The Cresset

A REVIEW OF LITERATURE, THE ARTS, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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THE PILGRIM

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The Election

It is axiomatic among politicians that most people do not vote for any candidate; they vote against his opponent. Applied to the presidential election, this maxim suggests that President Johnson’s 61-39 per cent popular plurality over Senator Goldwater should probably not be interpreted as a great personal triumph, perhaps not even as a mandate to carry out particular points in the President’s platform, but simply as a repudiation of the Goldwater-Miller ticket and the policies which it espoused.

The dimensions of the Goldwater defeat reflect, we think, the profound disappointment that many otherwise conservatively-inclined voters came to feel as the campaign ran its weary, purposeless course. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to estimate how much of the Senator’s potential support was lost to him by the conduct of his supporters at the convention and by his choice of Representative Miller as his running mate. Then followed the creation of an amateur campaign staff which went out of its way to antagonize the regular Republican party organization. This was followed, in turn, by quarrels within the Senator’s entourage which resulted in his being given contradictory speeches to read as the campaign progressed. And by the last stages of the campaign it became obvious that the Senator himself had lost interest in the whole business and was just waiting for it to be over.

The sad thing is that he took some good men down with him — Charles Percy, Robert A. Taft, Jr., Richard O. Ristine, to mention only three who might have done much to reinvigorate the Republican party. An even sadder thing is that, as of this election, the Republican party has allowed itself to become identified with the Thurmonds, the Wallaces, the whole church-burning crew of Southern intransigents who turned out to vote for Senator Goldwater because they thought he would allow them maximum freedom to continue persecuting the Negro. Certainly one of the first steps that must be taken toward the rebuilding of the party is finding some way to repudiate this identification of Republicanism with racial injustice.

Fortunately, the party does not lack able, attractive leaders around whom to rally, among them Governors Rockefeller, Romney, and Hatfield; Senators Javits, Case, Scott, Cooper, and Morton; and Representative Lindsay. For this moderate leadership, the election was a net gain; with Goldwaterism out of the way, it is possible at last for responsible Republican leadership to move toward that right-of-center position where, many of us believe, the winning candidate in 1968 will find his majority.

Lest We Forget

While the memory of the recent presidential campaign is still fresh in our minds we ought to bring pressure on the leaders of both parties to establish some reasonable standards of ethics for future campaigns. It may or may not be true that the late campaign was the dirtiest in history, as some have alleged, but it certainly reflected no credit on the nation, the parties, or the candidates. For the candidates, it was an exercise in fatigue, futility, and frustration. For the nation it was a campaign which seemed deliberately designed to ensure that whichever candidate was elected to the highest office in its gift, he would assume office as a thoroughly discredited man. Anyone naive enough to take campaign oratory at its face value could only have concluded that his choice lay between a homicidal maniac and a moral leper.

As the campaign drew to its weary and pointless close, the most disturbing question in our mind was whether any one of the four candidates could possibly be sane, and this question arose not out of anything that any one of them had said about the others but out of what all of them had been engaged in for the past eight weeks. Would any fully rational man submit himself to the physical wear and tear, the silliness, the character-assassination, the surrender of every shred of human dignity that a campaign of this kind requires — even for the Presidency? Is it really necessary for a would-be suc-
cessor of Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln to pattern his campaign on the model of a local race for county sheriff? Are the great issues in a presidential campaign how long a candidate can go without sleep before his heart gives out or how long he can talk before his voice gives out?

Maybe we are a nation of fools whose votes go to the candidate who can give us the more Roman of circuses. But maybe we are not. Maybe the politicians are still operating on the basis of some myths which, if they ever had any roots in reality, have long since lost all meaning.

We would like to think that the country is ready for a campaign conducted almost exclusively on television with the candidates speaking calmly, intelligently, responsibly, and persuasively on the issues. In this past campaign, we would have liked to hear Senator Goldwater spell out his new conservatism and we would have liked to hear President Johnson outline the specifics of his Great Society — in both cases in the privacy of our home and with the searching eye of the television camera on them. And oddball though we may be in many ways, we think that this kind of campaign would be well-received by the great majority of our people. For the minority who prefer a Roman circus, perhaps we could subsidize gladiatorial matches in local stadiums.

Arrivederci, Niki

We are not disposed to waste a great deal of sympathy on Nikita Khrushchev in his hour of trial. He destroyed others on his way to the top, he destroyed others while he was at the top, and now he has been destroyed by younger men who learned their lessons well.

And yet we are willing to give the devil his due. As Russian rulers go, Tsarist or Communist, Khrushchev was almost a model of humaneness. He did seem to care that the Russian people were poorly fed, poorly housed, and poorly clothed, and his insistence on the production of consumers goods, allegedly at the expense of capital goods and armaments, is believed to be one of the reasons for his removal from office. He did seem to have a clear understanding of the awful power which the USSR and the United States have stored away in their nuclear arsenals, and his conduct in the 1962 Cuba crisis indicated that, for all his sabre-rattling, he was essentially a responsible man who had no intention of triggering World War Three. With the exception of Lavrenti Beria, all of Mr. Khrushchev's rivals of the past ten years are still alive. The terror of the Stalin Era has been replaced by what may be the freest atmosphere the Russians have known in the Twentieth Century. And the Russians under Mr. Khrushchev made some altogether remarkable strides in technology, culminating in the recent orbiting of a three-man space capsule around the earth.

It is just possible that the old boy was too humane for his own good. Or, as would now appear to be more likely, he never actually possessed that complete monopoly of power which Stalin had enjoyed. In any event, he made the curiously capitalistic mistake of being out of town when the Board met and scurrying back to find that he had just been voted the customary gold watch, to be presented by the new management team.

How long this team will function as a team is the question which is now fascinating the Kremlinologists. We will hazard the guess that it might prove relatively durable. This guess is based on our belief, reinforced by the fact and the manner of Khrushchev's ouster, that the government of the USSR is no longer, as it was under Stalin, a one-man show, but rather a corporate structure in which the vital, and possibly sometimes conflicting, interests of the party, the bureaucracy, and the military are represented. Mr. Kosygin seems to be admirably equipped for the job of chief executive officer of such a board and Mr. Brezhnev makes an attractive front man for the party. It is impossible to imagine either in the role of a second Stalin, and difficult to imagine either as a second Khrushchev. So perhaps the Russian system is coming of age with the technician and the administrator replacing the revolutionary in the seats of power.

The Blaze Over Sinkiang

We can still remember when people were saying, "I'm not worried about what Russia and America will do with the Bomb. But one of these days the Chinese are going to have it and then I'm not going to be able to sleep nights."

Well, the Chinese have the Bomb now and we have seen no reports of a spurt in sleeping-tablet sales. A word of assurance from our leaders that they knew it was coming, a word of comfort from the technicians that it will probably take the Chinese up to ten years to threaten anybody with effective nuclear weaponry and we all drifted back to whatever we had been doing before the story broke over the wastes of Sinkiang. We may not have learned to love the Bomb, but we have certainly learned to live with it.

Now it must be admitted that the proper business of the human race is living and loving and laughing and making a joyful noise to its Creator — not cringing in corners against the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe. But life and love and laughter are precisely what can not long survive in a world where every nation is a law unto itself and more and more nations are learning to manufacture weapons which probably no nation is moral enough, in the long run, to handle carefully and responsibly.

China brings to five the number of nations which presently belong to the nuclear weapons club. Egypt and Israel are reported to be assiduously at work on their qualifying credentials. And then who will it be? It can be predicted with something approaching absolute certainty that there will come a day sometime within the next twenty-five years when "the energy of a thousand suns" will be at the destructive command of some mad-
man or fool — remember October, 1962? — and all that man has made in the past six thousand years will lie in the balance against the whim of one diseased mind.

So we don’t have unlimited time to decide whether we are going to be masters or victims of the Bomb. And the people who go about yelling “One world or none!” are not necessarily eccentrics. It may be that world government is too pat an answer to the problem of effective arms control, but it is one answer which concerned people have given. If other people have better answers, this is the time for them to come forward and give them. The only man we can afford to write off in advance as having nothing to say to us is the man who has learned how to quit worrying and live with the Bomb. He has already made his bargain with death, and at a price which he might have bettered if he had not sold so soon.

**Herbert C. Hoover, 1874-1964**

How many of the thirty-five men who have served as President of the United States would history remember if they had never served in the Presidency? Our guess is that Washington, Grant, Eisenhower, and possibly Jackson would be remembered as great military figures; Jefferson as a kind of younger version of the multi-faceted Franklin; Madison, perhaps, as one of the inventors of American federalism; and Herbert C. Hoover as one of the great humanitarians of all time.

Few men live long enough to see the verdict of history on their life and work. Fewer still should wish to. But Mr. Hoover did live to see the remarkable accomplishments of his long life-time recognized and the alleged failures of his brief presidency set in more sympathetic perspective. At his death, all of us sensed that a part of the greatness of America had been taken from us — the greatness not so much of a former President as of an exemplar of those qualities of mind and heart which characterize the American at his best.

The word which comes immediately to our mind when we think of Mr. Hoover is “integrity.” He was a predictable man, a man who at all times and in all places could be expected to act in accordance with convictions that, whether right or wrong, did not allow compromise. It was perhaps the very inflexibility of certain of his convictions that prevented him from coping effectively with the economic crisis of his presidency. But it was this same unwavering loyalty to conviction that made him the great humanitarian and public servant that he was.

Mr. Hoover will always have a special place in our memory because he was one of the two major candidates in the first presidential election we can remember. For several days in that Fall of 1928 we proudly bore on our bodies the marks of our loyalty to him, a black eye inflicted by a nongenuinely minded young member of St. Bartholomew Roman Catholic Church, Pat Ferry by name, who took exception to certain remarks that we made in the heat of the campaign about the probable fate of his co-religionists in the after life. Looking back over the years, our only regret is that we supported Mr. Hoover for the wrong reasons: he deserved his victory, not because Governor Smith was a Roman Catholic but because, as subsequent events proved, Governor Smith was, if anything, less capable of seeing the revolutionary dimensions of the Great Depression than was Mr. Hoover.

Only once in his life did Mr. Hoover ever publicly voice his bitterness over the campaign of vilification that drove him from office in 1932 and pursued him for years afterwards. But he gave his detractors a more eloquent answer than words. He continued, as a good citizen, to serve the country which had rejected him as its President. And for this he will long be remembered.

**Letter From Xanadu, Nebr.**

We are in receipt of the following letter from our former colleague and correspondent, G.G., whom some of our readers will remember as an honest man, some as an irritating nuisance, and a few as a potential scapegoat who got away before they could load their failures on his back.

**Dear Editor:**

Thanks for the Christmas card which I see you got from the Seminary Press and I bet you conned them out of about a fifty percent discount, ha ha.

I appreciated the letter that came with it, too, but I really don’t know whether I would be interested in doing a monthly column again. The way it looks to me, with TV and all nobody is reading any more and it seems a kind of waste of time to be writing stuff that nobody reads. But I’ll think it over and give you an answer one of these days.

The Big Event of 1964 for the Missus and me was becoming grandparents again. Trudy and Ed had a baby girl on October 24 — which was sixteen months after they got married, you old finger counter — and we went up to Keokuk for a month to help out. They named the poor kid Bertha Dawn, which just between us I think is a kind of silly name because Dawn isn’t really a girl’s name at all, but she’s cute as a button and as smart as a tack. Ed says she reminds him of a certain church body — noise at both ends and perpetual hunger in the middle. I guess he means the Catholics.

Which reminds me — the ecumenical movement hit Xanadu this summer. Every year the Optimists Club puts on what they call Fun Days the last weekend in June and one of the big events is always a mock debate, usually on politics but this year they figured maybe everybody was too serious about the election to risk that, so with the Vatican Council and all they got the idea of asking Rev. Zeitgeist and Father Pucharski to argue the question: “Was the Reformation a Mistake?” It was a scream! They never did get to the point but they sure hummed it up. And I thought that there was something pretty wonderful about that because, like the modera
t said afterwards, “These two men of God have shown us that we are not first of all Protestants or Catholics but Americans who can have their honest differences but still come together for a good laugh with each other and their friends.”

December, 1964
AD LIB.

Better Christmas Programs

By ALFRED R. LOOMAN

Something seems to have happened to children's Christmas programs in recent years and what has happened is for the better. The programs I have attended in the last decade have a greater unity and are more cohesive than the ones I once performed in. Emphasis now seems to be on group participation and on presenting the elements of the story of Christ's birth in sequence. The final result is a program which is probably more meaningful for the child who is participating as well as for the persons attending the program.

The programs, in the days when I was performing in them, lacked variety. One always knew what was coming next and the same carols and the same recitations were used year after year. It occurs to me now that the attempt then was to make certain that every Tom, Dick, and Mary had the opportunity to give an individual presentation in the program. This may have been in the interest of congregational harmony.

One method of involving numbers of children and giving each a chance to speak was the card presentation, which was very popular in my day. This presentation consisted of a group going to the front of the church, each child desperately trying to hide a card behind him. Each card had one letter on it. As the child spoke a two-line verse he pulled the card in front of him. When all had completed their recitations, a word was spelled out, usually either CHRISTMAS or BETHLEHEM, since these were two of the longer words available within the Christmas theme.

