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The Brandt Campanile at Valparaiso University. Photographs courtesy University News Service.

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The Cresset
An irony of the ecumenical movement in its early days was that the closer the different Christian denominations came to one another in their hope for unity, the more they rediscovered their individual particularities. That irony turned toward tragedy when many Christians came to cherish their new found particularities above their earlier hope for unity.

It is one thing to treasure denominational particularities within a growing vision of the whole of Christian faith and practice, but quite another thing to set those particularities as the limits of the church. The triumph of particularity is complete when the passion for the truth of the faith stops short of finding much of it in other Christians.

Yet the ecumenical vision lives by the Spirit even if the movement sometimes detours into denominational patriotism. On my limited view, there is presently more ecumenical movement occurring locally than in the bureaucracies and hierarchies of the several denominations and their national and world councils—though there is an irony at the grassroots of the ecumenical movement too.

Locally, where Christians are engaged in more worldly tasks than their denominational officials, common enemies keep Christians together. Here are also disagreements, but because unity must be sought in the face of common enemies, the quality of the disagreements often improves. It is possibly a gift of the Spirit when this irony occurs, for unity can only come through better and better disagreements among those commonly committed to seeking the whole truth of Christian faith and practice.

Leading us into a common concern among Christians—the viability of their educational institutions in the teeth of adverse governmental policies—is our May alumni columnist, Patrick R. Keifert. He studied in the Special Program in the Humanities in Christ College of the University and was graduated with concentrations in Greek and philosophy in 1973. Mr. Keifert then began his ministerial studies at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, and completed them in the exile, now exodus, of Christ Seminary-Seminex in 1977. After a summer of study in Germany, he started his graduate work in philosophical theology at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago where he is presently writing his dissertation on a hermeneutical theory of religious historical narrative.

Mr. Keifert is Assistant Pastor of Pilgrim Lutheran Church in Chicago, and he and his wife Jeanette (VU, 1973) are parents to two daughters, Sandra Adeodata and Johanna Anastasia.

The Cresset welcomes alumnus Keifert to In Luce Tua.

The Editor

Pluralism in American higher education is confronting a crisis, a period of severe testing. The crisis of pluralism is aggravated by a decline in the number of students seeking higher education, and shrinking enrollments complicate the struggle to survive for many church-related schools. Public-supported schools already have the financial edge and, in an inflationary economy, the imbalance grows. A small, but possibly decisive, ingredient in this growing financial imbalance between public and church-related higher education is the liberal prejudice that religion is meaningless or worse, and this prejudice is best seen in anti-Catholicism. Catholics are not the only target of this bigotry, but they are the most obvious. A survey of the forces of anti-Catholicism and an examination of their possible relation to the ill-fortuned attempts to bring federal financial support to church-related higher education can, at least, alert us to the possible significance of this ingredient in the larger crisis. Indeed, if we are to foster pluralism in higher education we should be conscious of this anti-Catholic bigotry, expose it, and add it to our list of public enemies.

William J. Sullivan, S.J., calls "the private colleges and universities... both the principal sign and the primary agency of society's valuing of diversity. It is the Yales, the Yeshivas, the Notre Dames and the Baylors," he says, "which signal the diversity of American life and culture." This I take to be true; but in fact, our colleges and universities have become extraordinarily similar. Despite the new respectability of pluralism in American life generally, such diversity is disappearing in higher education. Reflecting less and less the diversity for which they were once known, private institutions account for less than one-fourth of the total enrollment of students today in comparison to over one half twenty-five years ago. The tuition spread between private and public schools has increased from three to one in 1952 to better than five to one in 1975. Not only is there an imbalance, but this imbalance is increasing.

Various studies have underlined the need to balance this ratio. In April of 1976, the presidents of American University, Catholic University of America, George
Washington University, and Georgetown University made "A 1976 Declaration of Independence," directing their grievances at the changes in federal policy that were leading to even greater imbalance in the costs between public and private education. The fewer number of students in the private sector of higher education was leading to a loss of diversity. They noted among the chief causes of the "demise of diversity" the "economic pressures resulting from tuition differentials between public and private institutions," and those differentials were seen as the result of adverse public policies in financing higher education and adverse tax legislation. Among the many possible causes of this adverse tax legislation I am including the liberal, elitist prejudice that religion is meaningless.

The theme of liberal anti-Catholicism has been developed by several writers, including a few non-Catholics. In a 1977 book, _An Ugly Little Secret_, Andrew Greeley, a priest-sociologist, called anti-Catholic bias the "last remaining unexposed prejudice in American life." "This prejudice," wrote Greeley, "is not as harmful to individuals as either anti-Semitism or racism. . . . [But] it is more insidious because it is not acknowledged, not recognized, not explicitly and self-consciously rejected. Good American liberals who would not dream of using sexist language or racist slurs or anti-Semitic jokes have no problem at all about using anti-Catholic language, ethnic slurs, or Polish jokes." As _Time_ magazine noted, there is some truth in writer Peter Viereck's remark in 1959: "Anti-Catholicism is the anti-Semitism of the intellectual."

The Anti-Semitism of the Intellectual

Acquaintances at the University of Chicago, a school where Greeley studied, suggest to me that he is writing his personal experience large and venting his feelings on liberal America. Others suggest that anti-Catholicism is a thing of the past, that since John F. Kennedy's election and Vatican II, Americans have set aside their anti-Catholicism; or so I am told by a friend studying American church history. This may be the case. Catholics are Governors in twelve states—including the most populous (Jerry Brown's California, Hugh Carey's New York). Some 13 members of the U.S. Senate and 114 members of the House are Catholic. Whatever Ted Kennedy's problems are as a candidate for the Democratic nomination to the presidency of the United States, surely his religion has not hurt him. Greeley would grant this and more. The Italians and Irish are, he notes, the most educated and wealthiest groups of gentiles in the U.S.A. Michael Novak, himself an example of Catholic success, predicts a renaissance of American Catholicism.

Where then is the anti-Catholicism? To begin, we should note that a long history of deeply ingrained prejudice cannot be erased by a few years of ecumenical good feeling. The first European immigrants to these shores brought with them, as a part of their doctrinal baggage, anti-Catholicism. Catholics were outlawed along with Jews in many early American cities and colonies. When the Catholic immigrant waves of the nineteenth century began arriving, the civil and economic implications of this "alien" onslaught created a tremendous backlash from the Protestants. As Catholics sought to preserve their ethnic traditions, the fear of the ruling Protestants intensified. The Know Nothing Party and its similarly violent anti-Catholic cousin, the Ku Klux Klan, represented for a period of time the opinions of a significant number of Americans. Though the violence has subsided to a great extent, the twentieth century has witnessed a continuation of this Protestant bigotry.

Two forms of anti-Catholicism remain today. The more traditional nativist variety, best illustrated by the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod's reaffirmation of its opinion that the Pope is the Antichrist, is fading. The second, more "respectable" type, is that of the elitist, liberal intellectuals. For this group the only acceptable Catholic is the apostate who has gained respectability by his break from the fetters of religious superstition. Greeley argues that some of the most "successful" Catholics, listed by my friend studying church history as examples against my thesis, are, in fact, first-rate examples of such apostasy. Catholics, to achieve prominence in respectable society, have had to set aside their Catholic identities, argues Greeley. Novak concurs that Catholics among the liberal elite share the same biases against their co-religionists as do their Protestant peers.

The scanty attention given Catholics by the elite is amazing when one considers that Catholics make up 25 per cent of the population. Greeley argues that ignorance about Catholic opinion and action remains among the elite; he cites as examples of that ignorance the elite's assumptions of "Catholic anti-intellectualism" or "illiberalism" in a variety of liberal writings. The persistent opinion among liberals that the abortion issue is a Catholic issue can only be explained by a deeply ingrained prejudice. Legalized abortion is, of course, opposed by conservative Protestants, the Eastern Orthodox, Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and many others, including black religious and political leaders. Two years ago, the Chicago chapter of the Planned Parenthood Federation sent a mailing to college newspapers that included a cartoon showing a Catholic bishop clutching a gasoline can to his breast as if it were a Bible; he was on his way to torch an abortion clinic. My point is simple: many people who pretend to liberal tolerance and
Reflecting less and less the diversity for which they were once known, private institutions of higher education account for less than one fourth of the enrollment of students today.

informed opinions are prejudiced with respect to Catholics.

The intellectual and cultural elite continue to perceive the "Catholic fourth" as illiberal and prejudiced, "whereas polls show that not to be the case," notes Martin E. Marty. This, coupled with what Marty describes as "the inevitable political expression that goes with deep personal convictions in the religious sphere," makes liberal anti-Catholicism a candidate for explaining some of the imbalance that exists between public-supported and church-related higher education. A rehearsal of some of the legislative history of various proposals for direct-to-student financial aid supports this possibility.

The history of the imbalance between public and church-related higher education begins with the G.I. Bill following the Second World War. This legislation made grants directly to students rather than making grants to institutions, and thus this legislation allowed the consumer to choose his school. The immediate effect of the enactment of the original G.I. Bill was actually to shift the proportion of students attending colleges and universities toward the private sector. The student ratio was 50-50, public and private, in the early 50s. But this philosophy of allowing the consumer to choose, presently followed in various other fields, was not continued and expanded to non-veterans in the field of higher education. Worse, later forms of the G.I. Bill effectively lowered the possibility that students would choose private rather than public supported institutions. The Korean G.I. Bill, and those that followed it, changed the funding arrangement of the original G.I. Bill. For example, the subsequent bills set a lump sum for both educational and living expenses, while the original Bill separated them. One can hardly blame the veteran for choosing the school with the lowest tuition when the government benefits were so arranged.

More recent attempts at providing direct student aid have been made both on the federal and state level. For example, "tuition offset" legislation, a plan that allows the student to pay less tuition from his own resources if he attends a private school, represents in the mind of the National Independent Colleges and Universities a method to be recommended. This was first tried in Georgia, after a constitutional amendment had been adopted in 1972, and was in the amount of $400 for each student enrolled in a private college or university. Similar legislation has been proposed and adopted in several state legislatures and in the United States Senate, but "tuition offset" proposals have been killed in House committees. Given the supposed value of the private sector in higher education for providing diversity, why have these proposals met such an end?

Judging from congressional hearings, some opponents deem public aid to private church-related higher education contrary to the traditional separation of church and state. Others find the constitutionality of such aid a most confused matter. Recent Senate testimony by constitutional scholars illustrates present judicial confusion. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan gives the example of Mr. Justice Black who was apparently "required to say with a straight face with respect to an Ohio statute that it is constitutional to provide a book to a Catholic school, but it is not constitutional to provide an 'instructional aid.'" Moynihan, summarizing the testimonies, said to his Senate colleagues, "Please, help the Court out of this situation which has become absurd." The Court "decisions are an immense embarrassment to everybody." The constitutional question is hardly a sufficient reason for the failure of federal direct student aid legislation.

The Carter administration objects that the tax credit method, allowing certain tax deductions for tuition paid to private schools, would cost more than increasing the present loan programs. The largest difference cited was $1.6 billion versus $1.4 billion. But the excessive costs in administering the loan programs both for the federal government, where defaults are still the order of the day, and the growing accounting bureaucracies of the universities were not included in the administration's figures. These costs are particularly taxing on the typically small church-related college and do not apply to the direct-cash-in-the-pocket advantages of the tax credit system proposed.

