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Is There a Historian In the House?

Few gaps are more gaping than the gulf between history as known and explained by the historian and history as it is revered by modern man. It is impossible to harmonize historical science, which conveys neither lessons nor justifications, with the myth of history which animates modern man, be he an ordinary citizen searching for his "roots" in his family history in the past or a president searching for his "place" in world history in the future. For secular men, history is a god who makes them, judges them, and alone is worthy of sacrifice.

Especially in public life is the worship of history so conspicuously idolatrous. When Nikita Khruschev told Richard Nixon that history would decide between the USSR and the USA, they were alike in their secular faith that history is such a god who judges. Whatever may be the course of Khruschev's faith in the Marxist dialectic of history, Nixon will surely go to his grave serene in his belief that "History will vindicate me." (As if history might miss their petitions for vindication, Nixon and his Watergate co-conspirators pile their books on the altar of history in anxiously increasing numbers. History has often enough been the trick the living play upon the dead, but in our time history is becoming the trick the living hope to play upon the yet unborn.)

The place of the historian in a society which mythologizes history as its god is always shaky, and never more so than at present when history is becoming the last refuge of scoundrels and the serious study of history is in retreat. Helping us think through the historian's problems in our society is our May alumni columnist, Charles K. Piehl. He received his B.A. in history from the University (1970) and his A.M. (1972) and Ph.D. (1979) in American history from Washington University. Currently he is Public Services Coordinator at the Altoona Area Public Library in Pennsylvania. He has taught history in University College of Washington University, at Concordia College in Seward, Nebraska, and, most recently, at Mount Aloysius Junior College in Cresson, Pennsylvania.

Dr. Piehl's major interest is the social history of the American South. His dissertation concerned the social history of a region of North Carolina between 1870 and 1920; and he is presently researching racial and class themes in the art of the Southern-born twentieth century painter Robert Gwathmey.

He is married to Kathy Kracke (VU, 1970), "another deluded humanist" now Reference Librarian at the Altoona Campus of Pennsylvania State University. Norah, their four year old daughter, has already fallen under the spell of reading books and may, if she is not careful, become a historian.

The Cresset welcomes alumnus Piehl to In Luce Tua.

The Editor

Humanists On the Defensive
The Example Of the Historians

Charles K. Piehl

Unknown to most Americans in the election year of 1972—perhaps intentionally hidden from them—was the fact that George McGovern held a Ph.D. in history (Northwestern University, 1953; Dissertation: "The Colorado Coal Strike, 1913-1914"). It is unlikely that general knowledge of McGovern's academic credentials would have helped him in his campaign. For me, the most interesting point to consider is how his degree had become essentially meaningless during the twenty years since he had obtained it. Like many current Ph.D.s in history, McGovern had drifted away from his specialized field and acquired new interests, new hopes, and new credentials that put his academic training into perspective. While McGovern's decision to migrate from teaching and scholarship into another profession occurred in another time and for different reasons, it typifies the changes and adjustments some people trained in history and many other humanities disciplines have had to make.

At the time Richard Nixon was trouncing McGovern, I was in my third year of graduate course work in history at Washington University. In 1969 and 1970, before I entered graduate school, I had already heard faint rumblings of the collapse of the academic job market. The ten years that have passed since then have turned what began as a job crunch into a general crisis of identity and confidence for thousands of historians, especially for young scholars and teachers hoping to get started in the profession. Most disturbing of all, the victims of this crisis have received very little sympathy or help from the general public.

Ask most engineering students if there is an academic crisis, and they will tell you that their most serious problem is getting through college so they can wait for high paying job offers to role in. These young engineers are the envy of many older Americans; they are hardheaded, practical, and acquisitive. They fit in and are rewarded for it. History and other humanities disciplines like philosophy, literature, and languages are superfluous. Those engaged in them are merely foolish, raising questions that keep the rest of society from enjoying itself.
The problem of too few academic positions for too many job-seekers has lasted long enough now that many observers are suggesting that the situation will not improve and that the wise person will learn to cope with it rather than wait for it to change. In fact, it can be argued, the academic explosion of the 1960s was abnormal because it fed on the post-war baby boom, an aberration in the generally downward trend in fertility during the last several centuries of Western history.

If this is true—and the evidence seems convincing, despite my hopes—what is the effect of the crisis on people who want to turn humanities disciplines into professional pursuits? The problem is the result of meager employment opportunities combined with the general demeanning of entire fields of academic study. It takes a heavy toll on those who are trying to ride out of the storm. I will use history as an example only because I know it best. People in other humanities disciplines will recognize the situation.

The easiest emotion for a young Ph.D. in history is feeling sorry for himself, for there is much to lament: that he wasn't born ten or fifteen years earlier, that birth control pills were invented, that the tenure system protects incompetent faculty members, that mandatory retirement ages are rising or disappearing. There are consolations. Professional conventions bring together hundreds of people in the same mood. Black humor abounds. People laugh about the chances of a plane crashing and hundreds of history jobs opening up at once. The lack of job interviews at such conventions gives the job seeker time to see the sights in cities he otherwise might not have visited.

For the most part, however, the state of the historical profession is a breeding ground for bitterness. Racism and sexism thrive in such an atmosphere as each woman, Black, and Chicano who finds a teaching job is believed to have been the recipient of special affirmative action consideration. Anger must be kept beneath the surface when talking with a college senior in chemical engineering who flaunts the fact that he has just turned down two jobs in industry with salaries twice what Ph.D.s in history would be happy to accept if they could find jobs at all.

What has been the effect of this demoralization on history as a discipline? In the mid-1970s historians hoped for a comeback of their profession. The Bicentennial, despite all its anticipated commercialism, offered a chance for a serious reconsideration of the American past in which professional historians would participate. They believed this might help reverse the trend of dwindling enrollments in history and stimulate a general recognition of the value of historical inquiry. Soon after the Bicentennial, the TV phenomenon of Roots swept across the nation and caused millions of people to look into the histories of their own families. Yet, the historical profession has benefited only marginally from these developments. The Bicentennial's major accomplishment was giving Americans an overdose of patriotism. Although hundreds labored on local Bicentennial committees and others wrote magazine articles about "the meaning of America," they generally were disappointed at the results of the whole affair. The most enduring memory of the Bicentennial for the people I now work with is the red, white, and blue motif on the Bicentennial Christmas tree that was the final indignity of a year marked by gaudy displays and meaningless meetings but not a rebirth of historical interest.

Roots left a deeper impression on Americans, one that still gives historians hope. Many students have been stimulated to study history and to take courses where family histories are researched and written. Others have found in Roots a starting point for serious examination of slavery and black history. Incidentally, both family history and the study of slavery were active fields of professional study and teaching before Roots appeared on home screens.

The Demoralized Discipline of History

However, the popular interest in history revealed in the success of Roots may be just as fleeting as the Bicentennial. Although it is encouraging to see historians taking a positive stand concerning the influence of television on the American mind and building on the best of television programming, the study of history and the humanities will suffer if their health is dependent on the trendiness of the major networks or even PBS. The mass media will never revive history or any other humanities discipline.

Which returns us to the effect of the current crisis on the professional study of history. Although young graduate students and Ph.D.s have been most directly affected, the senior members of the profession have not been immune. Protected by the still strong armor of tenure, they are the envy of the academically unemployed thirty-year old Ph.D. working for $120 a week in a bookstore. Many continue to fly to conventions at university expense while unemployed job-seekers take Greyhound and stay at the YMCA. Most faculty members have summers free to read, write, and prepare for courses. Sabbatical leaves offer them something to look forward to. Their status remains relatively high.

Nonetheless, the crisis has jolted them almost as much as it has younger historians. Enrollments have dropped; course loads have been increased. At some schools the graduate faculty has experienced the ultimate academic indignity—returning to teach undergraduates. The once attractive salaries of professors have not risen as fast as the cost of living. Research money is harder to obtain. The glut in the field and the financial problems of scholarly publishing houses have made publication even more difficult than before.

Worse yet, the abundance of young Ph.D.s has limited the mobility of virtually everyone in the profession. Many capable senior faculty members have been discouraged from leaving unsatisfactory positions because...
they do not wish to abandon their secure jobs for better ones. They fear entering the overcrowded employment market against stiff competition. Young Ph.Ds frequently find themselves being interviewed for a position by a senior faculty member who reveals his own dissatisfaction or insecurity in the process. No wonder that the AHA Newsletter, the monthly bulletin of the profession, carries periodic laments from discontented, middle-aged historians.

The effect of the current crisis on historical scholarship is more difficult to assess. David Hackett Fisher, a respected historian, recently wrote in The New Republic that to be an historian today (a young social historian especially) is to share something of the excitement that must have been felt by young physicists in the early 20th century, by young biologists in the mid 19th, by young archaeologists in the 18th. . . . Even in the midst of many external difficulties—the job crisis for young scholars, the salary crunch for older ones—one senses the slow return of confidence in a field that was badly shattered only a few years ago.

Fischer's perspective is clearly that of a secure, tenured professor at a research university. In the strict sense he is correct, for as a "young social historian" I am familiar with much of the best of the new scholarship in the field of history.

However, I also know the frustration that many young historians feel. I work a 40-hour (or more) week and last fall also taught six hours of history two evenings a week and completed the last draft of my dissertation. I hope to teach again this fall. I have at least three or four research projects in my head, but I have difficulty merely keeping up with my field. I am pursuing what is for me an interesting and potentially productive historical study, but it will probably take me three times longer to complete than it would if I were a college faculty member. I have no free months to work on it, no time during the day, and no sabbatical to look forward to. I am limited to weekends, evenings, and vacation time.

A Life Without a Livelihood in History

How much of the excitement—and with it valuable historical study—will die simply because energy is sapped? How long before the effort is given up as too wearing on personal and family well-being? I have seen it already happen with friends of mine who six years ago had productive theories to share with other historians but have burned out by their early thirties. The response of some professional historians is that those interested in their field will persevere. Such a narrow view ignores practical realities that enter into any commitment to a discipline.

What are the alternatives open to those in the profession of history? An all too obvious one is to leave it, and many have taken that step. Some historians have become lawyers, others have gone into business, a few into government jobs. One of my graduate school friends now works for the CIA, a position he would have rejected out-of-hand when he began graduate study. Another is employed by the State Department. Others struggle along in much lower paying jobs where they hide their academic degrees. Most of these people are in positions where their skills as historians are woefully under-used, if they are used at all. The change has been painful for most of these people—and embarrassing for many—since they laughed about such possibilities only a few years ago. The majority of them will never become teaching historians. A few express hatred toward those who lured them into the field.

Another possibility is to alter the training of historians so that they may more easily fit into non-teaching jobs. This approach has recently been given the name "public history." A few of the positions envisioned by supporters of public history are relatively well-paying and secure jobs such as mid-level civil service and business employment. Last year the National Endowment for the Humanities gave the New York State Board of Regents a $250,000 grant to prepare historians and other humanists for entry into business professions. Other public history jobs are the kind of positions into which historians have been drifting throughout the seventies—archival, museum, and historical society work and low-level local government jobs.

At its best, public history more adequately prepares young historians for the positions outside of the teaching profession in which many would eventually find themselves anyway. At its worst, however, public history is a watered-down program designed to keep students taking graduate (and undergraduate) history courses so faculty members will have something to do. If public history promises young historians that they can be successful historians merely by having a degree in public rather than traditional history, it will end up as a fraud.

What is the answer? No matter how it is stated, it will require serious and painful re-ordering of the thinking of all historians (and other humanistic professionals), for things probably will never return to the situation in the golden age of the 1960s. Academic enrollments show little indication of an upturn large enough to relieve the pressure in the crowded job market. The only choice, it seems to me, is to allow promising historians to practice history as a second occupation.

Training in history must remain vigorous, for reducing the standards for history degrees will not solve the problem even though it may temporarily draw students to courses. Many other fields will continue to be more financially promising, and students ought to know this right away. Those interested only in the pecuniary rewards of history will probably not enter the field at all.

What ought to change, first of all, are the attitudes of faculty members toward those practicing history outside of the teaching profession. The non-teaching historian continues to be seen as an exception in the field, a sort of fish out of the pond. In reality, his situation was the norm
Public History and Academic Monopoly

Alterations will have to be made outside of colleges, too. Trained historians seeking to continue research and writing will need to confront head-on the problems they encounter in their workplaces. Many people outside of the humanities still believe college teaching jobs come easily to Ph.D.s. Historians will have to try to be honest with their supervisors about their interest in history, while convincing them that they do not necessarily plan to depart in the fall for a college teaching position.

