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September, 1970

THE CRESSET

Clarity is one of the truly distinguishing characteristics of the Educated Man. Told

Learning is not what we were taught to believe. Ignorance is not so frightful than not

A SPECIALIST should be like a surgeon, whose job is to make a sharp point given different from the normal person. Should be able to do well

THINKING PERSON should be able to do well

Love and work

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THE CRESSET
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Comment on Current Issues

A Right of Privacy?

The question may sound strange, because the answer to it may seem too obvious. As Americans, we are cultural heirs to a great tradition of privacy. This is seen most clearly in the code of the American Frontier, which forbade inquiry into a man's past — perhaps for fear of learning too much about him. Then too, the Reformation, to which many of us subscribe, places primary emphasis upon a man's personal relation to God, which is, one gathers, a matter of the heart and of the mind or of that recessive, untouchable essence of a man, his "soul," so easily screened from public scrutiny.

Many people have seen in the growing complexity of society various threats to the cherished privacies of its members. The information contained on one's 1040 tax form furnishes a pretty good index to the life patterns and special proclivities of its author. The census bureau, credit company, and school, military, and employment questionnaires all fish for data about us which some of us would rather not reveal. When, further, it has become technically feasible to collect this information gleaned by disparate agencies into one central file on each of us, the last vestige of our privacy seems on the way out. All of which leads us to think that we have a right to privacy, not just an occasional desire for it. And it leads us to wonder whether this is not an enforceable right, a right which others can impinge upon only at their peril.

Not every person, or every age of peoples, has developed such a keen sense of privacy. In early Greek society, a "politics of participation" saw personal virtue equated with civic virtue, and privacy had no place. Similarly, the Germanic conception of the "folk" treated the nation as the place in which the individual found his true identity and expression. Even today there are countries in which it is not socially improper to inquire about a man's income — and hence countries in which this piece of data is not such an abiding curiosity.

If it is true, as some among us allege, that each of us has a right to privacy, it is relevant to ask where that right comes from and what is its scope.

The supposition that the right of privacy is a natural right raises a host of questions about what is meant by a natural right, and whether it is even remotely plausible to think that anyone has any of them. Fortunately for those who believe that a man has a right to privacy, it is not necessary to decide the question of whether or not this right is a natural right. For it has already been decided (for Americans, anyway, by the Supreme Court) that we (Americans) have a legal right to privacy. The landmark decision on this matter was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives by married persons was unconstitutional, on the ground that the law invaded the sacred realm of marital privacy.

In reaching the Griswold decision, it is arguable that the Court asserted the existence of a legal right to (marital) privacy on the ground that there is a natural right to (marital) privacy. The court, of course, did not say as much, since natural law jurisprudence has long been out of fashion in this country. Thus in the opinion of the Court (if one can call it that; there were four separate opinions written for the majority and two vigorous dissenting opinions, making a total of six different opinions from the nine Justices) the right of (marital) privacy "emanates" from other Constitutional rights. It is part of the "penumbra" of rights guaranteed by various of the first nine amendments to the Constitution.

The opinion in Griswold was novel in that for the first time it explicitly asserted a Right of Privacy as such, apart from any of the other legal categories (such as trespass or property rights) usually invoked in breach of privacy suits. But even so, the Court did not assert an unconditional or unlimited Right of Privacy on the part of American citizens. Indeed, the very suggestion that a citizen has an unlimited or unconditional Right of Privacy cuts at the very heart of the idea of social organization.

One aspect of the idea of privacy is the notion of solitude — non-involvement with other members of society. But if everyone had and exercised that right, there would be no society at all. Further, no one can sensibly claim that his "right to be let alone," as Justice Brandeis phrased it, is indefeasible. If that were a man's legal right, he would legally be out of reach of social control, which is the very purpose of law in the first place. Hence, a legal system which conferred on its citizens a legal right to be let alone in all circumstances would be utterly self-contradictory and obviously impossible.
**Big Brother in the Bedroom**

So our legal right of privacy is far from unconditional. Nor is it intrinsically valuable. Being let alone is not an end in itself as part of the dignity of man. Even the Fourth Amendment (where we start with the nearly absolute premise that a man's home is his castle) and the Fifth Amendment (where we accord silence and secrecy to the known or putative criminal), which most strongly suggest the conception of privacy as an intrinsic good, are hedged with devices to nullify the benefits they promise.

In the case of the Fourth Amendment, provision is made for the securing of warrants upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. What is thus prohibited is unreasonable searches and seizures. In the case of the Fifth Amendment, the right not to testify (for or against oneself) is balanced by legal provisions for conviction even in the face of one's stony silence. What the Fifth Amendment secures, then, is the right not to contribute to one's own conviction with one's own testimony on the stand. This right arose not from a keen respect for people's privacy so much as from a felt need to curb the tendency of law enforcement agencies to subject a suspect to the rack and screw as the chief means of obtaining his conviction.

The right of privacy is extrinsically valuable. That is to say, its value derives from the social utility produced by granting to people such a right. But of course once this is seen, it is immediately apparent just how fragile and like an accordion the right of privacy is. For social utilities change, and insofar as the right of privacy is accorded to citizens in virtue of its social utility, the scope and very existence of this right will depend upon its fluctuating social utility.

The point is nicely illustrated by a passing comment in Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in *Griswold*. The dissenting Justices, Black and Stewart, had argued that the Court should not substitute its social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected by the people to pass laws. This restraint should be exercised even when they pass a law like the one at issue, which even Justice Stewart conceded was "uncommonly silly." Justice Goldberg replied:

> The vice of the dissenters' views is that it would permit such experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental personal rights of its citizens.... The logic of the dissents would sanction federal or state legislation that seems to me even more plainly unconstitutional than the statute before us. Surely the Government, absent a showing of compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children have been born to them. Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be 'silly,' no provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the marital right to bear children and raise a family. While it may shock some of my brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected.

What is worth noting in this interesting argument is the qualification Justice Goldberg slips in while raising the spectre of Big Brother stumbling into the bedroom. Goldberg's argument is that "absent a showing of compelling subordinating state interest," governmental supervision of the marriage couch, whether to prohibit or to promote the use of contraceptive devices, is unconstitutional. But if there were a "compelling state interest" in the regulation of (even) natural marital relations, it might well not be unconstitutional to outlaw the use of contraceptives, or (conversely) the failure to use them. Even marital privacy is thus not unconditional. Its value too is extrinsic, in spite of the fact that the Court makes much of marital privacy's being a fundamental right. *Fundamental, i.e., non-fundamental, conditional, provisional, possibly temporary.*

Now if, in the opinion of the Court, even the right of marital privacy is subject to change and review, one wonders what sense it makes to speak of the (legal) Right of Privacy at all. If rights are the sorts of things which come and go, depending upon the times and circumstances, and possibly within the career of the interpretation of a single document, then they are at best rights in a very extended sense. They are enjoyed only at the pleasure of the relevant law-making or law-interpreting body. They certainly are not Constitutional rights, which must be honored upon pain of undercutting the very basis of the entire legal system. And if this is true of the Right of Privacy — or even the much more limited Right of Marital Privacy — it follows that these rights are not legal rights in the full-blooded sense of that term which we may once have fancied them to be. They're here-today, possibly-gone-tomorrow rights.
Priorities in the Body Politic

I do not wish to suggest that there is no "right" of privacy, or that the notion of a Right of Privacy is unimportant or confused. On the contrary, it seems likely that talk of the Right of Privacy is very much on the ascendency, especially as we find it increasingly difficult to exercise that right. Now that the Supreme Court has given some legitimacy to the general notion of a Right of Privacy, we are already seeing the invocation of this "right" in an effort to reform and abolish some nettlesome laws.

For example, abortion laws are being attacked on the ground that they violate a woman's Right of Privacy to do as she wishes with her body. This is an intriguing angle. It is far from clear that the law grants people the right to do what they want with their bodies. One may not, for example, disrobe with impunity at a public assembly (unless one is at a certified Rock Festival, etc.); nor, in some States, can one legally attempt suicide. But for all of that, the Right of Privacy has seemed to some courts to include the right to abort.

What we see in the Right of Privacy is a novel legal concept, doubtless responsive to a widespread popular fancy, which is used by various legal institutions and public advocates to come to terms with changing social situations. The concept of a Right of Privacy, like any concept, is a tool of thought about the world and man's place in it. But this concept, unlike some others, has no necessary applicability. Indeed, its recent legal birth and now rampant use suggest that the belief that each one of us has such a right is something of a conceit.

Provisional rights depend for their existence upon priorities; in our quasi-democratic system of government, this means that whether we have a Right of Privacy depends upon our own priorities. Yet priorities, like the social utilities which they reflect, have a way of changing. If they do, and the Right of Privacy is discarded in the process, nothing intrinsically good will be lost, though life would, in that event, be very different for us. Still, it's not so very good now, so what lies ahead may well be better.

On Second Thought

By ROBERT J. HOYER

A strange phenomenon is occurring with increasing frequency in the church: the use of monetary threat to affect the course of congregational and denominational policy. Congregations enter what they call a "status confessionis," they withhold their expected contributions from their denomination until such time as its leaders act in accordance with their will. Church members withdraw support because the church program is not what they desire. Church publications are boycotted until the publishers respond to the will of the protesters.

Each evidence has its converse. Leaders hire and fire personnel to satisfy the protest so that monetary support will continue. Publishers print in anxiety over subscription lists only what will not damage their income. Congregations act in order to keep the support of the "good giver."

One little word calls all of this into question. It was spoken by Jesus Christ our Lord. He said, "You cannot serve God and mammon." You can argue about the applicability of the word, but you cannot deny its truth — not just because Jesus said it, but because it is so obviously true. You cannot serve God and Mammon. Choose your leader: monetary need or God.

Arguments for the monetary threat are good. We should not give to what is unGodly. The work of the church needs contributions, and we cannot afford to endanger the whole program for one minor part. Publishing is costly, and we can print only what will be supported and used. The will of the people is, in a real sense, the voice of the Spirit in the church and we must listen.

Another little word used by Jesus Christ throws all these arguments out. The word is "faith." If we believe, we convince, exhort, and lead to change by the Word in Jesus Christ. Money does not speak the Word. If we believe, we trust in God as we do what we are called to do. We do not trust in the wallets of people. If we believe, we listen to the Spirit that speaks Jesus Christ, not the voice that threatens money.

Churches who use the power of money to affect their will are serving mammon and not God. They do not act in faith, they do not speak the Word. Men who alter or avoid what they feel called to do because of monetary threat are serving mammon and not God. They do not act in faith, they are not listening to the Word.

The judgment is harsh, but not too harsh. There is no condemnation in it. In the Christian ethos, when we realize that we are judged we only realize that salvation and joy lie in another direction. The judgment is only a call to deny the threat and the fear of money. It is a call to serve God in whom is our only hope.
The Ethics of Population and Pollution

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Before addressing myself directly to the ethical issues involved in the population-pollution problem, I would like to make a few methodological comments about the nature of ethical reflection on these kinds of questions. This is necessary as many think of the ethicist as a kind of moral legislator who determines the right and wrong, the good and bad, of each issue. To be an ethicist would seem to commit one to a claim of moral wisdom and insight greater than that of most men. Thus, the ethicist’s job is conceived as being able to dictate the non-ambiguous “ethical solution” for the population-pollution issue.

As much as ethicists may be tempted to assume this vaunted status we cannot do so for at least two reasons. First, ethicists have no special knowledge about the good that other men do not. There is no abstract good to know, but the good comes clothed always in the garment of ambiguity. As such we are limited by the same kind of painful human experience that besets all men. Rather than recommending the “good” we simply try to help men see what is at stake in the decisions that we all have to make.

