Wrongfully Incarcerated and Never Fully Compensated: An Examination of Indiana's Failure to Indemnify Exonerated Inmates

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I. INTRODUCTION

“Not guilty,” two simple words that changed one man’s life forever.1 David Camm, a former Indiana State Police officer, is overwhelmed with emotions after spending thirteen years wrongfully imprisoned for the murders of his wife and two children.2 He is released from prison only to return to an empty house—no wife, no children.3 Loss, anger, loneliness, and pain were his only companions.4 Everything Camm worked for to maintain his livelihood, including his commendable reputation, career, and family were destroyed.5 From the moment he discovered his mutilated wife and children, through the endless trials and numerous false convictions, and through thirteen years of being wrongfully imprisoned, Camm has suffered unimaginable loss that continues to this day.6

1 This scenario is a true story of a recent Indiana exoneree used to illustrate the issues presented in this Note. See Stephan Johnson, Exclusive: David Camm Speaks to Local Reporter for First Time, WDRB (Dec. 18, 2013, 4:28 AM), http://www.wdrb.com/story/24244525/exclusive-david-camm-speaks-to-local-reporter-for-firsttime [http://perma.cc/U79H-MWWF] (discussing Camm’s initial interview with a reporter upon being released from prison).


3 See id. (exhibiting Camm’s former interviews where he discussed the horrific murder of his family and the tragic aftermath). Many exonerees do not even have a home to return to upon release from prison. See Meggan Smith, Have We Abandoned the Innocent? Society’s Debt to the Wrongly Convicted, 2 AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF 3, 3–6 (2007) (providing details of exonerees who are released from prison and forced to rely on their families for financial support and housing).


5 See Johnson, supra note 1 (elaborating on Camm’s life after serving thirteen years in prison for a crime he never committed).

6 See id. (covering Camm’s release from prison and the traumatic effect wrongful incarceration had on his life).
In October 2013, after tirelessly fighting to prove his innocence, Camm was exonerated and subsequently released from prison. Despite his release, Camm could not cope with the tragedy and injustice inflicted on him and his family. He told reporters, “You know, those people who say time heals all wounds and those cliché[s]? I don’t think anyone who says that has ever been through anything like this. Because I’m telling you that time doesn’t heal anything.” As a result of his wrongful incarceration, Camm filed a lawsuit against Floyd County, Indiana and various other

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7 See Verified Complaint and Jury Demand at 36, Camm v. Faith, No. 14-123 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Verified Complaint] (discussing Camm’s trials). The State of Indiana charged Camm with the murder of his family within three days of discovering them. See Camm v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1129–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the murders occurred on September 28, 2000, and Camm was charged on October 1, 2000). After his first trial in 2002, the jury returned a guilty verdict and sentenced Camm to 195 years in prison. Id. at 1130. Purported high velocity blood spatter on Camm’s t-shirt and his sexual encounters with numerous women were the main evidence used against him. Id. In 2004, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the three murder convictions, concluding that Camm was unfairly prejudiced when the State introduced evidence regarding his extramarital affairs. Id. at 1142. The court further stated that the jury would likely have found Camm not guilty if the improper evidence was prohibited. Id. at 1137. Following the reversal of Camm’s conviction, the State linked the DNA discovered on Camm’s car and on a sweatshirt left at the crime scene to Charles Boney. Schlesinger, supra note 2. Boney’s DNA was also discovered underneath Camm’s wife’s fingernails. See id. (discussing the type of evidence that ultimately linked Boney to the murders). Camm was charged a second time under the theory that his motive for the murders was to cover up his molestation of his daughter. See Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009) (stating that an autopsy report revealed blunt force trauma to the daughter’s external genital region and the State’s expert testimony proposed that the daughter was sexually molested within twenty-four hours of her death). Boney was also charged as a co-conspirator. Id. During his second trial, the jury convicted Camm again and sentenced him to a term of life without parole. Id. In a separate trial, Boney was convicted of murdering Camm’s family and sentenced to 225 years in prison. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Camm then filed an appeal of his second conviction. Camm, 908 N.E.2d at 219. In 2009, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed Camm’s conviction, reasoning that the State failed to connect the daughter’s alleged injuries of molestation to Camm. Id. at 223, 237. Murder charges against Camm were re-filed and his third trial began in August 2013. Verified Complaint, supra note 7, at 36. In 2009, Camm entered a verified petition for appointment of a special prosecutor to remove Keith Henderson as the prosecutor due to a book he was trying to publish about Camm’s trials. Id. at 31. Henderson refused to step down, which lengthened Camm’s time in prison for another two years. Id. In 2011, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that Henderson had a conflict of interest due to his book regarding Camm’s trials. Id. at 31–32.

8 See Verified Complaint, supra note 7, at 47 (articulating that from the date of his arrest on October 1, 2000, until his ultimate exoneration on October 24, 2013, Camm fought hard to prove his innocence through the courts, while the true killer was free for nearly five years).

9 Johnson, supra note 1. See Smith, supra note 3, at 11 (demonstrating the struggles exonerees encounter when attempting to adjust back into the real world including psychological damage and trouble securing housing and employment).
individuals, seeking compensatory and punitive damages to be
determined at trial.\(^\text{10}\)

False convictions continue to plague the United States’ criminal justice
system.\(^\text{11}\) The proliferation of exonerations since 1989, now over 1700,
undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system.\(^\text{12}\) In 2014, prisons
released 125 innocent inmates, making it a record-breaking year for
exonerations in the United States.\(^\text{13}\) Upon release, these individuals are

\(^{\text{10}}\) See Verified Complaint, supra note 7, at 49–50 (stating that Camm sought damages based
on the following: “false detention and false imprisonment, deprivation of liberty,
humiliation, mental and emotional distress, violations of his constitutional rights, and
personal and physical injuries, including but not limited to pain and suffering, severe mental
anguish, emotional distress, loss of family relationships, severe psychological damage, loss
of educational opportunity, loss of professional opportunity, loss of income, infliction of
physical illness, inadequate medical care, humiliation, indignities and embarrassment,
degradation, permanent loss of natural psychological development, and restrictions on all
forms of personal freedom including but not limited to diet, sleep, personal contact,
educational opportunity, vocational opportunity, athletic opportunity, medical care, privacy,
personal fulfillment, sexual activity, family relations, reading, television, movies,
travel, enjoyment, and expression” solely because Indiana has not adopted a compensation
statute for exonerees).

umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/About-Us.aspx [http://perma.cc/K4S9-BS48]
(presenting the Registry, which was created in 2012 and contains a collection of exonerations
in the United States since 1989 to date).

\(^{\text{12}}\) See id. (noting that as of January 30, 2016, 1733 individuals were exonerated and the
numbers increase almost daily). Since the late 1980s, DNA analysis has assisted in
identifying the true perpetrator and releasing innocent individuals. Unvalidated or Improper
Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cause wrongful-
conviction/unvalidated-or-improper-forensic-science [http://perma.cc/JR29-ZYLN]
[hereinafter Improper Forensic Science]. Currently, all of the states have implemented the
Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), which stores DNA profiles of convicted felons
and matches them to future DNA samples to help solve crimes. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1968 (2013). As a result, DNA technology has exonerated 329 innocent individuals in
the United States. The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_start=0&c4=Exonerated+by+DNA [http://perma.cc/5ZKV-PH9X]. The Innocence
Project calculated that DNA proved the innocence of twenty death row inmates in twelve
different states. The Innocent and the Death Penalty, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/the-innocent-and-the-
death-penalty [http://perma.cc/2ZFD-YCH7]. The DNA exoneree served an average
of fourteen years in prison. Exonerating The Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/exonerating-the-innocent/exonerating-
the-innocent [http://perma.cc/MQT7-RZJD]. It is difficult to calculate how many more
innocent individuals are imprisoned, but scholars estimate that approximately 5000–10,000
false convictions occur each year in the United States and about 2000–4000 are prison
sentences. James R. Acker et al., Stepping Back – Moving Beyond Immediate Causes: Criminal
Justice and Wrongful Convictions in Social Context, in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS:
STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 3, 3 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014).

\(^{\text{13}}\) See Exonerations in 2014, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 1 (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_rep

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forced back into society to confront serious difficulties in every aspect of their lives, ranging from financial troubles to lacking access to medical care.\textsuperscript{14} Despite the growing number of exonerations, twenty states, including Indiana, currently lack a wrongful incarceration compensation statute.\textsuperscript{15} Given that society accepts the inherent possibility of erroneous convictions to maintain public safety, it should also take accountability for indemnifying exonerees when these errors do occur.\textsuperscript{16} To ensure that exonerees receive the critical resources needed to successfully reintegrate back into society, the Innocence Project recommends model legislation,
which provides a practical foundation for Indiana to consider when adopting compensation legislation.17

This Note examines Indiana’s liability for unjust incarcerations.18 First, Part II provides a background on exonerations, constitutional implications to improper confinement, and different states’ approaches to rectifying wrongful incarcerations.19 Next, Part III analyzes the critical provisions for effective wrongful incarceration compensation legislation in Indiana.20 Then, Part IV proposes a comprehensive compensation statute for erroneous incarcerations that Indiana should adopt.21 Finally, Part V concludes by emphasizing the importance of a compensation statute that supplies adequate reparations for the exonerees in Indiana.22

II. BACKGROUND

When innocent individuals are falsely convicted, the injustice is three-fold—first is to the individual; next is to the victim of the crime; and finally

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18 See Elizabeth Griffiths & Michael Leo Owens, Remedying Wrongful Convictions: Societal Obligation to Exonerees, in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 267, 278–79 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (urging society to take on the obligation of providing exonerees with the support they need to reestablish their lives). The authors argue that “[a]pologies, social welfare benefits, employment, education, expungement of records, reforms of criminal justice procedures, and monetary compensation . . . would demonstrate substantial effort to fulfill societal obligations for their loss of liberty and opportunities due to wrongful conviction.” Id. at 268.

19 See infra Part II (explaining the exoneration process, methods of compensation, constitutional significance, Indiana exonerees, and compensation provisions adopted by other states).

20 See infra Part III (examining provisions that address and provide the type of support exonerees need to effectively reintegrate back into society).

21 See infra Part IV (proposing an extensive compensation statute, which includes the essential tools innocent ex-prisoners need to transition back into society after experiencing the tragedy of being wrongfully incarcerated).

22 See infra Part V (providing an overview of the issues discussed throughout this Note and emphasizing the importance of implementing a compensation statute that provides the type of support exonerees need to regain normalcy).
to society because a criminal remains embedded in the community.\(^{23}\)

Despite their established innocence, the challenges exonerees face when transitioning back into society are profound and their injuries are exacerbated when states fail to remedy them.\(^{24}\) Although exonerees can never be made whole again, states have an obligation to restore their lives to the extent possible.\(^{25}\) In an effort to compensate innocent individuals who suffer from the adversity of the criminal justice system, thirty-one states and the federal government have adopted varying forms of wrongful incarceration compensation legislation.\(^{26}\)

\(^{23}\) See ABA CRIM. JUST. SEC. AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM., ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY xxix (Paul Giannelli et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter ACHIEVING JUSTICE] (creating policies to rectify the causes of false convictions); Consequences of “Errors of Justice,” INNOCENT IN PRISON PROJECT INT’L, http://www.ippi.org [https://perma.cc/MR6L-529S] [hereinafter PRISON PROJECT] (discussing some of the consequences of wrongful imprisonment including: heightened crime because the real criminal is free, “precious lifetime is literally killed,” mental state is affected, life in prison is dangerous, thus innocent individuals do not only suffer from wrongful imprisonment, but also from injuries and diseases as well). Marriages, families, and friends fall apart, children suffer from not having their parent(s) in their lives. PRISON PROJECT, supra note 23. Exonerees are more likely to face disenfranchisement and employment discrimination. Id.

\(^{24}\) See The Wrongly Convicted, supra note 15 (detailing different ways that states can compensate exonerees which includes either a fixed sum or a range of recovery for each year spent in prison, access to services including “housing, food, psychological counseling, medical and dental care, job skills training, [and] education”).

\(^{25}\) See id. (discussing flaws in existing legislation, such as compensation via private bills that require exonerees to endure costly and demanding political campaigns and threatens to deny compensation to exonerees who deserve it, prohibiting compensation to those who entered into a guilty plea or false confession, denying additional remedy to individuals who can prove patent and intentional civil rights violations that resulted in their false convictions, and denying compensation to individuals who have an unrelated felony conviction on their record). Every life matters and a state should not wrongfully incarcerate an innocent individual and then fail to take accountability for their actions. See The Wrongly Convicted, supra note 15 (“Despite their proven innocence, the difficulty of reentering society is profound for the wrongfully convicted; the failure to compensate them adds insult to injury. Society has an obligation to promptly provide compassionate assistance to the wrongfully convicted.”).

Indiana has yet to address the problem with a satisfactory legislative solution. In states that lack statutory compensation, exonerees may pursue either civil litigation or private legislation. In order to fully understand the need for a compensation statute in Indiana, it is necessary to acknowledge the underlying issues of false convictions and the unlikelihood of success for exonerees who seek reparations through the current system.

Part II.A provides a background on exonerations and the options presently available to exonerees seeking compensation. Next, Part II.B illustrates the consequences of wrongful incarceration on exonerees. Part II.C explains the constitutional implications accompanying false convictions. Then, Part II.D describes specific exonerations in Indiana and support services offered by the State that can be extended to innocent ex-prisoners. Finally, Part II.E presents a variation of compensation provisions offered throughout the states.


See infra Part II.A (explaining the different methods of exonerations and the limited alternatives for exonerees seeking compensation in states that fail to adopt a compensation statute). One of the alternate avenues for redress is civil litigation, which involves common law tort claims or civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 269. Another option for exonerees seeking indemnification, if the state allows it, would be private litigation, where the exoneree lobbies the legislature to pass a private compensation bill granting remuneration. Id.

See infra Part II.A (providing a foundation of the issues related to exonerations, including common causes of false convictions, the exoneration process, and the general method of compensation offered to exonerees).

See infra Part II.A (defining key terms and presenting the types of evidence used in trials that often lead to wrongful convictions as explained by The National Registry of Exoneration, an organization that takes wrongful conviction cases to the courts).

See infra Part II.B (explaining the overall effects of wrongful confinement on innocent individuals even after their release from prison and discussing the critical resources exonerees need to recuperate from the years of injustice they endured).

See infra Part II.C (presenting current United States’ and Indiana’s constitutional provisions for individuals charged of a crime and the course of actions offered to individuals when constitutional violations occur).