There were risks involved in this type of presentation. For one thing, no two children held the signs at the same height. Some were low, some were high, and those in the back of the church never saw the complete word. And invariably one child would produce his letter upside down and keep it that way, which always produced a great amount of tittering among the other children present.

Since each of the letters in the card presentation represented a word, the two-line recitation on that word was often forced and the poetry of it left something to be desired. I much prefer today's recitations, which are usually direct quotations from the Bible.

Children now seem to be able to speak more naturally when they recite than we did. Our recitations were delivered in a high sing-songy voice for the most part and were completely without expression. A few, whose parents had told them to speak up, shouted their lines, but these were offset by the many who only mumbled them. At least one child each year, usually a girl, would recite with a great deal of expression, a sure sign that somewhere along the line her Mother had taken elocution lessons. While speaking, each child kept his eyes riveted on the teacher in the front row who was silently mouthing each word and every child, upon finishing, would send a wild-eyed look toward his parents for, hopefully, a look of approval.

The music and the singing in the Christmas programs strike me as being better now than they once were, one sign that the Church has progressed in this area. More emphasis now is placed on singing by choirs and less on solos, duets, and trios, which were common years ago. Again, this may have been because of an emphasis on getting as many individual presentations as possible. One advantage of a choir is that if one or two happen to be singing off key, it isn't noticeable, but I can recall some of the duets and trios in our programs where one person going off made a shambles of the number.

One custom connected with the Christmas program has disappeared and I don't suppose it will be revived. But it was formerly the practise — in most congregations, I understand — for the elders or the school board to pass out a treat right after the program. I can remember we would line up and would each receive a box of candy and an orange. This was in the days when fresh fruit, especially such an exotic one as an orange, was a real treat. The candy, packaged in a box shaped like a church, ran to hard candy and a cone-shaped chocolate with a firm vanilla cream inside. It was not until years later that I discovered this was the cheapest type of chocolate available, but I still have a taste for that variety. Since children have so much candy now and oranges are a regular part of the diet, I see no reason for carrying on this custom.

Although the Christmas programs have changed, the message has not. And no matter how often we have heard the story of Christ's birth, it seems new and fresh each year, especially when that story is told by a child.
Faith and the University

By MARC RIEDEL
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
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One of the first objections one is likely to hear when anyone suggests that there might be something unique about a Christian, or even a Lutheran, university goes something like, "What do you mean, unique? Is Christian mathematics different from mathematics? Or do Lutherans learn physics a different way than anyone else?" Indeed the suggestion that Lutherans ought to teach and learn a different kind of science than people at other kinds of university is, as it seems, quite adequately countered by reference to the Russian experiment with communist biology. The disastrous human results of Chinese commune-economics and the perfidious conduct which flows from Lenin's elitist-ethic seem to clinch the argument that what is true of the natural sciences is at least true of the social sciences, even if the ghosts of psychoanalytic and class-struggle criticism have not been laid to rest in the humanities.

Two sorts of assumption undergird such objections. The first are to the effect that the function of the university is the pursuit of truth by objective methods. The second concern the fact that theories and methods are to be determined by the facts about the objects investigated and that anything which proceeds from the subjective beliefs of the investigator is an imposition on, and a fortiori a distortion of, the facts. The conclusion, and the point to the objections, is that no university is worthy of the name which closes avenues of research or binds the thought of its members by imposing on them obligations to maintain or even to explore any favored doctrines.

Unexceptional as these assumptions seem to be, many Christians continue to think it would be odd if being a Christian didn't make some sort of difference to one's intellectual life and hence to the aims and values of the university. It seems to them inadequate to say that a Christian university is simply one which happens to have been started by a group of Christians. As far as truth goes, they commonly point out that religious commitments are consequently a function of the conditions of good activity and good institutions generally. If a Christian university has a unique value, the reason for it is to be found in the relation of faith to these conditions and to the structures in which the values of activity are realized. Hence we must return to the nature of faith and show its relation to the activities of the university and its members.

The Unity of the Faith

The conclusion from the article "Faith as Community" in the November Cresset is that faith is itself a condition of good action, indeed, of any fully human action. In the terms of that article a value is, concretely, an effective development, or its result, in some circumstances of one or more human potentialities. This also in fact parallels the definition of a trait of character. The limits to such development are, in one sense, scarcely assignable, both since they build on each other and since, again concretely, they depend on the circumstances in which the actualization takes place, and since we change those circumstances as we grow. In another sense, even the possibilities inherent in our biological structure do not mature in every environment whatever. One needs a minimal amount of food, clothing, and love to survive at all, much more to become what is possible for man. The point here is that while human values have their sources in developed human capacities, such capacities do not develop automatically in a pre-determined fashion, and, further, not every development is good.

The reason for this statement is that a man is not merely a bundle of isolated capacities; he is an organism with a unity. Two points need to be emphasized in this connection. The first is that there is a definite direction to the process of growth for the individual. It does not begin from nothing nor end just anywhere. Physiologically, it begins from the highly structured cell and proceeds toward the mature individual. To say the individual is highly structured is to say that he has a built-in unity which to destroy is to deprive of its specifically human being. Psychologically growth begins from somewhat more inchoate capacities to think, feel, sense, and act. But it also proceeds to a state of mature capacity. Even socially and culturally, although the range of possible variation here seems nearly limitless, growth begins from the cultural forms discoverable in the community which adopts the child, is limited by the possibilities inherent in those forms, and proceeds toward forms of behavior which are mature in the sense that they are...
responsible to the conditions of a free and unified life in the total society of the time.

This description of the process of growth yields criteria for the judgment of characters, actions, and social forms. The latter are inadequate if for any reason they make impossible or curtail unity of function, release of new potentiality, or development to maturity of function in any individual, in any of the sub-communities in which activity is concretely organized, or in the total human community. No doubt the most important of these criteria is unity of function since the opposite of unified function is chaotic or disordered power which is in effect nothing and accomplishes nothing but further chaos and disintegration of life.

The second point to be made is that while the intrinsic unity of the person taken biologically may be determined by its genetic code, or taken sociologically may be determined by the unity of the family or cultural customs, the unity of life taken as an intentional whole is a rationally determined unity in which structure is related to purpose, and determination of purpose is controlled both by the actual or practicable possibilities of diversification of character and by the known or guessed-at idealities of happiness in human relations. The practicalities must be determined in the situation in which constructive action is called for. They are a matter of empirical inquiry and projection from the facts.

The idealities are the ultimate criteria. They are known either as the pre-suppositions of the process of improvement and of the conduct of a good and blessed life, as the necessary means to it, or as the conditions and standards already known by experience to conducing to fulness of life. I shall not go into these in detail. Their precise delineation is the business of inquiry, a function of the university. Minimally, however, rational determination of life requires respect first of all for rational procedure itself. Second, since reason is not arbitrary whim, it requires respect for the things to be ordered — the human materials of feeling and attitude in the individual, or the human beings in society. Third, it requires the recognition of the interdependence of persons and hence respect for the equal right of each person to a share in the community, both simply, as an existing human being, and proportionally, as he is willing and able to share in the formation of the community.

But the power to perform according to these criteria, while it is a created possibility of man, is actualized in the individual only when the breath of life is breathed into him, that is, when they are actively communicated to him in a community in which they are live ideas. The characteristic of the necessary community is that its members can forgive offenses. They issue an enabling call to completeness. What this means has been said. Concretely, they can accept the normal inability of men to do what their nature dictates. They can recognize the large extent to which the aimless irrational is at work in themselves and in society as a cause of despair, fear, and self-protective hostility. They can cover the hostilities with understanding, restore each other to loving community, and work to remove the conditions which foster imperfection. How such life enters the community is, as previously noted, in one sense a mystery. It is, in theological terms, the mystery of the power of the Christ, the power which is the unity of the life of God. In another sense it is the not at all mysterious, though miraculous, power which is given and experienced every day through the loving, restorative acts of people.

The community which has this power of unified being can communicate it to the individual, whose own personality becomes unified and alive as a contributing member of the process. Thus, the final form of the ideal is the form of the community of forgiveness since that is the community in which each member is given his freedom, that is, a power to achieve a positive unity of life and an improvement of his capacities of feeling, thought, and action consistent with that of others. The form of the community is thus an enabling and a directive form precisely because it is a comprehensive unity, in the individuals and among them, of intellectual, emotional, and active elements and thus draws on all motives. It is therefore properly called a rational form, since nothing should be called wholly rational which is not in contact with actual existence and its motive power.

Since among some Christians the word “rational” is used to refer only to the abstract categories of intellect and its verbal operations, the structure in question may be called a spiritual form or a spiritual power. In fact, however, this pejorative use of the word “rational” is illegitimate when the talk is of the concrete whole which is the actual functioning man or community. For in existence there does not appear to be any emotion which is absolutely uninformed by conceptual content, nor any idea of a state of life or action which is completely without affective quality. The more concrete the idea, that is, the more inclusive it is of the whole functioning structure of anything, the greater its motivational power. Hence the communication of a true idea can only be fully effected in an existential context where its import is discernible in attitude and action.

In the language of Lutheran theology, this idea, form, or spirit is communicated through what is called the “declaration of the Word.” But “declaration” is then itself taken as a comprehensive term which includes preaching, teaching, ceremonial observance, and service of many kinds. In fact, “preaching the Word” is simply doing whatever will in the circumstances communicate the Living Word. Minimally, an idea is always involved to which people may respond. If among some people the idea of forgiveness presents itself clearly and powerfully through sermon and sacrament, the Word has been declared to them. But if people are so circumstanced that traditional terms and behaviors do not present them with an idea and a possibility of choice, then the Word has not been declared and another kind of sacrificial act is required. The Word of God did not go out from Him
in the same way in the redemption of the world as in its creation.

Thus faith as the pre-condition and as the enabling power of good action provides the cause and a further criterion of good action. For while each human potentiality may have its own form of goodness when considered abstractly in respect of its own development, its development may require modification when it is included in the whole pattern of active life. Various traits of character may be contradictory to each other and thus make impossible the unity of character on which is conditional both a more mature development of capacities for the creation and appreciation of values and a broadening range of satisfying relations with other human beings. The final criterion, then, is that of a unified character in individual and society functioning in changing circumstances and improving itself in range and depth.

It is such a unity that I have called faith. I have also called it the unity of God. But if faith is the community of God, it is also the broadest possible community of men as men. This accounts for the peculiar significance of the Christ in Christian tradition. A potential unity in men can only be actualized by an existing unity or unifying force. As the very exemplar of God, Christ is the mediating power calling men to be one as He is one with His Father and enabling them to be so through His sacrificial acts of restoration. As, in the tradition, He is the Word through which the heavens were made and through which grace comes, He is the form and expression of the divine acts of creation and redemption. As Christ in us, He is the unity of thought, feeling, and action. As He who sends a Spirit, He responds to our needs.

**Church, State, and School**

Again it must be recognized that no society has the complete unity of faith described, nor certainly does the whole human community. Hence no existing institution may be used simply as a criterion of the ones we have, though some which are more advanced may be looked to as practical to copy. The problem is, thus, how we are to try to improve our lives short of reaching the goal. In a sense, no doubt, we cannot do any one thing which will insure the desired result, since the power seems always to come unpredictably. Yet since it also seems not to come where no preparation has been made, the problems of action become problems of organizing ourselves and society so as to foster the development of a whole life. We cannot organize the whole human race and all activities at once. In fact, we should not wish to do so except for very limited purposes inasmuch as, since we neither know what such an organization should concretely be nor have the capacity to realize it, we would necessarily mismanage and stultify life — fostering not freedom and perfection but slavery and misery. Hence the task is to form habits and institutions which will enable us to improve our action in relatively stable and controllable situations.

Even in an ideal condition capacities are developed and values realized in particular forms, for the world changes and the content of the ideal changes with it. Working as we must, not having the capacity to grasp and form all things, we begin from our needs and aspirations in situations we can manage.

When we do so we see that the kinds of activity we can perform and the capacities we can realize are classifiable according to their proximate though abstract ends, and the habits and institutions in which they are formed are correspondingly so.

Thus faith first of all needs knowledge of the general goals of life, of the means to achieving them, and of the detailed facts which make up its situation. Hence it needs a knowledge of the workings of nature, society, and personality, and an ongoing critical inquiry into the forms these have taken. Hence it provides the strongest motive for a completely objective pursuit of the truth it needs. It also needs means of communicating these to the young and developing in them the responsible power to carry on the life of faith. The institutions in which these are provided are the schools, and the university is the place where these functions ought to be drawn together at the highest level of rationality and competence.

Secondly, faith needs forms of organization of the activities which produce and distribute the ordinary means of life, and forms which govern and improve the social and physical conditions under which life can be achieved. Since there are always forces at work which militate against the structures which make a good life possible, there is a further need for the exercise of restraining power. The institution in which these functions are most effectively drawn together is the state.

Thirdly, since it is a matter of unity within the whole person and between all men, faith needs a peculiar institution whose function is explicitly to invoke, communicate, and nurture the unity of the forgiven life through preaching, through acts of love and sharing, through symbolic expression and ceremonial enactment. This peculiar institution is the church.