Supervisors of historians working outside of teaching should be made to understand that interest in historical research and writing may be the product of a lively mind and energetic person. One of the most valuable aspects of the current situation is the necessity for historians to explain their interests to their co-workers. This is a difficult task, one that faculty members seldom have to do. Yet what better endorsement for history is there than that a person should pursue it seriously while being employed doing something else?

Of course, this alternative will not be easy. Training in another field requires time and money that are hard to find. Employers are very reluctant to hire people with advanced degrees in the humanities. Even when a job is obtained, vacations and free time still need to be sacrificed for research and writing. Grant evaluators, editors and publishers, faculty members and professional organizations will have to give support to historians with two occupations.

Demoralization will haunt the profession of history and many other humanities fields for a long time to come. Humanists who begin to see their fields of study as more than just ways of making a living will not automatically find happiness, but they will regain an element of the pride and self-respect that has been seriously damaged in the crisis of recent years.

Some Shard of Sun

For Gordon

you wrestle with pipes
the resisting metal—
trucks on the hiway—
the sun straining against the leaden sky—
you speak of metaphors
bound to pipes and fittings
sounding the depths of my struggle
writing in this next room—
you offer hope by doing
something found in grappling with your pipes
exhausted beneath the sink
and you hear my poems
rough pipes which won't fit—
my recitative of worries
my terrible emptiness which words fall away from
as feeble assults on armor—
I wrestle these empty spaces
turning life to catch some shard of sun—
and between our rooms
we meet—
the growing begins—
the healing starts . . .

J. T. Ledbetter
The Recapitulation of Christ in the Regenerate Soul

Philonic Typology and the American Puritans

Margaret Batschelet

One of the major critical controversies surrounding the subject of typology is its differentiation from allegory. Both forms posit a “double-layered” reality, a fundamental truth clothed in some form of symbolic indication; yet one form is accepted by even the most rigorous theological conservatives and the other rejected by even the more imaginative moderates. In making this differentiation, some critics have favored Erich Auerbach’s suggestion in his early essay “Figura” that the distinction between the two forms should be based on “historicity”: that is, the fact that in typology both the sign and the thing signified occur as definite happenings within time. (“Since in figural interpretation one thing stands for another, since one thing represents and signifies the other, figural interpretation is ‘allegorical’ in the widest sense. But it differs from most of the allegorical forms known to us by the historicity of both the sign and what it signifies.”)

This distinction limits typology to a strict technical definition: it is concerned with the exegetes of events and individuals in the Old Testament (the types) by means of corresponding events and individuals in the New (the anti-types). This is frequently accompanied by a “closed” chronology—one the New Testament fulfillment has taken place the types have no more significance. There is no doubt that this definition accounts for the practice of many typologists, most notably conservatives like the School of Antioch and, later, Samuel Mather. Yet it leaves many exegetes in limbo—if allegory is seen as originating in the imagination of the exegete rather than the truth of his text, then many exegetes would deny that they are allegorists, even though their exegesis is not grounded in history.

I suggest that the distinction between these two varieties of exegesis should rest, rather, on what the exegetes consider to be God’s role in the symbol they are studying. Under this differentiation, allegory can be seen as a man-made comparison, an exegesis whose source lies entirely in human imagination. In contrast, typology is a divinely established pattern leading ultimately to the Incarnation. It is not the exegete’s fancy which leads him to the identification of one sequence of events with another; rather it is his discovery, aided by divine grace, of the meaning which God has implanted in the text. As Philo suggests, “Now these are no mythical fictions, such as poets and sophists delight in, but modes of making ideas visible, bidding us resort to allegorical interpretations guided in our renderings by what lies beneath the surface” (De Opif Mund. 56).2 “Typology” thus becomes the description of the symbolic framework the exegete believes is established by God.

Using this definition it is possible to discover more than one variety of typology in general use from the earliest periods of Christianity. There is a conservative strain dealing chiefly with the fulfillment of the Old Testament type in the New Testament antitype which can be termed “Pauline” typology. But there is also another strain in which Old Testament types are frequently seen as fulfilled in something other than the biblical framework. This variety can be termed “Philonic” after its earliest practitioner, Philo of Alexandria. The chief distinction between Pauline and Philonic typology is two-fold. First, Pauline typology sees Old Testament type fulfilled in New Testament antitype. Adam is a type of Christ. With Christ’s Incarnation Adam’s significance as a type ceases; it is fulfilled in Christ’s coming and no longer functions beyond this fulfillment. In contrast a Philonic typologist would agree with the identification of Adam and Christ, but would assert that the type continues to function beyond the Incarnation. Adam is also a type of the soul before regeneration, and the process of the type’s fulfillment in Christ takes place again each time a soul is reborn. For the Philonic typologist, in other words, types can and do recur interminably. They exist as historical events, but they are not limited to history; they are also concrete examples of the internal process of salvation.

The second distinction between these two varieties of exegesis is linked to the first. Pauline typology with its Old Testament type/New Testament antitype structure is rigidly chronological. The types are historical occurrences of salvation. Each soul re-enacts the drama of regeneration. As Christians the Philonic typologists may


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accept the idea of history as leading to a culmination, but this does not prevent the process of the Incarnation from recurring in the elect soul.

The importance of Philonic typology for the American Puritans lies in both its emphasis on recurrence rather than culmination and its effectiveness as a means of describing the internal process of salvation. The tendency of the Puritans to see themselves as the typological parallel to the struggles of the Israelites depended upon a Pauline historical culmination: where the Israelites had failed, the colonists would succeed. When the awaited culmination did not take place, the result was despair. In contrast Philonic typology provided a concept of recurring culmination, involving not the colony as a whole but the individual soul, and it was this individual soul with which the Puritans were ultimately concerned. Like the Reformers they were concerned with studying their own spiritual growth; since each man had no church tradition to rely on, he was responsible, in a very real sense, for seeing to his own salvation. But in order to judge adequately, each person must have some standard or pattern against which to measure his own spiritual growth. There must be some means by which experience could be evaluated and the isolated individual rejoined to the community of the regenerate.

The tendency of the Puritans to see themselves as the typological parallel to the struggles of the Israelites depended upon a Pauline historical culmination: where the Israelites had failed, the colonists would succeed.

In this connection Philonic exegesis relied on Paul’s statement in Galatians 2:20: “I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me; and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.” The re-enactment of the events of the Incarnation in the regenerate soul represented a way in which God could be known. Regenerate knowledge consisted of the unification of spirit and Spirit and this unity could be seen in the re-enactment of certain eternal forms, the constantly recurring “types.” In this way the isolated Puritan soul could be joined to a greater unity: the over-arching pattern of Christian history as it repeated itself both in the macrocosm of biblical events and the microcosm of the regenerate spirit.

II

Although not a Christian and thus not involved in the Christian process of finding the Incarnation pattern re-enacted in the soul, Philo is the source for the method the Philonic typologists adopted for freeing the types from the framework of biblical history. Like other exegetes Philo ascribed a two-fold nature to the scriptures: a literal or obvious meaning and an underlying sense which he sometimes described as “allegory.” However, he differed from Paul in that the underlying sense he related to the Pentateuch was taken from a broad range of Greek philosophy: for Philo the scriptures not only were the source of the religious teachings of the Jews but secular philosophy as well.

For Philo everything in scripture was available for interpretation—names, dates, historical incidents, and other more minute points, such as the mystic sense of numbers. This minuteness was the outgrowth of his conviction that nothing in scripture was without significance; he cautioned exegetes to neglect no detail of the text, “for you will not find a single pointless expression” (Leg. All. III, 50). Like Paul, Philo’s method of exegesis was based on a unified view of scripture: it was considered revelatory of God, the creator and ruler of history, in all its aspects. Thus passages revealing this point in their literal sense were to be taken literally; yet if such meaning was not found, the passage had to be read allegorically, so that this particular truth could be seen as divine revelation. Philo’s reading of scripture became, finally, the examination of the soul’s relation to God.

The fact that Philo approached scripture from this point of view meant that he was less concerned than Paul with maintaining the pattern of the history he found there. Where Paul was concerned with what he considered an enduring historical event—the Incarnation—and its relationship to and revelation in other historical events, Philo was concerned with an internal psychological and spiritual event which was continually taking place. The former’s method is related to and concerned with time and its fulfillment; the latter’s concerned with what took place above time within the spirit of the believer. Thus Philo could discard the pattern of the scriptural event almost as an impediment; he could use it as simply the key to his own philosophical description of the event’s content. It was not the event itself which ultimately concerned him; it was the spiritual truth which it revealed.

Philo’s influence on the Christian exegetical school at Alexandria is most clearly seen in two of its most prominent members—Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Like Philo, Clement widens the scope of the exegete to include almost all scripture; likewise he finds the core of exegesis to be philosophical rather than historical and emphasizes the need for special understanding on the part of the exegete. The source of this special understanding, according to Clement, is divine will: “It remains that we understand, then, the Unknown, by divine grace ...” (Strom. 5, 12).³ The exegete, like his text, is inspired.

For Clement the ultimate object of exegesis was the gnosis, the mystic knowledge of God’s essence. And the way to this ultimate knowledge was through “philosophizing” (Strom. 1, 1) by which the Spirit was separated from the frame of words “as the edible part of the nut in

the shell" (Strom. 1,1). According to Clement the inspired exegete who progressed towards God through the scripture saw "intellectual objects" and "future things" with the mind (Strom. 5,3). Truth was not a matter of visible proof, of historical correspondence, but of intellectual, and ultimately spiritual, comprehension. The relation between Christ and the gnosis was absolute: "If, then, we assert that Christ Himself is Wisdom, and that His working which showed itself in the prophets, by which the gnostic tradition may be learned ... then it follows that the gnosis, which is the knowledge of things present, future and past, which is sure and reliable, as being imparted and revealed by the Son of God is wisdom" (Strom. 6,7). Christ is wisdom; the gnosis is wisdom. Christ and the gnosis are one. But the gnosis extended beyond the historical manifestation of Christ in the Incarnation to "the knowledge of things present, future and past"; to the essence of the Incarnation, the Word itself. The gnosis, then, was removed from any strictly historical expression. It was expressed once, definitively, in Christ's life; but it was not frozen there. It was anticipated in prophecy and Greek philosophy and it was continually renewed in the spirit of the exegete who came in contact with it in the process of interpretation. The ultimate goal for Clement's exegesis is thus a mystical unity with God which transcends any temporal process and which is not limited to the historical duration of Christ's life.

**The gnosis was expressed once, definitively, in Christ's life; but it was not frozen there. It . . . was continually renewed in the spirit of the exegete who came in contact with it in the process of interpretation.**

Origen shared Clement's concept of the privileged exegete who is enabled to approach the central knowledge of God's mystery by means of grace, but he extended Clement's doctrine of gnosis even further. As Jean Danielou points out, Origen's typology extended beyond the revelation of the New Testament within the Old; the Old Testament is "opened" in Christ's life, but Christ's life is reflected in the life of the Church and the life of the Church in the eschaton. By extending the line of typology beyond the New Testament, Origen found adumbrations of the interior life of each individual Christian within the life of Christ:

The truth of the events recorded to have happened to Jesus cannot fully be seen in the mere text and historical narrative; for each event for those who read the Bible more intelligently is clearly a symbol of something as well. Thus in this way his crucifixion contains the truth indicated by the words "I am crucified with Christ." Coni. Cels. 2. 69

For Origen, then, God acted towards each soul as he did towards Israel, towards Christ, and towards the eschaton. Not only was the exegete given access to the gnosis, the central unchanging essence of the Incarnation, but events which signified the manifestation of that essence in time were repeated interminably in the soul's existence. From a practical standpoint this allowed Origen and his followers to move beyond the strict biblical framework of the Pauline historians; the Old Testament type might legitimately apply to the New Testament antitype, and yet it might also be reflected in the life of the soul as well, as Christ's life was re-enacted by the Christian. Thus while maintaining the relation of event to event in the Old Testament/New Testament axis Origen could simultaneously increase his range to include the dimension of the soul's experience in its journey toward reunion with God.

Philonic typology, as it emerged from Alexandrian Christianity, thus posited two assumptions. First, the essence of the Incarnation, Clement's gnosis, could be found recapitulated throughout the Old Testament and the New Testament in certain recurring patterns. Second, these patterns continued their occurrence within the soul as it moved towards regeneration; the types extended beyond the Incarnation into the present as the description of an internal process.

