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
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Human Dignity after Augustine's *Imago Dei*: On the Sources and Uses of Two Ethical Terms

Matthew Puffer

This essay considers how Augustine's writings on the *imago Dei* might shed light on contemporary human dignity discourse and on debates about the sources, uses, and translations of these two terms. Attending to developments in Augustine's expositions of scriptural texts and metaphors related to the *imago Dei*, I argue that his writings exhibit three distinct conceptions of the *imago Dei* that correspond to three accounts of the *imago Dei* and human dignity offered by Pico, Luther, and Aquinas, respectively. This plurality of meanings suggests that appeals to an "Augustinian" understanding of the *imago Dei* or human dignity threatens to confuse rather than resolve debates about the sources and uses of these terms. As long as Augustine remains an influential voice within the Christian tradition regarding the meaning of the *imago Dei*, the question of its translation into the secular idiom of human dignity will remain a live one because Augustine himself inaugurated quite diverse yet legitimate modes of interpreting these central tropes.

FROM GENESIS TO THE PAULINE EPISTLES TO THE HADITHS of Sahih al-Bukhari, the sacred texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam affirm that human beings were created in the image of God.¹ Throughout these traditions' respective histories, prominent figures such as Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, and Ibn Arabi have made the image of God central to questions of religious thought and life. More recent adherents continue to discuss the image of God and often treat it as interchangeable with another term that many take to be its secular analog—namely, human dignity.²

Indeed, today it is the grammar of human dignity more than the language of the image of God that is in the ascendancy. Pope Francis, for example, appeals to the image of God and human dignity almost interchangeably, and yet he invokes human dignity ten times more frequently than the image of God both in ecclesial documents and in the public square.³ And it is not only

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religious figures who increasingly deploy this rhetorically powerful language. “Human dignity” is now ubiquitous in daily speech as well as in legal, political, and philosophical discourse. From presidential addresses and *New York Times* op-eds to the Irish, German, and South African constitutions and International Criminal Court rulings, “human dignity” has emerged as a key term in the modern ethical-political vocabulary, raising basic questions about its sources, uses, and translatability.

Jürgen Habermas, for example, consistently invokes human dignity in recent work on the future of biotechnology—advocating ethical limits on genetic engineering and enhancement technologies—as well as in explicitly legal and political arguments surrounding human rights. He argues that “the concept of ‘man in the image of God’ [translates] into that of the identical dignity of all men that deserves unconditional respect,” and he asserts that this translation of religious terms into a secular idiom occurs “without emptying them through a process of deflation and exhaustion.”⁴ Of course not all philosophers and political theorists share Habermas’s judgments about the image of God, its straightforward translation into human dignity, or its potential for grounding human rights. Analytic philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, for example, contends that the “image of God is not adequate . . . for grounding natural human rights.”⁵ It might provide a basis for some value, but according to Wolterstorff, the status of inviolable dignity needed to ground human rights does not derive from the image of God but from a separate divine conferral of worth. Legal theorist Jeremy Waldron considers the translation question a bit more complicated. He recognizes that the image of God, like human dignity, has a long history and a wide range of meanings: “if [the image of God] is looked to as a ground [for human rights], [which interpretation we select] may make a considerable difference to the character of the rights theory we erect on its foundation.”⁶ That is, depending on what the image of God names, its moral and legal entailments will vary considerably.

Still other scholars are far less sanguine about the utility of human dignity, whether for bioethics, human rights, or the public sphere. Ruth Macklin famously argues that “dignity is a useless concept,” and Stephen Pinker similarly perceives invocations of human dignity as a ploy manifesting the “stupidity” of cultural “theocons.”⁷ On the other hand, many Thomists, humanists, Kantians, and legal scholars consider an affirmation of human dignity essential for precisely those debates in which Macklin and Pinker dismiss it.⁸ Theorists and advocates on both sides of a range of contemporary social and political issues—from abortion, assisted suicide, and genetic experimentation to torture, immigration policy, and reparations—invoke human dignity to buttress their respective claims and positions.⁹ In light of the protean appeal to human dignity on numerous sides of deeply contested questions, legal scholar Christopher McCrudden asks: “Does this demonstrate that the concept is hopelessly vague

and excessively prone to manipulation? Or does the existence of dignity arguments on both sides of controversial debates simply demonstrate the complexity of moral argument?"¹⁰ Like McCrudden, larger political institutions are beginning to wrestle with the questions raised by the multiplicity of sources and uses of human dignity. Signaling its importance for understanding our world today, the US President's Council on Bioethics, the British Academy, and the Union Académique Internationale have recently commissioned conferences and published volumes on the question of human dignity, consulting scholars and practitioners across diverse fields and disciplines.¹¹ Sociologists of religion from Emile Durkheim to Mary Douglas, Peter Berger, and Hans Joas remind us that it is contestations such as these surrounding the genesis and ends of human dignity that disclose just what a culture constructs as the sacred, demarcating the boundaries and essence of the human condition. Everyone cares about human dignity today, even if we mean different things and we care in different ways.

On a more quotidian level, the manifest disagreements about what human dignity entails raise questions about the extent to which theorists who invoke human dignity are talking about the same thing. Most often, invocations of human dignity resemble one of three philosophical conceptions. Some turn to ancient antecedents—e.g., Aristotle, Seneca, or Cicero—for whom *semnotes* or *dignitas* has to do with virtue, self-regulation, or the conferral of and respect for an honorable social status.¹² Many others invoke Kant's *Menschenwürde*, the inviolable worth derivative of the special human capacity for self-legislation (*Autonomie*) in accordance with reason.¹³ Most often, however, the meaning resembles John Stuart Mill's more liberal construal of autonomy, the liberty to act in accordance with a life plan one chooses for oneself.¹⁴ The contemporary deprivatization of religion further muddies the waters as appeals to these three different meanings of dignity overlap to varying degrees with concepts from diverse religious and cultural traditions—like the image of God, Islamic conceptions of *fitra*, or South African notions of *ubuntu*.¹⁵ It is hardly surprising, then, that the meaning of human dignity in present-day religious, philosophical, and legal discourses varies greatly depending upon who appeals to it and the purposes to which they put it.

