 8:12

"Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee ... The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined!"

Thus proclaimed the prophet Isaiah some eight hundred years before the eventful appearing of the Star in the East that led the Wise Men to the place where He lay whose prophesied coming as the "light of the world" was announced by the angel in heavenly splendor. And, as light was the condition of life in God's creative program; as His heavenly rainbow was His sign to Noah and all his descendents of His promise of merciful providence; as also again did His heavenly light in the East signal the bridging once more of time and eternity — the reunion of God and man — and the arrival of the great turning point in human history when man's hitherto gloom-ridden horizon began to be brightened by the rosy-fingered dawn of the age of new light and life in the new-born Christchild, so also is this bright festival season of the Epiphany of the Christchild as the Savior also of the Gentiles and all the world fittingly observed as a time of glory to God and of light for mankind setting out upon another year of grace.

But the question will always persist, as prominently and critically as the original star in the East, whether or not for us and others the world over "the people that sat in darkness have seen a great light." It's true enough, of course, that there are something like seven hundred million professing Christians in our world, but it is also a hard fact that there are more than 1.6 billion pagans still being driven by their senses with Nicodemus or by fear with the jailer at Philippi to agonize, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" It is encouraging to read that students on a well-known secular college campus in our country criticized the non-denominational Protestant services conducted there as "too bland," protested against the "anythingarianism" of the religious climate there, and requested a new chapel with improved campus religious program, asserting the "changes and increases in the entire religious program are very much in order"; but it is disconcerting also to note that students on other campuses are devotees of a cult-like form of agnosticism called "Negoism," negating any definite truths and principles about God, soul, and morality.

There really is little comfort in highest-ever church attendance statistics for a country in which simple human rights of dignity for all citizens are still the bone of violent contention and where a well-known religious observer is moved to ask, "Have we forgotten how to be grateful for the highest living standards the world has ever known?" He notes, for example, "There have always been stingy people in churches and synagogues. But, in the past, they were usually ashamed of their selfishness and tried to make excuses for it. Today it is quite respectable — even fashionable — in some congregations to scoff openly at both public and private efforts to combat poverty" (Louis Cassels, UPI, November 21, 1964). There are altogether too many such "signs of the times" around us that it is not light but sin-born darkness, not the "glory of the Lord" but the degradation of God's highest creation — man — that has descended once more upon us. National leaders of the world salute one another and the New Year with plaudits of confidence for "peace on earth," the meanwhile girding their countries for even more desperate efforts to ward off nuclear annihilation of whole continents. A few years ago, the "Man of the Year" salute of a national news magazine was given to a leader whose outstanding achievement, it felt, was that "he oiled the wheels of chaos." And about two years ago, a well-known Protestant clergyman published a nationally distributed article entitled, "Can Protestantism Be Saved?" (Readers Digest, September, 1962), asking, "Is the voice of the Protestant church as strong as ever?" "The answer," he avers, "is bleak and inescapable. Protestantism today is losing ground — not so much in numbers as in spiritual effectiveness." In support of his contention he cited "the church's apathy in the face of the challenge posed by decaying society that surrounds it, its indifference to what seems to be an anti-religious movement in the U.S., and the will to attack on all battlefronts of the world." Significantly, he concludes: "Can Protestantism be saved? Of course it can. Not by councils or hierarchism, but by aroused, inspired, dedicated individual Christian men and women who have strong beliefs and are not ashamed of them. The problem is ours to tackle together, ministers and laymen." Disconcerting and paradoxical as all this seems to be at the beginning of a new year, it is not surprising that "Today's Fabulous Figures" included what might well be taken as a significant footnote to the times — that, while the over-all death rate in the U.S. has declined 10% since 1940, lowest in our history, we not only consumed more ciga-
On Second Thought

Ephesians 4:12. KJV: “for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry...” RSV: “for the equipment of the saints, for the work of ministry...” SEMinary: “for the perfecting of the ministry for the equipment of the saints....” BPE: “for the equipment of the minister for the perfecting of the saints...” FIELD: “for the work of the minister in perfecting the equipment of the saints....”

At least we are agreed that there shall be no comma there. But we are not really agreed on what the work of the ministry is, nor on what equipment is needed by the saints. We cry plaintively: “The multiple work of the congregation is too much for the clergyman. He must train his laity, become a teacher of teachers and a leader of leaders. Administration should be turned over to the layman, and free the pastor to be a pastor.”

Perhaps. But what is the work of ministry? It is God’s people out in the scattered church, loving and serving men unconditionally! It is proclaiming by such service that God our Lord loves all men; in the act of continuing His ministry it is worshiping Him who gave His life to us. What has that to do with the administration of the congregation? Very little. The fewer people involved in running the congregation the better — then few will think that’s the ministry.