Considered simply as types of functions or activities each of these may be abstracted from the whole context of life in which it appears. Each may have a separate study devoted to it, and the science of each is potentially architectonic. Thus we can look for knowledge of human social and political life as well as of nature; and theology is a kind of knowing. All things can thus be organized according to the subject matters, principles, and methods of sciences. But science is itself an activity which has social causes and implications, as do religious beliefs and ecclesiastical activities. Hence all of these must be considered by politicians and are subject, by whatever mechanism of market or planning, to social policy. Again, the disinterested love of truth and the knowledge it produces, the goals set by societies and the means used to accomplish them, as well as the actions that flow from these are motives and consequences which affect the total character of life. They therefore properly come within
the purview of the church. Finally, it should be added, since faith requires the commitment of the individual, all of these functions and sciences may be considered in abstraction from the context in which they live. Sciences and arts, law, and, indeed, faith itself, are then conceived in relation to the existential commitment which determines their measure, their quality, and their direction of growth.

In actual fact, however, none of these functions are performed or exist in total isolation from the others, and every institution, consequently, must take into account the functions of the others and is faced in some degree with the problems of the others. The university, too, must therefore be discussed in detail both with respect to its special function and with respect to its bearing on the whole lives of its members.

Meanwhile, however, the questions with which this essay began may now be given a general answer. There certainly may be such a thing as a Christian university. In fact, if faith is a cause and a criterion both of good actions and institutions, then, taking the terms as I have assigned them, insofar as an academic community does its whole job, it is a Christian university. The question is not then whether Christian biology is different from the ordinary kind, but whether the motives of the biologist and the whole character of his institution are such as to produce a true scientist. The character of the Christian community is such as to call forth the highest efforts of every individual in his calling precisely because it lifts the burden of defensive values and makes possible the pursuit of human excellence.

Further, since faith has a need for the university, as well as an interest in perfecting human capacity as such, and insofar as the church embodies the faith, the church to be a good one must actually encourage learning. Hence there may be a Christian university in the more specialized sense that a church establishes one. In respect of its particular function, it will be subject to the same criteria as any other one. There is a danger, of course: namely, that the church can be too narrowly conceived and thus fail to give the university its rightful place in the faith. To the extent that the church fails in its function, becomes bound by institutional forms, or hardens the living Word into dead dogma, it will also bind and kill the freedom and creativity of inquiry which is vital to the faithful life. The solution to such problems lies not in weakening the university to keep it from giving offense to the weak, but in strengthening the church so that it can support the integrity of the inquirers in the face of the vicious motives of those who would use them or restrict them.

Curricular Considerations

These conclusions concerning the Christian university follow from what has been said since the treatment has been of human functions and institutions in respect of their existential relations. In their actual existence man's functions are not isolated entities, because the existing individual is the unitary locus of many inter-related activities. While he may specialize in one thing or another, he is an existing whole in which specialization proceeds from, though it reciprocally modifies, his whole personality or field of energies. The same is true of associations; for while they may be instituted for special purposes, once instituted they cannot neglect the fact that existentially they are formed of whole human beings whose attitudes react on the character of the institutions and, hence, on the fashion in which its special purpose is formed and carried out. It is in respect of their existence then that faith has been found to be the condition of perfection or of complete human being in institution and character.

Since this completeness was held to lie in a unity of function which is a term of development, it is now necessary to go on to specify the capacities which are to be unified in the whole existent individual or community. In this essay I shall restrict myself to the aspects of them which are central to the academic aspects of the university.

Now although they are existentially related in respect simply of their operation, special functions may be treated separately and may be carried out in relative independence of each other. In fact division of labor is sometimes the most effective means of attaining a total end.

What faith frees us for is improvement of action. But which actions? Not those which happen naturally, since they would happen in any case. Nor does faith give us any super-natural powers. Hence it frees us in respect of what is proper or peculiar to us: the appreciation and creation of beauty, the discovery and invention of new possibilities of action, and the investigation and knowledge of the vast universe which is our home.

Each of these may be done well or badly. They may sometimes be done well by chance or by custom. But if they are to be done well as a rule, they must be done according to a thought-out plan or a rational method. The special business of the university is precisely the development and the exercise of rationality in these activities.

Whether one discusses science, politics, or art, the curricular aims of the university will include roughly the same things. Since the problems of each discipline grow out of its own history as well as out of the current situation, an extensive study of authoritative traditions is prerequisite to understanding and creativity. Teachers and students must come to understand not only what is recognized currently as valid knowledge, but what has been and may again be the source of fruitful theory. This requires the tracing out of recurrent themes in the history of each discipline as well as the recounting of facts. Further, since there is a social context to every science, as well as to knowledge as a whole, there is a place for a kind of universal history which relates the academic disciplines to the whole human enterprise of which they are a part. Learning history need not, of course, be rote
memorizing as will be shown below in the discussion of
method. Nevertheless facts must be learned since both
intelligent action and originality in a field depend on
knowing what is the case.

Developing the skills required in a science is an obvi­
ous necessity, but what governs the selection of rele­
vant facts and determines the appropriateness of skills
are the principles of each of the disciplines and the prin­
ciples which finally mark out the character of the aca­
demic process and its role in the life of which it is a part.
By principles I mean the basic determinants of the things
studied, which vary from discipline to discipline, but also
those which govern the selection of things to be studied
and the manner of their treatment. It is when he knows
the facts in the light of these principles that the student
has learned and understood them. And it is in the light
of them that one shows the partialities and relativities
of doctrines, emotions, and tastes. But what is important
for action is that it is in terms of these that one finally
justifies what one does or gives reasons for holding it to
be right.

The distinction, now indicated several times, between
particular functions and the broad existential context
of activity governs the organization of the university,
the relation of the departments within it, and its own re­
lation to society. In view of the distinction of our capa­
cities made above, the most natural division of the de­
partments of the university would seem to parallel that
between the inquiry into existing things which has a view
to discovery of facts and laws, the direction of action
with a view to the improvement of life, and the creation
and appreciation of expressive forms. The current tend­
ency appears to be to reduce these functions to two —
the scientific and the poetic — so that one either does
objective research into the facts about nature or conduct
or bits of art, or one expresses one's subjective philosophy,
religion, or feelings. Associated with this reduction is the
tendency to say that nothing can be said about values
and aspirations which has objective status or general
validity.

But if the argument of this paper has been sound, it
follows that there is a rational study of action which gets
its point and its criteria from what may even be called
transcendental values in the sense that they are proper
to all men as such. Now there may certainly be "be­
behavioral sciences" of society, though the laws discovered
can never achieve the stability peculiar to those of the
natural sciences precisely because the generalizations
we formulate about actions are among the things which
cause us to change our action and hence the generaliza­
tions we will then make. However, in a Christian, and
hence in a good university, there will always be an at­
tempt to bring knowledge to bear on the improvement
of men's lives. The social sciences will then not only
describe people's values, but discuss the means of im­
proving them and the criteria of improvement.

Similar remarks may be made about what have tradi­
tionally been called theoretical sciences and about the
arts. While inquiry and artistic production are human
activities and thus come within the purview of the archi­
tectonic science of action, they do so in their inter-rela­
tions with other actions and in respect of their contribu­
tion to the whole activity of life, not in respect of the
uniqueness of their character. Hence, while scientists
may attack problems arising in industry and artists may
express theories and hopes about political and economic
activity, and while sciences, arts, and institutions may
be responsive to social evolution, the Christian univer­
sity will resist the degradation of science into a mere
tool of commerce or war and the corruption of art and
science into the mere rhetoric of demand-creation through
advertising. On the contrary, since the development of
these functions is both inherently satisfying and a part of
the fulfillment of man, the Christian university will sup­
port the claims of science for science's sake and art for
art's sake.

This insistence on the integrity of individual functions
is not, nevertheless, to minimize either their methodo­
logical inter-relations nor their existential unity. Whatever
the departmental organization of the university, there
must be interdepartmental units which explore problems
which are common or which would hold promise of fruit­
ful solution by the use of more than one discipline. The
clarification of the existential unity is, however, the
problem of principle. Philosophy is traditionally the
science of principles. As this discussion has evolved, it
reveals the need for three different kinds of discussion of
principle. First, the philosophic investigation of each
discipline involves the clarification of the basic theoreti­
cal terms which organize its subject matter. To do this is
to discover the basic terms or ideas which structure prev­
vailing theories and to test alternative ways of organizing
the facts of the field. The aim of the discussion is to
elicit the criteria which must be satisfied by any theory
which is to be adequate to the particular subject matter
or the facts of the field.

Inquiries into the bases of each science involve one in
problems of the nature of inquiry itself. Hence what
must be considered are 1) how any terms may be mean­
ingfully structured, 2) what the relationship is between
such structures and facts, or what the essential charac­
teristics of fact and theory are, and 3) how we can come
to know such connections. These inquiries reflect the
traditional subjects of logic, metaphysics and epistemo­
logy; but as stated, the distinction between them is not
sharp. Rather they are three phases of one problem the
character of which, as stated, is primarily logical. This
basic science may therefore fairly be called logic or the
analysis of theoretical structure; and some of its prin­
ciples have been adumbrated in this essay in its analysis of
values, behavior structures and facts.

If such problems are raised by the analysis of any dis­
cipline, they also have application in the life of faith.
But my discussion of faith has yielded only a criteriology
of faithful living and has only indicated a divine charac­
ter and a divine source of such life. The proof of the
existence and the definition of the latter waits on a metaphysical discussion of things. But the application of the criteria to the concrete behavior and commitments of man requires another science, the science of theology.

As the argument of “Faith as Community” had it, we begin our inquiry into faith from some common experiences about the character of human action and the human situation. But the statements of the facts experienced or the formulations of the experiences, and hence the facts themselves as known, are inextricably mingled with the tradition of formulation. It follows that they are only known through a tradition. Theology, therefore, is the science which mediates between the criteriology of faith, or the philosophy of religion, and the commitments of individuals or belief. It gives concrete meaning and application to the criteria by elucidating the doctrinal terms of the traditions in the light of the criteria. It criticizes and aims to improve commitments and involvements by referring them to the doctrine of the clarified traditions. And it adds to and enriches the tradition by relating it critically to all aspects of current culture, including other traditions which express our total commitments. It cannot, of course, either give or impose commitment. The achievement of faith as a good total commitment remains unpredictable: it is not the automatic consequence of doctrinal knowledge or churchly association. In theological terms it is a matter of the gift of the Holy Spirit and the mystical union of Christ with His Church.

The foregoing arguments show why preaching, the rhetoric of theology, is relatively useless unless it is both theologically grounded and relevant to the problems of its hearers. They also indicate the distinctions and relations between faith, theology and philosophy, and thus, since theology is not the same as the propagation of faith, they justify the fact that the science of theology has a distinct place in the organization of the university.

In fact, philosophy and theology are both capstone sciences in the curriculum. Philosophy is the theoretical study of principles in which knowledge of facts is finally related intellectually to the structure of meanings. Theology is the study of living commitments in which actions and institutions are related intellectually to the imperatives of faithful life. But since the articulation of functions and sciences at the beginning of this section indicates that there must be a third such capstone discipline, this can only be the art of worship. Its function must be the consideration of forms of art and ceremonial action which express the conditions of men and the relation of these to the conditions of faith. It will regard life itself as worship and gather all its activities symbolically into the form of beauty.

As sciences each of these is abstract. Each in its own way treats the one principle which is the unity of faith itself. But thinking, acting, feeling, or rather, living and being as informed by these sciences is the noblest and most exalted state possible to human nature. It is being as in the order of creation we are meant to be. It is the meaning, in the order of redemption, of the Way of Christ in which every individual with his special capacities and functions is called into involvement with the whole forgiven life.

Administrative Problems

The actual organization of the university as well as its continued existence depend to a large extent on inventiveness in curriculum construction, talent in administration, economic feasibility of supporting a division of labor, the particular orientation of those who institute the school, and no doubt even the customs and conditions of the time. It would be silly to think that any university could achieve its end in abstraction from these, and therefore the improvement of these is a necessary part of the concrete life of the university. A series of further questions consequently arises as to the extent to which existing universities can achieve the goal or progress further toward it. Insofar as these are subjects of some study they belong under the science of administration as a part of the science of action.

But, in general, where it is feasible within any of the above limitations the Christian university will seek to actualize the intellectual functions discussed above. No doubt the most natural way, since the university’s chief concern is inquiry, is to separate the traditional arts college from the technical schools and to divide the former into departments as they are chiefly concerned with the theoretical sciences of nature, the practical social sciences of behavior, or the arts or humanities. The three capstone sciences then fall in the humanities since they are not themselves factual inquiries into natural or institutional processes, though they require these, but intellectual disciplines; and the measure of uniqueness of the Christian university will be not only in the motives and competence of its scientists, but in the abilities of its humanities to accomplish the dialectical amalgamation of science, art, and action.

Teaching Methods

Since the test of the good university is not only in the new facts it discovers, but in the understanding of principles and, finally, in the commitments it produces, the methods of teaching must be appropriate to these. Hence although, again, facts must be learned, they will be taught in historical, logical and pragmatic contexts since it is these which give them their significance. Instruction, consequently, necessarily involves the students in inquiry itself, in the analysis and construction of theories, in controversy over opposed theories, and in the dialectical summation of all they learn.