In response to this manifest diversity of concerns and meanings, this essay seeks both to further complicate and to clarify the various interpretative issues surrounding historical understandings of the image of God and human dignity. I illumine the uses and translations of these terms by showing that several meanings were already present in one influential source of ethical thought and by tracing their development. For much of Latin Christendom—from Boethius and Aquinas to Martin Luther and Jonathan Edwards—Augustine of Hippo was an, if not the, authoritative voice, second only to their sacred scriptures. And, in many debates that have shaped Roman Catholic and Protestant thought,

much has depended on which side could most persuasively claim Augustine's authoritative legacy. With an eye toward assessing Augustine's influence upon later rival interpretations of the image of God and human dignity, this essay offers a fine-grained account of developments within Augustine's own scriptural exegesis, highlighting three distinct interpretations of the image of God that are evident as his understanding evolves throughout his writings. This account complicates appeals to a single purported "Augustinian" conception of the image of God by disclosing not one meaning but three. Thus, the story I tell about the image of God in Augustine's thought in no way resolves, but rather anticipates and mirrors, debates about the sources and uses of human dignity that emerged in the earlier modern period and echo even more today. Instead, my account clarifies how each of three prevalent, competing meanings of human dignity finds its theological analog in a version of the image of God already present in Augustine's writings. Therefore, I argue, as long as Augustine remains an influential voice within the Christian tradition regarding the meaning of the image of God, the question of its translation into the secular idiom of human dignity will remain a live one.

Three Versions of the *Imago Dei* in Augustine's Writings

Much of Augustine's *Confessions* is devoted to disavowing Manichaean understandings of evil, the image of God, and justice.¹⁶ In Book 6 he confesses that, at the time of his conversion from Manichaeism to Christianity in 386 CE, the bishop of Milan, Ambrose, was preaching on a longstanding interest of Augustine's, the image of God.¹⁷ As a Manichean "hearer," Augustine learned from fellow followers of Mani that the Hebrew Bible embraced by Christians as the Old Testament included in it absurd doctrines, including the ascription to God of a human form. This, Mani said, was the implication of Genesis 1:26–27: "Let us make humankind to our image, according to our likeness. . . . So, God created humankind to his image, to the image of God he created them, male and female he created them." As a Manichee, Augustine had learned not to trust the Hebrew Bible for numerous reasons, and the ascription of a human form to God was paramount. After his exposure to the Alexandrian Neoplatonism of Ambrose and his conversion from North African Manichaean Christianity to Catholic Christianity, however, Augustine's vigorous affirmation of the image of God became a central point of contention in the new convert's polemical interactions with Manichaean elites such as Faustus. Subsequently, interpretations of scriptural references to the image of God became an enduring interest that slowly deepened over the next four and a half decades of Augustine's teaching, preaching, and writing, including five major expositions of Genesis 1 in particular.¹⁸ In the end, more than eight hundred explicit references to the

image and likeness of God would be inscribed across more than 150 of Augustine's letters, sermons, and treatises.¹⁹

Three distinct conceptions of the image of God emerge in three successive periods of Augustine's forty-five-year writing career. In Augustine's early writings (386–400 CE), he presents the image of God as something extrinsic to the human, as the Son who is the proper object of human love. In the middle writings (401–412 CE), he re-presents the image of God as something intrinsic but not inherent to the human, as a natural capacity for loving God that can be lost and regained. In his later writings (413–430 CE), Augustine eventually comes to see the image of God as an intrinsic and inherent capacity for loving God that is persistent and nonadventitious to human nature. In what follows, I show how these three distinct meanings that Augustine gives to the image of God slowly emerge out of a practice of continual revision in his theological exegesis of scripture.

As Augustine explains to Marcellinus—the Roman official and friend to whom Augustine dedicated his magnum opus, *The City of God*—“I write as I develop, and I develop as I write.”²⁰ Through careful attention to developments in his writings about the image of God, I demonstrate how the initial conception of the image of God evident in Augustine's early writings gradually evolves into the quite distinct understandings presented in the middle and later writings. More specifically, subsequent to Augustine's early interpretive framework, I argue that seven developments in Augustine's theological exegesis of specific scriptural texts and metaphors account for the distinct accounts of the image of God in the middle and later writings.

Augustine's Early Interpretive Framework

Three features of Augustine's early moral reasoning provide a useful background against which subsequent developments can be cast in sharp relief. First, Augustine's initial interpretations of the image of God owe much to the preposition “to” (*ad*) in the Genesis 1:26–27 text, “God created humankind *to* the image and likeness of God” (*ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*).²¹ From his first writings in 386 CE until Book 13 of the *Confessions* (c. 400 CE), Augustine repeatedly emphasizes that human beings are created with a particular relation to the image of God. He does not assert that the human person *is* the image of God, or even that humans are created *in* the image of God. Rather, the human is created *toward* the image of God. The image of God is an extrinsic telos toward which the human agent orients his or her love. His consistent emphasis in these writings is that human beings were created with a disposition or orientation *toward* the image of God, where the image and likeness of God is understood to be the second person of the Trinity, the Son of God, consubstantial with and coequal to the Father. It is the Son, qua image of God, toward

whom the human was oriented, dispositionally, in creation. Augustine learned this interpretation of Genesis 1:26 from Ambrose, who synthesized New Testament texts that proclaim that Jesus Christ *is* the image of God (Col 1:15 and 2 Cor 4:4) with a virtue-framed conception of the progressive renewal of human nature *toward* God's image. In this early period of Augustine's development, he too frames the moral progress made by an individual believer in the grammar of Neoplatonic ascent, allowing, at least for a time, for the retention of residual Manichean commitments regarding the attainability of perfection in this life.