What equipment do the saints need? Knowledge ingrained, like a virus in every cell, knowledge of the unconditioned love of God in Christ. The saints get it through hearing about it in the public proclamation (about love!); through receiving it in the forgiveness of pastoral counseling (forgiveness!); through practicing it in the charity of Christian welfare (charity!). What has that to do with the administration of the congregation? Very little. The fewer people trained to administer a congregation the better — then few will think that’s the required equipment.

It’s heavy equipment that the saints must carry. Are we substituting a lighter load of handwork, party games, and topic studies? It’s a hard and costly work, the ministry. Are we substituting cheaper and easier board meetings, workshops, and stewardship canvasses? If the multiple work of the congregation is too much for the clergy, maybe there is an answer better than training the layman to do it. Maybe we ought to get rid of the work, and get back to the ministry.

January 1965
The Windows of the Valparaiso Chapel

By ADALBERT RAPHAEL KRETZMANN

Valparaiso University will, this month, dedicate two great windows in the chancel of its Memorial Chapel. These two windows, along with the previously dedicated center window, emphasize and glorify the work of the Holy Blessed Trinity. They are the work of Peter Dohmen, of St. Paul, Minnesota, an artist who was trained under one of the most significant of modern church architects, Dominikus Boehm, and under the founder of the new monumental style of glass and mosaic work, Professor Thorn-Prikker. He had previously installed the Meier Memorial Music Window between portions of the great organ on the west wall of the Chapel and the “Christ Window” in the chancel. The windows to be dedicated this month honor God the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Each window reads individually like the face of a clock, beginning at the top and going around the window clockwise.

The Creation Window (left of center)

The Creation Window shows the creating hands of God, our Father. In the second division, above them and around the sun, which is central, is seen our solar system with some of the identifying marks for the planets. Beneath the Hands of God are Adam and Eve as the crown of creation, surrounded by plants, trees, and the serpent of temptation.

In the fourth division are seen the tablets of the Law. The heights of Mt. Sinai are indicated behind the tablets. In the fifth division the creativity of man, made in the image of God, is emphasized and represented in the symbols for painting, architecture, science, and astronomy, looking out of the darkness of earth to the light of heaven.

Reading upward on the left side of this window, the harp is seen as the symbol of man’s creativity in music. (The crown symbolizes David, who left us the heritage of the Psalms.) Above that, in the second division, is the altar of sacrifice with a church tower and a crowning clock as the symbol of the clergy and of watchfulness. The other divisions show more of the creative acts of God. At the very top is the dove of peace with an olive branch in its bill as a reminder that all of man’s striving has its climax in peace for the world.

The Sanctification Window (right of center)

In the division at the upper right are seen the two ancient rolls (books), symbols of the Old and New Testaments. Beneath them is found the dove of the Holy Spirit in His appearance at Pentecost. The great flames of fire extend into the left side of the window in the third division.

The third division is filled up with instruments of torture as symbols of the martyrdom of the faithful witnesses of the Word. The fourth division emphasizes the music of the Church under the symbols of the angel with the trumpet and the organ and its keyboard. At the bottom of the right side are symbols of medical science — the caduceus with test-tubes, reactors, etc.

Moving upward on the left side of the window are the symbols of Christian wisdom — the open Scriptures, revealing Christ as the beginning and the end; a typical roll of Scripture; the flaming lamp; and the owl, as one of the most ancient symbols of wisdom.

In the third division upward appear symbols of the priestly office — the cross, the shepherd’s staff, the alb, the stole, and the chalice and wafer. The next division upward is a continuation of the symbol of the Holy Spirit in the flames of fire extending from the right side of the window.

In the second last division on this side are found the symbols of the world mission of the Church — the baptismal shell, the pilgrim’s staff, and the apostolic sandals. In the topmost division Luther’s coat-of-arms denotes the confessional background of the University. This is combined with the torch which is an element in the seal of the University.

The color and form composition of the windows is such that they give proper emphasis to the star-like character of the chancel form and thereby serve as a complement to the architecture, rather than as a dominating feature.

The Christus Rex

To be dedicated at the same time as the windows is the “Christus Rex,” cast by David Elder specifically to be suspended from the cross behind the chapel’s high altar. The most recent findings in the field of research in religious art and architecture indicate that the Cross, as it was used in its earliest form, was symbolic of the triumph of Christ and was, therefore, usually shown in a very colorful, often jeweled, form. When the figure (corpus) finally began to be used on the Cross it showed a Christ who was “living and reigning to all eternity” as “King of kings and Lord of lords.” It is this victorious Christ that Elder has represented.

The windows are the gift of Mr. and Mrs. Alfred C. Munderloh of Grosse Pointe, Michigan. The “Christus Rex” is a memorial to Miss Elizabeth Selle by her family. The altar had been given previously by Mr. and Mrs. L.C. Heine of Omaha.
My maiden column for The Cresset appeared in the maiden issue of this journal. I devoted my contribution to a discussion of Jean Sibelius, the famous Finnish composer.

