THE CRESSET

Cover and Inside Cover

Cover: An arrangement of small silver Ethiopian pectoral crosses. Brietzke Collection.
Who Am I? Lies Inside Who Are We?

Identity-seeking is one of the ennobling afflictions of those fated to live in the modern world; most of our more distant ancestors were spared and denied the problem and opportunity. In contemporary America, the identity-seeking of persons, groups, and institutions is presently at fever pitch and bids fair to preoccupy us, whoever we are, for the unforeseeable future.

Mercurial personal and social change, of course, forces identity-seeking upon persons and institutions as they attempt to rediscover their being in the flux of becoming. As an individual is ill advised to seek his identity by withdrawing from society and turning inward, so is an institution best advised to seek its identity in its social relations and by looking outward. Engaged rather than detached identity-seeking seems wisest for both the individual and the institution—the college freshman and the college, the fledgling seminarian and the seminary.

Our December alumni columnist, Christa Ressmeyer Klein, helps us reflect on how personal and institutional identities are forged together when persons commit themselves to institutions and, as importantly, when institutions commit themselves to persons. Her focus on this process of infused identity formation is the seminary—that strained creature of both the academy and the church, stretched between an orderly learned tradition and the contradictory living religion of a people. One suspects, however, that her lively example could be generalized to other individuals and institutions.

Dr. Klein was graduated from the University in 1966 with majors in philosophy and theology. After a year in New York City working for the Lutheran Human Relations Association and as a student in church history at Union Theological Seminary, she began work on her doctorate in American Civilization at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1971, she helped design and teach an introductory course in historical studies at the City College of New York; in 1975 she joined an Auburn Seminary research staff funded by the Lilly Endowment to study the history of American Protestant theological education; and in 1978 she was appointed Assistant Professor of Church History at Lutheran Theological Seminary in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Dr. Klein’s husband, Leonard, is pastor of Trinity Lutheran Church, an AELC congregation in Astoria, Queens. They have two children, Maria (6) and Nicholas (2½). Recently Allegheny Airlines dropped its direct connection to Harrisburg from LaGuardia, and now Dr. Klein commutes on Amtrak coaches and thinks Amthoughts.

The Cresset welcomes alumna Klein to In Luce Tua.

The Editor

IN LUCE TUA

A Woman’s Place Is At Home On A Seminary Faculty Or, Why It Is Good That Seminaries Look More Like Parishes

Christa Ressmeyer Klein

Wednesday mornings in Gettysburg hold simple pleasures. On this day each week I wake to a country-western broadcast from Chambersburg, and not the demands of the “all news” station in New York or of my young children. I usually take my breakfast alone in my room and linger over coffee and the morning’s reading, all the time knowing that back home in New York Leonard hurriedly is putting Nicholas in a clean diaper before coaxing a sleepy Maria into tights and some favorite jumper. He will feed the two, herd them with their equipage into the car, and drop Maria at school and Nicholas at the sitter’s before returning to his parsonage office to begin his workday.

Meanwhile, back on Seminary Ridge, I enjoy my solitude before facing students and colleagues. In the evening I will travel home to Astoria, west of LaGuardia Airport, and remain there until the following Tuesday morning when I leave again for Pennsylvania. This weekly rhythm allows me to fulfill my obligations to teach three courses annually in American Church History and to participate in Lutheran Seminary’s community while living with my family in New York City where my husband is a full-time pastor.

Actually there is a lot more to it than that. The Gettysburg appointment carries me into another sphere, one in which I am no longer the private citizen I was once when I balanced dissertation writing, adjunctships, research assignments, and babies in the context of the parsonage. The public responsibilities in joining the Gettysburg faculty to share in their work in classroom and chancel are proving more significant for me than I had expected.

To give two examples: first, the logistics are effecting new dramas at home, and second, exposure to seminary life and studies are enticing me to consider contemporary Lutheranism from new perspectives.

I had not anticipated such added benefits from teaching away from home territory. For years I have been able to combine part-time academic work, much of it done at home, with motherhood. Now five days out of each week I continue that mode. Children’s rest periods and bedtime schedules supplemented by regular appointments with babysitters make the home office both feasible and pleasantly varied. Children bring relief from hard thinking...
and writing, which in turn offer relief from the demands of children. Regular lunches with my spouse give added time for conversation above the fray. Only at home can one feel positively smug about engaging in research while simultaneously machines are working at dishes and the laundry. Yet the balance of these various roles is always precarious and all too easily threatened when the demands from any one sector heighten. Successful juggling takes considerable concentration, flexibility, and stamina, resources not always available in the right proportions.

My two days away provide a temporary respite from the juggling act and the opportunity to concentrate on teaching history in the intriguing milieu of a historic seminary. Gettysburg was the first Lutheran Seminary to attempt requiring an undergraduate education for admission to theological studies. This seminary was founded in 1826 by the General Synod before my ancestors in the Missouri Synod had left Saxony for America. In its early decades its star professor, Samuel Simon Schmucker, developed a loose form of confessionalism to shape an inclusive Lutheran identity at a time when rationalism, unionism, and indifference were eroding the religious loyalties of the descendants of the eighteenth-century Palatine immigrants. The seminary's doctrinal position was soon judged insufficient by some Americans and many new immigrants influenced by the maturing confessional movement on the Continent. For a time Gettysburg symbolized one pole of confessional interpretation and Missouri the other.

Perhaps I shouldn't be surprised at the meaning such an appointment holds for me. For a number of years I have been working on a project funded by the Lilly Endowment to study the historical development of the American seminary. Documents I've read attest to the great dreams of the nineteenth-century founders that their seminaries be fountainheads for the churches and for the young nation: bastions of orthodoxy, nurseries of piety, and centers of classical learning. That vision, however tarnished and modified in the ensuing century and more, still infects in some measure (and with considerable variation) most who teach and work in these schools. Can any seminary ever live up to all these expectations, even in their less confident twentieth-century forms? Therein lies the gamble of casting one's lot with a seminary. The risk interests me all the more, I suppose, because two family fathers, Franz A. O. Pieper (1851-1931) and Paul M. Bretscher (1893-1974), took it at Concordia in St. Louis as have my relations George W. Hoyer and Dorothy Ressmeyer Hoyer at Concordia and now at Christ Seminary-Seminex. And now I, lay woman, have stumbled into a family business and teach at Gettysburg. The ironies surpass articulation. Has the family line come to this?

Home has not been the same since I took this job. Leonard and I are both more pressed for time and feel the heightened need to preserve order in the midst of our burgeoning activities. If there is anything in particular I notice, it is the proliferation of semi-classified stacks everywhere: journals, toys, Maria's art "projek," mail appeals, mending, family photographs, etc. We lack that decisiveness necessary for efficient order: should things be pitched or kept; if kept, where filed; if filed, when acted upon? Meanwhile, stacks beget stacks, even while I'm in Gettysburg. I now know that the art of housekeeping has only minimally to do with cleaning and far more with classification. Where can one find for hire the combination of an archivist and reference and circulation librarian for the household?

**Are Household Archivists for Hire?**

There are more comforting aspects. Leonard has advanced from gourmet cooking to the more morally significant level of turning out routine edibles for children at breakfast and dinner. I find his increasing efficiency in this and in bedding down the kids at night enviable. We find ourselves with more common interests and resources to share. And the adage about heart and distance is verifiable.

The children are adapting. My absence, it appears, does not give pleasure. But they have grown to love certain adults and teenagers who care for them when Leonard cannot. Each child deals with my travels in characteristic ways. Maria channels her prodigious energies for projects into decoration for my room on campus. She tells me, "Look at them and you won't feel lonely." Nicholas plays at being mommy. More than once he has emerged from my closet in heels and a necklace to announce, "I go to Gettysbird." He shuffles a circle in the hall and returns with the triumphant "I come back."

In retrospect it seems that I have had the greatest problem with adjustment. Of course that first year of flying would have to include landing at Harrisburg, one mile upstream from Three Mile Island, if, nuclear accidents notwithstanding, my sense for impending disaster were not already fine-tuned. The evening before each flight in the catharsis of a hot shower—kids in bed, lecture in process—the eternal "what if's" come haunting. Why do I risk our manifold joys to present in far off Gettysburg my first attempts to synthesize the American religious experience? I know that the car taken to and from the airport is statistically the more likely coffin than the M-298 Allegheny Metro-express, but the plane remains the more dramatic symbol of my distance from my loved ones.

I appreciate my exposure to an America different from the one I know best in the Atlantic Corridor. The snobbery of New Yorkers about the territory west of the Hudson is too well known to require comment. But we make distinctions even among ourselves. I used to think that all New Yorkers could be divided into two types: those who had to live there and those who chose to. Because all New Yorkers complain, this contrast is not always easy to discern. I thought I had the foolproof test
in those Christmas cards with country churches in Georgian style which only had-tos would even consider sending. But my exposure to the seminary chapel in its lush landscape has charmed me into recognizing the religious authenticity of the federal style and my arrogant game has been called.

Still, the differences I find between town and city are striking. For example, the neighborhood of my husband's parish in Astoria is like an aging foster mother whose German and Irish children have grown up and are moving away. Now she harbors Greeks, Italians, and some Asians. Her children cherish their pasts but have staked everything on their twentieth-century American future. The town of Gettysburg is also an aging mother, but most of her children are her own and the town's future appears to lie with memorializing her nineteenth-century past.

The college and seminary provide much of the heterogeneity of the place. Although most of the seminary's diversity remains within the confines of the usual Lutheran mixture, that change is worth noting. The few Blacks, Finns, Slovaks, and Norwegians, and more Swedes and other Germans who have joined the Pennsylvania Dutch on campus in recent decades represent the changes in American Lutheranism itself. For the most part ethnicity is no longer the definitive factor in determining which seminary one attends, or for that matter, teaches in. The more determinative Lutheran denominationalism is now less exclusive. Sociological explanations for these changes rest with the process of Americanization; theological ones, with the agreements forged over the Lutheran Confessions since World War I.

Other obvious changes cannot be measured against the homogeneity of central Pennsylvania but against the characteristics of student bodies past. Today more students are married, more have children, more are over twenty-five, and more are women, all of which variations tend to make the seminary look more like the parish than was ever imagined. The seminary is no longer a young man's school.

The total effect of these changes has yet to be gauged. Yet, it is certain that they contribute to this generation's struggle to define the character of Lutheran identity. It may be the genius of Lutheranism that this problem of definition surfaces in every generation. Begun as a movement within Roman Catholicism, Lutherans must always be deciding how they are to relate to that heritage. In America the task is complicated by dominant religious developments rooted in the Reformed tradition. How are Lutherans to respond to American Christendom's two major nineteenth-century developments, evangelical revivalism and liberal Protestantism?

In my own family I see past generations working with the problem of identity in a variety of ways. My paternal great-grandfather, Franz Pieper, became the reigning dogmatician in Missouri after C.F.W. Walther's death. He lived at a time when the numerous Lutheran bodies shaped their particular identities in combat with each other over the meaning of the Confessions. His particular contribution was to make more functional for the synod the sixteenth and seventeenth-century theological positions which Walther had originally hammered out for American use.

As a child I listened to the conversation at the elegant and sumptuous table set by his daughter, Clara Pieper Ressmeyer. There the dual protocol of rectitude and orthodoxy was ever present. The rhetoric in her husband Rudolph's preaching conveyed the confidence that all was well in Zion and that the formulae for expressing truths need not change.

**Has the Family Line Come to This?**

In the same generation, my mother's father, Paul Bretscher, was less at ease. Two generations away from Missouri's founders who had been university educated in Saxony, he was among the earliest on the Concordia faculty to hold a university doctorate. He lived with the tensions of serving as a broker of New Testament scholarship for the church—no easy task. In his time questions of Lutheran identity coalesced more and more around the nature of Biblical authority, the issue that ultimately split Missouri.

In the years that my parents were growing up, Henry Francis Ressmeyer in the East and Ruth Marie Bretscher in the Midwest, full confessional subscription became a common denominator among American Lutherans. At
the same time, ethnic distinctions were blurring, while in my time the corporate shapes of Lutheran denominations expanded and perhaps grew more faceless. All of these factors—the rise of confessional consensus, the emergence of large church bureaucracies, and the weakening of ethnic communities—are forcing Lutherans into new quests for identity. It has become increasingly difficult to locate oneself and know one’s location within Lutheranism. Old pieties can no longer be taken for granted in the parish. And Lutherans must wrestle once again with the question of how Catholic or Reformed they are in practice.

**Are Lutherans Identified in Liturgy?**

Without the structural buffers of ethnicity and confessional difference, worship in particular lies exposed. I sense that the theological controversy surrounding the new Lutheran Book of Worship, the widespread uncertainty over preaching, and the debates over the administration of the sacraments, including the question that has cropped up at Gettysburg and elsewhere of communing baptized infants and young children, are all indicative of an emerging arena in which issues of identity are at stake.