Secondly, there are no pure moral issues, but rather they come mixed with extremely complex matters of fact and interpretation. For example the issues of population and pollution depend for definition on a great deal of expert knowledge of such people as demographers, ecologists, biologists and sociologists. As an ethicist I cannot pretend to be an expert in any of these areas. I must simply accept a good deal of what they tell me in good faith.

I think there is a problem here as we must be careful not to indulge in a glorification of the expert. This is dangerous because experts disagree and we might easily make the error of enshrining bad science. More important than this however is that such disagreement among “objective” scientists often is the result of basic value presuppositions that they have failed to make explicit.

However this is meant only as a warning. I do not mean to imply or suggest that the findings of scientists are not extremely important for informing our moral options. We must be willing to let new findings direct our ethical response. For at least part of the meaning of the idea of responsibility is trying as much as possible to know what is going on. In as much as expert opinion informs us of this it is of extreme moral importance.

Given these qualifications however I think that what an ethicist can do is to try to suggest a framework within which the issues of population and pollution can be morally discussed with more rigor than otherwise might be possible. The ethicist in a sense is not a man with answers, but rather he is a man with certain questions that he thinks are important to be asked. For in the asking of such questions he tries to delineate as clearly as possible what morally is at stake in certain issues and in so doing perhaps indicate what are some of the possible alternative directions. Ethics is rather like art in this as it is ultimately an attempt to clarify our vision through conceptual stimulation of the imagination.

The Overpopulation of the Underdeveloped

I should like to begin by briefly indicating my understanding of the population and pollution issues so you can see the kind of perception with which I am working. This is important for one’s ethical analysis of any problem depends to a great extent how and what one understands the problem to be — my understanding of it might be wrong; therefore, it is important for me to make clear exactly what I think is going on. In other words what I am indicating is that the descriptive task is not simple or non-moral, but an integral aspect of any moral analysis.

First in regard to population I take the problem to be the rapid growth of world population. Population growth in the past has been checked by high death rates balanced by high birth rates — as a matter of fact the latter was thought important as a way of maintaining large families necessary for survival in agrarian economies. However with the advent of modern medicine, control of plague, and better nutrition, to mention just three reasons, the birth rate is now far exceeding the death rate. Coupled with this is the phenomenon known as the “doubling effect.” It took until 1850 for the world’s population to equal a billion. From 1850 to 1925 a second billion was added, and by 1960 a third billion was added. We are expected to reach four billion by 1985. This of course is but the concrete realization of Malthus’ insight that population growth occurs in geometric proportion rather than arithmetic.

What is especially disturbing about this increase is it is occurring in its most dramatic forms in underdeveloped countries where population already exceeds food production. The upshot of this is that we can anticipate in the next fifty years mass starvation and sickness that results from malnutrition. Even Donald Bogue,
the most optimistic of the demographers, in arguing that the population crisis will be over by the 21st century says that in countries such as India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and Egypt there is no way to avoid mass starvation.2

Also intimately related to the question of population beyond that of starvation is the human problems brought on by population density — increases in tension, stress, urbanization, and the question of whether our political forms can handle the problems arising from the increase of population. In the light of this analysis many are concluding that morally we must do something to reduce the rapid growth of population.3

The one issue that stands out among these kinds of problems however is of course that of pollution. What starvation is to an underdeveloped country pollution is to the developed. Increased industrialization and waste occasioned by our population growth is threatening our environment in a way that even if we are able to feed ourselves we may not be able to survive. This is not just a matter of destroying what natural surroundings we have left, but it is a question of the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink — we are in effect poisoning ourselves by the very necessities of the prerequisites of living in a mass industrialized society. Therefore pollution and population go hand in hand; we cannot effectively do anything about the one without doing something about the other.

This is how I understand the situation descriptively today. Such a description could be wrong, but I think that the realm of proof now rests on those who would argue to the contrary. Once the issue is put in this stark way, however, the natural reaction of many is one of shock and then a determined resolve that something must be done about the coming crisis. The primary assumption behind this response is that survival is the main value at stake and that all steps necessary must be taken in order to reverse the current trend. It is a corollary of this assumption that any means can be justified in this situation in order to achieve the end of reduced population growth.

For example there are only two ways to reduce population growth — increase the death rate or decrease the birth rate. Most of those who assume that survival is the one value presupposition involved in this question endorse some rather extreme and coercive ways of controlling the birth rate. However they also often assume that it is appropriate to use certain techniques to increase the death rate. They are, for example, impressed by the statistic that shows the most effective way to institute a sudden and dramatic drop in the birth rate is to resort to widespread abortion (and abortion is a death increase strategy; it is not birth control).

In such a context abortion is simply viewed as a means to a morally good end — no longer is the question of abortion considered as an issue in itself, the question of the viability of the fetus is often not even raised — it is simply assumed that the already born have a claim to life that is greater than that of the fetus.

However as this argument now stands one must ask what prevents the same kind of reasoning from being used as a justification for the destruction of all unwanted infants before they reach their first year. That way we could separate the wheat from the chaff with greater precision. Or given the logic of the argument one must not ask why the proponents of abortion as a means to solve the population crisis do not recommend that all those over 65 be eliminated in the name of the good of the whole. (Of course that is not efficient since they are past the time of child rearing.)

Who is to Suffer for the Good of Us All?

What I want to illustrate by these examples is that the form of the argument that is often used to discuss the population crisis is the classic utilitarian argument that the good of the whole justifies and dictates the right moral policy — and the good is identified by the quantitative satisfaction of the individual desires of the greatest number. But as soon as the argument is stated in this abstract form we can ask some rather important questions about it: (1) what is the content of such a good; (2) who is to decide what such a good is; (3) who is to suffer for the good of the whole; (4) and finally are any means justified if the desired end is achieved.

As soon as such questions are raised it becomes clear that the moral issues in the population-pollution crisis are more complex than simply the question of survival — that is they are more complex if we are interested in surviving as fully human beings — otherwise we may simply be willing to survive at a cost of employing measures that would make us less than human. It is to recognize that human life is not an end in itself if it is divorced from the moral values that make human life worthwhile.

Often when someone raises these kinds of questions that challenge the reigning orthodoxy surrounding the population issue the questioner is accused of being more concerned with the quantity of life than the quality. For example Robert Ardrey in a recent Life article says, "The humanist preoccupation with the numbers game has sacrificed human quality for human quantity. Life must be prolonged, whatever agony it presents to the dying. A child defective physically or mentally must somehow be saved to join the breeding population." He concludes "that we will find out one day over-protection of human beings will produce a genetic collapse in the most compassionate population."4

While I do not wish to attribute Ardrey's views to all who follow this line of reasoning I do think that it makes clear the logic of the position. But it must also be pointed out that contrary to Ardrey's assertion it is those who adhere to the utilitarian argument that are concerned with the numbers game as they assume that all men can be treated as strict numerical entities to be added and sub-
tracted as inorganic units. It is not finally an issue of quantity versus quality, but rather differing interpretations of the quality of life.

In this connection I must admit that I am a bit concerned how some understand "quality of life" in the debate of the population issue in this country. For I sometimes think that they are more concerned with preserving a certain kind of middle class standard of living than moral quality. This is probably an overstatement but we must be on our guard not to use the population issue as a support for our own self-interest. In this respect it is interesting to note that some black Americans are extremely suspicious of the population argument as they perceive it as a possible attempt at genocide. Moreover, much of the third world views the attempts to regulate their birth rate as but a different form of Western imperialism.

In the light of these questions I should like to suggest that the moral issues raised by the population-pollution crisis are best understood in relation to the dialectical values of self-determination and community. By self-determination I do not mean just the possibility that men have to determine their futures through their beliefs, intentions and choices. Such ability is of course a prerequisite for the values of self-determination, but it is not the normative principle itself. Normatively, self-determination embodies those aspects of our moral existence that allows us to determine, rather than be determined by, the natural. This is the reason that the value of self-determination is so basic in any consideration of human behavior. It is that aspect of our lives that insures the possibility of human creativity and freedom.

In this respect it is interesting to note that some black Americans are extremely suspicious of the population argument as they perceive it as a possible attempt at genocide. Moreover, much of the third world views the attempts to regulate their birth rate as but a different form of Western imperialism.

The value of self-determination is related to many different kinds of our institutional behavior. For example, it is the primary value underlying the personal nature of human sexuality and propagation. As humans we think it important that we claim certain rights in regard to our responsibility for regulating our sexual activity. In this sense it is also the value to which those who advocate birth control as they assume that what it is to be a man is to shape rather than be shaped by his sexual "nature."

But equally important for human behavior is the value of community. Men cannot determine themselves in a vacuum for the content of their self-determination comes from their social groups. This is not just a recognition that men are basically social animals, but it is also a normative prerequisite for significant human experience. To be human is to be other-regarding. It is to recognize that our self-determination must be limited in accordance with the rights of others.

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**Individuals in a Wider Ecological Community**

This aspect of our moral being is institutionally and concretely determined by sets of expectations that allow us to be able to count on and trust the others. These expectations can be thought of as boundaries over which we cannot go if we are to maintain our existence together. Such boundaries of course can and do become perversions to serve causes that are detrimental to the human group, but such perversions do not cancel the basic significance of such sets of expectations. In this respect however it is extremely important to denature the kinds of communities to which we belong, for as men we will be as limited as our most inclusive communities.

What is interesting of course about these two sets of values is they are not necessarily consistent. Often the value of self-determination is stressed to the extent it is destructive of community; or human community can be made so exclusive a value it results in the oppression of human creativity. No abstract balancing of these two values can solve the hard historical problem of striking the proper balance between them as this must be worked out in the contingencies of our concrete existence.

It seems to me that it is just this kind of problem — that is balancing the values of self-determination and community — that the population and pollution crisis is occasioning. The central issue I think both are calling forth is the question of community, for both force us to ask if part of the cause behind this crisis is not due to the fact that many of us have been working with too narrow community loyalties. For example the issue of pollution forces us to realize that our communities cannot just be limited to our immediate families and localities. It reveals that we are ecologically tied together in a network of interdependence. Unless we recognize this and work for a genuinely common good, a good that is not identified with each of our individual satisfactions, then we may all have to live less wholesome and healthy lives.

In a way this problem reveals beautifully that if self-determination is to be sustained it depends on adherence to a community loyalty. We must communally decide to limit our individual potential as pollutants or we will find that we have not gained more self-determination but less. In a sense this problem is calling us to consider the importance of the idea of the common good for the criterion of governmental action.

This is even more to the case in respect to the question of population, for this problem is forcing us to see that in reality, not just in ideality, we are in a community with men everywhere. We in America cannot morally afford to ignore this as a problem for all the world for we are bound up with the destiny of the human community. In more personal terms this problem is forcing us to see what has always been true about human sexuality, but what we have often ignored — that is that procreative behavior is an individual and communal right. Our sexuality is not an inherent right that cannot
be balanced by the demands of others — in fact if it is to remain our right at all we must learn to limit it for the good of the community.

Thus the population-pollution crisis does raise serious moral questions — but it is not alone the question of survival, but rather it is the question of what kind of human communities do we want to live in. It seems to me that we would want such communities to at least allow for the significance of men’s self-determination as it can be ordered to the common good. Society serves as the enhancement of our self-determination not as its defeat.

In this respect as we go about meeting the necessity of reducing population growth we should place a premium on birth control rather than death enhancement. This means I would favor if necessary extreme coercive birth control measures before I would resort to abortion. Moreover this means that we would try to use those methods that would as much as possible preserve the voluntary nature of the propagative process. Thus the importance and responsibility of becoming informed on these issues is to be stressed.