For roughly the first decade after his conversion to Catholic Christianity—five years as a layperson and five as a priest in the North African town of Hippo Regius—Augustine remained convinced that those who follow a truly virtuous way of life attain moral perfection in this life.²² In such early works as *On the Morals of the Catholic Church* (387–89 CE), *On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees* (389 CE), and *On the Sermon on the Mount* (393 CE), this notion of progress [*profectus*] is signified figurally by seven steps that correspond to seven days of creation and to seven beatitudes (where an eighth day or beatitude represents an octave, or a reprise of the first). Those who are carried upward by their ever more rightly ordered love for the Son, the image of God, find their corrupt natures are healed and their virtues are strengthened, giving them ever greater victory and control over the fallen and rebellious concupiscent libido. In these texts and many others from this early period, Augustine presents the moral life in terms of two possible trajectories. Depending on the willing orientation of one's love toward the object(s) of its enjoyment, one is either ascending or descending in one's nature, knowledge, and love.

Second, during this early period, Augustine repeatedly interprets these two trajectories in terms of three metaphorical distinctions that he finds in Pauline texts that refer to the image of God—the “old human / new human” of Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4; the “image of the earthly human / image of the heavenly human” of 1 Corinthians 15; and the “outer human / inner human” of 2 Corinthians 4. The synthesis of these three metaphorical distinctions is not peculiar to Augustine. In fact, it replicates the exegesis of Faustus, the Manichean Elect (or *perfecti*) with whom Augustine became quite familiar during the formative decade that Augustine lived as a “zealous [Manichean] hearer.”²³ Faustus writes, “For according to the Apostle there are two men, one of whom he sometimes calls the outer man, generally the earthly, sometimes too the old man; the other he calls the inner or heavenly or new man.”²⁴ Like Faustus's Paul, Augustine's synthesis of the old/new, outer/inner, and earthly/heavenly distinctions indexes a single dichotomy, but influenced as he is by the Neoplatonism of Ambrose and others in Milan, it is a binary not so much of knowledge as of will; not gnosis, but orientation or disposition. Thus, all three scriptural metaphorical distinctions signify the same twofold possibility regarding one's ascending or descending trajectory, with the choice dependent on

one's disposition, the voluntary orientation of one's love. The weight of rightly ordered love of God and all things in God—including both higher goods (i.e., invisible, intelligible, eternal, immutable, incorporeal goods) as well as lower ones (i.e., visible, sensible, temporal, mutable, corporeal goods)—carries one toward God, an ascent, whereas the disordered love for lower goods carries one away from God, a descent.

Third, Augustine's exposition of the four stages of humanity in his 395 CE Romans commentaries perceives in Paul a soteriological framework that effectively displaces the earlier, more libertarian conception in which persons freely choose whether to ascend the seven gradual steps of virtuous perfection. Augustine now interprets Paul as providing a four-stage framework: (1) before the law (*ante legem*), (2) under the law (*sub lege*), (3) under grace (*sub gratia*), and (4) in peace (*in pace*).²⁵ These four stages are separated by moments of instantaneous transition and transformation—stage one ends with the giving of the law, regeneration marks the transition from stage two to stage three, and the general resurrection of the dead ushers in the eternal peace of stage four. Within this newly discovered framework, the renewal or renovation *toward* the image of God, previously spread across seven gradual steps of ascent, becomes confined to the third stage of human existence *sub gratia*, where only the regenerate elect have the capacity to resist the concupiscent libido. Most significant for our purposes, the four-stage framework introduces new interpretive possibilities both for the image of God and for the metaphorical distinctions that Augustine, under the residual influence of Faustus, had previously collapsed into two orientations of the human will.

With these three features of Augustine's early thought in view—(1) the image of God identifies the Son toward whom the human is oriented; (2) the old/new, outer/inner, and earthly/heavenly scriptural metaphorical distinctions refer to two orientations of will; and (3) the reframing of salvation history from seven gradual steps to four distinct stages—we are better positioned to appreciate a series of subsequent developments in Augustine's understanding of the image of God.

Seven Developments in Augustine's Scriptural Imagination

Gerald Bonner once wrote of Augustine, "It is reasonable to regard his opinions on most theological issues as having been established by the time he became sole bishop of Hippo in 396."²⁶ On the contrary, through careful attention to Augustine's theological exegesis, I demonstrate seven developments in Augustine's evolving understanding of the image of God, all of which occur after 396 CE. Earlier, I argued that Augustine's early writings (386–400 CE) depict the image of God as an extrinsic telos—the image of God is the Son of God toward whom human dispositions were rightly oriented in creation and

toward whom fallen human beings ought to reorient their loves. In what follows, I examine Augustine's writings from 400–430 CE, with special attention to several developments in his interpretive judgments about scriptural texts and metaphors, including the meaning of the image of God and whether this image might be lost.

First, around 400 CE, after two abandoned commentaries on Genesis, Augustine makes two important revisions that anticipate and precipitate additional related changes. These two developments are apparent in his exegesis of Genesis 1 and 1 Corinthians 11:7 in *Confessions* and in *On the Works of Monks*, respectively. Augustine's third exposition of Genesis 1:26–27 in just over a decade, Book 13 of the *Confessions* reconsiders the implications where the human is said to be created “to our image” and “according to our likeness.” Augustine's first exegesis that attends to the plural pronouns coincides with a new judgment that the “*ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*” refers to the Trinity rather than solely to the Son. Hereafter, Augustine no longer contends that human beings are created with a disposition *toward* the Son—where the Son is understood as the perfect image and likeness of the Father. Instead we read that human beings are created *toward* the image of the Trinity.²⁷ Arriving only in the final few pages of *Confessions*, what this will come to mean for Augustine is anything but clear at this point.