I find these to be healthy developments. What better issues for Lutherans to debate these days than liturgical ones, since it is just conceivable that the liturgy may provide the particular context and sense of belonging in which Lutherans can again find meaningful identity. When the liturgy is done so that Lutherans are able to recognize themselves as part of the communion of saints, then maybe they can survive the loss of such traditional Lutheran props as ethnicity and inter-Lutheran confessional debate. Many questions of theology and practice remained unsettled after our Lutheran forebears worked out the issues of confessional identity. In addition, new ones continue to arise in the modern ecumenical context, particularly on the relation of Lutheran worship to the ancient catholic liturgies. This generation faces the task of settling some of these questions.

That is why it is a good thing seminaries look more like parishes. Seminaries are now safer places than they have been before to explore the theology and practice of worship and thereby contribute to the discussion of Lutheran identity. Not only are there more resources in liturgical scholarship available than ever before, but also the presence of student families, women, and even the mixture of Germans and Swedes with others mandates that seminary communities take great pastoral care in considering the whole range of religious needs. Worship must express not only the fullness of God’s revelation in Word and Sacrament but also the hopes and fears of the entire community. Questions of initiation into and representation in the liturgical life at the seminary prod the community to consider matters affecting parishes everywhere. Here is but one area that makes the risk of casting one’s lot with the seminary worth taking.

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**Moon**

Son of a gun, shot by Thor with a “big bang” out of a granite fist, drifting like butter through an unquiet universe we can only determine by lightyears, waves—

Seems to smile at our theories on open nights, passing, winking at cows And baying dogs, fluff halo dancing like imagination above pastureland fences, high of forehead, smooth egg. 

Eclipsed by the shadow of our earth, like an irony at the end of the third act of a great play: 

Dawn.

Final lunar eclipse of the decade.

Peter Brett

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**Photograph by Ken Bazyn**

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The Cresset
Toward a Just Peace in the Middle East

Christopher C. Joyner

In a real sense, the Middle East situation today is characterized by this century's most tragically ambiguous regional dispute, the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That is to say, the Palestinian Arabs, after living in Palestine for over a millennium, became in 1948 a people without a country: more than three million of them are now dispersed throughout the Arab world—with the largest concentration in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and the Gaza Strip area—possessing little else other than the legacy of their nationality and the memories of their former resident homeland. Additionally, it bears realizing that the Palestinians have been cruelly trapped as the chief victims between Zionism's ideological insistence on the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (i.e., Israel) and the resultant Arab insistence on the destruction of that same state. Thus, this article's purpose is, first, to explain the major contentious issues that continue to frustrate viable resolution of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict; second, to proffer for serious consideration some proposals aimed at bringing this dispute to a peaceful reconciliation; and third, to draw some conclusions and assessments about the feasibility of implementing these suggestions in what today patently appears to be an intractable situation.

Four Issues in the Present Impasse

The fundamental issue underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict is the national claim of both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs to the same piece of territory, namely, the ancient Biblical land of Palestine. Upon most of that soil, Jewish immigrants since the 1880s have labored successfully to build a sovereign nation-state; Palestinian Arabs likewise aspire to build their own state, couched in the same guarantees Israel has sought—secure and recognized boundaries. Today, however, Jews are free to inhabit territory designated as their own nation-land; the Palestinians on the other hand, are not.

Regarding specific issue-areas, four are of particular concern, and consequently they merit mention.

1. Israel's continued control over the occupied territories. In the course of the Six Day's War of 1967, Israel seized possession of and has since militarily occupied four strategically important regions: (a) the Gaza Strip and (b) the Sinai Peninsula, both of which under international law belong to Egypt; (c) the West Bank of the Jordan River, which from 1948-1967 was administered by Jordan; and (d) the Golan Heights, a piece of mountainous land which legally is still Syrian territory. The persistent refusal of the Israeli government to relinquish these "buffer zones" on grounds of maintaining secure border areas remains a critical obstacle to any peaceful Middle East settlement.

2. Creation of an independent Palestinian state. Although included in the United Nations 1947 Partition Plan, the creation of a Palestinian political entity as part of Great Britain's Palestine Mandate has yet to be achieved. Though Israel was created as a Jewish state, and Transjordan was formed as an Islamic state, the area reserved by the United Nations for the Palestinians—the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip—now is under the control of Israel; the West Bank was taken from Jordan in the 1967 war, and likewise the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Not surprisingly, creation of such a Palestinian political entity routinely has been depicted as absolutely non-negotiable by Israel, an attitude principally attributable to the obvious security such a polity might portend given the espoused formal commitment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the eventual destruction of Zionist Israel.

3. The role of the PLO in diplomatic negotiations. As just intimated, the PLO has indicated in its National Charter that the "liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine." As a consequence, Israel vehemently and steadfastly refused to recognize the legitimacy of the PLO as representative spokesmen for the Palestinians, or to deal with any member of the PLO, or to enter into any diplomatic negotiations wherein a PLO representative is in attendance. For Israel's government the official policy posture considers the PLO to be only a murderous terrorist

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group, undeserving of de facto or de jure recognition. On the other hand, however, for Arab Governments the PLO has been designated through consensus resolution to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people of any liberated Palestinian territory. 11 Similarly, the PLO was recognized in October, 1974, by the United Nations General Assembly as the representative of the Palestinian people, 12 and later that same year, the General Assembly passed another resolution reaffirming “the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine,” including “the right to self-determination without external inferences,” the right to national independence and sovereignty, and the right for them to “return to their homes and property . . . [in Palestine].” 13 Clearly, if peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is to have any real chance for success, the contentious nature of the PLO must be modified and agreed upon by all parties.

4. The occupation status of Jerusalem. To be sure, the Israelis have vivid, agonizing recollections of the years 1948-1967, when the city of Jerusalem was under Jordanian control and Jews were denied access to the holy shrines there. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1948 war, Jordanian troops looted and burned much of the Jewish Quarter. In the Six-Day War of 1967, however, Israeli troops captured the city. Hence, for the Israelis, continued political occupation of Jerusalem is perceived as being the most reliable manner of keeping the city open to Jews, as well as other religious pilgrims, and for safeguarding the holy sites there. Though yet to be addressed directly or adequately in any diplomatic forum, resolving the status of Jerusalem will remain for all parties a highly sensitive issue for emotional, religious, cultural, and historical reasons.

These four issue-areas, then, entail the fundamental problems which must be mollified if genuine peace is ever to come to the Middle East. Yet, in reviewing these issues of disputation, a curious irony becomes apparent: Had the Israelis not been so overwhelmingly victorious in the 1967 War, most of the above areas of disagreement would have been stillborn. This is an important point to bear in mind for two basic reasons. First, Israelis now occupy more land, in further fulfillment of achieving the Zionist objective of Eretz Israel, the land of “greater Israel” portrayed in the Old Testament. Second, in strictly secular, contemporary political terms, controlling the occupied territories today also affords greater flexibility for the Israeli-Government in future negotiations, particularly considering that the territories might be used as bargaining chips for hitherto unavailing Arab concessions.

These observations notwithstanding, the basic question remains: Is a just peace with dignity and security for all disputant parties possible in the Arab-Israeli conflict? Arguably, the answer I would suggest is yes, but most likely only over the long term, in deliberate measured phases of negotiation. Indeed, if any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be realized, it will take time, patience, faith, guarantees, and, of paramount importance, political will on behalf of all parties to achieve peace through compromise and conciliation. We now turn to the ingredients of one such proposed peace formula.

At the outset, it should be admitted that the scheme herein suggested would probably be rejected in its present form by Israelis and Arabs, as well as Palestinians. Yet, placed within its parameters are realistic and viable answers, and presuming that the political will of the parties is available, also attainable goals. At the heart of this proposal lie three fundamental assumptions which must be evinced to provide any degree of success: (1) Israel and the confrontation Arab states must be genuinely willing to end all hostilities, including terrorist attacks, armed reprisals, economic boycotts, and naval blockades; (2) the antagonists must be prepared to accept a peace that can be followed by the normalization of relations, including intraregional trade, tourism, and exchange of diplomats; (3) international security guarantees must be made available, a responsibility most likely to be shared by the United States and the Soviet Union working in concert with the United Nations. If these assumptions can be realized, then peace in the Middle East becomes a distinct possibility. Thus, the formula for securing this peace has four major components: diplomatic prerequisites; the Palestinian question; Israel’s national security; and the status of Jerusalem.

**Four Parts of a Formula for Peace**

1. With regard to diplomatic prerequisites, hypernationalism must give way to more practical considerations. Hence, all disputant parties must participate in the process of hammering out a Middle East settlement, including Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinians (ostensibly with PLO representation). In addition, each participant must forthrightly accept a commitment to respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the other parties. Securing such a commitment will furnish the necessary legitimacy and sincere conviction needed for fostering productive negotiations. Finally, all Arab states in the region and the PLO must diplomatically recognize Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign nation-state within its pre-1967 territorial borders.

2. Notwithstanding the vituperative rhetoric and terrorist activities of various PLO factions, peace will not come to the Middle East until Israel agrees to accept the self-determination of the Palestinian people for their own homeland there. Toward this end, as distasteful as though it may be to Israel, the PLO must be accorded some role and voice in the negotiations, and a plan must be devised whereby a Palestinian polity could be created in the region.
At this time, the land most feasible as a candidate for a Palestinian territorial entity is the occupied territory of the West Bank. Therefore, Israel would have to withdraw militarily from the West Bank, as well as abandon the more than fifty recent settlements that are now in existence there. This is not to suggest that Palestinian statehood must be an immediate accomplishment. A transition period of perhaps twenty years likely would be necessary to make the Israelis more comfortable with their new Palestinian neighbor and to permit the Palestinian people to mature, both economically and governmentally. The new Palestinian entity would be allowed to adopt its own flag, to elect its own Parliament, and to set up its own judicial system. Of great symbolic significance and diplomatic convenience, the new polity would be permitted to issue passports for its citizenry, an act which no doubt would imply de jure recognition and de facto acceptance by the international community. The now occupied territory of the Gaza Strip could also be added as an appendage to the West Bank Palestinian territory. The caveat here of course is that Israel would have to guarantee unimpeded access between the two regions much like the traffic now passing between West Germany and West Berlin.

3. In order to assuage Israel's anxieties about its national security in light of the above proposals, convincing international guarantees of one form or another would have to be readily available. Consequently, a number of suggestions appear plausible. First, specified limitations must be placed on the nature of the Palestinian polity created. For example, while a domestic police force might be allowed to enforce internal order, a standing army would be prohibited, with international inspectors assigned to insure this. Secondly, the Palestinian entity's government should not be permitted to enter into any regional or international treaty agreements aimed at doing harm to Israel. Third, there would have to be some insistence that an international peacekeeping force be stationed within the new polity, if for nothing more than to be used as an interposition device in the event of an outbreak of renewed hostilities.

Related to the notion of Israel's security is the continued occupation of territories owned by Egypt and Syria. Prospects for peace in the Middle East will be little more than a pipedream so long as captured Arab lands remain in Israeli hands. Therefore, Israel would have to withdraw from the Sinai—a provision already largely achieved through the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty—and the Gaza Strip, as well as from the Golan Heights. Israeli settlements would have to be dismantled, and sovereignty would have to be restored to those territories' legal owners, Egypt and Syria, respectively.

Nonetheless, in exchange for withdrawal, Israel would receive special guarantees for demilitarization of these areas, guarantees which could be maintained by international police force patrols, presumably under the United Nations' auspices.5

4. The final problem area requiring solution is the emotionally sensitive status of Jerusalem. Israel should abandon its claims to territorial sovereignty over East Jerusalem and adjacent suburban settlements. The Old City, with its many holy shrines, should be designated an international, non-affiliated city, sort of a Vatican of the Middle East, if you will. West Jerusalem would be retained by Israel as its capital. Admittedly, Jerusalem again would be a divided city, but international guarantees could be implemented to insure free and unobstructed passage of people and goods between sectors.

A Radical Possibility in the Proposal

Taken as a whole, one might conclude from this proposal that Israel will have to accept most of the concessions in any forthcoming negotiations. So, what does Israel receive in return for recognizing the PLO, giving up the occupied territories, and making Jerusalem a partially internationalized city? Put simply, Israel gains full diplomatic recognition, coupled with regional acceptance by neighboring Arab states, and international guarantees of security by the United States and other nations. But far overshadowing these means is the overall end objective, peace. That is what all the disputants stand to gain in the final analysis.6

Any longer-term solution to the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be neither quick nor easy, and the resultant implications are likely to be profound—diplomatically, politically, economically, religiously, and socially. Even so, in the process of striving toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement, the potential is ever present for diplomatic breakdown or regional war. Yet, on the other hand, the potential is also there for a lasting peace, with the concomitant reward of a just and dignified co-existence for Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in their respective homelands.