**III**

Philonic typology flourished alongside Pauline typology throughout the succeeding generations of exegetes. Both varieties of interpretation were formalized as the analogical and historical "senses" of the medieval quadrivium and both were used by Reformed theologians who, while rejecting "allegory" as representing only the imagination of the exegete, accepted Philonic typology as a means of expressing the relationship of the isolated individual and God.6 The American Puritans used both Pauline and Philonic typology in what were, by the Seventeenth Century, traditional ways: to describe the manifestation of the Holy Spirit both in biblical history and in the experience of the regenerate soul in its journey to salvation. But they carried the historical role of typology a step further; it became a means of describing the manifestation of the Holy Spirit in the communal experience of the entire colony. The experience of the Israelites in their journey to Canaan became the means of testing the experiences of New England, the validation of New England's special sense of itself as well as the seal of God's interest in the colony. This concern is an adaptation of Pauline historicity with its concept of a continuous, progressive line extending from Old Testament to New Testament and, in some instances, to the millennium. The Puritans broadened this line to include

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their communal experience; the line remained progressive.

Yet the Puritan penchant for seeing themselves and their history as recapitulating the Old Testament types led ultimately to frustration. There was an unspoken assumption behind the early exultation: New England was not simply the recapitulation of Old Testament types, it was actually their fulfillment. What Israel had failed to do in its degeneration, New England would succeed in doing in the colonists' conquest of the wilderness: New England would retain God's favor and serve as a source for the coming millennium. With the coming of "declension" in succeeding generations, the certainty of fulfillment began to waver.7 It was accepted that the typological Israel had been recapitulated in the founders of the colony; they had indeed been Moses, Joshua, and even Abraham. But the succeeding generations seemed to have lost their pattern; the inevitable line of fulfillment from Israel to New England no longer seemed inevitable. If anything the colony seemed prone to recapitulate Israel's decadence as well as its glory.

Like the Reformers, the Puritans were concerned with studying their own spiritual growth; since each man had no church tradition to rely on, he was responsible . . . for seeing to his own salvation.

In the late versions of this historical typology, the writers were obsessed with the past and with the possible future; they had lost all hope of fulfillment in the present. In contrast Philonic typology presented a means of interpreting experience while avoiding the frustrations of historical exegesis. Since the Philonic point of view posited not an external, but a continuous internal culmination in the form of regeneration, it was possible to avoid the despair the Pauline exegetes felt at the course of history. There was no need to await the fulfillment of types in the millennium; the types were being fulfilled constantly in the experience of each regenerate soul.

Even while the idea of communal typology was still dominant, the possibilities of another kind of typology had been raised. Roger Williams had rejected the parallel of New England and Israel from the outset. "Let Master Cotton find out any such land or state that is the Church and Israel of God," he challenged.8 The Church of Israel, like the story of Abraham and Hagar, "from first to last included figurative and allegorical Kernels were the Husks and Shells disclosed with more humble diligent spiritual teeth and fingers."9 Williams' immediate subject was the tolerance controversy raging in the colony, and his purpose in disputing the New England-Israel parallel was to refute the claim of the anti-toleration faction that they were given legal sanction for their actions against dissenters by the Old Testament strictures of Moses against heresy. Such laws, Williams argued, no longer had any legal force; like Israel itself they had been rendered typical by the coming of Christ.

But Williams did not revert to a strict Pauline historicity. It was not that the types were fulfilled and abolished by the coming of Christ; rather they continued to be fulfilled in the spirit of the believer. Williams insisted that Christ's punishments were spiritual; "since the coming of Christ . . . blasphemers in Israel and blasphemers against Israel (the church of God) are spiritually put to death by the two-edged sword coming forth of the mouth of Christ. . . ."10 The Word slew the reprobate for eternity by cutting him off from grace. Any heretics to be slain were slain within the soul of the regenerate when their own sins were put to the sword. If the types were to have any life beyond the New Testament, Williams advised, they could only live on within the spirit, not in the historical community.

The nature of this spiritual typology was a matter of concern both to Williams and to his principal adversary, John Cotton. As Jesper Rosenmeier has pointed out,11 one of the cardinal issues of the Antinomian Crisis was the nature of the integral image which was renewed in the regenerate. The Elders of the church insisted that "regeneration" was, in fact, the rebirth of Adam's innocence in the soul; this was the final stage of redemption, a return to Adam's original obedience in the covenant of works and the restoration of Eden. Against this Cotton asserted that Adam had already proved inadequate for salvation; Christian regeneration could mean only one thing—"wee are thereby united unto Christ, that is we are made to be of one and the same spiritual and holy Name and Disposition with the Lord Jesus by the work of the same Holy Ghost."12 Sanctification, for Cotton, was the renewal of the Image of God within, the unity of the soul with Christ through conformity to him. "[Christ's] sacrifice was of infinite value, it was provided from eternity and promised from the foundation of the world; it was shadowed in types, and exhibited in sundry representations, and the lively efficacy of it in the hearts and lives of his people since the world began."13 The mark of redemption was the recapitulation of Christ within the

9Ibid., p. 154.


The Cresset
spirit of the regenerate; the elect were predestined by God “to be conformed unto the image of his Son.”

Cotton once again presented the Philonic position; the types were recapitulated internally as a mark of regeneration. The saint was part of the Incarnation as much as the Old Testament prefigurations of it; the gnosia which was inherent in them was inherent in his spiritual growth as well. Despite its status as the “radical” position in the Antinomian Crisis, this concept gained adherents even among Cotton’s opponents. It was Thomas Shepard who asserted that, “As the Glasse set full against the sunne receives not onely the beames, as all other dark bodies doe, but the image of the Sunne: so the understanding with open face beholding Christ, is turned into the Image and likeness of Christ.” Nicholas Noyes and Increase Mather concurred in Cotton’s description of Sanctification, and Edward Taylor asserted that the conformity of the soul to Christ was indeed “the highest thing in God’s determination” for the gospel to bring about.

Philonic typology presented a means of interpreting experience while avoiding the frustrations of historical exegesis. There was no need to await the fulfillment of types in the millenium; the types were being fulfilled constantly in the experience of each regenerate soul.

Not only the Incarnation but typical situations from the Old Testament as well were recapitulated in the soul of the believer. For Thomas Hooker the sufferings of the Israelites, as well as those of Joshua, typified the sufferings the soul must endure before being humbled sufficiently for God’s grace. Moreover, in making the traditional typical connection between Solomon’s Temple and the Church, Hooker reasserted another traditional Philonic position: that what was typical of the church as a whole might be, in turn, referred to the soul of the individual saint. “As in generall all the people of God, thus obeying the word of God; so in particular, every Christian man and woman is the Temple of Christ.” As God dwelt in Solomon’s Temple, “so the heart truely prepared is the Temple of the Lord and the Lord Christ takes possession and rules in it, and fills it with all grace.” The salient feature which united Temple, Church, and saint was the indwelling Christ; it was the unity of Spirit in regeneration which made the internal recapitulation of types possible.

In a larger sense this unification recapitulates that of the Godhead and human nature in the Incarnation, the theanthropy which absorbed Edward Taylor. He, like Cotton, felt that regeneration was a joining of the soul to Christ, “and so a Christ-like Spirit, and Disposition is comon to all these.” In a larger sense this was seen in the mystical union of Christ and his church, but it was definitively set forth in the “natural union” of the Spirit to human nature in the Incarnation. By analogy the members of the Church were “members of Christ’s body, of his Flesh, and of his Bones. His Manhood is of our Manhood.” The personal union communicated the Godhead “unto manhood”; the mystical union communicated Christ’s personal excellence to the heart and life of every member “that the functions thereof may be managed with a Godlike glory upon them, and so then to act thus will be to the Glory of God.”

In his Poetic Meditations Taylor moved from this vision of the unification to call upon his own nature to be renewed by the internal image, to unite with Christ. In Meditation 2.24 Taylor used the Feast of the Tabernacles as a type of the identity.

But yet the Wonder grows: and growth much, 
For thou wilt Tabernacles change with mee. 
Not onely Nature, but my person tuch. 
Thou willst mee thy, and thee, my tent to bee, 
Thou wilt if I my heart will to thee rent, 
My Tabernacle make thy Tenement. 
Thou’lt tent in mee. I dwell in thee shall here.

Thy Tenent and thy Tenement I bee. 
Thou Landlord art andTenent too to mee.

Taylor’s play upon “tenant” and “tenement” concerned the central paradox of theanthropy and, by extension, Philonic typology: as Christ took up residence in the soul, it assumed his image and he became part of it. Yet in this process the soul also took up residence in Christ, in his mystical body the invisible church, and became part of him. There was a reciprocal unity in which each element absorbed and was absorbed. As Christ was recapitulated in the soul, the soul itself became typical, another means of showing forth the essential glory of God:

Again the unification of Christ and the soul became part of the eternal manifestation of the gnosia. As Christ was set forth in Old Testament types and New Testament Incarnation, so he continued his theanthropy in his action within the spirit of the regenerate.

The danger in this emphasis on the internal image, the recapitulation of Christ within the soul, was its tendency to stress the spiritual as opposed to the historical Christ. Both Taylor and Roger Williams accused the Quakers of rejecting the historical Christ altogether in favor of the Christ within. As Williams asserted, "I told them I acknowledged Christ within as much as any of them, and in infinitely more, for I did confess that every believing soul did bring home and apply the power and virtue of Christ's nature the Puritans could again rely on the historical Christ but themselves, yea they preached the Lord Jesus to be Himself, yea they preached the life of the regenerate spirit. Interpreted rightly and understood as part of the nature of the regenerate spirit, the types could serve an almost sacramental function, sealing the relation between man and God.

The attractions of Philonic exegesis, both for the New England Puritans and their predecessors, were many. Uncircumscribed by time and historical incident the types could have a more profound application if seen in connection with the soul's development. Lifted from the rigid exegesis of the concrete, the types became more personal, more tuned to the spiritual needs of the individual exegete. In a society which placed such immense emphasis on individual experience, the unmediated contact between the soul and God, Philonic typology provided a necessary means of describing that experience, a way of placing the regenerate soul in the context of a greater pattern, an eternally recurring series of events. Yet although the process which is described, the soul's metamorphosis, remains abstract, it is nonetheless real and the types are far from a fanciful designation. Rather, the types maintained their traditional nature as symbols whose very existence proved the reality of the process they signified.

Philonic typology came to the American Puritans as a fully developed tradition with its roots in Alexandrian Christianity. Yet the special situation and characteristics of the New England Israel made it particularly susceptible to this variety of exegesis. When declension made other forms of comparison troubling in the extreme, Philonic exegesis remained as a source of comfort and consolation.

In the end Philonic typology remains typology, the description of a divinely instituted pattern of events existing solely in order that such meaning should be shadowed forth. It is this distinction from allegory which makes it a legitimate form of typological exegesis. For all types of typology, however, Christ remains the central antitype, the crucial fact to which all possible types are referred. The Incarnation illuminates the past, making plain the significance of the Old Testament. Yet for the Philonic typologist it also has this effect upon both present and future; Christ's life remains the ultimate key which interprets all facets, both internal and external, of human existence.

In a society which placed such immense emphasis on individual experience, the unmediated contact between the soul and God, Philonic typology provided...a way of placing the soul in the context of a greater pattern, an eternally recurring series of events.

The problem for Philonic exegetes was to maintain a balance in their view of both symbol and symbolization, literal and spiritual. To deny either the spiritual or the physical Christ was to deny his unique nature, the God-man. Both parts of the Incarnation must exist in eternal tension. In their concern to maintain the two parts of Christ's nature the Puritans could again rely on the particular nature of traditional typology; the fact that, as generations of typologists had maintained, both history and the meaning represented by it were true. Moses existed as a historical figure, he was literally "true"; but he also existed as a divinely instituted metaphor, he was symbolically "true" as a type of Christ. In the same way the Puritans could maintain vehemently that Christ had existed as he was described by the writers of scripture, but they also could explain that the historical Christ was another kind of "metaphor" for what took place in the soul in regeneration. Christ lived once historically in Nazareth; but he continued to live spiritually in the souls of his church. Both aspects of his life were real; and typology served to validate the relationship.