Beyond information such steps the society can take to encourage small families such as tax breaks should be encouraged. Also better infant care should be stressed (especially in underdeveloped countries) as a way of making clear that large families are no longer a necessity.7 It is important in this respect to understand the wide range of possible ways to reduce population growth as a way of increasing our ethical option.8

Each of the methods I have suggested above are designed to encourage the growth of community responsibility, but the question arises what if there is not time for voluntary family planning to work, as it would seem already the case in some underdeveloped countries.9 It may be that more coercive techniques are necessary in such situations, but if so they must be justified in terms of the common good. Such coercive strategies should be used as much as possible to enhance human freedom and encourage responsible community behavior. For it may well be that survival is the question at stake but let us make sure we survive as humans — that is as men who are free to determine themselves in accordance with the need of the other.

FOOTNOTES
8. For the most comprehensive analysis of the various techniques of population control and their ethical assumptions, see Bernard Berelsen, “Beyond Family Planning,” Science, (February 7, 1969), pp. 533-543.

The Bases for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement

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On March 5, 1970, President Nixon proclaimed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) “The Law of the Land,” following the ratifications of 43 states (including the United States, The Soviet Union, and Great Britain) necessary to bring the treaty into force. The President said that the coming into force of the NPT was one of the major steps in moving “from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation and a lasting peace.” He also expressed hope that the signing would bring about a reduction of tensions among nations, tensions which have made armaments necessary.

This article seeks to summarize many of the arguments which have been advanced as to whether new states should or should not develop independent nuclear weapons systems. While there appears to be some basis for believing that the current international system offers, on balance, a net incentive for such states not to manufacture nuclear weapons, there also appears to be little hope that nuclear proliferation can be stopped in the absence of a United States — Soviet agreement to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. The success of the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty, then, depends greatly upon the success of the current Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) between the superpowers in Vienna. There is, unfortunately, reason to doubt that these talks will be effective.

During the months of February and March of this year a number of statements by U.S. Government officials indicated certain inconsistencies in the Nixon Administration’s policies with respect to strategic arms matters. The questions of nuclear non-proliferation,

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ballistic missile defenses, and more sophisticated "offensive" deterrent weapons such as the highly touted multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) to be affixed to U.S. Minuteman missiles, are of necessity interrelated. The present administration, however, takes one point of view on the proliferation problem and what amounts to a contradictory point of view on the question of its own defensive and deterrent forces. In brief, the administration expects other nations to renounce nuclear weapons while at the same time demonstrating to the world its own belief that they are useful, even necessary, to protect our security.

In part, the dichotomy between these two policies is not intentional, but is due to the fallacies in the logic of nuclear deterrence strategies — which have guided U.S. strategic thinking for over two decades. The importance of the inconsistencies cannot be overlooked, however, particularly in light of the future prospects of widespread nuclear proliferation. The United States cannot continue on what appears to other nations to be a hypocritical course in weapons development and reasonably expect these countries to stand idly by without developing their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of responsible behavior by the present administration and by its Soviet counterpart at Vienna and Helsinki, the vital need for a reduction and eventual end to the dependence of states on weapons of mass destruction for their security will go unrealized and the initiative towards world security will fall to the presently non-nuclear states.

**Inconsistencies in American Nuclear Policy**

The Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states, *inter alia*, that the states concluding the treaty express . . . their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

Two other clauses commit the signatory powers to the "strengthening of trust between states in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons (and) the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles . . . pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament." It also reminds the states that:

In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

In seeming accord with the philosophy of the Nixon administration to lessen East-West tensions with regard to weapons development, Secretary of Defense Laird, in a military posture statement to Congress on February 20, said that, "We have no irrevocable decisions on the future composition of our strategic general purpose or mobility forces." In good Pentagonal stage, however, Laird did say that while the Department of Defense would put off firm decisions on big new weapons until after the SALT, it considered an expanded missile defense system (ABM) "essential" in the meantime. He did not elaborate on the logical distinction between "essential," on the one hand, and "no irrevocable decision," on the other. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D. Miss.) added, on the same day, that the United States would not become a second-class power if Congress could help it, an obvious warning to his fellow senators who would cut the Pentagon's budget.

Five days later, on February 25, Secretary Laird asked Congress to approve plans for a third Safeguard ABM complex, for Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The Secretary also sought Congressional authorization for preparations, but not actual deployment of, Safeguard ABM systems for four other vaguely defined areas, including Washington, D.C. The latter location is significant, since the Safeguard is designed to protect not population centers, but hardened missile sites, indicating a future function for a more widespread ABM system. Laird explained that:

Given President Nixon's determination to postpone additional actions on U.S. offensive (missile and bomber) systems this year in order to advance prospects for success at SALT, further programs on Safeguard deployment becomes the only viable course available.

Apparently, to do nothing while awaiting the outcome of the preliminary SALT negotiations would not have been a viable course for the United States.

Indeed, Laird's understanding of the President's determination itself appears to have been faulty. On Wednesday, March 11, — not a week after the President had signed the proclamation for the enforcement of the NPT, and only two weeks after Laird's statement — it was reported in the press that the United States would deploy its first intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads (MIRV's) in June, 1970.

Administration officials said that although the deployment date had been known within the government for some time, no proposals were made to President Nixon that he delay the date because of the SALT talks.

The beginning of deployment of the missiles with multiple warheads would probably make even more difficult any Soviet-American agreement to keep the nuclear arms race from entering a new phase. "But," it was argued by some administration officials, "since no SALT agreement is in sight and since the Soviet Union has not slowed down its own arms development, the United States must stick to its schedule."

It first appeared that the MIRV's were a qualitative advancement designed to maintain the U.S. counterforce strategy by getting more mileage out of the Min-
uteman missiles by simply replacing single warheads with multiple ones, capable of being targeted against the increasing number of Soviet ICBM's. Had this been the case there would have been no significant change in the U.S.'s "counter-force" deterrent strategy designed to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. It was revealed two days later, however, that the American MIRV is not a significant qualitative advancement over the single-warhead Minuteman II, at least in terms of present U.S. strategy. Pentagon Spokesman Jerry Friedheim told newsmen that,

We do not have the capability (with the MIRV) to attack hardened silos in the Soviet Union, and we do not plan to acquire that capability. 9 This means that U.S. MIRV's must be targeted, in a most threatening manner, against Soviet cities; because when the warheads are made small enough to fit into the MIRV's, they are too small to destroy a hardened weapon. Friedheim added that the Soviets are "very close" to having the capability to destroy American Minuteman sites.

These developments imply two things. First, it appears to be the policy of the Defense Department to use anti-ballistic missiles on an increasing scale as our only counter-force weapon. Secondly, if the assessment of Soviet capability is accurate, it would mean that the whole MIRV program for Minuteman missiles borders on being obsolete before it is deployed, since it is only effective as a countercity weapon. Moreover, as a counter-city weapon, the MIRV would obviously be redundant — there cannot be over 1,000 viable soft targets in the Soviet Union (the approximate number of American Minuteman II's already deployed), to say nothing of the some six hundred Polaris (and soon to be MIRVed Posiedon) missiles cruising the oceans.

The most generous conclusion one can draw from these strategems is that the administration was either trying to confuse the Soviet Union or is seeking to attain a position of strength from which to enter SALT. Very probably, it was trying to do both. But more important for present purposes, the statements of the President and his Secretary of Defense make the Preamble to the NPT appear meaningless, or, at best, just so much rhetoric, in the eyes of a potential nuclear power. The announced decisions are almost completely antithetical to the necessary rationale if a workable non-proliferation agreement is to be realized in the future. To understand why, it is necessary to delve more deeply into the various arguments with respect to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Catalytic War

The most fundamental motivation behind a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons would appear to be to deter a particular military threat. Different aspects of this motivation surrounded the American-sponsored European Multi-Lateral (nuclear) Force (MLF) in the early 1960's. The same rationale applies equally to such diverse countries as Germany, in the face of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union; Israel, in the face of the circumferential threat from the Arab countries supplied by the Soviet Union; and the government of mainland China, which may perceive a threat either from the nationalist regime on Taiwan, backed by American nuclear power, or from the Soviet Union on its northern border.

A natural corollary of the desire for enhanced security through the development of an independent nuclear arsenal is the desire for increased freedom of action and participation in decision making. The desire for freedom of action in the contemporary international system (particularly for small power allies of the superpowers), however, is tied to the rationale of "catalytic war." The catalytic-war rationale dictates that if a small power can develop an infant nuclear force, it can threaten to escalate any aggression it may suffer into a nuclear exchange. By virtue of the danger this threat presents to the alliance, and, thereby, to the superpower ally itself, this ally will be compelled to intervene in the conflict — substituting its own, larger, deterrent force for the small one of its partner — to prevent the escalation from actually occurring.

The rationale of catalytic war shifts the initiative for responding to aggression from the superpower to the small power. As such, it could lead a major nuclear power, such as the United States, into a conflict it would otherwise have chosen to avoid. The major power, therefore, has an interest in preventing the development of independent nuclear forces within its alliance. Its principal justification for this tactic is that small power deterrent independence can never be complete. Despite the argument often made, for example, by the French, that an independent nuclear force is meant solely as a "minimum deterrent" in case the American deterrent in Europe loses its credibility, American strategists have emphasized that the proliferating power would always be dependent on the support of the great power deterrent. 13

The Franco-American controversy over the efficacy of independent nuclear deterrents is characteristic of the destabilizing effect nuclear proliferation may have on an alliance. Despite the opinion of some analysts that independent nuclear forces would not be destabilizing, these arguments have not been able to stand up under either theoretical or historical analysis. Professor Oscar Morgenstern has argued, for example, that independent control of nuclear weapons given only to certain allies would invariably create dissenion within the bloc. 15 Albert Wohlstetter has observed that while there might be certain political benefits from independent nuclear forces (in terms of national feelings of independence and self-determination) which might outweigh the political liabilities of increased dissenion, even these benefits could not be divorced from the dangerous military implications of such forces (a weaken-
The Dilemma of the Superpowers

The Defence of the Capitals over the Credibility of the American Deterrent brought about a crisis of confidence in the European strategy of solecism of the French facture their own, already useless, deterrent forces. In the French case, for example, because of the ability of the Soviet aggressor to determine the level of conflict, an effective deterrent strategy would imply not only the ability to fight a limited war of defense against a conventional attack, but also the attainment of invulnerability of one's strategic forces to insure that his weapons are not destroyed in a preemptive strike.

The deterrent requirements of the 1960's, which Aron describes, were largely brought about by new weapons technologies, and these also had an effect on the stability of relationships within alliances. Independent deterrent arguments appeared during the 1961 shift in the American strategic doctrine toward NATO, which gave increased importance to non-nuclear forces for the initial defense of Western Europe. U.S. strategists argued that, given the invulnerability of the American strategic nuclear force, it would be highly unlikely for the Soviet Union to launch an initial strike against any European ally of the United States for fear of immediate American retaliation. Rather, the so-called McNamara Strategy reasoned that what was to be feared was a small border incursion which would not justify a response with nuclear weapons. Conventional forces were to be used to combat such aggression, keeping the nuclear arsenal "flexible"—to be resorted to if the conflict was escalated beyond its original limits. This strategy, however, required American superiority both at the conventional and at the nuclear level—illustrating the growing relationship between deterrent and defensive strategies.