See infra Part II.D (examining wrongful convictions in Indiana and the inadequacies among the awards provided to Indiana exonerees).

See infra Part II.E (revealing the variety of exoneree compensation offered by other states).
A. Contextual Explanation: Exoneration and Current Methods of Compensation

The criminal justice system recognizes two forms of innocence—factual and legal innocence.35 Factual innocence is the same as actual innocence in that the convicted individual did not truly commit the crime.36 Legal innocence involves a procedural or legal violation that contributed to the false conviction.37 Unjust convictions occur when the courts of law declare innocent individuals guilty of crimes.38 The common causes of false convictions include: perjury or false accusations, official misconduct, eyewitness misidentification, false or misleading forensic evidence, and false confessions.39

35 See Krieger, supra note 17, at 367 (discussing the types of innocence and revealing that most innocence projects only accept cases of factual innocence).
36 See id. (presenting an example of factual innocence where the individual was in another state at the time the crime was committed). Some states will deny a request for compensation, stipulating that the exoneree needs to prove himself “absolutely innocent.” See Yamiche Alcindor, Many Wrongfully Convicted are Simply on Their Own, USA TODAY (May 5, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/04/wrongfully-convicted-suffer-long-after-release/8480237/ [http://perma.cc/V4FU-A865] (providing an example from Wisconsin where an exoneree’s request for compensation was denied because he needed to prove he was absolutely innocent). The proposed statute in this Note only allows compensation to individuals who can prove they are factually innocent. See infra Part IV.A (stating that the exoneree must prove his innocence to be eligible for compensation).
37 See Krieger, supra note 17, at 367 (providing examples of procedural violations, which can include instances where evidence should have been suppressed and legal innocence, which can include self-defense or consent). Valparaiso University Law School’s post-conviction clinic investigates and litigates claims pertaining to false convictions, unjust sentences, factual innocence, and procedural rights violations. The Law Clinic, VAL. U. L. SCH., http://www.valpo.edu/law/current-students/law-clinic [http://perma.cc/GT2A-V97X].
38 See Acker et al., supra note 12, at 8 (indicating that prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and juries are all subject to the psychological, organizational, institutional, economic, and sociopolitical influence that can contribute to wrongful convictions).
39 See % Exonerations By Contributing Factor, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationContribFactorsByCrime.aspx [https://perma.cc/DE2A-63NR] [hereinafter Contributing Factor] (providing a graph which details the contributing factors of false convictions); see also The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ [http://perma.cc/Y4KZ-NV54] (presenting the common causes of DNA exonerations, which include: eyewitness misidentification, unvalidated or improper forensic science, false confessions or admissions, government misconduct, informants or snitches, and inadequate defense). The following percentages are updated as of January 30, 2016, and change almost daily. Perjury or false accusation is the leading cause of exonerations in the United States, with fifty-six percent of cases overturned. Contributing Factor, supra note 39. False accusation occurs when a person accuses an innocent individual of committing a crime. See Glossary, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [http://perma.cc/V9X9-A6XX]. Among exonerations in the specific crime categories, the rate of perjury or false accusation is highest in child sex abuse (eighty-
two percent) and homicide cases (sixty-three percent). Contributing Factor, supra note 39. Roughly thirty-six percent of sexual assault cases are overturned due to evidence of perjury or false accusations. Id.

When police officers, prosecutors, or other government officials misuse their authority or the judicial process in a way that contributed to a wrongful conviction, their behavior is construed as official misconduct. Glossary, supra note 39. Official misconduct accounts for forty-seven percent of the total exonerations. Contributing Factor, supra note 39. In many instances, these officials do not adhere to their obligations of ensuring justice, instead, they are more concerned with securing convictions. Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php [http://perma.cc/76WT-M576]. Official misconduct is the most prevalent in homicide cases (sixty-four percent). Contributing Factor, supra note 39. In forty-two percent of child sex abuse exonerations and twenty-seven percent of sexual assault cases, evidence of official misconduct led to their release from prison. Id.

In some circumstances, individuals are convicted of a crime that never existed, either because an accident or a suicide was misinterpreted for a crime, or the crime was fabricated. Glossary, supra note 39. In other situations, false convictions occur because informants are encouraged to testify against the individual. Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Snitches-Informants.php [http://perma.cc/6GCN-YWQM]. In fifteen percent of wrongful conviction cases overturned through DNA testing, an informant testified against the defendant at the original trial. Id.

Unfortunately, memory is not a dependable recording device. Jacob L. Zerkle, I Never Forget a Face: New Jersey Sets the Standard in Eyewitness Identification Reform, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 365 (2012). A mistaken witness identification occurs when a witness incorrectly identifies an innocent individual as the person who committed the crime. Glossary, supra note 39. In other situations, false convictions occur when eyewitness testimony is persuasive evidence, thirty years of social science research has proven that eyewitness identification is frequently inaccurate. Id. Poor police practices contribute to eyewitness misidentifications. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at xvii–xviii (revealing flaws in the eyewitness identification procedures including the administration of the photo lineup). The highest number of mistaken witness identification occurs in sexual assault convictions (seventy percent). Contributing Factor, supra note 39. Approximately twenty-four percent of homicide cases and sixteen percent of child sexual assault cases were overturned due to eyewitness error. Id.

False or misleading forensic evidence occurs when a forensic analyst or forensic expert presents evidence that was either based on unreliable methods; caused by errors in forensic testing; expressed with exaggerated confidence; or fraudulent. Glossary, supra note 39. False or misleading forensic evidence occurs in twenty-three percent of exonerations. See Contributing Factor, supra note 39 (showing the contributing factors for false imprisonment). Improper forensic evidence is the highest contributing factor for wrongful sexual assault convictions (thirty-two percent). Id. Approximately twenty-three percent of homicide exonerations and twenty-two percent of child sex abuse exonerations occurred as a result of false or misleading forensic evidence. Id.

A false confession ensues when an individual either made a dishonest declaration to authorities which was treated as a confession; the authorities asserted that the exoneree made that statement but the exoneree refused to admit it; or the authorities misconstrued the exoneree’s statement to be an admission of guilt. Glossary, supra note 39. Approximately thirteen percent of innocent individuals were released from prison as a result of false
An exoneration transpires after an individual is convicted of a crime and subsequently discharged based on new evidence of innocence. The methods of exoneration can include a governor granting a complete pardon, an acquittal of the charges factually related to the criminal conviction, or a dismissal of the charges by a court or prosecutor. The confessions. Contributing Factor, supra note 39. False confessions are most pervasive in homicide convictions (twenty-two percent). Id. False confessions were also the contributing factors in eight percent of sexual assault and child sex abuse convictions. Id.

Inadequate legal defense occurs when the defendant’s lawyer at trial or on appeal provides markedly deficient representation. Glossary, supra note 39. The already limited resources of the criminal justice system generates a disservice to indigent defendants and the harm is elevated when ineffective, incapable, or overburdened defense lawyers are selected to represent them. Inadequate Defense, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/inadequate-defense [http://perma.cc/J57A-QUJK]. These lawyers fail to properly investigate, call witnesses, or prepare for trial, which has historically led to a number of false convictions. Id. Inadequate legal defense is a contributing factor in roughly one of five exoneration cases. Ineffective Lawyers, EXONERATION PROJECT AT THE U. OF CHI., http://www.exonerationproject.org/bad-lawyers [http://perma.cc/YR2K-KVWJ]. Examining the common causes of false convictions illuminates the central issues and demonstrates a need for immediate reform in the criminal justice system. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 255–59 (2000) (presenting a list of reforms in DNA testing, mistaken witness identification, false confessions, jailhouse snitches and informants, forensic fraud, junk science, prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct, and inadequate defense attorneys to protect innocent defendants).

40 See Glossary, supra note 39 (defining exoneration and exoneree). Most states provide convicted defendants with the opportunity to set aside their convictions on appeal. See Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 217, 218 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (noting that appeals are essentially impractical for individuals who seek to overturn their conviction after entering a guilty plea). Every state offers all convicted defendants the opportunity for post-conviction review, which is “a judicial proceeding that allows a person to challenge his conviction using grounds that could not have been raised on direct appeal.” Id. at 220. Every state also allows convicts to file a motion for a new trial based on new evidence; however, this option is not favorable to individuals who are wrongfully convicted because the evidence needed to prove their innocence, like witness recantations or scientific evidence, does not appear until after trial and with investigative cooperation. Id. at 218.

41 See Glossary, supra note 39 (detailing the different ways an individual can be exonerated). Factual innocence is not automatically established through an acquittal or dismissal. King, supra note 40, at 225. An acquittal essentially indicates that the evidence provided did not prove guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. An acquittal can be similar to probable guilt or that the defendant committed the offense, but lacked the required intent. Id. Similarly, a dismissal or pardon may be granted for reasons beyond innocence, which can include: challenges of retrying the defendant years after the crime took place, resource distribution, victim’s request, or political strain. Id. The exoneration process usually commences with the innocent individual contacting an attorney or an innocence project through written or verbal communication. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 225 (2011) (stating that the majority of exonerees initially seek DNA testing); Krieger, supra note 17, at 367 (revealing that the average Innocence Project receives about 600 requests a year). The attorney will typically
individual who is falsely convicted and later relieved of all the legal consequences resulting in the conviction is identified as an exoneree.\textsuperscript{42}

Exonerees generally have four options when seeking reparation for wrongful incarceration: civil rights claim, tort claim, private compensation bill, or a compensation statute.\textsuperscript{43} A civil rights suit involves an exoneree filing a claim under federal statute § 1983 and demonstrating a deprivation of constitutional rights resulting in their false conviction.\textsuperscript{44} A common law tort claim requires a showing of fault on the government’s conduct investigations, which can involve “interviewing the requestor, searching for new DNA, interviewing people involved in the case (witnesses, experts, family members), obtaining trial transcripts and/or police reports, investigating the crime scene, and/or meeting with the requestor’s prior counsel and/or prosecutor.” Krieger, supra note 17, at 368. If there is enough evidence to prove factual innocence, the attorney will file a writ of habeas corpus to obtain discovery rights and an evidentiary hearing. \textit{Id.} The writ of habeas corpus may be proceeded by a motion to be appointed counsel in DNA cases, so the attorney can file a separate motion to obtain DNA testing before determining if a habeas motion is appropriate. \textit{Id.} A writ of habeas corpus is “a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” \textit{Habeas Corpus}, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009). The attorney has the burden to prove that a reasonable jury would not convict their client by a preponderance of the evidence when considering the new evidence with the old evidence. Krieger, supra note 17, at 368–69 n.223. “If the court grants the writ, the [inmate] is officially exonerated.” \textit{Id.} If post-conviction DNA testing is requested and a judge orders a new trial or a governor grants a pardon, the exoneree receives an order from the court vacating their conviction. GARRETT, supra note 41, at 230. Prosecutors eventually join in the motions to vacate the convictions, but they can take months and even years to agree to exonerate an individual, despite DNA tests proving the inmates innocence. \textit{Id.} This lengthy and costly appeals process leaves many innocent prisoners in a considerable amount of debt. Daniel S. Kahn, \textit{Presumed Guilty until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims under State Compensation Statutes}, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 129 (2010).

\textsuperscript{42} See Glossary, supra note 39 (stating that a person can be released from the consequences of the crime because new evidence of innocence required the case to be reexamined).

\textsuperscript{43} See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 556 (listing the possible avenues for exonerees who seek wrongful incarceration compensation). See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text (specifying the different tort claims Camm filed to seek relief for his wrongful incarceration); see also infra Part II.C (discussing civil rights claims that arise out of constitutional violations, which result in the wrongful incarceration). The availability of these avenues of compensation depends on each state. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (listing the states that have adopted a compensation statute). Most of the states place considerable barriers to recovery and if compensation is provided, it is usually inadequate. Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 554.

\textsuperscript{44} 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 states: [D]eprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. \textit{Id.}
A private compensation bill requires exonerees to lobby their state legislatures for a private bill to recompense them. Statutory compensation is enacted by state legislatures, which regulates government action regarding restitution to exonerees.

Scholars maintain that civil rights and tort claims are not feasible alternatives for exonerees because they mandate proof of official misconduct, which is either difficult to substantiate or non-existent. The Innocence Project cautions exonerees who pursue a civil rights claim or a private bill, indicating that both options require a lengthy battle in court or through the legislature. A private compensation bill is granted when the state legislature makes an exception for an individual to receive compensation, which requires an ongoing battle.

45 See Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 269 (“Successful claims often require the identification of a malicious criminal justice actor or action, recognized as the ‘cause’ of wrongful conviction.”).
46 See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 558 (revealing that the individual who is seeking compensation through a private bill usually needs a campaign manager and vigorous lobbying). Some states declared private bills as unconstitutional, while other states that do offer them do not have the sources to address the rising number of petitions filed by exonerees. Id.
47 See Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 270 (discussing the types of awards offered through statutory compensation). “Compensation statutes provide for either an administrative or judicial remedy.” ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 113. Some states utilize existing agencies, while others use a process just for exonervations. Id. at 113–14. In several other states, the Court of Claims determines the compensation for exonerees. Id. at 114. Therefore, the best course of action for an exoneree seeking compensation is through an existing compensation legislation. Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 559. Scholars also argue that statutory compensation is a better approach than civil litigation and private legislation, in terms of fulfilling societal obligations for unjust convictions. Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 275. Some states will adopt compensation statutes because exonerees encounter substantial difficulties when seeking compensation for damages through existing tort remedies. See N.Y. CT. OF CL. LAW § 8-b(1) (McKinney 2016) (“The legislature finds and declares that innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been frustrated in seeking legal redress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the law and that such persons should have an available avenue of redress over and above the existing tort remedies to seek compensation for damages.”).
48 See Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 269 (concluding that exonerees’ low socioeconomic status makes it difficult to prove malicious criminal justice action, thus they rarely succeed in their civil rights or common law tort claims).
50 See Slifer, supra note 49 (revealing the disadvantage of pursuing a private compensation bill). The exoneree “must find a state representative to draft such legislation, introduce it,
Association (“ABA”) declared that compensation statutes are critical because other means of recourse are unlikely to yield compensation for exonerees. The post-conviction and reparation process presents constant hurdles for exonerees; however, exoneration and even compensation do not fully assuage the anguish of wrongful incarceration.