Within a year of concluding his *Confessions*, Augustine wrestles for the first of many times with the apparent, literal, and spiritual meanings of 1 Corinthians 11:7. In *On the Works of Monks* (401 CE), Augustine first quotes this text—man is the image and glory of God but woman is the glory of man—and he does so as a warrant for a second important revision. 1 Corinthians 11:7 is important to Augustine because it is the one scriptural text that explicitly states that a human being *is* the image of God (or, rather, it is the only text that does so that is not also explicitly referencing Jesus Christ). At the same time, however, it attributes the image of God to the male as opposed to the female human being. Here, Augustine claims for the first time not that the human being is created *toward* the image of God (*ad imaginem Dei*), but rather that the human being *is* the image of God (*est imago Dei*).²⁸

Prior to around 400 CE, Augustine had interpreted Genesis 1, Colossians 3, Ephesians 4, 1 Corinthians 15, Romans 8, and 2 Corinthians 4 within a reading that affirmed *the Son* is the image of God—the image toward whom the human was oriented in creation. After 400 CE—when his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 11:7 coincides with the Trinitarian rendering of Genesis 1:26–27—Augustine consistently affirms that the individual human being *is* the image of God, albeit still only with respect to the rational part of the human soul. Augustine's interpretation of the image of God shifts at this point, from an image of God signifying an extrinsic telos toward which the human being was created and toward which the human progresses, to an intrinsic referent within the human itself.

Subsequent developments manifest a continuing evolution from 401–412 CE. By arguing that the human being *is* the image of the Trinity, Augustine creates new difficulties when it comes to sustaining his earlier interpretive decisions regarding other texts, particularly those that invoke the term “image” in relation to the Son. For example, in a third revision, Augustine reinterprets “conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom 8:29). No longer is this a reference to moral progress through virtuous renewal in this life. Rather, he asserts that the image of the Son here references the resurrected spiritual body, a referent that comes to be shared with the “image of the heavenly human” of 1 Corinthians 15:49. Recall that previously, in *On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, being “conformed to the image of the Son” and the “image of the heavenly human” had been considered synonymous with the “new human” of Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4 and with the “inner human” of 2 Corinthians 4.

Both of the latter metaphors come to be reinterpreted as well. A fourth revision involves relocating the “old human / new human” of Colossians 3 and Ephesians 4 from its prior referent, a binary of concupiscent descent or virtuous ascent, to a new referent—namely, the moment of regeneration or conversion, from *sub lege* to *sub gratia*, in Augustine’s four-stage framework. A fifth revision mirrors this development when Augustine relocates the “earthly human / heavenly human” distinction of 1 Corinthians 15:49 from its prior referent—the same dichotomy of descent or ascent—to the moment of transition from this life to the next, from *sub gratia* to *in pace*. Collectively, these developments serve to disaggregate the three metaphorical distinctions that Augustine had previously synthesized. The “old human / new human” and “earthly human / heavenly human” metaphors now index regeneration and resurrection, respectively—two distinct transitions in the four stages of humanity.

Augustine’s sixth significant revision emerges out of his exegesis of 2 Corinthians 3 in *On the Spirit and the Letter* (412–413 CE) and has to do with the large question of whether or not the image of God is lost in the Fall. In his early works, from 386 to 400 CE, Augustine was able to write of a lost disposition. For example, in *Against Adimantus* (396 CE) Augustine is quite clear that the disposition toward the image and likeness of God, one’s orientation to the Son, can be lost. But where the image of God remained an extrinsic telos, the meaning of losing the image of God was more akin to losing one’s way than to losing something intrinsic. From 400 to 412 CE, in the years he composes *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, all of this changes, and it is in this period and in this text more than any other that we find Augustine’s strongest and most repeated assertions that the image of God is indeed lost in the Fall and only restored in regeneration.²⁹ After the Fall and before regeneration, *sub lege*, the image of God is not only deformed or tarnished but destroyed. The image of God is thus totally lost for unregenerate humanity.

But this stark conviction soon comes under further scrutiny and revision. Augustine first entertains an alternative hypothesis—that the image of God might not be lost in the Fall—somewhat tentatively in an exegesis of 2 Corinthians 3 in *On the Spirit and the Letter*. There the concern is Paul's discussion of the law of Moses in relation to God's covering and lifting of the veil. In the same year, in 413 CE, *Sermon 362* and *Letters 147* and *148* all return to this passage from Paul, arguing that the “image transformed from glory to glory” (2 Cor 3:18) is not a recovery of what was lost but an uncovering of that which had been veiled. From this point forward in Augustine's writings, including his final *Retractiones*, Augustine cites 2 Corinthians 3:18 as a warrant for this revised interpretation—the image of God is not lost in the Fall.³⁰

The most significant implication of this sixth revision, the new conviction that the image of God is not lost but only veiled, is that it leads to identifying the image of God with an inherent, persistent capacity for the contemplation of God. This capacity of the rational soul, Augustine tells us, persists even in those for whom this capacity is not empowered or activated by the divine grace and love of the Holy Spirit. Three times in *De trinitate* 14, Augustine repeats that the image of God is this capacity in human nature for participation in God as opposed to the active participation itself.³¹ The capacity is intrinsic to and inherent in human nature such that it is not lost even when this capacity is not activated, not operationalized by God's love as the Holy Spirit. Thus, the old, unregenerate, *sub lege* human (of Col 3 and Eph 4) is just as much the image of God as is the new, regenerate, *sub gratia* human. The image of God is no longer something extrinsic to the human toward which it is oriented, as it was from 386–400 CE; nor is the image of God something lost in the Fall and restored only to those who are reformed or remade as God's image by regeneration and the mind's inspiration, as it was from 401–412 CE. Rather, after 413 CE the image of God is persistently present in the nature of the rational soul itself as an intrinsic capacity, regardless of whether the soul willingly exercises this capacity and participates in the divine self-love.