The Defense of the Small Powers: The Dilemma of the Superpowers

Professor John Erickson notes that the Kennedy Administration became aware of the limits of an "unlimited" reliance on nuclear weapons for the security of Western Europe immediately upon taking office. Its strategy of "flexible response" brought about the obsolescence of the French force de frappe even before it was developed. The American recourse to the conventional "shield," in its deterrence theory, however, brought about a crisis of confidence in the European capitals over the credibility of the American deterrent—which, in turn, led to an overreaction on the part of the European policy makers, i.e., the French, to manufacture their own, already useless, deterrent forces.

The relationship between deterrence and defense becomes most apparent when one looks at the defense needs of states which are parties to sub-bipolar conflicts. Many of these states face a serious dilemma. On the one hand, an increase in one's military capability to enhance its security has long been the prerogative of all states. An advance to the nuclear level may be justified as simply another step towards such a posture. On the other hand, if a level of stability exists at the non-nuclear level, there would appear to be no real reason for assuming the costs of a nuclear weapons development program. Moreover, looking beyond the immediate advantages of attaining a nuclear striking force before one's enemies achieve it, there appears to be little doubt that, in circumstances of already tenuous stability at sub-bipolar levels, acquisition by one potential belligerent would almost inevitably lead to acquisition by its immediate enemy, with little or no net increase in security.

For a small state to gain any security at all from nuclear weapons it would either have to use the weapons preemptively or embark upon a costly program of attaining invulnerability. In the case of the more emotional and psychological conflicts at the sub-bipolar level, even apart from preemptive strikes, there is the danger of rapid escalation of border conflicts to nuclear exchanges. But there is an even more compelling argument against proliferation in these types of circumstances. It is based on the contemporary military fact that credible nuclear deterrents are invariably linked with the ability of the deterring power to carry on conventional wars while maintaining the option to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in the face of extreme threats to national survival.

This is the same argument that was used to show the relative uselessness of independent deterrents in alliance situations. The examples of countries faced with localized conflicts which do not directly involve either of the superpowers (and, therefore, for whom independent deterrents would appear to be rational choices) does not invalidate this principle. The reason for this is that in the contemporary latent bipolar international system, any conflict which threatens to escalate into nuclear war tends to involve the superpowers. Naturally, the degree of involvement may vary with the crisis at hand. But it is undeniable that each superpower is intimately concerned with preventing the explosion of crises which, directly or indirectly, through its adversary's opportunity to exploit the crisis, affects its interests.

Moreover, the current concern with nuclear proliferation itself in Moscow and Washington, as expressed in the 1970 Treaty, would make the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a sixth or seventh country an object of concern to both duopolists. Ultimately, if the threat of even localized nuclear war is an object of concern to the present nuclear powers, hostilities themselves would certainly be of even greater concern, and would undoubtedly lead to political, if not military, intervention.
The intervention of either the United States or the Soviet Union in a crisis potentially involving the use of nuclear weapons would, at first, most probably be at the level of conventional weapons — given the risks of retaliation by the other superpower should the conflict polarize. Should the off-chance arise where nuclear weapons would be used preemptively by one of the duopolists against a minor nuclear power, its recently acquired "independent deterrent" would be of no further concern to the international system, which would be faced with either a fait accompli or a major nuclear war.

The prospect of intervention, then, on a conventional level, automatically places severe restraints upon countries seeking a purely "defensive" nuclear force. As was noted above, it is in the nature of the contemporary system that such forces cannot be entirely "independent." It is with these conditions in mind that national nuclear forces, whether designed to be solely deterrent or solely defensive, must be evaluated. Given superpower strategies designed to fight both conventional wars and nuclear wars, and given the restraints upon deterrence strategies imposed by the invulnerability of superpower nuclear forces, small power nuclear deterrents cannot avoid calculating the effects of their deterrent forces on ultimate strategies to use these weapons should hostilities break out. The inescapable link between "deterrent strategies" and "strategies of use" (i.e., for defense against aggression or for preemptive use) must be a major consideration in national calculations of the nuclear option.

The dilemma of the superpowers, in seeing nuclear weapons dispersed to potential local belligerents, is most easily seen in the hypothetical situation of a small power capable of putting the former in a position where the great power would have to carry out a suicidal policy if it would obviously have otherwise avoided. This is the most fundamental reason that the United States and the Soviet Union have come to agreement on the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will become evident, however, that this very rationale is, paradoxically, what is most solidly standing in the way of a truly effective agreement on non-proliferation.

The Nuclear Club: Prestige and Priorities

For most potential nuclear powers, the option to develop national nuclear arsenals will not be decided solely on the basis of deterrence and defense strategies. Indeed, the foregoing analysis indicates that basing a decision to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of military needs would, in most cases, be a highly questionable undertaking — raising at least as many problems as the new forces were designed to solve. It is, therefore, pertinent to note that there are other motives for the development of national nuclear forces, among the most important of which is the national desire for prestige.

Prestige has at least two sub-categories in the contemporary international system. On the one hand, it is related to the strength and influence of the superpowers, and, moreover, their pretensions to strength and influence. This force has been manifested in both the attitudes of France (with respect to American influence in the Western Alliance) and China (vis a vis Soviet control over international communism). On the other hand, at the sub-bipolar level, questions of national prestige are raised if and when past or potential antagonists acquire nuclear weapons. Alastair Buchan cites particularly the cases of Japan vis a vis China, West Germany with respect to French forces, and the major neutral powers, Sweden, Switzerland, and India — the latter with respect to China.

Of the arguments against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from a political standpoint, one of the most important is the danger of a new uncertainty in the international system; an uncertainty grown so dangerous as to threaten hopes for a universal system of order. Another aspect of this argument is the difficulty a large number of nuclear powers would bring to the management of crises. In the event of hostilities, concurrent great-power action may come too late, or not at all. Moreover, it seems valid to assert that the "nuclear club" appears, tentatively, to have stabilized at five. Acquisition by any one power would act as a break in restraint which could lead from the sixth to the sixteenth nuclear power within a matter of a few years, as nations sought to keep up with their neighbors.

Arguments concerning the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation are, however, based on the assumption that the world in which we live is, in fact, stabilized by the Soviet-American duopoly of control over the truly sophisticated nuclear weapons. Such arguments are opposed by the simple fact that not all countries agree that events are any longer in full control of the two superpowers — if they ever were — and, moreover, if they were, they should be no longer. The most obvious countries holding this view are China, with respect to the Soviet Union; France, with respect to the United States; and India and Japan, with respect to both the USSR and the United States, as well as to China.

It would, indeed, appear that the Soviet Union and the United States are wholly inconsistent in their policies. On the one hand they oppose nuclear proliferation, but, on the other, they continue to sell conventional armaments to a variety of countries, thereby supporting belligerency. Equally as important, and perhaps the most crucial contradiction of all, is the reliance of the superpowers on their deterrent forces as sources of security and stability. This cannot but appear to other countries seeking greater security that both the United States and the Soviet Union "protest too much." They cannot have it both ways. They talk out of both sides of their mouths when they argue that nuclear proliferation would be destabilizing to the international system at no net gain in security for any country, and then go ahead and increase their own nuclear forces, ostensibly to pre-
serve their own tenuous security but, in fact, increasing their military and technological superiority over all other nations.

**The Criterion of Wisdom: The Negative Ideal**

Perhaps the most significant answer to this widening technological and credibility gap, in terms of the political ordering of the international system, is the necessity for a change in national priorities. Minimally, this means moderating the ever increasing reliance upon military weapons for the acquisition of influence and power in future international systems. The way to this reordering of priorities must be led by the non-nuclear-armed states.

There are two aspects to this argument. First, the acquisition of nuclear weapons means foregoing the option of acquiring them at some future time if certain conditions are not met. It means giving up a not insignificant bargaining position. If the great powers (and, perhaps, eventually also France and China) perceive the dangers to international stability from nuclear proliferation, they should be willing to pay some price for preventing it from happening. This price would now appear to be larger than the one which a new, weak, nuclear-armed state could extract under the guise of a new “nuclear threat.” Unfortunately, for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, signing such an agreement now, without adequate political compensation, would also effectively neutralize the maintenance of this future option.

Secondly, there currently exists a certain amount of prestige with the underdeveloped countries of the world from standing opposed by example to the further spread of nuclear weapons. This stature must be cultivated neutralize the maintenance of this future option. It means giving up a not insignificant bargaining position.

The present level of the development of highly sophisticated nuclear weapons points the way to the principle that self-restraint is the criterion of wisdom in foreign policy. Future developments in the field of nuclear weapons acquisition could bring the emerging stability of the international system crashing down around the heads of those who, themselves, are seeking only greater security and influence. The most obvious, albeit the most neglected, reason for this state of affairs is that statesmen tend to deal in the short run with what they consider to be political reality. They might be better advised to deal in terms of the long-run effects of their actions on the perceptions of their neighbors.

International politics is that form of politics which best illustrates the predominance of particular (national) interests over what must be referred to vaguely as the more general interest of the emerging international community. Rousseau’s famous “Essay on Inequality” is not read with a view to mankind as a whole. At least not yet.

There do exist enough self-interested reasons for states to forego further nuclear proliferation. The reliance of the great powers on nuclear deterrence, and the consequent tendency for small-power leaders to emulate this reliance (often for quite pristine reasons associated with national security and prestige) threatens to compromise the hopes for non-proliferation. It would appear, therefore, that the negative ideal — based on the horror of the weapons themselves and their possible use — must become the authoritative legitimating principle, tying together the many motivations small nations must have to forego nuclear weapons for any reason. Such a responsibility falls to the non-nuclear powers in the face of the abdication of responsibility by the superpowers.

The conflict between absolute principle and strategic necessity can be resolved in perhaps no other way.

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**FOOTNOTES**

5. Ibid.
25. Beaton and Maddox emphasize this factor as one reason Canada, which could contribute to the NATO arsenal without some of the difficulties faced by West Germany, for example, has not sought nuclear weapons; op. cit., p. 107.
26. These arguments are applied to India by Buchan, op. cit., p. 10; and to Canada by Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
I came home from teaching my Greek class a couple of weeks ago to encounter our six-year-old son gyrating through the house and singing, 
O say can you see
my eyes,
If you can,
then m' hair's too short.

When I stopped him to ask what perverted mind of the local playground had cooked that one up, I was patronizingly informed that the lines are from Hair. Whereupon our eleven-year-old daughter took me by the hand, led me to the phonograph, and called my attention to the opening words of that musical,
When the moon is in the seventh house
and Jupiter aligns with Mars,
Then peace will guide the planets,
and love will steer the stars...
and to the refrain line, “This is the dawning of the Age of Aquarius...”

It thus appears, as every six-year-old knows, that the Age of Aquarius is upon us. And as part of a “Free University” assignment on our campus I have been listening to current folk, rock, and otherwise popular music with the long-haired, transistor-toting citizens of the Aquarian Age. I have heard them debate the meaning of a line from Simon and Garfunkel’s “Bridge over Troubled Waters” (Columbia, 4-45079) with the passion of a convention of orthodox rabbis or medieval allegorical exegetes. I’ve listened to them speak of the great Aquarian values, peace and love, with an eloquence echoing a Martin Luther King or the apostle Paul. And as I wondered about the matter of communicating the Gospel to these children of the Age of Aquarius, it seemed to me that there are some authoritative directives to be found by comparing the way Paul preached in Antioch with the way he spoke in Athens, as reported in the 13th and the 17th chapters of Acts.

The reader will recall that Paul and his company arrived in Antioch of Pisidia during the course of their first missionary journey. When they attended the local synagogue on the Sabbath, Paul was asked to appear as guest preacher.