In all these Typick Lumps of Glory I
Spy thee the Gem made up of all their shine
Which from them all in thickest glory fly
And twist themselves into this Gem of shine.
And as the Shine thereof doth touch my heart,
Joy sinks my Soule seeing how rich thou art.

(2.6, 11. 31-36)

\[\text{In a society which placed such immense emphasis on individual experience, the unmediated contact between the soul and God, Philonic typology provided... a way of placing the soul in the context of a greater pattern, an eternally recurring series of events.}\]

2Williams, V, 7.
Junius R. Sloan
Nineteenth Century American Portrait and Landscape Painter

Junius R. Sloan was born on March 10, 1827, in Kingsville, Ohio, near Lake Erie. He received no formal education beyond high school and left home in 1848 to become an itinerant portrait painter. His reminiscences of this first journey, recorded later in his life at the request of his school-teacher mother, describe numerous long, cold, and penniless trips made by coach across the farmlands of middle America.1 In Ashtabula, Ohio, he finally sold several portraits for ten dollars each, and the profits enabled him to travel to Erie, Pennsylvania, where he stayed with Moses Billings, a portrait painter he admired and with whom he intended to study (but probably never did). In the summer of that same year Sloan went to Vermont where he painted signs, houses, and even picket fences to pay for room and board, and for a time he traveled with two young men who were daguerrotypists. It was in Vermont that he received a commission to paint the portraits of the parents of these two boys. These paintings of Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Severance are the earliest extant paintings by Sloan.

In the fall of 1849 Sloan returned to his parents' new home in West Springfield, Pennsylvania, and made a visit to Geneva, Ohio, to visit his closest friend, Robert Spencer. Here Sloan painted the portrait of Platt R. Spencer (founder of the Spencerian method of penmanship) and fell in love with his daughter Sara, whom he would later marry.

In the years between 1850 and 1855, Sloan journeyed to Cincinnati, Ohio; Erie, Pennsylvania; Poland, Ohio; and Kewanee, Illinois; and back to Cincinnati. His first self-portrait was painted in 1854 on the first anniversary of his engagement to Sara Spencer. From 1855-1857 Sloan maintained a studio in Princeton, Illinois, where he settled temporarily because he had heard that Princeton had “taste, wealth, and a lack of pictures.” Life in Princeton, however, was difficult for an unestablished artist and not a little dull. Deciding to try a more stimulating environment, Sloan moved to New York City late in 1857; there he shared an apartment with Julian Bryant (nephew of

1 Only highlights of Sloan's life are presented in this article. A fuller picture of his life can be read in J. Carson Webster's biography of Sloan in Art in America, Vol. 40, Summer 1952, pp. 103-152. Sloan's letters, cash books, clippings, and sketchbooks are available in the Spencer Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago, or on microfilm from the American Archives of Art, New York. A thorough acquaintance with Sloan's paintings can be gained through examining more than 260 paintings in the Sloan Collection at Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana, Richard H. W. Brauer, Curator.

Lora Lee Walker took her undergraduate degree at Syracuse University and is a University of Pittsburgh M.A. candidate in art history, specializing in the Italian Renaissance. This article on Junius R. Sloan grew out of her research in the Sloan Collection of Valparaiso University for a paper presented to Dr. Barbara Novak, Professor of Art History at Barnard College, who was a visiting professor at Pittsburgh in the course of the author's studies. Richard H. W. Brauer, Curator of the Sloan Collection, has selected and arranged the illustrations for some of the Sloan paintings discussed in the article.

May, 1979
William Cullen Bryant) in the studio of painter Daniel Huntington.

In June of 1858 he left New York to marry Sara and settle in Erie, Pennsylvania; there he remained until 1864, making spring and summer painting trips to the Catskills; Geneva, Ohio; New York City; and Kewanee, Illinois. (His cash books reveal he had an income of $617.60 in 1863.) Life in Erie, however, was less than stimulating, so in 1864 Sloan and his wife, Sara, moved to Chicago where he remained for three years. From 1866-67 he rented a studio in the Crosby Opera House and embarked on one of his most successful periods in terms of artistic recognition and sometimes also financial rewards. (His cash book records an income of $1080 in 1866.)

In May, 12, 1867, a Chicago Tribune critic gave Sloan's work some of its first public recognition:

A prophet is not without honor save in his own country. There is a painting in the window of Street and Pearson's bookstore on Washington Street. It is a landscape near Ticonderoga. Hart did not paint it, nor Durand, nor Inness, and yet there is hardly an inch of that picture that would disgrace their signatures. Its middle distance is one of the best I have ever seen, and yet the man who painted the picture is going to leave Chicago because he cannot sell his paintings here! If he depended upon the Chicago market for sale, he couldn't make enough to buy pepper for his eggs. If that painting had been painted in a New York or Boston studio and sent out here for sale, some of us would have broken our necks running after it. The painter's name is Sloan. His studio is in the Opera House. Some of us have heard of him. We shall all be very proud of him when he paints in New York and shall claim him as a Chicago artist. It is only to our shame that we are not proud of him now.

Before Sloan did leave Chicago, six of his landscapes were included among those to be raffled off to raise funds for the foundering Chicago Opera Society in 1867. His paintings hung in the Opera House gallery with those of Bierstadt, Cropsey, Hart, Kretchmer, Sonntag, Inness, Hunt, Cole, Church, Blakelock, Nast, Sully, and Head. During this same period paintings of Sloan were purchased by Chicago patrons like A. L. Coe (president of Mead and Coe); Edward Worcester (president of Western Tube); George T. Smith (of the Chicago Board of Trade); Alex C. Soper (president of Soper Lumber); D. B. Gamble (president of Proctor and Gamble); E. D. Hosmer (of Hosmer and Son); C. R. Larabee; and George M. Pullman. In 1867 Sloan moved to Yonkers, New York and lived there and in Hyde Park until 1871. His paintings were shown in the National Academy and Brooklyn Art Association. After suffering a slight stroke, Sloan returned to Chicago where he remained until 1900, except for painting trips to Vermont and Connecticut. His income was supplemented throughout this final period of his life by money earned from teaching positions at schools where his wife Sara taught Spencerian script. In August of 1900 he traveled to Redlands, California, where he died as a result of a fall. Sloan never left America and never received any formal art training.

**Summer is "the Sketching Season"**

From Sloan's many letters to Robert Spencer we learn that Sloan was a shy, self-conscious individual who preferred the company of nature to that of people. His letters contain many references to the sense of solace and peace he was able to find in the country, especially during the summer which Sloan referred to as "the sketching season." He wrote to Spencer that he tried to work for the Temperance League early in his career, but he claimed he could not help the League for lack of funds and lack of speaking ability.

The painters represented in the Opera House Gallery are listed in the Chicago Tribune of January 22, 1867. Sloan's list of patrons is found among his papers in the Spencer Collection.

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Sloan frequently disparages his abilities as an artist, husband, and father in his letters to Sara. The letters indicate that Sloan spent many long periods away from his family and they suffered from his lack of money. The tone of these letters changes over the years from solicitude and concern to guilt-ridden worry of a lonely man. He frequently apologizes for his long absences and lack of financial support and relies heavily on the advice and support of his eldest son, Percy, who remained at home with his mother and young brother, Lyman.

Sloan apparently was an artist who had difficulty reconciling his own artistic vision and philosophy with the demands of his patrons and dealers. In a letter to Sloan from his dealer in Chicago in 1870, the dealer—after complimenting Sloan on his newest picture which he had displayed in a room with pictures by Moran, Willis, Hamilton, Ruggles, Cropsey, Voght, and Murray—advises Sloan to “make no more portraits of localities.” He advises him to study Turner, then sit down, dream and let the soul guide his pencil to compose “a landscape of great breadth and distance with sufficient room for clouds and sunlight and shadows arranged in a broad and simple manner. Such pictures sell!” He ends the letter by saying “Let us have soon a large canvas and an ideal landscape.” Sloan was unable or unwilling to comply with these requests, and in 1871 the dealer acquiesces to Sloan in a letter by saying: “However, you must work out your own ideas.”

**The American Countryside in Repose**

What were Sloan's artistic ideas? What was the artistic style which embodied his ideals?

Fortunately, we have over 260 paintings in the Sloan Collection to examine in answering this question. The paintings are representative of the work of a large group of landscape painters at work in the rural areas of America in the nineteenth century. In quality of technique the paintings rank between those of the craftsman and those of the first-rate painters like Inness, Durand, and Cole. Sloan's style, however, is remarkable for its clear colors, lucid atmospheres, and carefully delineated forms of nature. There is a freshness, a sparkle, and a crispness to his work that separates him from the average nineteenth century provincial painter. These qualities are present not only in his landscapes but also in his earlier portraits and indicate that Sloan was an artist with native talents and a strong personal vision which allowed him to create paintings with that "American look."

His paintings record the pastoral American countryside in repose, emphasizing its tranquil beauty. They combine the real and the ideal—using elements of the idealized Claudian setting in combination with a realistic, linear treatment of the details of nature. Sloan's landscapes are valued not only for their artistic excellence but also as visual historical records of the American countryside in the nineteenth century.

Sloan's landscape style can be readily analyzed by examining one of his best works, *On Winooski River, Vermont, 1878*. In terms of composition, mood, and treatment of individual elements, it is typical of Sloan's successful landscape paintings. In organizing his landscapes,

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3Webster, pp. 132-133.

4The paintings were given to Valparaiso University as an endowed collection in 1953. The gift was made by Percy Sloan, the artist's eldest son, who had taught in Chicago public schools and had designated the collection for a university which would use it to foster art education.

5Milo M. Naeve, Curator of American Art at the Art Institute of Chicago, claims there were almost no other artists of Sloan's quality with an interest in landscapes in Illinois from 1860-1890.
Sloan frequently uses the basic Claudian composition (perhaps derived from his contact with the painters of the Hudson River School). Trees are used to frame the scene and rivers or creeks are used as a whole. This de-emphasis of the mountains can perhaps be explained by Sloan’s feelings of disappointment at seeing his first mountains. His reminiscences record the following comment after seeing the mountains of Vermont: “I had a very erroneous conception of how they would appear and I confess to some disappointment when the first sight . . . fell short of my ideal.”

Sloan’s skies are delicately rendered with a clearness of color that provides a dramatic background for the carefully delineated leaves and tree branches. The overall composition of his paintings is orderly and often classic with a strong horizontal arrangement. Our eye is seldom drawn to any dramatic elements—people are rarely included, cows only occasionally. Few elements interrupt the systematic movement of the eye from the foreground to midground and finally to the background. This transition is smoothly made in most cases by the effective use of tonal gradation.

The mood of Winooski River is also typical of Sloan’s prevailing landscape mood. Nature is always depicted in repose—we are shown no storms, no results of storms, and almost all are summer or autumn scenes. The scenes have been chosen by Sloan for the exemplification of beauty and visual composition rather than dramatic content. The emphasis is on a peaceful scene and its beauty. The details of trees and their foliage probably indicate the influence of Ruskin’s writings on Sloan. Sloan demonstrates an interest in light and its effects in such paintings as Showery Afternoon on Lake George, 1865; all quotations from Sloan are found in his reminiscences and letters contained in the Spencer Collection.
Valley of the Nepperhan, Yonkers, N.Y., 1869. Oil on canvas, 14 1/4 x 22 1/2".

Cool Morning on the Prairie, 1866; Landscape Near Diedrich Farm, 1867; Bridge Over Kaaterskill Creek, 1868; Crum Elbow Creek, 1869; Cloveruck Creek, 1870; Sunset on Bay View, 1875; and Landscape Near Lake George, 1879 illustrates a twenty year period of well-conceived and successfully-executed landscape paintings.

Sloan's work prior to this period reflects many of the problems that the unschooled artist had to work out. Against his father's better judgment, Sloan set out to be an artist at the age of twenty-one and got his start doing portraits. The early, aforementioned portraits of Mr. and Mrs. Severance done in 1848 are painted in flat tones with the hard outlines typical of the limner and primitive portrait painter tradition. There is a careful rendering of details and the colors are crisp and clear. The lighting, however, has an artificial "spotlight" effect. Sloan demonstrates his considerable ability at capturing the spirit and character of the stern New Englander. Knowing that the Severance's two sons were traveling daguerrotypists makes one wonder at the possible influence of photography on Sloan's choice of presentation and style in his early portraits.