Unconscious Anti-Catholic Prejudice

Leading liberal critics argue that the tuition tax credit would benefit the upper and upper middle class more than the poor; however, sponsors introduced adjustments to prevent this abuse. Other liberals suggested that aid to private schools failed to serve minorities. Nonetheless, the record of private schools in educating minorities is outstanding when compared to the public schools and demonstrates both their ability to adjust more quickly than public institutions to the needs of their students and their independent leadership in higher education. In short, most liberal objections can be met. Liberal failure to support this legislation lies at least partially in a possibly unconscious anti-Catholic prejudice that gives expression to their general prejudice that religion and religious education are meaningless.

Senator Moynihan's experience with the Liberal Party of New York can serve as a closing illustration. Nearly at the same time that Moynihan had begun pushing his legislation to support private schools, the Liberal
Party of New York State took time out to reconsider its endorsement of the Senator. To be sure, various other reasons were given other than his sponsorship of this legislation. However, both Senator Moynihan and Andrew Greeley were convinced that an anti-Catholic bias lay behind this reconsideration. The Party accused Moynihan of "pandering to Catholics." One could hardly have a high opinion of Catholics and suggest that they could be "pandered to." The Liberal Party chairman, a graduate of Meadville-Lombard Seminary (Unitarian/Universalist) and the University of Chicago Divinity School, when confronted with evidence of his anti-Catholic bias in the press release that ended his Party's support of Moynihan, began to cite precedents for distrust of contemporary American Catholicism. Among his major citations were the abuses of the sixteenth-century Catholic hierarchy in Poland! Even the Protestants of the north of Ireland do not cultivate such long and bitter memories. This gives cause for reconsidering how much of liberal elitist anti-Catholicism disappeared with the election of John F. Kennedy. Perhaps Michael Novak is correct when he suggests that the election of Kennedy represents more the Catholic elite's Americanization and alienation from their co-religionists than the Protestant elite's accepting of Catholics.

The Catholic Elite's Americanization

In general terms, any noticeable prejudice against Catholics must eventually relate to church-related schools, since in the public's mind Catholic schools represent the largest block of such institutions. Furthermore, such prejudice might well affect public willingness to make it more financially possible for individuals to attend church-related institutions. Proving so "respectable" a prejudice is not an easy task, and I have not done so in this short column. I hope, however, that the need for further research and consideration of the place of this prejudice in tax legislation affecting higher education is evident.

In sum, the role of anti-Catholicism in the demise of diversity in higher education may be a decisive one, and such prejudice poses a genuine problem for American pluralism. The liberal Protestant establishment appears to preach pluralism but legislate conformity. Progressive Americans who are committed to minority rights might well include Catholics among their concerns. For those who are within religious "minority" groups, a renewed investment in church-related higher education might take the form of legislative watch-dogging and seeking increased public support for pluralism in higher education. An articulate defense of church-related higher education is needed to give winsome reasons for increased private support and federal direct-to-student-aid. As Americans, we all have much to gain in the balance.

Rules Regarding a Resurrection

"When Elisha came into the house, he saw the child lying dead on his bed."

-2 Kings 4:32

First you receive the news: "the child has not awaked" say nothing go directly to the resting place close the door behind you pray your prayers hard and fast find what you need in the face enter it even death if you must lie down upon the body flat as flesh would have it like lumber, wood to wood so close your grains run together eye to eye, hand to hand spare no parts be obdurate, do not budge stay until even the bone is warm with the smell of old clothes and new birth you know he's home now relax, flex your muscles, smoke walk once to and fro return to the child it won't be long seven sneezes the sleep falls from his eyes

Donald E. H. Marshall

Condescension

It began with a baby this time no instant "Let there be" of humankind no molded mud-and-clay-man rib-carved-woman puffed to life with holy breath but a normal, aching, bleeding, crying birth blood, sweat, and tears. "God certainly has come down in the world." muttered the neutral bystander. Ah! but there were no neutral bystanders. God certainly has come down in the world.

J. Barrie Shepherd
The media often make the distinction between “reality,” the true state of affairs, and our “images of reality,” ephemeral pictures in our heads. All of us have read newspaper or magazine articles about the image of women, or the image of the elderly, in which cherished but outmoded images are shown to be naively or even stubbornly resisting the changes that have taken place in the real world. The language of the media refers to a tension or discrepancy between image and reality. For the anthropologist, the interesting question becomes, how do we know what is image and what is reality?

The distinction is not always easy to determine. For example, what we now refer to as the image of women, a decade ago would have been referred to as the reality or nature of women. Ten years ago many Americans accepted the then common cultural assumption that women are rather helpless dependent homemakers, content to bask in the glory of their husband's accomplishments, without any personal or career aspirations of their own. But now, because of the feminist movement and the ERA controversy, we realize that the “helpless female” is a socially constructed image of women. What previously was widely accepted as an accurate description of reality is now being questioned and has been transformed into image.

Most readers remember when women's role in society was part of the taken-for-granted, those aspects of social life that are never or rarely ever questioned. But after we did realize that our view of women was culturally conditioned, that it was a variable image, we set about with a vengeance to root out the old conceptions. Indeed, the function of the thousands of women's consciousness raising groups was precisely to challenge what had previously been accepted about women’s roles and to probe the taken-for-granted in each individual’s own life situation.

Most of us do not usually take time from our busy daily schedule to distinguish between image and reality; we just get on with the business of living. When we read about image versus reality, or when that opposition is even brought to consciousness, there is the implication that an image, a mental picture or process, is different from reality. And that means we are questioning our own representation of reality. We say it's only an image, and thus imply that it's not entirely accurate. The point is that when we do make the distinction for any reason, we are in effect calling our own beliefs into question. Usually, however, we accept our cultural definitions. We take our beliefs and thoughts as reality and our conceptions of others as immutable human nature, and we do not probe the taken-for-granted. It never becomes an issue. For most of us, it is difficult enough just to live in the world. If we went around questioning everything, not only would we be much less effective as human beings but we would never have time for anything else.

Opening Up the Taken-for-Granted

Anthropologists engaged in the study of social life do need to penetrate the taken-for-granted in order to conduct their scientific investigations, and we have discovery procedures that enable us to distinguish image from reality. These methods are relatively straightforward and may be applicable to the reader's own life situation. Let us consider four such procedures.

The first is to investigate areas of conflict and controversy when people are questioning their accepted guidelines, when they are examining the unexamined. To suggest this may seem as if I am cheating the reader. I am saying that if you want to penetrate the taken-for-granted, wait until the people themselves no longer take it for granted, wait until they start an indigenous debate and then just listen. It may seem rather grandiose to label this a discovery procedure.

But the method works, and it is quite reliable. Periods of public debate and conflict are times when participants do open up and examine the taken-for-granted. They become very aware of the distinction between image and reality as they themselves are trying to determine which is which. During these periods everything is
Societies vary in the extent to which transitions in the life cycle are acknowledged. Only recently in America have we come to identify and describe the mid-life crisis.

up for grabs, and one never knows in advance what the outcome will be.

It is relatively easy to gather information during this phase as the issues are openly discussed. Direct questions may be asked without anyone taking offense, people are usually willing and even anxious to talk about the subject and to present their opinions, and the topic generates considerable interest and excitement. Further, since one can ask seemingly foolish questions, one can probe what previously had been basic assumptions. "Marjorie, I acknowledge that you have equal rights and I understand your need to fulfill yourself as a human being, but isn't there any difference at all between what a man should be and what a woman should be?" "Son, I agree that we are not living in the nineteenth century, and I too value the changes in the quality of life that have resulted from the youth revolution, so let's get down to basics and talk man-to-man about what the rights and responsibilities should be between parents and children." Only when such topics have become an "issue" are they even discussable.

The second procedure is to replicate an anthropological field study which in its personal impact has been compared to a psychoanalysis. But as one who has done both, my own view is that the anthropological experience is by far the more profound.

The anthropologist goes outside of his normal society and initiates the study of lifeways in an alien setting. He makes every effort to suspend any critical judgment, and he approaches the phenomena naively, insofar as it is humanly possible. He does not assume anything, he questions everything, he never believes just one informant, and he has an attitude of openness. He has no axe to grind, he is not selling anything, and he does not try to help anyone. He observes closely, he listens carefully, and he participates fully and monitors his own reactions. He realizes that people who occupy different positions in the system will have different perspectives, so he seeks alternative views.

He really pays attention to what people say and what they do because the discrepancy between their verbalizations and their actions provides his best insights into image and reality. Here, image means native conceptualizations, their view of the world, their norms and ideals, their verbalizations; reality means what actually happens, the true state of affairs. Let me be perfectly clear. The people themselves may not be aware of any discrepancy, for during times of relative stability they take image for reality. But an outsider can see the difference. It is, of course, not easy to achieve this kind of understanding and the field anthropologist works very hard at achieving it. He goes everywhere, he never refuses an invitation, he takes notes all the time. He may work twelve to fourteen hours a day, seven days a week for a year or more.

We are often asked, what is most difficult about anthropological field work? It is not the physical hardships, although we sometimes play them up to appear more glamorous; we casually tell in a letter home about the tiger that crossed the road last night or the cholera outbreak in the next village. Another possible difficulty is that the people deceive us so that we gather inaccurate information. This is of some concern, but it is not very likely that any group could sustain a deception for long periods. In any case we are continually checking into this possibility by comparing the data we receive from different informants, by noting the discrepancy between what people do and say, by participating ourselves in daily activities so that we can observe what really occurs. It is, in fact, much more likely that a people will be deceiving themselves than the anthropologist. Another concern is fear of ethnocentrism, that we will impose our own view of the world on the people we study, and this is indeed a serious problem that we make every effort to avoid.

But the most pernicious difficulty of all is that we will accept a people's images about themselves, that we will not penetrate their taken-for-granted, or that we will not question their cultural assumptions. If an idea or culture pattern is so widely shared that the people never question it, if the very possibility of questioning never occurs to them, then it may not occur to us. During the course of the study we may come to believe what the people believe about themselves, which means that we have lost our analytical ability. This happens in field research and we can only try to be aware of it.

A Kind of Self-Imposed Alienation

In anthropological field study, however, we do come to distinguish between reality and a people's images of that reality. Our insights are a consequence of our method and of the nature of the field experience. Isolated as we are from our own society we have nothing to fall back on and we even begin to laugh at "their" jokes. Our aim is to penetrate as deeply into their society as possible by a process of total immersion, but never so deeply that we cannot come out again to communicate our findings to our colleagues. We maintain a balance so that eventually we do come home to write about our experience. It is like a suspended involvement; at the same time that I am participating in a native funeral ceremony in Sumatra giving a blessing in the local language, I keep thinking of Levi-Strauss and the paper that I shall deliver at the next annual meetings of the anthropological association. The total experience is a kind of self-imposed alienation. We are
It is interesting that in America we create so many “out-of-structure” experiences. It is as if we must escape structured society in order to discover our true selves.

simultaneously in and out of society, suspended between the field culture and our home professional culture. We maintain a divided segmental self, but as it is only a temporary condition, we can sustain it.

The third procedure is to examine the midpoint of all transitional states. Van Gennep showed us that transitions in the life cycle are divided into three phases—separation, the midpoint or liminal phase, and reincorporation. To provide an example, a tribal rite of passage at puberty or a fraternity initiation begins when the initiates are separated from normal society. They are moved outside the village, to the basement of a house, or to some segregated place. During the midpoint phase they receive instruction in tribal secrets and are given tasks and ordeals to test their manhood. In the final phase they are reincorporated back into society in their new role as full-fledged members.