His audience was made up of Jews and of Gentiles sympathetic to the Jewish tradition, called “God-fearers” (Acts 13:16, 26). In addressing this group, Paul began by recalling the mighty acts of God on behalf of Israel (13:17-22), continued by announcing the arrival of Jesus, the Saviour and Davidic King (23-37), and concluded with an announcement of the availability of forgiveness and a new kind of freedom because of this Jesus (38-41). Throughout this Antioch synagogue sermon, Paul made generous use of direct quotations from the Scriptures (13:33-35, 41) and frequently alluded to the biblical tradition.

If we take this report as typical of Paul’s synagogue preaching, we might observe that when Paul addressed those steeped in the Jewish and Scriptural tradition, he spoke in a very traditional manner.

I suggest that the audience we encounter in the youthful Aquarians is not at all Antiochene, but rather quite Athenian. Like those men of Athens, they are “very religious.” As evidence for this assertion we may follow Paul’
precedent and cite some of their poets, more specifically the lyrics of some of the songs the Aquarians listen to.

One discovers a certain fascination with the figure of Jesus in these songs. I remember the surprise that came with hearing lines reminiscent of “Jesus loves me” from the Sunday Schools interjected into the very swinging and sophisticated world of The Graduate a few years ago. Simon and Garfunkel’s MOCK toast to Mrs. Robinson announced:

And here’s to you, Mrs. Robinson,
Jesus loves you more than you will know,
(Wo, wo, wo . . . ) (Bookends, Columbia, KCS9529)

The trend has continued. A favorite with the Aquarians is Leonard Cohen’s song, “Suzanne” (Judy Collins, In My Life, Elektra, EKS74027). The second verse gives Jesus a title not to be found in the New Testament:

And Jesus was a Sailor,
when he walked upon the water,
And he spent a long time watching
from a lonely wooden tower . . .

The number one record in our midwestern area last spring was a Jesus-song, written by Holler and Abbott entitled, “Natural Man” (Hank Cardell, Laurie, LR-3530). The refrain portrays a manly, thoroughly non-docetic Jesus, with marked Aquarian features;

Didn’t he wear some dirty brown hair,
And a beard all matted down?
Handsome and tan, but a natural man
And his sandals scrapin’ the ground.

Of special theological interest is an intense, driving rock number by Webber and Rice, entitled “Superstar” (Murray Head and The Trinidad Singers, Decca 732603). The Aquarian honorific epithet “Superstar” is placed upon Jesus and the refrain raises the question of Messianic consciousness:

You’d have managed better if you’d had it planned,
Why’d you choose such a backward time and such a strange land?
If you’d come today you would have reached a whole nation
Israel 4 B.C. had no mass communication . . .
Jesus Christ, Superstar, Do you think you’re what they say you are?

But the songs of the Aquarians do not focus on Jesus to the exclusion of God, in the manner of the “death of God” theologies. In fact, there is an explicit reaction against the “death of God” slogan in Leonard Cohen’s “God is alive, magic is afoot” (Buffy Sainte-Marie, Illuminations, Vanguard VSD79300):

God never sickened,
many poor men lied,
many sick men lied.
Magic never weakened
magic never hid,
magic always ruled.
God is afoot,
God never died . . . the heart did not believe.

The same reaction again appears in Peter, Paul and Mary’s “Hymn” (Late Again, Warner Brothers, WS 1751):

Passing conversations where they mentioned your existence,
And the fact that you had been replaced by your assistants.
The discussion was theology and when they smiled and turned to me,
All that I could say was “I believe in you . . . ”

If we ask what view of man informs the songs the Aquarians listen to, we sense a certain kinship with that audience in Athens. What could be more Stoic than the lines from Simon and Garfunkel’s, “I am a Rock” (Sounds of Silence, Columbia CS9269):

I am a rock, I am an island . . .
I have no need of friendship,
friendship causes pain.
It’s laughter and it’s loving I disdain,
I am a rock, I am an island . . .

And the spirit of a brand of popular Epicureanism is reflected in the refrain of Leiber and Stoller’s recent “Is that all there is?” as recorded by Peggy Lee (Capitol, 2602). After confessing disappointment in the best that life has to offer, the refrain declares:

If that’s all there is my friends,
then let’s keep dancing,
let’s bring out the booze and have a ball,
if that’s all there is.

One senses a certain similarity between the reverent agnosticism in the inscription “to an unknown God” and another line from “Superstar”:

Don’t you get me wrong,
I only want to know,
Jesus Christ . . . who are you?

The Aquarians are also more Athenian than Antiochen in that a great number of them lack any positive relationship to the institutions of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In good Pauline fashion I cite an inscription, which may be taken as typical of the attitude of many toward the institutional church. On the basement wall of our campus coffee house someone has sketched a noble Viking, complete with spear and horned helmet, the symbol of our Norwegian-Lutheran heritage. Below it is written, “We have come to rape, loot, and build a Lutheran church.” Now whatever the story behind that bit of graffiti, it reflects something less than a positive attitude toward Lutherans, the church in general, or both. And rather than dismiss that criticism as insignificant, one ought to recall the lines from Simon and Garfunkel’s “Sounds of Silence,” about the “words of the prophets . . . written on the subway walls, tenement halls.” (Sounds of Silence)

Finally, it appears to me that like the Athenian audience, many of the Aquarian people are quite uninformed about the fundamentals of the Christian faith. The Athenians simply had not been exposed to the Christian tradition; the Aquarians have often been over-
exposed to a distortion of that tradition, and have accordingly become disinterested in doctrine, which they dismiss as irrelevant.

IV

If it is true that there is certain congruence between the Aquarian and Athenian audiences, then it may be that those of us engaged in preaching and teaching the Gospel in the Age of Aquarius can learn something from the way in which Paul approached that task in Athens.

Paul began by calling the Athenians, with whom he certainly had some theological differences, "very religious." I suggest that we begin by affirming the religious spirit of the Aquarius people. Can we not recognize in their Jesus-songs a powerful Vergegenwaertigung of Christian tradition, reaching right into the midst of the life of a whole generation, via guitar, eight-track stereo cartridge, and automobile radio? Can we not discern in their musical portraits of an Eleanor Rigby, a Richard Cory, or a "most peculiar man" a sense of loneliness and alienation, a quest for meaning, even a longing for the "unknown god" whom the Aquarian heart refuses to bury? And is not the desire to give oneself as a "bridge over troubled waters" consonant with the life-style of the One who hung from a "lonely wooden tower"?

When the Aquarians see the institutional church as shot through with phoniness, perhaps we can stop defending it for awhile and start listening to their criticisms. The best setting for such a listening, of course, is within the institutions themselves, and I suggest that every youth worker, high school Sunday School teacher, and maybe even some professors in church colleges...

Music

"To Arms!" "Who Me?"

By WILLIAM F. EIFRIG, JR.

The times are bad. But you didn't need to read this column to be apprized of that. Did you know, though, that the musical world is not exempt from the general malaise? The existence of symphony orchestras is threatened by rising costs. Opera companies can scarcely bring ends within sight of each other let alone make them meet. It's the fault of rock music, of course. Audiences have been seduced away from the concert hall's irrelevance, a shrinking number of serious-record stores, a union that has almost priced orchestras out of the market, radio stations dominated by pop releases, a record-buying public that only responds to a few glittering names, a repertory glutted by old war-horses. Only the New York Philharmonic and the Philadelphia Orchestra still record for American companies. The others have contracts with European studios, if they have them at all. Even these foreign companies find it necessary to couple American orchestras with well-known names from their "stable of conductors" in order to give some "sex appeal." "We've come to the end of an era," says one recording director. The future of classical music will have to be different. RCA, fol-
lowing the lead of less prestigious labels, figures that future will mean “getting across to the kids.” Beethoven’s Ninth is now packaged in a cover featuring a photograph of Woodstock. The amount of exposed flesh on record jackets (and it’s not classical statuary either) suggests that “the kids” will be able to bring into their living rooms what heretofore they have furtively eyed on the racks of drug store literature.

We are informed: “There exists a primal apathy toward classical music in America.” “In 1970 the public seems to be absorbing less and less of anything classical.” Oh, we’re in trouble, my friend. Get your helmet (Wagnerian or Italian according to your preference) and meet me in the trenches.

Hold on a minute, though. Before I take up arms, I want to be sure I recognize the enemy.

Every time I am in a Chicago concert hall or the opera house, there are very few vacant seats. I know the costs of maintaining subscription series are rising; perhaps the union is in part to blame. One pays for what one thinks important enough, though, and there seems to be individuals as well as corporations and foundations that will pay for the support of serious musical enterprises. The number of young aspirants in the professional arena as far as I can see is no less than before and they calculate the hard facts coolly.

So why assume battle positions? This “crisis” is fashionably based on a silly premise, namely, that “classical” and “pops” are enemies and that the salvation of great art requires a demonstration that just as many people are for one side as support the other. (Is there somebody out there working on a rebuttal to the great American fallacy of establishing worth by majority vote?) Serious music by its nature will appeal to only a small part of the population. Only as heirs of a romantic educational vision do we attempt to place Plato on every bookshelf, Michelangelo on every wall, and Bach on every phonograph.

If record sales have fallen off, perhaps it is a sign that an era of cultural hypocrisy is wearing off. More probably it is the result of normal economic processes: too many producing too much for the market. Recall the record catalogues of the Forties. How glad we were to get a few staples in automatic sequence. The LP catalogue is a surfeit of pleasures by comparison. Or cast your mind back further. My uncle’s Victrola collection contained McCormick singing “The Rose of Tralee” as well as “Il mio tseo.” It’s my impression that those high-standing cabinets with the crank handle contained as much Whitman as Wagner.

No, gentlemen, I’m not going to fight your war. I’ve got my symphony tickets for this year; I’ll support the efforts of good people to sustain serious musical opportunities; but you’ll have to get yourselves out of the financial bind. If most of your buyers invest their money in the fleeting pleasures of the latest hit, do not on that basis predict the end for those of us who make our investments differently. Even if you should leave us with our current collections, we will still make the music we like best. We don’t mind being a statistical minority.

The Theatre

Letter From Abroad I

By WALTER SORELL

It is one of the saddest experiences to see one’s idols fall from their pedestals. Before leaving New York for London I saw Jean-Louis Barrault’s production of Rabelais, and now I wish I would have missed it. When Barrault staged Claudel’s Colombe many years ago he created a beautiful image of total theatre at its best within the framework of theatrical tradition. With Rabelais Barrault jumped on the bandwagon of the latest structureless, spontaneous, movement-oriented theatre. It was total theatre, but it fell apart. Some of its parts, loosely scattered around, were not without interest but never quite came together on the prosценium stage of the City Center.

The contemporary non-theatre is a dangerous trap for a great artist like Barrault. He is musical and movement is second nature to him, but his primary, propelling force has always been the word. The amateurs, however, of whom there are so many in our modern non-theatre and for whom charlatanism is second nature, do not fall into any trap since they already are the trap.

There could have been no better prelude to my journey to London than to experience the grim farce What the Butler Saw by the late Joe Orton, produced at the Rooftop Theatre of the McAlpin Hotel. Even though Orton died before giving this play its final version, it is a minor masterpiece of a genre which is very much Orton’s sole creation: The “whodunit” story in a Feydeau style with the scintillating dialogue of an Oscar Wilde. The theatrical events are highly improbable and, as a matter of fact, the entire plot idea pictures reality upside down. Yet the flow of the action is so fast in its farcical wit and the connotations of what the nonexistent butler sees are of such mordant significance that this frothy concoction turns into a tour de force.
Such a play must be staged with great style and verve. The acting must be perfect, the performers must be able to give each phrase the meaning it has while seemingly throwing the points away nonchalantly. The New York production did not live up to the play's challenge as the London production did last season. There are very few actors left even in London who can still do justice to Oscar Wilde, let alone Wilde with Feydeauesque sassiness. Most of New York acting is on a fair or highly acceptable level. But spending only a week in London's theatres makes one aware of how a fine acting tradition — which we lack — can create an atmosphere of mystery without which there is no really great art.