Much water has flowed over innumerable dams since October 1937. At that time Sibelius was still alive. Now he is dead. He passed away in 1957. But his native Finland has not forgotten him. This year it will observe the 100th anniversary of his birth. Finland honored him during his long life; it will continue to honor him after his death.

Has the music of Sibelius fallen into desuetude? Has it lost whatever power and vitality it was said to have? More than one scholar will tell you with burning emphasis that it never cut a wide swath in the history of the tonal art. Many, on the other hand, will declare with equal assurance that Sibelius was a great composer. As for myself, I confess in all conscience that I still regard him as a mighty master.

But why should I use the word "confess"? Perhaps I have been influenced to some extent by friends and associates who cry out with full-throated conviction that Sibelius was a woefully overrated writer of music. Actually, however, I have nothing to confess. I should have used the word "assert."

If you ask whether I consider Sibelius' Finlandia his finest composition, I shall have to reply with a resounding No. Finlandia contains a beautiful melody which has found its way into many hymnals. I wish this were not the case. But what can I do about it? Exactly nothing. Those who like to see this fine melody transmogrified into a church hymn may have their way. I cannot see eye to eye with them.

Finlandia is a bit noisy and somewhat pompous. Sibelius had not yet cut his eyeteeth when he wrote this work. Shall one call Finlandia one of the sins of the composer's youth? No, for it abounds in growing pains that gave much promise. Incidentally, it is the only work of his in which I have been able to see him leaning here and there on Tchaikovsky. In my opinion, those who speak of the famous Finnish master as an imitator of the renowned Russian are spouting balderdash pure and simple. How ridiculous can conclusions become in this vale of tears and off-the-cuff analyses?

Unfortunately, the works of Sibelius do seem to have fallen into desuetude. But they will rise again. Of this I am sure. Do you remember when nearly everybody was sure that Tchaikovsky's music had outlived its usefulness? I do, for I was one of those who held to this pockmarked notion. Long ago, however, I realized how wrong I had been. Tchaikovsky needs no champions today. He will survive all assaults and all mealymouthed praise.

Maybe Finlandia is destined to survive my own assaults. Who can tell? But permit me to mention some of Sibelius' works which I regard as infinitely more important than Finlandia. Among his symphonies I prefer the first, the second, and especially the fourth. In fact, I consider Sibelius' Symphony No. 4 one of the finest compositions of its kind since the days of Johannes Brahms. Am I using the words "of its kind"? I should not do so, for Sibelius' Symphony No. 4 is unique in every respect. One dare not speak of any work "of its kind." It is strictly sui generis. To my thinking, it is filled with powerful eloquence.

Although En Saga is an early work, it is scored with extraordinary aptness and incisiveness. Besides, it is a remarkable example of the kind of writing that holds me spellbound. Tapiola, I think, must be ranked among the truly great symphonic poems. The Swan of Tuonela is both enchanting and vividly expressive, and the Violin Concerto is an exciting contribution to a genre that is all too thinly spread in the many-sided field of composition.

Candor compels me to say that I can do without some of Sibelius' works. But those I have mentioned — with the exception of Finlandia — are sufficient to warrant my own ironclad belief that Sibelius was a great composer. Now let the fur fly!

Not long ago one of the most prominent music critics in the world accused me rather sharply of overestimating Sibelius. Although I have weighed his words with diligence and much respect, I must continue to regard the famous Finn as a mighty prophet. And I am confident that the Sibelius festivals to be held this year in Finland and in other parts of the world will do much to prove that my conviction is not founded on quicksand. You can have Arnold Schoenberg, Anton von Webern, Alban Berg, Roger Sessions, Walter Piston, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and hosts of others whom I could mention if I had the space required to do so. I will continue to cherish Sibelius.
Evangelical Catholicity

Dr. Jaroslav Pelikan did not invent the term "Evangelical Catholicity," but his new book, Obedient Rebels (Harper & Row, 1964, $5.00), should firmly insert it into contemporary theological discussion. Subtitled "Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle in Luther's Reformation," and dedicated to Paul Tillich, this book could significantly chart the theological and churchly task for much of the present young generation of churchmen.

The book is billed as a fresh contribution to Protestant-Roman Catholic dialogue. We shall be interested in the response from Roman circles, for the book is important in this connection. Here the intriguing thesis is that both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism are children of the Reformation, and Rome will not be truly Catholic until she understands this and draws appropriate consequences. Yet the work seems to me to be more significantly directed to Protestants, for the accent is on "catholicity" and Protestants are called to a reconsideration of those Catholic elements which have eroded from the Reformation tradition.