The midpoint, we see, is suspended between two stages in the life cycle or between two structural positions in society. No longer adolescents but not yet adults, initiates are set apart at the margins or edges of society and are stripped of all visible signs of social status and hierarchy. Outside of normal society, unified in their segregation, without power or position, they develop intense feelings of fellowship and camaraderie. They may wear ragged clothing, indicative of their shared equality and structural poverty, and they undergo hardships together. Symbolism of dirt and filth and death indicates that they must become leveled before they can be reborn to their new position in the social system.

Societies vary in the extent to which transitions in the life cycle are marked by group ritual, and some transitions are not even socially acknowledged. It is only recently in our own society that we have come to identify and describe the mid-life crisis. But despite the variation, those who are in a midpoint phase are sufficiently out of the structure so that they can look back and reflect upon it. Midpoints are par excellence the time for reflection, reformulation, and cosmic thoughts. They may serve to inculcate societal values, to provide instruction in preparation for a new role, or there may be a time for taking stock or thinking through the direction of one’s own life career.

Anthropologists study the form and symbolism of the midpoint phase. They find that those undergoing transition make good informants as they are less firmly embedded in their social structure. Slightly dislocated, somewhat outside their normal social selves, they are reflective about their own situation and usually willing to examine their taken-for-granted. Relieved of the obligations and responsibilities of their customary social roles, those in transitional states frequently experience feelings of freedom from societal demands and report a heightened sense of spontaneity and even creativity. For the anthropologist the study of midpoints represents an excellent point of entry to the understanding of social images. Those in the midpoint phase are thoughtful, are less likely to embrace and blindly defend societal ideals, and are conscious of the discrepancy between image and reality. But the midpoint phase, by definition, does not last very long and it is followed by a period of reincorporation.

Many institutions in contemporary society try to capture the quality of the midpoint phase including religious retreats and pilgrimages, encounter group weekends, communes, and Club Mediterranean vacations. These are not transitions in the life cycle, of course, and are frequently purely commercial enterprises. But nevertheless, it is interesting that in America we have so many efforts to create an “out-of-structure” experience. It is as if we cannot find adequate satisfactions in structured society so that we must escape from it in order to discover our true selves. These modern efforts have in common the following characteristics: people are taken to a segregated place; feelings of shared equality and fellowship are generated; the symbols of power are minimized or even considered so inappropriate that people must dress alike or may only use first names; there is instruction or self-examination; and, finally, the total experience is a communal one marked by time boundaries, definite points at which it begins and ends. Everyone knows exactly when to turn off the liminal experience and re-enter normal society. The anthropologist may extend the scope of his investigations of midpoints to include contemporary “out-of-structure” phenomena.

Into Out-of-Structure Experiences

The fourth procedure is to study ritual, myth, and other expressive forms. Some writers restrict the meaning of the term ritual to religious rites, and some imply that myth is a demonstrably false belief, but we take a much broader perspective. A ritual is a performance, a myth is a story, and both are standardized products of a culture. American rituals include graduation exercises, Memorial Day ceremonies, Fourth of July fireworks displays, the inauguration of the President, and even rock concerts and professional football games. Myths include the stories of Abe Lincoln, George Washington, Horatio Alger, Davy Crockett, and Popeye the Sailor Man. We are as much interested in popular rituals and myths as in the heavy serious ones; they are equally revealing. Rituals and myths are universal forms found in every known society but their particular manifestations are products of a given culture and express the dominant ideology and ideals of that cul-
As dreams can be interpreted to reveal the inner conflicts of an individual, a careful reading of myths by an anthropologist may reveal the cosmic dilemmas within a culture.

We study rituals and myths as cultural products to learn something about the culture that is not elsewhere revealed.

All expressive forms, including rituals and myths, arise from the human imagination. The performances that the members of a culture choose to witness and the stories that they choose to tell themselves are manifestations of the cultural imagination. Rituals and myths are to a culture what dreams are to an individual. They may sometimes seem absurd, mixed up, childish, or just unintelligible. On initial inspection they may not make sense, but just as dreams can be interpreted by an analyst to reveal the inner conflicts of an individual, a careful reading of rituals and myths by an anthropologist may reveal the cosmic dilemmas and dominant themes within a culture. Expressive forms, whether they be myths or paintings, do not use the language of everyday speech but express their messages in a symbolic language which cannot simply be read as one would read a straightforward descriptive account. The symbolism of ritual and myth must be interpreted if the underlying message is to be revealed.

Four Mirrors to Society and the Self

What rituals and myths do is to portray an aspect of our own experience “out there” in drama or story form so that we may reflect about it and come to terms with it. A simple example from the television series All in the Family may be appropriate. Archie Bunker is funny in part because his denigration of women is so obviously an archaic throwback to an earlier era, but all of us can see an aspect of ourselves and our own predicament in Archie’s performance. To see on television an appealing caricature of the bigot and male chauvinist enables us to objectify our dilemma. It serves as a mirror of an inner problem, an objectification of our experience, held up for us to examine. All rituals and myths, cultural performances and stories, operate in essentially similar ways, although the particular dilemmas depicted are not always conscious or obvious. Many of the dilemmas are unconscious or only dimly perceived, but nevertheless we discover ourselves in the expressive forms of our culture.

In summary, this article suggests four anthropological methods to distinguish image from taken-for-granted reality. The four procedures described are all ways of obtaining a reflexive view, of moving outside normal structured roles and predicaments so that we may look in.

The first method focuses on an indigenous controversy. We examine conflict at a time when the participants themselves have become very conscious of their own generally accepted lifeways and definition of reality. Society is suspended between the old and the new, and alternate positions are advanced and examined.

The second procedure is the classic anthropological field investigation, a way of moving outside one’s own culture and engaging in long-term systematic study of another culture. The field worker is suspended between the two cultures; he is both in and out of society, simultaneously.

The third procedure investigates transitions in the life cycle at the midpoint or liminal phase, when persons are suspended between two structured roles. They are betwixt and between, temporarily removed from structure, and the anthropologist examines their predicament before they once again become established in their social system.

The fourth procedure is to study ritual and myth, which objectify or mirror in symbolic language the inner life and dilemmas of a culture. They throw a dimension of a society’s experience into bold relief, in performance or story form, so that it may be examined outside oneself.

The four procedures yield a reflexive view of social life. We study conflict when old ideas are being reformed; as a field worker we learn an alien culture as if we were new members become socialized; we examine transitions when new roles are being defined and created; and we analyze the expressive objectifications that emerge as products of the culture. All are mirrors to society and the self.

One implication is that we cannot penetrate the taken-for-granted or differentiate from reality by armchair reflection, by simply sitting down to “think” about the matter. The reason is that we tend to rationalize, we explain away what may be unpleasant, we confuse ideal norms with actual behavior, and we take what we would like to be for what is.

In conclusion, my hope is that these ideas may be suggestive and that the four procedures may be helpful. They do reflect recent thinking in social anthropology, but of course there are other possible methods. We all know of artists and poets who see deeply and have the ability to penetrate the taken-for-granted to the underlying reality. How do they do it?

I recall a phrase by the poet-philosopher Friedrich Schiller quoted by Freud. Schiller refers to "the momentary and passing madness which is found in all real creators." Schiller’s answer is madness, at least temporary, which is another way of getting outside oneself to obtain a reflexive view. In comparison with a retreat to madness, my anthropological methods may appear relatively attractive. In any case they are less drastic, and I recommend them.
Kairos and Craftsmanship

Religion no longer affects our spiritual illness; a comprehensive faith could overcome it, but such faithful comprehension is not often found.

Jay C. Rochelle

There is a spiritual illness which has nothing to do with the increase or diminution of religion and religious feeling; it has little to do with the rise and fall of interest in "spirituality." This spiritual illness stems from an improper attitude toward the material world. "Religion" no longer affects the illness because wedges have been driven between the material world and the spiritual world of "religion"; a comprehensive faith could overcome it, but such faithful comprehension is not often found.

"The "Alternatives Movement" has brought a healthy dose of genuine—if sometimes romantic—materialism back to our culture. This movement is really the first challenge in this century to a concept of the "good life" as relentless pursuit of material prosperity. Until the "Small is Beautiful" movement and others related to it, we lived with a general approach to the material world in which matter had been converted from means to end. Not surprisingly, such a conversion lessened the value of the material world; this lessening of value occurred because matter's ultimate value is not as a thing-in-itself, but as a pointer to the reality whom Christians call God the Creator. Christianity truthfully perceives that the value of matter is found in its nature as means; to make it an end in itself perverts it from its value as a witness and proclaimer of the Ground of all Being.

All craftspeople know this to be true, regardless of their religious faith. They know it because they are genuine materialists. The sacredness of the material world is known by the genuine materialist and hidden from or perverted by the false materialist. The line between true materialism and false materialism is fine, but it is discoverable.

There are two major clues for finding the line between truth and falsehood. The first has to do with artificiality. The spiritual is most often discoverable in the simple; the duplicity of artificiality is a mark of a false materialism. The artificial proves itself false because artificiality is based on a principle of cheating. The artificial is that which cheats on the use of excellent materials, which would save the good wine until last when all are drunk on lesser spirits. The artificial is known in the difference between rock and concrete, wood and pressboard, plaster and sheetrock, gold and brass. Genuine materialism prefers one oak table to four formica-topped tables. But we must be careful here; for some people would say that this is merely a matter of taste and that we are confusing aesthetics with spiritual truth. So there is a second clue which helps us.

The distinction between true and false materialism is seen, secondly, in the distance between the natural and the artificial. This distance is commonly created by the amount of force necessary to make the thing in mind out of raw materials. There is a certain amount of force used in the world of all artisans. The potter uses fire to harden pots; the ironworker uses fire to forge shapes of iron; the jeweler must grind and polish stones to create rings; the calligrapher cuts reeds and quills, grinds ink, and literally carves the letter into the paper or skin. This is controlled force consistent with the needs of the craft.

There is a jiu-jitsu of craftsmanship—the relationship of the craftsman to his material is one of gentle force, force which is aligned with the force of the raw material itself.

The word "need" is important here; it connects with the Buddhist teaching of right action, action consonant with what needs to be done. Action beyond the meeting of those needs becomes manipulation, exploitation, and finally violence. This is the root of the difference between simplicity and duplicity. There is a jiu-jitsu of craftsmanship; the relationship of the craftsman to the material is one of gentle force, force which is in alignment with the force of the material itself. As Arthur Waley, in his The Way and its Power, speaks of the Taoist tradition:

The Taoists saw in many arts and crafts the utilization of a power akin to if not identical to that of the Tao. The wheelwright, the carpenter, the butcher, the bowman achieve their skill not by accumulating facts concerning their art, nor by the energetic use either of muscles or outward senses; but through utilizing the fundamental kinship which, underneath apparent distinctions and diversities, unites their own Primal Stuff with the Primal Stuff of the medium in which they work (p. 58).
The illness of the spirit initially referred to in this article is brought on by improper relations to the material world. The Taoists speak of Li as the “organic pattern” within nature; what we translate as virtue (Te) means the ability to discern and follow the organic pattern. The illness is a loss of harmony in which the material world ceases to be an occasion for wonder and awe and has, instead, become the enemy to be conquered. Spiritual damage is sure to follow such an attitude, for we were created to live harmoniously with nature. To the extent we use our powers of objectification improperly (hypothesizing the natural world as something detached and outside ourselves, and therefore exploitable), we shall find ourselves spiritually schizophrenic.

In the crafting life these Taoist principles are perceived. They may not be utilized perfectly, and I would not suggest that craftsmanship is the Way, though I surely think it is a Way. In the craftsman’s life a balance is restored between action and production, and the right amount of force is used to produce the desired result. Some balance is also restored between the natural and the finished product; only as much manipulation is used as is necessary to make what is being made. The crafting life deals with present reality, focuses on here-and-now existence, and offers fulfillment in the moment. “Fulfillment in the moment” does not mean hedonism; it means that the craftsman has a different understanding and perception of time. In large part this different understanding of time is related to the relationship between the craftsman and his or her material.