B. Life After Exoneration: The Struggle Continues

American history has shown that prisons neither rehabilitate nor deter future crimes. A study conducted in 1971, known as “The Stanford Prison Experiment,” placed twenty-four healthy, intelligent, middle-class college males in a simulated prison environment to examine the behavioral and psychological effects of incarceration on individuals.

ensure its passage, and gain the governor’s signature[,]” which is very political and does not assure rational or dependable outcomes. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 112.

51 See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 112 (arguing that alternate approaches to compensation such as tort or civil rights lawsuits and private bills are “frought with difficulty”).

52 See infra Part II.B (discussing the negative effects of wrongful imprisonment on innocent individuals despite their release from prison). The Life After Exoneration Program (“LAEP”) assists exonerees in rebuilding their lives, while addressing the underlying causes of false convictions. See Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Conviction, 5 AM. U CRIM. L. BRIEF 10, 16–17 (2010) (stating that LAEP bolsters mentoring relationships and builds a network of wrongfully convicted people throughout the country by connecting recently released exonerees with those who have been released for some time). Massachusetts’ exoneree Neil Miller served ten years in prison for rape until DNA confirmed his innocence. Id. at 11. Once released, he said, “I feel like I am homeless. I am home, but I am not really home, because I do not know where home is.” Id. Like Miller, many exonerees spend so much time in prison that they become acclimated to the prison lifestyle and have trouble breaking free from it, even after their release from prison. Id. at 12. When Miller is overwhelmed in an unfamiliar social setting, he returns to his prison routines. Id. Michael Evans spent twenty-seven years wrongfully incarcerated in Illinois and upon his release, he would not open the doors on his own or take food from the refrigerator because he was restricted from doing those things while he was in prison. Id. at 12. Some exonerees admit wishing to return to prison because they became accustomed to that lifestyle, thus it was easier for them to handle. Scott, supra note 52, at 15.


54 See Philip Zimbardo et al., The Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment, 1–2 (Aug. 1971) http://web.stanford.edu/dept/spec_coll/ uarch/exhibits/Narration.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGK4-XAQ2] (demonstrating the adverse effects of prison on normal and healthy individuals). Half of the subjects were assigned to be guards and the other half were prisoners. Id. at 2. The researchers replicated a prison environment to emulate a real prison setting in the basement of Stanford’s
Remarkably, the experiment exemplified a stark resemblance to a true prison setting. The study exposed prisons as an institution that degrades humanity, pulverizes human dignity, and gives rise to barbaric behaviors. Furthermore, the study demonstrated that a powerful social setting can induce good people to exhibit evil behaviors.

Exoneration provides individuals with their freedom, but it does not give them their life back. In fact, exonerees suffer from varying types and degrees of mental illnesses, some of which include anxiety,
depression, phobias, paranoia, and post-traumatic stress disorder.59 These individuals also display “signs of ‘estrangement, loss of capacity for intimacy, moodiness, inability to settle, loss of a sense of purpose and direction, and a pervasive attitude of mistrust toward the world.’”60 Additionally, exonerees are released to precarious conditions filled with societal isolation, poverty, employment discrimination, and shattered relationships.61 Exonerees who spend many years in prison have trouble with real-world skills, such as driving, typing, and using a cell phone.62 Innocent individuals on death row confront a significantly distinct form of criminal punishment because they face the probability of being executed on any given day.63 In addition to the trauma caused by unjust incarceration, death row prisoners also battle with anger and bitterness as they struggle to survive inside the prison walls.64

59 See id. at 14 (discussing the psychological impact of incarceration on innocent individuals); Kimberly J. Cook et al., The Problem of Fit: Parolees, Exonerees, and Prisoner Reentry, in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 237, 237 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the similar challenges exonerees and parolees face when released from prison, but noting that many states only offer support to parolees). Prisoners also have more medical and mental health problems than the general population due to the confined living conditions, drug use, poverty, and substance abuse. Scott, supra note 52, at 13. In many circumstances, states are not held accountable for the wrongful incarceration and therefore, they fail to provide exonerees with the necessary support they need to transition back into the real world. Cook et al., supra note 59, at 238.

60 Scott, supra note 52, at 14. The horrors of the prison life do not discriminate between those wrongfully accused and actual offenders. Cook et al., supra note 59, at 239.

61 See Scott, supra note 52, at 10 (revealing the hardships, beyond the psychological effects, exonerees endure when released from the prison environment); Sara Rimer, Life After Death Row, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 10, 2000), http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/200001210mag-deathrow.html [http://perma.cc/C3EC-GHT5] (discussing the experiences of innocent individuals exonerated from death row, an experience that has completely destroyed their lives); ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at xxviii (“[I]ndividuals who have been wrongfully convicted often see their lives and families destroyed by their lengthy incarceration.”). Georgia exoneree Earl Charles said his wrongful conviction was a “scar” he always wore, despite his proven innocence. Scott, supra note 52, at 11. Charles eventually committed suicide because he was unable to adjust to life outside of prison. Id. Family members of war veterans and exonerees both say that the individual, either in the military or prison, returns with a diminished capacity for feelings. Id.

62 See Scott, supra note 52, at 11 (illustrating the detrimental effects of wrongful incarceration on specific exonerees). Many exonerees struggle with day-to-day tasks such as crossing the street, using appliances, and setting up bank accounts as a result of their incarceration. Id. at 15.

63 See Cook et al., supra note 59, at 238–39 (stating that death row inmates are “‘expelled from humanity’ and not expected to return to society or recover from the pains of imprisonment”). The majority of these individuals are also lonely, bored, and endure habitual brutality as a result of being on death row. Id. at 239.

64 See id. (discussing a Florida exoneree, Juan Melendez, who spent over seventeen years on death row and states the hardest part of being on death row was hearing about someone getting executed and wondering if he was next). Alfred Rivera, a North Carolina death row
The Life After Exoneration Program ("LAEP") study confirmed that most exonerees have an immediate need for employment in order to regain a stable lifestyle.65 Other research has also suggested employment as an integral component to successful reintegration.66 In fact, exonerees are more likely to return to prison in states that do not provide them with the necessary support services for proper reintegration.67 Due to their

exoneree, stated that “on death row, you truly die even before death, mentally. You have nothing to look forward to.” Id. Kirk Bloodsworth, the first death row DNA exoneree, was living in his truck as a result of his unemployment and subsequently suffered from a nervous breakdown. Scott, supra note 52, at 11. He was fired from his first job out of prison because he was labeled as an ex-convict, which negatively affected the business. Id. at 11–12. Bloodsworth also was unable to work in an environment that did not contain any windows because it brought back memories of his imprisonment. Id. at 12.

65 See Scott, supra note 52, at 10 (surveying approximately sixty exonerees to determine the varying types of difficulties they face as a result of their wrongful incarceration); Over 500 Exonerees: A Number That Keeps Growing Every Month, LIFE AFTER EXONERATION PROGRAM, http://www.exonerated.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=87 [http://perma.cc/4B5A-BNBS] (discussing a 2005 study conducted by the LAEP of sixty exonerees which revealed that fifty percent of exonerees relied on their family members for housing, sixty-six percent were not financially independent, thirty-three percent lost custody of their children due to their incarceration, and at least twenty-five percent suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder). Additionally, many exonerees earn less income after being released from prison than pre-incarceration. Smith, supra note 3, at 3.

66 See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 576–77 (indicating employment as an integral support service that prevents exonerees from committing future offenses).

67 See id. at 554 (stating that although these exonerees are innocent despite the incarceration, they are still detrimentally affected because prison often acclimatizes them to criminal conduct). Using data set compiled from the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University, in a sample of 118 exonerees, forty-five (38.1%) exonerees were convicted of at least one crime after they were released from prison and seventy-three (61.9%) did not commit any offense once exonerated. Id. at 570. Seventy-one exonerees in the group received some form of compensation. Id. at 571. The research revealed that compensation over $500,000 considerably reduced post-exoneration offending but anything below that amount did not have a particular effect. Id. at 576. The false rape conviction of Wisconsin’s exoneree, Steven Avery, is a prime example of the detrimental effects of wrongful incarceration on innocent individuals. See Steven Avery, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/steven-avery [http://perma.cc/24XJ-NUZY] [hereinafter Avery] (illustrating Avery’s exoneration where he served almost twenty years in prison for a crime he never committed, and then murdered a young woman two years after his release from prison). On July 29, 1985, Penny Ann Beernsten was jogging outside when a man dragged her into a wooded area, raped her, and choked her unconscious. Id. Beernsten was able to identify her attacker to the police and based on her description, the police showed her photographs of nine men. Id. From the photographs, she picked Avery as the man who raped her and Avery was arrested the next day. Id. Despite having presented sixteen alibi witnesses to prove he was nowhere near the crime scene, Avery was convicted and sentenced to thirty-two years in prison. Id. DNA technology eventually proved his innocence after he served eighteen years in prison. Id. In fact, the DNA profile matched a man who was serving a sixty-year sentence for a sexual assault that occurred after Beernsten’s attack. Avery, supra note 67. Unfortunately, after his
experiences in prison coupled with the lack of support offered by many states, the majority of exonerees are dependent on relatives and friends until they are able to regain stability. 68

Exonerees and parolees confront similar complications in securing employment and housing, reforming relationships, battling psychological illnesses, and reconstructing families upon release from prison. 69 While most states supply parolees with job skill development, vocational training, housing, and employment, many exonerees are discharged without any support services that may be offered to parolees. 70 Lacking the basic necessities for survival elevates the obstacles exonerees endure upon release from prison and makes reintegration more difficult. 71

Considering the unjust taking of an individual’s liberty, the detrimental effects of such taking, and many states’ failure to properly address the wrongdoing, the United States and Indiana’s Constitution provides another perspective on the complications involving unjust incarcerations. 72

release from prison, Avery murdered a woman and was sentenced to life in prison. Id. During the time of his second conviction, a bill was pending in the Wisconsin State Legislature to award him $425,000 in compensation for his initial wrongful incarceration; however, Avery did not receive the funds due to his subsequent murder conviction. Steven Avery, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3003 [https://perma.cc/C5MD-UDXQ]. 68 See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 118 (urging the government to take responsibility and provide exonerees with job and vocational training, mental health counseling, substance abuse programs, assistance in housing, and monetary compensation). As a result of the financial hardships exonerees endure upon release, the Innocence Project recommends, “If the court finds that the claimant was subjected to a lien pursuant to defense services rendered by the State to defend the client in connection with the criminal case that resulted in his wrongful conviction, the court shall extinguish said lien.” Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 6. 69 See Cook et al., supra note 59, at 237 (“[P]arolees emerge from prison with many shared practical and emotional hurdles to confront and overcome [as exonerees].”). 70 See id. at 237-38 (revealing that parolees are often required to report their activities to state officials and in some instances, their failure to report can result in re-imprisonment; while exonerees and the state often have no continuing obligation to one another). 71 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (revealing a study conducted by the LAEP that illustrated a critical need to provide support services to exonerees upon their release from prison). 72 See infra Part II.C (examining the significant provisions of the U.S. and Indiana’s Constitution in relation to wrongful incarcerations).
This nation has long embraced the fundamental principle of law that all persons are innocent until proven guilty. However, an undesirable consequence is attached to it—“some persons are innocent even though they have been proven guilty.” The U.S. Constitution provides a series of protections for individuals who are suspected of a crime. More specifically, it includes a restriction against unreasonable searches and seizures, a right to a speedy trial by an objective jury, a right to confrontation, a right to effective legal counsel, and a right to equal protection of the law. Similarly, Indiana’s Constitution provides explicit safeguards for individuals accused of a crime.

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73 See Acker et al., supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the miscarriage of justice in relation to wrongful incarcerations). See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). The Court further states, “this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created.” Id. at 459.

74 Acker et al., supra note 12, at 3. Despite the requirement of a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to render a guilty verdict, wrongful convictions still occur. See Hannah Laqueur et al., Wrongful Conviction, Policing, and the “Wars on Crime and Drugs,” in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 93, 93 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (explaining the war on crime and drugs and how these wars changed American policing and contributed to wrongful convictions).

75 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (detailing the constitutional amendments that protect individuals charged with a crime).

76 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (detailing the constitutional amendments that protect individuals charged with a crime).

77 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (detailing the constitutional amendments that protect individuals charged with a crime).
Despite the constitutional provisions protecting the accused, the number of innocent individuals released from prison continually rise, increasing claims against the federal and state government.\textsuperscript{78} Exonerees may file a civil action against the federal government under § 1983 for constitutional violations.\textsuperscript{79} Alternatively, exonerees can file tort claims against the state government, such as malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.\textsuperscript{80} However, the government actors, including prosecutors and judges, are secured by absolute immunity in circumstances where a legal right has been violated.\textsuperscript{81} Police officers are similarly shielded by qualified immunity.\textsuperscript{82} Nevertheless, many exonerees pursue claims against the state seeking reparations for their unjust incarcerations, and the cases in Indiana further illustrate the issues pertaining to such an approach.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{D. Indiana: Wrongful Incarcerations and Limited Compensation}

Since 1989, twenty-four individuals have been exonerated in Indiana and the numbers are steadily increasing.\textsuperscript{84} The amount of time these

\textsuperscript{78} See supra note 39 and accompanying text (elaborating on the common causes of false convictions in the United States and that most of the causes do not necessarily trigger a constitutional violation); supra note 13 and accompanying text (revealing that 2014 had the highest record of exonerations reported in a single year).
\textsuperscript{79} 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see supra note 48 and accompanying text (indicating the limited likelihood of success for exonerees filing civil rights claims).
\textsuperscript{80} Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 556. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements to succeed in common law tort claims).
\textsuperscript{81} See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 557 (indicating that absolute immunity is unconditional, making it difficult for exonerees in instances where a constitutional right was violated). Indiana also provides governmental immunity for police officers and prosecutors acting within the scope of their employment. IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3 (2016). In Julian v. Hanna, the court held that the prisoner was entitled to bring a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because Indiana law provided an inadequate remedy. 732 F.3d 842, 848 (7th Cir. 2013). The court additionally noted, “A state cannot be permitted to create blanket immunities from federal suits for violations of federal law (such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause), as Indiana has done in this case.” Id.
\textsuperscript{82} See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 557–58 (stating that qualified immunity shields government actors from liability unless they knowingly violated the law). Therefore, the exoneree is unable to recover in instances where the government made a mistake or neglected to exercise due care in avoiding the mistake. Id. at 558.
\textsuperscript{83} See infra Part II.D (examining specific exonerations in Indiana, their outcome, and support services currently in place that could assist exonerees in regaining a stable lifestyle).
innocent individuals served in prison spanned from two years to twenty-seven years. Their sentences ranged from a minimum of two years to a maximum of life in prison, and two exonerated inmates were serving time on death row. In an effort to combat the issues of wrongful convictions, Indiana’s Supreme Court promulgated a new rule mandating that law enforcement agencies record interrogations beginning in 2011. The purpose of the law is to assist police officers, prosecutors, courts, and juries in their quest for accuracy, fairness, and due process of the law. Additionally, the State reduced its forensic backlog of cases that needed DNA testing in hopes of solving more crimes. The State endeavors to
resolve the principal issues precipitating wrongful convictions, however, it fails to address the issues of post-exoneration and rectifying such wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{90} In fact, among the individuals that have been exonerated in Indiana, only six received monetary compensation.\textsuperscript{91}

Ralph Jacobs and Christopher Smith both filed a lawsuit against the City of Newcastle, Henry County, and the State of Indiana, alleging that the police wrongly coerced their confessions resulting in their false murder convictions.\textsuperscript{92} After serving two years of their sentences, Jacobs received a settlement of $435,000 and Smith received $605,000.\textsuperscript{93} In 2008, a jury awarded Larry Mayes $9 million dollars in a wrongful conviction lawsuit against the City of Hammond and its law enforcement officials, after he served nineteen years of his sentence.\textsuperscript{94} Mayes' case eventually settled on appeal for 4.5 million dollars.\textsuperscript{95} After serving eight years as an

\textsuperscript{90} See supra note 15 and accompanying text (listing Indiana as one of the twenty states that lack a statutory compensation scheme); infra Part IV.A (presenting a statute for Indiana to implement); infra Part IV.B (addressing commentary associated with adopting a compensation statute in Indiana). See also Michael W. Hoskins, Rising Number of Exonerees Reflects Flaws in the Justice System, IND. LAWYER (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/rising-number-of-exonerees-reflects-flaws-in-justicesystem/PARAMS/article/24009#news [http://perma.cc/KKZ2-HJ77] [hereinafter Hoskins, Rising] (describing the rise of exonerations in Indiana and the State's lack of effort in seeking to address the issue).

