Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Urinalysis: The Constitutionality of Random Suspicionless Drug Testing in Public Schools

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Notes

LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF URINALYSIS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

As freshman Guy Good sits in his fourth period Spanish class at Garrison High School on the first day of school, his nerves have settled and he is excited about the various opportunities his school has to offer.² Like many high school freshmen, he is insecure about his developing body and is often uncomfortable in social settings. Unlike many of his peers, Guy has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, for which he takes Ritalin on a daily basis. Guy is frustrated by his disorder, but understands that he needs to take Ritalin to function productively and concentrate in school. Because he is self-conscious about his condition, Guy and his parents decided that they would keep this medical information confidential.

Ten minutes before the bell is due to ring for fifth period, the principal enters the class and demands that Guy follow him to his office. Guy is embarrassed by being singled out in front of his classmates, but knows that he has never caused any trouble. Still, he breaks into a nervous sweat when he hears the principal announce his name in front of the class.

Unbeknownst to Guy and his parents, over the summer, the school district implemented a random drug testing program and he is one of the students who has been selected. He is led to the restroom where the principal hovers behind him and demands that he produce a urine sample for testing and disclose any medications he is currently taking. Guy’s face turns pale and his mouth goes dry. With no choice, he produces the sample, reveals his Ritalin prescription, and leaves the principal’s office feeling violated.

Following recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment’s application to public school children, random suspicionless drug testing, like that at Garrison High School, has become a reality in American schools. This Note will address the constitutional boundaries of suspicionless drug testing for Guy and other students in public schools who may be subjected to such privacy concerns.

In doing so, Part II will first provide background information describing the structure of the Fourth Amendment and how it has been applied to the states, particularly in the public school setting. Part II.B will then introduce the “special needs” doctrine that the Court has created, which has allowed the government to circumvent the warrant and probable cause provisions of the Fourth Amendment. In addressing how the Fourth Amendment has been applied in the school environment, Part II.C will generally discuss the diminished constitutional rights afforded to students and how these rights differ from those of adult citizens.

Next, Part III of this Note will discuss how these decisions establishing diminished rights have paved the way for school districts to implement suspicionless drug testing for all students enrolled in public school. Part III will also examine the policies that have recently been implemented by school districts and how the Court might apply its previous decisions in determining their constitutionality. Finally, Part IV will propose a new test, which factors in the rights of the students’

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3 See infra Part II.A.
4 See infra Part II.B. While the “special needs” doctrine has traditionally been applied to criminal contexts, this Note will discuss how the Supreme Court has recently applied it to non-criminal conduct, particularly in the public school setting.
5 See infra Part II.C.
6 See infra Part III.
7 Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919. In this case, the school district’s drug testing policy was held to be unconstitutional after applying the balancing test that was implemented by the Court in Vernonia. Id. at 930; see infra Part IV.
parents, for courts to apply when addressing the privacy rights of students in public schools.8

II. BACKGROUND

To properly analyze the issue of suspicionless drug testing in public schools, Part II will discuss prior Supreme Court decisions that have led to the gradual erosion of the language of the Constitution and students’ constitutional rights. Part II.A will first explore the text of the Fourth Amendment and its subsequent interpretation by the Court.9 Next, Part II.B will discuss the special needs doctrine that the Court has used to circumvent the language of the Fourth Amendment.10 Lastly, this Part will interpret how the Court has applied the special needs doctrine in public schools.11

While the Supreme Court has held that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,” it has also held that students’ expectations of privacy are not the same as those of adults.12 In the face of the national “War on Drugs,” the Supreme Court held school policies implementing mandatory suspicionless drug testing for high school students to be constitutional despite the protections of the Fourth Amendment.13

8 See infra Part IV.
9 See infra Part II.A.
11 See infra Part II.B. The Court has conclusively held that schools are to be considered state actors in regard to the Fourth Amendment, stating:

If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students.

13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
In the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, school districts across the country have implemented drug testing policies that expand their reach to students who are involved in extracurricular activities or who drive to school, or even in some cases, to the entire student population. New Jersey has implemented a state-wide policy mandating that high schools conduct drug testing on their students. In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush proposed the allocation of $23 million in federal funding to schools that implement drug testing programs for students. However, while a bill requesting this funding was proposed in the House of Representatives, it was never enacted. This federal push to implement drug testing programs for all students is an indication of a future debate that the Supreme Court may have to decide: Is suspicionless drug testing constitutional for all high school students when they are subjected to compulsory attendance? This Note suggests that suspicionless drug testing is a violation of both students’
Fourth Amendment privacy rights and their parents’ fundamental rights to control the upbringing of their children.