Time is a deceptive aspect of human existence. There are essentially three ways of picturing time. The first is no-time, a state of being in which there is no perception of the passage of time. No-time is only possible where there is no self-awareness because an awareness of the self occurs in history and thus presupposes awareness of the self’s passage through time and space as basic for reflection and reference. No-time is a reality only for the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms—and then only because a human makes the observation. A geranium cannot reflect on its own life!

The second picture is of time as duration. This is time measured by clocks and calendars. It is time as framework. I can speak of being at such-and-such a place at a certain time and then check my calendar to make sure I don’t have to be somewhere else at the same time. I can mark significant events by anniversaries: the fifteenth anniversary of my ordination, the eighteenth of my wedding, the twenty-fourth of my father’s death. This time is characterized by measurability. It is not necessarily meaningful; only our recollection of a past measurable time makes it meaningful. It is merely a way to mark the flow of one’s life and history. It is the reference point for memory—even though memory has the quality of destroying barriers of time and making past events into present feelings.

The third picture is of time as significant event. “Event” means any human experience from first breath to last breath, first kiss to last kiss, first blush of adolescent infatuation to final dedication of mature love. There is a name for such time; it is called, from the Greek, kairos. Measurable time is called chronos, from which we get such words as chronometer, chronicle, chronic, and synchronize. Chronos was the Greek God of time, notorious for devouring his children; we know him as the grim reaper. Chronos is time as duration, as continuum, as fleeting experience, as change and decay, and, ultimately, destruction.

To the extent that we objectify improperly and hypothesize the natural world as outside ourselves, therefore exploitable, we shall find ourselves spiritually schizophrenic.

Kairos is a unique word and a unique concept. Its meaning is approximated in phrases like “the right time,” “the right psychological moment,” “the Aha!—experience,” and “he has wonderful timing.” We speak of a person having timing, and this notion partially translates the word; the idea of timing bears the sense of appropriate action or speech which will enhance or enliven or, perhaps, capture a segment of clock-time. It carries the idea of fullness or completion. The well-timed action or word brings a fullness to time which might otherwise not be there. It also partakes of newness; right timing brings a sense or originality with it. All of these qualities are part of the meaning of Kairos.

The act of crafting is an act in time as chronos, of course, but it is also one of those acts which partake of kairos. Crafting provides an opportunity for the experi-
Chronos is transformed into Kairos and nature is able to bear grace.

ence of kairos because crafting fills clocktime with the kinds of significant behavior in which fulfillment is experienced. Time filled with meaningful labor, during which the focus is on the work itself in its individual parts, will be time in which the sense of duration is replaced by a sense of fulfillment, or at least fullness.

Time does not weigh heavily on one who is involved in craftwork which is connected with right action and in which right motivation is at work. The matter is worked to its finished form through a process of harmonious identification with the material with which one works. One learns the quirks and idiosyncrasies of the material along with the discipline of the craft and a harmonious partnership is created. In this harmonious partnership, in this relation of craftsman to material, the qualities which enable kairos may be looked for. When the focus is shifted from the money involved, the ego-gratification of the crafter, and the satisfaction of the customer to the right action which produces the finished product, then time no longer weighs heavily on the craftsman. He or she is then centered in the work itself, in the harmonies and balances which create the end product.

Thus it is that centering and kairos are related as subjective and objective sides of the same experience. One cannot exist without the other; one cannot happen without the other. When one centers on the material and the process of crafting and is no longer concerned with questions of ego, then time appears to slow down, even to stop from time to time. But the moment has great and lasting meaning.

It is the nature of matter to bear spiritual value, and craftsmanship is a means whereby the creative spirit of an individual may be born into the world. It is a minor mystery.

Crafts have been called "minor mysteries" since medieval times. As mysteries, they are considered minor in relation to the major mystery of the Incarnation and to distinguish them from it. Yet crafts are mysteries; they are ways by which the thoughtful and reflective among their practitioners can see into the meaning of life. Through them, the connection between the spiritual and the material world opens up once more to the eyes of the beholder. The nature of matter as bearer of spiritual value becomes evident once again, because the craft itself is a disciplined means whereby the creative spirit of the individual may be born into the world of flesh and blood. It is, indeed, a minor mystery.

In craftsmanship, chronos is transformed into kairos and nature is, after all, able to bear grace. In such a way are illnesses of the spirit cured.

May, 1980
Voices for Praise
A Choral Reading on Bach

Organ Prelude
In dir ist Freude
B. W. V. 615

Left (Quietly)
When has the heart
had such a voice for praise?

Right (Also quietly, but with a
bit more energy)
When has the trembling spirit
found such mighty fortresses
in which to make a joyful noise?

Left (Brightly)
Every good endowment
is from above . . .

Right (Similarly)
... and every perfect gift
coming down from the Father of Lights.

Left (Fervently)
The organ breathes
the Living God.

Right (Similarly)
The order of God is a Holy Tune.

Left (Fervently)
The bellows,
the bellows
move the nations
of clouds across
the fields of His glory.

Right (Similarly)
Eternal ages wake
from sleep and hear

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The organ breathes the living God, and the order of God is a holy tune. Listen, the feet at the organ pedals make us pilgrims all.

Left
The tumult of this time disconsolate

Right (Falling volume on last word)
falls, falls fast away.

Both (Jubilantly)
The order of God.
is a Holy Tune.
The Word is a shining light for all darkness.
(A period of silence)

Left (Sharply)
Yet ... there is a darkness for the light.

Right (Sharply)
Yet ... there is a light for all darkness.

Left (Wistfully)
O, how fleeting and insignificant . . .

Right (Similarly)
. . . is all the life of man.

Organ Prelude
Christ unser Herr zum Jordan kam
B. W. V. 684

Left (Excitedly)
Listen, the feet at the organ pedals make us pilgrims all.

Right (Similarly)
Listen, blessed is he who hears and knows the way.

Both (Intoning deeply)
On high bombard and pedal basse the hills rise on the thunderline at Golgotha.

Left (Quickly)
Christ is alone.

Right (Sharply)
Death is the player.

Both (Smoothly and firmly)
Yet hear the Jordan flowing polyphonic all beyond our doubt.

Left (Sharply)
Death is the player.

Right (Sharply)
Death is the player.

Both (Smoothly)
Yet hear on the deep continuo the Jordan flowing sweetly on.

Left (Assertively)
The skull is a power and Golgotha the place of skulls.

May, 1980
The cross is a tree without leaf or flower, the timbered shadow of the law. The horn of night is blowing fugal intervals between the doom and glory.

Right (Similarly)
The cross is a tree without leaf or flower.

Left (Somewhat harshly)
The timbered shadow of the law . . .

Right (Similarly)
. . . falls in a daylight blackness on the hill.

Both (Softer)
Yet blooms with a rose on the blush of thorns.

Left (Softly)
Lacrimae, Christi

Right (Softly)
Your tears, O Christ.

Left (Kyrie, eleison.)
Right (Lord, have mercy.)

Both (Despairing)
There is no arm in the darkness only the darkness, O, man, bewail your grievous sin.

Left (Each word a beat)
Yet hear the feet at the pedals walking.

Right (Similarly)
Perpetual journey of the faithful making.

Both (Strong and steady)
Christ is the way.
His rose blooms through the shadow of the law.
The grandeur that was Rome diminishes in his humble glory.

Left (Steady)
Let us remember his wounds . . .

Right (Steady)
. . . and know we are healed.

Left (Briskly on each syllable)
Toccata.

Right (Similarly)
Toccata.

Left
Touch.

Right (Reverently)
The Fingers of the music touch Christ, his ribs.

Left (Reverently and strong)
His bones now ebony with bruise.
And the voice is singing
dooms, O dooms of love.

Right (Reverently and a bit softer)
Now white
with rarest
thin
and contrapuntal
purity.

Both (Very softly)
Softly
O, see
the Dove
at the chambered pages
flying soft.

Left (Reverently)
The music lingers
on arabesques
of grace.

Right (Similarly)
And the voice—
the voice
is singing
dooms,
O dooms of love.

Left (Sadly)
Is crying
atonalities
of joy and grief.

Both (Like the beat of a clock until
the last line which is almost sung)
Where, when
It is finished.
Time stops.
The night
is lying in.

Left (With great clarity in high voice)
The horn of night
is blowing fugal intervals . . .

Right (Lower)
. . . between the doom
and the glory.

Left (Distracted, gloomy)
Ah, birds
fly the shadow
and have no eyes.

May, 1980
Before the cock cries dawn on his candled wall where shadows have no breath, 
the stone is rolling like the sun across the dark now opening.

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Right (Distracted, bitter)  
The owl is a fool and the stork  
a drunken dancer.

Both (Solemnly)  
Christ lay in death's dark kingdom.

Left (Poise on syllables)  
Until . . .

Right (Poise, hold)  
Until . . .

Both (Strong upbeat)  
Before the cock cries dawn on his candled wall.

---

Left (Brightly)  
O, Wonder!

Right (Brightly)  
O, wonder!

Both (Voices pulsing)  
The Great Heart Beats where shadows have no breath.

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Left (lighter)  
Is beating on the stone . . .

Right (Rolling)  
. . . and the stone is rolling like the sun across the dark now opening.

Both (Quick)  
Where, when . . . diapason (very brightly)

---

Left (All of the following in a crescendo)  
The pipes . . .

Right  
. . . at the strong right hand . . .

---

Right

So straightly mad and tall.

Both (Ecstatio)
The star of morning pipes and plays its silver trumpet . . .

Left (Jubilantly)
Clarion . . .

Right (Similarly)
Clarion . . .

Both

When has the heart had such a voice for praise?  
The Word is a voice for all darkness.  
The organ breathes the Living God.

Left (Strong, sustained)
Every good endowment is a gift from above . . .

Right

. . . and every perfect gift comes down from the Father of lights.

Both (Earnestly)
Awake! The Voice calls us!  
The rivers of faith are flowing full.  
In Christ is joy, is joy.

(A period of silence)

To God alone on high be glory.

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Choral Prelude (Organ)  
Vor deinen Thron tret Ich  
B. W. V. 668

Photographs of the Chapel of the Resurrection courtesy of the Valparaiso University News Service

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The Cresset
Peter Augustine Lawler

I want to present an analysis of the present status of the complex question of the political utility of religion in America's liberal democracy. As always, it is instructive to begin with the understanding of this question put forth by the statesmen responsible for the Founding of the regime. America, it has been truly said, was the first nation to be built self-consciously on a secular foundation. The principles to which the regime is dedicated are derived from knowledge of "the laws of nature and Nature's God," which may be discovered through a rational inquiry into natural necessity. These principles, as the Founders understood them, owe nothing to what has been revealed by the Christian God. They presuppose, instead, the replacement by Hobbes and Locke of the moral doctrine of Genesis with their teaching about natural rights and the scientific enlightenment. America is properly referred to as a liberal democracy, but it is often forgotten by those who do so that the term liberalism means liberation from the authority of the church. Although the Founding may owe nothing intellectually to Christianity, even Jefferson recognized that the preservation of a secular republic requires Christianity's assistance. Because the theoretical argument


2Consider the following from Jefferson: Letter to Pierre Samuel DuPont De Nemours (April 24, 1816). Letter to John Adams (October 28, 1813), and, above all, Letter to Roger C. Weightman (June 24, 1826).


supporting the regime owes too much to the liberation of self-interest and to assertiveness with respect to rights, it is deficient in terms of generating the moral qualities associated with the performance of necessary social and political duties. It is politically salutary for Americans to believe in an otherworldly divine justice which rewards republican or bourgeois virtue and in the Christian doctrine of love of God and neighbor in order to moderate bourgeois acquisitiveness in the service of what the duties of citizenship require.4

4America is properly referred to as a liberal democracy, but it is often forgotten that the enlightenment meaning of "liberal" meant liberation from the authority of the church.