If this acting tradition would need any special proof, the National Theatre brought it about with its latest production of The Merchant of Venice in which Sir Laurence Olivier appeared as Shylock. Kenneth Tynan once described Olivier on stage as a tiger unleashed in the arena, and two seasons ago he gave the Captain in Strindberg's The Dance of Death a ferocious intensity. Olivier has not played Shylock since his student days. Apparently he was not interested in just giving the Elizabethan image of Shylock the touch of his personality. The Renaissance conception of Jews as usurers who eat no pork and stroke red beards was not sufficiently enticing to him.

Jonathan Miller, the director, placed the play in a late Victorian Venetian setting. The people, however, have the bearing of Londoners who never make you forget that England conquered the sea and the greater part of the world. The entire atmosphere is that of imperialistic power gained by adventurous merchants, of social arrogance and a fin de siecle decadence. Dandies stroll through the streets, sit in coffee houses, let their fortunes gamble with the fortunes of others.

In this gloved and tophatted world Shylock is the product of his time, indistinguishable from the genteel gents. He dresses like them. He hides his skullcap beneath his topper. His awareness of being useful, and therefore tolerated, is covered by a different arrogance. It is the certainty of being smarter, more interested and informed. He is a distant cousin of the Rothschilds. He has dignity and is particularly careful of his speech pattern. He gestures with restrained intensity when emotionally upset but has none of the mannerisms of the mythical Jew. He is too clean-shaven for that. He strangles his ancestral vestiges in a soundless laugh. Only when realizing his total defeat at the end of the trial scene does he gradually loses his stiff upper lip. He leaves the scene like a beaten dog. Then, backstage with Tubal, centuries of ghetto life and persecution are telescoped into one wailing sound. Those who have heard Olivier's wail will never forget it. It is a desperate, piercing, growing and fading sound as if the Wailing Wall would want to echo at once all it has ever heard.

Not all the actors are equally memorable, but all are of one great ensemble. If my memory does not trick me, Katharine Hepburn's Portia impressed me more than Joan Plowright's. But she was asked to play a different Portia, not a charming heroine with superior intellect and some cunning, but a suffragette with law degree and a somewhat militant attitude towards the male. The entire trial scene is conducted in a businesslike manner as if the members of the board wished to oust and punish a black sheep.

The director tried to give the casket scene more power with the help of an interlude of two singers, with an eye-rolling black Prince of Morocco coming directly from a minstrel show, and with a senile Prince of Aragon. At the end Jonathan Miller gently and wisely rewrote the play by adding a pantomimic epilogue. The couples have found each other and exit with joy of togetherness. Only Jessica and Antonio are still on stage. A messenger arrives from Venice with letters for them. Finally Jessica alone on stage. As Jessica reads the message and muses over it for a moment, we hear from the distance the Kaddish, the Jewish prayer of mourning. Is it Jessica who mourns the death of her father, or is it Shylock's voice mourning Jessica? One leaves the theatre, overwhelmed by the poetic magnitude of play and acting, wondering about this beautiful world of so many contrasts and of so much passion and misery, love and hatred.

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**Resignation**

And so... what if I cry?  
Always the return of silence.  
The helpless rage  
Consuming like a slow fire.

And so... why should I cry?  
To chew a bitter resentment  
To what end?  
Tears dissolve pleasure.

EDITH SUSLICK

September, 1970
Events of the Summer: Continuity and Change

By ALBERT R. TROST

Having allowed this column to lie fallow for two months, it seemed useful to attempt a review of significant current events over that period. The problem with such an effort, of course, is that of criteria of significance. At the end of the year we are used to seeing TV networks attempt a review, but they usually cop-out by covering "the biggest news events of the year." This means those stories that received the most coverage at the time because of perceived audience interest. As we all know, violence will be a large factor in determining this interest.

I would like to use much more fallible and subjective criteria. What events of the summer seem to have the most meaning for the longrun viability of the world's political systems? When this question is asked, three events vie for attention. Two of the events have implications for change in the nations in which they occurred; one points more to continuity in the character of a political system. One of the events is clearly ominous, another is fairly hopeful. The three events which stand out are the victory of George Wallace in a run-off primary in Alabama, the death of Antonio Salazar of Portugal, and the victory of the Conservative Party in the parliamentary elections in Britain.

Having come in second to the incumbent Governor Albert Brewer in the regular primary, Wallace's victory in the run-off was a little unexpected. Unlike the campaign a few weeks earlier, Wallace sought to differentiate himself in the run-off by a strong white racist appeal. His success means at the least, that instead of going the way of most third-party candidates into oblivion, he will be around in the national spotlight for the 1972 presidential election. What is especially significant and ominous about his presence is that the preliminary results of the 1970 census indicate that for the first time in our history the largest population category is the white suburbanite. That this group is susceptible to a Wallace-like appeal or a "Southern strategy" was indicated in a trip made by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, George Romney, to Detroit suburbs in late July. The former Governor of Michigan was heckled and ridiculed for his integration-directed housing policies. The absence of George Wallace in 1968 would not eliminate the problem of racism, but it would eliminate a tempting and mis-guided solution that would radically change the American political system.

On July 27th, Antonio Salazar, the dictatorial leader of Portugal for almost forty years, died. Although Salazar was replaced by Marcello Caetano as Premier in 1968 following a stroke, his continued presence gave encouragement to the army and other groups to maintain the system for which the dictator stood. Dr. Caetano has already indicated a more lenient attitude toward the opposition and the press. He has formally changed the status of the political police so their role is diminished. One can hardly be less democratic than Salazar, so Premier Caetano is sure to make progress in a democratic direction. This will cause less embarrassment for the United States and other NATO allies of Portugal. This will also make Portugal more attractive to the European Community movement.

However, Salazar's passing will have the most significance for Africa. Portugal has the largest remaining colonial empire on that continent and Dr. Salazar had a personal stake in its maintenance. Even Caetano has made no change in Portugal's African policy. The opposition, however, is strongly against the holding of possessions there, and the more reign these politicians are allowed, the more the policy will be criticized and reformed. Portugal is presently fighting costly guerrilla wars in Africa and there cannot be popular support in Portugal for this effort.

Change in Portugal will not be of such magnitude as to turn that political system into the model of liberal democracy. The political culture militates against such a development, but even minor changes in the domestic political climate could go a long way toward changing an international posture in the under-developed world that is a major factor of irritation and instability.

Because the election in Britain in June did not get much news coverage in the United States, its significance may be overlooked. The election was partially eclipsed by the violence in Northern Ireland which attracted many American reporters. It is precisely the lack of violence across the Irish Sea in Great Britain that makes the election significant.

The victory of the Conservative Party represents the fourth change in governmental direction in Britain since World War II. None have provoked violence even though the changes in policy represented in the change in governing party are often great. The Labor Party coming to power in 1945 represented the nationalization of basic industries. Victories for the Labor Party in 1964 and 1966 meant changes in the basic educational system and Britain's status as one of the great powers, yet the changes were passively accepted. The social peace surrounding the present change from Labor to Conservative is more sig-
significant because it was unexpected. With the voting age lowered and the economy showing favorable signs, things seemed to be working in Labor's favor, but the unexpected happened. Major policy changes that will continue to test the staying power of the British political system are the resumption of military support for South Africa and a reversal of the military withdrawal from Asia begun by the Labor Party. A major dock strike is also complicating matters at this writing.

Through all this apparent change the British political system remains un-questioned by a very large majority of its citizens. In view of the events of this summer in the United States, Portugal, and many other countries, there are few political systems that can say as much.

The Mass Media

... Proof Through the Night that Y(our) Flag Was Still There

By RICHARD LEE

This past summer this writer was in wilderness and as removed from most mass media as he blissfully could be. At the height of his holiday he was accessible only by mental telepathy and carrier mosquitoes.

However, to reach his favorite wildernesses and return he had to drive thousands of miles in sixteen states. From Flag Day through Independence Day to Labor Day that meant a grueling over-exposure to the mass medium of the American flag.

At the risk of courting the wrath wreaked upon George S. Kaufman one Christmas when he wished he might never again hear “Silent Night,” I could wish never again to see the flag of my country after this summer. One only wonders what national spasm in 1976 can peak such a summer of flag-waving and decalomania.

On the automobile windshields and bumpers to the right were flags with captions: In God We Trusted, In 'Nam We Busted
If Your Heart Isn't In It, Get Your Ass Out of It
THE MARINES — THE MUNCH A VIET CONG
FOR LUNCH BUNCH
USA ALL the Way
These colors don't run!
Agnew Tells It Like It Is
Spiro in '72
GOD BLESS AMERICA AND BOMB HANOI!

And other imprecatory psalms. One bumper sticker on the right embrangled the Confederate secessionist stars and bars with the stars and stripes of the Republic with the familiar AMERICA — LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT!

To the left were flags upside down in signals of distress, flags colored conservation green, flags joined to the CND semaphor, flags with the population theta for the canton, flags with doves and olive branches, flags clasped by black and white hands, flags between V'ed fingers, and one plain 3 x 5 card with only the word F*L*A*G printed on it. There were also some flags personalized with their lovers’ disappointments in America secretly to avoid getting their windows smashed, motorcycles tipped, or themselves harrassed by the police.

There was some beleaguered humor among all the scarred, mangled banners. On a VW microbus somewhere west of Wenatchee, Washington, was a straight American flag undercut with MADE IN JAPAN. Near Missoula, Montana, on a rancher's dusty Continental was a flagless sticker reading OUR FLAG IS IN VIETNAM WHERE IT BELONGS. The hooker was on the other end of the same bumper: WHEN FLAGS ARE OUTLAWED, ONLY OUTLAWS WILL HAVE FLAGS! And on a motorcycle windscreen in Sausalito, California, appeared the query ON THE OTHER HAND, HOW MUCH DOES MY COUNTRY LOVE ME? But generally there was too little humor to redeem a time when many of us don't like many of us very much.

Following the flag down the streets and highways of one nation, divisible, is a study in the unmassing of a medium. The American flag no longer says one thing at one time to all. Indeed, those of us who side neither with the majority on the right nor the minority on the left are now reluctant to display the flag at all.

On one hand we might appear to be agreeing that “Lindsay is a Faggot” and “Our Hero is Spiro” or endorsing an oil company's tasteless promotional giveaway. (One of our staunch Republican friends, distressed by the means his party is using to forge its majority, closeted his flag, muttering: “The flag should never be displayed after sunset, and this summer is one long sunset!”) On the other hand we might appear to be agreeing that the flag is high camp, a decoration for freaks, and without protocol. At best, we might only add our flag to the super-saturation of

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flags and hasten the ultimate passivity. Conceivably, patriotism now resides not only in withdrawing the flag from Vietnam but also in withdrawing it from its commercialization and trivialization at home.

Unlike Jesus' gibbet of shame and glory, the American flag has stood only for glory. That is the chief flaw at the foundation of its mythology, and it is now necessarily being restored to its contradictions. "Old Glory" is sticking all over a nation that enslaved one race and nigh decimated another in its formation. Now the flag advances, even to the moon, over a nation living rapaciously off half the world's resources and by its commercialization and trivialization at home. The flag may even be the wave of an ignoble future. But patriotism now resides not only in withdrawing the flag from the travail of nation building as many in the real United States of America. The citizens of this country have as much soil and blood on their flag from the shame and glory of the real United States of America. The citizens of that nation have as much soil and blood on their flag from the struggle of nation building as many in history, if less than some still more than others. And they have before them civil and global atonements for which no flag-waving will substitute if the promises of America are to be fulfilled.