\textsuperscript{91} See infra Part II.D (detailing the exonerees in Indiana and the monetary award secured by only six exonerees).

\textsuperscript{92} See Ralph A. Jacobs, Jr., THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3321 [http://perma.cc/S4FS-RJRI] [hereinafter Jacobs] (revealing that the two men were mildly intellectually disabled and the police were able to obtain confessions from both individuals). Jacobs and Smith ultimately pleaded guilty after being convinced by the police to enter a guilty plea and were sentenced to eight and thirty-eight years, respectively. Id.

\textsuperscript{93} See id. (confirming that physical evidence linked another man, Jerry Thompson, to the murder for which Jacobs and Smith were convicted). As a result, the trial court dismissed the charges against Jacobs and Smith, and released them from prison in 1993. Id.

\textsuperscript{94} See Mayes v. City of Hammond, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (stating that the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mayes for nine million dollars). See also Larry Mayes, THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3415 [http://perma.cc/8FUX-VME7] [hereinafter Mayes] (discussing the incident leading up to Mayes conviction and exoneration). Mayes was convicted of sexual assault, robbery, and kidnapping, and was sentenced to eighty years in prison after multiple victims identified him as the perpetrator. Id. He was convicted in 1982 and exonerated in 2001 after DNA testing excluded him as the assailant. Mayes served nineteen years of his sentence before he was released. Id.

\textsuperscript{95} See Mayes, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (presenting Mayes' civil rights complaint). It took Mayes seven years to settle his federal civil rights suit against the City of Hammond. Michael Hoskins, After Exoneration, IND. LAWYER (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/after-exoneration/PARAMS/article/24010 [http://perma.cc/8Q4D-AXZB]. When asked about his time in prison, Mayes said, "You can't ever make up for that time, but you can enjoy what time you have left." Id.
innocent man behind bars in Indiana, Christopher Parish filed a wrongful conviction lawsuit against the City of Elkhart and the lead investigator on his case. In 2010, a civil jury awarded him $78,125 in damages and $191,000 in attorney’s fees. Parish appealed the judgment, arguing that the award was inadequate and eventually settled for 4.9 million dollars. In 2012, Brian Neirynck filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against St. Joseph County, Indiana, which was settled for $100,000 in 2014. In 2015, Billy Julian settled his wrongful incarceration claim against Frankton Police Department and Madison County Sheriff’s Department for 3 million dollars. Nevertheless, many wrongful incarceration claims

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96 See Jennifer Nelson, Court Orders New Trial on Damages Owed to Wrongfully Convicted Man, IND. LAWYER (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/court-orders-new-trial-on-damages-owed-to-wrongfully-convicted-man/PARAMS/article/30381 [http://perma.cc/7QDC-GBNR] (discussing Parish’s claim for his wrongful conviction). Multiple witnesses identified Parish from a photo lineup as the man who acted as an accomplice to an armed robbery. Christopher Parish, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3524 [http://perma.cc/4RW5-G2YS] [hereinafter Parish]. He was convicted in 1998 at the age of twenty-one and sentenced to thirty years in prison. In 2002, Parish filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended in 2004, and presented evidence proving that his attorney failed to properly investigate his case. Some of the evidence revealed that the victim was shot in a parking lot and not in the apartment as stipulated during his trial, and DNA tests on a hat in the apartment where the shooting took place matched a man who was already serving time in prison for attempted murder. In 2005, the Indiana Court of Appeals recognized that Parish received ineffective assistance of counsel and set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. The charges against Parish were eventually dismissed.

97 See Parish v. City of Elkhart, 702 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2012) (confirming that the damages awarded to Parish were inadequate and remanded the case for a new trial to determine proper damages); Parish, supra note 96 (detailing Parish’s trial and revealing his initial award was granted on October 27, 2010).


remain pending in the court system, while other exonerees were denied restitution altogether.\textsuperscript{101} For instance, the United States Court of Appeals against the Frankton Police Department, Madison County Sheriff’s Department, and three officers for framing and concealing evidence. \textit{Id}.  

\textsuperscript{101} See James Hill, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4329 [http://perma.cc/9W9D-KADA] (revealing that James Hill’s federal civil rights lawsuit remains pending as of December 2013). Hill was falsely convicted of sexual assault, robbery, and kidnapping with Mayes, but was tried separately and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison at the age of seventeen. \textit{Id}. He was released on parole in May 1998, after serving sixteen years in jail. \textit{Id}. After finding out about Mayes’ exoneration in 2005, Hill filed a post-conviction motion to vacate his conviction, claiming that the prosecution withheld evidence. \textit{Id}. A Lake County Circuit Judge granted his petition and ordered a new trial on October 6, 2009. \textit{Id}. The District Attorney’s Office subsequently dismissed the charges. \textit{Id}.  


David Camm, a recent Indiana exoneree, filed a notice of claim against Floyd County, Indiana and numerous other defendants in October 2014 seeking compensation for thirteen years of his wrongful incarceration. \textit{See supra} note 7 and accompanying text (detailing Camm’s trials); \textit{supra} note 10 and accompanying text (specifying the claims Camm filed against the State and numerous individuals, which remain pending).  

Lana Canen was charged with murder after her fingerprint matched a plastic pill container in the victim’s apartment and a neighbor indicated that Canen made some incriminating statements. \textit{Lana Canen}, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4047 [http://perma.cc/P9LU-THKS] [hereinafter \textit{Canen}]. Canen was unjustly convicted and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. \textit{Id}. Years later, a different expert analyzed the fingerprint and found there was no match between Canen’s print and the one found at the scene of the crime. \textit{Id}. The former neighbor who initially stated that Canen made incriminating statements also recanted her testimony. \textit{Id}. Canen’s conviction was vacated, the charge was dismissed, and she was released from prison after serving seven years of her sentence. \textit{Id}. In January 2014, Canen filed a lawsuit, which remains pending, seeking redress against detectives who made the erroneous fingerprint identification leading to her wrongful conviction. \textit{Id}. Canen states that she has never received any redress for a mistake that seized eight years of her life. Ted Land, \textit{Lana Canen Shares Lessons with Notre Dame Class: Wrongly Convicted of Murder, She Explains Human Consequences of Inaccurate Investigations}, WSJT (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:32 PM), http://www.wsbt.com/news/local/1ana-canen-shares-lessons-with-notre-dame-class/22325114 [http://perma.cc/NPZ3-Y39K].  

Kristine Bunch unjustly spent seventeen years of her life in Indiana’s prison for arson and murder of her three-year old son who died in a mobile home. \textit{Rob Warden: Convicted of Murder by Arson – But the Fire Was Accidental}, NORTHWESTERN L. CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/
for the Seventh Circuit dismissed Richard Alexander’s wrongful conviction lawsuit against the City of South Bend, despite him serving three years in prison. Additionally, Dwayne Scruggs was never compensated for the false conviction that stole seventeen years of his life, however, his record was expunged a year after his release.

The State of Indiana is equipped with the necessary tools to assist exonerees in successfully transitioning back into society. Financial burdens are limited as the majority of damages awarded in Indiana are subject to a cap.

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See Richard Alexander, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=2990 [http://perma.cc/X2J2-X468] (discussing Alexander’s false conviction of two sexual assaults, robbery, burglary/unlawful entry, and theft after the victims positively identified him as the assailant). He was sentenced to seventy years in prison and served three years until DNA proved his innocence. In 2006, Alexander filed a federal wrongful conviction lawsuit under § 1983 deprivation of civil rights, and § 1985 conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, against the City of South Bend, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City because Alexander was unable to prove any misconduct on behalf of the police officers. Alexander v. City of South Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 558 (7th Cir. 2006).

See Dwayne D. Shruggs, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3625 [http://perma.cc/6XWH-GUF2] (explaining Shruggs’ unjust conviction of sexual assault and robbery). Shruggs was convicted in 1986 after the victim identified him as her attacker. In 1993, the court allowed DNA testing from Shruggs and compared it to the evidence collected from the case, which ultimately proved Shruggs’ innocence. In 1994, nearly a year before his death in May 1995, Shruggs’ record was expunged.

See infra Part III.D (recommending support services for exonerees and mechanisms of providing them with such support); infra Part IV.A (proposing a statute for Indiana, which utilizes programs already implemented by the State and remains consistent in terms of its limitations).

See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2016) (stating that medical malpractice is subject to a cap of “[o]ne million two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($1,250,000) if the act of malpractice occurs after June 30, 1999”); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (subjecting punitive damages to a cap of three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the case or fifty thousand dollars). Although exoneree compensation should not be capped, as advocated by the Innocence Project, nearly all of the monetary damages awarded in Indiana are subject to a cap, thus, the proposed compensation statute concedes to the likelihood of an imposed statutory limitation. See infra Part IV.A (recommending monetary damages to be limited to two million dollars).
statute of limitation, and the civil appeal procedures guidelines are relatively standard.106 The Indiana Department of Corrections provides necessary support services to parolees and the State also offers Section 8 and subsidized housing to low-income individuals.107 Additionally, Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration ("FSSA") implemented programs to foster independent, healthy, and constructive lives for Indiana residents.108 The inconsistencies arising from the State’s failure to adopt a statutory compensation scheme is problematic; however, existing support services could easily be extended to exonerees.109 In fact, many states began authorizing compensation legislation in an effort to remedy the injury sustained by innocent ex-prisoners.110

106 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-11-2-3 (mandating that claims be presented within two years if pertaining to professional services); IND. CODE § 34-11-2-4 (providing a two year statute of limitation for injury to persons or property); IND. CODE § 34-18-7-1 (indicating a two year limitation in bringing medical malpractice claims); IND. CODE § 34-20-3-1 (revealing a two year statute of limitation for product liability or strict liability in tort claims); IND. CODE § 34-23-1-1 (requiring wrongful death actions to be commenced within two years of the injury). Since the majority of the statute of limitations for claims in Indiana is two years, the proposed statute also recommends a two-year limitation for bringing a wrongful incarceration claim. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting claims to be commenced within two years from the effective date of the statute or the exonerees release from custody). The appeals process in Indiana allows up to thirty days after the judgment for an appeal to be filed. IND. CODE § 22-9-8-1; see IND. CODE § 22-9-8-2 (discussing the required contents of a record for an appeal); IND. CODE § 22-9-8-3 (stating that an individual can file an appeal only if they have exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to them). The Innocence Project also recommends that compensation claims should be heard by the state’s civil court or other administrative structure that handles comparable compensation claims. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 2.

107 See Programs and Re-entry, IND. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.in.gov/idoc/3264.htm [http://perma.cc/F2K2-WP9P] (offering support such as education, health care, pre-release services, re-entry services, and youth services for individuals incarcerated as adults); see also Section 8/Subsidized Housing, IND. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. AUTH., http://www.in.gov/ihcda/2333.htm#Vouchers [http://perma.cc/Z5E6-E2PF] (discussing Section 8 housing information and application procedures for obtaining immediate services from the State).

108 See FSSA Mission and Vision, FAMILY AND SOC. SERV. ADMIN., http://www.in.gov/fssa/4839.htm [http://perma.cc/85GY-JLE6] (presenting the FSSA’s mission which is "to develop, finance and compassionately administer programs to provide healthcare and other social services to Hoosiers in need in order to enable them to achieve healthy, self-sufficient and productive lives").

109 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a compensation statute for Indiana to implement, which provides the necessary support services for exonerees).

110 See infra Part II.E (illuminating the differences in the types of awards offered to exonerees among the states).
E. Indemnifying Wrongful Incarcerations: State Statutory Provisions for Post-Conviction Relief

Many scholars criticize existing wrongful incarceration compensation statutes because of their variance and insufficiency. As a result, the ABA and Innocence Project presented model reforms to encourage states to adopt comprehensive compensation legislation. Many legal scholars and wrongful conviction policy advocates favor statutory reparation despite its inadequacy because it is most likely to promote intrastate fairness in compensating exonerees.

Many state statutes require proof of factual innocence in order to be eligible for compensation. The innocence is usually proven either by a preponderance of the evidence or by a clear and convincing standard.

111 See Cook et al., supra note 59, at 238 ("[C]ompensation statutes are widely varied, grossly inadequate, and often even non-existent."); Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 270 (reporting that many states offer payments, sometimes nontaxable, based on specified dollar amounts for each year the individual was wrongfully incarcerated). In addition to monetary compensation, some states offer job training, psychotherapy, medical coverage, educational benefits, and reimbursement of legal expenses associated with the exoneration. Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 270.