But, if popular acceptance of Christianity is a necessary precondition for republican decency in America, it can also be viewed as constant danger to the regime's orientation around material prosperity. Most basically, as Hobbes and Locke first argued, if men take their souls too seriously and do battle over matters relating the proper road to salvation, the "arts of peace" connected with prosperity will atrophy. Even if concern with immortal souls does not lead to civil war, the focus upon eternal justice leads to a noble contempt for what is required of worldly success and, of course, only worldly success is a legitimate public end in a secular regime.5 Finally, the belief that the Bible reveals the knowledge necessary for human well-being deflects intellectual effort away from the scientific inquiry necessary for the technological mastery of nature, and such inquiry is the key to burgeoning material prosperity.6


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May, 1980
The American Founders, as a result, are best considered as intellectual heirs to the modern philosophical attack upon the political effects of Christianity, initiated by Machiavelli. Machiavelli's purpose was to politicize minds that were excessively concerned with eternity, to lower their horizons in the service of earthly goals human beings can realistically achieve. Subsequently waves of modern thought have slowly worn away any reservations human beings might have about viewing this world as their one and only home. Modern thought, for this reason, seems to have culminated in the historicism of Nietzsche and Heidegger: What man is not determined by some eternal essence but by the particular characteristics of his historical time and place. His fulfillment must be achieved and understood within in the context of his particular set of historical circumstances or “world” in the Heideggerian sense.

**Part of the enlightenment project was to make Christianity “reasonable,” to reform it by purging those elements which militate against commerce, comfort, and worldly prosperity.**

Christianity, to repeat, appears to be necessary for the preservation of American liberalism, but it is also potentially subversive of its goals. Consequently, part of the enlightenment project, to which the American Founders contributed, has been to make Christianity “reasonable,” that is, to reform it by purging those elements which militate against worldly prosperity. Christianity, properly understood, does not conflict with the natural human devotion to commerce and comfort, and, consequently, it need not stand in the way of earthly success.

Today, it is possible to wonder, from even a strictly secular political perspective, whether this project to domesticate Christianity has not turned out to be altogether too successful. Theologians, responding to the call of modern philosophy, have thoroughly “demythologized” Christianity in the light of what are believed to be unquestionable scientific truths brought forth by the enlightenment. The theologians of hope, the theologians of liberation, and so forth have resolutely sought to eliminate all the allegedly illicit or “Platonic”

7The authoritative exposition of this understanding of Machiavelli is Strauss' *Thoughts on Machiavelli.*


9Consider Tocqueville's thinly veiled description of the modern philosophical project, the purpose of which was to turn men away from thoughts “fixed on contemplation of another world” and toward “hunting for prosperity” (p. 743) and compare it with his own praise of American religion for “confining itself to its proper sphere” (p. 443): otherworldly elements of Christianity. In accord with the full consequences of the truth of Heidegger's radically historicist teaching, one is led to believe that it is no longer safe to assume that God himself exists apart from the concrete dynamic of history. It is certainly difficult to determine whether many of the most influential contemporary theologians think Christians ought to believe in transhistorical divine justice or in any doctrine even remotely akin to the immortality of the soul. As an unintended consequence of Vatican II, even Catholic theologians, who heretofore, through the doctrine of natural law, expressed a number of fundamental reservations to the modern understanding of human nature, appear to be succumbing quickly to the charms of historicism. Only the evangelical Protestants hold out, with an admirable dogmatic obstinancy which is attracting additional Americans daily, but it is not clear how long fundamentalism can flourish in such an unfriendly intellectual environment.

In view of the remarkable progress of this intellectual dynamic, no competent social or political thinker would argue today that Christianity presents a significant obstacle to the genuine attachment of Americans to the secular ends of the regime. Instead, the most important political problem seems to concern providing the means by which Christianity can possess sufficient strength to support the self-restraint necessary to pursue successfully those ends. From the perspective of regime preservation, the utility of Christianity drastically diminishes when it no longer provides certain moral answers or divine support for moral action. It appears to be politically necessary to resist the always intensifying intellectual attack on the idea of Christian orthodoxy.

**Christianity’s Advanced State of Decay**

At this point, one might object that, given Christianity's advanced state of decay, it would be well to attempt to develop some other sort of support for the acceptance of moral duties. But surely it is futile to hope for a viable religious alternative to Christianity, because the sophisticated intellectual skepticism which increasingly dominates all areas of American life is incapable of generating genuine religious movements. The twentieth century experiments with the development of credible non-religious replacements for Chris-


12See Tocqueville, pp. 442-45.
tianity, moreover, have produced politically monstrous results. There is ample evidence for condemning all attempts to dethrone the Christian God with either the Historically Inevitable (Communism, socialism) or with Resolute Self-Assertion in the face of existential groundlessness Nazism, Fascism). Similar efforts by “secular humanists,” such as John Dewey, to transfer religious emotion to the co-operative use of the scientific method, although less dangerous, are far less plausible, if only because Dewey’s “common faith” avoids any encounter with human death.13

The most sensible of “neo-conservative” thinkers today argue that, although the social and political crisis which arises with the decay of Christianity is a radical one, it is unwise to attempt any radical innovation in response to it.14 They have learned the necessity of moderation almost too well from the consequences of the radical political experiences associated with the rhetorical extremism of Nietzsche and Heidegger, the two philosophers who have felt most deeply the meaning of the so-called “death of God.” The best one can do, it appears, is to awaken the makers of public policy to the fact that the preservation of the regime requires a vital Christianity.

Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, as perhaps the key element in their defense of “mediating structures,” have lobbied for the adoption of the “Kurland Rule” (put forth by legal scholar Philip Kurland) in the formulation of public policy. This rule states that “if a policy furthers a legitimate secular purpose it is a matter of legal indifference whether or not that policy employs religious institutions.”15 The First Amendment, Berger and Neuhaus suggest, ought not to be thought of as a justification for either an activist judiciary or a meddlesome bureaucracy using the power of government to diminish the impact of Christianity on social and political life. The greatest danger, in this regard, is that the expanding scope of government will usurp all but the most narrowly theological functions of the churches. Consequently, religious institutions should not be discriminated against because they are religious, in the distribution of Federal funds for social purposes. The churches, further, should be given maximum possible autonomy in the use of those funds, that is, public officials and bureaucratic experts

should not use the power of the purse to attempt to secularize the orientation of religious institutions. Berger and Neuhaus even seem to want to go beyond Kurland by suggesting that in certain circumstances there might be good political reasons for the government preferring the use of religious institutions in the implementation of social programs.16

There is one very serious objection to this sort of strategy. Some Christian leaders argue that a place on the government payroll as an officially approved “mediating structure” will undermine the already tenuous integrity of the churches. They will be directed away from their primary purpose, which is to provide spiritual meaning, toward social service functions associated with the secular welfare state.17 The worry here concerns the already potent tendency among well-meaning Christians to historicize the church’s mission. In addition to the theological developments already discussed, the facts of the Christian-Marxist dialogue, the more or less uncritical acceptance of the World Council of Churches of socialist ideology, and the political movements associated with Catholic liberation theology in Latin America are the clearest evidence of this problem. The assumption by the churches of functions dictated by government policy and funded by public money would simply hasten the reduction of the Christian mission to secular and even atheistic purposes. In attempting to strengthen Christianity, the policies recommended by Berger and Neuhaus might have the unintended consequence of weakening it by contributing to the destruction of its spiritual self-understanding.

A rational defense of the possibility of the truth of Christianity must be put forth as a politically necessary counter-movement to the enlightenment domestication of Christianity.

Despite the strength of this objection, some such policy is needed. Without it, there will be no public recognition of the political utility of the preservation of Christianity, and the growing social service bureaucracy will wield its power in ways antagonistic toward this preservation. Berger and Neuhaus, for this reason, go a long way toward restoring the wisdom of the Founders concerning the relationship between secular political morality and religion in opposition to the moral obtuseness and political naivete of the First Amendment absolutists. Nevertheless, I find it difficult to believe that Christianity’s deterioration can be reversed or perhaps even significantly retarded by such alterations in public policy. The dynamic involved, I


14See, for example, Irving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), especially pp. 55-72. Kristol and Peter Berger are the intellectual giants among the so-called neo-conservatives.


16Ibid., p. 12 and passim.

17See, for example, Dean M. Kelley, “Confronting the Danger of the Moment.” Church, State, and Public Policy, ed. by Jay Mechling (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 19.
have suggested, is primarily an intellectual one, motivated by an intense self-criticism based on historic principles occurring within each of the mainstream denominations. As long as public policy remains within the framework of any reasonable interpretation of the First Amendment, it will have very little effect on the phenomenon of the progressive historicization of Christian doctrine.

Without denying some utility to the correction of misguided public policy, it must be argued that the fundamental project facing social and political thinkers today, as Berger himself comes close to recognizing in other recent work, is a restoration of the intellectual respectability of orthodox Christianity. A rational defense of the possibility of the truth of Christianity must be put forth which does not do violence to the way orthodox Christianity understands itself. This project might be understood as a politically necessary countermovement to the enlightenment project to discredit and domesticate Christianity. The proportions of any such endeavor are awesome; even many theologians would deny the possibility of its success.

**Modern Historicizing of Christianity**

I can only suggest a starting point: reflection on the possibility that orthodox Christianity has been almost the sole means of preservation of certain possibilities for human excellence which liberal democracy characteristically obscures or denies. This reflection might lead to the conclusion that the doctrine of historicism can be shown to be radically questionable on grounds which owe nothing to revelation. If this conclusion is widely accepted by competent thinkers, influential theologians might be freed from the perceived necessity of accepting the truth of the historicistic insights of Heidegger or some form of Heideggerized Marxism. The political requirements of this critical time seem to demand great thinkers, in whose thought this new competence and, in turn, a revitalized Christian theology can be grounded, because only great thinkers transcend the intellectual dogmas of the age.

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18 Peter Berger. *The Heretical Imperative* (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1979). Consider Jay Mechling: “Myth and Mediation: Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus’ Theodicy for Modern America.” *Soundings* 62 (Winter 1979): 338-68. Mechling’s article is an interesting attempt to view Berger and Neuhaus’ mediating structures project as part of a comprehensive effort on their part to reconstruct a viable religious myth for America. In my view, Berger’s thought owes too much to the historicism and existentialism implicit in the Weberian sociological tradition to provide a successful intellectual foundation for such an effort. The critique of modernity which pervades all of his writing is simply not radical enough.

19 See, for the beginning of such an argument, Tocqueville. pp. 542-46.

20 The best philosophic discussion of the questionableness of historicism is Leo Strauss. *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 9-34.
Worldliness Without End in American Politics?