In its need for truth and valid commitment faith can tolerate no blockage of inquiry which might be the means of forgiveness in practice, no arbitrary impositions of authority which might make faith rest on a doctrine, and no end to the reformation of traditional doctrine and
practice which make live commitment possible.

Thus, there is ultimate risk in teaching and learning. It strives for understanding and commitment which it cannot guarantee. There is its glory and its pain. For to achieve its end is a final good, but to fail is to have aimlessness or evil commitments fill the place of faith. But the risk must be taken or there can be no education for teachers or students, and responsible inquiry under the forgiveness offered by faith must be the university’s answer to every failure and criticism. It follows, of course, that the university ought not to be called to account for everything its members do. Training in responsible commitment necessarily means not only granting freedom to come to commitments and opportunities to test their adequacy, but providing discipline in the duty and method of these. Yet soldiers sometimes fail under the harsh discipline of the training field as well as by the chances of the battleground.

What is said about methods and risks applies to theological inquiry and instruction as well as to anything else in the academic community. Learning theology is not preaching, nor is teaching. Teaching and learning ideas proceeds through inquiry and irenic controversy. Hence there can be no such thing as heresy in a classroom, and there is a place in the university for a protagonist of any idea if for no other reason than that the concern of the faith is ultimately to include and redeem all men and ideas.

Part of the social responsibility of the university is to make clear to the society it serves that the canons of inquiry are determined only by their end — to get the truth — and its methods are determined only by the subject matter and the problems raised. Though science is a social activity, the canons of science are not open to political question. What society may consider is what sorts of problems about what sorts of subjects it should pay for inquiry into. But it must always be prepared to reward originality of thought and pure research since not only its improvement but its life depend on these. Since everyone’s life gains value to himself when he exercises his created power to think, it is an essential function of society to promote that possibility. What is true for society is true in a higher degree for the faithful since their aim is the fulfillment of what God created and the attainment of all possible knowledge about the world in which they must work.

**Extra-Academic Concerns**

But the university is not only an organization in which a curriculum is organized and presented as discussed in the foregoing section. It is not an abstract institution which deals only in intellectual knowledge with students who have been completely formed by their parents when they get there. It is an association of persons, and persons are developing wholes. To be sure, its special business is education. It is not a dictator of mores nor a psychiatric clinic. But, inasmuch as everything which happens to persons is more or less, and for better or for worse, educative, and since in most cases the university is to some degree isolated from its larger society as a continuing community which attracts people because of what it is, it cannot absolve itself from responsibility to some extent for the extra-academic development of its members.

To avoid a faulty abstraction, I do not mean that the administration of the school is solely responsible for these any more than it is for the academic functions. In fact, a university will probably be weak to the extent that its administration assumes such sole responsibility. Rather, teachers, students, and administrators with varying degrees of responsibility in different matters are mutually responsible to each other and the larger society for the development of their characters and community.

What is said in this and the previous sections is at the heart of the issue concerning academic freedom. Much discussed on behalf of professors, it is also vitally important for students. The rebelliousness of late adolescence and early adulthood is a sign of the fact that the development of character can go on in a significant way at this time. To simply stifle it both breeds resentment and tends to substitute convention or arbitrary whim for rationality as the guiding principle in the individual. To leave it quite alone neither satisfies students’ felt need for the guidance of more mature people nor takes advantage of its creative possibilities for the reformation of traditions, the development of new insights and values, and the smashing of idols.

Hence the Christian university ought further to distinguish itself by providing forums in which student opinion is heard and a variety of organizational structures in which students with whatever cooperation from faculty and administration is necessary and desirable, have the opportunity and the freedom to make decisions which affect the whole community and to take the responsibility for the consequences in the community of faith.

This is not to say, obviously, that the government of the university is turned over to students. The institution requires a structure and procedures of policy formation which will provide a long run stability in spite of the turnover of personnel in all of its parts. This requires planning and sensitivity to a variety of pressures which students, and to a lesser extent, faculty, are neither interested in nor equipped for. Yet even such structures and procedures may become atrophied when their purpose is lost or conditions change, and faculties and administrations may yield too easily to fashions and to economic and political pressures in curriculum construction and in the defense of freedom. Hence, provision needs to be made by the institution for the orderly expression of self-criticism. If students do not learn this by the time they leave the university, their chances of doing so later are not large.

The remainder of the point of this section may be summarized by saying that while students and teachers have
to some extent the same needs as anyone else, they also have needs peculiar to them, and they must therefore, as members of the faith, perform a peculiar ministry to each other. The anxieties of the scholarly life, though not as spectacular, may be just as poignant as those of the life of public office or business competition. They are best redeemed within their own community of understanding when student ministers to teacher and teacher to student and thus the bond is established which frees the university for its function.

That the chapel should have an important place in the Christian university presumably goes without saying. But its role should be somewhat different from that of the usual church. Its relation to the university community as a whole is parallel to that of what was called the capstone science of worship to the other sciences in the curriculum. As that regarded life itself as worship so the chapel should seek to bring every redeemable act of man into itself, and, conversely, to be a fountainhead from which acts of redemption flow to nourish the world around it. In these respects it should no doubt be what the church should be everywhere — not simply a narrow round of people performing ancient liturgies, but a revivifying force among the people — healing the wounds of the despised, reconciling the factions in feuds, bringing wholeness of life out of spiritual death, and celebrating that wholeness in meaningful ceremony. In the latter particularly, the university chapel can do unique service. It can be the experimental theatre in which artists of religion produce new forms which are significant of faith to all the people of the age.

I do not mean that the chapel breaks with its tradition. No one can wholly do that, and no one would who seeks to communicate with men. But as the sciences must know their own history, and as theology in criticizing culture in the light of its tradition must put its own tradition in question, so the chapel should reform its tradition to let it shine more clearly through new ceremonial on the darknesses of our lives.

Epilogue

Language becomes its own object either when one does not know what end it serves and one must look back to the life from which it proceeds to make sense of it, or when one cannot achieve the goals talked about and so looks for the power that makes talk effective, or when one cannot give expression to one’s life and so looks for techniques of expression. My original concern was with the meaning of faith for the above reasons, so I looked to actions and institutions in the hope of finding in them the goods of life and the possibilities of improvement. That is, I discussed their structure and function in practical terms instead of narrating the history of the social determination of action or constructing a typology of churches and universities in social-scientific terms. Instead of investigating the logic of religious language, I tried to discuss its principles — the ends of men as men. I have set aside the possibility of talking about the nature or essence of God or His ultimate purposes on the assumption that not much could be said about these in any case, except in a language that is in question, and have found in the God-indicating community of faith as the power of life a self-sufficient end of our action and hence of our speech.

Thus these essays intend to be a contribution to one of the inquiries of the university, the philosophy of action. They have issued in a locus of principles and criteria of action and of moral and theological doctrine and in an application of these to the university. They have not, however, provided facts about the world which they alleged that the faith has a need for, nor have they applied criteria in detail to specific theological doctrines. But if it was true that the very meaning of faith was in question and if my conclusion about it is right, then it follows that the natural and social sciences are not only free but have a profound duty to investigate every aspect of nature, and that theology has the same freedom and duty to reformulate the meaning of its traditions. Finally the arts are free to express our absurdities, purify us of them, and encourage us again to take up the task of being complete human beings who are not too proud to admit that they are less than gods nor so fearful of failure to be shy of speaking in glowing terms of their ideals.

NOW IN THE LAPSE OF YULE

Now in the lapse of Yule toward the year’s end,
As the star dims and the three wise ghosts recede
Into the blood-dark east, what dooms portend
For the simple heart that has only love for seed?

Only the sound of a tree for symbol felled
Thundering across the universal night?
Only a surging earth and a sunlight spelled
By the seed’s rejection into its opposite?

—Perhaps: yet hope cries emblem still to show
When the first crocus triumphs over snow.

GEORGE BRANDON SAUL

14

The Cresset
Since I talked to you last Sean O'Casey closed his tired eyes, which had failed him for quite some time. Though his heart stopped beating, his words will "knock at the door" of eternity and most of his figures will continue to hang like "pictures in the hallway" of immortality. The New York actors staged a reading from his dramatic prose in a deeply moving and highly dignified manner.

The gifted young playwright Lorraine Hansberry is fighting for her life in a New York hospital. Her second play, "The Sign in Sidney Burstein's Window," did not find the going as smooth as her "A Raisin in the Sun." But this is the fate of most second plays. It must be put on the shelf with some other magnificent failures. It is a very human play painting the mores or "immores" of our time, showing that "Everyone is his own hipster," that we so easily give in to the inner and outer dirty deal.

Its honesty in giving us a kaleidoscopic image of despair and failure, of forced compromise with what is left for us in life is moving and disarming, but it is the huge canvas of varied personalities and not the life of the protagonists that gives the play substance and meaning. Whenever the play becomes too big and diffuse in color, the many questions spread over too much ground defeat the structure of the play. Perhaps Miss Hansberry set out to create a tormented picture of mankind in our time seen through many figures who are not too unfamiliar in Greenwich Village. If so, she succeeded, but without letting us see the picture in clear focus. Soon our interest is lost on the detail (however harassingly human it may be), and the images of the protagonists Sidney (the fanatic reformer and world improver) and Iris (an unsuccessful actress and irritated wife) become blurred.

"Oh What a Lovely War" is oh what a lovely example of many things that lie at the root of the very existence of the theatre. The question of who is more important on stage, the dramatist or the director, has for a long time been decided by Joan Littlewood in her favor. It is said that Brendan Behan's "The Hostage" and Shelagh Delaney's "A Taste of Honey" were rewritten by Miss Littlewood and the actors. (This is not a rare, though deplorable, phenomenon of our time. I was present when, in anger, Thornton Wilder left the German stage director Erwin Piscator after a debate about who should have the last word in the theatre. Michael Gazzo's "A Hatful of Rain" was almost completely rewritten in the Actors Studio based on the Method actors' improvisations.)

"Oh What a Lovely War" also proved how little scenic design is needed to create great stimulation, leaving everything to the actor's intuitive power and suggestiveness where the visually obvious would have failed. This World War I satire has a strong dramatic impact with its cabaretlike scenes from songs of that era — which now have the flavor of a devastating critique — down to the moving scene on the Western front where there was nothing new at Christmas time when the Tommies and Jerries got together in no-man's land to exchange presents and to drink schnaps before shooting at each other again the day after Christmas. Oh What a Lovely War! Oh what a lovely world! And what a lovely play!

One of our great novelists, Saul Bellow, embarked on playwriting, particularly because he was bored by and angered with the trivialities that are dished out in the theatre nowadays. He is quoted as having alluded to the appalling language in the theatre — "I mean it is a matter of 'Shut the door,' 'Put out your cigarette,' or 'You're a bitch.'" With his first play, the intellectual farce, "The Last Analysis," Mr. Bellow fell into a trap similar to the trap into which Lorraine Hansberry fell with her second play. Both have ignored the economy of the theatre. Dramatically, almost everything is wrong with it, and yet through print and college discussions it may survive many another successful play. A comedian — seemingly on his way out — goes through the traumatic experiences of his life from birth to the moment when he televises his self-styled psychotherapy via closed circuit to a meeting of psychoanalysts at the Waldorf. On a cluttered stage we find the world's gloom and man's hopelessness choking the blocked channels of Sam Levine, the tired comedian, who, indefatigably, probes his past and psyche. By using Freud's catechism, Saul Bellow makes fun of Freud, our time, and the world with such desperate urgency, fanatic intensity, and brilliant oversophistication that the spectator has no time to keep up with the author's cleverness. His epigrams chase each other relentlessly; the director, Joseph Anthony, assumes that a farce must move at a neck-breaking tempo. The result is confusing and tiring.

The point of departure in this comedy is wrongly chosen, the first act drags at a dangerous speed. Much goes on while actually nothing happens. The hero's neuroses dance at a witch's sabbath, and too many words flicker past our eyes without giving shape to their deeper meaning nor warmth to the human heartbeat. Saul Bellow had so much to say that he overlooked the fact that he was writing a farcical play for the theatre.
From the Chapel

Christmas in Context

By MARTIN E. MARTY
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The University of Chicago

Why do the heathen rage,
and the people imagine a vain thing?
—Psalm 2:1

Such a good thing as Christ’s Mass should be seen in context, if we are fully to appreciate it. Everyone knows what the context of this Feast is: It comes
In midst of coldest winter
At deepest midnight hour.
It is a joyous day, devoted to the worship of a Child:
To you this night is born a child
Of Mary, chosen virgin mild;
This little child, of lowly birth,
Shall be the joy of all the earth.
The holiday is also to be observed liturgically, in the spirit of the Gospel:
And she brought forth her first born son...

I was careful to set Christmas in the proper context by being careful not to prejudice the case in either direction. These three verses are not taken on the one hand from one of those pretty little carol books, full of cherubs, which we get with two box tops of this or that; on the other hand, they did not come from some High Church St. James St. Michael Liturgical Arts Society manual of arcane readings. They came from “German author unknown, c. 1500”; from “Martin Luther, 1535,” and from St. Luke. They are all to be found in the stanch, staid, blue-covered Lutheran Hymnal (or, better, The Lutheran Hymnal: why settle for anything but the best?)