112 See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 561 (proposing legislative reforms that include physical and psychological services in addition to an increase in the awards currently offered to exonerees); ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 109–19 (presenting reforms in compensation statutes to address the challenges faced by exonerees); Model Legislation, supra note 17 (presenting model compensation legislation proposed by the Innocence Project to consider).

113 See Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 270 (indicating that statutory compensation is preferred over civil suits and private legislation because it is more likely to provide compensation to exonerees); see also supra notes 43–51 (elaborating on different methods of compensation and their limitations).

114 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.03(1)(a)(1) (West 2016) (stating that substantial evidence of actual innocence must exist to be eligible for compensation); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8(c) (2016) (requiring a pardon from the governor issued on the ground of innocence or a certificate of innocence); see also supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between factual and legal innocence). The Innocence Project also proposes a provision that allows exonerees to recover if their conviction relied on a statute or other accusatory instrument that violated the U.S. or the state Constitution. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 3. The ABA states that compensation is generally available to exonerees who can prove that they were: convicted of a crime, served all or part of the sentence, exonerated, and innocent of that crime. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 114.

115 See infra Part IV.A (requiring a lower standard of proof to show that the individual did not commit the crime(s) for which he was convicted). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that more than fifty percent of the evidence demonstrates that the exoneree was wrongfully convicted. Preponderance of the Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance_of_the_evidence [https://perma.cc/WQX4-YEAK]. Preponderance of the evidence is the burden of proof in civil trials. Id. For a clear and convincing standard of review, an exoneree must prove that it is substantially more likely than not that the individual was wrongfully convicted. Clear and Convincing Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_
Some states prohibit compensation for individuals who contribute to their false conviction either by entering a guilty plea, false confession, or *nolo contendere*, while other states have no such restriction in place. Monetary compensation among the states that have adopted a statute range from $5000 to $80,000 for each year an individual spends wrongfully imprisoned. Some states place a cap on the total financial compensation.
allotted, while others do not limit such recovery. A supplementary award for time spent on death row, parole, probation, or as a registered sex offender is offered by many states.

In addition to monetary compensation, some states offer support and re-integrative assistance to exonerees. These services include, but are not limited to: physical and mental health care, counseling, education, employment skills development, and vocational training. Because some of these services do not become available until years after exoneration, the

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118 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06(1)(e) (West 2015) (offering a maximum of $2,000,000 in monetary compensation), and 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8(c) (2016) (limiting compensation to $199,150), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2015) (placing a cap on the monetary award to $25,000), with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)(1) (West 2016) (placing no restriction on the total amount of monetary award for exonerees). According to a report conducted in 2012 by the Vera Institute of Justice, Indiana spent an average of $14,823 annually to house one inmate. The Price of Prisons Indiana: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, THE VERA INST. OF JUST. (Jan. 2012), http://www.vera.org/files/price-of-prisons-indiana-fact-sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MRY-A43N] [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE]. The Innocence Project suggests that expenses incurred to house prisoners should not offset the total damages awards available to exonerees. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 6.

119 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2012) (awarding exonerees additional compensation not to exceed $100,000 for each year on death row); MINN. STAT. § 611.365 (2015) (giving at least an additional $25,000 for each year served on supervised release and sex offender registry, to be prorated for partial years); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 103.052(b) (West 2016) (providing an additional $25,000 multiplied by the number of years served either on parole or as a registered sex offender, expressed as a fraction for partial years); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060(5)(a)–(b) (2015) (offering an additional $50,000 for each year on death row and $25,000 for each year spent on parole, community custody, or on a sex offender registry). The Innocence Project recommends an additional $62,500 for each year a person was on death row and at least $31,000 for each year served on parole, probation, or as a registered sex offender, to be pro-rated for portions of the years served. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 4.

120 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e) (West 2016) (offering counseling services in addition to monetary compensation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365(4) (West 2015) (granting tuition reimbursement for successful completion of each semester, or employment skills and development training); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.102(b)(1) (West 2016) (providing life-skills, job, and vocational training for as long as they are beneficial to the exoneree). The Innocence Project advocates immediate psychological services and “long-term assistance to help exonerees regain lost time through on-going counseling aimed at repairing damaged relationships and addressing the psychological strains of the wrongful conviction and prison experience.” Scott, supra note 52, at 17. LAEP and the Innocence Project furnish exonerees with access to counseling services. Id. at 16.

121 See Scott, supra note 52, at 17–18 (depicting the types of support services offered by many states).
Innocence Project recommends immediate services for exonerees.\(^{122}\) Finally, many states provide record expungements for innocent ex-prisoners, which assists them in securing employment and rebuilding their lives.\(^{123}\)

The injustice suffered by innocent ex-prisoners is everlasting and Indiana’s current method of redress is failing.\(^{124}\) Despite the constitutional safeguards, the frequency of exonerations is on the rise.\(^{125}\) Indiana owes a civic debt to its exonerees for unjustly taking their freedom and should repair their injury by adopting a statute that provides the tools exonerees need to begin restoring their lives.\(^{126}\)

### III. ANALYSIS

The upsurge of wrongful convictions indicates a need for an immediate systematic reform.\(^{127}\) The current redress methods are inadequate, and exonerees rarely prevail in securing compensation.\(^{128}\)

\(^{122}\) *See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 9* (suggesting states to provide immediate services such as: housing, education, vocational training, transportation, monetary assistance, re-integrative services, along with mental, physical, and dental care).

\(^{123}\) *See, e.g.*, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06(1)(e) (West 2015) (waiving the expungement fee and requiring an immediate expungement of the criminal record arising from the wrongful arrest, conviction, and incarceration); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702(h) (West 2016) (stating that the court will enter a certificate of innocence and an order expunging and sealing the record as soon as the claimant is entitled to judgment, and a copy of the order is mailed to the exoneree). The Innocence Project provides a drafter’s note for states to incorporate an expungement provision to eradicate the false conviction from the exonerees record. *Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 6–7.*

\(^{124}\) *See supra* notes 43–51 and accompanying text (discussing the methods of compensation for exonerees and their disadvantages); *supra* Part II.B (illustrating the detrimental effects of incarceration on individuals); *supra* Part II.E (describing the variety of compensation offered by different states).

\(^{125}\) *See supra* Part II.C (exhibiting the constitutional implications related to wrongful incarceration).

\(^{126}\) *See infra* Part IV.A (presenting a model statute for Indiana that provides the services exonerees need to begin rebuilding their lives).

\(^{127}\) *See Model Legislation, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/model-legislation#sthash.IRVH2gdk.dpuf [http://perma.cc/56L6-DDPT] (indicating that a reform is needed in the criminal justice system to protect the innocent and strengthen the work of law enforcement and prosecutors); *supra* note 13 and accompanying text (stating that the highest number of exonerations ever recorded in the United States was in 2014). As the number of exonerations increase, society’s obligation to exonerees also increases. *See Griffiths & Owens, supra* note 18, at 267 (stating that society should be held accountable for the unjust taking of exonerees’ freedom, regardless of mistake).

\(^{128}\) Mandery et al., *supra* note 14, at 556–57. Seeing that the contributing factors of false convictions do not typically encroach upon a constitutional right, difficulty surfaces when exonerees have to prove a constitutional violation occurred as a result of their wrongful conviction. *See supra* note 39 and accompanying text (displaying the common contributing
Indiana’s lack of a statutory compensation scheme heightens the burden of exonerees seeking redress in the State. The State is in a much better position than defendants to prevent wrongful convictions, thus, it should be held accountable for its mistakes. Indiana’s legislature should look to the Innocence Project’s recommended model legislation as a starting point for drafting a state compensation statute. In addition to developing a workable compensation arrangement, the State must also address the underlying causes of false convictions to prevent the systemic failures perpetuating the abundance of wrongful convictions.

Factors of false convictions and the number of exonerations that resulted from each factor; supra Part II.C (explaining the possible constitutional violations with respect to wrongful convictions). If exonerees are awarded compensation, it is limited to money and does not offer the support services needed to properly reintegrate back into society. See supra Part II.B (discussing the effects of incarceration on individuals and the resources needed, in addition to money, to successfully transition back into society).

129 See Scott, supra note 52, at 19 (revealing that in states where exonerees do not receive compensation, those individuals have more difficulty overcoming their mental health problems). Compensation statutes enable exonerees to live productive lives. Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 564. In states where a compensation statute is non-existent, courts struggle to provide exonerees with adequate compensation, causing further inconsistencies in their awards and elevating their struggles. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting manageable guidelines for a compensation statute that courts can follow); supra Part II.D (evidencing the disparities among the awards granted to exonerees in a state that lacks a compensation statute); supra Part II.E (discussing the compensation awards offered by other states).

130 See Mandery et al., supra note 14, at 564 n.58 (arguing that prosecutors and jurors should also pay a portion of the exoneree compensation for contributing to the wrongful conviction).

131 See infra Part IV.A (using the compensation statute proposed by the Innocence Project as a foundation for the statute Indiana should adopt). The Innocence Project cautions that “state laws vary greatly and there are important concerns to be addressed under each state law.” Model Legislation, supra note 17 at 6–7.

132 See supra note 39 (explaining the contributing factors that give rise to false convictions in the United States). The ABA has proposed reforms to address the underlying causes of false convictions in the United States. See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 100–07 (proposing reforms in prosecution practices such as: sufficient funding for the prosecutors’ offices, manageable workloads, procedures for evaluating cases, and preserving evidence for a reasonable period of time). Scholars have also argued that the prosecutor’s job should be to seek justice not victory. David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2010). One of the reasons for the increasing numbers of false convictions is because of the difference in power between the state and the defendant, which scholars call the power theory. Id. at 20–21. The state is in a better position than the accused because it has the resources to flip witnesses and generate plea bargains, while the defendants usually have attorneys that are overworked and have very little to no capacity to investigate the case. Id. The other reason is the sovereignty theory, where the prosecutors have an obligation to govern justly and impartially. Id. at 21.

To address the issues involving false confessions, the ABA suggests that all law enforcement agencies videotape their interrogations and if videotaping is not feasible, then audiotaping would be the next best option. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at xvii. The ABA also encourages states to implement legislation that requires taping of interrogations, offer state funding, and sanctions for noncompliance. Id.
Part III.A establishes why the model statute proposed by the Innocence Project should be the foundation from which Indiana’s statute is constructed. Part III.B analyzes the rigid eligibility requirements for exonerees to obtain compensation. Part III.C advocates a cap on the total monetary damages. Part III.D demonstrates the necessity of re-entry and re-integrative services for innocent ex-prisoners. Part III.E

The ABA’s eyewitness identification reform involves implementing guidelines for conducting lineups and photo spreads to improve their accuracy. It also recommends training on nonsuggestive techniques for interviewing witnesses and constructing a method for enforcing and updating the proper interviewing guidelines. The ABA suggests that photo lineups should include double-blind procedures, in which the detectives conducting the lineup are unaware of the identity of the suspect and informs the witness that the suspect may not be in the lineup, therefore, the witness is not obligated to select a person from the photo spread. Other reforms to photo lineups include: foils (provides a higher number of photographs for which the witness is to select the suspect), sequential procedures (showing the witness one photo at a time as opposed to a number of them altogether), and videotaping the line ups (to allow the judge and jurors to see whether the witness was affected by exterior forces when selecting the suspect).

To address the issues pertaining to forensic evidence, the ABA recommends that crime labs and medical examiner offices should be standardized. The ABA suggests funding the labs and requiring accreditation of the labs and offices as well as certification of the individual examiners. The ABA also suggests a requirement for appointing defense experts for indigent defendants because forensic evidence is crucial in these types of cases. The ABA also proposes forensic science training for all attorneys at a low cost so that lawyers are knowledgeable in the relevant area of law.

Because of the number of false convictions that arise from jailhouse informants, the ABA recommends that defendants should not be prosecuted solely on evidence pertaining to uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony. Additionally, the ABA suggests that federal, state, and local governments should guarantee “high quality” defense attorneys in serious criminal cases because of the greater potential of penalties for serious crimes and the danger of allowing the real criminal to roam free in the community.

To address issues with investigative policies and personnel, the ABA recommends adequate training and disciplinary procedures to ensure investigative personnel are properly equipped and held accountable for their actions. With respect to the forensic labs, the ABA urges improved training and accountability measures for police officers, and accurate collections and storage of evidence through funding mechanisms.

See infra Part III.A (discussing the monetary and support services suggested by the Innocence Project, which are suitable for compensating exonerees in Indiana).
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the stipulations that should be in place for exonerees to receive a judgment in their favor).
See infra Part III.C (suggesting a restriction on the total amount of money awarded to exonerees in Indiana).
See infra Part III.D (proposing immediate support services for exonerees to help them successfully transition back into society).
argues the need for an expungement provision eradicating exonerees’ erroneous conviction record.137

A. The Model Statute Proposed by The Innocence Project Provides a Solid Foundation for Indiana to Build Upon

The Innocence Project is intimately acquainted with the pain and difficulties exonerees face when released back into society and as a result, formed a series of recommendations for states to indemnify these innocent individuals.138 Its model legislation provides monetary compensation and support services to exonerees, generating consistent and just outcomes.139 However, the suggested proposal is imperfect.140

First, the legislation proposed by the Innocence Project allows compensation for individuals who entered into a guilty plea or false confession.141 This element is problematic because by professing guilt to a crime that one did not commit, the individual contributes to their false conviction and thus, should be held accountable for such actions.142 False confessions are among the major causes of unjust convictions, thus, the exoneree should be entitled to compensation only in circumstances where

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137 See infra Part III.E (demonstrating the importance of expunging the false conviction from the innocent individual’s criminal records).
138 See About Us, supra note 17 (revealing that the Innocence Project is a national organization that is committed to exonerating innocent people through DNA testing and reforming legislation). The Innocence Project provides details of individual exonerations involving DNA, offers reforms to current practices, and supplies detailed information of each state’s approach in addressing the issue of unjust incarceration. Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent [http://perma.cc/RH5H-YSMD].
139 See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 4, 9 (presenting the model legislation recommended by the Innocence Project, which provides the necessary support for exonerees).
140 See infra Part III.A–E (analyzing important provisions needed for Indiana’s compensation statute); infra Part IV.A (presenting the proposed compensation statute for Indiana, which provides monetary compensation and additional support for exonerees).
141 See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that an exoneree can obtain compensation if “[h]e did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence to cause or bring about his conviction. However, neither a confession or admission later found to be false, nor a guilty plea to a crime the claimant did not commit constitutes bringing about his own conviction under this Act”); infra Part III.B (arguing a need for rigid eligibility standards that do not allow compensation for voluntary conduct that resulted in the individual’s false conviction).
142 See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 11 (indicating that false confessions can deceive police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and juries into focusing the case on the innocent suspect, which often leads to the false convictions). Scholars argue that the consequence of a guilty plea is waiving the right to appeal the false conviction. King, supra note 40, at 218. Once an individual enters into a guilty plea, the courts generally will not listen to any arguments showing that he was coerced, a witness lied to the police, or that the forensic evidence was erroneous. Id.
the guilty plea or admission is involuntary or coerced.143 Next, the model legislation asks courts to consider economic and non-economic damages when rendering monetary compensation and does not provide a cap, which, in turn, could lead the State into a financial deficit.144 The same amount of money should be offered for each year the exoneree served wrongfully incarcerated, subject to a cap.145 This approach avoids the lengthy case-by-case litigation and generates consistency among the awards provided to the exonerees.146

The Innocence Project also recommends a variety of services that should be available for exonerees; however, this Note only focuses on the support services necessary for successful reintegration.147 Finally, the Innocence Project’s model legislation does not contain an actual expungement provision, but rather advises states that such an arrangement should be implemented.148 The expungement of the false

143 See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 11 (revealing that about twenty-five percent of wrongful convictions consisted of false confessions); infra Part III.B (allowing compensation for individuals who did not voluntarily bring about their false conviction). People generate false confessions for a multitude of reasons including: duress, coercion, intoxication, diminished capacity, mental impairment, ignorance of the law, fear of violence, the actual infliction of harm, the threat of a harsh sentence, and/or misunderstanding the situation. False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php [http://perma.cc/3LP5-STT8]. The burden should lie on the exoneree to prove that the guilty plea or false confession was involuntary. See infra Part IV.A (presenting a compensation statute for Indiana that restricts eligibility to individuals who did not voluntarily contribute to their false conviction).