The historical portrait of the Reformers, particularly Luther, reveals Catholics trying to reform the church around the Gospel and the means of grace. Especially revealing is the story of Luther's own efforts to save Christendom from fragmentation; the Reformer's battles on all fronts are marked by deep pastoral concern, leading him to efforts to achieve a theological consensus among the theological party participants. These results are a clear judgment with successes and failures; but the successes are instructive. For progress toward theological consensus is both necessary and possible. In the chapters dealing with the contemporary situation in the ecumenical movement, Pelikan shows that in the documents produced by the Faith and Order Commission it is possible to discern progress in achieving theological consensus among the theological participants. These results are a clear judgment on all churches which withhold support from such movements; they are full of promise that, as the author has written elsewhere, history can be overcome by history.

I have noted that "catholic substance" forms the driving thrust of the author's concern. He means by this the life and thought of the church as it comes to us in the historical forms such as Bible, dogma, liturgy, and prayers. The presupposition is a commitment to the church as a historical and empirical reality, the bearer of the Holy within history.

This is a commitment to the Holy Spirit, to the Lutheran axiom that the finite can bear the infinite. Post-Reformation Protestantism has tended to permit an erosion of this substance. This erosion has been retarded in those churches where doctrine and liturgy are serious parts of the living tradition, though it is perfectly possible that churches can hold on to the forms of catholic substance, while the substance itself erodes. In the stream of history it is paradoxically the innovators who are from time to time called upon to conserve the traditional Christian substance.

The catholic substance needs the criticism of the Protestant principle. The Protestant principle was expressed during the Reformation in the great solae concerning Christ, scripture, grace, and faith; it happened, these assertions often ossified into dead traditions themselves; removed from the context of the catholic substance in which they first came to expression, they themselves can contribute to the erosion of the biblical message.

There appears to me to be some unclarity here with respect to the Protestant principle. This probably reflects this reviewer's own difficulties with Tillich at this point; for Tillich, it appears that the predominant thrust of this principle deals with the recognition of the limits of finite. Thus the Protestant is alert to idolatries. Tillich sees this insight expressed in the doctrine of justification by grace, and this doctrine is for him not just one doctrine but a principle which cuts through all doctrines. Pelikan adopts this point of view at times, though at other times he notes that there is much agreement between Protestants and Romans today on the question of justification. Justification as an isolated doctrine or as a theological principle? I do think, therefore, that the evangelical aspect of evangelical catholicity needs further elucidation. How does the evangelical principle elicit the joy of the evangel from the catholic substance in such a way that legalisms are destroyed? There are portions of Pelikan's presentation where this is done, and never more brilliantly than in his exposition of how the fourth article of the Augsburg Confession -- dealing with justification and presenting the "novelty" of the Reformation -- is basically a conclusion drawn from the full meaning of the previous three articles which stated apparently prosaic catholic teaching concerning Trinity, man, and Christ.

A final chapter presents a fine description of the theological task of evangelical catholicity today. The suggestive elements of this task are: confessional, conserving, catholic, critical, and correlating. It is to be hoped that this designation "evangelical catholicity" will not degenerate into a meaningless slogan, but will attract the energies and imagination of vigorous and creative minds. Interested readers may want to pursue the course of evangelical catholicity as this was introduced in nineteenth century Puritan America by the Reformed theologians of Mercersberg, Pennsylvania. This is a most instructive episode in American church history and has been brought to light by James Hastings Nichols in Romanticism in American Theology (University of Chicago Press, 1961, $7.50). Nichols' book is a model of fine historical writing as well as inept titling, for the title has little to do with the tale here related.

Dr. Martin Marty has written a new book, Varieties of Unbelief (Holt Rinehart Winston, 1964, $5.00). His theological commitment is to biblical, historical theology combined with contemporary analysis, all of which are most congenial to the theological approach outlined by Pelikan. Marty's book is pastoral theology in the best sense. This requires explanation, as well as an enlargement of the notion of pastoral theology. Marty himself calls his work an essay in pre-apologetics. It is an analysis of the kinds of soil on which the seed of the Gospel falls today. Since such analysis is meant to serve the task of communication, conspiracy, and conversion -- both within and outside of the church -- the intention of the book is eminently pastoral. Not only preaching but also ordinary Christian conversation and tactic must take this soil into account, as well as the care of souls.

Marty analyzes the state of belief and unbelief in American culture today. An excellent section is devoted to what he calls the originality of unbelief, in which he addresses himself convincingly to the unique features of modern unbelief which distinguish it from that unbelief and theological disenchantment which can be found everywhere in Western Christendom throughout its history. Then he proceeds to establish a typology of unbelief, examining by this method the qualities of unbelief. If the Christian indeed seeks communication on a minimal level -- to say nothing of conspiracy (forming tactical alliances for limited goals) and conversion -- he must understand something of the spiritual terrain on which he operates. Thus the typology distinguishes forms such as nihilism, atheism, agnosticism, and apathy. Each of these is further analyzed to discover the extent to which we are here faced by an open or a closed system of thought or posture. One sort of approach is obviously demanded by a closed system; another by an open point of view.