In 1849 Sloan painted the portrait of his future father-in-law, Platt R. Spencer. In a letter to Robert Spencer dated July 31, 1850, Sloan says of this man:

How brightly at times comes up before me the image of your father as he used to sit for me, endeavoring to get that humorous mouth of his into some comfortable shape. I believe I shall never forget its lines and some of its expressions—if I but shut my eyes and think—I'm ready to join him in a sympathetic laugh.

The portrait of Spencer does give us insights into Spencer's personality. The eyes have sparkle, the mouth and brow appear to be holding back the impending smile to which...
Sloan refers in his letter.

In 1854 Sloan painted his own portrait and that of his recently affianced Sara Spencer. Sloan's self-portrait is one of his best works and represents the best qualities of the typical American portrait style. One is reminded of the 1830s portrait of Mount and Bingham, for example. The outlines are crisp and clear, his colors bright and pleasing to the eye. The flesh tones are realistically rendered and we gain a knowledge of the character and personality of this young artist through Sloan's handling of his facial features. The Mount and Bingham portraits which it resembles date twenty years earlier; such a time lag is a common occurrence and an understandable one when dealing with the work of a provincial artist like Sloan. Sloan's portrait of Sara is less expressive but also has that clarity of color and line which was to remain an important part of Sloan's style throughout his career.

After 1863 only six portraits were done by Sloan, all of Platt Spencer, Sara, and his son Percy. One can only surmise the reasons for Sloan's switch from portrait to landscape painting. We know from his letters that Sloan felt more at home with nature than with people. It has also been suggested that Sloan's friend and artist, Robert S. Duncanson, with whom he stayed while in Cincinnati, persuaded Sloan to begin working with landscapes. Another possible reason for the change of subject matter may have been the influence of photography on portrait work. We know that Sloan was aware of photographic technique from his early contact with the Severance brothers; he himself worked with photos—taking portrait prints and coloring them with oils and selling them for five or ten dollars each. Sloan must have felt the impact of photography on portrait work, but he says this of the mechanical art in 1863: "Only mediocre artists engage themselves in the machine picture business. They are to me tame affairs compared with a good oil painting, and I believe they never will be much else."

The World They Saw Around Them

Although the following discussion of the development of Sloan's landscape style makes certain comparisons between his landscapes and those of other nineteenth century American painters, it should be emphasized that these comparisons are not made in order to prove the influence of these painters on Sloan's work. After researching Sloan's life and studying the paintings in the Sloan Collection, I conclude that Sloan did not come under the direct influence of any of the artists that will be mentioned here but that he simply shared an affinity with them. These nineteenth century American landscape painters shared a love of nature, and a reliance on the Claudian composition. They all desired to re-create, in the most pleasing fashion possible, the world they saw around them.

*The world which they saw around them*—that is the key phrase in understanding the similarities between Sloan
and certain other nineteenth century painters. They all painted what they saw. There is a similarity of look to their landscape paintings because they were looking at the American countryside of the nineteenth century. It had a distinctive look and the artist recorded that look in his painting.

Sloan claims he had no teacher—only nature. But no artist paints in a vacuum, and there is an affinity of spirit and style among the regional artists of the period. We know Sloan read Ruskin, Sir Joshua, Burnet, and Stuart. We know that he saw paintings by Bierstadt, Cropsey, Hart, Kretchmer, Sonntag, Inness, Hunt, Cole, Church, Blakelock, Nast, Sully, Heade, Huntington, Suydam, Hubbard, Duncanson, Le Clear, Beard, McEntee, Whittredge, Leutze, and Matthews. This literary and visual information undoubtedly made an impact on Sloan's creative output, but to my mind the principal source for Sloan's style lies in his affinity with the regional American landscape painters.

One of Sloan's earliest landscapes is Small Falls, Kaaterskill Cove, 1860. It is undeniably one of his best works and more of a nature study than a formal composition. The painting recreates the cool, quiet atmosphere of a heavily wooded area by the careful delineation of the details of nature and Sloan's use of crisp, cool colors for the shining surface of the water. We know from Sloan's letters and sketchbooks from 1860-1866 that he developed his skill as a landscape painter by studying the world around him through his sketches. He writes to Robert Spencer in 1857: "I have taken heed to fill in the thousand spare moments in looking at nature—the book from which I study is spread out before me in all places and is always open . . ."

A Showery Afternoon on Lake George, 1865, is an example of a group of paintings by Sloan which demonstrates his interest in light and atmosphere—an interest which was to surface throughout the period from 1863-1879. We may be seeing the influence of the earlier luminist style in Sloan's work. In these paintings the water is not used as a vehicle to lead the viewer's eye into the background but is seen as one of the central elements of the composition. Its shiny surface draws the eye to it, and the water and the clouds create the mood of this showery, late afternoon. The painting is successful not only in the creation of a mood, but also serves to document the look of Lake George on that particular afternoon in 1865.

In 1866 Sloan began to establish a reputation for himself in Chicago. Four of his paintings were displayed in the first auction sale held by the Artists of Chicago in June, 1864, and he had paintings in Jevne and Almini's Gallery in Chicago as well as a painting in the exhibition at the Sanitary Fair in June, 1865. In 1865 Sloan painted Esopus Creek, a view near Shokan, New York, The curving stream, the sloping hills, and feathery foliage of the trees may all have been derived from reading Ruskin. Sloan's continuing concern with the details of leaves and trees can probably be traced to this influence.

In 1866 Sloan painted Cool Morning on the Prairie, another work which demonstrates his interest in the effects of light and atmosphere on the landscape. The mood is effectively created through Sloan's use of subdued tonalities and dissolution of forms. We sense the chill and dampness of this prairie morning. The composition of this work is unusual for Sloan. It has a classic structure with a strong emphasis on the horizontal (for example, the line of cows in the background and the line of the fence). The luminist influence can also be felt here. The painting represents the work from one of Sloan's best periods and is an important point in Sloan's artistic development and for the development of American landscape painting in general.

Several of the paintings from 1866-1870 show a more painterly style with a darkening palette and a green-blue

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Woodlawn, Chicago. 1892. Watercolor, 8 x 18".

Only one of Sloan's watercolors will be mentioned here. Generally they are scenes previously done by Sloan in oil, and their technique is typical of the popular style of the period consisting of pale colors, thinly applied. Landscape with Fisherman, 1896, is reminiscent of many of Sloan's pastoral stream scenes with the addition of the old fisherman sitting peacefully by the stream. The painting retains the lucidity and clarity of the earlier oil paintings, but it is not notable in its quality of execution or unusual in its composition. Sloan evidently continued to paint until the last days of his life. His final paintings are dated 1900.

No mention has been made of the several genre paintings done by Sloan. Two of these works date from 1860 and are titled Studio Fancy and Portrait. Both are composed with the figures accented by the diagonals of a bridge or fence and a clump of bushes or trees to frame the scene. The third genre piece of 1866, Knitting Lesson, is a carefully rendered, detailed representation of the interior of a nineteenth century prairie farm house and is reminiscent of Dutch interior scenes. It is also remarkable for its sensitive treatment of the relationship between a grandmother and her small granddaughter. It ranks among Sloan's best works and one wishes he had done more paintings in this style and mood.

The landscape and portrait paintings of Junius R. Sloan are an interesting part of the works of the nineteenth century provincial painters. The canvases stand apart from most because of their lucidity, clarity of color, and atmosphere. Sloan's treatment of the details of nature is crisp and scientifically accurate without losing the artist's sense of wonder and affection for the world he sees around him. Sloan's paintings deserve to receive more attention by twentieth century art historians and art lovers, and Sloan himself should be restored to his rightful position in the ranks of nineteenth century American landscape painters.

*ibid.*
From the Chapel

Exalting a Servant

Joan Lundgren Hunt

Perhaps it is no wonder that the women were first at the Cradle and last at the Cross. They had never known a man like this—there never has been such another. A prophet and teacher who never nagged at them, never flattered or coaxed or patronized; who never made arch jokes about them, never treated them either as "the women, God help us!" or "The ladies, God bless them!"; who rebuked without querulousness and praised without condescension; who took their questions and arguments seriously; who never mapped out their sphere for them, never urged them to be feminine or jeered at them for being female; who had no axe to grind and no uneasy male dignity to defend; who took them as he found them and was completely unselfconscious. There is no act, no sermon, no parable in the whole Gospel that borrows its pungency from female perversity; nobody could possibly guess from the words and deeds of Jesus that there was anything "funny" about woman's nature.

But we might easily deduce it from his contemporaries, and from His prophets before Him, and from His Church to this day. Women are not human; nobody shall persuade us that they are human; let them say what they like, we will not believe it, though One rose from the dead.

Dorothy L. Sayers, Unpopular Opinions

This sermon was preached in St. Paulus Lutheran Church, San Francisco, California, at the service of ordination for The Rev. Jan Otte-Murphy, Assistant Pastor of University Lutheran Chapel, Berkeley, and Counselor at Kairos Home for Girls, Oakland. A fellow alumna of Valparaiso University with Pastor Otte-Murphy, Joan Lundgren Hunt is a graduate of Luther-Northwestern Seminary St. Paul Minnesota, and is presently a librarian at North Texas State University, Denton, Texas, where her husband is a violin student.

May, 1979

"And Mary said, 'My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior, for he has regarded the low estate of his handmaiden.' Hasn't it occurred to you that these words from the Magnificat apply almost perfectly to Jan? Jan herself identifies with this song of Mary, because she picked this text to be the Gospel for her ordination service. Jan finds, and we find, our heartfelt emotion expressed in the words of this song—our joy, our relief, our sense of liberation, our gratitude and praise, that Jan shall be ordained, that she finally will be specifically named a pastor among us. "My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior!"

We also seem to find, in Mary's song, the pattern which helps make sense of Jan's experience. Jan has played a part in God's pattern of "turning the tables" on powerful forces which oppose the Gospel, and raising up the oppressed. The description of this pattern is a repeating theme in the Magnificat. It tells how God humbles the high and mighty on the one hand, while with the other he lifts up and comforts those who have nothing, who are nothing. "He has shown strength with his arm, he has scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts" on the one hand; while with the other "he has regarded the low estate of his handmaiden... He has filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he has sent empty away... He has put down the mighty from their thrones, and exalted those of low degree."

The mighty forces that find themselves dethroned by God today are both outside us and in us. Sex discrimination and the corresponding resentment it provokes are being dealt a blow; the way the church has of becoming clergy-centered stands judged and condemned. In the most significant ways, Jan's ordination points beyond itself: It points to God, the source and judge and guide and Lord of the church's life; to God, who continues to reform his church as surely as he did in Luther's time; to God who makes all things new with the strength of his arm and the brooding of his Spirit.

"He has put down the mighty from their thrones." First, the mighty church traditions which define the roles of women—and even our natures—in limiting, demeaning ways have been overturned—one, if not for all. Jan, since you entered Concordia Seminary in St. Louis to prepare for the ministry of the Gospel, it seems God has been shaping your character through trial. You were one of the first women at a Missouri Synod seminary, as it was then, and you had to justify your calling in the face of synodical resolutions that say it is against Scripture for women to be pastors. Then at Seminex, as one of a handful of women preparing for ministry there, you always held that women's ordination was not a peripheral and secondary issue in the confessing movement.
On the contrary you always tried to explain that the ordination of qualified women would be a powerful witness to the freedom of God's people in the Gospel. I can remember sitting up with you late into the night working through these things; you were an inspiration to me and helped me clarify my own thinking about the matter. For almost eighteen months since you have been a certified candidate for the ministry, you and those concerned about you have waited and hoped and worked and prayed for the church to confirm your calling, for a congregation and the AELC to call you as a pastor. And now the tables have been turned on those ecclesiastical traditions which excluded you from the pastoral office. The call has been extended, the authorization declared; the waiting is over, you are here today to be ordained.

God "has regarded the low estate of his handmaiden.... He has put down the mighty from their thrones and exalted those of low degree."

Yet, alongside my joy and delight in this day is some vindictiveness. There is a cutting edge of triumphalism in me—in many of us. We feel gleefully smug because the sexist sentiments in the church "got theirs." I mention this not because I am proud of it, but as a confession of sin in which many of you will join me. This defensive, resentful pride of ours may be our natural reaction to prejudice directed against us, but it has a way of turning around and perpetuating more prejudice; it leads us to depersonalize those with whom we are at odds. However, this mighty power of our self-righteousness, too, is dethroned, leveled, humbled by the strong arm of God, our Savior. This strong arm God showed above all in Christ Jesus on the Cross. It is the strength of forgiving love, of forgiving even those who are killing you, "for they know not what they do." Jesus is our peace, who has made us both one and has broken down the dividing wall of hostility (Ephesians 2:14).