A. The Limited Protection of the Fourth Amendment in America’s Public Schools

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides for individuals to be secure in their person as against unreasonable search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment contains two distinct clauses that must be considered separately. The first clause states that unreasonable searches and seizures will be unconstitutional. The second states that specific warrants, with a showing of probable cause, are required before the government searches property. The Supreme Court has previously held that the warrant clause is not suited for the school setting, and has only considered the first “reasonableness” clause of the amendment in its application with respect to students.
The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the public school environment is relatively undeveloped. However, recent Court decisions have established that schools are government agencies and that Constitutional protections will apply to searches administered by school administrators. At the inception of the Fourth Amendment, its fundamental basis was the protection of property interests, but the Court’s jurisprudence in the last century has determined that its focus should be interpreted as a protection of individual privacy. While the Supreme Court now recognizes privacy as a constitutional right, it is unclear what level of scrutiny it will use in a constitutional right of privacy challenge.

24 See Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-Wide Drug Testing, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 999, 1000 (1999). Traditionally, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has focused on searches and seizures in the criminal setting and only within the last fifty years has the Court considered its application in the school setting. Id. Prior to 1985, the first time the Fourth Amendment was addressed in the public school context, school officials were not considered to be government agents with respect to Fourth Amendment application. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325; Raby, supra, at 1000. The relationship between students and their teachers was analogous to that of a parent and a child. Raby, supra, at 1000; see also supra note 11


26 PALMER, supra note 13, at 69. Palmer concluded that this shift in interpretation indicates that privacy has become a constitutional right. Id. Decisions in the last century have accepted privacy as a constitutional right, but have tried to define exactly what level of privacy individuals should enjoy. Id.

27 Id. In a line of cases regarding abortion, the Court found the right of privacy to be a fundamental right found in the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 212; see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court has identified three levels of scrutiny that it will apply when a law or policy is challenged: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational basis test. PALMER, supra note 13, at 344. The most rigid of these tests is strict scrutiny, which requires the state to provide both a compelling state interest in the law, and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest. Id. Strict scrutiny is applied to rights that are enumerated in the Constitution, as well as to unenumerated rights that the Court has found to be fundamental rights. Id. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the state must prove that the law must “serve an important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 345. The rational basis test only requires that the legislature has a reasonable basis for enacting a particular statute. Id. As a result, most laws challenged under the rational basis test will be upheld. Id. While the Court has recognized the right of privacy as a fundamental right in other contexts, it did not apply any of the three levels of scrutiny described when determining what students’ expectations of privacy should be. Id. Instead, it focused on the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which most closely resembles the intermediate scrutiny test. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has identified situations where it is “reasonable” to perform the search and seizure of an individual in the absence of individualized suspicion. The Court has self-created these reasonableness exceptions and defined them as “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” In these special needs circumstances, the Court created a balancing test that compares the importance of the individual’s privacy interest against the governmental interest of waiving the warrant and probable cause requirements.

B. The Court-created Special Needs Doctrine and the Court’s Departure from the Language of the Constitution

In two cases decided on the same day, *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n* and *National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab*,

28 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, and a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion or wrongdoing. *Id.* In the criminal context, individualized suspicion is a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, but the special needs doctrine has allowed the government to search individuals in situations with no individualized suspicion of unlawful behavior. *Id.*

29 *Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n*, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”).

30 *Id.* Part of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee for people to be secure in their persons is that the government is barred from conducting unreasonable searches without some type of individualized suspicion, which requires a showing of probable cause. *Chandler*, 520 U.S. at 308. The Court’s application of the balancing test has been criticized for having a “thumb on the scale,” favoring the schools drug testing policy, as Irene Merker Rosenberg wrote:

Engaging in a reasonableness inquiry completely divorced from the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the majority manipulated the constituent factors in the balancing test, easing the government’s burden of establishing appropriate ends and means and minimizing not just the individual privacy right but also the intrusion on it . . . . [I]n effect, the requirement of a governmental interest of sufficient magnitude, an ends inquiry, has been diluted by allowing the other two balancing factors to be interjected into the government interest analysis before any balancing takes place . . . . Yet the balancing test itself demands that each factor—the private interest, the government interest, and the nature of the intrusion—be viewed in isolation before the balance is made, in order to assess correctly the magnitude of each of these factors.


31 *Skinner*, 489 U.S. at 619. In these cases, the Court ignored the “probable cause” requirement of the Fourth Amendment and developed the “special needs” doctrine to justify the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. *Id.* The Court determined that there were circumstances where an individualized suspicion is not
the Court developed the special needs doctrine and described how it applies in the context of non-criminal drug testing. In both cases, the Court first established that drug testing through urinalysis is a violation of an individual’s privacy and constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. After making this determination, the Court considered the reasonableness of non-criminal urinalysis searches in the government employment context. In doing so, the Court weighed the privacy interests of the individuals against the government’s interest in public safety.

necessary when the government has special needs that outweigh the requirements of probable cause and individualized suspicion. Id. at 624. While the Court did not specify what level of scrutiny it would apply, it stated that a search may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the privacy interests involved are minimal and where there is an important governmental interest. Id. Although this seems similar to intermediate scrutiny, the Court also concluded that the state had a compelling interest in drug testing its employees, and thus this program would have passed strict scrutiny. Id. at 633.