In a seventh revision Augustine returns to 1 Corinthians 11:7—man is the image and glory of God but woman is the glory of man—a provocative text that apparently excludes the female from reflecting the divine image. As noted earlier, Augustine's figural reading of 1 Corinthians 11:7 interprets the male and female as signifying two parts of the one human. The development worth highlighting here is more of a series of revisions with a trajectory as opposed to a single development. Initially, Augustine takes the male to signify the mind and the female to signify all that is concupiscent in human nature—the normative implication being that the male is to exercise dominion over the female, just as the rational soul exercises dominion over its irrational elements and the body, as the human does over the nonrational animal and as Christ does over the Church.³² Augustine's second reading promotes the female from signifying all

of the concupiscent elements in human nature, including the material body, to signifying only the nonrational parts of the soul, thereby excluding the physical body.³³ Instead, the serpent takes over that lowest signifying function previously assigned to the female. In a third reading, Augustine yet again relocates the distinction of 1 Corinthians 11:7 so that both male and female signify the mind—the inner human (of the inner/outer distinction from 2 Corinthians 4)—but in such a way that only the male signifies the mind’s contemplation of wisdom whereas the female signifies the mind’s active knowledge that manages temporal things.³⁴ As such, the female in 1 Corinthians 11:7 no longer signifies the nonrational part of the soul held in common with the beasts but rather an aspect of the rational portion of the soul considered unique to the human, albeit a decisively subordinate aspect.³⁵

Human Dignity after Augustine’s *Imago Dei*

The developments mapped in the foregoing present a gradual unfolding in Augustine’s interpretation of the image of God. Scriptural distinctions and metaphors that initially overlap in a single, simpler conception of the moral life eventually fold outward and migrate, taking on different meanings within a larger four-stage soteriological framework. The unfolding starts from a vision of the image of God in which all of the texts initially considered were located within a framework of virtuous ascent toward perfection: The *ad imaginem et similitudinem* (of Gen 1), the “image of the heavenly human” (of 1 Cor 15), and being “conformed to the image of the Son” (of Rom 8) all refer to the telos toward which the rightly ordered rational soul is oriented. Here, the image of God is extrinsic to the human—the Son is the image of God toward which the human disposition aims, to which human love conforms itself, and to which the weight of its love carries it. Within this framework of virtuous ascent, Augustine renders several of scripture’s metaphorical distinctions in terms of two potential dispositions of will. From old to new (Eph 4, Col 3), from earthly to heavenly (1 Cor 15), from outer to inner (2 Cor 4)—a reorientation of will distinguishes those who remain enslaved to concupiscence from those who are making progress on the path of a gradual perfection, a perfection attainable in this life through the pursuit of the moral life of which the Catholic Christian faith is the chief exponent.

Gradually, Augustine revisits the scriptural texts’ distinctions between old and new, outer and inner, earthly and heavenly, and all begin to unfold outward onto a larger framework. The scriptural “old human / new human” distinction (Col 3 and Eph 4) and the “earthly human / heavenly human” distinction (1 Cor 15) no longer reference a gradual growth but now index, instead, two different instantaneous transitions: regeneration and resurrection. As the various texts unfold, they

disclose not one image of God but two. First, the image of the Trinity refers to a capacity of the mind that persists across all four stages of human existence. Thus, the image of God is no longer a telos toward which one progresses, nor is it lost in the Fall. Second, the “image of the Son” (Rom 8:29), having been displaced from its prior identification with Genesis 1:26, comes to reference the spiritual body of the resurrection that only the elect will inherit *in pace*.

Developments in Augustine's theological exegesis of the image of God afford a new vantage from which to offer a few critical observations about the uses of the language of human dignity in relation to the *imago Dei*. I noted at the outset both the variety of sources and diversity of meanings operative in human dignity discourse—e.g., Seneca, Kant, and Mill—and also several competing judgments regarding the translatability of the image of God into the language of human dignity—e.g., Habermas, Wolterstorff, and Waldron. The three different interpretations of the image of God evident in three periods of Augustine's writings—first, an extrinsic telos; second, something intrinsic that can be lost; and, third, an intrinsic capacity that persists—allow for a more complex assessment of the uses of these terms. Given the variety of interpretations of both human dignity and the image of God, we must judge Habermas's claim to be ill-informed—the image of God does not simply translate directly as human dignity without loss or remainder. Waldron is nearer to the mark. Any translation of the image of God as human dignity will need to specify which meaning of each term that one has in view. As long as invocations of the image of God and human dignity leave the diverse historical sources and meanings of these terms unspecified, they will fall victim to the critiques rightly advanced by Macklin, Pinker, and others.

At the same time, labeling a particular account of the image of God “Augustinian” does little to specify which account of human dignity one has in view. Consider, for example, three major heirs of Augustine's legacy in the Medieval and Reformation periods who respectively exhibit Augustine's three interpretations of the image of God with quite different implications for the meaning of human dignity. Augustine's first interpretation finds an analog in the Italian Renaissance humanist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola; his second, in the one-time Augustinian priest, Martin Luther; and his third, in the great Medieval synthesizer of Augustine and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas. These figures reflect different strands of Augustine's legacy in interesting and complicated ways.