Marty then turns to those forms of unbelief found particularly within the churches. Here he is on home ground, not simply because he is a churchman but because he has built much of his career on the analysis of how Christian profession differs from Christian practice. His present treatment in the context of the typology which he has created is fresh and
convincing. We see again how certain Christian forms and symbols merely mask the actual driving and directing forces in people's lives. A man may say quite easily, "Lord, Lord" but be driven in actual fact by unbelief.

The echoes of Luther's analysis of the commandments are clear in this book; unbelief is the primordial sin. But the forms and varieties of unbelief require the careful analysis exhibited here, or Christian conversation and preaching may not only miss the mark completely but ironically promote what it seeks to overcome.

Marty's analysis of closed and open systems is also, by the way, applied to the church's belief-systems. Closed systems of thought here not only tend toward idolatry and therefore unbelief, but are pastorally deficient, as they do not contain those aspects of openness which can receive correction, imaginative reinvigoration, and the many novelties which history is constantly presenting. Such openness is not meant to be incompatible with commitment, though someone will have to elaborate this more fully. The issue is important for pastoral care, for apologetics, and for permitting the reformation of the church.

RICHARD P. BAEPLER

To Thine Own Self Be True

Evelyn Waugh has promised a three volume autobiography. The first volume is now available: A Little Learning (Little, Brown, 1964, $5.00, 234pp.), and it carries the account through Waugh's education and his first, dismally unsatisfactory effort at earning his own keep.

Waugh begins with the observation that "only when one has lost all curiosity about the future has one reached the age to write an autobiography." The passion for self-justification is presumably much too strong before that time, and the writer's revelation of himself too likely to be a revelation of what he would like himself to be. Waugh appears not at all concerned with his place in literary history, or any other history for that matter. The account is candid, unaffected, low-keyed; a casual recounting with no sign of the intensity with which most men contemplate their own lives.

An American reader will often be confused by the names, the places, and the elliptic descriptions of peculiarly British institutions. But this does not seriously interfere with the reader's enjoyment, and Waugh isn't really concerned as yet to explain himself.

There are some signs here of the future author of Brideshead Revisited, far fewer of the rollicking creator of Black Mischief, Vile Bodies, or Put out More Flags, and unmistakable evidence of a Ronald Knox biographer. (Monsignor Knox is quoted frequently, often in unlikely contexts.) But above all what we have is a cultivated mind out for a leisurely ascent from poverty was not a smooth one. The opportunity to go to college presents itself because Gregoory had developed into an outstanding runner in high school. He emerged from Southern Illinois University with no particular academic achievements and little preparation for a career. But what are the career opportunities for Negro college graduates? Gregory set off for Chicago to make his name and fortune as a comedian.

The trials along the way are amusingly and sometimes touchingly recounted. But the climax of the book, from the writer's own point of view, comes after he finally arrives. Gregory elects to risk what he has painfully achieved by throwing himself into the thick of the civil rights struggles. But the story falters. Perhaps that's because its meaning is not yet as clear to Gregory as is the meaning of his early years.

Dr. Thomas A. Dooley wrote his autobiography at an even earlier age. He had to, for he had not been allotted many years. He had to, for he had not been allotted many years. His three books recounting the work he did in Southeast Asia, first as a Navy doctor, then as a private citizen, and finally as founder of Medico, have now been summarized in paper back in Doctor Tom Dooley, My Story (New American Library, Signet. $1.50, 128pp.). It is strictly a capsule review.

It is difficult to decide what to make of Ilya Ehrenburg's Memoirs: 1921-1941 (World, 1964, translated from the Russian by Tatania Shebulina with Yvonne Kapp, $6.95, 543 pp.). They can't really qualify as autobiography. For one thing, Ehrenburg begins his account abruptly with himself in young middle age. And he is the pivot around which the book swings rather than the center of its attention. But the interest of the book nonetheless stems, at least for this reviewer, from the insight it provides into the thinking of this courageous and independent Russian man of letters. The trouble is that it provides far less insight than we want.

Ehrenburg takes too much for granted. Most obviously and least importantly, he takes for granted that the reader has heard of the scores of literary and semi-literary figures who pop in and out of the pages. Perhaps an educated Russian reader would know most of them; but even their names will usually be strange to the American reader. There is an appendix of biographical sketches, and this helps somewhat. Unfortunately, the appendix confines itself to those names that Ehrenburg merely mentions in passing. But we usually aren't even familiar enough with the men he actually stops to sketch to appreciate fully his vignettes. Of course, the Memoirs weren't written for Americans. On the other hand, this translation was.