We have long recognized that a “compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search. . . . The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests. . . . [C]hemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests. . . . Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.

There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.

We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in

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33 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
34 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
36 Id. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677. These cases both involved government employees—railroad employees and customs agents. The Court in both cases held that their expectation of privacy was diminished due to their occupations. In Von Raab, the Court opined: We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in
1. *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n:* The Introduction of the Special Needs Doctrine and the Start Down the Slippery Slope

In *Skinner*, the Court considered a drug testing program implemented by the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") that required blood testing and urinalysis of employees who were involved in train accidents or violated certain safety rules. While there was evidence of a substantial drug and alcohol abuse problem with railroad employees in general, there was no individual suspicion, which the Court had previously required before subjecting an employee to a drug test.

To determine what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court administered a balancing test, weighing the governmental interest in requiring drug testing against the individual’s right to privacy. The Court determined that the governmental interest and special needs outweighed the individual’s right to privacy and that the drug testing in this situation was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court also reasoned that individualized suspicion was not required to make these searches constitutional; the overarching problem of the employees

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37 *Skinner*, 489 U.S. at 606. After evidence showed that drug and alcohol abuse had led to a significant number of train accidents, the FRA adopted safety standards for the railroad industry. *Id.* These standards included breath and urine tests to employees in violation of safety rules. *Id.* The Court cited a drug abuse problem affecting the railroad for over a century, and at trial, the FRA exhibited substantial evidence indicating that the use of alcohol and drugs on the job was a significant concern in the industry. *Id.*

38 *Id.* at 606. “When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause, we have usually required ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before concluding that a search is reasonable.” *Id.* at 624. *Id.* at 618. The Court stated: What is reasonable . . . “depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” *Id.* at 619 (citations omitted).

39 *Id.* at 633.
in general was sufficient evidence to satisfy the “reasonableness” requirement.41

But in his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority as being “shortsighted” in sacrificing “fundamental freedoms” in light of the national war on drugs, which he described as a “momentary emergenc[y].”42 Marshall was concerned with the majority’s willingness to stray from the language of the Constitution in favor of a pressing public concern.43 The Court’s eagerness to stray from the Constitutional language was again put to the test when it was faced with National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, a case with similar facts to Skinner, but without a reasonable suspicion of employee drug use.44

2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: Slipping Further, the Court Finds Drug Testing Constitutional Without a Showing of Reasonable Suspicion

The Court in Von Raab decided the constitutionality of a urinalysis drug testing program designed to test members of the United States

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41 Id. The Court concluded that the usual requirement of individualized suspicion would hinder the Railroad’s regulation program. Id. Later, the dissent in Vernonia v. Acton questioned that finding, stating:

One searches today’s majority opinion in vain for recognition that history and precedent establish that individualized suspicion is “usually required” under the Fourth Amendment (regardless of whether a warrant and probable cause are also required) and that, in the area of intrusive personal searches, the only recognized exception is for situations in which a suspicion-based scheme would be likely ineffectual.

515 U.S. 646, 676 (1995) (O’Connor, J. dissenting). The Court referred to the holding in Skinner, where a suspicionless test was first upheld, stating that, “it could be plausibly argued that the fact that testing occurred only after train operators were involved in serious train accidents amounted to an individualized suspicion requirement in all but name, in light of the record evidence of a strong link between serious train accidents and drug and alcohol use.” Id. at 675.

42 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). “Precisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great.” Id.

43 Id. at 655.

Customs Service ("Service") when they applied for transfers or promotions. Unlike the testing program in *Skinner*, the Service had not indicated a specific drug problem among its employees and it also conceded that the program had not been successful in discovering users. Additionally, Service employees, unlike most citizens, have a diminished expectation of privacy and bodily intrusions.

Despite a lack of individualized suspicion, or even a specific drug problem with the employees in general, the Court held that the governmental interest in administering drug tests on Service employees outweighed their privacy expectations. The Court also stated that the drug testing program substantially related to the Service’s goal of deterring suspect employees from obtaining highly sensitive positions.

Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in the *Von Raab* holding for the same reasons stated in *Skinner*. However, Justices Scalia and Stevens came on board in the *Von Raab* dissenting opinion and distinguished *Von Raab* from *Skinner*, arguing that there was no

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45 Id. at 660. These tests were required of employees seeking three areas of employment: “drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws,” carrying firearms, and the handling of classified material. Id. at 660-61. The laboratory specifically tested for marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. Id. at 662. Employees who test positive are subject to dismissal from the Service. Id. at 663.

46 Id. at 673. “[N]o more than 5 employees out of 3,600 have tested positive for drugs.” Id.

47 Id. at 672. The Court reasoned that Service employees have a diminished expectation of privacy compared to the average citizen because “successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity,” and they should not be able to keep information from their employers that bears directly on their fitness. Id. As a result, their privacy interest did not outweigh the government’s compelling interest in the safety and security of protecting our national borders. Id.