The unmassing of the medium of the flag would be no danger to a democracy. Indeed, the more genuine the democracy the more one would expect the flag personalized with individual meanings and minority hopes. It would be a flag least divinized with mystique. One ur-flag of our country, after all, simply was "Don't Tread On Me."

The danger to democracy is rather that anxious, religious, mass flag-waving which triggers reflexes negating democratic behavior: total commitment, passion, immoderation, dogmatism, intolerance, conformity, contempt for differences, and finally suspicion of all men.

The political commentary of a critic of the mass media is, of course, worth next to nothing. But when democracy becomes a show, taking the flag on the road, he properly comments on the performance. And what he sees is democracy propagandized: the negation of democracy by turning it into something mythical, evoking belief, primitive feelings, and liturgies. Flag-waving which becomes such a simple incitation in no way disposes citizens for democratic acts. Frankly, it quickens all our vigilante tendencies and arouses men who recite democratic formulas and behave like totalitarians.

Books of the Month

A New Look at an Old Radical


Once, in a New Orleans hotel suite, a group of reporters discussed the personality of "Kingfish" Huey Long while the Southern political boss slept on one of the hotel beds. Finally, the story goes, Long woke up, listened for a moment and ended the discussion quickly. "Oh hell," he said, "say that I'm sui generis and let it go at that." For years, historians have followed Long's advice. Some have maintained that Huey Long could have gained power only in Louisiana where the citizens accepted the governmental corruption which enabled him to control the state so completely. Others claim that Long's oratorical skills gave him an unusual ability to play on the fears and aspirations of the poor American or insist that the Depression presented him with a unique opportunity to practice his demagoguery. But most have agreed that Long was an aberration within American politics, an object of curiosity but not a subject for serious study.

In an attempt to place Huey Long within the American tradition, T. Harry Williams rejects these explanations of Long's power and popularity. Long's ideas, rhetoric, and techniques were not uniquely his own, or even typically Southern. Williams insists. His use of patronage to control his state political machine, for example, was based on the standard rule that an organization rewards its friends and punishes its enemies. Much of his rhetoric, similarly, derived its force from the traditional rural distrust of Eastern bankers and city-based capitalists — a sentiment which the Populist movement had helped to create. By combining this radical rhetoric with the skill of a politician, Long created the most powerful political machine in America in the 1920's and built a national movement which, by 1934, was strong enough to frighten even Franklin Roosevelt.

Long understood the desires of the poor American. His home county, Winn Parish, had always been among the poorest and most radical in Louisiana. When the state joined the Confederacy in 1861, the citizens of the parish, certain that the rich planting interests had engineered the war, refused to allow their representative to sign the act of secession. Later, when agricultural discontent swept the Midwest and South, the parish was one of the strongest centers of Populism in the nation.

Although Huey's father was never a Populist, the son absorbed the movement's rhetoric. At the age of 15, Williams notes, Huey used Populist arguments skillfully in a debate against a leading Louisiana Socialist and won the support of his audience. His talent for public speaking convinced him that he had the ability to persuade people of virtually anything and led him to decide to become a traveling salesman.

Immediately after graduation, Huey traveled to New Orleans where a cooking oil company hired him as their representative. A succession of selling jobs followed, and soon Huey proved that his evaluation of himself was correct. He could sell almost anything — from cotton-seed oil to canned meats. But when he persuaded a Houston plumbing contractor to hire him as a stenographer, even though he knew no shorthand, Huey made his most important discovery: He was most skillful at selling himself.

Over the protest of his family, Long decided to quit his selling jobs, read for the Louisiana Bar, and involve himself in politics.
His experience with Louisiana's workmen's compensation laws soon convinced him that the existing statutes favored the large corporations rather than the workers, and, at the age of 22, he began a fight for an increase in the amount of benefits paid to the disabled. By the time the bill was passed, the entire state knew Huey as the clever young lawyer who had challenged the powerful corporations and won. In 1918, sensing his popularity, Long decided to run for a vacant seat on the Board of Railroad Commissioners—a body traditionally under the influence of the major railroads serving Louisiana.

Huey was elected Commissioner by promising the Louisiana farmer that he would fight for better railroad service, and after his election he did not forget that pledge. By this time, Williams insists, Long had decided that he could be governor of the state someday and, to provide himself with an issue popular with the Louisiana poor, launched an attack upon the railroad rate structure, a standard target of southern Populists a generation earlier. When the power of the Railroad Commission was expanded to include all public utilities, Huey once again gained state-wide fame when he forced the Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company to rescind a rate increase. The company had intended to refund the overcharges by reducing future bills, but Huey, with the instincts of a sure-footed politician, gained the gratitude of the company's subscribers when he forced the corporation to make all refunds immediately—by check.

**Not Enough Money to Beat Him**

By 1923, Huey was sure that he could win the governorship and began a slashing campaign against the regular Louisiana political machine. His opponents were controlled by the corporate interests, he insisted, and Standard Oil was behind the attempt to defeat him. Williams claims that Long's accusations were not fabrications. The vice-president of Standard Oil actually did send agents throughout the state to instruct businessmen that they should not support the unpredictable Public Service Commissioner. On election day, Huey was defeated, although at least one large contributor to his opponent's campaign fund prepared to support him in the next election. "We can't raise enough money to beat him again," he warned the anti-Long politicians. Immediately after his defeat, Long began strengthening his organization in preparation for the 1927 election. He formed alliances with New Orleans politicians traditionally hostile to the rural rhetoric which he employed and gained support among the French of southwestern Louisiana by co-operating with their hero, Senator Edward Broussard. While he strengthened his political ties, he continued to employ the radical rhetoric which had been so effective in his earlier campaigns. Once again, Standard Oil was his target, and he claimed that the eastern-controlled corporation had bribed the incumbent governor to prevent New Orleans from constructing natural gas pipelines. For three years, Huey continued his attacks upon the administration until the fears of the opposition proved correct. Williams estimates that Long's opponents were able to raise only one-tenth of the money they needed to defeat him, and in 1928 he was inaugurated governor of the state.

Many of the established politicians were certain that Huey had only used reform as an issue to sweep him into office. They soon discovered, however, that he took all his election pledges quite seriously. Under his direction, the Louisiana legislature passed bills providing for free schoolbooks, natural gas pipelines for New Orleans and toll-free bridges and highways. But when Huey called a special session of the legislature in early 1929 to enact a manufacturer's tax on the refining of oil, he discovered that he had pushed the state's business interests too far. Convinced that such a bill would bring economic ruin to Louisiana, a group of leading businessmen and industrialists began to exert pressure on the Louisiana legislature to impeach Long, to remove him from office, and replace him with a governor more amenable to the state's financial interests.

Williams reminds us that the impeachment attempt was the most serious crisis of Long's career and that his handling of his defense reveals his skill in both politics and propaganda. Upon hearing of the attempt to remove him from office, Huey immediately announced that his old enemy, Standard Oil was behind the move. The legislature had been offered bribes by the company, he insisted, and any representative who voted against him had obviously received large sums from the corporation. After the House voted impeachment, however, Huey knew that only skillful legislative maneuvering could prevent his conviction by the Senate. By offering jobs, new roads, and other favors, he obtained the votes of enough senators to ensure his acquittal. Significantly, Huey saw no inconsistency between his attacks on Standard Oil for buying votes and his own open offers of favors to those who supported him. By 1930, Long completely controlled the government of Louisiana, but he soon felt that the state did not provide sufficient opportunity for exercise of his talents. Since he totally controlled the state Democratic party as well, he decided to become a Senator and bring his ideas for economic reform to the attention of the nation.

Huey called his national program "Share Our Wealth." Firmly based on the traditional Populist-Progressive belief that wealth in America was unfairly and unnaturally distributed, the plan required a one hundred per cent income tax on all yearly income over a million dollars. With the money obtained from such a tax, Huey assured poor Americans that the federal government could provide each family with a yearly income of at least two thousand dollars. When conservatives questioned the economics and administration of such a plan, Huey admitted that the details were hazy. But he insisted that Share Our Wealth's operation could be worked out by "great minds" after it passed into law.

**Sharing the Wealth of the Nation**

Williams claims, however, that the political impact of the plan was more important to Huey than its practicality. For by the end of 1934, approximately four million Americans belonged to Share Our Wealth Clubs. Scattered throughout the nation, these chapters provided a national political organization for Long when he made his planned attempt to win the Presidency in 1936. Before Huey had the opportunity to use the organization which he had so carefully built, he was assassinated in the halls of the Louisiana State Capitol Building, and the movement largely dissolved.

At the time of Long's death, however, he had already significantly affected American politics. At least one piece of "New Deal" legislation (the Frazier-Lemke Farm Purchase Act) was, in fact, opposed by Roosevelt and passed the Senate only because of Huey's threat to filibuster until the conservative Senate Majority Leader, Joseph Robinson, brought it to a vote. In addition, Franklin Roosevelt's "shift to the left" in 1935 is frequently attributed to his fear of Long and his desire to weaken the Share Our Wealth movement.

In general, considering Long's impact on America in the early 1930's, it is strange that Williams' book is the first major biography of Long ever attempted. The reason that historians have so neglected the Long story is not difficult to discover, however. Long wrote no detailed letters to his associates, kept no diary and few records of his political maneuverings. As a result, virtually no written sources exist which could serve as the basis of a detailed biography.

Such an impediment did not discourage Williams. He saw an opportunity to use the oral sources which historians of recent America have so often recommended as valuable but have so rarely employed. To research Long's life, Williams interviewed Huey's friends, enemies, and political associates. By questioning 305 persons (from Long's bodyguards to Harry S Truman), he obtained the reminiscences and anecdotes which he has woven into a remarkably coherent narrative.

The result is a carefully written work which places Huey Long within the tradition of American politics. But this first major American biography to rely primarily on oral sources and the first significant attempt to see Huey Long as a part of the American tradition, Williams well-balanced account is sui generis indeed.

*RONALD SCHLUNDT*
In the history of sculpture, wood has had as much attention by artists as any other material. There is good reason for this. No other material offers the range in color and density as wood. Because of its "grain" and "imperfections" like cracks and knots, it has a will of its own. It fights back and resists casual efforts by the sculptor.

On the other hand, by making the least concessions to its properties, wood responds handsomely. For instance, a well sharpened chisel seems to be further honed when used on hardwoods such as walnut, cherry, or African mahogany. A cut with the grain leaves a clean, polished surface. Grain lines can be controlled to conform naturally to the desired shape thereby adding color, variety, and excitement.

Yet, in spite of its good qualities, wood has always been a secondary material when large, monumental works were being considered. Where such works were concerned, sculptors usually turned to marble or bronze.

There are two basic reasons for bypassing wood as a material for large monuments. First, the notion that wood is not permanent, and second, wood is limited by the size of the log.

It is true that wood, being organic, has always been subject to attack by disease and insects. And of course, wood can be consumed by fire. But bronze and stone are not totally immune to damage or destruction. Over a period of time, wind, sun and rain can erode even the finest marble. Even more destructive than the elements is man. In ancient times each generation seemed to wish to obliterate any memory of its predecessors by smashing or disfiguring their monuments. Bronze works were often melted down for utilitarian or military purposes. Such destruction is by no means limited to the past. Modern warfare is ruthless in its destruction and the losses that occur daily to artistic works of all kinds are incalculable.