We can be sure, can we not, that most of our worshipers legitimately concentrate on a winter’s night, a joyous event — the birth of a child, and a Christmassy liturgy. These make up the context of Christ’s Mass, don’t they?

They don’t.

The context of the event in which God mirrors His fatherly heart and gives of His very self in Jesus Christ is different and is greater than anything we have indicated so far. This context does not require us to be concerned about some details (the season) or to be obsessed with some features (the child-worship) or to be satisfied with a pure Christmas “order of service” and mood. Perhaps we can do ourselves a service so that we can better render God and our brothers their service if we wrest Christmas from the conventional context. I shall try to set a different stage for you.

The seasonal context. Every other year, at least, I wish preachers would have to prepare their Christmas sermon during summer vacation. The Christmas event stands out in a different kind of relief, then. A liturgical arts publishing firm in the city in which this university is located used to try, a decade ago, to convince the buying public that I was a liturgical designer. My assignment was to prepare a set of liturgical greeting cards for Christmas. My problem: the deadline for cards to be marketed in November is July. I would have to “think my way into Christmas” in the heat of summer, without benefit of Perry Como “Silent Night” records or Christmas tree lights, or anything Meditating on the texts for those cards in July helped me think new thoughts about the context of Christ’s coming.

When I became a man, I put away childish things like drawing and regressed into new vocations, including book reviewing. There the old problems again confronted me: how to take note of a book of carols designed for November when it is published in July? When I tried, it was easier to empathize with our Australian Christian brothers who sing of the “midst of coldest winter at deepest midnight hour” in midst of hottest summer in down-under land. I could see something of the problem our Palm Beach and Sun City elders have conjuring up their childhood Christmases and could again understand why so many of them trek back north to the grandchildren for at least one week-end near the winter solstice. Why? Because they and we have a clear context in mind, and it includes the kind of white Christmases we used to know and the kind in which, “as everyone knows,” Christ was born.

Nothing of what I have said so far is very controversial or touchy. We all know well enough to “demythologize,” to extract the mythical elements out of the non-Biblical and purely human notions that grew up around Christmas. Really, we all know something about Palestine’s climate and nothing about the season of Christ’s birth, so we know that we tamper only with emotions and not with truth when we tamper with the season and the midnight hour.

Much more controversial and touchy is the idea of tampering with the child-worship which is integral to, central to all we think about Christmas. Here we cannot demythologize; we cannot pull out from history the history of the Child’s coming. The Old and New Testaments and all the ages of Christian history concentrate on this feature of Christmas. We like to put Christmas into the child’s context. We have Christmas programs and special services; we like to see children’s eyes light up as they open presents and as they reflect the little lights from Christmas trees (lights imported at great expense from Italy). We cannot forget how again and again Luke and Luther and others turn us to the child-ed es-
Christmas Eve, at deepest midnight hour, child-worshipper. Context of Christmas, asks our midst of coldest winter, Nice little Christmas Festival Liturgy. From the committees to do what a friend of mine called whenever church. This makes it possible for ministers and music. Dim imaginations and sentimentalities. How helpless, hopeless are the hymn-book readings on pp. 55-56, changed our whole estate because our race He is the center of the nothingness of life which they hope to stretch into an everything.

Christians indeed do engage properly in "child-worship" at Christmas, because they want to be sure that nothing they say about or do for Christ in worship be other than or less than what they say about or do for the God whose fullness dwelt in Him. But even this worship can become a sentimentalization or a fanaticism if it is torn from the larger context in which we have just seen it. We do not in any direct sense at Christmas "honor every mother and every child": we do so only in the indirect sense that at this season we see how God has changed our whole estate because our race He "has honored thus that He deigns to dwell with us." But Christ's Mass is not Everychild's Mass.

The purpose, for example, in Luther's sometimes too imaginative and sometimes too realistic devotions to the child at the mother's breast was not to stress the cuteness of the child but the condescension of God; it was not to accent the beauty of a domestic scene but to accent the completeness of God's identification with our condition; it was not to stress the strength of family life but rather the weakness of God.

How do we set this unseasonal event into its larger context? We get good help again from the blue book and behind it the black book from which our texts above came: the Church's ancient liturgy as it is received in our tradition and in our services. There we come across a larger context, one which helps rescue us from our own dim imaginations and sentimentalities. How helpless and hopeless are the hymn-book readings on pp. 55-56 for "Christmas Day, the Feast of the Nativity of Our Lord." (Fortunately for many, there are no readings for "Christmas Eve", which is the time when more come to church. This makes it possible for ministers and music committees to do what a friend of mine called whenever he ventured: "To whip up a nice little liturgy of our own.")

What do we do with the apparently random, haphazard set of readings which greets us? To our surprise, only one text is of the kind that would make its way into "nice little liturgies of our own" and that is the Gospel, from Luke 2. Except for the Epistle, everything else is from the Old Testament, and what did it know about the context of Christmas, asks our "midst-of-coldest-winter-at-deepest-midnight-hour-child-worshipper."

Try this line from the Gradual: how helpful is it in a nice little Christmas Festival Liturgy:

Thy people shall be willing in the day of Thy power: in the beauties of holiness from the womb of the morning.

Only "womb" seems to fit the Christmas context. Or the Psalm in the gradual:

The Lord reigneth, He is clothed with majesty: the Lord is clothed with strength, wherewith He hath girded Himself.

Anyone could have picked a better Introit than that for the Candlelight-and-Holly Vespers!

Is any Epistle of the year more hedged about, fudged from, skipped over (except for Easter's, when we have another context problem) than today's:

For the grace of God has appeared for the salvation of all men, training us to renounce irreligion and worldly passions, and to live sober, upright, and godly lives in this world, awaiting our blessed hope, the appearing of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ, who gave Himself for us to redeem us from all iniquity and to purify for Himself a people of His own who are zealous for good deeds. (Titus 2:11-14)

"Harrumph," harrumph the boys in the balcony. What does that have to do with Christmas? Why not read The Other Wise Man or The Littlest Angel or something in context?

It has everything to do with Christmas! This is its context. Christmas means nothing about seasons or children except in the drama of all seasons for men of all ages. As the Epistle reminds us, we stand between Advents, remembering one and awaiting another. We will understand neither without renunciations and without hope. The accent is on "the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ, who gave Himself for us to redeem us from all iniquity.

We have heard too many sermons about the commercialization of Christmas. Don't bother about them. Let's worry about what Erik Routley in The Man for Others calls "uncontexting Christ" at Christmas.

The very wide acceptance of the cult of the Child among people who otherwise have nothing to do with the Christian way is in its own way evidence that this cult can easily be an escape from truth. Popular forms of Christmas worship nowadays do much to foster the opinion that the Christian Gospel is a matter of sweetness and light. (Oxford University Press, p. 8lf.) Routley precedes us in suggesting that Liturgy will help us respond manifoldly and in context. He goes so far as to suggest that we will do best if we would begin a service with the words which begin the Psalm from which our Introit is taken:

Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing?

They do, we do rage because Christ-in-context violates all our preconceptions and pretensions. We worried about the Sunday School gym floor and we tithed and it did no good: we still have to be justified by faith. We took a Christmas basket to old First Immanuel Church and we still have to be judged for rent-gouging in the
slum properties we hold in which its members live. We knelt at the side of the manger and we still have to make room for the Christian brother who kneels-in next to us. We already said we loved everybody in the world and we still have to revise our politics in order to find ways to do something about that love.

It's enough to make a person rage.
It's enough to make a person imagine a vain thing.

But if we “renounce irreligion and worldly passions” we can “await a blessed hope” in the name of a man who was a child who became a man who was one in whom the fullness of the Godhead was pleased to dwell. Whose giving of Himself in the temporary helplessness of childhood was merely “in context” and in harmony with the giving of Himself in permanent identification with us in our need.

On Second Thought

BY ROBERT J. HOYER

The command of Jesus is unqualified: “Give to every man who begs from you.” It embraces the bum on the street as well as the United Fund or the Red Cross or the church. It is equally irrelevant to say: “It’s for a good cause” or “He’ll only use it to get drunk.” There is no distinction to be made between the merits of the “cause,” as there is no distinction in the love of God.

The command, like all the laws of God, is set before us as a mirror to reflect our guilt. Note that well. It is there to reveal our guilt, not to measure the worth of the man who asks us. If we refuse to give to the beggar we sin not so much in our refusal as in our defense of the refusal. When we say that it was right for us to refuse because the man is evil, we set ourselves apart from the common woe and guilt of man. Our sin is no less and no worse than that of the man who gives and claims that he was right in giving because the law commands him to give. He too has set himself apart from the woe and guilt of man. Our sin is no less and no worse than that of the man who gives and claims that he was right in giving because the law commands him to give. He too has set himself apart from the woe and guilt of man. Our sin is no less and no worse than that of the man who gives and claims that he was right in giving because the law commands him to give. 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Our sin is no less and no worse than that of the man who giving of Himself in the temporary helplessness of childhood was merely “in context” and in harmony with the giving of Himself in permanent identification with us in our need.

SINE NOMINE
I’m tired, Lord.
I want to sit still
And not move.

No more meetings
or questions
or decisions;
No more children
watching me
and learning;
No more poor
hungry
desperate people
Standing in front of me;
No more friends
expecting me
to be and do.

A little while ago
It was different, Lord.
It was easier.
We had a comfortable
Nodding acquaintance,
You and I.
I was happy and peaceful.

But you have changed that now:
You and your mercy,
You and your incredible love,
You and your tireless walking
Around the world.

I tire quickly.
And I must sleep
A little.

ANNE SPRINGSTEEN

The Cresset
The Grand Panjandrum

By Walter A. Hansen

“I can’t think of an orchestra I haven’t broken down.”

Do you want to know who made this emphatic statement? Well, it was Zubin Mehta, the dynamic, hard-driving, and somewhat diminutive conductor of the Montreal Symphony Orchestra.

Once upon a time a violinist said of the late Fritz Reiner, “I hate his guts, but he can make me play better than I think I can.”

I have no reason whatever to surmise that the members of the Montreal Symphony Orchestra hate Mehta’s guts. Nor can I say that the men and women who play in the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra dislike him.

Let me pause for a moment to tell you that Mehta is the Grand Panjandrum, so to speak, of the two orchestras I have just mentioned. It is not my purpose either to belittle him or to hand out a slur when I speak of him as the Grand Panjandrum. I have used this term to point out with special emphasis that when he conducts, the players must and do obey. Make no mistake about this.

Maybe I could have interviewed Mehta had I chosen to attend a party held in his honor a few weeks ago after he had conducted an excellent performance of Georges Bizet’s Carmen at the wonderfully beautiful Place des Arts in Montreal. I had an invitation. But the hour was late — or early. Midnight had passed into history before the large audience began to make its way out of the magnificent auditorium. Consequently, I preferred to return to the hotel and go to bed.

No, Mehta’s direction of Carmen — with Shirley Verrett, the highly accomplished Negress, in the title role — had not tired me. On the contrary, I had more than one thrill as I listened to and watched the brilliant and deftly paced performance. At the very beginning I was impressed by Mehta’s insistence on clarity and incisively rhythmical vitality.

Let me state at this point that I greatly prefer the Grand Salle of the Place des Arts in Montreal to Philharmonic Hall at Lincoln Center in New York City.

Mehta was born in Bombay in 1936. He is the son of a Parsee. As such, he is an adherent of Zoroastrianism, which was the religious system of the Persians before they were converted to Islam. As you probably know, many of the Parsees fled to India to escape the Moslem persecutions during the seventh and eighth centuries.

This young man has a mind of his own. He knows what he wants — both when he presides over an orchestra and when he asserts himself in restaurants by insisting on the right to prepare his own shrimp-cocktail sauce.

Harriet Graham, writing in Maclean’s Magazine, speaks of him as “perhaps the hottest young conductor on the current musical scene.”

“I much prefer when the ladies collect money for my orchestra,” Mehta once said, “because no lady has the guts to tell me what to do.” “North America,” he declared, “can’t breed good conductors; North America can’t dominate one woman, let alone 90 men.” Maybe some of this bumptiousness will wear off as time goes on. But as a conductor Mehta will undoubtedly go from strength to strength. He is an exceedingly busy man. When his duties do not keep him in Montreal and Los Angeles, he appears as guest conductor in England, France, Germany, Austria, Holland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and other countries.

I had another fascinating experience in Montreal. One evening I listened with rapt attention as the Japan Philharmonic Orchestra, under Akeo Watanabe, played one of Mozart’s symphonies; Antonin Dvorak’s Symphony from the New World; and Kobikiuta, a work by Kiyo-shige Koyama, a prominent Japanese composer. In addition, Toshiya Eto, an exceptionally able violinist, gave an excellent performance of Alexander Glazounoff’s Concerto in A Minor with the orchestra.