48 Id. at 677. These tests were upheld as they pertained to employees involved in drug interdiction and carrying firearms, but the testing pertaining to the handling of classified material was remanded because the Court felt that it was too ambiguous to uphold. Id. The government interest in this case involved ensuring that the front-line personnel were both physically fit and had “unimpeachable integrity and judgment” when evaluating those who cross the national borders. Id. at 670.

49 Id. at 676. The Court noted that Service employees often are exposed to criminal activities in the smuggling of drugs across the nation’s borders. Id. at 669. They are also tempted by bribes and have been highly involved with dangerous and illegal activity due to the high sensitivity of their position. Id. “The public interest likewise demands effective measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm, even if the incumbent is not engaged directly in the interdiction of drugs.” Id. at 670.

50 Id. at 680. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for sacrificing fundamental freedoms in light of a temporary war on drugs. Id. at 686-87; see *supra* note 44.
connection between the frequency of the use and the harm demonstrated by the Service, which was an essential factor in the Skinner decision.51 Because there was no showing of an actual problem in the field, Justices Stevens and Scalia opined that there was no social necessity like that demonstrated in Skinner, and therefore, no governmental interest strong enough to justify the drug testing policy.52

Despite strong dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court did not find suspicionless drug testing in the workplace to be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy until it considered such testing for candidates running for political office in Chandler v. Miller.53


The Court held suspicionless drug testing to be unconstitutional for the first time in Chandler.54 In Chandler, nominees for state office challenged a Georgia statute that required each nominee to submit to a drug test within thirty days of being elected or qualifying for election.55 In determining whether the testing was reasonable, the Court looked to guidance from its previous decisions in Von Raab and Skinner.56

51 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters felt that many of the facts the majority relied upon in Skinner were not present in Von Raab, stating, “The Court’s opinion . . . will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by urine testing. . . . To paraphrase Churchill, all this contains much that is obviously true, and much that is relevant; unfortunately, what is obviously true is not relevant, and what is relevant is not obviously true.” Id. at 681-82.
52 Id. at 683.

What is absent in the Government’s justifications—notably absent, revealingly absent . . . is the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of bribetaking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug use.

Id.
54 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
55 Id. at 308. The Court began its discussion by stipulating that urinalysis conducted by state officials has been established as a search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id; see supra note 34. The plaintiffs were members of the Libertarian party who challenged a Georgia statute that provided “[e]ach candidate seeking to qualify for nomination or election to a state office shall as a condition of such qualification be required to certify that such candidate has tested negative for illegal drugs.” GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140 (1993).
56 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
The issue in Chandler was whether the state’s interest in a drug testing program qualified as a special need. The Court stated that in order to satisfy the special need requirement, the reason for the test must be substantial enough to outweigh the individual’s privacy interest. While the state argued that the drug tests were justified, the Court concluded that there was no concrete danger that would allow a Fourth Amendment exception for suspicionless testing.

More specifically, the Court found that the state had no legitimate purpose behind the statute, which addressed a drug problem that could be dealt with by ordinary law enforcement. But the Court stressed that the decision in Chandler could only be read in its narrow context. Consequently, the Court held that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to outweigh the privacy interest of the candidates. Yet the Court concluded that blanket drug testing policies can be constitutional in some cases, stating, “But where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”

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57 Id. Candidates are given thirty days to be tested, are allowed to be tested by their own physician, and have access to the test results before anyone else. Id. at 318, 320. Once the urine specimen is provided, it is tested for five specified illegal drugs and the doctor prepares a certificate reporting the results of the candidate. Id. at 310. In the event that the candidate tests positive, he or she would have control over the release of the test results. Id. at 312. At that point, he or she could decide not to run for office and avoid anything being released to the public regarding drug use. Id. The information would also be kept from law enforcement. Id.

58 Id. Georgia based its argument on the incompatibility of drug use in state positions. Id. It argued that the candidate’s judgment and integrity would be impaired, which would detract from the public’s confidence in the candidate. Id. It also argued that anti-drug laws would be compromised. Id.

59 Id. at 318-19. From the oral argument, when asked if whether there were particular instances of drug use by state officials, counsel for the state answered, “No, there is no such evidence, [and] to be frank, there is no such problem as we sit here today.” Id. at 319.

60 Id. at 320. The Court found that the statute was not designed to identify candidates who were drug users, nor would it deter drug users from seeking state office. Id.

61 Id. at 320-21. The Court stated that there was a telling difference between the duties of the employees in Von Raab and the candidates in Georgia. Id. Public office candidates are subject to more public scrutiny, while customs employees are not subject to the same scrutiny as those holding traditional jobs. Id. The state relied heavily on the precedent established in Von Raab. Id.