In the subtitle of this paper, the adjective "radical" was used to describe the peace formula herein proposed. The term "radical" of course is relative to time and condition; what is radical to some people is pro forma to others. Hence, ten years ago, a peace accord between Israel and Egypt would have been "radical" and nothing more than a chimera. Today it is a reality. If this bold step is any harbinger, then a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is indeed possible. That is the ultimate aspiration contained in this package of proposals, and if peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors can be achieved by adopting any or all of them, then its purpose will have been wholly fulfilled.


The first thing to bring to a play, of course, is not criteria, but a wakeful self, a stillness of expectation and foreboding, and an open eye. The wakefulness is a taller order than it may seem; in fact, it could be argued that falling asleep in the middle of a dull play is the one irrefutable act of criticism.

Expectation must be kept in check or it can ruin the whole experience. Foreboding may actually be more useful—I am certain that some of my delight when I saw Whose Life is it Anyway? came from wondering all the way to the theatre how a rich evening of drama could happen with the main character prostrate in bed at all times.

As for the open eye, nothing is harder than to be an eyewitness. Pre-dilections and even thought-out criteria are no substitute for taking in on the stage. Immediacy and directness are, after all, theatre's most distinctive characteristics.

Still, there are criteria: does the play hold together (unity)? Does it move along (coherence)? Does it strike a responsive note in human experience? The last question is most important and the most difficult. Surface identification is not at all crucial; I have never actually lived in the court of Elsinore nor in the Bronx apartment of the Loners. Yet, for a play to touch an emotional nerve, to bare a hidden fear, to evoke a deep joy or any other human commonality is to know that art does illumine our inner selves in astonishing and unexpected ways.

But how about the thirty or so plays which you saw this past year? Any observations as a whole?

Some say theatre is expensive. Orchestra seats for some Broadway plays are as high as $25, but the TKS booth on Seventh Avenue helps by selling tickets to many plays at half price on the day of performance. Besides with movie prices what they are now! And prices at college and university theatre as well as community theatre are usually not high. Quality is not a location. I saw a fine Midsummer Night's Dream in a summer college workshop production which turned circles around Al Pacino's Richard III on Broadway; a college performance of Our Town was superior to two-thirds of what I saw in professional theatre this year.

Others say theatre is not only expensive but offensive. The other day I found a book in our college library shelves, published in 1884, The Theatre by Josiah W. Leeds, subtitled: An Essay upon the Non-accordance of Stage-Plays with the Christian Profession. The opening sentence reads: "It was told me by a friend that a certain person with whom he was well acquainted in his younger years, having made an appointment to meet one of his associates at a theatre entrance, was so struck by the usher's iteration of 'This way to the pit! This way to the pit!' that, appalled at the peril to which he was exposing his soul, he hastily left the place, and was never afterward seen at such a resort." Quoting Tertullian, Colley Cibber, and many others, the little volume is a tirade which confirms the stereotyped meaning of the adjective, "Victorian."

I now see a strange pattern in my selection of particular plays which I reviewed this past year: St. Mark's Gospel, two Shaw plays, the drama of David Mamet, and, finally, The Elephant Man and Sweeney Todd. Some might say that I began in grace and ended in sin. The language in Shaw is audacious debate; the language in Mamet is compulsively obscene. The Elephant Man has a nude scene; Sweeney Todd is well nigh blasphemous at times.

But each of the performances measured up well not only in unity and coherence but, even more, in human insight. Other plays achieved those goals too. I think of Michael Weller's Loose Ends, of Sam Shepard's Buried Child in the Village, and a revival of Arthur Miller's The Price, which in many ways exceeded the original.
Quarrels between religion and drama, both historically and theatrically, will be fierce, for family quarrels are always struggles of love and hate.

production I saw in 1968.
The point is that a musical is not a reading of the Gospel of St. Mark; a Shaw farce is not *The Elephant Man.* A work must be judged according to its nature, and how well its nature is realized. Arthur Miller, as usual, gives good advice: be wary of the obsession with pure style in the contemporary theatre. He adds: "It hides a lot of human emptiness. There is less than meets the eye. I think a play ought to cast a shadow; it ought to be something you can walk around, rather than a sudden burst of fireworks in the darkness."

*How do you catch the essence of a play?*

That's a huge question, and I sense I'll need a rather lengthy response. I can begin by saying that drama is act. It is a doing (*dran*—to do), a happening, an event, or, as Aristotle, the father of dramatic theory, described it, drama is first of all action. The essence of drama is not an idea, although certainly a drama always has ideas, but ideas put into action, dramatized ideas. Drama is neither philosophy nor even poetry. To go searching for philosophical or religious ideas apart from the actions of a play or to talk glovingly about the poetic verse apart from the action of a play is to violate the nature of drama.

In *King Lear,* for example, all of us know the lines:

As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods
They kill us for their sport.

(IV, i, 38-39)

To isolate these lines as Shakespeare's religious philosophy, on the one hand, would be to imply that *King Lear* is an essay, an exposition of ideas, and Shakespeare is speaking to us directly. To ignore the depths of skeptical fatalism in these lines by talking only about their fine poetic power, on the other hand, is to imply that Shakespeare's play is primarily a lyric poem, an evocation of moods and feelings by means of metaphorical language. But the dramatic understanding of the play would best be achieved by focusing on the action of the scene. A particular man in a particular situation utters these lines. Who is this man from what we have observed about him earlier in the play? When does he say these lines? Where does he say them? To whom? How are they received? In brief, what is the relationship of these lines to the whole of this man and to the whole of the play? We begin to catch the action of the scene by observing that the speaker is the Earl of Gloucester whom we have seen in action as a naive and gullible but nevertheless loving father of his two sons, and as a highly superstitious and extremely mercurial man of moods and temperaments who at present is contemplating suicide in the blind depths of his despair of losing his son Edgar. That his enemies have recently blinded him in their sportive abuse and that Edgar is actually guiding him at this time and will only have him pretend to leap from the cliff—all this and more is part of the dramatic immediacy of the scene.

The first question for a drama therefore are not these (although both must be part of the total understanding of the play): What is the philosophical or religious viewpoint of the play or what is the language of the play? The primary focus is: What's happening here? What's going on in this world of people? What kind of actions, inner and outer, are the people performing? A play-reader by looking analytically at the philosophy or the poetry of the play may have the advantage of detachment and of close attention to the text, but he may miss what the spectator cannot ignore: to become caught up in the action on stage. Francis Fergusson in his excellent book, *The Idea of a Theater,* helpfully points out that the action of a play or a scene can best be indicated by the use of an infinitive phrase. He suggests that Oedipus's action is "to find the culprit," and out of this action flow the conflicts, inner and outer, of the whole play, for both Oedipus and the audience are caught up in this action.

*If drama is essentially "act," then how is it related to other art forms?*

Because drama is essentially "act," its greatest weakness and, at the same time, its greatest strength is that it is the least didactic of the verbal artforms. The essay, of course, is most amenable to teaching. It presents an idea, and in rhetoric the essayist can make the presentation as didactic as he wishes. The form of almost all sermons, although they need not be, is therefore the essay, the exposition. Lyric poetry also interprets reality rather directly through its evocation of moods and feelings, less so than the essay, but more so than narrative, whether in poetic or prose form. The narrative poem as well as the novel or short story possesses direct interpretation. The fiction writer intersperses the dialogue of the characters with his own commentary: the reader is told that this character, poet, and novelist each has in varying degrees ways of directing the reader's attention to his point of view.

The Gospel does not present us with an idea, but with an action.

The Incarnation is God's use of dramatic form.

Drama, on the other hand, is people in action. True, the directions in the text to the actor and reader gives clues to the interpretation of the dialogue, but unless the actor or the reader's imagination conveys this interpretation, the action is dead, inert, inactive. Propaganda reveals its inauthenticity very quickly in drama; neither the actor nor the audience can hear the ring of truth in the words. Neither can enter the action. And if an author uses a character too obviously as his own mouthpiece, the dramatic conflicts are lost, for there is no interaction.

Drama therefore possesses inherently the risk of induction; the reader-viewer is given only the bare
bones of a happening, of people in action; he is to imagine, that is, dramatize, in his inner self, the rest.

And, finally, how would you describe the relationship of drama to the Christian faith?

One way is that the most dramatic action, and, at the same time, the central core, of the Biblical revelation is the Gospel account of the drama of the incarnation, the act of Jesus Christ on this earth. It is not first of all that Christ said something, but that He did something; He was born, He died, He was buried, and He rose again. The Gospel does not present us with an idea, but with the action of God revealing Himself in the flesh. The Incarnation of God's use of the dramatic form in human history. Christianity is not revealed in a painting or a sculpture or even an essay or poem or a novel, but in a drama: the act of reconciliation and atonement of Jesus Christ.

What I am suggesting is that, among the arts, drama is analogical to what the Christian faith is about. For not only is the Incarnation the central dramatic event of history, but worship also is an act. We do something. We pray, we present, we sing. And in some highly dramatic actions, we are purged with water, and we eat bread and wine with one another. When we worship, we are engaging in a drama with God and one another.

When religion and the forms of art meet, whether in conflict or in creative interplay, one of the major places of that meeting, as it was in late medieval history and earlier in Greek paganism, will be in the arena of drama. By the nature of religious faith and worship and by the nature of drama, the two will be dependent upon one another and yet have deep conflicts with one another. The quarrel between the religious and the dramatic, both historically and theatrically, has been and will be fierce, for family quarrels are always hate/love struggles.

What is needed is a mutually rich tension between the dramatic and the religious. For that's where the action is.

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I Saw a Shooting Star Tonight
And Named Her For You

As she slid in yellow arc
behind blue mountains, old and still,
your face—the moon—
returns to mind
and words, a child's,
splash back—describe
the thrill you felt
at your first sighting
of a comma in the skies.
You lay, I guess, face up,
heart up, heels-hipbones
meeting mustard rooftiles
(quiet) needing no surprise.
And then she smiled
(on edge) and died.
In life she'd gone unnoticed,
one among a field of flowers.
But in death she gave you something
warm and broken, old and fine.
And now I lay in water.
And another sister sighs.
And I applaud (with laughter)
At Time's-Big-Top-Circus slaughter—
A true trapeze-girl's always born to die.
And so I came to name her for you:
sail on: Silver Olive Daughter.
And play, Piano-lady, Diamond-dreamer, Gentle-Healer,
you the ancient singer with a patient winking eye.

You may sleep forever to this shabby lullaby.
The Bible and the Threat of Philosophy

Part Two of Three Parts

The Bible Between Fundamentalism and Philosophy

The philosophical attitude toward Scripture is now crystallized in the historical-critical method of Biblical studies which has led in many ways to a better understanding of the Bible. We moderns are in the position of being able to understand the Bible better than all previous generations, except possibly the generation in which the New Testament writings were written.

The variation in wording between "deviation" (Essay 1) and "threat" in the present essay is deliberate, and it points to certain convictions of mine as to the relative seriousness of the danger to a true biblical view posed by the two entities: fundamentalism and philosophy. Philosophy in the present context will simply mean the setting up of human reason, of personal and subjective factors, in opposition to the claim to speak with divine authority which the Bible makes for itself.

The philosophical attitude to Scripture has become crystallized in the so-called historical-critical method. The historical-critical method is not always described as clearly and sharply as it might be. On occasion we meet descriptions which may leave the reader in uncertainty as to what the historical-critical method really is. However no one is helped by such a state of affairs. For understanding, we need clear ideas, sharp outlines, as accurate definitions as possible. Such a clear description of the historical-critical method comes from the Introduction of Vol. 3 of The Pelican Guide to Modern Theology. There R.P.C. Hanson writes:

Only a hundred years ago, most Christians of all traditions would have been content to describe the Bible as inerrant, infallible, and inspired equally in every part. . . . But in spite of shocked churchmen . . . the revolution moved inexorably on. It consisted in the simple but far-reaching discovery that the documents of the Bible were entirely conditioned by the circumstances of the period in which they were produced (my italics) . . . It meant that the books of the Bible were henceforth open to being treated precisely as all other ancient documents are treated by historians of the ancient world. No sanctity, no peculiar authority, no special immunity to objective and unsparing investigation according to the most rigorous standards and methods of scholarship, could ever again be permitted to reserve the Bible from the curious eyes of scholars.

The historical-critical study of the Bible has led in many ways to a better understanding of the Bible and its message. The energy expended on the biblical languages, the state of the text of the various writings, their literary connections, the religious background of the various books, has put us moderns in the position of being able to understand the Bible better than all previous generations, except possibly the generation when the New Testament was produced.