I could easily follow the line of least resistance and say that the Japan Philharmonic Orchestra does not play Occidental music in a manner that gives complete satisfaction to every Occidental listener. But a criticism of this kind would be claptrap pure and simple. I prefer to state without any circumambiguous words or phrases that I thoroughly enjoyed the concert. While I was eating breakfast in the hotel the next morning, three of the players sat down at the table next to mine. When courtesy prompted me to tell them that I had taken much pleasure in the performances of the orchestra of which they were members, one of them merely stared at me, one managed a wisp of a smile, and one kept his back turned toward me. But this did not induce me to damn the concert with faint praise. I swallowed my courtesy together with a vitamin pill and went on my way.

I had the good fortune to be present while the Montreal Bach Choir made a number of transcriptions for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Have I ever heard Bach’s wonderfully constructed motet titled Jesu, meine Freude sung with greater clarity or with more apposite-ness and pertinence of expression? I do not think so. My hat is off to George Little, who directs the choir. Would that he had many counterparts in the world!
The fine Arts

Ancient Modern

By ADALBERT RAPHAEL KRETZMANN

In the traditions of Greek art there lingers the historic background of Cretan-Mycenian beginnings. All of it was strongly bound up with the worship of gods and goddesses and many of the traditional representations were regarded as true gifts of the gods. The god Hephastos was looked upon as the patron of all artistic and creative ability. He is the representative of a pre-Grecian world who, according to legend, originated in the Cretan city of Phaistos. The Greeks connected him with Ptah of Memphis, the founder of Egyptian art, and the god Koschar from Phoenicia.

He also has mystical connections with Daidalos in the service of King Minos of Knossos. He built the famous labyrinth and laid out the dance floor for Ariadne.

The great historian, Thucydides, establishes connections between Greek culture and its predecessors and many of the conclusions of Thucydides have been archeologically and linguistically supported by the discoveries of recent years. It is now quite well established that all examples of Greek art which have names ending in -nth, -ss, -tt, - and -ene, belong to a pre-Grecian culture.

The development of ceramics in Cretan-Mycenaean reduced the manufacture of stone vases and objects to a secondary position during the first periods of the Island art. The work reflects a well defined taste. In the second period belong statues of small and delicate shape. Since large scale sculpture was foreign to Minoan civilization, statues of considerable size were found only rarely. The modeling of small figures, however, continued to flourish all through the various periods of art. Particularly the treatment of the faces becomes very interesting.

The sculptured vases made of stone are particularly well done. Almost every kind of household item was made in a highly artistic way for every day use. Sometimes very hard stones, such as basalt and obsidian, were used. The greatest care was taken in the selection of the colors, whiteness, or transparency of such stones as grained marbles, porphyry, various kinds of alabaster, and rock crystal.

Later the use of softer stones gave rise to products which carry relief decoration, some of which are to be counted among the best of all the Aegean island art. Even in the use of such precious materials as ivory and gold the artists were perfect masters of technique. The Boston Museum of Fine Arts possesses a chryselephantine goddess that is an exact copy of the goddess from Knossos. The best objects of art have been found in the sanctuaries and most of those of larger size are found in the Archaeological Museum at Heraklion.

The later work on the island does not have nearly the strength and character of the early examples which we show in these pictures. Much of it depends on architecture. The large relief of the Lion Gate at Mycenae is the most significant find.

The photos shown here have a peculiar strength and value because of their lack of disturbing detail and their courageous and honest approach to "form." The high development of this art so early in the days before Christ seems to point to a strong connection with Egypt and the vigor of its early art. The fields are still wide open for great and perceptive research on the part of some good minds.

COME UNTO ME

Poor world,
Sad neglected, searching
World!
He loved you much,
And cried for you
And died.

What have we said
Lately
That's been of any use
Or comfort?

We say,
"You're wicked and depraved."
(As if you didn't know.)
We say,
"God loves you. Go
And change your dress;
When you look more like us
Then you can join us on the way
To heaven."

Small wonder
That so often you
Jump from bridges
And high buildings.

ANNE SPRINGSTEEN

Marble figure of a harpist from Keros on the Island of Crete, now in the National Museum at Athens — Third Century before Christ.

Head from a marble figure found at Amorgos, now found in the National Museum at Athens — Third Century before Christ.
The Faces of Tyranny

In *The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic* (Devin-Adair, 1964, $6.50, 300 pp.), Fulgencio Batista argues his case to Americans. He cannot be blamed for trying. Batista has had an extraordinarily bad press in the United States. The Cuban experience may finally have revealed something to us: but for many years Americans have been fed through their daily newspapers a fairly steady diet of morality plays in lieu of intelligent reporting on Latin-American affairs. The plots were always similar. First there were the noble people, struggling to better their condition, and thoroughly dedicated in their hearts to Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and the Bill of Rights. Then came a crafty dictator, usually in uniform, who overthrew legitimate, democratic authority, and substituted a reign of oppression, murder, favoritism, graft, and heavy deposits in Swiss banks.

Fulgencio Batista was such a villain. And Fidel Castro was consequently a hero in the eyes of most Americans. That was back in the good old days, of course, the days of Minnie Minoso and the Pearl of the Antilles, when Americans went to Cuba for winter vacations and Havana was represented in an American baseball league. *Tempus fugit and gloria transit.* From the hero of 1959 Castro has fallen to the status of principal villain, matched in American eyes only by Mao and ex-Beatles who had served as assassins and executioners for the previous government.

But what of Batista? Will he now enjoy an American renaissance in accord with the rule that enemies of the bad guys are good guys? *The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic* is Batista's own attempt at his refutation. But it doesn't come off. The book will only convince those who want to be convinced and perhaps those who can't read the most obvious between-the-lines print.

The book does show that the Cuban people were better off under Batista than they are under Castro, but its author intends more than that. It is Batista's thesis that under his administrations Cuban advanced steadily in freedom, democracy, national independence, per capita income, social services, literacy, and general well-being. But for all this he was rewarded with an organized campaign of calumny in the United States and eventually subversion of his regime by the *New York Times* and the State Department.

Both halves of the thesis can be partially substantiated from the record, and Batista marshals the evidence. The Batista years did witness impressive economic and social gains in Cuba. And with the benefit of hindsight it is easy to indict both the State Department and the *Times* for at very least the crime of naivete. But Batista does not deserve all the credit that he claims. Some politicians demand applause for the rain that falls during their administrations. On the other hand, it should be noted, Batista recognized the actual relation between foreign investment and rising prosperity for the Cubans and maintained an environment calculated to attract foreign capital. He simultaneously experimented with all sorts of welfare legislation, some of it empty posturing, but much of it undoubtedly significant.

Then why was Batista so widely condemned in the United States? Why were most Americans rooting for Castro and his revolutionaries? Batista suggests a nefarious plot between ultra-liberals and pro-Communists. But even if such a conspiracy existed, it could not have been successful in the absence of widespread public disapproval of the Batista regime. Batista tries to show that this disapproval was completely undeserved.

He attempts, first of all, to demonstrate that his regime was a legitimate one; but the demonstration falls flat. Two illustrations will suggest why. Page 38: "The seizure of power [Batista's] had been inevitable to avert an attempted coup d'etat and civil war." Translation: I seized power to prevent someone else from maybe doing it. Or again, on page 7, a lengthy quotation tucked into a footnote explains Batista's first coup, in 1933. Batista cites this explanation approvingly:

> The demand of the hour, after the overthrow of the tyranny, was the establishment of a sound authority. To do that, it was necessary to reorganize the Army, in which there were still, despite the public scandals and vigorous opposition of the young officers, many of the despised figures who had served as assassins and executioners for the previous government. That is why the Army did not have the moral force to clear the streets of shameful spectacles staged by marauders and the killers of *porrastas*, whose cheap exhibitionism contrasted so sharply with the heroic records of the true revolutionaries who had faced death so many times in the difficult days of the fight against the tyrant. Nothing really depends upon the quotation. But it is certainly a choice example of rhetorical question-asking. The author's rhetoric, the conspicuous omissions, the sudden resort to "necessity," the explanations that explain nothing, all betray the weakness of Batista's case.

Moreover, as Batista chronicles his accomplishments, we are introduced to Law #45, Decree #798, *Law #1589*, Decree #1437, and further #s too many to count. The recitation of accomplishments is impressive; but so is the multiplication of #s. Batista accomplished much. He was also a dictator.

But the real question has not been raised, and Batista could hardly be expected to pose it. Does every country have to be a democracy? Must every government be freely chosen by its people? Does the United States have a mission to bring democratic, civilian rule to all the peoples of Latin America? Is our determination to play missionary by withholding support from naughty governments evidence of our good will and sense of responsibility? Or of our arrogance and hopeless sentimentality?

It is almost as if we Americans can find no intermediate position between isolationism and busy-body meddling. Our foreign policy is not likely to acquire clarity, consistency, or effectiveness until we learn that there are innumerable stopping points between those two extremes. Foreign policy is not a means of salvation, and it holds out no promise of utopia. It is a way of getting along in the world, and its promise is orderly change. No more. And that, it appears to this reviewer, is the lesson of Batista's *apologia pro vita sua*.

The post-Stalin thaw opened many doors through the Iron Curtain, but East Germany remains today a society closed to most Westerners. It is an ugly dream for us, its ugliness marked off for all to see by the Berlin Wall, its dream character proclaimed by our refusal to admit its political existence.

Joseph Wechsberg, musician, author, and regular contributor to the *New Yorker*, was born in Czechoslovakia, knows Eastern Europe well, and speaks fluent German. One year ago he received permission to tour East Germany, and his experiences and reflections are evocatively conveyed in *Journey through the Land of Eloquent Silence* (Little, Brown, 1964, $3.95, 146 pp.)

The "eloquent silence" is Wechsberg's interpretation of the sudden pauses, the wordless looks, the unfinished replies which told him more than he actually heard. He was accompanied, of course, by a "guide"; but he managed to escape his escort often enough to gain valuable insights into the life and thought of the people of East Germany.

We discover in this book how defensive many of them are as they contemplate their society. We discover the strange ambivalence with which they view their countrymen of the Federal Republic. The desire for reunification is mixed with resentment at the West German's prosperity and smugness. They are ambivalent also toward the United States, sometimes seen as their potential deliverer, sometimes as their tormentor. Similarly with the USSR. Is Russia the architect of their plight or their sole protector? One gains in reading a new sense of the complexity of the German problem, a problem of people and not just of diplomatic negotiations.

A large part of the book has nothing to do with the author's stated theme. He comes in his travels to Weimar, and falls under the spell.
of Bach, Goethe, and Schiller. But these pages are among the most interesting in the entire memoir, and nothing is lost save the literary virtue of unity.

Tyranny takes many forms. Alexis de Tocqueville long ago warned that a tyranny of the majority may be the most oppressive of all. Peter Simon vividly reminds us of this fact in Lovejoy: Martyr to Freedom (Concordia, 1964, $3.00, 150 pp.). But he shows at the same time that one man, with faith and courage, can stand up against bigotry and fear and alter the course of history.

Elijah Lovejoy was such a man. Simon’s account of his brief life is well researched and carefully drawn, but manages at the same time to be a moving portrayal. In one way Lovejoy was an ordinary man. He shared many of the prejudices and preconceptions of his day, and for most of his life fell in easily with prevailing attitudes toward the institution of slavery. But slavery stopped being just an institution when Lovejoy saw it in practice. It was cruel and inhumane. And from the moment he concluded that the Christian could not countenance slavery, Lovejoy calmly set out to walk a path whose end he must have foreseen. In that he was far from an ordinary man.

Lovejoy was selected in 1833 to edit a St. Louis religious newspaper, the Observer. It was never an abolitionist paper. But Lovejoy’s pronouncements on the slavery question grew steadily more pointed — and more intolerable to the people of Missouri. Eventually Lovejoy was persuaded to transfer the paper’s operations up-river to the burgeoning town of Alton in the free state of Illinois. But a social critic was no more popular in Alton than in St. Louis. The “good people” of the community wanted peace and tranquility. For this goal they were willing to sacrifice freedom of speech and of the press and, if necessary, Lovejoy’s life.

By refusing to keep silent, Lovejoy signed his death warrant at 35 years. A tragic waste? Paul Simon, himself a young newspaper editor and publisher as well as Illinois legislator, does not draw this conclusion. For in his courageous death Lovejoy accomplished more than he could have achieved by living and writing. The bullets which brought him down in November 1837 hammered heavy nails into the coffin which was slowly being built for America’s “peculiar institution.”

PAUL T. HEYNE

WORTH NOTING

THE FAILURE OF THEOLOGY IN MODERN LITERATURE

By John Killinger (Abingdon, $5.00)

Where faith and culture cross lines, there is always ample room for fruitful discussion. Here in nine seminal chapters a fluent exposition is given of several recurrent themes in the theology of the Christian faith as presented in contemporary literature: God, man, the church, the sacraments, the ministry, the last doctrine, the major emphasis . .. of Western Christian theology and the arts in the present age. The dichotomy is only more apparent than real, and the problem as much due to changing styles as it is to essential materials.