In his “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” Pico shows that he, like the early Augustine, drank deeply from the casks of Neoplatonic thought: “Let us disdain things of earth . . . putting behind us all the things of this world, hasten to that court beyond the world, closest to the most exalted Godhead. . . . Let us emulate their dignity and glory. And, if we will it, we shall be inferior to them in nothing. . . . If we burn with love for the Creator only, his consuming fire will quickly transform us into the flaming likeness of the Seraphim.”³⁶ The dignity

of man for Pico is thus not something intrinsic but a particularly high—indeed, god-like—rank or status to which humans may aspire. What is unique about human beings is not that they *have* this dignity but that through the liberal arts they are capable of striving toward and eventually attaining its likeness. In this respect, the “dignity” spoken of in Pico’s “Oration” is analogous to the image of God in Augustine’s early writings from 386 to 400 CE. It is not what we are by nature or something we inherently possess but rather a task, an aspiration, an image into which we as indeterminate beings strive to make ourselves.

In his 1535 *Lectures on Genesis*, Martin Luther mirrors Augustine’s second account of the image of God as intrinsic but not inherent, as something lost but potentially restored. This is hardly surprising given Luther’s indebtedness to Augustine’s *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* (401–412 CE), in which this interpretation is most pronounced. Correlating dignity to the image of God, Luther writes,

Attention should therefore be given to the text before us in which the Holy Spirit dignifies the nature of man in such a glorious manner . . . made according to the image and likeness of God. . . . What is that image of God? . . . Augustine has much to say in his explanation of this passage, particularly in his book *On the Trinity*. Moreover, the remaining doctors in general follow Augustine . . . they contribute very little toward the correct explanation of the image of God. . . . I am not sure that they are very useful. . . . I am afraid that since the loss of this image through sin we cannot understand it to any effect. . . . We cannot have an adequate knowledge of what that image of God was which was lost through sin in Paradise.³⁷

According to Luther, the “image and likeness of God” of Genesis 1 indexes the peculiar dignity of pre-Fallen human nature. Rejecting the later exposition in *De trinitate*, wherein Augustine argues that the image of God is never lost, Luther favors an interpretation consonant with *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*—the image of God was intrinsic to the human as created but was lost through sin. It is not difficult to see how this conception of the image of God corresponds to less stable notions of human dignity in which even basic rights might be forfeited or lost by an individual’s sin or gross violations of justice. If human dignity grounds rights to life, liberty, freedom of religion, and the prohibition of torture, but a guilty verdict (e.g., in cases of first-degree murder, crimes against humanity, or treason) might forfeit or invalidate such rights, this corresponds to a view that human dignity might be intrinsic to those who possess it but does not inhere for those who violate some moral obligation. In this account, human dignity is not inalienable or absolute; like the image of God, it can be lost.

Aquinas’s account of the image of God corresponds to Augustine’s later interpretation advanced in *De trinitate*. Aquinas argues that the image of God in the human is the rational soul’s natural capacity for judgment, choice, and

action in accordance with that choice. According to Thomist ethicist Jean Porter, this account explains why “torture is an assault on human dignity” and ought, for this reason, to be absolutely prohibited: “The good of the soul, the integrity of the image of God within the individual, his or her capacities for faith, hope, and love—no considerations of personal or national security, nor even the possibility of widespread loss of life, can justify an assault on these.”³⁸ Torture is thus a violation of human dignity because it attempts to undermine an agent’s rational judgment, choice, and action, no matter the moral state of the accused—it assaults the very capacity that is the image of God.³⁹

Pico, Luther, and Thomas therefore present three rival versions of human dignity that correspond to distinct interpretations of the image of God, each with an antecedent in one of three periods of Augustine’s writing career. Although each figure inherits a different interpretation of the image of God, each has a legitimate claim to the “Augustinian” moniker. Similarly, the interpretive development within Augustine’s writings on the image of God suggests that a posture of critical openness is appropriate for “Augustinians” of various stripes today. Furthermore, Augustine’s praxis of critical engagement with his sacred texts presents an opportunity where contemporary translations of the image of God into the grammar of human dignity are concerned. Namely, we might anticipate developments beyond Augustine in contemporary understandings of human dignity where Jews, Christians, or Muslims take into consideration texts highlighting ethical or theological facets of the image of God that Augustine elides—e.g., Genesis 9:6, Colossians 1:15, and 2 Corinthians 4:4. Augustine’s own evolution in conversation with his scriptures suggests that he would welcome critical reassessment of his own writings in light of such texts.

Regarding such developments, a letter to Hillary in 427 CE, near the end of Augustine’s life, is instructive for the remarkable self-awareness it exhibits: “I should wish no one to embrace all of my teaching. . . . I have not always held to the same views. Rather I believe I developed . . . while writing. We can have good hope for someone if the last day of this life finds him still developing.”⁴⁰ Augustine exhorted his parishioners likewise to “always develop” (*semper profice*).⁴¹ As Christian ethicists today develop critical and constructive accounts of the sources and uses of human dignity, we have much to learn from the ways that contemporary moral discourse continues to fashion human dignity after Augustine’s *imago Dei*.