But the historical-critical method by no means stops with the kind of investigations which I have so far mentioned. It criticizes the material of the various writings themselves, subjecting their contents to the bar of what is rational or possible. It compares the statements of one writer with those of another, and of one man with himself, points out differences, inconsistencies, contradictions. To give a picture of all this, even within the NT, is too big a task. Accordingly, I shall confine myself at this stage of the presentation to the gospels in the main.

It was pointed out earlier that John's gospel has long been regarded by the scholarly world as an unreliable historical source for the life of Jesus. Jesus in John is too grand a figure, too overpowering in his divinity, really non-human in his effect on the reader. This effect, it is felt, quite convincingly disqualifies the gospel as a reliable picture of Jesus. But it was not long before the same critical spirit raised doubts also as to the picture of Jesus that appears in the other gospels. Since Mark was regularly regarded as one of the sources of the other two and the earliest gospel, it was natural to take the position that in Mark's gospel if anywhere we should expect to find the truth about the life of Jesus. The views of a man called Wrede were to give this conviction a crushing blow. One of the prominent features of Mark's gospel is the so-called Messianic secret. Jesus in Mark regularly conceals...
any Messianic claim and imposes silence on his disciples and others in respect of his own person. Wrede showed to his own satisfaction and that of many other scholars that this Messianic secret was actually not an historical trait of Jesus at all, but that it was a theological construction of the early church read back into the life of Christ, imposed upon the gospel material.

Wrede's criticism was a foretaste of the situation which now holds sway in large parts of the scholarly world. Since about the end of the first World War, the interest in the history of the origins of the Christian faith moved from the text of the gospels as they stand to the period before they were written to the interim between the time of writing and the actual days when Jesus lived, preached, and died. The tradition concerning Jesus for some time took an oral form. The study devoted to a recovery of the history of the tradition and the origin of it till the time of fixing in writing is known as form criticism. A further development of it, that devoted to the theology of the men who actually did the composing of the gospels, is known as redaction criticism. The net result of the work of these men—there are more radical and less radical among them—is that most of the material that we meet in the gospels comes from the early Christian congregations, both Jewish and Hellenistic, and not from Jesus. Jesus is the mysterious figure behind the gospels, who must be recovered by refinement after refinement of critical criteria.

The net result of form criticism and redaction criticism is that Jesus becomes the mysterious figure behind the gospels to be recovered by refinement after refinement of critical criteria.

It is interesting to see what the Jesus so recovered actually looks like, and to note the difference between that Jesus and the Jesus of the church's tradition.

The reconstruction of the life and teaching of Jesus was no problem for historical research as long as it was held that at least the Synoptics gave a reliable sketch of that teaching and life. Now, the traditional conviction may be summed up briefly as follows: The gospels give us authentic, historical accounts. Full agreement in content exists between the historical Jesus and the dogmatic picture of Christ, i.e., the Jesus of the dogma of the Apostolic and Nicene Creeds. Jesus is the eternal Son of God who in a supernatural way was born as a true man, and who by word and many a miracle demonstrated his essential unity with God, and who at the end of his life was exalted to be the Lord (Lord of church and history) by his death, resurrection, and ascension into heaven.

The Jesus of modern critical scholarship is as different from this picture as can possibly be imagined. Jesus was the son of Mary with an unknown father, who was probably born in Galilee about 5 B.C. He was probably at some time of his life a disciple of John the Baptist. His own public activity occurred some few years later, beginning a year or so before 30 A.D., in which year most likely he met his death. Conzelmann declares that no more of the whole tradition of the Passion can be assured historically than that Jesus was condemned and that he was crucified. Some other aspects of the gospel story of Jesus may be historically accurate: that he was brought up in a rural area; that, unlike John the Baptist, he associated freely with men rather than cut himself off from them; that travelling from place to place preaching was, especially in Galilee, the characteristic form of his activity; that Capernaum was a centre of his work; that at his death he had gathered around him a circle of followers, but the number 12 and the term "apostles" came later; that his teaching led him into conflict with scribes and Pharisees; that he travelled finally to Judea and Jerusalem and met his end in conflict with Jews and the Roman hierarchy.

Historical critics are much happier and more sure when it comes to uncovering the teaching of Jesus. The rank-and-file Christian not so. For here, with the years, the scholar has less and less to say. Accounts of Jesus' teaching become progressively shorter, as the acids of criticism are applied to the transmitted words of Jesus. All the titles of eminence are denied as having been claimed by Jesus: Messiah, Son of God, Son of Man, and the rest. "As far as we can see Jesus never used of himself any of the christological terms of glory found in the synoptic writers. Therefore it is impossible to reconstruct the self-consciousness of Jesus from these titles of eminence." All that can be claimed about him in relation to his estimate of himself is that he understood himself and his work as the sign of the imminent Kingdom of God. For the rest he called men to repentance, preached the kingdom of God, and enunciated a number of high principles under the idea of the will of God.

What sort of Christian faith emerges, once historical criticism has been consistently applied to the source of the Christian faith, the Sacred Scriptures?

At the turn of the century tremendous excitement in the Christian world was occasioned by a book, by no means large, written by Adolf von Harnack. The German title, Das Wesen des Christentums or "The Essence of Christianity," was translated into English under the title What is Christianity?

In his study of the question of what Christianity really is, Harnack deliberately declares that "he will employ the methods of historical science and the experience of life gained by studying the actual course of history" as the proper means by which to arrive at the answer. His answer is engagingly uncomplicated. "The Christian religion is something simple and sublime; it means one thing and one thing only: eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God." Or, more completely:

If, however, we take a general view of Jesus' teaching, we shall see that it may be grouped under three heads. They are each of such a nature as to contain the whole, and hence it can be exhibited in its entirety under any one of them.

Firstly, the kingdom of God and its coming.
Secondly, God the Father and the infinite value of the human soul.
Thirdly, the highest righteousness and the commandment of love.
We turn from this great representative of what is known as liberal theology to the master of demythologization, Rudolf Bultmann. During the last world war there appeared an essay of his, which proved as provocative as the work of Harnack. It was entitled New Testament and Mythology and had the sub-title “The Mythological Element in the Message of the New Testament and the Problem of its Re-interpretation.” One of the roots of the essay was the laudable intent to divest the Christian message of every aspect which might wrongly give offense to modern man, so that he might be confronted with the true message of the gospel and the true offense, which alone could bring him to the point of that decision upon which true life depends. The other roots were the conviction that the New Testament gospel is presented throughout in mythological dress and the existentialist philosophy of Heidegger.

**Critics of the Christian faith sometimes try to overwhelm believers with the incongruities of the faith, but the thinking believer knows more difficulties than the critic can produce.**

That the New Testament could become important for modern man only through demythologization may become clear from the following brief summary of Bultmann’s view concerning the New Testament as it stands.

It is no longer possible for anyone seriously to hold the New Testament view of the world . . . we no longer believe in the three-storied universe. The only honest way of reciting the creeds is to strip the mythological framework from the truth they enshrine—that is, assuming that they contain any truth at all . . . we can no longer believe in spirits, whether good or evil. . . . The miracles of the NT have ceased to be miraculous. . . . The mythical eschatology is untenable for the simple reason that the parousia of Christ never took place as the NT expected. . . . Man is essentially a unity. He bears the sole responsibility for his own feeling, thinking, and willing. . . . He finds what the NT has to say about the “Spirit” and the sacraments utterly strange and incomprehensible. Biological man cannot see how a supernatural entity like the pneuma can penetrate within the close texture of his natural powers and set to work within him. . . . It is impossible to revive an obsolete view of the world by a mere fiat, and certainly not a mythical view. For all our thinking today is shared for good or for ill by modern science.

If this criticism is not radical enough for you, see how Bultmann finished his description of the problem.

And as for the pre-existence of Christ, with its corollary of man’s translation into a celestial realm of light, and the clothing of the human personality in heavenly robes and a spiritual body—all this is not only irrational but utterly meaningless.

The NT as it stands, then, has to be seen as presenting truth in mythological form. But what truth? After reviewing a number of attempts to get behind the myth to the truth, including the path of Harnack, Bultmann declares that only the existentialist interpretation is true and fitting. He holds that the NT offers man an understanding of himself which challenges him to a genuine existential decision, that is, to live authentically. Men, until they have come to faith, lead an unauthentic life, a life determined by the attempt to find security in earthly, temporal things, “The authentic life, on the other hand, is a life based on unseen, intangible realities. Such a life means the abandonment of all self-contrived security.” This is an unmythological interpretation of the Christian understanding of Being, existence.

The two brands of Christianity produced by philosophy which we have just described should cause no real surprise. Results like these could have been predicted. I should like now to point out why this should be the case.

Philosophy as judge of the biblical claims and teachings—my first reason—effectively excludes the Bible as the source of Christian faith and life. It is the very nature of reason to claim the whole. Once the right has been granted to reason to be judge and arbiter in one instance, in one direction, no argument can be advanced why it should not be arbiter in each and every place. So reason displaces Scripture.

But not only that. The Bible and human reason or philosophy are inherently, fundamentally incompatible; they are irreconcilable opposites.

St. Paul has written sharply and unforgettable about this in his first letter to the Corinthians.

For the preaching of the cross is unto them that perish, foolishness; but unto us which are saved, it is the power of God . . . . For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom know not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe . . . . Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world that come to nought: but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory; which none of the princes of the world knew: for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.

All thinking Christians know that the apostle is speaking nothing but the truth here. They have experienced in their own hearts and souls and brains that the Christian gospel, the message of the Scriptures, and reason come into continual conflict. Unbelievers and critics of the Christian faith try to overwhelm the believer at times with the incongruities, nonsensicalities, irrationalities of that faith. They would do well to conserve their energy. The thinking believer knows of and has been tempted over and over again with far more difficulties for the faith than the unbeliever can produce. For the Christian knows the faith from the inside; he is an expert and a connoisseur in this matter, and the critical unbelievers are rank amateurs by comparison.

So Scriptural teaching, the Christian faith, and philosophy are completely incompatible; they are, to use Luther’s phrase in another connection, more than contradictory. That being so, philosophy cannot but be a threat and a most serious threat to the Bible and what the Bible is all about. By that last phrase I am of course referring to the Bible’s central concern, that around which everything in it really revolves, which is the gospel of forgiveness, life, and salvation through and because of the merits, suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Human reason and philosophy as critic and judge, as source of truth, will always and in every instance be a threat to the gospel. The nature of philosophy, on the one hand, and of the revelation of God through Jesus Christ, on the other, combine to produce this mutual incompatibility and antagonism.
Susan Adams Brietzke

The Ethiopian Cross

As it is uncommon to associate Christianity with Black Africa before the nineteenth century European entry into that continent, it often comes as a surprise that Ethiopia was ruled by Christian emperors for nearly fifteen centuries before the
Christianity was introduced into Ethiopia in 330 by three Greek Christians, and shortly thereafter the Bible was translated into Ge’ez (a Semitic language which bears the same relation to modern Amharic as Latin does to modern Italian). At present, some 35 per cent of the 27 million Ethiopians profess the faith.

The cross, or maskal, a symbol which was to become so important in Ethiopian Christian life and art, was first depicted on fourth century Ethiopian coins in its simple Latin and Greek forms. This symbol caught the imagination of Ethiopian artisans who began to improvise on the theme, creating crosses of great intricacy and beauty in a wide variety of materials. While the cross has been a motif occurring frequently in fabric, architectural decoration, basketry, and pottery throughout the centuries, this visual arts column is limited to handcrosses, used by the clergy, and to pectoral crosses, which are worn by nearly all Christian Ethiopians.

The earliest symbol of the Christian faith was a simple cord (metab) tied round the neck of a Christian at baptism. In the fifteenth century, one emperor decreed that all Christians must wear a pectoral cross as well. This practice is still widely observed in Ethiopia and the crosses range in length from 3/4" to 4". There is some evidence to suggest that the earliest crosses were fashioned from wood; later, iron became popular. In the early nineteenth century, following the introduction of the Maria Theresa silver dollar, nominally from Austria but minted widely in Europe and the Mid-East, silver became the most sought-after material. Gold wash on silver and even solid gold and inlaid crosses are made, but relatively infrequently. In some cases, crosses are formed by cutting the design into the coin itself, polishing it, and adding a silver ring (see the Greek cross, top of figure 4). Much more commonly, the coin silver is alloyed or even used to plate copper or brass crosses. A few fine silver crosses are made with a filigree or applique technique (see large central cross on cover). The most common method of fashioning crosses is cire perdue, and it is the strapwork patterns formed in this manner that have become perhaps the most distinctive of the Ethiopian designs (see figure 3). The cire perdue (literally, "lost wax") method is a casting technique in which a mold is built around a wax original, which is burned away when hot molten metal is poured into the mold.