More disturbing is what Ehrenburg takes for granted about himself. The man does not emerge in the Memoirs. But Ehrenburg is just the one person whom above all we want to meet and understand. He has to be a commanding personality. No ordinary man could have his kind of courage. But the roots of this courage, the conception of self and world which animated him through these difficult years, are concealed from the reader in comments on other people and on events.

Someone predisposed to believe that Ehrenburg is just a sophisticated apologist for the Soviet regime could find support for his prejudice in these pages. When he lectures the reader on the economic causes of social and moral disintegration, his arguments are as hollow and over-simplified as those offered in the United States from the opposite end of the political spectrum. We are left in no doubt about what Ehrenburg thinks capitalism does to man. But the dehumanization wrought by the Bolshevik regime is implicit only.

Yet we know too much about Ilya Ehren-
I WAS CASTRO'S PRISONER

By John Martino in collaboration with Nathaniel Weyl (Devin-Adair, $4.75)

On July 23, 1959, John Martino of Miami, Florida, made a routine business trip to Havana, Cuba. Although his thirteen-year-old son was sent home six days later, it was October 6, 1962, before Mr. Martino returned to the United States. The intervening months had been spent in the nightmare of Castro regime prisons.

Arrested by mistake, charged with participating in the escape of a man of whom he had never heard, granted only a sham trial, denied medical treatment for a chronic kidney ailment, and faced constantly with the possibility of deportation to that very worst of Cuban prisons, the Isle of Pines, Martino had, nevertheless, the unique opportunity of seeing from the inside the effects of the Cuban revolution. And because he possesses an excellent memory he is able to retell the tragic stories of many of his fellow prisoners (including Castro men who had outworn their usefulness, members of anti-revolution groups, plus a few other Americans) and to describe the almost unbelievable conditions in the prisons, and the motley assortment of "officials" who have brought these conditions about.

Of his own imprisonment Martino says, "I believe I owe my forty months in Cuban prisons to the determination during that period of the State Department and the American Embassy in Havana to appease the Castro regime." As a man who was once on embassy ground but who, on a plea to his patriotism, was persuaded to return to prison for 48 hours, Martino writes, "The bitter truth was that I would not leave Cuban prisons until more than three years later and I would have no reason to thank either the American Embassy or the Department of State for that deliverance." One chapter is entitled "The American Embassy: Profile in Cowardice". Yet one has the feeling that this man is being truthful, not spiteful.

Time has shown that many mistakes were made in connection with Cuba. One of the worst was the Playa Giron invasion. Lack of support for the loyal underground, breaks in communications, the withdrawing of American support at the crucial time, and "the fact that the CIA people in charge of the Cuban operation failed to take steps to prevent the 100-or-so known Castro agents in Miami from penetrating their ranks" — these facts seemed almost unbelievable to the prisoners. But as a result of the attempt, the prisons were filled with thousands of Cubans, and many of them died at the pardon, the firing squad. Says Martino, "The analogy that came to my mind was the Alamo. Both were heroic actions by small bands of soldiers, who fought because of deep conviction and who were superior to the enemy in physique, management of weapons, resourcefulness, intelligence and morale. The men at the Alamo died under enemy fire. The men at Playa Giron were the victims of stupidity, cowardice and betrayal in high places. The Alamo is one of the glories of our past as a nation. Playa Giron is a stain on our national reputation for courage and integrity."

I was Castro's Prisoner is a bold book and a thought-provoking one. One feels that the writer does not speak without evidence, and that he tells of the errors of his country in an attempt to help cure them. He also strives to make Americans aware of the extent of Communist activity, for as a La Cabana prisoner told Martino, the Communists were behind the Chessman case; they were in on the Little Rock affair; they are involved with the Black Muslims. They even had a well-known American like Ernest Hemingway appearing on television with Fidel Castro. As one of the leaders said, "You know, Martino, the difference between a Communist and you people who believe in democracy? We work twenty-five hours a day at being Communists. The ruthless dedication of our people — especially the young ones — is something frightening to see." This John Martino has seen; this he wants the rest of America to see — before it is too late.

STEPHANIE UMBACH

SUMMERNESS CAME UPON US

summerness came upon us
despite a midget spring
& afterwards i wondered
more in fantasy than fact
about that park bench &
the swan-infested pool
so femininely indiscreet
our youthful figurines
left no mementos in
the grass or tranquillness
of boston common decency

how strange some twenty
years or more since then
i meet my karma on a
distant street unfilled
with summerness but
active with the winter
crys of children calling
daddy to the closing
auto doors of dusk

—DOUGLAS S. RATH
A Minority Report

From Plato to LBJ

By VICTOR F. HOFFMANN

About four hundred years before Christ, Plato insisted in his *Republic*: "A state, I said, arises, as I conceive out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a state be imagined?" Since humans have many wants and needs that cannot be met by their individual enterprises, the state gathers together many people who will help one another in the meeting of needs and wants. Thus the state is dedicated to mutuality and reciprocity. The shoemaker makes and fixes shoes for the farmer. The farmer raises and markets produce for the shoemaker. The hotel manager will put both of them up in his hotel. According to Plato, the state brings together for purposes of exchange not only the shoemaker, the farmer, and the innkeeper but also implement manufacturers, builders, traders, artisans, merchants, soldiers, and philosopher-kings. According to Plato, "...justice is that quality in the individual which makes possible the association of individuals in states."