144 See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 4–5 (recommending exonerees to be compensated for each year they served wrongfully incarcerated). The Innocence Project also suggests that the states should consider economic damages, which can include lost wages, costs associated with the criminal defense and efforts to prove innocence, medical, and dental expenses. Id. at 4. The non-economic damages suggested by the Innocence Project include physical injuries, sickness, non-physical injuries, or sickness due to the wrongful incarceration. Id.

145 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (revealing that the majority of damages awards in Indiana are subject to a cap). Consistency in awarding exonerees is important and the award should only be increased due to the number of years spent wrongfully incarcerated, on death row, parole, probation, or as a registered sex offender. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (providing examples from different states that award additional monetary compensation to innocent individuals who served time on death row, parole, probation, or as a registered sex offender).

146 See infra Part IV.A (presenting a compensation statute for Indiana that provides clear and consistent guidelines, and are not subject to the court’s discretion). The purpose of statutory compensation is to provide explicit guidelines for the courts to follow. Infra Part IV.A.

147 See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 4–5 (suggesting that support for children should also be provided); infra Part III.D (discussing the critical support services needed for exonerees, which includes physical and mental health care, counseling, tuition reimbursement, vocational and employment skills training).

148 See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 6–7 (“Because a criminal record can prevent a wrongfully convicted person from rebuilding a successful life, every state should include an
criminal record is critical because it can determine whether or not the exoneree secures employment to effectively transition back into society. Despite these amendments, the Innocence Project’s model legislation offers the most meticulous proposal, particularly in its eligibility requirements, and therefore, provides a solid foundation for Indiana’s wrongful incarceration compensation statute.

B. Indiana’s Statute Should Establish Rigid Eligibility Requirements

A statute that provides reparations to individuals who can prove that they have been wrongfully incarcerated and actually innocent of the charges is the best proposition for recovery. Therefore, the proposed statute for Indiana should limit compensation to individuals who can prove their factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Any higher burden than the recommended standard is unnecessary because it would require the exonerees to endure another lengthy litigation despite already having proven their actual innocence.

See infra Part III.E (discussing the importance of an expungement provision in the proposed compensation statute). See also supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text (revealing the significance of obtaining employment for exonerees, and the consequences of unemployment after release from prison).

See Model Legislation, supra note 17 (presenting the Innocence Project’s model legislation, which provides relevant sections including eligibility requirements, presentation of the claim, judgment and award, time limitation, right of appeal, and eligibility for immediate services); infra Part III.B (discussing the qualifications that should be implemented to successfully obtain compensation).

See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 113 (recommending the compensation statutes be designed to ensure that only actual innocent individuals recover, and to accelerate the procedure from exoneration to compensation).

See infra Part IV.A (specifying eligibility for compensation. “[C]onsistent with actual innocence” has a broad interpretation to it, but in this context, it means that the individual did not commit the crime and there is no indication of the defendant’s guilt in relation to the crime. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 115. In circumstances where the individual is released due to a procedural or legal violation, that person is not considered “actually innocent[,]” and therefore, unable to recover under the proposed statute. Id. There are occasions where an individual will be exonerated on one charge but still lawfully imprisoned because of another valid conviction. Id. at 117. The ABA rightfully suggests that individuals who are serving consecutive charges even if one of the charges is held to be invalid should not be compensated. Id. Further, the ABA states that “[t]he causation requirement that a claimant must have been incarcerated as a result of the conviction eliminates potential claims by those incarcerated for other crimes during the same period that they were serving a sentence due to the wrongful conviction.” Id. at 114. See infra Part IV.A (presenting a model statute that allows the courts to dismiss the claim if sufficient facts are not proven by a preponderance of the evidence).

See, e.g., supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (explaining the thirteen years and three trials Camm endured to prove his innocence); supra note 113 and accompanying text
Criminal justice reform advocates chastise the plethora of plea bargains, saying too much power rests in the hands of prosecutors who attempt to siphon guilty pleas.\textsuperscript{154} Other scholars argue that people who plead guilty or were coerced into confessing should not be restricted under these statutes.\textsuperscript{155} The ABA also reports that innocent individuals plead guilty in exchange for shorter sentences, therefore, the plea bargain should not automatically preclude recovery.\textsuperscript{156} Despite these remonstrations, including a provision that prevents individuals from recovering if they voluntarily contributed to their false conviction through a guilty plea, admission, or confession, limits recovery.\textsuperscript{157} Just as the state is held accountable for its actions by providing compensation, exonerees also need to be held responsible for their conduct that resulted in the false conviction.\textsuperscript{158} The proposed statute for Indiana should include a provision that states: “He did not by his own voluntary conduct, cause or bring about his conviction.”\textsuperscript{159} The term “voluntary” is paramount because, as

\textsuperscript{154} See Resnikoff, \textit{supra} note 13 (“At least [ninety percent] of criminal cases in the United States result in a guilty plea.”).  
\textsuperscript{155} Slifer, \textit{supra} note 49. Bruce Barket, an attorney who represented an exoneree stated that compensation is critical and he is shocked that there would be any arguments against it. \textit{Id.}  He said, “They can’t just pick up where they left off. They lost careers, jobs, families, the ability to build a career. Their lives were, in essence, destroyed.” \textit{Id.}  
\textsuperscript{156} See \textit{ACHIEVING JUSTICE}, \textit{supra} note 23, at 116 (indicating that plea bargains generally avoid a lengthier sentence if the individual were convicted after trial). The ABA cautions that care should be taken when prohibiting recovery to individuals whose behavior contributed to their conviction. \textit{Id.} at 115. The ABA further argues that false confessions should not bar recovery because it could have been coerced or unreliable due to police misconduct. \textit{Id.} at 115–116. This concern is especially important in circumstances where the defendant is an adolescent or mentally impaired. \textit{Id.} at 116.  
\textsuperscript{157} See N.Y. CT. CL. LAW § 8-b(4) (declining compensation to individuals who contributed by his conduct to his false conviction); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (limiting eligibility by preventing those who contributed to their false conviction from receiving compensation). Contributing to their false conviction is not limited to a confession, admission, or guilty plea. See also infra Part IV.A (allowing compensation for individuals who did not voluntarily cause or bring about his conviction).  
\textsuperscript{158} See \textit{Contributing Factor}, \textit{supra} note 39 (revealing that 221 of 1733 exonerees falsely confessed to a crime). Often times, the false confession led to their conviction. See \textit{supra} note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of entering into a guilty plea, which often leads to the false conviction and bars future recovery).  
\textsuperscript{159} See infra Part IV.A (presenting a statute that limits compensation for individuals who voluntarily contributed to their false conviction). Most state statutes do not allow compensation to exonerees who plead guilty or generated a false confession, but it is
previously mentioned, these acts are not always voluntary and are often obtained through coercion, torture, and other unjust mechanisms.\(^{160}\) Therefore, in circumstances where the false admission of guilt was involuntary, exonerees should be entitled to compensation.\(^{161}\)

C. Indiana’s Statute is Likely to Consider a Cap on the Monetary Compensation

Monetary awards are extended in almost every state that has adopted a compensation statute.\(^{162}\) The Innocence Project and the ABA recommend that states should consider economic and non-economic damages when determining the amount of money offered to exonerees.\(^{163}\) Critics argue that placing restrictions on the total amount of money offered to the exonerees leaves the individuals who spent the most time in prison at a severe disadvantage.\(^{164}\) However, state funds are not unlimited.\(^{165}\)

important to understand that these acts are not always voluntary and thus, should be remitted. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (providing the reasons why people typically generate false admissions).

\(^{160}\) See supra note 143 and accompanying text (listing circumstances where individuals will admit to crimes they never committed). Prohibiting compensation to individuals who have contributed to their unjust convictions denies justice to those who were coerced, explicitly or implicitly, into confessing or pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit. The Wrongly Convicted, supra note 15.

\(^{161}\) See supra note 143 and accompanying text (stating that the burden should be on the exoneree to prove their confession or guilty plea was involuntary). Some examples of involuntary admission include duress, coercion, and mental impairment. Id.

\(^{162}\) Griffiths & Owens, supra note 18, at 271. Compensation awards should not be unreasonable. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 116. “[L]arger awards, and provision for attorney’s fees, will not only ensure that wrongly convicted are adequately and fairly compensated for their loss, but will ensure that claimants can find counsel to assist them to pursue indemnification.” Id. See also Innocence Project Report, supra note 26 (describing the monetary compensation provided by each state that has adopted an exoneree compensation statute).

\(^{163}\) ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 116. According to the ABA, non-economic losses could include: pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of consortium, and loss of reputation; while economic losses consist of lost wages, costs expended for trials, and medical expenses such as psychological counseling after release from prison. Id. The condition of the imprisonment, such as death row, should also be a factor that increases the amount of compensation. Id. The ABA states exonerees should not be entitled to punitive damages. Id. Some states include a certain amount of recovery for each day or year of wrongful imprisonment, which the ABA argues is a mechanical approach that restricts recovery. Id.

\(^{164}\) Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 15, http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf [http://perma.cc/3SD3-VERS]. The average DNA exoneree in the United States spends between thirteen to as many as thirty-one years wrongfully imprisoned. Id. at 3. The ABA also states that if a cap is placed, it should be consistent with other existing caps in the state. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 116.

\(^{165}\) See infra Part IV.B (addressing the concerns of taxpayer dollars to fund the compensation awards).
Some state compensation statutes are outdated, providing meager amounts of money while others are relatively generous.\textsuperscript{166} Counterintuitively, other state statutes are too ambiguous and unduly discretionary, which results in disparate outcomes for individuals in similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{167} The level of disparity among the awards is heightened when the courts have the discretion to determine what they believe to be adequate compensation for each individual, which leads to a poor system overall.\textsuperscript{168} In the absence of a statutory compensation scheme, exonerees seeking redress for their unjust incarceration often file tort claims requesting exorbitant amounts of money, putting the state in a position to disperse more money in the end.\textsuperscript{169}

To combat the issues of monetary restrictions, Indiana should offer equitable compensation to exonerees.\textsuperscript{170} More specifically, the State should provide $62,500 for each year the individual spent wrongfully incarcerated and an additional $62,500 for each year spent on death row, to be pro-rated for partial years.\textsuperscript{171} An additional award of $31,000 should be given for each year the exoneree served on parole, probation, or as a registered sex offender.\textsuperscript{172} The cap for the wrongful incarceration compensation should be set at $2 million due to other existing caps in the State.\textsuperscript{173} The current legal standard and process are overly burdensome and those who have already suffered need immediate assistance.\textsuperscript{174}
Providing exonerees with adequate relief can help to reestablish their lives.175

D. Indiana’s Statute Should Provide Immediate Re-entry and Reintegration Services

The Stanford Prison experiment exemplifies a powerful illustration of the adverse effect of prisons on average, healthy, human beings.176 Individuals who spent a considerable number of years in prison cannot easily readjust to the outside world without assistance.177 Therefore, in addition to providing monetary compensation, Indiana should also provide immediate support services to its exonerees.178

The support services should include assistance with job and vocational training, placement services, and reimbursement for any tuition and fees paid for each semester successfully completed by the claimant in an educational program.179 Assistance should also be offered for mental health such as post-traumatic stress, counseling, physical and emotional services.180 Support services are especially important because

175 See supra Part IV.A (providing a statute that includes the necessary compensation for exonerees upon release from prison).
176 See supra notes 54–57 (revealing that even though it was an experiment (it was not conducted in an actual prison, and used healthy college educated males) the men’s behavior drastically changed for the worse and only within six days, causing researchers to terminate what was supposed to be a two-week long study).
177 ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 118. See supra Part II.B (discussing life after exoneration and the effects of wrongful incarcerations on exonerees); see also Scott, supra note 52, at 15 (discussing the problems exonerees face with excessive spending and budgeting).
178 ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 118. Instead of providing lump sums of money to exonerees, a better solution would be to provide support services and medical expenses, which would better allocate the needs of the exoneree and help them rebuild a stable life. Id.
179 Unlike probationers or parolees, who may have assistance in navigating access to public services or benefit from reentry plans, the newly released innocent person is simply set free.” Id. at 118. Experts indicate that if a state statute is enacted, it takes approximately three to seven years for exonerees to receive some form of compensation. Alcindor, supra note 36.
180 See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 118 (providing the ABA’s recommendations to offer services such as job and vocational training, mental health counseling, substance abuse programs, assistance in obtaining housing or food stamps, and a monetary stipend). The proposed statute also recommends that the state’s probation department or a department that addresses mental health services provide these services for exonerees. Id.
180 See Scott, supra note 52, at 13 (arguing that “counseling and psychotherapy and treatments are helpful”). John Wilson, a professor of psychology, studies the psychological impact of wrongful imprisonment and states:

I believe that the injuries from a wrongful conviction and incarceration are permanent. I think they’re permanent scars. And even though counseling and psychotherapy and treatments are helpful, I don’t think...
most exonerees have trouble budgeting and accrue large amounts of debts. The goal of providing support services is to assist exonerees in becoming self-sufficient again. In states like Indiana, that do not have a compensation statute, exonerees have a more difficult time confronting their mental health problems because they have very few alternatives. 