Usually, the basic design of the cross betrays its area of origin. However, as the craftsman cannot use a mold twice, each cross has an identity of its own, and sometimes a very free use of the cross motif has resulted in a unique and striking piece. The cross shapes are basically round, Greek or Latin, quatrefoil or diamond, and some are scarcely recognizable as the Christian symbol (see figure 4). The most common type of decoration on the simpler crosses is an incised pattern, but occasionally figures can be discerned.

The older Ethiopian crosses have a lovely smoothness as Ethiopians are very often seen fingerling their crosses as they go about their work. So much a part of their lives is the neck cross that many beautiful silver crosses are cast with an elongated lower arm shaped like a tiny spoon and used as an ear cleaner!

While the greater portion of the neck crosses illustrated here date from the late nineteenth century, several of the handcrosses in this collection have been studied by reliable experts in Ethiopia and may date from the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.

The habit of carrying handcrosses (which vary in length from 6" to nearly 3") or proceessional crosses (usually a large cross head mounted on a long wooden staff) was first noted by Bede, who wrote of Augustine entering Canterbury carrying a silver cross. The handcross, which concerns us here, seems to have come to Ethiopia through Egypt in the early years of the Church; to this day, it is carried by all Ethiopian Orthodox priests or monks (abbas) tucked among the folds of their voluminous garments or suspended from their necks (see the small loop on the extreme bottom of the central example, figure 5). The crosses are used to give blessings, are held out to be kissed by devout passersby, and are not infrequently employed to give a smart crack to rude children.

The designs are similar to those seen in the neck crosses, with the additions of an elongated lower shaft (where the cross is grasped) and a square base which represents the Ark of the Covenant (tabot). On the shaft or tabot of several of these examples is a short blessing or the name of the

Figure 3 Figure 4
cross's original owner in Amharic script. Again, the simpler crosses are decorated with incising.

Wood has long been the most commonly used material, as it is cheap and easily worked by both professionals and amateurs. The latter create "country" crosses with a rustic charm; on the other hand, the extremely fine work of the professional artisan is easily distinguished (see figure 6). A variety of woods was used, and many extremely old wooden crosses have survived through loving care and the frequent application of beeswax (see inside cover). Iron and copper were the earliest metals used; later brass and silver became popular. Cire perdue is the most common method in the production of metal hand crosses. It is interesting to note that, traditionally, artisans working in metals were non-Christian "pariahs" and their work had to be consecrated before use. The small iron cross (see figure 5, right) is in the very popular Gondar style which may have been influenced by the Portuguese who made several forays into Ethiopia in the sixteenth century. The simple small copper and brass cross in the collection (see figure 5, left) is an interesting mid-point between the hand and processional cross as it was, no doubt, mounted on a shaft.

The illustrations are a portion of a personal collection of Ethiopiana assembled during a two-year period while my husband and I taught at Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa. Our teaching was cut short by the gathering Revolution, but we had some experience of the country both as an almost medieval Christian Empire and as a struggling African socialist state. What socialism will mean to the Church and the Christians in Ethiopia is still unclear, but the power of the Patriarch and the Church's economic strength are already considerably reduced. Muslims, some 40 per cent of the population, demand equality and, to some extent, the socialist "religion" will almost certainly erode established faiths. Unsubstantiated reports of government harassment of Christians, however, have been discounted by reliable observers. What socialism means for the Christian arts is equally unclear, but I fear that Ethiopian arts generally face a decline and that the fine old pieces of Christian art will not see the light of day for many years, representing as they do the decadent old regime.

Figure 5

Modern painting on parchment of an ancient Ethiopian fresco showing saints using crosses.
A Public Stance on Academic Workloads: The Most Misunderstood Feature of Higher Education

Donald W. Whisenhunt

Despite the fact that there is a higher ratio of college graduates in the population than ever before, the public understanding of universities appears to remain unsophisticated. Perhaps part of the problem is that we have been spending too much of our time talking to each other. We should be seeking and seizing opportunities to carry our messages to the more removed but potentially receptive publics whose fates are intertwined with our own.

These comments by J. W. Peltason, President of the American Council on Education, are very well taken, and his suggestions need action.

Even though the following remarks may appear elementary, unnecessary, or redundant for persons in higher education, college and university leaders need to remind themselves that the general public does not understand higher education as they do. Therefore, academicians probably should reassess their positions and take their case to the public. Among the general public, the matter of workload of academicians—particularly professors and administrators—is probably the most misunderstood feature of higher education.

The question of faculty workloads is one of the most emotional and volatile issues. Some states even have legislated the definition of faculty workloads. Leaders in higher education need to articulate to the public more effectively than ever before the elements involved in the workload of an individual faculty member.

Taking, as an arbitrary figure, a teaching load of twelve semester hours, it should be explained to the public exactly what this means. It is correct that with such a workload, the faculty member is actually in the classroom only twelve hours per week, but as is well known, actual classroom performance is only a small part of the faculty member's responsibility. Most institutions require professors to serve on committees and to serve in other time-consuming and often frustrating capacities. Most institutions also require that faculty members serve as academic advisors to a reasonable number of students. For the conscientious advisor who sees his advisees regularly, the amount of time involved is substantial.

Furthermore, most institutions assume that the individual faculty member will continue to be active in his discipline. The degree to which research is encouraged or even required varies widely, but even in institutions with the least emphasis on research, there is, nonetheless, an expectation that the professor will occasionally produce something of a scholarly nature. These duties, if taken seriously and performed in a rigorous manner, will consume many hours per week. The general public is usually unaware of these responsibilities and the impact they have on the workload of the faculty member.

University faculties as a whole are a conscientious and hard working group of professionals. In any faculty, there will be some who do not carry their weight, but they are the exception. Appropriate measures must be taken to correct such problems in order to maintain academic credibility. It is quite unfair to use such an exception to generalize that all faculty are underworked just as it is to use an extremely hard working person as an example to reach the opposite conclusion.

Persons outside the university sometimes have trouble understanding the absolute necessity that university professors have time to think.

The primary responsibility of a faculty member, of course, is to teach the classes assigned. To perform this duty properly, a great deal of preparation is necessary. Obviously, some individuals do not prepare as thoroughly as they should, but it is also true that the great majority of professors are quite conscientious in their efforts. Therefore, the number of hours per week that a person spends in preparation for one hour in class can be enormous. This is true even for the professor who has taught the class many times because students are quick to criticize a teacher who simply repeats old notes and whose lectures are growing stale. Without doubt, class preparation time can be significant.

For specialized institutions, the teaching load question is even more serious. For example, throughout the United States there is a growing number of upper-level universities— institutions that accept only junior, senior, graduate-level students. In such an institution, especially if it is small, the teaching load question is serious. In a small institution, few of the instructors teach multiple sections; in other words, almost all of the faculty with a

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twelve hour teaching load have four different preparations. With several hours of preparation time required each week for each class, four different courses multiply the preparation time by four. The size of the class has little to do with the amount of preparation required to teach the class effectively. The workload question is further complicated if the instructor teaches one or more graduate classes, inasmuch as the need for more preparation time for graduate instruction is widely recognized. Therefore, the normal workload for faculty members in an upper-level institution is heavier (with or without graduate courses) than for a professor at a four-year institution with a comparable teaching load, because two or three of his courses are probably the same lower division courses that require less preparation than upper-level and graduate courses.

*Questions are sometimes raised about what an administrator actually does. Vice-presidents and deans appear to be merely warming chairs.*

Another factor that persons on the outside sometimes have trouble understanding is the absolute necessity that professors have time to think. On the surface, this appears to be wasted time, but in truth, if they are to be effective in the classroom, teachers must have time available for reflection. Nothing can be more disastrous for a creative person who deals in the realm of ideas than to have such a heavy load that he does not have time to think. Such a person will soon burn himself out.

Another element of the workload not always recognized by the public is the fact that the good faculty member does not stop working when he leaves the campus. Persons who work with their minds cannot function in an eight-hour day context as does a craftsman or a clerk. A creative person who deals in the realm of ideas than to have such a heavy load that he does not have time to think. Such a person will soon burn himself out.

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As the professor's workload is misunderstood, so too is the workload of academic administrators, sometimes even within the university itself. Usually the public does not question the workload of an administrator as readily because most administrators are employed on a forty-hour week and a twelve-month year basis. Even though they appear to the uninitiated to be working full-time, questions are sometimes raised about what an academic administrator actually does (oftentimes by people on the campus as much as those off). Higher administrators (presidents, vice presidents, deans) appear to some to be merely warming a chair and living the good life. Those in such positions know the fallacy of such assumptions.

The key to academic administration is human relations. Many of the tangible duties that administrators perform are virtually clerical in nature and could be done by most anyone. By far the most significant task is the responsibility to deal effectively with people. Academics are highly educated and often highly specialized individuals who by their very nature are, as they should be, narrowvisioned and concerned about their own fields of endeavor. The administrator must take cognizance of their special concerns and strive to see that they mesh in overall institutional objectives.

In a recent provocative article, E. Grady Bogue offers some very interesting comments upon administrative stereotypes with which we are all familiar. Although he approaches the question of academic administration from a different perspective, many of his conclusions bear out the suggestions made above. To quote him: "Too many academic administrators are insensitive to the relationship between their style and the actions of those with whom they work." Obviously, the administrator with this characteristic is bound to have difficulty. Bogue further states: "Some climates are so filled with tension and mistrust that they affect the physical and emotional health of our colleagues." In describing another style of academic administration, Bogue makes this observation: "This academic administrator either ignores or is unfamiliar with a large body of social and management research indicating that the effective administrator is neither authoritarian nor permissive but is one who matches style with situation." Bogue's comments bear out the contention that academic administration is a highly personal activity, and there is no easy way to gain prior preparation for it. The successful academic administrator insures that many diverse personalities are able to work harmoniously together; he realizes that administrative skill does not necessarily grow naturally out of the academic backgrounds of most college administrators. A major part of the administrator's skill in human relationships must be his ability to make difficult and painful decisions which will often be unpopular to all or part of the academic community that he supervises. His skill is evident if he can convince the academic community that his decisions, while painful and unpopular, are necessary for overall institutional well-being and fair to all concerned.

If the administrator receives a higher salary, it is not primarily based on the greater amount of "work" which he performs, though he does "work" (in the traditional sense) a longer year than most of his academic colleagues. He is principally compensated for his skill in human relations, for bearing his level of responsibility, and for standing on the firing line.

For academic administrators who combine teaching responsibilities with administration, the balancing of both duties is quite difficult. Even though an administrative

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3Ibid., p. 81
4Ibid., pp. 81-82

The Cresset
assignment may be for only a portion of the load (one-half, one-fourth, etc.), it is very easy, because of tasks that need to be done, for the administrative assignment to become all-consuming and to take virtually all of the person's time. On the other hand, at the same time, the conscientious person will also devote as much time as possible to his preparation for his teaching and keeping current in his field. The plight of a person with a split assignment is not an enviable one. A reduced teaching load to compensate for a load of administrative duties may actually place the person under more than a full load of work. While many people are willing to do more than expected for the good of the institution, especially if their efforts are recognized, the extra duties which sometimes accompany split assignments should not be expected indefinitely.

**Some courses must be taught regardless of the "demand" for them, but those situations are likely fewer than most academics would believe.**

The reduction of teaching load, of course, reduces the number of classes taught, and the administrative assignment is a new administrative expense. The smooth running of the organization, however, is a necessity, and the reassignment of part of a person's load from teaching to administration is a legitimate expenditure of funds for administration. If courses in the individual's discipline are in high demand, it may become necessary to hire part-time faculty to absorb the teaching load that he relinquishes. If courses in the individual's discipline are in lower demand, the elimination of one or two courses from the schedule on a temporary (or even permanent) basis may add students to classes taught by other members of that same discipline and reduce the number of "small classes" for which the institution does not get state funding under the formulas used in many states.

There are, of course, some courses which must be taught regardless of the "demand" for them, and there are some subject matters which require "small classes" to teach them well, but those situations are probably fewer than most academics would believe. In general, it would seem that the financial costs of teaching load adjustments must be balanced against the benefits to be derived from the higher morale accompanying a better administered institution.

In conclusion, it is worth repeating that the comments made here are elementary and self-evident to anyone in academic administration. What is not so obvious, as President Peltason suggested, is the need for administrators to articulate the diverse roles and functions of professors and administrators and professor/administrators to the constituencies which support the institution. Incorrect assumptions must be corrected, and academicians must not allow the general public to assume that they are underworked and are simply feeding at the public or private trough.

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In Barcelona waking to the sound of creaking horse-drawn carts, the sound of wood and animal bending, aching over the cobblestone ruts. Waking to civilization at war with itself, sun at noon greased yellow in a damp bed with bugs. Seeing smiles of the ageing women, "broken plough-shares" he says watching lights on the curtain dance and blur. Product of the life gamble in flight in arthritic slow motion in mortar fire the memory recalls whole families swept by the tide: moving targets. "Like debris" he says, watching the streetcars pass the streetsweeper.