62 Id. at 321-22. Instead of stating that the need of the state was a special need, thus qualifying as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court termed the need “symbolic.” Id. at 322. The Court went on to say that if a need only had to “set a good example,” then the Court’s opinions and descriptions in its previous cases that describe the special needs doctrine, were a waste of words and time. Id.

63 Id. at 323.
By 1987, the Court had established the framework of the special needs doctrine of the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, when it was first faced with a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy for students, it had to consider the doctrine against prior case law concerning the constitutional rights of students.

C. The Diminished Constitutional Rights of Students in Public Schools and the Enhanced Power of the State

The Court has been inconsistent in determining what legal status students have vis-à-vis public schools and how constitutional rights should apply to them. The Court’s “reasonableness” inquiry must consider “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, and at early common law, public schooling was not compulsory, and school administrators were considered to act in loco parentis. Under the in loco parentis doctrine, schools act in the role of parents in maintaining discipline in the school setting.

Since that time, with the advent of compulsory education laws in every state, schools have gradually taken on more of a state actor role, thus subjecting the school administrators to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Complimenting this change of jurisprudence is a recent, yet somewhat unrelated decision, Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court acknowledged that “our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance” in determining constitutional rights.

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64 See supra Part II.B.  
66 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.  
67 Raby, supra note 24, at 1009. In loco parentis is defined as “[a]cting as a temporary guardian of a child.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999).  
68 See Raby, supra note 24, at 1009; supra Part II.C.  
70 Id. at 571-72. While Lawrence was a somewhat unrelated case granting homosexuals a fundamental right of privacy against government intrusion under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was a big step for the Court in expanding the general right of privacy. Id. While the right of privacy is not specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution, it is now said to be a constitutional right found in the “penumbras” of the Bill or Rights. Id. at 595; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Suspicionless Drug Testing in Public Schools

T.L.O.\(^{72}\) was the first case in which the Court considered how the Fourth Amendment should be applied in the school setting.\(^{73}\)

1. **New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Limited Student Rights in Public**

   In *T.L.O.*, a high school teacher caught two female students smoking in the school bathroom, in violation of a school rule, and took them to the principal’s office.\(^{74}\) The vice-principal searched the purse of T.L.O., found evidence of marijuana use, and turned the purse over to police.\(^{75}\) T.L.O. filed suit and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “the broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school authorities.”\(^{76}\)

   The State of New Jersey’s first argument was that the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply to searches and seizures executed by law enforcement, not school officials.\(^{77}\) To address this issue, the Court considered whether public school officials are considered to function in the capacity of a state actor or that of a parent.\(^{78}\) The Court concluded that if school officials acted in a parental capacity, students would not be subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which requires the

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\(^{72}\) 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

\(^{73}\) *Id.*

\(^{74}\) *Id.* at 328.

\(^{75}\) *Id.*. The vice-principal was originally searching for cigarettes, but upon further examination, he discovered evidence associated with the use of marijuana and turned it over to police. *Id.* After removing the cigarettes, the vice-principal discovered rolling papers, then proceeded with a more thorough search of the purse, where he found a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a bundle of dollar bills, and a list of other students who owed T.L.O. money. *Id.*

\(^{76}\) *Id.* at 332. Lower federal and state courts have struggled in trying to balance the Fourth Amendment rights of students and the need for schools to provide a safe learning environment. *Id.* at 332 n.2. Some have viewed schools as private parties “acting in loco parentis and . . . therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.” *Id.* Other courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does apply in school settings, requiring probable cause before a search is constitutional, and in some courts the special needs doctrine has replaced the need for probable cause. *Id.*

\(^{77}\) *Id.* at 334.

\(^{78}\) *Id.* at 336. In addressing this issue, the Court considered previous decisions that have held school officials as state officials when applying the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (“The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. . . . The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty.”); *Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist.*, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”).
involvement of state actors. The Court also established that the concept of schools acting in a parental role is not “consonant with compulsory education laws,” and concluded that teachers do not act as surrogates of the parents and thus, do not have the same freedom from the constraints of the Constitution that parents enjoy.

After finding that school authorities are subject to the Fourth Amendment, the Court applied a reasonableness test to the specific facts of the case. The Court determined the reasonableness of the search by balancing the school’s need to search the student against a student’s right to privacy. This balancing test requires weighing a privacy interest that society is “prepared to recognize as legitimate,” against “the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.”

In addressing the issue of a student’s legitimate privacy concern, the Court first discarded the need for obtaining a warrant prior to searching a student. The Court next modified the requirement of suspicion and

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79 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. The Court rejected the notion that public schools exercise control as a parental figure, as they might in private schools. Id. The Court stated that such a view “is not entirely ‘consonant with compulsory education laws.’” Id.

80 Id. “If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students.” Id. The Court also stated that, “the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.” Id. at 343.

81 Id. at 337. “On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.” Id.

82 Id. According to the Court, a two-fold inquiry had to be satisfied: (1) whether the search was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the scope of the search was reasonably related to the circumstances. Id.