**The Throne of Clericalism and Sexism**

"He has shown strength with his arm, he has scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts; he has put down the mighty from their thrones and exalted those of low degree." It may seem strange to suggest, as I do, that a third mighty throne put down by God through this ordination is the tendency of the church to become clergy-centered or "clerical." Clericalism is when God's people are divided along the lines of a sort of a caste system. The ordained clergy are the upper caste. They have more status, they presume more authority, and generally speaking the greater responsibility rests on them for getting the church's work done.

The laypeople, on the other hand—according to a clericalist idea of the church—are somehow not as uniquely, individually important to the church's life and mission as the professional ministers are. The corresponding interior feeling that the clergy develops is often condescension—an attitude of "taking care" of laypeople, of protecting us from reality instead of knowing they share responsibility with us. Under the rule of clericalism, laypeople often play for power through congregational politics, or else feel apathetic, frustrated bored; rarely do we feel the intense, purposeful vitality which is part of being the agents of God's living will.

But God turns the tables on clericalism, too, He does it by the simple reality that we are all baptized. In baptism, the Triune God declared himself to be for me and with me, and there is now no greater status of responsibility to be conferred on me by any human distinction. Baptism is the precious call to ministry that has come to all of us. There is a bumper sticker: "If you don't want to ordain women, stop baptizing them." Another sticker might read: "If you don't want everyone to be a minister of Christ, stop baptizing them." The work of Christ is the property of none of us exclusively, but it is precisely Christ's work which he empowers us all to share. I know that Jan is committed to being a co-worker with all of you in your...
work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ (Ephesians 4:12). It will be your sharing in this common ministry that will mark this ordination as part of God's reforming activity in the church—God's reformation which puts mighty clericalism out of its throne.

It's important to understand what is happening here today. The mighty forces of sex prejudice and clericalism have, through God's judgment, been put down from their thrones. So have the mighty forces of our self-righteousness and pride at being on the "right" side and supporting the "evangelical" thing. The way for unaffected joy is clear; the humble are being exalted. Jan is being ordained, and we are being reminded that God's ministry is our own also. We are conscious of being "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people, that [we] may declare the wonderful deeds of him who called [us] into his marvelous light" (1 Peter 2:9).

But make no mistake. Listen to the words of our Lord Jesus: "You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them. It shall not be so among you; but whoever would be great among you must be your servant, and whoever would be first among you must be your slave. Even as the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many" (Matthew 20:25-28).

The mighty have not been put down and their thrones emptied just so that we who are of low degree might rule in their place. We are being exalted, but not to fill thrones. We are being exalted to the way of the cross. We are lifted up to suffer for and with others. We are raised to bear one another's burdens; to understand how the world sees itself and to minister in it. By the mercies of God, we are to present our bodies as a living sacrifice (Romans 12:1).

In presenting Jan for ordination, we are presenting her, and she is presenting herself, for the way of the cross.

The Cross of Weakness and Struggle

Yet let this not seem strange or offensive to us; for it is the way of God that growth comes through trial, fellowship through shared weakness and struggling together, it is the way of God that joy and honor are known in low estates, that resurrection is given where there is suffering unto death. "Blessed and happy are we who believe that there will be fulfillment of what was spoken to us from the Lord" (Luke 1:45).

O Lord God, who has called us your servants to ventures of which we cannot see the ending, by paths as yet untrodden and through perils unknown: Give us faith to go out with good courage, not knowing whither we go; but only that your hand is leading us and your love supporting us; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

(Prayer of Holden Village, Chelan, Washington)
There are many in America who see the matter of racial equality in general and school desegregation in particular as passé. The political will to implement the *Brown* decision and thus strike down segregated education is spent. We find ourselves on a plateau.

While a number of school desegregation cases are still in litigation, particularly in the northern and western states, it is apparent that the legal gains made in the 1960s and into the early 1970s will have to suffice for the immediate future. If one is optimistic about the long range development of desegregation efforts, the term is cautious advancement; if one is cynical, the term is retrenchment. Regardless of perspective, judges, lawyers, politicians, community leaders and civil rights advocates tend now to couch their comments in carefully guarded terminology, stressing the "enormous difficulties and complexities," the tenacity of "second generation" desegregation problems, and ambiguity of *de jure* versus *de facto* desegregation, and the present backlash in white America against any further efforts at changing the status quo in race relations. Regardless of the rhetoric, the message is the same: Where we are is as far as we are likely to go for the indefinite future.

From the perspective of black Americans, the 1970s must appear as a time of retrenchment, of a lack of momentum, and even of the loss of some of the hard-won gains from the 1960s. Be it the fracturing of the black/labor/liberal coalition, the findings in the *Bakke* case, or the rulings of federal judges that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has been guilty of intentional nonenforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the message has to be coming through that a white backlash and a retreat from the civil rights convictions of the 1960s are in full swing. If the vision of those earlier years was, "We Shall Overcome," the present vision could perhaps be characterized as "We shall hold our own."

Thirty-five years have elapsed since the Carnegie Corporation commissioned Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist, to investigate and record the conditions of the black minority in America. His monumental book, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy*, still stands as a benchmark for assessing progress toward racial equality and the fulfillment of the American creed. What makes Myrdal's book central to any discussion of American race relations is that he not only identified but brought into full relief the gap between the creed of equality and the fact of racial inequality. He chronicled the schism between our words and our deeds.

So indefensible was this contradiction, Myrdal noted, that it constituted an inherent flaw in the fabric of American democracy. It was a flaw Myrdal contended would become evermore intolerable to white Americans and thus lead inevitably to improvement in the lot of black people. The movement toward equality was inexorable so long as the American creed retained its legitimacy. The driving wheel of change would be the moral conscience of white America.

Myrdal's analysis was little less than visionary. The period of 1958-42 when Myrdal conducted his study is, on one scale, a mere 420 months ago, but on another it is light years ago.

Something of that time is captured by Newman, *et al.* (1978) in their description of the early 1940s:

Three out of four black Americans still lived in the South, but North or South, virtually the only jobs open to them were the most menial: over half of all black workers were employed in agriculture or personal service. How much education a black man or woman might have meant little; skilled jobs involving contact with white workers were simply not available. Such jobs as blacks could get paid scarcely human wages: long days at stoop labor sometimes brought $3 or less a week, sunup to sundown; domestic work little more. Black children went to schools that were open fewer days each year (to free them up for field work during picking seasons), and black adults could still expect to be beaten or fired from their jobs for attempting to register to vote. Ordinary life was conditioned by discrimination: separate parks, separate water fountains, separate sections of the bus or train. One wartime munitions factory in St. Louis went so far as to build a separate factory for black workers; elsewhere, places that did hire black secretaries or clerks hid them behind partitions.
Every colored American knew that Brown did not mean he would be invited to lunch with the Rotary the following week. It meant something more basic and more important. It meant that black rights had suddenly been reborn under a new law. Blacks' value as human beings had been changed overnight by the declaration of the nation's highest court. At a stroke, the Justices had severed the remaining cords of de jure slavery. The Negro could no longer be fastened with the status of official pariah.

If the status as 'official pariah' was suddenly eradicated, the status of black Americans as social pariahs was more slowly and grudgingly removed. Indeed, the process continues yet today. Nevertheless, the fact that the legal system in the United States sought to root out all forms of sanctioned racial segregation has to stand as one of history's great and positive forms of societal exorcism.

Though Brown and following decisions, in and of themselves did not resolve all the contradictions Myrdal described in his book, they did go far to set the nation on a new course. The Supreme Court proclaimed to the nation that the enforced separation of human beings by race was neither God's will nor the purpose of the Constitution, as amended after the Civil War. In plain language the courts told the American people that segregation was wrong and they had now to find ways to eliminate it.

Much has been done to alter the legally enforced segregation and de­radiation of black Americans at the core of the American dilemma Myrdal described. The ends have been defined; what remains is the working out of the means. Indeed, this process of finding the means to eliminate racial segregation has created a new chapter in American race relations. It is, as it were, a new American dilemma, manifesting itself in such areas as housing, employment, and education.

Orfield notes that American opinion is split between the desire for school integration and a simultaneous resistance to implementing it. He states (1978:102):

It is hard to find a political leader who opposes integrated education and equally hard to find one who supports housing. Polls of white people across the country show strong support for educating black and white children in the same schools but strong opposition to the technique used to bring them together. Though the courts have found no other way to end unconstitutional segregation in the big cities, the public is not convinced and does not want to make a decision between segregation and busing. If the federal courts are right and the choice between busing and segregated education is often unavoidable, one can only interpret the political rhetoric and public opinion polls in two ways. Either the consistently expressed preference for integration is meaningless and cynical or it represents genuine misunderstanding of what the courts have chosen and what the consequences of their decisions have been.

If it is true that white America wants a segregated and unequal society while it mouths platitudes of equality and integration, then our future is bleak. It will legitimize the findings of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, better known as the Kerner Commission, which stated (1968:1): "This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving towards two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal. . . . Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future of every American." While it is one thing to know these trends exist and persist, it is quite another to confirm these disparities and caste-like conditions as the vision for the future of the country.

If, on the other hand, the present political rhetoric and public opinion are manifestations of "genuine misunderstanding," then a different vision is possible. If the present dilemma is based on misinformation or errant interpretation (rather than on a racism so ingrained that the American creed will be mortgaged to sustain it), then perhaps we are not headed for the reincarnation of Plessy v. Ferguson.

Progress is being made in the desegregation of public schools in the South, but the picture is not so positive in the North and West. In fact, in some parts of these latter two regions, schools are becoming more intensely segregated. Recently published HEW data (cf. Center for National Policy Review, 1977) indicate, for example, that in 1970, 74 percent of all black children in the public schools in Chicago were in schools with 99 to 100
percent minority enrollment. In 1974, the comparable figure was 80 percent. In Los Angeles, the figures for the same years are 55 and 62 percent respectively; for Detroit, 36 and 50 percent respectively.

It should be remembered that these data are for the extreme—99 to 100 percent minority student enrollments. In fact, on a national average, Latino children are now as concentrated in schools with more than 70 percent minority enrollment as are black students.

In spite of these increased concentrations in sectors of the country, the national average shows a decline in the levels of school segregation. Whether such a decline will continue depends upon several critical factors. First among these is the matter of how the courts and federal agencies define de jure segregation in areas where schools have never been segregated by law. While there have been individual instances where desegregation efforts have been set back because of judicial rulings that schools are not required to alleviate racial imbalances they did not cause, the more general stance of the courts has been oriented differently. Desegregation has been ordered where school officials were able to maintain segregation by arbitrarily drawing attendance zones, by selectively erecting new schools, and by the assignment of black teachers to black schools. If the courts continue to see such action as having the intent to segregate, these actions will be remedied under current statutes governing de jure segregation.

A second factor concerns what remedies for segregation will be invoked by governmental agencies and courts. While such efforts as magnet schools, the pairing of schools, and the altering of attendance zones may mitigate segregation, the evidence is overwhelming that the greatest decreases in segregation have come in those districts where students were bused to achieve desegregation. There is little doubt but that if busing as a tool of desegregation is limited or banned, urban areas would revert to having largely segregated schools due to neighborhood patterns.

A third factor, and one related to the second, concerns the future for interdistrict desegregation. If the only required integration in many of our urban areas is that of within-district, present demographic trends will produce a thorough resegregation for hundreds of thousands of black students. The reality is that within-district desegregation is simply not possible in many of our large cities. While desegregation can continue to proceed apace in many of our medium and smaller cities and towns, it is increasingly possible in the larger areas only when initiated on a metropolitan basis.

The more the task of desegregation has fallen to the courts alone, the less systematic, comprehensive, and acceptable the process has become . . . What we face is the absence of political will.

The matter of school desegregation is likely to be with us for years to come. Despite substantial desegregation in southern and border states in recent years, more than half of the black children in these areas are in majority black schools. In the North and West, the figures are even higher. In these regions, more than 80 percent of all black students are in majority black schools. That so much of the task still lies before us, coupled with the general perception that school desegregation has passed the point of even diminishing returns, suggests it is time for a reconsideration of the basic and underlying assumptions influencing the present approaches.