And at night the flesh of lovers explodes, forming blood bridges in to the future ... as half-blood soldiers, saunter the streets, move artillery north.

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**Photograph by Ken Bazyn**

- **Picasso**
- **Painting**
- **Guernica**

Peter Brett
Old Parties And The New Right

Cleavages and Coalitions In The Coming Decade

Albert R. Trost

This semester I have found myself, rather unexpectedly, teaching the course American Political Parties. I had taught the course on a regular basis until six years ago when I happily moved into new areas, leaving the subject to a better-trained colleague. In the intervening years, I have only casually read in the area, missing, as I have now found, many significant articles. For instance, the last presidential election that I was able to follow-up in a professional way was 1968, an election that seemed, like its predecessor, 1964, to be so unusual that it was dismissed as an aberration among modern presidential elections. It did not occur to me then, or since, that those elections in the 1960s might be the beginning of a fundamental change in the American political system. Getting back into the professional literature, one now notices that 1972 and after were distinguished by some of the same departures from pattern.

The fundamental change that escaped me was not the emerging of a "new Republican majority" to take the place of the Democratic electoral majority put together in 1932. This had been forecast by some writers after the 1968 election. No, the Republicans are still in an inferior electoral position to the Democrats. Democratic candidates are still supported by much the same "New Deal Coalition," blacks, working class, at least some of the South, and urban voters.

The change is about as fundamental as you can get in a course on American political parties. It is nothing less than a significant decline in the importance of the political party itself, at least as a national political institution.

In contrast to the party systems of Western Europe, the American party system—and here we are talking about the modern Democrats and Republicans—has not been very important in organizing the machinery of government. The daily watcher of the news in the United States knows that the President cannot count much on the members of his party in Congress to support his policy initiatives. He and his staff must forge ad hoc coalitions in Congress for each policy proposal. Sympathetic liberal Republicans are often more helpful to President Carter than most Democrats. Likewise, the two major parties in the United States have seldom represented clear alternatives on policy issues. They have come nowhere close to representing alternative ideologies. Again, for the most part, European parties go much further in the direction of debating issues and propagandizing a certain point of view.

Claims about the effectiveness and influence of the American parties, however, are seldom made on the basis of how they organize the government or how they clarify and expose issue-positions. The American party system has always been the definitive example of the role of parties in organizing and conducting elections. In fact, some writers have slipped into the language of sports and claim that the Republicans and Democrats are mobilized almost entirely for "winning" elections. It is this electoral function that is in decline now. If this is the only manifest function of the parties, what will happen to them if it fades? The most likely answer is that either we will have a new kind of political party in the United States, or that other political institutions, like interest groups or ideological associations, will step into the parties' electoral function.

The evidence for the decline of the political party at election time falls into about four categories. The first and most direct kind of evidence is the growing number of people who respond to opinion researchers' questions about their party identification by calling themselves "independents." After 1970, there were more "independents" than Republicans. According to the Gallup poll, 29 per cent of the people called themselves "independent" in 1940 compared to 34 per cent in 1974.

A second kind of evidence is the decline in straight-party voting. This change from the previous pattern affects the head of the ticket (President, governor, and senator) more than it does the lower part of the ballot. The voters seem to be evaluating the conspicuous offices less on the basis of political party considerations and more on the basis of candidate and issue considerations. For U.S. Congressmen, down through other state and local offices, the political party and the factor of incumbency have more influence.

A third kind of evidence, also from opinion polls, relates to the decreasing regard people have for institutions generally (after Vietnam and Watergate), political institutions more particularly, and, most especially, political parties.
In contrast to party systems abroad, American political parties have not been very important in propagandizing ideologies or organizing the machinery of government.

Finally, there are an increasing number of contenders for the parties' electoral role. These contenders include candidates who try to obscure their party affiliation, single-issue campaigns like the Pro-Life group or the tax-revolt forces, interest groups which have been encouraged by a loophole in the 1974 campaign-financing law to extend themselves into electoral roles through "political action committees," reform and citizen-action groups, and ideological committees and associations on the left and the right.

A very good illustration of the decline of the party in elections and the challenge from another kind of political institution is provided by the much-discussed New Right. Although Martin Marty in a column in the February 28, 1979 issue of Christian Century seems to question whether there is in fact anything "new" about this manifestation of the right-wing, feature articles over the last year in U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, The Atlantic, and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report do suggest a fundamental difference in the New Right.

At a general level, the New Right is critical of the "old right" for being too defeatist and too passive in the face of defeats for conservative stands, especially in Congress. The activism on behalf of conservatism that it advocates calls for a direct appeal to the voter. Such an appeal, at the least, calls for money and an image re-packaging. The "old right," meaning a journal like National Review or politicians like Senators Barry Goldwater and John Tower, tried to sell a total, consistent system of conservative thought. Such a product had only a few buyers in terms of funds or votes.

The electoral strategy of the New Right calls for operating with the two-party system, at least for the time being. It seeks conservative candidates from the Democrats and Republicans, as well as conservative stands on the issues. To pressure the parties to adopt its candidates and stands, the New Right is, first of all, trying to raise a large independent pool of financial resources. This is to be made available to conservative candidates as well as campaigns against liberal candidates. Secondly, the New Right proposes to make available to favored campaigns, technical campaign advice. At the core of this advice is the suggestion that candidates focus on one or two "social issues," such as the Panama Canal or abortion, rather than a conservative philosophy or the advocacy of capitalism.

In terms of personalities, Martin Marty's skepticism about the newness of the group is partly justified. In the Senate, Jack Garn and Orrin Hatch of Utah, Paul Laxalt of Nevada, James McClure of Idaho, and Jesse Helms of North Carolina are hardly "new" converts to conservatism. Nor is it unusual for conservatives in the House and Senate to operate independently of party caucuses as those mentioned above do in the Senate with their own "steering Committee." The closest thing the New Right has to an executive secretary and master strategist, Richard Viguerie, who makes a living as a consultant on fund-raising and publishing books and magazines, is also an old face on the right. From the mid-1960s he has been associated with Young Americans for Freedom and the George Wallace campaign in 1968.

However, there are some new organizations, oriented to the citizen and the voter that are new on the right: the Committee for Survival of a Free Congress, run by Paul N. Weyrich, and the National Conservative Political Action Committee, directed by John Dolan. Both of these men, along with Richard Viguerie, have a good deal of experience in fund-raising and political campaigning. What clearly marks these groups as "new" is the amount of money they have available. The National Conservative Political Action Committee spent $3 million in the 1978 election cycle. The Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress spent $2 million, and a group closely connected to Ronald Reagan, Citizens for a Republic, spent $4.5 million in 1977-78. The manner of raising the money is also distinctive with these groups: direct mail contributions. The pool of contributors to the New Right has been more than doubled from the approximately 100,000 donors to old conservative causes and candidates. Richard Viguerie claims the pool can be expanded to four or five million in the next three years by the use of his mail lists.

**Loopholes in the Federal Election Campaign Act**

**allow any expenditures to oppose a candidate as long as the opposition is not in behalf of any specific candidate.**

Though it is the large amount of money that has attracted most of the attention to the New Right in the popular press, it is their activity in elections and their independence of the major parties that is most significant. Typical of the New Right's electoral activism are their plans for defeating five Senate liberals in 1980, plans which have already been put into effect. Even before opposition candidates have been announced, campaigns based on single social issues, with high media-use, have begun against Senators Church, McGovern, Culver, Bayh, and Cranston. For instance, in Idaho, television ads have already appeared attacking Senator Frank Church for his stand in favor of the SALT agreement. Because of a loophole in the Federal Election Campaign Act, unlimited expenditure is permitted as long as it is not on behalf of a specific candidate. Though this favoring of independent groups through the loophole seems to have been unintentional.
by Congress, it has not made it any easier for the parties to perform their traditional role in elections.

It is also very clear that the New Right has little interest in building up the traditional party system. In an interview reported in U.S. News and World Report on February 26, 1979, Richard Viguerie said

Conservatives for a long time made a serious mistake by focusing in on only the Republican Party. I think you're going to see that change in a rather dramatic way in the next few years.

Primarily, I see conservatives now playing a major role in what is called coalition politics. The idea is that is isn't important whether you're a Republican or a Democrat; it is important whether you're a liberal or conservative. Organizations that support conservatives are looking for candidates to elect without worrying much about which party they join.

The New Right is not likely to be a decisive factor in the further demise of the traditional parties in the United States. Though it was fully mobilized for the 1978 elections, its influence was critical for the success or failure of candidates in only a few elections. The senatorial election in Iowa in 1978 which resulted in the victory of Republican Roger Jepsen is explained partly by the activity of New Right groups, but empirical evidence of this is lacking. The phenomenon of the New Right does indicate that there are some dedicated challengers for the parties' traditional electoral functions.

The political party is not going to disappear in the next decade or two. The two major parties are probably not even going to change their names, nor will they appear very different to the lay observer. Nevertheless, a major change in the party's role in the political system appears to have begun. At least, there has been a good deal of change in the importance of the party at the national level in elections. The change may never filter down to local and minor elected offices. Because we have depended so much on the political parties as aggregators of the many interests in the nation and as softeners of a political cleavage and issue differences, the consequences for the stability of the national political system could be far-reaching indeed.

Richard Maxwell, Assistant Professor of English at Valparaiso University, is writing a book on the mysteries of London and Paris in nineteenth century literature. As chairman of the University's foreign film committee, he is currently impresario of the fall semester screenings on film and politics.

The put-down is a perilous form. Several excellent performances—Mariel Hemingway as the young girl Tracy, was most often praised—and no obviously weak ones. The script was well written. It told a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Given the sorrow most films come to in trying to end, the final scene between Allen and Hemingway, with its delicate treatment of love and egoism, innocence and experience, seemed especially touching. The portrayal of New York City was memorable, partly because of good black-and-white photography, partly because the interplay between the characters' lives and the urban environment was consistently kept in the viewer's mind.

All these virtues were recognized, and yet as the months went by the initial wave of praise was overtaken. A number of prominent magazines and journals, from the Washington Monthly to the Village Voice, found fundamental flaws in Manhattan. True, Andrew Sarris in the Voice thought Manhattan the finest of Allen's films. A week later, however, no less than four of his colleagues filed suspicious or actively dissenting reports complaining about everything from Allen's preference for "heterosexual serial monogamy" to his "anti-feminist bias" and apparently his "anti-Semitism." The dissents culminated (I suppose) in essays published by Commentary and The New York Review of Books—periodicals which haven't agreed on anything for the last fifteen years. The reviewers in question, Richard Grenier and Joan Didion, react to Manhattan with something surprisingly like bloodlust.

This emotion is especially evident in Didion's review, which is concerned to pile on Woody Allen all

What generally happens is that some unfortunate novelist, or poet, or film director is envisioned as a symptom, a product, of corrupt times to be scourged with authority.

The supposed sins of the 1970s. For example, Didion quotes Allen as saying, "Even with all the distractions of my work and my life, I spend a lot of time not face to face with my own mortality," and then comments—in the very last line of her essay—"This is actually the first time I have ever heard anyone speak of his own life as a 'distraction.'" Anyone acquainted with English syntax will see that she has wrenched Allen's somewhat pretentious declaration out of joint. His small foolishness is not enough. He must be made to seem a jackass. Didion's comments do so much, so cleverly, to obscure the excellence of Manhattan that one begins to think about the whole tradition of reviewing and how it can push otherwise thoughtful readers or viewers towards an absurd degree of aggressiveness. Manhattan needs to be freed from some unfair attacks.

A bit of historical background will be of assistance. "By and by," wrote Carlyle in 1831, "it will be found that all Literature has become one boundless self-devouring review." Carlyle, as he was well aware, lived in a great age of reviews and reviewers. The French Revolution had recently opened up the discussion of old orthodoxies; public opinion was beginning to make its influence felt. The review, in the hands of Carlyle and Macaulay, became an important literary form, and an influential one. To mold public discussion in witty or prophetic prose seemed—at least for the first half of the nineteenth century—the most urgent task of the writer.