83 Id. at 338-39. The Court recognized that maintaining order in the classroom is a difficult task and drug use has become a major social problem. Id.

84 Id. at 340. The Court held that the warrant requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,” we hold . . . that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.

Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)).
rejected the “probable cause” requirement, stating that the school setting requires a reasonableness that “stops short” of probable cause.\textsuperscript{85}

The Court applied a two-prong reasonableness test that it had conceived in \textit{Terry v. Ohio}.\textsuperscript{86} Under this test, “one must [first] consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception’ . . . [and] second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”\textsuperscript{87} Accordingly, the Court held that the vice-principal did not act unreasonably in his search of T.L.O. regarding the cigarettes or the subsequent search for marijuana.\textsuperscript{88} The decision in \textit{T.L.O} established a diminished right of privacy for students in public schools, setting the precedent for the Court to follow in reviewing a challenge to a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy.\textsuperscript{89}

2. \textit{Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: Urinalysis of Student Athletes Without Individualized Suspicion}

While \textit{T.L.O.} addressed how the Fourth Amendment applies in the school setting, it did not address whether individualized suspicion was a necessary requirement in applying the reasonableness balancing test.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Id.} at 341. The Court opined that probable cause is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search, stating, “Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interest suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Id.; see} \textit{Terry v. Ohio}, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1962) (a criminal case involving an officer who searched the outer clothing of a criminal suspect and found a pistol in his pocket).

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{T.L.O.}, 469 U.S. at 341. The Court stated:

\begin{quote}
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} at 341-42.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Id.} at 346-47.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Id.} at 342 n.8. However, in other contexts, the Court has held that “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.” \textit{Id.} “Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where ‘other safeguards’ are available ‘to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’” \textit{Id.} (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
But in *Vernonia School District 47* v. *Acton*, the Court was confronted with the issue of a generalized high school drug testing program.

In *Vernonia*, the school district introduced the Student Athlete Drug Policy, which authorized random drug tests for its student athletes. The school district implemented its drug testing program after recognizing a sudden influx of drug use in its schools. Athletes were particularly subject to the drug testing because the school district claimed that the athletes were at the forefront of the school’s drug culture.

As a result, the drug testing policy was implemented and applied to all students involved in interscholastic sports. The express purpose of
the policy was to prevent drug use and to promote safety in the school district. The policy required students to submit to a drug test at the beginning of the season for their sport and also required written consent from both the student and his or her parents to be subjected to random testing throughout the school year. With his parents as co-plaintiffs, James Acton, a seventh-grade student athlete in the Vernonia school district, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the policy was a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

In reviewing the school district’s policy, the Supreme Court first considered the nature of the privacy interest at issue. The Court asserted that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective expectations of privacy,” and an expectation of privacy will differ depending upon the individual’s relationship with the state. In regards to the Vernonia School District’s policy, the Court determined that it was crucial that the policy pertained to children who were in the temporary custody of the state.

While the Court recognized that minors lack some of the fundamental rights of adults, it reiterated its holding from T.L.O. that schools do not act in loco parentis over its students. However, the language of the Amendment does not mandate individualized suspicion as a necessary component of all searches and seizures, the historical record demonstrates that the framers believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of reasonable searches and seizures.”

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96 Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 651. Acton also made a claim that the policy violated Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution, which does not pertain to this Note. Id. at 652.
99 Id. at 654.
100 Id. (stating that an individual’s expectations of privacy will vary depending on whether the individual is “at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park”). The Court made only brief mention of the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment; it instead circumvented the “probable cause” and “warrant” language of the Amendment and quickly jumped into the discussion of the special needs doctrine because this did not concern criminal acts. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 353.
101 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
102 Id. at 654-55. Despite the view taken by the Court, it also recognized that it “ha[s] acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities act in loco parentis,’ with the power and indeed the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). The Court has determined that private schools are in loco parentis, and are thus exercising the role of a surrogate parent in regard to its students. Id.; New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985). If a school is said to act in loco parentis, it is not considered to be a state actor, and thus, is free to conduct searches outside the scope of the Constitution. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
Court emphasized the “custodial and tutelary” power of schools that allows for schools to apply a degree of supervision to students that is greater than that imposed on adults. 103 Additionally, the Court stated that the school’s custodial and tutelary responsibility should be taken into account when considering the reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment protection of students. 104 But after recognizing a diminished expectation of privacy for students in general, the Court still held that student athletes have an even lesser expectation of privacy due to the nature of athletics. 105

After considering the scope of the privacy intrusion, the Court considered the character of the intrusion. 106 Reiterating that drug testing by urinalysis should involve the utmost privacy protection, the Court determined that collecting a urine sample in the manner done by the Vernonia School District was non-invasive and thus created a negligible privacy concern. 107

The Court also considered whether or not the school had a compelling interest in conducting urinalysis drug testing on student athletes. 108 Specifically, the Court defined this interest as one “that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.” 109

103 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55 (suggesting that T.L.O. emphasized this view, instead of denying it). The Court then limited this protection, stating, “we do not . . . suggest that public schools . . . have such a degree of control . . . to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect.’” Id. at 655 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).