Indiana should bear these costs because exonerees are released into society traumatized by the injustice and forced to depend on family or friends solely because of a mistake made by the State. The statute’s purpose is to provide exonerees with immediate compensation, but in circumstances where it is not possible, the statute includes a section for immediate services. Because parolees are provided with support upon release in Indiana, the forms of assistance are already accessible and can be extended to exonerees. Indiana’s Section 8 Housing Program provides low-income individuals with assistance in securing housing. Additionally, Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration is in the best position to determine eligibility for immediate services because it provides employment opportunities and services to Indiana residents that seek to live productive lives. Since there are programs in place to assist parolees and low-income individuals in Indiana, extending these programs to exonerees would be a seamless process and would help you can undo the permanent damage to the soul of the person, to their sense of self, to their sense of dignity. 

Id. Wilson asserts that more mental health professionals should be trained to treat exonerated individuals and these specialists should be available through public agencies. Id. at 14. Limiting the amount of money exonerees spend does not fall on the state, rather, a compensation scheme that provides support services would help ensure that the resources are beneficial to the exoneree. Id. at 18. 

See supra note 62 and accompanying text (revealing specific instances where exonerees struggle to do everyday tasks). See supra part II.A (discussing the limitations for the current methods of compensation). See supra note 179 and accompanying text (presenting the ABA’s recommendation of services that the states should provide to the exoneree). See infra Part IV.A (allowing up to three years of immediate services for exonerees, which includes housing, education, vocational training, monetary services, and health care). See supra note 107 and accompanying text (presenting the services offered by Indiana’s Department of Corrections, which, if extended to exonerees would be an efficient way for Indiana to provide them with adequate and timely compensation). See Section 8/Subsidized Housing, supra note 107 (stating that Section 8 housing in Indiana helps offset the cost of construction and rehabilitation). See supra note 108 and accompanying text (indicating that Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration can provide the best outlet for exonerees because it already deals with the issues exonerees face upon release from prison).
alleviate some of the hardships exonerees face when transitioning back into society.\textsuperscript{189}

E. Indiana’s Statute Should Expunge the Exoneree’s False Conviction Record

Many states do not automatically expunge criminal records, causing exonerees to be continuously confronted with the stigma of a criminal record despite their proven innocence, which impacts their mental health and makes it even more difficult to reintegrate into society.\textsuperscript{190} Nevertheless, even if the states expunge the false criminal records, it does not erase the reality of what exonerees endure in their daily lives.\textsuperscript{191} Some states, however, offer an automatic expungement as soon as the individual is declared innocent and Indiana should follow suit.\textsuperscript{192}

The ABA states that an exoneree should be treated as if the conviction had never occurred for the purposes of any collateral sanctions or discretionary disqualification.\textsuperscript{193} Scholars reveal that lacking fundamental skills to accomplish daily tasks and requiring a disclosure of the false conviction are two key components that hinder exonerees’ ability to secure employment and live productive lives.\textsuperscript{194} Furthermore, scholars specify that difficulty with record expungement and the inability to attain a job further exacerbates exonerees’ mental illnesses.\textsuperscript{195}

Indiana must certify the expungement of false convictions because those that have established their innocence still struggle to obtain

\textsuperscript{189} See supra notes 107–08 (discussing the State programs currently in place, which could also provide exonerees with the assistance they need).

\textsuperscript{190} Scott, supra note 52, at 10. Exonerees are not entitled to continue working at the job they had prior to their arrest and when applying for new jobs, they must disclose their arrest and/or conviction, despite their proven innocence, which makes securing a job that much more difficult and consequently elevates any existing psychological problems the exoneree may have. Id. All the while, parolees are provided with free job placement, temporary housing, and counseling. Id. at 12.

\textsuperscript{191} Id. at 16.

\textsuperscript{192} See FLA. STAT. § 961.06(1)(e) (2016) (taking immediate action to expunge the criminal record and waiving any fees associated to the record expungement); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-702(b) (2016) (offering automatic expungement of the criminal record and mailing a copy to the exoneree to confirm the record expungement).

\textsuperscript{193} ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 119. The ABA recommends that procedures should be implemented to automatically expunge the criminal conviction and the innocent individual should be allowed to petition for expungement if the conviction remains on the record. Id. If needed, a provision should be incorporated to say that the individual is entitled to respond in the negative when asked under penalty of perjury if he has ever been convicted of a crime. Id.

\textsuperscript{194} See also supra Part II.B (introducing the effect of wrongful incarceration on exonerees and their need to secure employment once released from prison).

\textsuperscript{195} See Scott, supra note 52, at 10 (emphasizing the importance of record expungement for exonerees).
employment or professional licenses. The false conviction should automatically be removed from the court and police records upon exoneration. Record expungement is critical because it severely impacts exonerees’ ability to rebuild a successful life. Therefore, Indiana should provide monetary compensation, immediate support services, and record expungement for exonerees to ensure successful reintegration.

IV. CONTRIBUTION

Indiana’s failure to adopt an exoneree compensation statute provides courts with inordinate discretion and restrains exonerees to ineffective remedies. The lack of a compensation statute is callous and the need for a state law in Indiana is overwhelmingly clear. Indiana’s legislature should adopt a compensation statute that conspicuously outlines a path for the courts to follow and is consistent in its application. Additionally, the statute should provide exonerees with the critical support they need to alleviate some of the difficulties they encounter when released back into society. The following proposed statute addresses the inadequacies in the model legislation suggested by the Innocence Project, and furnishes the courts with concrete guidelines while procuring timely and adequate support for exonerees. Part IV.A proposes a compensation statute for Indiana that provides the resources exonerees need for successful reintegration. Part IV.B discusses commentary associated with this

196 ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 119 (revealing that the criminal record can affect exonerees’ ability to secure housing and other public benefits).
197 See infra Part IV.A (proposing state action to immediately expunge the criminal record upon exoneration).
198 Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 6.
199 See supra Part III.A–E (analyzing the need for critical provisions in Indiana’s compensation statute, including a strict eligibility requirement, cap on damages, support services, and record expungement); supra Part III.E (examining the importance of an effective expungement provision in the compensation statute Indiana should adopt).
200 See Scott, supra note 52, at 19 (“A majority of states have no statutory compensation scheme in place, and the wrongfully convicted in those states will bear a tougher burden to overcome their mental health problems upon release as there are few alternative routes to receiving compensation.”).
201 See supra Part II.D (revealing the inconsistencies among the awards granted to Indiana exonerees).
202 See infra Part IV.A (presenting a comprehensive compensation statute for Indiana to enact).
203 See supra Part III.A (evaluating the financial and support services that should be provided to exonerees upon their release from prison).
204 See supra Part III.A–E (examining the necessary provisions for Indiana’s compensation statute).
205 See infra Part IV.A (proposing an exoneree compensation statute for Indiana, which contains the necessary tools for successful reintegration after incarceration).
phenomenon and addresses possible apprehensions affiliated with adopting a state compensation statute.206

A. Proposed Wrongful Incarceration Statute for Indiana

Utilizing the model statute recommended by the Innocence Project and integrating pivotal provisions from different state statutes, the proposed statute aims to limit court discretion, while consistently providing exonerees with the relief they need.207 Although compensation statutes among the states vary in scope and application, the proposed statute targets the tribulations innocent individuals face upon release from prison and provides a precise and feasible standard for the courts to follow.208 A case-by-case analysis naturally encourages constant litigation, which can be challenging, expensive, and time consuming.209 The objective of the proposed statute is to eliminate this archaic approach altogether.210 The statute should appear as follows:

COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION211

SECTION 1. 4. ELIGIBILITY FOR COMPENSATION JUDGMENT AND AWARD

A. In order to obtain a judgment in his or her favor, claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. Claimant was convicted of one or more crimes and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the sentence; and

206 See infra Part IV.B (assessing some of the concerns regarding the implementation of a state compensation statute).
207 See infra Part IV.A (providing important components of an adequate exoneree compensation statute because some states provide too much compensation, while others do not provide enough).
208 See infra Part IV.A (presenting a compensation statute that directly addresses and provides services for the obstacles exonerees face once released back into society).
209 See supra notes 43–51 (explaining the problems in the current methods of compensation, which includes inconsistency, cost, and time).
210 See ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 112 (stating that compensation statutes are needed because the other options generate little success for exonerees). With scientific advancements on the rise, government officials will be better equipped to combat the issues resonating with our criminal justice system and the compensation statute will have to be tailored to remain consistent with the changing times. See Improper Forensic Science, supra note 12 (discussing the advantages of DNA in helping to resolve crimes).
211 The proposed italicized amendments are the contributions of the author. The text that has not been italicized represents the language as it appears in the model statute proposed by the Innocence Project. See generally Model Legislation, supra note 17 (exhibiting a practical foundation for Indiana’s model compensation statute).
a. Claimant has been pardoned for the crime or crimes for which claimant was sentenced and which are the grounds for the complaint; or
b. Claimant's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and:
   i. The accusatory instrument was dismissed; or
   ii. If a new trial was ordered, either claimant was found not guilty at the new trial or claimant was not retried and the accusatory instrument was dismissed, provided that:
      a. The judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, or the accusatory instrument was dismissed on grounds not inconsistent with innocence; or
      b. The statute, or application thereof, on which the accusatory instrument was based violated the Constitution of the United States or the State of Indiana.

2. Claimant did not commit any of the crimes charged in the accusatory instrument, or the acts or omissions charged in the accusatory instrument did not constitute a crime; and
3. Claimant did not by his or her own voluntary conduct, cause or bring about his or her conviction; and
4. He did not commit or suborn perjury, or fabricate evidence to cause or bring—about—his conviction. However, neither a confession or admission later found to be false, nor a guilty plea to a crime the claimant did not commit, constitutes bringing about his own conviction under this Act.

4. Claimant's claim is not time-barred by the provisions of Section 5 of this Statute.

B. If the court finds after reading the claim that the claimant has not alleged sufficient facts to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim, either on its own motion or on the State's motion.

SECTION 23. PRESENTATION OF CLAIM

All claims of wrongful conviction and imprisonment shall be presented to and heard by Indiana's the state's civil court, or the state's other appropriate administrative structure that handles similar compensation claims.
SECTION 34: JUDGMENT AND AWARD

A. If the court finds that the claimant was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated pursuant to Section 14, subsection A of this Statute Act, the court shall award:

1. Damages for the physical injury of wrongful conviction and incarceration, which shall be:
   a. Not less than $62,500 for each year of incarceration, with an additional $62,500 for each year served on death row. This amount shall reflect inflation from the date of enactment as adjusted by the State auditor and partial years the claimant served.
   b. An additional award of Not less than $31,000 shall be given for each year served either on parole, probation or as a registered sex offender, to be prorated for partial years served.
   c. Total monetary compensation awarded may not exceed two million dollars ($2,000,000).

2. Physical and mental health care, including counseling, for the life of the claimant through Indiana’s employees’ health care system, to be offset by any amount provided through claimant’s employers during that time period;

3. Reimbursement for any tuition and fees paid for each semester successfully completed by the claimant in an educational program or the education of the claimant and any biological children that were conceived prior to his incarceration for the wrongful conviction at any community college or other unit of the [State] public university system, including any necessary assistance to meet the criteria required therefor, or a mutually agreed upon vocational program; and employment skills development training;

4. Compensation for any reasonable costs incurred by claimant, between his release from wrongful incarceration and the date of his award, for immediate services secured upon exoneration and release, including housing, transportation and subsistence, re-integrative services and mental and physical health care costs; incurred by claimant for the time period between claimant’s release from wrongful incarceration and the date of claimant’s award; and
5. 6. Reasonable attorney's fees for bringing a claim under this Statute Act calculated at ten percent of the damage award plus expenses;
   a. These fees, exclusive of expenses, shall not exceed $75,000, as adjusted by the State auditor to account for inflation from the date of enactment; and
   b. These fees shall not be deducted from the compensation due claimant; nor is counsel entitled to receive additional fees from the client.

C. The damage award shall not be subject to:
   1. Any cap applicable to private parties in civil lawsuits;
   2. Any taxes, except for those portions of the judgment awarded as attorney's fees for bringing a claim under this Statute Act; or
   3. Treatment as gross income to a claimant under the provisions of Indiana's taxation code. [the State's taxation code]

D. The acceptance by a claimant of any such award, compromise or settlement shall be reduced to writing and is final and exclusive, except when procured by fraud.
   1. Be reduced to writing; and
   2. Except when procured by fraud, be final and conclusive on the claimant.

E. Any future damages awarded to the claimant resulting from an action by the claimant against any unit of government within Indiana [State] by reason of the same subject shall be offset by the damage award received under this Statute Act.

F. The damage award shall not be offset by any expenses incurred by the State or any political subdivision of the State, including, but not limited to: expenses incurred to feed, clothe, provide any service, or secure claimant's custody.
   1. Expenses incurred:
      a. To secure the claimant's custody; or
      b. To feed, clothe or provide medical services for said claimant; or
   2. The value of any services or reduction in fees for services, or the value thereof to be provided to the claimant that may be awarded to the claimant pursuant to this Act.

G. If the court finds that the claimant was subjected to a lien pursuant to defense services rendered by the State to defend the client in connection with the criminal case that resulted
in the wrongful conviction, the court shall extinguish said lien.

SECTION 4. EXPUNGEMENT OF CRIMINAL RECORD

A. If the court finds that the [claimant] is entitled to a judgment, it shall enter a Certificate of Innocence finding that the [claimant] was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated. 
B. Immediate action shall be taken to administratively expunge the claimant’s criminal record arising from his or her wrongful arrest, conviction, and incarceration. 
C. Upon entry of the order of expungement, the [circuit court] clerk shall promptly mail a copy of the order to the person whose records were expunged and sealed. 
D. All fees for this process shall be waived.