The triumph of the reviewer has not lasted. Occasionally, in the twentieth century, someone has made a distinguished literary career out of reviewing—Edmund Wilson, for example. Most reviewers have followed the path of least resistance. One weakness of the tradition is germane to Manhattan's odd reception. Since the Quarterly Review attacked Keats (and according to a popular myth caused his death) reviewers have been fatally enamored of the put-down: the essay designed to demolish permanently some artistic or intellectual reputation. The put-down is a perilous form. In retrospect, it usually seems a drastic misjudgment or an unwarranted expenditure of energy. The put-down, no matter where it is directed, tends to reveal much more about the attacker than the object of attack. What generally happens is that some unfortunate novelist, or poet, or director is envisioned as a symptom, a product, of corrupt times. If reviewers persist in their attraction to the put-down, it is perhaps because the pace of change in the modern world has been so relentless and so upsetting. These cultural conditions gave the review its first real importance, and the review in turn searches for a voice of authority with which to scourge the foolishness of modern man. Thus it is that some artistic works provoke an almost miraculous quantity of irritation. The review thunders at us and we can no longer see the work itself. Such, I suspect, is the dilemma of writers like Didion and Grenier.

The objection to Manhattan which has occupied most space is that the film expresses a typical seventies snobbery and narcissism. There are disdainful references to "the audiences for whom Woody Allen designs his easy intellectual references," as if Allen's films would be improved by genuinely difficult intellectual references. Grenier says, "This is the world not of the intellectual or even of 'our culture,' but of the gossip columnists and Women's Wear Daily." Didion indulges in several long paragraphs attacking "the counterfeit 'insider' shine to the dialogue." I don't know what you would expect if you read these complaints before seeing the movie, but reading them afterwards is puzzling. Many of the intellectual references in Manhattan, including some of the easy ones, slid right by me—I think because the movie gives no signal that these references have any primary importance. They do, of course, serve a function, being one device among many which Allen uses to demonstrate the cliquishness and self-regard of the world he is describing. Didion's protracted attention to this fairly small matter dominates her review, blinding her to some significant distinctions. "Toward the end, the Woody Allen character makes a list of reasons to stay alive. 'Groucho Marx' is one reason, and 'Willie Mays' is another... This list of Woody Allen's is the ultimate consumer report, and the extent to which it has been quoted approvingly suggests a new class in America, a subworld of people rigid with apprehension that they will die wearing the wrong sneaker, naming the wrong symphony..."

Manhattan discriminates more finely than either Didion or her "sub-world." Having favorite books, music, and baseball players does not automatically mean that you are ready for People magazine, or that you are rigid with apprehension. By way of his experiences in the film, the Allen character had earned his right to express affection for Mozart or Willie Mays. His list does not identify him with the pretentious name-dropping of several other characters in Manhattan, or with the ex-wife (played by Meryl Streep) who is writing a book on "selfhood." Didion—along with other reviewers—has attempted to turn Allen's satire against himself. She can do so only by the most willful wrenching of the film's intent and effect. Manhattan is partly about the trendiness of life in big cities but it does not follow that the film has succumbed to this vice.

If random accusations about 1970s narcissism were all that Didion and Grenier could come up with, their reactions to Manhattan would be inexplicable. Both reviewers, fortunately, hint that there is some much larger problem of artistic coherence in the film. Here, it must be admitted, Allen may have helped his attackers along—not by his work on December, 1979
A problem with the term "comedy" is that it covers both jokes (wit and slapstick) and transcendent reconciliation, a conviction of harmony and willingness to forgive.

The comedy of erotic disillusionment is not an American invention. It takes its finest form in European opera: outstandingly Cosi Fan Tutte and Der Rosenkavalier, where lovers fall out only to find some seemingly transcendent reconciliation—not exactly a return to innocence but at least a conviction of harmony in the world and a consequent willingness to forgive. Comedies of this kind are difficult to bring off, for they propose a final enchantment where all possible disenchantments may seem to have occurred. Music is usually important in resolving this difficulty. The people in Cosi Fan Tutte are even sillier than Allen's characters, but this does not prevent them from singing beautiful melodies—nor are these melodies used in a merely satiric or ironic way. Silliness and pettiness coexist with eros. This compromise cannot be directly explained but it can be dramatized.

One of the big problems with the term "comedy" is that it covers both jokes (wit or slapstick) and the emotion of reconciliation just described. The logical course of development for many excellent comedians is from mastery of the one thing to mastery of the other. No one can say by what process this metamorphosis occurs. Allen, in any case, has come closer than any other American filmmaker to doing the sort of thing that Mozart used to do. He isn't as talented as Mozart but quite talented enough to be taken seriously. In his development, moreover, he differs drastically from his distinguished American predecessors. Neither Chaplin nor Keaton managed more than the most sentimental or conventional kinds of romantic plot; the self-sacrificing hero of City Lights is the exception that proves the rule—the trickiest case of the usual new world attempt to preserve at all costs the illusion of innocence. Manhattan moves beyond the old stalemate in a series of extended conversations, or confrontations, between key characters. One sequence in which Allen and Michael Murphy are contemplated mournfully by a gorilla skeleton, is a wonderful argument about the ethics of sex. The question of whether all is fair in love has seldom been dramatized more tellingly than it is here. The scene demonstrates this comedy's flair for combining passion and detachment—not least by way of the gorilla, who makes unspoken comments on the evolution of the human race.

Set against Murphy, Allen (or the character he plays) becomes the film's moral spokesman. Another scene, at the very end, allows a character besides our hero to assume this role. Allen rejects the Mariel Hemingway character, despite all her efforts to keep his interest; when he decides that she's what he wants after all, she's on her way to London. The two of them may get back together eventually, but if they do their relationship will be different. In the meantime, as she gently explains to him, he must trust her. The situation and the emotions are hardly original with this film; when, however, have we seen them envisioned as comedy, and comedy especially of this kind? Manhattan uses the concerns and attitudes of 1970s people, yet it does so without becoming just another symptom of a bad time. The stylizations of erotic comedy distance and control the topical concerns of the film; satire is refined, very gradually, to a gentle, unmistakable affirmation of human possibilities.

The complaints of the critics have done little justice to this elegant film. When Grenier complains that "the Gershwin music is never used as contrast in any case, but supports the film's romantic moments in the most uncritical way possible," he has willfully missed the effect for which Manhattan is trying. When Didion observes that Manhattan glorifies a "kind of emotional shopping around," her prophetic cries of woe have been directed not at Nineveh, not even at the narcissism of a consumer society, but at an effort in good faith to move past the dilemma of the modern comedian. It was recently said of a fine poem, "What is in the American mind these days—the detritus of past belief, a hodgepodge of Western science and culture, a firm belief in the worth of the private self and in the holiness of the heart's affections, a sense of time and space beyond the immediate—is here displayed for judgment." Much the same can be said of Manhattan, which in intention and largely in accomplishment could be a significant turn in Allen's career—perhaps even in American film.

Sophie's Choice


The second most delightful thing about Sophie's Choice, William Styron's fifth novel, is that the author comes out and tells you exactly why he wrote the book and what he sees as its purpose: "to help demonstrate how absolute evil is never extinguished from the world." In a day when fiction writers are supposed to practice ambiguity if not downright obscurantism, such forthrightness is disarming. But the most delightful thing about Sophie's Choice is that Styron makes it all work.

And to make it work he employs the oldest of the fiction writer's techniques: a skillfully managed plot. Sophie's Choice is the story of a young Southerner who is living in New York City just after WWII and trying to write his first novel, and his friendship with Sophie, a Polish survivor of Auschwitz, and Nathan, Sophie's American Jewish lover. For 515 pages Styron keeps us reading to find out what happens next, events that include revelations about Sophie's concentration camp experience and developments in the tragic relationship between Sophie and Nathan. Remarkably, Styron is able to sustain his narrative drive even through passages which quote Hannah Arendt and other experts on the psychology of the Nazi. He kneads these otherwise stiff passages into the flow of his story by incorporating the reader into his own requirement for an expert's understanding of the holocaust.

But the straightforward style of this book is a coming-of-age story, all the more interesting to students of literature because it is offered, not by a young writer seeking in a first work to define himself in the process of telling his own story, but by a writer whose literary credentials have been established for nearly thirty years. The novel's narrator, Stingo (and this nickname is the only identity we get for the character), Styron deliberately associates with himself. Both are Southerners living in the North. Both worked on first novels in the late 40s. Both published successful fictional treatments of Nat Turner in 1967. It is often suggested that thinly veiled autobiography diminishes the force of fiction. Here the opposite is true. By associating Stingo so closely with himself, Styron renders the young writer's struggles all the more poignant. How much Stingo really is Styron, I'm sure only his intimates know, but the middle-aged Stingo who relates Sophie's Choice emerges as a man of candor and warmth and wisdom, a man of broad and attractive compassion. One senses that these characteristics apply to Styron's creator as well.

Sophie's Choice is the story of the holocaust and the legacy of guilt it bestowed on those who refused to die. Sophie cannot throw off the guilt that her life was purchased at the expense of someone else's death, that every act of guile which prolonged her life was tainted with the blot of collaboration. The irrationality of this guilt renders it no less devastating. Understanding the paradox of this guilt is the key to this novel as it is perhaps to much of the holocaust itself.

There are places to quibble with this book of course. Sophie seems far too intelligent, far too cautious, and not nearly desperate enough to have risked trying to smuggle meat through the Nazi occupation of Warsaw. That people were actually sent to Auschwitz for no greater crime I certainly believe, but this particular crime seems forced on Sophie's circumstances as Styron depicts them. One might also question the inclusion in this novel of two episodes from Stingo's abortive love life. The two long scenes may demonstrate the essential sameness of 1940s young women despite jarringly different facades maintained on one hand by a pseudo-liberated, gutter-mouthed New York Jewish girl and a pseudo-prudish Baptist Southern girl on the other. And the scenes certainly provide a kind of humorous relief. But in the end they are at best tangential to the central story and diminish the tight-
ness of the novel’s construction.

More seriously, Styron fails to develop the character of Nathan sufficiently for us to understand the way he is able to exercise over Stingo. The author is so effective in portraying the dark side of Nathan, at showing us his brilliant cruelty, that Nathan becomes wholly hateful. We are told that most often Nathan is kind and charming, but, save for a scene in which Nathan praises the first pages of Stingo’s book, we get little glimpse of his attractive side. This is a crucial weakness. The movement of the story depends on Stingo’s repeated willingness to forgive Nathan’s outbursts of irrational spitefulness. Such forgiveness for a character no more redeemable than Nathan is difficult both to understand and accept.

But in the end Sophie’s Choice transcends all of this, even this last. The power in this novel is easily great enough to overcome its flaws. With subtle mastery Styron uses his descriptive skills to capture the abiding tragedy the holocaust proved even for those who survived. In one stunning passage Stingo tells of surprising the beautiful Sophie while she was grooming herself in front of her mirror, “... it was wrong enough of me to have stolen in on her in this way and violate her privacy, so I announced myself with a small cough. She turned from the mirror with a startled gasp and in so doing revealed a face I shall never in my life forget. Dumbfounded, I beheld—for a moment startling—her mirror.

Sophie’s Choice is a serious book which deals with one of the most horrible episodes in human history. Its theme is unrelentingly somber. But through it all Styron persists in finding genuine hope, the hope that is life itself. Given the story he tells, that Styron finds a determinedly uplifting and successful ending, is a supreme accomplishment. Sophie’s Choice deserves a wide readership.

Rick Barton

The Taste for the Other: The Social and Ethical Thought of C. S. Lewis


C.S. Lewis shared his vision of the way God’s world really is—or at least is yearning to be—in story and essay for some twenty years. His Chronicles of Narnia and more pointed theological writings reveal Lewis’s affinity for what Gilbert Meilaender calls his Augustinian understanding of the human vocation of fellowship with God (in Augustine’s words: “Thou made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee”), and Catholicism’s pilgrimage toward sanctification through grace. Lewis’s diagnosis of the plight of the modern West is accurate enough: ours is an age of striving to domesticate pleasure; rather than relish its gift nature, we want to repeat it again and again. True enjoyment of created things entails a dialectic of enjoyment without idolatry of them. His prescription is the renunciation of the ultimate of created things, a return to smallness and to work that is satisfying. Many find Lewis very appealing while they suspect him of being as unrealistic as Gandhi in his dream to reclaim the village spinning wheel for India.

The Taste for the Other is the latest addition to Lewis studies and focuses on the social and ethical dimensions of his thought. Meilaender’s study is largely expository and does not contain a major thesis about Lewis’s thought. Meilaender counts Lewis as a theologian of high magnitude—if not originality—although I do not think that this study probes Lewis’s thought with enough critical distance to establish that. Still, Meilaender is widely and deeply familiar with Lewis’s thought and articulate on the major elements of his social philosophy, including the limits imposed by creatureliness, the nature of community, and the varieties of human love and their relationship.

Meilaender’s sympathy with Lewis’s view at times results in a less than critical evaluation. For example, two questions which I take to be important remain unasked in Meilaender’s discussion of Lewis’s notion of human community. First, Lewis argues for a hierarchical relationship within family and community, drawing on the analogies of the relationship of the various organs of the body and of Christ to the church. The analogies are less than satisfactory if one does not share Lewis’s apparent medieval model of the world. Lewis’s advocacy of the husband’s headship and of the fittingness of an exclusively male priesthood ends with the concession that there is something “opaque, even irrational” in it, and Meilaender lets this non-argument stand.