Five Views Of Secularization
Albert R. Trost

It has been a commonplace in the social sciences to observe both the pervasiveness and the inevitability of the secularization of society. Secularization—meaning, loosely, the declining influence of religion on the non-religious institutions of society—was seen as a global trend. This secularization was certainly also seen in politics. For instance, one expert on the third world observed in 1974 that "political modernization includes, as one of its basic processes, the secularization of politics, the progressive exclusion of religion from the political system." 1


Recent developments in the third world, most notably Iran, and in the United States raise questions about the validity of this claim as we enter the 1980s. "Government by ayatollahs" in Iran and the political awakening of evangelicals and fundamentalists in the United States (single issue campaigns against abortion and for school prayer, recent talk about a Christian political party and the formation of Christian lobbies, Jimmy Carter and "born-again" religion in the White House, etc.) should provoke a re-examination of the pervasiveness and inevitability of secularization.

From the perspective of the mid-1970s there seemed little reason to question the secularization of politics in the United States or elsewhere in the world. Colonial empire and then the nationalism of independence had challenged and seemingly destroyed traditional values, including traditional religion, in most places in the third world. In addition, the whole world, developed and developing, has been affected by the dissemination of a world culture based on the values of humanism, materialism, science, and technology. Even more basic to a social theory of secularization is the effect of industrialization and modernization on the differentiation of roles in the society. In terms of the secularization of politics, it means that religion and politics become more differentiated or separated. Religion tends to retreat to liturgical and sacerdotal functions.

In the mid-1970s no one would have seriously questioned the secularization of politics in the United States. There was a general decline in religious influence in politics during the 1960s and early 1970s, especially in contrast to the religious activity of the 1950s. In the 1960s there were a series of court decisions that had the effect of further separating church and state, and John F. Kennedy's election seemed to put at rest religious considerations in the election of the President.

However, beginning with the election campaign in Bicentennial 1976, religious influences on politics appeared to return. At least in the United States, the secularization of politics did not seem as unidirectional, clear, and inevitable as it had earlier. Trends in religious practice and belief caused some sociologists of religion like Robert Bellah and Andrew Greeley to question the more general hypothesis of secularization, though they were not in the majority. What has emerged among social scientists is a more complex view of the secularization of politics. Secularization certainly does not move in a linear fashion and may not be inevitable in the United States.

The secularization of politics can be viewed in five ways. Beginning with the more traditional way of viewing the process, the secularization of politics involves the institutional separation of religion and politics, or the church and the state. In the United States, the constitutional commitment to the "non-establishment" of religion was made in the First Amendment almost two hundred years ago. Specific policies giving effect to the amendment have mainly come through the courts since 1947, with the greatest flurry in the 1960s and early 1970s. Compulsory prayer was removed from public schools, as was Bible-reading at religious ceremonies. Aid to church-related schools was constrained. Judicial decision-making has slowed-up in this area in the last five years, though administrative agencies have protected and perhaps even pushed along institutional separation. If secularization is seen only in these institutional terms, the trend does seem clearer. Secularization of politics here has come in spurts, but there is little to indicate that in the United States the trend
Religion contributes to American political culture by legitimating the political system, interpreting the meaning of politics, and giving an identity to some political groups.

is being reversed. A "wall of separation" is being built, but it certainly could be constructed a lot higher.

Another way of viewing the secularization of politics is to see it in terms of the expansion of government action into areas previously left to religion. Like the institutional separation of church and state, this is a result that primarily comes from formal governmental action—public policies. In the United States, this kind of secularization comes primarily in education, health care, and welfare. Again the trend seems clearly to indicate the lessening of religious influence.

To take education as an example, most of the church-provided education in America has been by Catholics. However, the Catholic school system has been contracting for the last twenty years as the result of financial problems and the geographical mobility of its clientele. Governmental policy affects the situation through aid and taxes, and there has been no legislation passed thus far that would solve the financial problems of church schools. The unwillingness of government to further aid church schools, hospitals, and welfare agencies has brought an expansion of the public sector and a contraction of the voluntary religious sector in the provision of these services. Again, the expansion of government could be more rapid and constant than it is, but the secularization trend seems clear enough.

In the United States, secularization of politics is much less clear when it is seen as the transformation of the values and attitudes associated with the political system. This set of political values and attitudes among both masses and elites is commonly called the political culture. Religion has contributed to the American political culture by helping to define the political community, legitimizing the political system, interpreting the meaning of politics, and in giving an identity to some political groups. Examples of religion's contribution to the political culture would be such ideas as "America, God's new chosen people," or the idea of a civil religion in America where public officials appeal to a transcendent value or being in order to legitimate policies or institutions. Some patriotic rituals and symbols can be seen in this kind of "religious" light. The religiosity and piety of public officials can also be seen as part of the political culture.

With the Vietnam War and Watergate plaguing our leaders and collective conscience, civil religion seemed to be in a decline, and the appeal to religion generally for legitimacy was not frequent. Likewise, the push for racial integration and tolerance made claims for ethnic distinctiveness less acceptable, and the ecumenism of the 1960s tended to mute religious differentialism. However, the new crises in Iran and Afghanistan have brought the practice of civil religion back, and an evangelical President has set new benchmarks for the public practice of religion by our leaders. Teaching Sunday School and religiously witnessing to other world leaders has not been seen in the Presidency at least since Woodrow Wilson. A moral and legal issue like abortion is now discussed in the context of religious concepts and has politicized many religious groups. Finally, the new "ethnic politics" denotes a new frankness and explicitness in using religion, race, and ethnicity as the basis for group political action.

If one looks at secularization in terms of the political process, the secularization trend appears to have been reversed in American politics. Here secularization would mean the decline in political importance and influence of religious leaders, religious interest groups, religious political parties, and religious issues. If the focus of attention is only on the mainline churches, the evidence is ambiguous. However, evangelical and fundamentalist churches and preachers have made a noticeable appearance on the recent political scene. Before the 1978 off-year elections there was already talk of a Christian political party.

In the last year, Time, Newsweek,
Religion is often useful for mobilizing mass populations behind a national effort.

The Chicago Tribune, and The New York Times, to say nothing of the religious magazines, have contained articles about two new political activities of the fundamentalists. Seemingly disavowing their tax-exempt status, church groups have endorsed specific candidates and worked for their election. "Religion Lobbies" have appeared under such names as Christian Voice and The Moral Majority. The former has the goal of mobilizing conservative Christians for political action. The latter, the brain-child of the Rev. Jerry Falwell of "electronic church" fame, aims to mobilize Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Claims of membership, financial support, and influence for these lobbies have yet to be demonstrated, but their appearance alone would seem in this one sense to run against secularization.

There is one final way to view the secularization of politics which would not seem to be at all applicable to the American experience. This is to insist that secularization means the elimination of the influence of religion on society. On this view, there would be no area of religious autonomy, religion having been completely subordinated to the political system. Some may see this kind of secularization in a cataclysmic American future (the same who see a totalitarian or communist future), but it is near impossible to discern this kind of secularizing trend at the present time. The American polity truly appears "benevolent" in its view of religion, especially religion willing to claim only a sacerdotal role. It also seems committed to keeping church and state separated.

The secularization of politics is firmly established in the United States, at least in the institutional sense (separation of religion and polity) and in the sense of removing many social activities formerly regulated by religion to the political sphere. Secularization of politics is not as clear in the political culture or in the political process. If secularization is seen in the radical terms of ending the autonomy of religion or bringing it under the polity, there is no movement in this direction.

Taking this multi-dimensional view of the secularization of politics in the United States, one must be very cautious about concluding that there is steady movement toward a secular pole. Does this make the United States (along with Iran) an exception in the world? Without deeper investigation of other national settings, the temptation is to answer in the affirmative. Certainly Western Europe evidences a strong secularizing trend. However, moving our focus into the third world, the current situation there should arouse some caution. Secularization of politics seen only as the separation of church from state or religion from politics is a clear trend in most places in the third world. This trend goes along with the idea of modernization as the differentiation of roles.

But there are other dynamics in the developing countries which may not preclude religious influence in politics. For instance, there is a general trend to mobilize mass populations behind a national development effort. Religion is often useful for this mobilization, especially where there is a diversity of languages and a variety of ethic cultures (Iran). Also, there is a possibility that religion can be used to legitimate rapid social change. This is the opposite of its historical function in the third world, but changes in the Catholic church in Latin America suggest that this legitimating function is a possibility.

A future world of politics without religion does not seem likely.
Except for jazz, the Broadway musical is the only indigenous American art form and has been the most popular drama in this country for the past fifty years.

flected our collective dream-states, our idealistic visions of what the U.S. is really all about.

And that's appropriate, for as Leonard Bernstein is reported to have said, except for jazz, the Broadway musical is the only indigenous American art form. An eclectic combination of opera and farce, the musical usually centers on some slight plot used only as an excuse on which to hang a string of dances and songs. Vaudeville is nearby; the elaborate sets and expensive costumes promote the American notion that the bigger the better. A spectacle and a showcase, the musical comedy has, of course, been the most popular drama in this country for the past fifty years. From Showboat in 1927 to the current The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas, Broadway and then university and community theatre and even restaurants throughout the country have presented with zest and zippiness the optimism inherent in our national character.

No one musical catches Americana more fully than Oklahoma!, a smash hit in 1943 and again in early 1980, this time at the mammoth Palace Theatre on 1564 Broadway. From the moment the curtain rises, we have entered a world of infectious exuberance. The opening scene begins in serenity: a farmhouse with a rickety wooden porch, a woman at a butterchurn, and in the background, through the wooden fences, acres and acres of amber waves of grain. A strolling cowhand, dressed to the hilt, sings a beginning salute: "Oh, What a Beautiful Morning!" and confides that he's got a beautiful feeling that "ev'rythin's going' [his] way." With a good-natured easy charm, Curly in his fine light baritone voice has mesmerized not only Aunt Eller, the no-nonsense matriarch of the family, and Laurey, his vivacious young love, but he has also won us in the audience to his sense of robust self-confidence. We like him, we believe in him, and in this time just after the turn of the century when free and open spaces were still around and "the corn is as high as a elephant's eye, an' it looks like it's climbin' right up to the sky," what can we do but lose ourselves in dance and song?

The dances are superb; re-fashioned by Agnes de Mille, the choreography ranges from rodeo-square dance to romantic ballet and everything in between. And the songs—well—they're part of our language: "The Surrey with the Fringe on the Top," "People Will Say We're in Love," "Ev'rythin's Up to Date in Kansas City," and all the rest. Not even the thought that "Pore Jud is Daid" can put a damper on things. And when the title song comes late in the last act, it builds up from a gentle breeze until it sweeps through the place like a gale. I'm ready to play leapfrog over all the fire hydrants all the way to the parking lot.

Sociologically-bent commentators will be quick to point out that such response is nostalgic, let alone pure escapism. After all, 1943 was one of the grimmest of years with the Axis still in control. And at the beginning of 1980, with the precarious economy and the uncertainties of Iran and Afghanistan, what sells but a story of true love in simpler times? Where else but in a world of fantasy would the farmer, rooted to the land, and the cowman, enjoying his freedom, be friends? Curly, with his horse and saddle and trusty gun, conquers all through pioneer determination and self-sacrificial tenacity.

Yes, the American Dream is still alive in such a world. Although the elusiveness of the phrase defies precise definition, certain elements are part of the image: to take initiative and advantage of opportunities, to work mighty hard at the task, to compete, to persevere (the I-can-do-it-philosophy), and then with pluck and luck, to make it. Success is the fulfillment of the promise. And if you think the Dream is dead, check the inside of your next match book cover.

A dream by its very nature is an illusion, a playing with reality, a world not actual. But at the same time, a dream is the place of fantasy, of magic, of imagination. And most of all, the dream is to pursue an ideal, to live in hope. Throw out the dream and with it go the ideals and visions of what might be or could be.

What we dream rather than what we are is our essential truth.