Killinger suggests two marks of identification for today’s Christian writer (pp. 229 & 230): “that the Christian author write about men in, or juxtaposed to, the redemptive situation” where tedium occasionally gives way to 

To Deum, and that such presentation "must have about it the kind of totality and coherence that will convince us of the utter reality of such a man in such a situation." Thus there is need for a continuing conversation between Christian theology and the arts in the present age where both Church and Culture are experiencing a renewal. Now let them recognize and fulfill their mutual dependence, “Christianity upon art to make it more sensitive, more incarnate in the world of men, and art upon Christianity to provide it with its real meaning and purpose” (p. 228).

HERBERT H. UMBACH

STRANGE WIVES

By Shirley Barker (Crown, $4.95)

At a time when minority groups are trying to find their proper place in the social structure, this novel offers considerable to the discerning reader. It also brings to mind statistics on the increase of marriages between Jews and Christians — this in contrast to the warning of Ezra the Scribe who, when the Israelites had conquered their surrounding enemies, warned his people not to take unto themselves “strange wives.”

The setting for the story is Newport, R.I., during the time of the Revolutionary War. News of the religious tolerance of Roger Williams, then governor of Rhode Island, had reached Jews in many foreign countries. Also, Newport had a good harbor and would make an ideal place for merchandising. The story tells of the attempt to build a Jewish colony and make of Newport the shipping center of the New World.

Hannah Bravo, a devout orthodox Jewess, arrived in Newport from Spain where she had just lost her husband in the Inquisition, and had miraculously escaped a violent earthquake. She soon gave birth to a son, Reuben, and in gratitude determined to bring him up in the strict orthodox pattern of his forefathers. On the other hand, there was Richard Tupper, the frustrated Puritan with two attractive daughters whom he found necessary to “let out for hire.” In the kitchen of Hannah Bravo, Jenny Tupper met Reuben and their romance began. In order to prevent such a romance, a friend of Hannah’s cooperated and sent to the Bravo household Riva Gold, a very beautiful and eligible young Jewess. The two young people failed to attract each other and Riva finally fell in love with an acquaintance of Jenny’s and married him. When Hannah was informed of Riva’s marriage to a Christian, Reuben decided to tell her of his forthcoming marriage to Jenny. Hannah asked that the prayer for the dead be said for her son.

The marriage was eventually a success and Hannah finally was reconciled, only because of the unusual love and devotion between Jenny and Reuben, and the compromises that they made. This success was in contrast to the early failure of Riva’s marriage in which neither husband nor wife could become adjusted to the other’s traditions.

Due to the unfortunate turn of events in the war, the settlement at Newport declined and many of the Jewish people moved to New York, where they established their shipping lines and eventually prospered.

BESSION E. JOX

DIARY OF AN EARLY AMERICAN BOY: NOAH BLAKE

By Eric Sloane (Wilfred Funk, Inc., $6.50)

“Folks-wealth” should be coined as a new word to describe something more than folklore, namely as revealed in this kind of romanticized history. Its democratic meaning is akin to the legal term “commonwealth,” still found on the official seal of our earliest states.

In modern times when everything a per-
son needs may be bought in a store, there are very few hand-made things left. So we are robbed of that rare and wonderful satisfaction that comes with personal accomplishment. In Noah's [Blake's] time, nearly every single thing a person touched was the result of his own efforts. The cloth of his clothing, the meal on the table, the chair he sat in, and the floor he walked upon, all were made by the user. (p. 40)

Here, then, is a year's record of Do It Yourself accomplishment.

I watched the response of young, middle-aged, and old persons who browsed in my copy; without exception, all expressed satisfaction. To anyone who is bored with his tasks or who questions the value of the many little things that comprise our daily living, this diary written in 1805 by a 15-year-old lad can be a tonic. And when you remember that Mark Twain's mid-19th century Huckleberry Finn was a similar teenager (in a Notebook). Clements said that Huck definitely was fourteen years old; you respect American youth then and now too.

Interpretation of Americana is Eric Sloane's forte. Among his previous books are American Barns and Covered Bridges, and The Seasons of America's Past. One day while exploring an old house, he discovered this small, wood-backed and leather-bound manuscript: its first page bore the inscription: NOAH BLAKE, my book/ March the twenty fifth./ Year of Our Lord 1805/ Given to me by my Father Isaak Blake/ and my Mother Rachel/ upon the fifteenth year of my life.

Fascinated by the intimate notations of simple. Early American craftsmanship, Mr. Sloane amplified the terse entries by means of verbal commentaries plus graphic diagrams or sketches (which look like today's Popular Science materials). Thus a backwoods farm in New England comes to life, reminiscent of Walt Whitman's pungent line: "The sentiment of the huge timbers of old fashion'd houses and barns."

Resourcefulness with adventure built one's professional and household equipment — such as nail-making or shingle-splitting — and helped maintain family customs associated with church festivals: "In the evening on Rotation Sunday, farmers and their families walked the boundaries of their property; it was both inventory and time for giving thanks for their land" (p. 33).

A fieldstone grike, a wooden tub, a folding ladder, a bottle-glass window — these are a few of the archaic but practical items mentioned in Noah's diary. On August 6: "We have begun a corn cratch, and I have begun taking down the old forge barn." Hurrah for those Good Old Days when even the spellings came closer to reality (holyday for holiday, or humblebee for bumblebee) than seems possible in our overly-sophisticated society today!

HERBERT H. UMBACH
KINSMEN OF THE GRAIL
By Dorothy James Roberts (Little. Brown. $5.75)
Perhaps one of the most frequently used themes in literature is the story of King Arthur and his knights of the Round Table. With Kinsmen of the Grail, Dorothy James Roberts has added another fine work to the collection.

This is the story of Gawain of Rho. Nephew of the king, knighted at twenty, the 40-year-old Gawain is still a faithful, if rather weary, follower of King Arthur. Then on a routine mission through Norgals, Gawain comes into contact with a disturbingly strange family — the lady Iglais, a widow who seeks only peace, and who makes little effort to save the properties which are being taken over by her neighbor, the Moors; Perceval, her 16-year-old son, naïve and child-like until he meets his first knight; Pellies, brother to Iglais, with whom he was raised; Perceval, who gave up his kingship to become a hermit, and his son Joseus, a former knight, living in seclusion to atone for killing his own mother in a fit of anger; Mortelle, the second brother, a king turned bandit; and Peleur, the third brother, a king much talked about but never met.

Gawain returns to the royal City of Legions, home of Arthur himself, a man "still all one color. eyes, hair, beard, skin, brows, a faded reddish brown", and to his son and heir, Lo-hot, child of Guenivere; blue-eyed Lancelot, brave and gentle; comfort-loving Yvain, close friend of Gawain; Ector, captain of the guard; sinister Kei; and Merlin, the king's counselor. Iglais, however, has told Gawain that her kinsman guarding the Holy Grail, brought to Britain by her family's ancestor, Joseph of Arimathaea. Thus Gawain combines his search for the missing Lo hot and the runaway Perceval with his quest for the Grail.

But one is tempted to read some symbolism into what may be only an excellent historical novel. Perceval, having obtained the sword which Gawain and his fellow knights had failed to gain, dons white armor decorated with a green cross, and becomes an almost Christlike figure. Gawain, a worldly man, strives for the Grail for an entire year, receives instruction from the hermits Pellies and Joseus, is saved from Mortelle (wearing black armor, a man who "could feign death," whose death had been reported several times) by Perceval, but at last sees that he is not yet ready for the Grail and must return to fight for Arthur. Iglais reluctantly realizes that her son has a special mission in life and that, following his fast-approaching death, she must go into a convent rather than accept Gawain's love. And the matured Perceval, having conquered Mortelle, tells Gawain that "in this quest each man must go along," receives the Grail from the ancient Peleur and predicts that both he and Merlin (pagan magic) will soon die together.

Both as an experienced author (whose numerous writings include other historical novels), and as a professional student of medieval and Arthurian literature (since her student days at Barnard College and the University of Wisconsin), Dorothy James Roberts is ideally suited to write a work such as this. The descriptions of long-ago Britain with its numerous Roman ruins are carefully drawn, and the chapter on Whitsuntide festivities at Arthur's court is outstanding. Her characters are alive in their doubts, fears, and decisions. The odd coexistence of Christianity and paganism is not neglected. It is apparent that much thought and research has gone into this fast-moving book of fiction, set in a background of both history and legend.

STEPHANIE UMBACH
WILLIAM FAULKNER: EARLY PROSE AND POETRY
Edited by Carvel Collins (Atlantic-Little, Brown. $2.25)
This collection will be valuable not only to the student of Faulkner but also to the person who desires to understand human change and the commitment which takes place in a mature author as compared to the same author in his youth. Having this collection to compare with Faulkner's mature works cannot but help one to recognize potentials and see the changes and commitment.

Assembled here are sixteen early poems, sixteen pen-and-ink sketches, and several prose pieces, written during Faulkner's time at the University of Mississippi. The writings are tied together and to Faulkner's life by Professor Carvel Collins' fine introduction and editing. When reading the poetry and critical pieces in the collection one is aware of the influence of Keats, Swinburne, and Verlaine. One is also aware of a voice in Faulkner attempting passion but not yet having committed itself to a passion or truth about reality in a microcosm or macrocosm. Consequently, the poetry at times is overwritten in order to achieve effect, and the prose is somewhat stiff and objectified: the writer attempting a posture that is not yet fully realized.

But one can see in these works the seeds of a writer who was later to blend poetry and prose into a poetic-prose that would serve not just as a style to clothe thoughts but as a style that would be an essential part of the emotion and humanness, flaws and nobleness that characterize the life of man in Faulkner's mature and significant works.

H. SAMUEL HAMOD

The Cresset

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November 3, 1964, will be written into the nation’s textbooks for all posterity to read, for on that day the Democratic party won one of the great electoral victories of all political history. The voters of the United States gave President Johnson sixty per cent plus of the popular vote. Mr. Johnson won forty-four states and the District of Columbia in gathering up four hundred and eighty-six electoral college votes. The President, now the chief executive in his own right and according to his own lights, will be welcomed on his return to the legislative processes by commanding majorities of sixty-eight Senators and two hundred and ninety-five Representatives. Out across the land thirty-three Democratic governors out of a possible fifty have won state-houses. "The President's coat-tails were big enough to take along a majority out of a possible fifty have won state-houses. -The President's coat-tails were big enough to take along a majority of state and local offices throughout the country. Certainly, on the surface at least, the landslide victory looks like a popular mandate to LBJ.

According to most reports, the President and top-level Democrats feel that he won the presidency because voters looked upon him as a sensible, prudent man who would not go to pieces "when the going got tough." According to these reports, the President looked like a man "who could get things done." as was especially evident in the legislative program pushed through the last Congress with the cooperation of Senator Dirksen and Congressman Halleck. The voter, it is alleged, felt relieved that the President managed to keep the lid on so many boiling caldrons at home and abroad.

Obviously Mr. Goldwater failed in his attempts to make the President look like a Communist, or a Socialist, or a Fascist, or a crook, or a contributor to juvenile delinquency, or a phoney, or a power-driven megalomaniac. Moreover, for Goldwater or any other Republican to call Mr. Johnson a tyrant or a dictator in the face of a three-to-two popular majority is a bit preposterous. If Mr. Johnson is a tyrant, over sixty per cent of the voters want it that way. However, it is hard in present circumstances to conclude that the voters have mandated a man on horseback. What we have in Mr. Johnson is not a Hitler. But we do have a man who understands the uses to which political power can be put.

Without question, Mr. Johnson and the top-level Democrats will look upon this vote as a mandate to push the Great Society into law.

Johnson and his advisors are looking for the Great Break-Through in three major areas: in urban programs, in the conservation of natural resources, and in education. The voters of America can look for the Great Push in urban renewal, slum clearance, relocation, traffic alleviation, interstate (military) highway construction, airport promotion, anti-poverty crusades, medical care, classroom construction, federal scholarships, dormitory loans, and the like. Any person, serious and aware of the dilemmas of his own community, knows that Mr. Johnson is not directing his attention to "fake" problems. The truly sensitive person is aware that he can no longer stand on the Protestant Ethic and the rural value patterns of by-gone days. Whether we like it or not, the Muse of History is permitting urbanism and metropolitanism to roll across what once was rural and Protestant America.

The American may say: "I do not like urbanism and metropolitanism." He may say: "I like it the way it once was down on the farm." He may say: "I would certainly like to return to the good old days." But he cannot and dares not say in right mind, or even in his heart: "I will not come to terms with urban renewal because urban renewal problems do not exist — and urban people are a bunch of crooks anyway."

He just cannot say: "The elements of Johnson's program for the Great Society are not relevant." He certainly cannot say: "Let us be careful that the cities do not swallow up us rural people." It is already happening.

The voter cannot and dares not build around himself the isolating and insulating buffer zones of ignorance, insensibility, and unawareness. If the state and local jurisdictions do not, will not, or cannot meet these dilemmas, Washington will and can. Though the debates about these matters were not accomplished during the campaign, the United States can no longer postpone them. Democrats and Republicans, churchmen and educators, mayors and trustees can no longer push these problems under the rugs of fear, anxiety, indifference, and incompetence.