Second, there is in Lewis’s thought an emphasis of the Gospels which I find inadequately displayed. Should the import of Aslan, the Christ-type for the children in The Chronicles of Narnia, be solely that he must be unconditionally trusted? Isn’t the lesson of Aslan’s death and return to life that he (and we) must assume powerlessness and die at the hands of the evil powers of Narnia? It seems to me that Lewis’s medieval optimism understates the tragic—and radical—nature of the Christian calling. But again Meilaender does not address the question.

Meilaender is right in suggesting that Lewis’s stories are a most effective kind of moral education insofar as they tell us what a virtuous society looks like by the kind of people it produces. He has done well to bring together lesser known of Lewis’s writings on the nature of the shaping of the good person in the good society.

Michael K. Duffey

The Cresset
Karl Marx: An Intimate Biography

If it had not been for the Russian Revolution, Karl Marx might have been relegated to the obscurity of other post-Hegelian German thinkers, of interest only to academic pedants with a taste for Teutonic intellectual polemics. But there was a series of revolutions avowedly "Marxist" and the "-ism" associated with Marx's name has spread in influence around the world. The Marx bibliography begins to approach the volume we associate with Plato, Luthur, Shakespeare, and other "world historical individuals" (a term that it pleases me to think would have annoyed Marx) who became larger than life, each one a symbol as well as a force.

But what of the "Red Terror-Doc­tor" himself? Can we not remove the "-ism" and look at what he was and did? This is the burden of Padover's work, to take "an objective account of him as a human being—lover, hus­band, friend, fighter, father, foe—rather than as the philosophical symbol and revolutionary idol that he has become." Padover is not, by the way, a Marxist, but rather a self-pro­claimed "Jeffersonian democrat." Given the divergence of the two political experiences represented here, he approaches Marx with acute ob­jectivity and an eye for the telling detail or insightful quote. All in all, the book merits the usual adjectives: coherent, illuminating, a significant contribution.

For many, of course, a "humanizing" portrait of Karl Marx is like a look at the warm family life of Attilia the Hun. Yet, for all the volcanic and even demonic qualities given Marx in Padover's biography, one comes away from it knowing things that make Marx all the more impressive on the one hand, and somewhat less fearsome on the other. Padover's Marx is a man of awesome learning and intellect, and gains the respect of intellectuals (and this is the source of some of his appeal) for his dogged pursuit of the Faustian myth; he lived a life committed to his intellectual ideals, no matter how much suffering it brought him and his family and friends. The non-human Marx van­ishes too as we see the virtues and faults of the devoted family man, careful German scholar, anti-Semite, and perennial pauper. We also get glimpses of the Old Testament prophet Marx, roaring against the insanities and injustices of capitalism and prophesying the proletarian apocalypse.

Padover's book is of considerable use to the Marx scholar, since it helps as no other study to "flesh out" the brooding ghost that haunts the Western world. For example, I discovered the effect of early nineteenth-century German Romanticism on Marx, which runs like an undercurrent throughout his work: the Romantic passion for large, apocalyptic events, great passions and causes, moral heights and depths, idyllic vistas and mor­bid sufferings. Like the Romantics, Marx's work is a grand drama of good and evil, suffering and salvation, a morality play in which the last come first at the end, a grandiose vision in which man finally comes full cycle and realizes himself. For all its rather cumbersome prose, Marx's work has nevertheless the scope of Paradise Lost, the apocalyptic tone of Moby­Dick, even the Gothic monstrosity of Frankenstein. One comes away from this book with the feeling that Marx was a lot more Jewish, German, and Romantic than he would have ad­mitted, particularly ironic in view of his scorn for all three categories.

Padover's book does have its limits. He avoids psychological speculation, which can be done well, but the reader will have to provide it him­self, as I did, if he wishes. It is not an intellectual biography; one learns more about Marx's carbuncles than the dialectic. Certainly Padover at­tempts no synthesis as to what Marx "really, really said."

The reader of this book also goes away pondering another question. What was it this shabby and unknown little exile was or said that was to strike a chord in so many modern men? Perhaps it is his dramatic vision in part, so graspable and simple and inevitable; but also it stems from his absolute devotion to his work and cause and his ruthless integrity. Doubting the vision, one can still wonder at the "radical"—defiant and indignant, but also op­pen-eyed and analytical—perspective on things that sustained the man. Marx's career set an example for modern intellectuals to ponder. His life says that the free man eschews the easy compromises of "normal" life, academic institutions funded by self-serving Establish­ments, and the stultifying pressures and charms of the conformist and immoral. He would not be happy at Valparaiso University, but then he likely wouldn't be happy at Moscow University either.

James Combs

Common-Sense Suicide

Doris Portwood has aimed this book to a specific audience—the elderly who are considering the ques­tion of suicide. Some of her argu­ments parallel those employed with respect to euthanasia, but she writes for those who still have sufficient health and strength to make a rational decision concerning their own lives.

The sense of compassion Mrs. Portwood has for her audience is obvious. Undoubtedly this is because she numbers herself among those who are struggling with the question she discusses. Her identification with her audience and the conviction that what she writes fits their dignity and their needs makes the book worthy of consideration.

As the title of the book implies, the arguments presented on the question of suicide make their appeal to "common sense." It is this appeal which is problematic. Traditionally, moral arguments from common sense were rooted in a "common morality." This provided common assumptions concerning the meaning of human life and the values which should inform deci-
sions. Here the appeals to common sense are made without benefit of such a moral tradition.

As a result, the values which inform the moral argument of this book appear to be derived from the workaday world of business. Human life has its meaning in a person's productive power to serve others. Once that power begins to diminish to the point of disappearing, the source of meaning is gone. Second, decisions are to be made by tallying the factors on a balance sheet. What is the state of one's health? What is one's financial position? Finally, the primary moral issue with respect to suicide falls under the category of personal rights, which is the state of one's health? What is one's financial position? Financially, does one have the means to continue living? Finally, the primary moral issue with respect to suicide falls under the category of personal rights, which is the state of one's health? What is one's financial position? Common sense arguments ultimately depend upon the context of a living community. Community provides more than a sense of belonging, which may give meaning to life. When a community functions adequately, an individual knows that the valuation of one's own life also implies a like evaluation of the lives of others. And then it makes sense to discuss with proper seriousness the question whether suicide can be a morally approved action, and if so, when.

Dale G. Lasky

The Living End


The next time you're browsing through your local bookstore you may be tempted to pick up *The Living End*, Stanley Elkin's latest novel. Given Elkin's reputation for humor (the New York Times Book Review has said, "No serious funny writer in this country can match him")—a blurb touted on the book jacket—and linguistic skills (John Gardner cites Elkin's work as possessing "incredible verbal energy"), and given the book's attractively few pages, *The Living End* might seem the perfect balm for a cold winter evening.

Resist that temptation.

The humor in this book turns out to be one reasonably funny joke (I'll resist giving it away for those of you who'll ignore my counsel and read it anyway). That's not a very good batting average, especially for a superstar humorist. You might do better in a night before your favorite sitcom. And the literary skills that Elkin exhibits here seem to boil down to the variety of disgusting horrors he can imagine plaguing the denizens of hell. Dante did this long ago. And Dante did it so much better.

Now of course, if sacrilege is your cup of tea, then *The Living End* may be just the book for you, for sacrilege seems to be its central point. After a passably interesting beginning in which we are introduced to Ellerbee, a saint of a man who runs a liquor store in Minneapolis and supports widows and orphans out of his meager earnings, we discover that Ellerbee is only a vehicle for taking us on a trip through heaven and hell. Poor Ellerbee is shot in a holdup of his store and God, ignoring his lifetime of good works, banishes him to the underworld. Ellerbee it seems had kept his store open on the Sabbath.

After several pages of monotonous (if horrible and certainly horribly detailed) suffering, Ellerbee largely disappears as the Holy Family takes central stage. That's right, not only is a petty, flighty, seemingly mad God the Father a character in this novel, but so is a crippled and bitter Christ, and a prudish and persnickety Virgin Mary. The drive of all of this seems to be to set up a speech by God who rejects the opinions of his saints who suggest that he has given the world its present shape out of a respect for human freedom of the will and a love of goodness. "Never," says God. "It was Art. It was always Art. I work by the contrasts and metrics, by beats and the silences. It was all Art. Because it makes a better story is why."

If you find this funny you'll likely enjoy *The Living End*. Not finding it funny, I found *The Living End* offensive—offensive not because of the sacrilege, but because of the book's implicit assumption that sacrilege, even without the saving leavening of humor, alone is entertaining.

I think I abandoned such a notion somewhere shortly after those rebellious days of junior high school.
To pray is not a substitute for work; it is the way to use the word of God to make the work godly and holy.
To pray in faith and to work in the same faith is to pray twice.

Work and Knowledge, Prayer and Wisdom
Kenneth F. Korby

How is learning made whole? And how is learning related to piety? One fruitful answer to those questions is presented in a fourteenth-century mural in the Spanish Chapel in Florence. St. Thomas is pictured sitting in a chair, and on his lap is an open book with the words from the Wisdom of Solomon (chapter seven):

"I prayed and the spirit of wisdom came upon me."

Valparaiso University, like those Christians in Constantinople who named the first great Christian house of prayer the Hagia Sophia (Holy Wisdom), gladly and boldly asserts in the academic world that wisdom is higher than high knowledge. And this spirit of wisdom comes not by hard work; it comes upon those faithful and hungry hearts that are inflamed with the passion of prayer. Such wisdom comes from Father God who delights to give His Spirit to those who ask.

In the arithmetic of its daily schedule, the University deems it valuable to set aside time for hearing the word of God and prayer. And such prayer is not seen as a haphazard affair where each one wanders off in his own solitude to pray. Rather, the whole community is convoked to the Chapel to invoke the Name of God on our hard work. God's passion to have us pray has been joined by the passion and vision of those men and women who built the Chapel for the prayer life of this whole community. Here our hearts are tutored to be chaste and single-minded, bold and courageous, in calling on the Name of him who taught us to pray "Our Father." We are invited by the promising God to gather each day, to ask for the "sweet wisdom" of the Son that "cheers our way," to crave that wisdom that "sweetly and mightily orders all things." The name of our house of prayer, "The Chapel of the Resurrection," signals that we are to await expectantly the Lord of the Cross who is made for us "wisdom and righteousness and holiness."

To pray is not a substitute for work; it is the way to use the word of God to make the work godly and holy. To pray in faith and to work in the same faith is to pray twice. To pray is not to seek an alternate method for learning chemistry or economics; to pray is to exercise that Jacob-like faith that will not "let go until you bless me."

My students have made their choice; they do not have to be here—in the University to study or in the Chapel to pray. Their choice to study here is a good one, overladen with promise, and I pray that they do not waste it. And they are invited to pray and accept the prodigality of God's promises and the generosity of His mercy to those beggars who crave wisdom.

Valparaiso University is a community of teachers and learners who pray for one another. We pray that we may not be silly people who cannot distinguish the good from the bad, nor dull people who are stuffed with our own self-contrivances and leave his gifts untouched, nor childish people who know only how to rebel. But as God confirmed his promises with Jesus, his great AMEN, so we gather with our fellows, confirming our prayers for one another with a full-throated, roaring AMEN. And as the word of God is confirmed in our hearts by the faith that is AMEN, so our work is confirmed and crowned by the spirit of wisdom that comes upon us.
In Time—
For Christmas

The herald angels’ song is an everlasting antiphony... It moves down the centuries above, beneath, and in the earth from Christmas to Christmas to Christmas... In it alone is hope before death and after death... Their song lives to the 2,000th Christmas, to the 3,000th, and at length to the last Christmas the world will see... And on that final Christmas, as on the first, the angels will know, as we must know now, that the heart which began to beat in Bethlehem still beats in the world and for the world... And for us...

O. P. Kretzmann
The Pilgrim

Many years will pass before you understand Christmas... In fact, you will never understand it completely... But you can always believe in it, always... The Child has come to keep us company... To tell us that heaven is nearer than we had dared to think... To put the hope of eternity in our eyes... To tell us that the manger is never empty for those who return to it... And you will find with Him, I know, a happiness which you will never find alone...

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O. P. Kretzmann, President of Valparaiso University from 1940 to 1968, was also Editor of The Cresset from 1937 to 1968. In these two rare books many of his beloved “The Pilgrim” meditations were reprinted and are now available to new Cresset subscribers as a gift to themselves—or to give as a thoughtful Christmas gift to friends. This offer expires January 6, 1980. Those who order early are more likely to receive their gift book in time for Christmas sharing—and will miss fewer issues of The Cresset.

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