What goal lay behind this kind of talk? Said Plato: "Our aim in founding the commonwealth was not to make any one class specially happy, but to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole ... We are constructing, as we believe, the state which will be happy as a whole, not trying to secure the well-being of a select few." Apart from the specific ramifications of *The Republic*, Plato was advocating concepts that have now become familiar to most of us: the public interest, the common good, and the general welfare.

In explaining these Platonic ideas, Andrew Hacker (in *Political Theory: Philosophy, Ideology, Science*) writes: "The good society is a unified society; its institutions encourage fellow feeling; individual behavior manifests attitudes of altruism and loyalty." Through the creation of the good society each individual receives advantages. Together, the members of society move under the direction of the state to one another in love, hope, and charity. Indeed Plato had been searching "...for ways and means to give each citizen in society the best that life has to offer."

Between Plato and Hacker, between 400 B.C. and 1964 A.D., political philosophers helped to carry on this theme. Aristotle was rather clear on the subject: "A state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice." Cicero looked upon the state as "...an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good."

The Constitution of the United States is no exception: "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America... The Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."

Since the time of the Constitutional Convention, the government of the United States has always been a welfare state. There can really be no argument about that, though one may readily argue about the extent of the welfare state.

At any rate, President Johnson cannot really be called a radical for advocating what states have been doing naturally and what political philosophers have been promulgating since 400 B.C. Under the concept of *The Great Society*, LBJ is preaching his views of the public interest, the common good, the collective happiness, the general welfare, the good society, the good life, justice for all, and domestic tranquility. The President argues that we must dream of a society that is dedicated to peace and prosperity for all, that is extending the frontiers of literacy and understanding through education, a society that will in deed and in fact be the Promised Land of milk and honey. The particular frontiers to which he wishes to move us and our resources are couched in his own words: "In the next forty years we must rebuild the entire urban United States"; "Poverty must not be a bar to learning and learning must offer an escape from poverty"; "There are those that say this battle cannot be done; that we are condemned to a soulless wealth. I do not agree. We have the power to shape the civilization we want. But we need your will — your labor — your hearts — if we are to build that kind of society."

The Cresset
"If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again!" This is a fine maxim, and undoubtedly an effective and workable one, if one tries often enough. But the staunch advocates of Pay TV must be asking themselves, "How often must one try?" During the past fifteen years several experiments in Pay TV have been undertaken in Canada and in the United States. All have failed. In the summer of 1964 Subscription Television, Inc., by far the most ambitious program ever undertaken for Pay TV, made an auspicious debut in California.

In an article in the October issue of The Atlantic, Sylvester L. Weaver, president of STV, described in detail the manner in which his firm planned to operate, the progress it had made, and the goals it had set for itself. Unfortunately, STV came to an abrupt and untimely end on November 3. By means of a technicality PTV had been inserted into the California ballot. Proposition 15, pertaining to this subject, was approved by an overwhelming majority, and STV as well as all forms of PTV were outlawed in California. The battle is not over. STV already has plans to try again in another state, an appeal has been made to test the constitutionality of Proposition 15, and a suit for $117,000,000 has been filed against the theater owners who sponsored a vigorous campaign against any and all forms of PTV in California. The outcome of this issue will undoubtedly affect the future of PTV in the entire nation.

The avowed aims of PTV are both laudable and desirable. Who has not been dissatisfied with TV as it is? Every year there is an outcry against the mediocre and often thoroughly nauseating run-of-the-mill TV fare. Every year networks and sponsors make extravagant promises for next season, and every year it is the same old story over again.

There are shining exceptions — programs which clearly underscore the drab mediocrity of the ordinary and just as clearly point to the almost limitless potential of TV as a medium for information and entertainment. One such shining example was The Louvre (NBC). This was television at its finest, an unforgettable hour of beauty and drama. The drama was the stirring drama of history; the beauty, the priceless masterpieces of art that are inseparably woven into the tapestry of history. The entire program was presented with impeccable taste. If you did not see The Louvre, do not fail to do so when it is shown again. This is a program which should be seen more than once. I hope that there will be other programs of comparable scope and stature in the near future.

Sophia Loren in Rome (ABC) had much to commend it to the viewer. After all, Rome is Rome. Personally, I should have chosen another guide. And an ingrained sense of values would have made it impossible for me to have given Miss Loren top billing.