Such a period of re-evaluation is necessary if the desegregation process is to proceed in such a manner as to maximize the probabilities that the ultimate goals of this major effort to social change will be achieved. And while most people sympathetic to these goals will have little quarrel with this admonition, in principle, the implications may be less widely accepted. Indeed, the new American dilemma suggests so long as the means to school desegregation continue to be thwarted, the goal remains an abstraction. The bottom line for this generation of Americans is that if they wish to desegregate the schools, there has to be busing. The refusal to accept this fact and to act on it means the nation will continue into the foreseeable future with racial isolation being the norm, not the exception.

If there is indeed to be future school desegregation in the United States, the present pattern of sporadic efforts through the courts does not appear to be an effective instrument for doing so. The more the task of desegregation has fallen to the courts alone, the less systematic, comprehensive, and acceptable the process has become. This is not the fault of the courts. But possibly, just possibly, those who have defaulted will be sufficiently disenchanted with the current state of affairs to re-enter the fray and seek new and sensible initiatives. What is lacking at present is not the expertise, not the accumulated wisdom of the past two decades, and not those with leadership skills to see the process through. Rather, what we face is the absence of political will.

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The Theatre
Of No Audience

John Gehm

It is both the task and the obligation of the artist not only to locate man in his universe but to investigate, as Auden puts it, "the conditions of his existence which he must accept as his fate which no wishing can alter."

Conditions (and wishes) change from age to age as the universe alternately contracts and expands. Art and artist move from certainty and piety—whatever the gods—to doubt and unbelief and back again, and on. It falls to the artist to attempt again and again, in a desperateness articulated by the poet and understood by the drunkard, to obliterate through pen, clay, or brush once and for all the mark of Cain.

Indeed, it is Art which breaks the Fall. And of art, it is dramatic art—the living art of "the seeing place"—that is unique, which breathes in the moment between contraction and expansion to reveal the dry socket or the true tear. For "theatre" occurs solely in the meeting place of the imagination, in between actor and audience. To be sure, it is "participatory" art. But more, it is "synaptic"—playwright with playgoer leaping toward a circuit, of sorts, exploring a world, and sharing in a unique but passing experience. In the process, an understanding is arrived at about all three: leaping, exploring, and the passing of experience.

Jonson's Shakespeare, or Hazlitt's, is certainly not ours. The dramatic is not art that can only be alive, that cannot be bound by or primarily expressed through the concrete mediums of paint, paper, or stone but can only be embalmed. The dramatic is an event which occurs once, then re-occurs from an ever-changing vantage point. That it cannot breathe apart from the breathing of its participants is the flesh-to-flesh, face-to-face aspect of the theatre which defines its form and through which it demonstrates its vision.

"Theatre," as Grotowski observes, "can exist without makeup, without autonomic costume and scenography, without stage, lighting, sound effects; it cannot exist without the actor-spectator relationship of perceptual, direct, 'live' communion."

Today's theatre, however, gives witness to the rupturing of that relationship and the transformation of that traditional "communion" into empty spectacle in competition technically with the so much more technically superior mediums of television and film. A quick tour of the theatre district, with rare exception, will suffice. Here, nothing is said and even less is asked, from both sides of the prosenium. Indeed, nothing can be asked, for the artist-audience relationship is today an incomplete circuit with widening gaps at either end. There can be no "communion," either in the theatre or in "real life," where there can be no communicants; there can be no "direct 'live' relationships" where there is no life.

It is important to understand that in the Theatre of Genet, Beckett, Handke, and, for America, Sam Shepard—four poets of the Apocalypse and all Auslanders—one finds only secondarily a theatre of absurdity, pessimism, and despair. Theirs and all of truly contemporary drama is first and foremost a Theatre of irony—an irony of the most profound sort. Theirs is the theatre of Kaspar, of Didi and Gogo, Claire and Solange, and of Shepard's entire "Starving Class." Their irony is the compounded, double irony of the composer slowly going deaf in an increasingly monodic world; of the painter going color-blind, by degree, in a landscape that is itself converging toward muddy greys. Theirs is hopelessness parlaying itself as it parodies a civilization programmed not to think of hope or hopelessness. Theirs is the "theatre of no audience" and of the artist of the asylum in smoke-glass madly painting spectrums and vivid portraits of an achromatic world which perceives no color and, leached, understands no rainbows. Nor tolerates the lunatic.

Theatre occurs solely in the meeting place of the imagination, between actor and audience.

As this age, like a silk noose, draws tightly to a close, one must come finally to the recognition of the following:

* the inevitability of the global village and the technical monoculture

* consequently limited and increasingly proscribed points of contact between persons in such a culture of converging responses, stimuli, and imaginations

* and the effective end to any possibility of truly "live" communion between playwright, actor, and audience, anywhere.

In a generation, the way in which man receives information, what he receives, and how he processes it have been completely transformed and narrowly reordered towards a lifestyle that is absolutely unprecedented in the entire history of human experience. It is much more than the technicization of a culture.

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May, 1979
It falls to the artist to attempt again and again, in a desperation voiced by the poet and understood by the drunkard, to obliterate once and for all the mark of Cain.

With the new ordering and converging modes of perception has come a corresponding, and quite necessary, breakdown of traditional "community" (most obvious at the family and local levels) in order to accommodate a new-think which deals more efficiently with "units" than with individuals (who often have hard to pronounce names). Comfort, security, and a spiralling standard of consumption ("quantity of life") are what is to be striven for in the new age. But this striving is at the cost of a mass-mediated culture in which communication and contact are no longer initiated by and for individuals but by the "unseen hand" and for "the group," that modern substitute for community. It is a false substitute in which convergence, common factor, and "sameness," rather than divergence and exploration of the unique are sought.

With the increasing replacement of variegated "community" by the support group—whether it be the corporate family, cult, or encounter group, the same "group dynamics" apply—has come an increasing desire to be told what to do, when to do it, and how it should be done. In standardization is security. Additionally, the opportunity for non-mediated interaction between individuals decreases as the workplace (the key to the three modern virtues) becomes less and less tolerant of "inefficient" spontaneity, creativity, discord, humor, surprise, thought, and real individuality, and more and more dependent on technical programs, formats, regulation, and "management" to achieve results. The uncontrollable variable in the equation—man—must be controlled. If this means IBM "jogging clubs" and employee "retreats," so be it.

In every sphere of life one sees the emphasis being forced away from the unpredictable, the emotional, the personal, the creative problem-solving, and toward the predictable patterns and mechanical "techniques" that can be automatically "plugged in" by man or machine (it makes little difference) to achieve statistically verifiable results.

For the first time ever, man is growing up in a completely artificial, totally man-made environment—"rooms inside of rooms"—surrounded by human constructs horizontally and vertically. He is utterly cut off from any sustaining contact or "grounding" with the natural cycles, phenomena, and rhythms that have instructed and inspired him for thousands of years. The body is regarded as a kind of sophisticated "machine"; the doctor, an expensive "mechanic." A trip to "the wilderness" is usually a comfortable drive to a state park with well-marked paths and courteous government "land managers."

**Why go to the theatre? TV and film can "do" a story much better and require much less effort.**

Nature, to be made "useful," is "developed" and managed by the application of the same techniques that are to be found in the factory, school, or office (or theater). Through statistical research, values are found which can be plugged into a workable formula that will demonstrably increase "efficiency" (make the most money, produce the highest SAT scores, etc.) in the most advantageous cost-benefit ratio. And there is only one set of correct values: a "yes/no" binary set.

The new generation of playwright and playgoer, born in America since 1950, is the first to have no experiential evidence to contradict that babies come from hospitals, food from FoodMarts, water from chrome spigots and tiled pipe, and milk from Seven-Elevens.

Natural processes and events that were once essential parts of the common experience of man have been transformed in a generation of television into nothing more than manufactured images. The life cycle has been de-mystified, Xeroxed, and injected into a public conditioned to accept the image as preferable to the reality it represents and the quantity of life as preferable to the quality. "Community" has been reduced to units of the viewing public that have been separated from experience by the image and separated from each other by the medium itself which delivers the images. The isolation among inhabitants of the same city, neighborhood, building, flat, or room is complete as each becomes quickly oblivious to his or her surroundings, numbly absorbing—in the same way—the same arrays of red, blue, and green phosphors. It is a public unable to trust sense or sensibility, completely dependent upon "experts" in every field to explain, to articulate, to judge, and to qualify.

For the first time, secondary, mediated versions of experience are accepted without question as experience itself (it makes little difference what one is watching—the complete passivity of watching is maintained) by a culture that can no longer discriminate between object and image, quantity and quality; between "reality" and a sped-up, slowed down, replayed, edited, cropped, clipped, photo-enhanced representation of reality.

For the first time, through television and popular film, proximity to an event or process or relationship is being confused with the image of proximity. Distance, space, and time are made meaningless as the image becomes preferable to the actual experience. Televised athletics is a case in point: one "sees" every goal (two

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*The Cresset*
Indeed, it is art which breaks the Fall. And of art, it is dramatic art, the living art of the theatre, that is unique, which reveals the dry socket or the true tear.

or three times] from a vantage point superior to that of the umpire. Television screens are now being installed in many of the newer stadiums in order to provide for the paying customers the same “advantages” the TV audience enjoys. This generation, playwright and playgoer, has “seen” everything and “seen” nothing.

The single “common experience” of 200 million or more individuals is the one single behavior of staring passively, without thought (statistically verifiable!) at a flickering screen, night after night after night. Over 50 per cent of all non-working, non-sleeping time is spent by choice alone with the flat, two-dimensional images technically far superior to the real thing. Why leave home? Soon, it may not be necessary at all. “Free time” is abandoned in favor of technical manipulation of emotion, thought, and “action.” Why go to the theatre? Television and film can “do” a story much better and require much less effort on our part.

For the first time ever, the “experience” of a whole generation—and the world—is converging towards exactly the same activity, the same behavior, the same passivity, stupor, inertia, openness to suggestability, the same way of perceiving—the same “image-ination.” The same images.

Rather than the varieties of experience the 16 or 19 or 56 or 84 inch TV “window on the world” is mistakenly thought to offer, there is only one experience. That “experience” is the confusing of the superficial, two-dimensional reality of the flat screen projection and, likewise, the non-thinking, compulsive consumption of work, recreation, and sex reflected in that screen, with authentic experience. For to experience “authentically” is to be engaged with other human beings on a variety of levels—physical, social, religious—and, at the same time to be aware of the uniqueness of each personality. This is the exact opposite of today’s common denominator approach to social engineering and TV programming.

This generation of playwright and playgoer is the first to have to depend absolutely on faceless, supremely efficient global networks—themselves interconnected and interdependent—staffed by persons just as alienated, powerless, and as derelict as themselves:

“The Bell System,” “the United Way,” UNICEF, the Bank of America, television networks, interlibrary loans, cartels, consortiums, interfaced power grids, pipelines, Mastercharge, communication and spy satellites, Planned Parenthood, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, K-Mart, Sears, Fages McMuffin, SAT, MCAT, LSAT, SCAT, STEP, CEEB, and the ETS, to name a few.

All are increasingly managed and regulated by the only network which is large enough to stay on top of them all—the State.

Playwrights and playgoers today witness an inability to create true community from the “bottom up.”

This generation is witness to the breakdown (or “massification”) of the traditional communities which sustained and supported man physically and spiritually and gave him meaning and existence and a “graspable universe.” Because of the elimination of the unplanned and spontaneous, this generation of playwright and playgoer is witness to, as well, an increasing lack of ability or desire to create new communities, true communities, from the “bottom up.” This modification of human behavior necessary for the smooth functioning of the mono-culture and the mass-mediated society is achieved through a social technology which man cannot control, let alone understand, which he has no power to change, let alone challenge.

To his fellow man, he has nothing “new” to say, for there is neither the contrast to be found within the traditional community nor the eye-opening variation of experience to be found outside of it—there is no “stepping out” of the global village. It is all the same: the same mindless work, the same division of thought and action in the life of every man. Each has had implanted the same goals, each has been given the same “narcotics” necessary to achieve those goals (television conveniently doing double duty here). Each life reflects the same flat, passive, two-dimensionality: everywhere, the same “image-ination.” In such a world—America today, Kampala and Peking in two or five or “x” years—“where,” as Peter Handke writes in Prophecy, “every day will be like every other day,” theatre has no place.