While there is no protection for art works from the destructiveness of man, technology has produced the means to protect wooden objects from the attack of disease and insects. Seals and plastic coatings protect from the elements. Barring willful destruction by man, the survival of a particular work in wood is reasonably assured for an indefinite period of time.

If it can be established that permanence is about equal...
between wood, stone, and bronze, what about size? How can wood compete with stone which can be quarried in any size? Or with bronze which is limited only by the size of the foundry?

In the past the most positive size for a piece of wood was the size of the log. Small pieces were fastened together with carefully made joints, pegs or with glues made of animal residues. But because wood moves with changes in humidity and temperature, the best glues would dry out and the finest joints loosen.

Today woodworkers have been given another assist by technology. Synthetic glues (epoxy and polymer resins) produce positive bonds between pieces of wood. These bonding agents retain their plasticity and are therefore able to shift as the wood shifts. The worker in wood is no longer limited by the size of the log. He can use boards that have been thoroughly dried and laminate them in any shape or size.

The panel depicting scenes from the parable of the Good Samaritan is an example of such lamination. It is made up of 1" x 3" oak boards bonded on the flat grain. This kind of lamination makes possible cross-grain carving of considerable detail without the usual splintering. Wood can be joined together by means other than the use of bonding agents. The work titled THE WALL consists of separate boards fastened to a support with steel bolts. It is intended to bring to mind the wall that separates Berlin or the wall that each human being raises between himself and other human beings.

TWO FIGURES is another example making use of steel to hold the various parts together. In this work functional bolts are combined with other pieces of iron that give a pleasing metallic contrast with the wood. Contrasting iron and wood can heighten the expressive intent of the work. The idea is certainly not new; such combinations can be seen all around in common objects: telephone poles, bridges, fences, railways, boxcars, scaffolding, fine automobiles, not to mention interior furnishings.

The use of modern power tools has added a new dimension to wood carving. Large logs or timbers can be roughed out with a portable power chain saw. Curved cuts can be made with a hand saw or a sabre saw.

LOT’S WIFE is the result of “slabbing” with a chain saw. The piece was subsequently sanded smooth, oiled and polished.

Wood is a material with a wide range of intriguing characteristics. Having once been alive is continues to show “living” properties long after being cured, dried and aged. It contracts and expands with the seasons; it is never dormant.

Because of this “aliveness” wood is a most fitting material for decoration or expressive purposes in our churches and homes.

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September, 1970
**Toward a Civic Pedagogy**

By STEPHEN A. SCHMIDT

“Pedagogy is the science of transforming societies.”
—Jose Ortega y Gasset

In retrospect, George S. Counts's widely published statement in 1932, "Dare The Schools Build A New Social Order?", can be judged as a typical instance of the arrogance so characteristic of American educators. School men in America have maintained the myth that schools teach and change society for longer years than I care to name.

The legend of public school education as an agency with potential to change America is a hallowed educational dream, nurtured by the rhetoric of the fathers. The ideals of Franklin, Jefferson, Mann, Harris and Dewey all find fruition in the formation of a public school system to educate the public. Educationists maintain a multi-billion dollar yearly establishment to maintain that sacred myth.

Other voices from our more recent educational past have held a different view. Their view has extended beyond the provincialism of the agency, the school. The educational insights of Horace Bushnell have largely been overlooked in the development of American Education. Bushnell called for an "organic" educational strategy. He believed that all institutions must be unified in harmony to form young persons. He realized and articulated the formative values of the cultural milieu.

His educational theory, outlined in *Christian Nurture*, has too long been neglected by educators throughout America. His ideal was not lost, however, on another church educator of the early twentieth century. George Albert Coe, known to many as the father of the Religious Education Movement in America, modified Bushnell's "organic" ideal to a broad democratic vision. Coe held a view of a civic pedagogy where persons would be formed in the total community. He called for a "Democracy of God" (inflated rhetoric for the reality he sought) where love and justice meet. His word was a clear call to educate in the public political sphere. The insight of a host of religious educators around Coe has been ignored by secular and church educators today. To pay close attention to Coe's vision would amount to a wholesale redirection in American education.

It would cause us to take seriously the development of Civic Pedagogues. A civic pedagogue is one who educates society by political thought and political action. Such teachers would be conscious of the impact of culture and subculture which limit their environments. They would bear the ancient insight of the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the early Christians. They would understand that a community educates, by the very existence of its ideals, values, structures, and life. Charles Stinnette's monograph, *Learning in Theological Perspective*, outlines in vivid detail the civic educational thought of those ancient communities. It would serve as a fine primer for the neophyte civic pedagogue.

Civic pedagogues would, of course, have to be equipped with necessary skills in their professional training. They would have professional courses not only in classroom methods, but in political science and political action. They would understand the structures of the system and how to effect change.

They would be about keeping the "ideal" alive and they would measure and judge all structures and all institutions according to the "ideal." They would not be system persons, but rather would be pedagogical prophets. They would know what George Leonard understands in his recent book *Education and Ecstasy*. They would know that education takes place in "structured environments," realizing full well that the ultimate environment is culture.

I would like to extend this brief analysis to make a few positive suggestions relative to the life and work of the church and specifically the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod.

The church ought not de-emphasise its educational activity. Rather it must intensify such endeavor, attempting to influence our age with justice and compassion. That task will be the responsibility of the civic pedagogues who educate where the action is in real life politics.

The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, rich with educational tradition, must free its pedagogues to act in formative positions. Lutheran teachers must insist upon immediate franchise within the church. They must then exercise franchise by positive political responsibility within the church and the wider public educational domain.

The pedagogues of the synod must form an agency of redress, a Teachers Union, to safeguard the freedom of the civic pedagogue when the political position threatens the status quo.

If these suggestions were implemented, then perhaps we could create a reality out of our rhetoric. And the myth of public education might yet reveal an essential truth. Teaching is, of course, a political act, and all our deeds are ultimately instruction.
Learning in a Time of Crisis

I am open to persuasion, but as of now, after thinking about it a great deal this past summer, I am opposed to the idea of closing colleges and universities for two weeks prior to the elections this fall so that students may get involved in the political process.

There are no doubt students who feel obliged in conscience to interrupt their ordinary work to participate in a campaign for some candidate who espouses policies in which they deeply believe or, more likely, to work toward the defeat of some incumbent whom they hold accountable for our present difficulties. These students should be given every possible encouragement to act on their convictions. But if my own university is typical, and I am pretty sure that it is, the number of such students is quite small, certainly no larger than ten per cent of the student body. The other ninety per cent plus are not so persuaded, and they ought not to be denied their right to go peacefully about their business.

I have great difficulty anyway with the idea that every new crisis in the ongoing agony of our society is an occasion for shutting up the academic shop. If what we are doing on the campus, if this whole business of gathering and evaluating information, if the clashing and testing of ideas is all Mickey Mouse, to be abandoned as soon as something really 'relevant' comes along, then there is no justification for the university in the first place. Society can not afford to maintain several millions of its members in subsidized dawdling. But if the university, in its ordinary, day-by-day round of work, is performing a useful and perhaps even essential social function, it makes no sense to close it down so that its members may all take off and do something presumably more urgent or, at least, more significant.

England did not close its great universities even during those grim days when invasion seemed imminent. The reasons why she did not dare set forth in a short essay by C.S. Lewis entitled "Learning in Wartime," an essay which I commend to the attention of those students especially who are seriously concerned about the present crisis and troubled by the thought that they ought to be more immediately involved in its solution.

The chief point that Dr. Lewis makes in this essay is that if mankind had decided to postpone the search for truth and beauty and wisdom until things settled down, the search would never have been undertaken at all. Human history is the record of one crisis following upon the heels of another. But man decided long ago that truth and beauty and wisdom are not optional extras; they are as essential to man's humanity as food, drink, clothing, and shelter. Without them, man ceases to be man in the full sense of the word and becomes something other and less than man. And so there must be in every society those who devote themselves to enlarging and diffusing man's supply of truth, beauty, and wisdom, even when this task seems unimportant by comparison with apparently larger and more urgent demands.

In a situation such as ours, it becomes necessary for every member of the university community — faculty, administrators, and students — to make sure in his own conscience that he is about his proper business. It may very well be that considerable numbers of us could contribute more to the general welfare by interrupting or abandoning the life of scholarship for the sake of greater involvement in the critical problems of our times. Our calling may not be to the university, but to the ghetto or the legislative chamber or the courtroom or even to the street. If that is the case, we should follow our calling and do the thing we are persuaded we ought to do. But we should not demand that the university transmogrify itself into something that it is not and was never intended to be. We should allow it to remain an open market for ideas (the only function which has ever really justified its existence) and we should seek or build other institutions to use ideas as weapons for the achievement of this or that particular social objective.

No doubt it seems that I am asking for the university a kind of detachment from "real life" and a kind of exemption from involvement in the turbulence of our times. In a sense, that it what I am asking, but not as a privilege but as a necessity for the carrying out of its unique task for society. Somewhere, in the raging cross-currents of our time, there must be a place of central calm where ideas are subjected to the dispassionate arbitrament of reason, where the phony and the half-true are exposed, and where truth (however unpleasant) has a chance to reveal itself. This has historically been the task of the university. If this is no longer to be her task, whom shall we ask to do the job?
**The Pilgrim**

**HIC et NUNC — et HERE**

For the benefit of my readers under thirty, the words at the head of this column are Latin for “Here and Now — and Yesterday” and will appear over this column for a few months while my eldest son and I conduct an experiment.

“Here and Now” reflects the new generation, everybody under thirty, the young, the very young, men and women whose motto is “here and now”. We want our rights “here and now”. We will not go to war “here and now”. We don’t like the words and ways of the older generation “here and now”.

The last word in our heading means “Yesterday” and includes all of us over thirty. The has beens. the never wases. the generation that has brought the world to the edge of disaster, the villains who are responsible for everything bad and nothing good.

The Nixons and Daleys and Agnews, the last gasp of a dying generation.

We shall conduct the column like this. D. v. I shall write every other month. My eldest son, a notorious member of the “here and now” generation, will write in alternate months. He is well qualified for the task. He has long hair (but is, thank God, not a hippie), was the editor of a college daily, has written for the underground press, and is now a more or less respected college teacher. He writes better than his old man, but with fewer ideas. He is now teaching “Urban Studies”.

It is interesting to me that all these unshorn characters invariably land in our ghettos, the lowest and darkest part of our world. Then, they say and think, we’ve really got our elders. They, the elders, allowed these black spots on our banners, and with the Bowery and South State Street we must eliminate their authors and finishers. They were in their limited way nice people, but their day is done. The sun is going down and it is not played by parents, teachers and pastors.

Perhaps the most mysterious part of the thought process of the “hic et nunc” generation is its shallow concept of freedom. It is always freedom “from”, never freedom “for”. This is not the freedom of Jesus Christ; it is the last dying gasp of twentieth century license — now by a curiously delayed osmosis heard in the rear pews of the Church. Yes, there are real and present faults in the Church, but they will not be mended by unintelligent echoes of a dissident world, by marching in the rain and going home to a good meal prepared by the “here” generation. We have wronged the black brother and the poor. But your proposed cures are worse than the disease. You cannot, you must not substitute a religion of reform for a religion of the redemption.

And so, my dear “hic et nunc” son, I question your intelligence and your apparent inability to think clearly. My basic indictment is intellectual. You will not build a “new church” out of the tag ends of a secular philosophy of life and history which is already exhausted and dying.

Get with it — and God love you!