Somewhere in the debates about the Great Society, the mandate majority will melt away and the G.O.P. will be able to gather up strength and political power. Notwithstanding — the voters of America will have to come to terms with the aspirations of the Great Society. The Great Break-Through to the future might just take place at this point.
Good For What Ails You

BY ANNE HANSEN

Are you tired? Run down? Do you have that all-indragged-out feeling? If you do, please do not reach for Lotireg, for that clever little guy named Speedy, or even for vitamins x, y, or z. Instead, I shall suggest a sure-fire tonic. Go to see Mary Poppins (Buena Vista, Robert Stevenson). Here we have Walt Disney at his best, and that is very good indeed.

Mary Poppins, a musical fantasy, is based on the adventures of the fictional English nanny created by P.L. Travers about twenty-five years ago. Miss Travers, an Englishwoman, must be gratified to see how successfully her magical nursemaid has been brought to life on the screen. Mary Poppins has all the ingredients that make for an outstanding film: fresh, lilting, singable songs; dazzling choreography; strikingly effective settings; enchanting whimsy; rib-tickling comedy; satire that is pointed but never cruel; an exceptionally well-made script; expert direction; and a brilliant cast. In addition, there are special technical and scenic effects which must be seen to be appreciated.

Julie Andrews, the charming and gifted musical-comedy star who appeared in the original Broadway productions of My Fair Lady and Camelot, is completely captivating as Mary Poppins. Dick Van Dyke displays remarkable versatility in a demanding, many-faceted role. It would be difficult to find any flaws in the performances of the supporting players. The children — Mary's charges and the heart and center of the story — are sweet, natural, and appealing.

There may be those who do not respond to excursions into sheer fantasy. To them Mary Poppins may seem a bit sweet, rather childish, and a little too long. But I doubt that most movie-goers will be able to resist the infectious gayety of this fine film. For this is clean, wholesome, and beguiling comedy for the entire family.

The next film on my list does not lend itself to carefree, wholehearted enjoyment. Fail Safe (Columbia, Sidney Lumet) plunges us abruptly into a nightmarish world of grim reality. The possibility of nuclear war casts a long and ominous shadow over the nations of the earth. Can a nuclear holocaust in fact come about as the result of a mechanical failure in the complex and intricate system designed to direct and control the monstrous weapons of modern warfare? Fail Safe, adapted from the widely read novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, is based on the premise that this can happen. The picture is exciting, the acting is good, and the action builds to a shattering and completely unthinkable climax. The film is also terrifying in its implications. This leads me to ask whether there can be any ethical justification for the deliberate exploitation of a subject which involves the fate of civilization. To be informed is right and desirable. To be misinformed is not.

The Visit, Friedrich Duerrenmatt's trenchant and sardonic study of an embittered old woman's macabre plan for revenge, scored a hit on Broadway in 1958. It is safe to predict that the film version of The Visit (20th Century-Fox, Bernhard Wicki) will not fare so well. Ingrid Bergman and Anthony Quinn appear in the roles that were played with brilliant success by Lynn Fontanne and Alfred Lunt in the stage production. But the characterizations presented by Miss Bergman and Mr. Quinn lack both depth and conviction. And Duerrenmatt's scathing exposition of the manner in which the townspeople not only succumb to the corrupting power of greed but actually succeed in rationalizing their actions is wholly perfunctory.

Fred Zinnemann must be ranked with the ablest directors of our day. Unfortunately, Behold a Pale Horse (Columbia) falls far short of the standard of excellence we have come to associate with Mr. Zinnemann's work. The photography is magnificent; but the acting is lackluster, and the story moves at a snail's pace.

Here are other current film releases. All are run-of-the-mill. Send Me No Flowers and I'd Rather Be Rich, both from Universal, are shoddy and in poor taste. Kisses for My President (Warners) is downright silly. Cartouche (Embassy) is a swashbuckling adventure yarn. Fate Is the Hunter (20th Century-Fox) is a thrill-a-minute melodrama. And Invitation to a Gunfighter (United Artists) is a cliche-ridden horse opera.

Two TV shows presented during the month of October relieved the tedium of the mediocre new programs which made unimpressive debuts and of the endless political palaver which assailed our ears. The first was the successful launching of Syn Com III on October 7. This remarkable synchronous communications satellite was used to transmit the Olympic Games in Tokyo to many parts of the world. And on October 25 a grateful nation paid a final tribute to a distinguished American. The name of Herbert Clark Hoover is not confined to the United States. Nor does it rest on the fact that he served as our 31st President. Mr. Hoover belonged to the world. Who can even attempt to evaluate the work of this truly great humanitarian? Mr. Hoover exemplified the best of the qualities which we like to call American.
Dear Editor:
The article by Professor Richard Sommerfeld, "Bureaucracy in the Church," is indeed welcome. Professor Sommerfeld rightly refuses to indulge in superficial criticism of institutionalism as such or in complaint about centralization of power. His article reflects an awareness of the fact that both institution and centralization are inevitable and the only relevant concern is that they be structured as creatively as possible.

There are, however, at least two urgent factors to which Professor Sommerfeld does not give adequate attention. Since he addresses himself explicitly to the Missouri Synod, I am surprised that he does not discuss the increasing conflict between the functioning polity of the Synod and the theoretical polity of the Synod as outlined in the Handbook. This conflict is especially apparent as a consequence of the last synodical convention in Cleveland as is documented in my article "A Study of Developing Polity at the Cleveland Convention" (AMERICAN LUTHERAN June. 1963). At the forthcoming Detroit Convention the delegates will be asked to approve a number of steps which with varying degrees of directness will have a significant effect upon the Synod's polity. It would seem that in the weeks and months immediately ahead members of the Missouri Synod would do well to study carefully what has been and is happening to the manner in which decisions are made and carried out in the Missouri Synod. These developments may all be for the better but unless we understand them we cannot know that.

A more serious failing in Professor Sommerfeld's article, however, is that his suggestions for improving the polity and administration of the Synod do not comprehend the hope that the Missouri Synod as an autonomous ecclesial institution is a temporary phenomenon. No degree of sophisticated suspicion about the immortality of institutions ought to distract us from the goal of the Synod's comprehension in the greater Church. As the Archbishop of Canterbury has had the courage to assert that the Anglican communion must see its own dissolution as its prime ecumenical goal, so must we Lutherans courageously assert the same about our synods. Not only must we make the assertion we must also begin to prepare for that eventuality.

Certainly this has radical implications for our thinking about synodical polity. It means that we must engage in a quest not simply for the polity of efficiency or administrative effectiveness but above all for the polity of unity. Administrative effectiveness is important since the Missouri Synod as such may long continue as an administrative unit within the larger Church. But we must never become so preoccupied with efficiency that we begin to re-enthuse that feeling of self-sufficiency that has all too often characterized our past.

As Lutherans we can rejoice that our confessional and theological position gives us a blessed flexibility on matters of polity. Although some American Lutherans have come dangerously close to dogmatizing the historic episcopate should be clearly distinguished from many current efforts to enhance and aggrandize present executive offices by the use of episcopal vocabulary or appurtenances. This attempt is hardly worthy of American Lutheranism. And we are not heartened by the number of executives in the several parts of American Lutheranism who are currently, although not usually publicly, advocating an increase of executive authority under the guise of episcopal government.

Although the implementation of the historic episcopate raises numerous questions, none of them are beyond theological or administrative resolution given a sincere commitment to the quest for Christian unity. It would mean that we as a synod would confess our insufficiency and seek through an ecumenical expression of the Church's ministry a vision of the Church that points us beyond any one manifestation of its institutional life. The absence of this vision from Professor Sommerfeld's article leads me to hope that the question of synodical polity will again and frequently receive attention in your esteemed journal.

Your servant in Christ
RICHARD J. NEUHAUS
Brooklyn, New York

Dear Editor:
In reference to your editorial on guns in The Cresset (October 1964, pp. 5-6) you overlook one very simple and indisputable fact—nothing, absolutely nothing can prevent criminals from obtaining guns. Any person who is already dedicated to a life of crime will not for a moment hesitate to violate laws against the purchase or possession of firearms. Thus laws against firearms only serve to disarm law-abiding citizens and have absolutely no effect on those who already live in conflict with the law and have no reason to fear violating one more law. Thus anti-gun laws actually work in favor of the criminal since the criminal can operate with less fear of resistance or opposition in areas where law-abiding citizens have been disarmed. A criminal who has reason to believe his victim may be armed will think twice before committing a crime. This is precisely why every responsible law-abiding citizen has a duty to possess firearms and why the government should continue to sell or distribute arms to groups such as the NRA. To become a member of the NRA one must be recommended by a law enforcement officer or other citizen with an established reputation in the community. For this reason only an infinitesimally small percentage of dangerous and irresponsible people (if any at all) could obtain arms through membership in this organization. Neither Oswald nor Ruby were members of NRA! This is our surest guarantee of our continued liberty. What lunatic-fringe extremist group like the Minutemen you mention would even for a moment contemplate taking over our government by force of arms as long as it knows that there are millions of citizens who are well armed and willing to risk their lives, if necessary, to defend their government against any external or internal attacks. Even if such a group did attempt a take-over, what chance would it have against such odds? Bear in mind, such take-overs always work from within the army and other controlled government agencies so you can not depend on the army to suppress such revolts. Look at Germany in 1933, Czechoslovakia after World War II and countless other countries taken over by minority groups because they were able to immobilize the armed forces by working from within them. Only the uncontrollable forces of our country, the free responsible citizens of our country can serve as security against small or large scale criminal assaults. Woe to us the day the free citizens of our country are disarmed.

You say "that very few civilians have any business at all keeping a rifle in their possession." The fact of the matter is that every citizen has a duty to keep a weapon in his possession. Of course, as you pointed out, there will be accidents. But would you advocate abolishing private ownership and operation of automobiles because this results in so many accidental deaths? This is one of the prices of progress in a crowded and complex modern society. (Furthermore many gun "accidents" were not accidental at all but suicides that are being covered up by the victim's family to avoid the censure of the church.) The two major duties and responsibilities of every citizen in our country are to vote at every election and to be prepared at all times to defend himself, his family and property and above all his country against any kind of criminal assault. The shirkers and cowards who do not exercise both of these responsibilities do not deserve the privileges of citizenship.

Yours truly,
DR. JOHN W. BRUNNER
Allentown, Pennsylvania

December, 1964
Where is Christmas?

Dear Stephen:

Yesterday as the sun went down, the maple west of our house was a riot of gold and red and brown . . . During the night the first cold wind came down from the North, and this morning the tree stood stark and bare against the hill . . . I looked at it as the coffee was brewing on our stove — and I knew it was time to say something about Christmas . . .

Exactly twenty years have come and gone since I wrote my first Christmas letter to your brother John . . . Both John and Mark have now gone away to see if Christmas still has a place on the campus of a great university . . . When dusk comes down over our house on Christmas Eve, I hope they may be able to hear the crying of the Child in the loudness of our time . . . Only then and here will they learn to be faithful and wise in a heavenly sense . . .

Tonight I remember, too, that ten years ago, just before Christmas, you were playing on the floor before the fire when you looked up and asked: “Where is Christmas?” . . . I did not answer at the time because I certainly knew that this was a very hard question . . . You had put the finger of a little child on one of the ultimate problems of life and time . . . If we always knew the answer and would live under its great light, we would be much happier than we are now and our world would be so much better for it . . .

In one way the answer to your question is easy enough . . . Christmas is in every place where people have heard about the Baby, the Mother, the cave and the shepherds running to their God in the night . . . Christmas is even in Chicago as people rush up and down State Street . . . in the carols sung from the Tribune Tower . . . in the lonely church bell in the Chicago Loop as it sounds more alone on Christmas Eve . . . in the choirs of eternity chanting . . . in Christmas trees huddled around the doors of grocery stores . . . in the stars of Christmas flaming in their courses . . . in the Virgin Mother making the bed of straw . . . in the quiet sleep of the Christ Child . . . Christmas is wherever man has been and God has come to forgive . . . The nine tolling monosyllables, “There was no room for them in the inn,” are the story of man; and the simple words, “For God so loved the world,” are the essence of God . . . Christmas is where people believe that it is both fact and faith . . . It is where there is wonder at the folly of men and the pity of heaven . . . It is where trumpets sound again at dawn . . . It is where men hear a song out of the heart of God — no mortal melody but the divine symphony of peace and the forgiving of sin . . .

Where is Christmas? . . . When all is said and done it finally must be in your heart . . . The events of Christmas Eve and Christmas Night must be lived again in the hearts of all of us who believe that in the Child was the final answer to the troubles and anxieties which disturb us these days . . . Christmas is a quiet interior thing which finally only God can see in all its power and glory . . .

Christmas is also in a famous cartoon which I saw just forty years ago . . . There was a dark, cold, windswept street and a brilliantly lighted mansion with holly wreaths in the windows . . . In the snow before the house were two ragged and huddled figures . . . a mother and her son . . . The boy is saying to his mother: “Ah, don’t cry Ma, ya singin swell.” . . . Christmas is here, even here . . . even in our crying in the night . . . in the fellowship of those who bear the marks of pain . . .

THANKSGIVING

Lord,
Keep my mouth shut a while,
Lest all these blessings counted,
Praises sung,
Beat with too great a noise
Against my inner ear
And make it hard to hear.
Lord,
Shut my mouth a while.
Put tongues in my hands
And voices in my feet.

ANN SPRINGSTEEN