Theatre exists first in the length, breadth, and depth of three dimensions. But at the same time it is a living array. It speaks to—and for—an audience that is three dimensional and living as well. “Theatre,” if it occurs at all, occurs not in the creation of a better three-dimensionality (one that is somehow “more real”) but in the moving beyond its length, breadth, and depth to examine the dimension it brushes up against—the fourth dimension of time. It illuminates as mask after mask is stripped away in the exploration of a landscape in four dimensions.

The conditions of man’s existence today, however, dictate against the possibility of encounter and contact and self-revelation both in the playing space and in the world at-large. A two-dimensional medium—video—must needs be the necessary and appropriate medium for today’s world not only because of the appeal of its superiority to theatre on a strictly
technical basis (which is the basis these days), but because its flatness and illusion is more proximate to the "experience" of mass-man. Indeed, as it speaks, it directs, shapes, controls, and reflects that "experience" simultaneously; that is, the experience of "sameness" in every aspect.

Formerly, through theatre, the fourth dimension of time has been explored by moving beyond the third dimension of "being there." Today, the magnitude of the experience has been reduced by a rank of one. Our two-dimensional culture (and those of it including actor, playwright, and patron) seeks merely the projection—the image—of the fully rounded, three-dimensional experience. "Life" is something done to us these days. And it is enough. We "brush up against," we "encounter," we "explore" only that image-inary world we are peddled and seek out like addicts. Still, it is a world in many ways more "real" than our own—for there, at least, one can ponder the possibilities of what living, in three dimensions, might be like.

But in the cathode-ray guns shooting streams of electrons at phosphors flickering thirty times a second there is little time to ponder more. And, it may be convincingly argued, happily so, for it would not be wise to think too long on the present conditions of man's existence.

To recognize the medium is the message is to understand the irony of contemporary theatre.

To recognize that the medium truly is the message today is to understand the source and sense of irony that describes the truly contemporary theatre. It is to locate (as Auden would have it) man standardized, analyzed, miniaturized, magnified, schematized, anesthetized, and abandoned—in a Universe that has been expanding since "Howdy Doody" and "Buffalo Bob" Smith.

Books

Christian Hope


Reading this relatively brief but patiently and boldly developed essay on Christian hope leaves one with a pleasantly queasy response. What the author intends is modestly placed before the reader. Using St. Thomas Aquinus' guiding maxim—"Hope is the faith that what we are doing is difficult but possible of attainment"—the author insists on his limited goals: "simply to show the possibility of Christian hope, not to establish it on general considerations."

Thus one welcomes the inclusive human net that Macquarrie casts over the topic in an important first chapter. His phenomenological method, a descriptive treatment of the language and experience of hope, takes us from partial to total hopes. Partial hope works in us as passion or emotion, as biological mechanism, as a theological virtue, or, more diffusely, as a "veiled belief about the world and man's place in it." In these senses and others, man has perpetually known what it is to hope. Total hope carries us to bolder acknowledgments, however. Total hope leads us to affirmations about our hopeing "that hope is at home in the universe," that "the creative energy at work in the universe is itself ultimately a spiritual reality," and, finally, for the Christian, that "if God is indeed the God of love revealed in Jesus Christ, then death will not wipe out his care for the persons he has created."

To place partial hope on a continuum with total hope, Macquarrie charts carefully the volitional role of hope as a "formal disposition of the will," relating hope to freedom, to the dynamic of action, and specifically to the life of action as a moral and social critique. In his opening forays he also teases out a key presupposition of the work: "Hope is possibly only in an ambiguous world, a world in which all is not utterly bad and yet one in which nothing is perfect either."

Insofar as hopeful man in an ambiguous world is historical man, subsequent chapters of this work sketch and sort the experience of hope in Israel, in New Testament Christianity, in Christian theology to the contemporary period, and in understanding of hope in recent theologians like Juergen Moltmann and Wolfhardt Pannenberg. With discrimination and grace, Macquarrie furthers both his analytic and synthetic task by introducing those careful shadings in verbal meaning and significance that distinguish hope from optimism, eschatological hopes from apocalyptic hopes, beliefs in immortality of the soul from beliefs in the resurrection of the body, and finally, on the basis of space-time relationships in thinkers like Albert Einstein and Martin Heidegger, literal understandings of the resurrection of the body and man's place in the universe from the possibilities that the author places before us as analogical speculations.

As an emerging picture of vulnerable hope comes to clarity for the reader, however, a number of interpretative hypotheses surface also, some of which support our question, pleasant as it may be. For example, in his discussion of David Straus' contribution to an understanding of the revolutionary ways in which the New Testament writers interpreted Messianic prophecies and applied them to Christ, Macquarrie urges, "But interpretation is surely not restricted to the exegesis of what was in the mind of the author. Interpretation is itself a creative act." Furthermore,
the author’s presumption that “inspired writing, whether in religion or literature, has a kind of inexhaustibility,” that it contains an “overplus of meaning ... beyond what the writer understood and beyond what his interpreters understood at any given time” may be important as an existential hermeneutic. Yet it is one strand in a tangled web of ideas about language and interpretation that requires more careful elaboration than it is given here. Not all interpreters possess Macquarrie’s philosophical and theological circumspection.

One could, I think, also raise questions about the broad “promise-fulfillment schema” that the author applies in the structure of his argument. This broad interpretive schema is continually corrected in retrospect. Experience strives with expectations; reality tempers and modifies hope—this complex dialectic comprises the movement of the faithful ones in history. But this “corrigible schema,” which also characterizes the growth and development of “secular” hoping man as well, would seem to require more elaboration when accounting for the catastrophic and seemingly mindless sufferings men have imposed on men in our time. True, Macquarrie sees how Easter is a conversion of Good Friday rather than a reversal, thus accounting for suffering in hope, for hope in suffering, and for distinctive Christian grace in the retrospective view which leads us to affirm that God was there in our suffering and hope. But one hopes that the author will return to the mysteriousness wrapped up in suffering and action in a further work.

Finally, because much of the author’s concluding exposition rests on speculative analogy, that exposition may prove persuasive primarily for the reader who asssents to the unities presupposed in the analogies. If we offer assent, we find our notions of Christian hope both altered and deepened.

Healing Love: How God Works Within the Personality


This book is a result of the efforts of two Christian psychologists to understand the relationship between human personality and Christianity. The purpose of their book is to develop a psychological understanding of personality that harmonizes with Christianity. Their central thesis is that human beings have two basic personality polarities: anger-love and strength-weakness. These are the continuums of the self which intersect at the spiritual core of the personality. The actualizing self is capable of expressing all up and down and back and forth on the continuums with dynamic and rhythmic ease as appropriate to life’s situations. The opposite of this is the re-pressing of any or all of the polar dimensions due to a fearful spiritual core which results in a shrinking personality.

The three levels of increasing deterioration, represented diagrammatically by concentric circles, and which result from the fearful core, are the manipulative level, the character level, and the psychotic level. As one moves inward from the outer level one experiences less mobility, greater rigidity, and more “shut-up-ness.”

Critical Christians are stuck at the anger pole, compliant Christians are stuck at the love pole.

Christians are often stuck at one end of a polarity and at some level of deterioration. The striving Christian is stuck at the strength polarity. The helpless Christian is stuck at the weakness polarity. The critical Christian is stuck at the anger polarity, while the compliant Christian is stuck at the end of the love polarity.

How is one to go about getting unstuck? For the Christian and the non-Christian the process is similar, but not quite identical. Christians and non-Christians must learn to be open to the truth about their lives and come to trust their own being. A basic step is to come to an awareness that they are loved at the spiritual core. For the Christian this is learning to trust God’s love at the core of the self. For the non-Christian, the authors are a bit vague about the process, except to illustrate how it is done in therapy where one feels loved by the therapist or a group of others.

For both Christian and non-Christian, however, the sense of being loved by others is increased as one strives to love others. When one begins to become unstuck, the anger polarity is characterized by expressiveness and assertiveness; the love polarity by affirming and caring; the strength polarity by contributing and cooperating; and the weakness polarity by feeling and empathizing.

Healing Love is a work that brings a vast and deep understanding of psychology and theology. It is a book that reveals a vast and deep understanding of both disciplines by its authors and is enhanced by excerpts from their own case studies and their own personal lives. Reading is made easy for both lay and professional persons.

Shostrom and Montgomery have well accomplished their goal of harmonizing the psychological understanding of personality with Christianity. The Christian reader will benefit most from the book. For the non-Christian much benefit will also be derived. For both Christian and non-Christian, however, a central issue not addressed is that of whether or not an awareness of God’s love, whose love both authors assume is work in all our lives, is essential to all human self-actualization.

Warren Rubel

May, 1979

J. Kendall Lott

May, 1979
Her Honor

Our city has a new mayor. Most of the people here are very excited about this fact, and even the totally apolitical among us are caught up in the puzzle and promise of the moment. Two unusual characteristics of the new mayor go far toward explaining the furor: (1) She is a consummate politician who Beat the Machine. (2) She is a she.

So, some of us are speculating over time these days, trying to figure out what having a mayor who Beat the Machine and who is a woman will mean to our town. We don't know yet what kind of a mayor she will be, but the way she arrived is fascinating.

Jane Byrne is clearly not an Independent. (Independents generally include anyone who votes or runs against the Machine in Chicago—they couldn't be called Republicans or they would be hooted out of town, and the word Democrat has been locally copyrighted by the Regulars.) Jane Byrne is now and always has been a Regular. She learned her politics from the Old Master Himself, Richard J. Daley.

Even today the circumstances surrounding her break with the Regular Party are unclear. She accused then-Mayor Michael Bilandic of chicanery, he fired her, and she vowed revenge. She then went up against her own "family," the party—and was called menopausal, crazy, stupid, and, worst of all, disloyal. But what the party regulars didn't see is that she was heard in the neighborhoods as being angry because she was betrayed by the party she loved. She thought the party was run by "good men and true," but it turned out a number of them were crooks. She was heard as being honest, frank, and straightforward. Her adversaries were perceived as being arrogant and deceitful.

As is so often the case among our politicians, Michael Bilandic took a bad situation (Watergate breakin, nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, record snowfall in Chicago) and made it much worse by denying it, covering it up, blaming the victims, praising the politicians, and lying to everyone in sight. After a while people not only could not believe what he said but they hated him for saying it.

Byrne, on the other hand, cultivates a no-nonsense style which indicates both respect for her self and for her listeners—and which seems to reflect absolute factualness.

Her primary election victory was much more complicated than this, but suffice it to say that she produced a gagle of angry, embarrassed, and confused politicians the day after her win. These folks are not used to losing, period. They are particularly unused to losing to a woman.

And what of our new mayor's sex? Does it make a difference that she is a woman? Whenever I attempt to discuss this question among my colleagues, we seem always to end up talking about Byrne the politician, and I suspect the reasons for this are more than simple weak-mindedness on our part.

One can, however, make a few observations. For example, immediately after the primary election, male politicians interested in making political alliance with her did so publicly by sidling up to her and awkwardly doing something physical—kissing, hugging, patting, and the like. (Mike Royko noted that all Chicago mayors expect to be kissed—only the part of the anatomy has changed.) That practice seems to have been iced out as she has gathered power and created personal space around her.

She made no plea to an identifiable women's constituency either to the right or to the left during the campaign. This leaves her free of debt to women, but she has spoken consistently (though only when asked) in favor of equal rights for women. She supports the right of women to choose an abortion, though she herself is opposed to abortion. She seems to favor fair employment practices for women; she is not going to appeal a court decision against the city regarding employment discrimination between men and women janitors. She has declared her intention to have women in her cabinet and a police­woman as bodyguard.

She sometimes uses "female" examples to explain feelings: her well-publicized wish after the primary to spend a morning at Elizabeth Arden being "done," or the feeling of needing to wash her hair after days of dealing with the taxigate affair. Would a man have said he needed a sauna and shower at the club?

Her entry into public life is a fairly classic story of expecting, upon college graduation, to become a happily married wife and mother for life. When life had other ideas, however, and her husband was killed, she was left with a toddler and the need to make a living. So Jane Byrne went to work.

I suspect, in the end, that her sex will not have a tremendous influence on the kind of mayor she will be. It will affect the way she is perceived by the media and therefore by the public, with some blame for her failures given to her sex, and some credit for her successes given to the men around her. It will increase her sensitivity to women's issues somewhat, and she will be a symbol of success for many women, but she will never be a stout champion of the rights of women. I just used the word "never" there. I should watch my language. Her Honor has already redefined what is possible in this city. Who knows where she will stop?