104 Id. at 656 (citing to vision, dental, and hearing tests that are routinely performed on students, as well as state required immunizations, which are requirements for all public school students).

105 Id. at 657. “School sports are not for the bashful. They require ‘suiting up’ before each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford.” Id.

106 Id. at 658.

107 Id.

108 Id. at 660. Relying on its holdings in both Von Raab and Skinner, the Court looked to whether or not the school district “demonstrate[d] a ‘compelling need’ for the program.” Id. at 661.

109 Id. While the difference between “compelling” and “important” may seem to be of little significance, the language is highly significant when it relates to the level of scrutiny being applied by the Court. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 364. In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court found the governmental interests to be “compelling,” which indicates that the regulation was examined under strict scrutiny. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. Under strict scrutiny, the law or regulation would be presumptively invalid unless the government could show a compelling state interest and the Court determines that the law was narrowly
Instead only an “important” need, and the Vernonia School District’s policy satisfied the governmental interest requirement without individualized suspicion because the need to prevent athletes from drug use outweighed the student’s expectation of privacy. 110

Finally, the Court narrowed its opinion, declaring that its decision applied solely to student athletes because of the immediate threat of physical harm that athletes may face from drug use.111 The drug testing policy in Vernonia was found reasonable, and thus, constitutional, because it fell within the reasonable role that the school takes on as a guardian and tutor.112

After the decision in Vernonia, district courts were split as to how far the scope of student drug testing should extend, particularly as school districts drafted drug testing policies that reached beyond student tailored to achieve its purpose. See PALMER, supra note 13. Interestingly, the Court downplayed the significance of the “compelling” language in determining the government’s interest, by stating, “[i]t is a mistake . . . to think that the phrase ‘compelling state interest,’ in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: is there a compelling state interest here?” Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. Instead of answering this question in isolation, the Court determined that the school district had an important interest “in light of” the other factors involved in the search. Id. Additionally, instead of considering each prong of the balancing test individually, and then measuring the competing interests, the Court bolstered its governmental interest here, but injected the other two prongs into its analysis of the governmental interest. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 365.

110 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. The Court interpreted the phrase “compelling state interest” differently than it has in prior cases. Id. In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has interpreted it to “describe[] a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern.” Id. The Court stated, “[w]hether that relatively high degree of government concern is necessary in this case or not, we think it is met.” Id. Additionally, School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe. “Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound”; “children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor.”

111 Id. at 662. “Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes.” Id. The Court accepted the district court’s finding that there was an immediate threat to safety, that the athletes were rebelling and that the problem had reached “epidemic proportions.” Id. at 663 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)).

112 Id. at 656.
In 2002, the Court granted certiorari in a case involving a school policy that extended drug testing to all students participating in extracurricular activities.114


In 1998, the Tecumseh, Oklahoma school district implemented a policy that required all students involved in extracurricular activities to submit to random drug tests.115 Respondents, who were involved in extracurricular activities at the school and subjected to random drug testing, challenged the constitutionality of the policy under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the school district failed to identify a special need for the policy.116 Additionally, respondents argued that the policy should be based on at least a minimum level of individualized suspicion.117 However, the Court reiterated that individualized suspicion is not always necessary and a search without such suspicion may be constitutional when there are “special [governmental] needs.”118

First, the Court addressed the privacy interest that the drug testing policy threatened to violate.119 Respondents argued that students participating in extracurricular activities other than sports were not subjected to the same communal undress and physical examinations as athletes.113

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115 Id. at 826. The policy required students to take a drug test prior to participation in an extracurricular activity, and also to be subjected to random testing throughout their involvement in the activity. Id. The policy reached to programs “such as the Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom pon, cheerleading, and athletics.” Id.

116 Id. at 826-27. Respondent, Lindsay Earls was involved in show choir, marching band, the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society. Id. at 826. Respondent, Daniel James was seeking participation in the Academic Team. Id. at 827. Again, the respondents included students who were denied participation and their parents. Id. Despite the fact that the parents were parties to the suit, the Court never mentioned the interest the parents have in raising their children as they see fit. Id. Petitioners challenged the policy both on its face and as applied to students involved in extracurricular activities. Id.

117 Id. at 829. Respondents did not challenge the application of the policy to athletes and did not make a probable cause argument and asked the Court only to consider individualized suspicion. Id.