It took almost two years for the dream-world of Oklahoma! to get to Broadway in 1943. Potential backers were dubious; nobody wanted to invest in something so corny and so clean. As the late Mike Todd reportedly put it, "No gags, no gals, no chance." With $83,313 finally raised (the musical Follies in 1975 cost $800,000, and think of current film budgets), the cow-country drama based on the 1930 play, Green Grow the Lilacs, with music by Rodgers and Hammerstein, opened in New York in March, 1943. And it didn't close until 2,212 performances later, outdistanced only by My Fair Lady with a Broadway run of 2,717 performances. The blurbs now say that tickets then became the status symbol of the World War II years. To lay hands on them, people offered steaks, nylon, gasoline, and other rationed items. Eleanor Roosevelt and Cordell Hull entertained foreign leaders and diplomats by bringing them to the play. A national company went on tour to 250 cities throughout the land and finally closed in Philadelphia eleven years later. The British saw 1,543 performances in London. And the original
In its supercalifragilisticexpialidocious splendor, the musical dreams the Dream. There is all the zing, zest, and zippiness inherent in our national character.

cast recording (the first made of a musical) and the film (re-shown a good number of times on TV) have introduced millions more to the Indian territory called Oklahoma.

That, my friends, is a success story! What else but the American Dream come true!

II

As a kaleidoscope and prism of our hopes and wishes, the Broadway musical, light and airy as it is, conveys a glimpse of the Dream. A panoramic sketch of musical comedy over the years gives one a sense of the buoyancy and sunny self-assurance present within that homogeneity of music, song, and dance.

With settings usually in distant times and places, the musical does not confront us directly with the present. The turn of the century is a favorite time: Hello Dolly! is set in the 1880s and Can-Can in Paris in 1893, while both My Fair Lady and The Music Man take place in 1912, the latter on no less than the 4th of July. Exotic places such as Bali Ha'i (South Pacific) and Siam (The King and I) and Baghdad (Kismet), and romantic locations such as the Austrian Alps (The Sound of Music) and Brigadoon and Camelot cast a filmy haze over all the action. If some young lad sings: "There is just one place/that can light my face," who would guess it would be Gary, Indiana. Even the times of Charnelwoman (Pippin) and of Weimar decadence in Berlin (Cabaret), although couched in rather cynical tones, are still recalled with bitterness of memory. Memory is all; "Try to Remember," sings The Fantasticks, and "Some Enchanted Evening" is the end of the day which began with the beautiful mornin'. After all, Annie Get Your Gun informed us that "I Got the Sun in the Morning and the Moon at Night."

The sources of the plots are diverse: Shakespeare plays (The Boys from Syracuse from the The Comedy of Errors, Your Own Thing from Twelfth Night, Kiss Me Kate from The Taming of the Shrew, and, of course, West Side Story, which is currently on Broadway, from Romeo and Juliet), fairy tales and children's stories (Once Upon a Mattress, Peter Pan again on Broadway now, Mary Poppins, The Wizard), as well as other literary works from the tradition (Man of La Mancha, Candide, Oliver!, Three Penny Opera, and My Fair Lady from Greek myth through Shaw). The indestructibility of comic strip characters gives a fertile base on which to build a happily-ever-after world: Lil' Abner, Annie, and You're a Good Man, Charlie Brown. Historic American characters reach mythic proportions: the founding fathers (1776), Annie Oakley (Annie Get Your Gun), George M. Cohan (George M), Fanny Brice (Funny Girl), Fiorello, and Gypsy Rose Lee. Ethnic roots are resurrected: Jewish (Fiddler on the Roof) and black (Porgy and Bess, Purlie, Ain't Misbehavin', Hallelujah, Baby). Re-telling a story in a new way, of course, includes Jesus Christ, Superstar, Godspell, and Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat.

And what kind of portrayal of life does the musical set forth? Optimism slips into sentimentality. Isn't the world full of "My Favorite Things"? "Just a Spoonful of Sugar" will make all the difference. "June Is Bustin' Out All Over," "Everything's Coming Up Roses," for The Bells Are Ringing and Celebration is in order. Therefore, "Shall we Dance?" and sing nonsense songs: "Do Re Me," "Pickalittle," "Shapoopee," and of course, "Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious." The advice to musical comedy audiences is always: "Only Make Believe." Liberation of the spirit as well as the body exudes from Hair and Grease.

Evil, well, "What's the use of wondrin if he's good or if he's bad." She may be a girl who "cain't say No," but we are assured it's all pretty innocent because Anything Goes when everybody's "doin' what comes naturally." If there's "Trouble" in keeping "the young ones moral after school," the problem will be located in wicked pool rooms and tell-tale signs of corruption. "Does he re-buckle his knickerbockers below the knee? Is there a dime novel hidden in the corn crib?" Now that's trouble, my friend, right here in River City.

Meanwhile, there's the joyous sensation of simply being alive. Zorba personifies the sense of harmony and oneness and communal vitality. "This was a real nice clambake, and we all had a real good time!" The finale of the musical with all the crescendo of song and dance bubbles with joy and flight. Good News in 1927 already told us that "the best things in life are free."

Idealism is pervasive: "Climb Every Mountain," "When You Walk through a Storm, Hold Your Head up High," and "Dream the impossible dream... to reach the unreachable star." For "Just in Time," "My White Knight" will appear. American industry may be a bit oppressive (Pins and Needles and The Pajama Game), but right and good will prevail. Although a darker strain appears in two current Broadway hits (Sweeney Todd and A Chorus Line), two other sold-out Broadway successes (The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas and Sugar Babies) rely on the old formula of good fortune at a fast pace with bouncing rhythms.

Most of all, Harold Hill, Curly, Fiorello, Charlie Brown, Annie Oakley, and Billy Bigelow all personify those characteristics of the American Dream which speak from us and to us and of us: self-sufficiency, individual initiative, and a streak of independence.

Leslie Fiedler may well be right: "What we dream rather than what we are is our essential truth."
While the male battles with circumstances, the female internalizes the battle as an ideological drama.

The anthology selections from seventeenth and eighteenth-century writers are all excerpts. Advanced students of Swift need complete texts, and beginning students would find these relatively unfamiliar writers more in need of a context to explain them than Swift is. For those beginners the most valuable parts of the book are Probyn’s introductory essays accompanying each selection, but the brevity of those essays makes them occasionally misleading. Those on Swift’s attitudes toward the Dissenters and toward the ancient-modern controversy are quite good; and those on Ireland, science, and political parties are generally accurate as far as they go. But the essay on the nature of man—a topic fundamental to all of Swift’s work—is ambiguous at best; and that on church and state appears to endorse a view almost universally rejected to reputable Swift scholars, namely that the rational horses of Gulliver’s Travels represent the deists and are therefore the target of Swift’s satire rather than his positive standard.

Jonathan Swift: The Contemporary Background is, paradoxically, at once too little and too much. For those who do not need the background, the book’s contents seem skimpy; for those who do, they are overwhelming. The need for what Probyn has tried to do remains unsatisfied by his book; perhaps it cannot be otherwise.

Nola J. Wegman

George Gissing: Ideology and Fiction


Goode thinks, for instance, that Gissing intended to show Camberwell (the middle-class suburb in In the Year of Jubilee) as “both a function of the urban centre and a self-perpetuating entity in a redistributive complex which keeps the sur-

Jonathan Swift: The Contemporary Background


The series of which Professor Probyn’s book is a part is designed to provide a context in which the student may intelligently read the literature of a particular historical period. The importance of such a context can hardly be challenged. Undergraduates rarely have the historical knowledge to provide it for themselves; and, without the background, the literature is often bewildering, particularly the work of a satirist like Swift, who is as topical as he is universal.

Jonathan Swift: The Contemporary Background consists of seven chapters and twenty-three individual selections—many of them hard to find elsewhere—by twenty-one of Swift’s contemporaries. Each chapter is prefaced by a brief essay in which Prof. Probyn sketches out seventeenth and eighteenth-century thought on that chapter’s topic and relates it to particular works of Swift. The topics are all central to Swift’s satire: “Dissent and Enthusiasm,” “Ireland,” “Science,” and the “Nature of Man.” In addition Probyn provides a brief introduction, chronologies of Swift’s life and of historical events, notes, and a selected bibliography of twentieth-century Swift studies.

Laudable though the aim of the book is, it is also—almost be definition—impossible of attainment. In the long run it can scarcely meet the needs of any of its potential users.
plus in circulation.” Did Gissing really have this in mind? I believe it is clear only that he saw the evils of suburban life influencing the lives of specific characters in his stories. In any case, he would never have expressed his beliefs in such unclear jargon.

The above quotation is a relatively lucid example of Goode’s prose. A more typical one is the opening sentence of Chapter Three:

The space in which Gissing’s novels can achieve their distinctness—a space identifiable in terms both of literary history and ideological situation—is one in which an unmediated materiality is reflected in the unrequited idealism of the post-Dickensian emancipated intellectual producer.

Faulty grammar further destroys the meaning of some of Goode’s prose, as in this example:

May, 1980

The meaning of suburban life influencing the lives of specific characters in his stories. In any case, he would never have expressed his beliefs in such unclear jargon.

The opening sentence of Chapter Three:

His punctuation is no better. As an Anglophile I hate to quibble about the British habit of using “comma splices,” but Goode goes too far with his fragments and period faults:

Gissing’s fictional structure demands, as we have seen, a goalless network of circumstance in which the possibilities of liberation are confined to mental states. So that the actual effect seems like an idealisation: Helen, Ida, Thyrza, and so on, are privileged by their very oppression to understand the psychology of that oppression and thus escape the vacillations it imposes on those who are mobile.

Is the “So that . . .” clause a result of the previous statement or the intended outcome of the following clause? The ideology being forced upon the unwitting Gissing is doubly unacceptable when the writing is full of faulty constructions and meaningless jargon.

The patient reader of the above quotations has already sampled some of the jargon. Mr. Goode has invented a veritable dictionary of hitherto unknown and henceforth unwanted terms: “areal” (as an adjective from “area”), “biologic,” “disorganic,” “effectivity,” “emotive,” “exclusivity,” “fictive,” “fixity” (as opposed to “mobility”), “individuation,” “inorganicism,” “ironised,” “isolate” as an adjective, mind you: (“the isolate awareness of the odd women”), “mediation,” “oppositional potential,” “organicism,” “parodic,” “politicised,” “referential significance,” “refied,” “scientificity,” “scientism,” “spatialisation,” “totalisation,” “totalised,” “unclassed.” “Demystified” is, inappropriately enough, the last word of the book.

“Reading Gissing is not a comfortable experience,” Goode writes. Substitute “Goode” for “Gissing” in that quotation. Paradoxically, this book makes one return to Gissing to enjoy his purity and clarity of prose and to sympathize with his heroes and heroines, who may be isolated and “unclassed” (but who do not exist in a state of “unclassment”); who are occasionally mystified and often ironic, rarely effective, sometimes political and even sometimes emotional; but above all who are immediate and individualized, whether or not the suburbs are redistributing the material surpluses.

Marilyn B. Saveson

Women and World Religions


This examination of what various world religions are able to contribute to women’s current search for genuinely liberating religion takes a position regarding two current views. The first view suggests that a more adequate “translation” of traditional religious concepts will allow such concepts to function for liberation in the modern world as the basically sound, dearly-won, irreplaceable religious insights they really are. The second view suggests scrapping traditional religious concepts as outworn world-views which have become demonic.

On the one hand, Carmody unambiguously rejects the status and role which world religions have traditionally accorded women (de-meaning them to the detriment of culture, society, and religion). On the other hand, she finds in each world religion concepts which are valuable in the emerging struggle for women’s freedom.