Notes

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1. For example, Genesis 1:26–27 and 9:6; 1 Corinthians 11:7; 2 Corinthians 4:4; Colossians 1:15; Sahih al-Bukhari 6227; and Muslim 2612 and 2841.
2. See Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations* (London: Continuum, 2002); Pope Francis, *Laudato si'*, May 24, 2015, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html; and Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, *The Sharia and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), esp. “The Protection of Life and Human Dignity,” 95–102.
3. In Pope Francis's *Evangelii gaudium* (November 24, 2013, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html), *Laudato si'*, and public addresses to the US Congress, to the United Nations, and at Independence Hall, seventy-nine references to human dignity eclipse a mere seven references to the image of God. Tallies for image of God/human dignity are as follows: 2×/28× in *Evangelii gaudium*; 3×/28× in *Laudato si'*; 0×/8× in his “Address to United Nations”; 2×/6× in “Address to Joint Session of Congress”; 0×/9× in “Address on Religious Liberty.” See <http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en.html>.
4. Jürgen Habermas, “Pre-Political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State?” in Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, *The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion*, ed. Florian Schuller, trans. Brian McNeill (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 45.
5. Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Justice: Rights and Wrongs* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 352.
6. Jeremy Waldron, “The Image of God: Rights, Reason, and Order,” in *Christianity and Human Rights: An Introduction*, ed. John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 216.
7. Ruth Macklin, “Dignity Is a Useless Concept: It Means No More Than Respect for Persons or Their Autonomy,” *BMJ* 327 (2003); and Steven Pinker, “The Stupidity of Dignity,” *New Republic*, May 28, 2008, <https://newrepublic.com/article/64674/the-stupidity-dignity>. See also Martha Nussbaum, “Human Dignity and Political Entitlements,” in *Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics*, ed. Edmund Pellegrino (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009).
8. See Jean Porter, “Torture and the Christian Conscience: A Response to Jeremy Waldron,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 61, no. 3 (2008); Ronald Dworkin, “The Morality of Abortion,” in *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 30–67; Ronald Dworkin, “Life Past Reason,” in *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 218–42; Martha Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2011); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010); Samuel Moyn, “Dignity's Due: Why Are Philosophers Invoking the Notion of Human Dignity to Revitalize Theories of Political Ethics?” *Nation*, November 4, 2013; Samuel Moyn, “The Surprising Origins of Human Dignity,” in *Human Rights and the Uses of History* (London: Verso, 2014); and Samuel Moyn, “The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity,” *Yale Human Rights and Development Journal* 17, no. 1 (2014): 39–73.

9. See Paul Ramsey, "The Indignity of 'Death with Dignity,'" *Hastings Center Studies* 47 (1974); Michael Meyer, "Dignity, Death and Modern Virtue," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 8 (1991); Jordan Paust, "The Human Right to Die with Dignity: A Policy-Oriented Essay," *Human Rights Quarterly* 463 (1995); Lois Shepherd, "Dignity and Autonomy after *Washington v. Glucksberg*: An Essay about Abortion, Death, and Crime," *Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy* 7 (1998); Edmund Pellegrino, ed., *Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009); and Leon R. Kass, *Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002).
10. Christopher McCrudden, ed., *Understanding Human Dignity*, Proceedings of the British Academy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xxx.
11. See Pellegrino, *Human Dignity and Bioethics*; McCrudden, *Understanding Human Dignity*; and Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth, eds., *The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
12. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), bk. IV–V; Seneca, *Letters from a Stoic: Epistulae Morales Lucilium*, trans. Robin Campbell (London: Penguin, 1969), no. 2, 40, 41, 47; and Cicero, *De Officiis*, trans. Walter Miller (London: William Heinemann, 1913).
13. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4:434–45.
14. See John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), chs. 2 and 5; and John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), ch. 1.
15. According to Abdulaziz Sachedina, the revelation to Muhammad ushered in a new understanding of human dignity: "The Qur'an's vision for the Muslim community was founded on a new locus of social solidarity that replaced distinctions based on tribal allegiance. Each individual was now endowed with personal dignity and liberty as part of his or her *fitra*, standing in direct relationship with God, the Creator, the Master of the Judgment Day." Abdulaziz Sachedina, *Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 175; see also Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 70–71; Thaddeus Metz, "Dignity in the Ubuntu Tradition," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 310–18; and Drucilla Cornell, *Law and Revolution in South Africa: uBuntu, Dignity, and the Struggle for Constitutional Transformation* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014).
16. See, for example, *Confessions*, 2nd ed., trans. Maria Boulding, ed. John E. Rotelle, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. I/1 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2012), 3.7.12–3.10.18, 6.3.3–6.4.6.
17. See *Confessions*, 6.3.4.
18. *On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees*, in *On Genesis*, trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. I/13 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2002); *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, in *On Genesis; Confessions* 13; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, in *On Genesis*; and *City of God*, bk. 11, in *The City of God: Books 11–22*, trans. William Babcock, ed. Boniface Ramsey, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. I/7 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2013).
19. Such fascination with the image of God already constitutes a remarkable development for the former Manichee who had once considered the affirmation that human beings are created *ad imaginem et similitudinem* (Gen 1:26) as a chief shortcoming of Catholic teachings.