There are other refreshing and rewarding departures from the stultifying "situation" or "family" comedies and the inane soap operas which have even invaded prime viewing time in the evening. Profiles in Courage (NBC), based on the collection of biographies which won a Pulitzer Prize for the late John F. Kennedy in 1956, emphasizes the values and the ideals that impelled courageous men and women to rebel against material opportunism, smug and vapid conformity, and economic and political expediency. A timely reminder!

The Other World of Winston Churchill (NBC) was a fascinating program. This was one in a series of special tributes which marked the great statesman's ninetieth birthday anniversary. Much of the material was taken from Mr. Churchill's book Painting as a Pastime.

This is the dull season for a motion picture reviewer. Premiere showings of important new films are booked for the Christmas season. There was a break in the pre-holiday lull when Circus World (Cinerama, Henry Hathaway) opened recently. Technically every new Cinerama release shows marked improvement over earlier efforts. In Circus World the special effects are truly spectacular, and the photography is magnificent. Although the plot is thin and hackneyed, the acting is excellent, and the remarkably fine and completely authentic circus acts feature some of the brightest stars to be found anywhere in the world. This is good entertainment for the entire family.

Topkapi (United Artists, Jules Dassin), a tongue-in-cheek thriller if ever I saw one, has a clever, highly complex plot, a large share of bumbling melodrama, a suspense-filled climax, and a completely predictable anticlimax. At no time can one take any of this nonsense seriously; it's just a "caper." Unfortunately, there is much too much of Melina Mercouri — in more ways than one! And the dialog often strays far afield from any decent standard of good taste. Will some kind friend please advise Miss Mercouri to unclench her teeth when she talks? Or was this just a gimmick to proclaim to one and all that she was cast as a femme fatale? The effect was maddening.

In 1952 Rashoman, a classic Japanese study into the nature of truth, won not only an Oscar but many other highly prized film awards. I suppose that it was inevitable for someone to undertake a remake. The Outrage (M-G-M, Marvin Ritt) presents a weak, westernized rehash which never quite makes its point.
Call Home the Heart

Surely now at year’s end the Pilgrim’s motto is illuminated by the universal momentary awareness of the passing of time ... Pilgrims we are, members of a pilgrim people, whom God gives marks along the way beside which we may take pause for a moment and reflect ... Such a milestone in our journey is New Year’s Eve ... Tonight we know again that man is always a traveler and that the winding road is ever a symbol of his life ... That year beyond year a voice from long ago sounds clear and true: “Strangers and pilgrims” — “we have no continuing city.” ... The strong men and women in the world are those whose life is a continuous New Year’s Eve — men and women in whom the sense of being pilgrims and strangers in the earth is most vivid ... Theirs is the God-given power to see the temporal in its true setting of the timeless ... They alone do not become citizens of this world, and they alone know that they must work while it is day, ere the night cometh when no man can work ... For them alone life is the tentative trumpet which finds its last meaning only in the matin choir on the other side ... Now at the year’s end we inquire again concerning our needs for the way which lies before ... It is the ultimate wisdom to know that the things we actually need are very few — but they are very great ... “Now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three.” ... Without them we have no glorious past, no blessed memory, no sure future, and no eternal destiny ... Perhaps it is the tenderness of God that places Christmas and the year’s end so near to each other ... We go into the hidden year in the light of the ranks of angelic choirs singing of hope and forgiveness and joy ... It may be a heavy world tonight — black, outworn, and hopeless — but the flaming ways of God are as near and clear as they were on that first Holy Night ... The angels did not go away forever ... We walk with them unawares, and a pierced Hand lies in ours ... Theirs, ours, and His is the great companionship of solitude and the warm voice of silence ... With Him life can never become too tame or too terrifying ... He brings courage and adventure, and takes away the fear of the secret years ... When men say that the future is uncertain they forget that there are more futures than one, and some are very certain ... One of whose coming we can be sure is the end of our pilgrimage — ten, or thirty, or fifty years away ... God’s grace will be strong then and the end will be like the lighting of a candle in a holy place ... Nothing uncertain and fearsome there ... There is another future which also holds no fear ... That is today and some of tomorrow — the steps which life just ahead ... We know what we must do today and tomorrow, and we have no great fear that we shall not be able to carry on until sunset ... But all the days that lie between these two futures ... They are all of darkness and perilous bridges and rough weather ... They are heaped black with foreboding ... And for these — above all else in life — we need Him Who knows the way and is the Way ... Lord and Leader, Friend and End, He alone can make our pilgrimage a prelude in the same key as the trumpets on the other side ... And so, an old hymn for the New Year ...

O juvamen oppressorum
O solamen miserorum
Pauperum refugium
Da contemptum terrororum
Ad amorem supernorum
Trahe desiderium!

Consolator et fundator,
Habitator et amator,
Cordium humilium,
Pelle mala, terge sordes,
Et discordes fac concordes,
Et affer praesidium!