For instance, she finds that, though Jesus was willing to bear the enmity of the religious establishment of his day by his solidarity with outcasts (including women), he was also a “victim of his time” in not including any women “power-bearers” among the twelve. Similarly, Paul and other early church leaders failed “to build their intuition of a trans-sexual equality into women’s full participation in church authority, office, and life.” As a result, women’s roles in Christianity have ever after been “sealed in ambiguity.” Carmody is, then, not a rejector, but a reformer, and her position is closest to the first view.

The Ariadne’s thread which she finds running through the maze of world religions is that of archaic religion’s appreciation of “women’s nurturing sort of creativity.” “In the beginning’ things were much better.” Carmody would have women know that “their subordinate status through most of history is a fall from what ‘must’ have been when humanity was new-made,” when divinity was androgynous and women and men were coequal possessors of humanity.

Carmody comes close to finding the genuinely liberating religious tradition in one who does not take the side of the powerful but vind-
We need to see divinity in terms of God's justification of the ungodly, and humanity in terms of Christ's self-sacrificing work of love for those who do not accept him.

cates the oppressed, but she does not actually describe "divinity" in the Pauline terms of God's justification of the ungodly nor "humanity" in terms of Christ's self-sacrificing work for those who do not accept him. Her view of "what 'must' have been at the beginning" is, however, not entirely oriented toward some past golden age. It does in fact approach being a view of the future (so strong and concrete in the biblical tradition) and of a new society of peace and justice when the present systems of oppression will have been overthrown. Read in that light, this book can serve as a challenging and valuable contribution to current discussions in religion and women's liberation. Ralph Gehrke

Man of Nazareth


Those who experienced the television broadcast of Jesus of Nazareth will find reading the novel by Anthony Burgess, who also wrote the screen play, to be more of a vexation than a pleasure.

When the screen version aired two years ago, director Franco Zeffirelli aroused controversy by announcing that the film would portray Jesus "as an ordinary man." However, critics such as Newsweek's Harry F. Walters concluded that "Rarely have both the humanity and divinity of Christ been evoked with as much passion, sensitivity, and ecumenical deference as Zeffirelli has brought to the screen." Walters added, "That is not to say that Zeffirelli ... has hewed entirely to the traditionalist depiction of the Christ story. ... While remaining faithful to the substance of the Scriptures, Zeffirelli has taken some dramatic license."

The latter at least could also be said for Burgess's novel. Man of Nazareth not only lacks many of the dramatic visual scenes of the movie, it also lacks the sensitive and powerful dialogue which made the film a moving and masterful presentation. Burgess's narrative is over-long and his novel's dialogue is clumsy, often lapsing into contemporary phrasing. As a result, the reader must struggle through most of the book sustained only by the compelling story of Christ.

Early events in Jesus's life—his birth, his meeting with John the Baptist, the gathering of the disciples—are brushed over in one or two pages while entire chapters are devoted to the machinations of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and the Zealots. His fictional account of how Christ spent the thirty years from his birth to his meeting with John is imaginative, if not orthodox. He tries to fill in the gaps in the biblical story by describing Christ's forty days and forty nights of temptation, as well as Herod's misadventures and the plotings of the Sanhedrin. For the effort, he should be congratulated. Burgess is an accomplished story-teller.

Burgess should probably also be commended for his description of Christ's torture and crucifixion in which he employs the same brutality of vision found in his most famous work, A Clockwork Orange. The horror of the crucifixion successfully contrasts the inhumanity of man with the gentleness of Christ's love for him.

Although few of the miracles and fewer of the parables are described in the narrative, Christ's relationships with his disciples are described so often that Jesus emerges with a certain human warmth and liveliness while yet remaining larger than life.

The only time Burgess relies heavily on the Gospels is in his chapters concerning Christ's arrest and crucifixion, and his final portrayal of Christ there is of a man "obsessed" with fulfilling the Scriptures. The final scene—the meeting of the resurrected Christ with his disciples—returns us to the beauty that graced his screen play, but we had to work our way through a rather rough, belabored, and overly creative novel to get there at last.

Nancy Hinton

The Cresset
Dear Editor:

Three seasons of the year Charlottesville in Virginia has an additional 16,000 residents, in our "academical village," to use the now-quaint term of its founder, Thomas Jefferson.

Some come from cities in Yankee territory, especially New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. When we reassemble in January, some of them will stop in and ask, "How was your Christmas?" Or, I may greet them, with slightly different phrasing, "How was your holiday?" When on the responding end, I decry the warm weather and absence of snow. This produces dissent: "Oh, that's why I came to Virginia, to get away from the cold weather." Then I explain, "Oh, no, a Northern winter is the best possible season." The ritual reply: "Oh, no, how can you say that? I can't wait till winter is over!"

The interest of these banal village occasions is not the lightness of the banter, or even the "affirming of each other's existence." Instead, in these brief exchanges I grasp how fundamentally different we human beings are when it comes to the most important elements of our existence: physical and emotional and intellectual needs. Some of us—myself not included—need, literally, the presence of another human being within calling distance twenty-four hours a day. Some need the sun and 80 degrees twelve months of the year, to feel really themselves. It is now spring in Virginia, magnolia and dogwood in the air, and the sweat of joggers, as lots of people express genuine physical needs in Adidas.

Though this sounds lightly frivolous, I beg to persist. People make do in alien conditions, but I think each of us visualizes an ideal mode of existence—interpersonal, climatic, geographical, religious—that arises from as deep within us as our very sense of God does. "We tacitly postulate," wrote Justice Holmes, "that if others were as intelligent and well educated as we, they would be compelled to agree with us... The fact is that each has his more or less differing system... whether our taste in truth is as arbitrary as our taste in coffee, and there is no objective truth at all, I leave to philosophers."

Religious needs in particular grow more and more interesting in our time, especially as controversy over inspiration and authority divides adherents to one of the world's larger religions, Christianity. For myself, I discover a need, the older I grow, to strive for faithfulness. This means, for one thing, to stand in respectful judgment on the Scriptures that happen to have survived. Because faithfulness means not taking in gullibly every awful thing I read about God.

There is, after all, an ungodly God sometimes present in the Bible—genocidal, overbearing, undergenerous, cryptic, petty—ungodly in the sense that our human minds, made in the image of the godly God of justice and mercy, cannot find his doings, as reported, wholly acceptable. I need to be faithful to the good in God, not the bad, just as here in Virginia I cherish the ideals of human freedom, and do not applaud Jefferson's possession of slaves at Monticello.

So I need to judge the stories and expressions in the Bible more earnestly than I judge, say, the biography of Jefferson by my neighbor, Mr. Dumas Malone. I take those ancient stories with grains, sometimes pillars, of salt. I see that God is sometimes not as good as he should be, but I speculate also that transmission has sometimes failed, and I will not be faithful to static.

This region is not only Jefferson country but strong Baptist country. For myself, I feel no need for immersion. The evangelical movement flourishes among young people here; for myself, I cannot arouse a need for Jesus at the center of my life instead of his father.

My own need is to be faithful to the God of Abraham and the prophets, who originated everything, even though in so doing he created us too prone to sin, too far from perfection.

Fortunately, such a God cannot damn us for missing the mark when we try. As Jesus told Zacchaeus, he came "to seek and to save that which was lost." Most of us are not lost, though perversely through history men have felt the need to say we are. I grasp faithfulness in the words of the late Samuel Sandmel: "In the Jewish view man is prone to sinful acts, but man can atone, and God forgives."

For the utterly depraved, those who seem genuinely to need to be lost, the Adolfs and Josefs, Herods and Ahabs, the early church inferred in God's orderly scheme a period of awakening, of finding, called purgatory. For the rest of us, the year's awakening in spring brings us to a flowering awareness of one more cycle in our lives that brings us nearer to the day when we greet the God we have all distorted, even as we tried to be faithful. Beyond even the versatile Jefferson—architect, writer, founder of a nation—God is a God for all seasons, and his home is no parochial village or "little mountain," but the great and infinitely abundant city we have needed more than we knew.

May, 1980
Concerning Unknown Lands

John Strietelmeier

In his *Natural History*, written half a century after the Resurrection, Pliny had this to say about the peoples of India:

It is known that many of the inhabitants are more than seven feet six inches high, never spit, do not suffer from headache or toothache or pain in the eyes, and very rarely have a pain in any other part of the body—so hardy are they made by the temperate heat of the sun; . . . Megasthenes states that on the mountain named Nulus there are people with their feet turned backwards and with eight toes on each foot, while on many of the mountains there is a tribe of human beings with dogs' heads, who wear a covering of wild beasts' skins, whose speech is a bark. . . . Tauron gives the name of Choromandae to a forest tribe that has no speech but a horrible scream, hairy bodies, keen grey eyes and the teeth of a dog. . . . Megasthenes tells of a race among the Nomads of India that has only holes in the place of nostrils, like snakes, and handy-legged; they are called the Sciritae. . . .

It goes on and on like this, getting more outrageous as it goes. There is the Umbrella-foot tribe which, in hot weather, "lie on their backs on the ground and protect themselves with the shadow of their feet." There are people "without necks, having eyes in their shoulders." There is the race, reported by Ctesias, whose children begin to turn grey directly after birth. Pliny knew about these people because he was a voracious reader who had immersed himself in the authorities. He was also a man of affairs, not easily taken in; he died as commander of the Roman naval base northwest of Naples. (As a matter of fact, quintessential scientist that he was, he died observing the great eruption of Vesuvius that buried Pompeii.)

But he was wrong about India. Megasthenes and Tauron and Ctesias to the contrary notwithstanding, the people of India, then as now, were simply men, women, and children with human faces. They could suffer all of the pains we suffer. Their speech was no more of a dog's bark than our own. And their feet, like ours, offered them little protection from the heat of the summer sun.

One of the disappointments of man's history since the Age of Discoveries is that, for all his searching, he has found neither Avalon nor the mountain named Nulus, neither divinities nor monsters, but always and only bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. And so we have had to relocate the creatures of our imagination on other planets. Buck Rogers, in the twenty-fifth Century, will surely encounter in deep space the creatures which we had expected to find, but failed to find, in India or the Congo Basin or Tierra del Fuego.

But while we no longer expect to find on this earth human creatures who differ fundamentally from us physically, we live in fear of strange, incomprehensible creatures who, for all their physical likeness to us do not, we say, have minds that work like ours. Out beyond the world of our first-hand acquaintance we postulate strange tribes that do not love their children, monsters who are not horrified by the thought of mass deaths, evil creatures who plot the destruction of civilization, madmen who plot pre-emptive strikes. And over the territory which these tribes inhabit, we letter the ancient cartographer's warning: "Here be Dragons."

When will we know each other's minds as well as we know each other's bodies and faces? When will we come to understand that our conflicts arise more out of our likenesses than our differences? Not that the differences are not important. But they do tend to be superficial in comparison with the likenesses. And it is in the likenesses, not the differences, that we see the essential nature of man, as saint and sinner, as hero and coward, as gentle parent and red-handed killer, as dreamer and destroyer, as image of God and evil incarnate. The human family is not only of one bone and one flesh. It is also of one mind. We see the menace in each other, but we see it as an expression of the differences between us when, if only we dared to admit it, it arises out of our common humanness.

And so we have a balance of terror which, like all balances, is easily upset. And so we think unthinkable thoughts of pre-emptive strikes and retributory strikes and a world devastated by nuclear weapons. And the great question is not whether to send our children through the Molochian fire of war, but whether only the young men should be sent and not the young women.

Let us pray:

From battle and murder, and from sudden death, Good Lord, deliver us.