20. Augustine, *Letter 143* in Augustine, *Letters 100–155*, trans. Roland Teske, ed. Boniface Ramsey, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. II/2 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2003).
21. The Genesis 1 text in Augustine’s *Vetus Latina* is difficult to reconstruct and bears important dissimilarities to the Hebrew and most English translations today in its use of prepositions. Neither the Latin Vulgate (*ad imaginem et similitudinem*) nor the Greek LXX (κατ’ εικόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν) preserve the distinct Hebrew prepositions pertaining to “image” and “likeness” in Genesis 1:26. In the Hebrew, *be* (in) and *ke* (after) apply to *tsalem* and *demuth*, respectively. In the Latin and Greek, a single preposition—*ad* (toward) and *κατα* (according to)—applies to both “image” and “likeness.” According to Aquinas, like much of the Latin West that follows Augustine, “Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made ‘to’ God’s likeness; for the preposition ‘to’ signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance” (*Summa theologica*, I.QQ.LXXV–CII (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1922), I.93:1).
22. Those who achieved this perfection, the *perfecti*, include Jesus’s twelve apostles, Paul, and other authors of the New Testament.
23. Augustine, *On the Advantage of Believing*, 1.3, quoted in Jason David Beduhn, *Augustine’s Manichean Dilemma*, vol. 1: *Conversion and Apostasy, 373–388 CE* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2010), 65.
24. Augustine, *Against Faustus*, 24:1, quoted in Beduhn, *Augustine’s Manichean Dilemma*, 121.
25. See *Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans*, 13–18.2, in Fredriksen Landes, ed. and trans., *Augustine on Romans* (Chico, CA: Scholar’s Press, 1982).
26. Gerald Bonner, “Augustine’s Doctrine of Man: Image of God and Sinner,” *Augustinianum* 24 (1984): 495–514, at 497. Etienne Gilson makes stronger claims of consistency going back to Augustine’s conversion in 386 CE: “We have never discovered the slightest philosophical change in any of his essential theses. Saint Augustine fixed his main ideas from the time of his conversion—even we believe regarding grace.” Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (London: Victor Gallancz, 1960), 364n49.
27. This conclusion of the *Confessions* coincides with the genesis of Augustine’s work *De trinitate*, a similarly formative pedagogical inquiry that explores the possibility of understanding the Trinity through an examination of the image of the Trinity in the human rational soul.
28. When Augustine takes up the question of the female’s identity *qua* image of God and quotes the exclusionary phrase, Augustine interprets this text allegorically, or figurally, in order to harmonize the portion of the text that seems to exclude the female with the Genesis 1:27 attribution of the image of God to both “male and female.” That is, a literal reading of 1 Corinthians 11:7 enables him to argue that human beings other than Jesus Christ *are* the image of God, whereas a figurative reading of the same text allows him to affirm that male and female *equally* are the image of God (i.e., ontologically), even as he interprets the text’s ascription of the image exclusively to the male in terms of gendered roles or offices (i.e., functionally). See *On the Works of Monks*, trans. Mary Sarah Muldowney, in Augustine, *Treatises on Various Subjects Fathers of the Church*, vol. 16, ed. Roy J. Deferrari (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1952), 32.40; Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. I/5 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1991), 12.7.9–12; hereafter, *Trin*.
29. See Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 258–59.
30. See Augustine, *Revisions*, trans. Boniface Ramsey, ed. Roland Teske, S.J., *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. I/2 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2010), 1.26 (25). In writings from 413 CE and later, Augustine vacillates as to whether the

“image transformed from glory to glory” in 2 Corinthians 3:18 refers (a) to the moment of conversion from *sub lege* to *sub gratia*, (b) to the process of renewal that takes place *sub gratia*, or (c) to the moment of transition to the resurrected life, from *sub gratia* to *in pace*. See *Trin.*, 14:17.23; 15:8.14.

31. See *Trin.*, 14:4.6; 14:8.11; 14:12.15.
32. See *On the Works of Monks*, 32.40; and *Confessions*, 13.32.47.
33. See *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, 3.22.34, 11.42.58–59.
34. See *Trin.*, 12.7.9–12.
35. Attendant to this change is an important reconceptualization of the relationship between the male and the female in the fall from grace: with Eve's new signifying function, Augustine ascribes to Adam and Eve a new shared agency and responsibility for the Fall that revises his previous more charitable rendering of Adam as exhibiting a tragic if benevolent solidarity and a less charitable rendering of a more malevolent and insubordinate Eve.
36. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, trans. A. Robert Caponigri (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1996).
37. Martin Luther, *Lectures on Genesis*, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, vol. 1 of *Luther's Works* (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), §42, p. 60–61.
38. Porter, “Torture and the Christian Conscience,” 351.
39. Of course, even Augustine's later reflections upon the *imago Dei* did not arrive at an absolute prohibition of torture, as *City of God* 19.6 makes abundantly clear. Instead, as Paul Griffiths rightly argues, Augustine's writings on the image of God fund a very different absolute prohibition: “A million innocent lives against the lie. . . . Only Augustine would accept the terms and ban the lie. The consistent Augustinian cannot lie to save innocent life, whether one or a million. . . . Should I lie to save the life of my child? No. Should I lie to prevent war, encourage peace, soothe the weary and discouraged, instruct the foolish, or liberate the innocent from torture? No.” Paul J. Griffiths, *Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 230. The image of God funds an absolute prohibition for Augustine, but it is a prohibition of lying. If an intrinsic and inherent image of God does not yet fund an absolute prohibition of torture even in the later Augustine, this need not prohibit those who claim the moniker “Augustinian” from continuing to develop his thought in such a direction. And yet we can hardly help but wonder for what reasons the absolute prohibition of torture that one “Augustinian” image of God might seem to fund somehow surpasses the developments in Augustine's own moral reasoning on the matter. It is interesting that in the more than eight hundred references to the image of God in Augustine's writings, not once does he address the scriptural text most often cited in discussions that relate the image of God to the ethics of killing and torture: “Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person's blood be shed; for in his own image God made humankind” (Gen 9:6). Likewise, one is hard-pressed to find Augustinian antecedents to modern interpretations of the image of God that are more Christocentric and which draw inspiration from Colossians 1:15 and 2 Corinthians 4:4—scriptural texts that identify Jesus Christ as the image of God. And again, in part, this may be attributed to the reality that in spite of his seemingly obsessive practices of scriptural exegesis, Augustine never quotes either of these Christological texts so important to modern interpretations of the *imago Dei*.
40. *On the Gift of Perseverance* 21.55 in Augustine, *Answer to the Pelagians, IV: To the Monks of Hadrumetum and Provence*, trans. Roland J. Teske, ed. John E. Rotelle, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. I/26 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1990).
41. *Sermon 169.18* in Augustine, *Sermons 148–183*, trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. III/5 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1992).