SECTION 5. TIME LIMITATIONS

A. An action for compensation brought by a wrongfully convicted person under the provisions of this Statute shall be commenced within two three years after either the grant of a pardon or the grant of judicial relief and the satisfaction of any other conditions described in Section 1, subsection A of this Statute; of Section 2 of this Act; provided, however, that any action by the State challenging or appealing the grant of said judicial relief shall toll said two three-year period. 
B. Persons convicted, incarcerated and released from custody prior to the effective date of this Statute shall commence an action under this Statute within two three years of said effective date. 
C. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, failure to file any applicable Notice of Claim shall not bar filing of a claim under this Statute.

SECTION 6. RIGHT OF APPEAL

Any party is entitled to the rights of appeal afforded to parties in a civil action following a decision on such motions as set forth in Indiana Code Sections: 22-9-8-1, 22-9-8-2, and 22-9-8-3. sections XX of said XXX of the [State] code.

SECTION 7. ELIGIBILITY FOR IMMEDIATE SERVICES

A. Any person wrongfully convicted and subsequently imprisoned pursuant to Section 1, subsection A of this Statute
for one or more crimes for which either he or she is pardoned on grounds not inconsistent with innocence, or the conviction(s) are reversed or vacated on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and either the charges are dismissed or he or she is subsequently re-tried and acquitted, shall receive up to three years of immediate services needed upon release and for successful return to society, including but not limited to: housing, which may include authorizing the prioritization of the wrongfully convicted as a category in Indiana's [State's] Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers program; secondary or higher education; vocational training; transportation; subsistence monetary assistance; assistance in obtaining government identification documentation; re-integrative services; and mental and physical, and dental health care.

B. The need for these services shall be determined through a review by the appropriate staff at the Family and Social Services Administration Department of Social Services [or [State’s] relevant agency], and provided by the appropriate State entities, or contractors thereof. 212

212 See Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 1 (including a section on legislative intent, which is excluded here because it is discussed throughout this Note). The statement of claim for compensation proposed by the Innocence Project has also been omitted, however, an “eligibility for compensation” section is provided, which was taken from the Innocence Project. Id. at 1–3. The language from Section 1.A.3 was taken from New York’s current statute. See N.Y. CT. OF CL. LAW § 8-b(5)(d) (McKinney 2016) (“He did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction”); supra notes 156–60 (discussing the importance of holding innocent ex-prisoners accountable for their voluntary actions that resulted in their wrongful incarceration). The language in Section 1.A.4 and 1.B were taken from the Innocence Project. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 2. The language in Section 3.A.1.c was taken from Florida’s statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06(1)(e) (2016) (“The total compensation awarded . . . may not exceed $2 million”); supra Part III.C (analyzing the need for a cap on the total monetary award allotted to exonerees). The language regarding compensation for counseling in Section 3.A.2 was taken from Connecticut’s statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e) (West 2015) (“Claims Commissioner may order payment for the expenses of . . . counseling”). Section 3.A.3 language regarding tuition reimbursement was taken from Minnesota’s statute. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365(4) (West 2015) (“[R]eimbursement for any tuition and fees paid for each semester successfully completed by the claimant in an educational program”). Compensation for children’s education expenses and child support is omitted because it is beyond the scope of this Note. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 4–5. The author of this Amendment has stricken the drafters’ note presented by the Innocence Project, which suggests a need for an expungement of the criminal record and/or a seal provision, and replaced it with a thorough expungement section. Model Legislation, supra note 17, at 6–7. Language from Illinois’ and Florida’s statute were taken to create Section 4. See supra Part III.E (illustrating the importance of expunging innocent ex-prisoners’ criminal records). Language from Section 4.A and 4.C were taken from Illinois’ compensation statute. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-702(b) (West 2016) (“If the
B. Commentary

Although releasing innocent individuals from prison may be seen as progress for many, each false conviction represents a tragic failure of our justice system. Indiana falls behind nationally because of its decision to disregard the opportunity to ratify a wrongful incarceration compensation statute. The absence of compensation for exonerees exacerbates their condition because by exonerating the individual, the State acknowledges fault, but in denying compensation, it is unwilling to remedy its mistake. Legislative action needs to be taken to provide an operative remedy for exonerees. Whether it is one life or one hundred lives, every life matters and seizing the liberty of innocent individuals cannot be justified.

See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (revealing that over 1700 individuals have been exonerated in the United States and 2014 was a record breaking year with 125 exonerations).

See Hoskins, Rising, supra note 90 (indicating that the potential for wrongful convictions in Indiana are expanding).

See supra Part II.B (illustrating the effects of false imprisonment on individuals even after being released from prison).

See supra Part IV.A (proposing model compensation legislation for Indiana). A state cannot reasonably expect an exoneree to survive without any assistance after being incarcerated for half of their lives, with no money and no place to go. See supra Part II.B (discussing a whole new set of struggles exonerees encounter once released from prison).

The statute of limitations for the majority of claims in Indiana is two years; therefore for consistency purposes, the time limitation presented in Section 5 for filing a compensation claim is limited to two years. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (detailing the types of claims that have a two-year limitation). The language in Section 6 is consistent with Indiana Code chapter eight on appeals and exhaustion of administrative remedies. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing the appeals process in Indiana). The language in Section 7 suggests that Indiana’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program is in the best position for providing exonerees with housing opportunities. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (introducing the services offered to low-income individuals). Additionally, Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration have the necessary resources that exonerees’ need to successfully reintegrate back into society. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (revealing FSSA’s mission of providing services to individuals to help them achieve self-sufficient and productive lives).
The firm guidelines in the proposed statute will facilitate a quicker compensation process and abate discrepancies in the awards amongst the exonerated in Indiana.\textsuperscript{217} Because the current avenues of compensation are inadequate and fail to provide clear or consistent standards, the proposed statute seeks to eliminate these irregularities.\textsuperscript{218} The recommended statute for Indiana is invaluable because it provides the courts with strict guidelines and maintains consistency in its application and outcome.\textsuperscript{219} The awards available to exonerees are clearly articulated in the statute; therefore, the impact of judicial resources and the time taken to go through the motions of each individual case are minimized.\textsuperscript{220} Additionally, the proposed statute provides an outlet for exonerees to get the appropriate support they need and deserve.\textsuperscript{221}

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\item See supra Part IV.A (proposing an Indiana model compensation statute). Courts cannot consume a lot of time to hear these cases, provide support services, and get money in the exonerees’ pockets as quickly as possible, thus eliminating potential discrepancies amongst the awards given to exonerees, unless one individual spent more time wrongfully incarcerated, is the best approach. See supra Part IV.A (introducing an award of $62,500 for each year of incarceration, with an additional $62,500 for each year served on death row). Indiana needs to implement a statute to limit court discretion and eliminate inconsistencies, especially because exonerees’ only options consist of seeking a private compensation bill or filing a tort or a civil action suit against the State, which often times are unsuccessful. See supra notes 43–46 (explaining the limited options of redress available to exonerees when pursuing a claim for wrongful incarceration).
\item See supra note 10 and accompanying text (revealing the numerous types of claims Camm filed because the State lacks a compensation statute). The lack of an existing compensation legislation for exonerees in Indiana places exonerees in a position to file tort or civil claims which, if successful, would end up costing the State a lot more money in the long run. Therefore, implementing a compensation statute that places a cap on damages, would benefit the State and its exonerees. See supra Part III.C (proposing a cap on total damages allotted to Indiana exonerees). The current methods of compensation do not provide feasible options for exonerees because the likelihood of prevailing in such lawsuits are highly unlikely and they do not provide the crucial support services needed for reintegration. See \textit{Achieving Justice}, supra note 23, at 112 (revealing that statutory compensation is the best avenue for exonerees seeking indemnification).
\item See supra Part IV.A (proposing a model statue for Indiana, which provides consistency and avoids overcompensating some exonerees while undercompensating others).
\item See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (illustrating the struggles exonerees face upon release). The benefits of a compensation statute is essentially threefold: (1) a statute providing clear guidelines benefits the state by limiting the amount of damages an exoneree is able to obtain; but also (2) provides the courts with a necessary tool to assess damages; and (3) helps to rebuild the life for exonerees; therefore, the importance of a compensation statute should not be minimized. See supra Part III.A–D (analyzing the critical components needed in an effective exoneree compensation statute).
\item See supra Part IV.A (proposing a compensation statue for Indiana so the State can take accountability for its mistakes and providing proper compensation to exonerees is the first step). The statute should also produce a deterrent factor that would trigger the courts and prosecutors to be more careful when prosecuting future defendants.
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Although the model statute provides a starting point for the courts, the statute itself is likely to change in the future due to technology and the evolving law.222 As a result, there are some concerns and criticisms that need to be addressed.223 One of the main apprehensions with implementing a state compensation statute concerns taxpayer dollars being expended to finance the awards.224 This concern is admittedly legitimate, however, exonerees still have a remedy at law, where they can—and frequently do—file lawsuits against the state with numerous claims relating to their wrongful incarceration.225 In these instances, some exonerees receive more money than what a majority of states would normally allow, and the money is still apportioned from taxpayer dollars.226 Therefore, the State should adopt a compensation scheme that features the type and amount of awards offered to exonerees, and while it is not ideal, placing a cap on the total monetary compensation available to each exoneree will limit recovery.227 Additionally, funneling costs to support services instead of providing a lump sum payment to exonerees also reduces the upfront costs to the state and allocates the money to better and much more effective use.228 Since the number of exonerations in

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222 See Dwyer et al., supra note 39, at 244–45 (discussing the advancement of scientific technology and its tremendous assistance in combating crimes and overall benefit to the criminal justice system). However, forensic techniques that can be properly authenticated such as blood typing are sometimes conducted incorrectly or portrayed inaccurately in trial.

223 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (listing Indiana as one of the states that has not adopted an exoneree compensation statute). Unfortunately, Indiana does not provide legislative history in terms of whether a state compensation statute was ever proposed, considered, or rejected; therefore, we are left to speculate the possibilities as to why a compensation statute in Indiana has not been adopted.

224 See Vera Institute, supra note 118 (housing a prisoner in Indiana cost the State $14,823 per year in 2012).

225 See supra note 10 (listing the damages Camm is seeking for his false incarceration because Indiana failed to adopt a compensation statute).

226 See, e.g., supra Part II.D (revealing the discrepancies in the monetary awards provided to exonerees in Indiana, which range from $100,000 to $4.9 million). In states that do not have a compensation scheme in place, exonerees are generally able to file lawsuits seeking exorbitant amount of money for the injustice they endured. See, e.g., supra note 10 (presenting the types of damages Camm is seeking as a result of his wrongful incarceration).

227 See supra Part IV.A (presenting a compensation statute for Indiana, which places a cap on the total damages to $2 million).

228 See Scott, supra note 52, at 15 (elucidating budgeting issues exonerees face, which would be especially problematic if they received lump sum awards). One argument asserts that Congress does not provide support services in its compensation statute, nor did it amend it, so that suggests that there is no need to provide exonerees with support services upon release. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2012) (offering only monetary compensation to exonerees). It is not fair to assume that Congress was aware of the impact wrongful incarceration had on individuals and therefore Congress’ lack of action is not a stamp of approval for not granting support services to exonerees.
Indiana is comparatively low to other states, the wrongful incarceration cases can be easily handled.

This discussion leads to the next concern, where critics argue that the relatively small number of wrongful incarcerations in Indiana indicates a statute is unnecessary. This argument begs the response that one wrongful conviction of an innocent, law-abiding citizen is a constitutional rights violation, and consequently cannot be justified. Indiana’s rate of exonerations in the recent years is the highest the State has ever seen and is projected to increase with modern technology. Exonerees must be compensated for a mistake that took, and continues to take their livelihood. Indiana needs to be held accountable for its actions in order to prevent this injustice from reoccurring in the future—providing redress for the exonerees is a start.

V. CONCLUSION

While fighting back tears, Camm said, “There are times when it is uncomfortable, but it is a process and I haven’t done anything wrong. I didn’t do anything wrong, I know that, so I can continue to walk with my head up. . . There’s no closure. It never ends. . . Time doesn’t heal. It just becomes a part of you.” Camm’s story is a single illustration of what life after exoneration entails in a state that does not provide financial assistance or support services to their exonerees. If Indiana had a compensation statute in place for wrongfully imprisoned individuals, Camm’s claim would have been easily managed, preventing lengthy litigation, while providing him with immediate and vital support.

History has shown that releasing a higher number of wrongly convicted individuals from prison will ultimately result in more claims against the state. Indiana has a moral and ethical duty to protect its citizens and its current method is failing. When the State fails to protect the freedom of innocent individuals, it not only reveals the flaws of our criminal justice system, but also allows the real criminals to remain in our

229 See supra Part II.B (exhibiting the adverse effects of prisons on individuals even after exoneration); supra Part II.D (revealing the issues resulting from a lack of a compensation statute in Indiana).

230 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (listing the states that have not adopted an exoneree compensation statute). Deterrents are crucial and if states are not held accountable, the increasing numbers of wrongful convictions are inevitable. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the reforms proposed by the ABA to reduce the number of wrongful convictions that take place in the United States).

231 McCutcheon, supra note 4.

232 See id. (interviewing Camm six months after his release from prison). Upon his release, Camm filed a claim against Floyd County, Indiana and numerous other defendants, seeking compensation for his wrongful incarceration. See Verified Complaint, supra note 7, at 73.
Given the rise of exonerations and its high probability of increasing in the near future, Indiana’s legislatures must address these issues now. “Only with a comprehensive compensation program and a criminal justice system that is held accountable, will wrongfully convicted individuals truly find some solace.” The fact that it is impossible to entirely compensate an individual for their loss of freedom does not excuse the State of its duty to remedy the injustice inflicted on exonerees. Indiana must adopt the proposed statute to alleviate the burden placed on the courts, but more importantly, to prevent cases tantamount to Camm’s in the future.

Maryam A. Afshar*

233 See PRISON PROJECT, supra note 23 (stating that more crimes will occur because the real criminal is out on the streets, while an innocent individual is serving time for a crime he never committed).
234 Scott, supra note 52, at 19.
235 Smith, supra note 3, at 12.
* J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University Law School, 2016; B.A., Political Science and Psychology, DePaul University, 2012. A special thank you to my mother, my father, my sister Ambar Afshar-Andrade, and my brothers Adeel Afshar and Arsalan Afshar for being my strongest supporters. Thank you Professor David E. Vandercoy for helping me solidify my Note and challenging me along the way. This Note is dedicated to my dear friend Wilberto Mendoza, may he rest in peace, and also to the innocent individuals who have suffered and continue to suffer from the adversity of the criminal justice system. May they truly find solace.