118 Id. “We have long held that ‘the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion.” Id.

119 Id. at 830.
athletes, and therefore had a greater expectation of privacy.\textsuperscript{120} But the Court discarded that argument, stating that “[t]his distinction . . . was not essential to our decision in \textit{Vernonia}, which depended primarily upon the school’s custodial responsibility and authority.”\textsuperscript{121} Next, the Court considered the second prong of the balancing test: the level of intrusion imposed on the students by the drug testing policy.\textsuperscript{122} The Court emphasized that although urinalysis testing should be afforded substantial privacy, the need to monitor and supervise students must be considered as well. Accordingly, the Court found the drug testing policy in \textit{Earls} to be very similar to that in \textit{Vernonia}, in fact, even less intrusive, and concluded that the invasion of the students’ privacy was insignificant.\textsuperscript{123}

The Court’s third and final issue to consider was the “nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them.”\textsuperscript{124} Because no individualized concern in the school district existed, the Court addressed the drug abuse problems confronted by youths in general, stating that, “the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id.} at 831. The \textit{Vernonia} Court decided that students who subject themselves to competitive extracurricular activities subject themselves to the same diminished privacy as student athletes. \textit{Id.} The Court recognized that some of these activities required off-campus travel and the same communal undress experienced by student athletes. \textit{Id.} Further, many of these activities were highly regulated by the policies of the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activity Association. \textit{Id.} The Court found this regulation to be analogous to the adults who choose to work in a highly regulated industry such as in Von Raab and Skinner. \textit{Id.} at 832.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Id.} at 831. The Court then explained that students involved in extracurricular activities also have subjected themselves to limited expectations of privacy similar to those of athletes. \textit{Id.} The Court used the example of clubs and activities that require off-campus travel and communal undress. \textit{Id.} at 832. The Court also placed significance in the fact that the school board’s policy required that the test results remain confidential and access to them was only on a “need to know” basis. \textit{Id.} at 833. The school policy also assured that the outcome of the test would not have any criminal repercussions or any bearing on the student’s academic standing; the only punishment would be a denial of that student’s extracurricular activity and notification of the student’s parents. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Id.} at 832.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id.} at 833 (holding that this policy was even less intrusive than that of \textit{Vernonia} because the results were not turned over to law enforcement, there was no academic disciplinary action, and the only discipline applied was limiting the student’s participation in the extracurricular activity).

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id.} at 834. Again, the Court did not specifically address a standard of review that must be met. \textit{Id.} at 836. The Court found the school district’s concerns to be “legitimate,” but never made any mention of a “compelling” standard that would be required under strict scrutiny. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} at 834. The Court cited studies that showed the rising number of high school seniors reporting they had used drugs since 1995. \textit{Id.} For instance, the number of seniors
relied heavily on the suspicionless policy it upheld in Von Raab, noting that drug abuse is a national problem and because the government has a need to prevent this problem, the Court accepts the school district’s immediacy argument, making the drug testing necessary under the test established in Vernonia. In expanding Vernonia, the Court emphasized that the safety interest in deterring drug use is important to all students, not just athletes.

However, Justice Ginsburg, joined by three other justices, wrote a scathing dissenting opinion, stating that, “The particular testing program upheld today is not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse: Petitioners’ policy targets for testing a student population least likely to be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging effects.” The dissenters opined that the lack of suspicion prior to the implementation of the policy was a dispositive factor in distinguishing this case from Vernonia,
which cited a specific problem great enough to invoke the special needs doctrine.\textsuperscript{129}

The dissent argued that the \textit{Vernonia} decision could not be interpreted to “endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life and health of those who use them.”\textsuperscript{130} The dissent also pointed out that the \textit{Vernonia} majority conspicuously did not go so far as to permit drug testing of all students enrolled in public schools.\textsuperscript{131}

The \textit{Earls} dissenters then addressed each step of the \textit{Vernonia} balancing test, first considering the nature of the privacy intrusion.\textsuperscript{132} Specifically, Justice Ginsburg examined the \textit{Vernonia} Court’s specific emphasis on the limited privacy expectations of student athletes, who subject themselves to communal dressing by choosing to “go out for the team.”\textsuperscript{133} While the \textit{Vernonia} Court held that athletics are “not for the bashful,” the \textit{Earls} dissent held that other extracurricular activities cater to all types of students, including those who are modest and shy.\textsuperscript{134}

In examining the third prong of the balancing test—the immediacy of the governmental concern—the dissenters focused on the stark contrast between the reasoning behind the policy in \textit{Vernonia}, and that in \textit{Earls}, where the school district had consistently reported to the federal government that no drug problem existed in its school district.\textsuperscript{135} The dissent agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, that “without a demonstrated drug abuse problem among the group being tested, the

\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. at 844.
\item Id. (stating that a student who has a personal privacy interest in the items she brings to school should also have that same privacy expectation regarding the chemical composition of her urine).
\item Id. at 845 (stating that if it had chosen to extend such testing to all students, it “could have saved many words”). As Justice Ginsburg interpreted the Court’s decision in her concurring opinion in \textit{Vernonia}, “the Court’s opinion . . . reserve[s] the question whether the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all students required to attend school.” \textit{Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton}, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
\item \textit{Earls}, 536 U.S at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
\item Id.; \textit{Vernonia}, 515 U.S. at 657.
\item \textit{Earls}, 536 U.S at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent next considered the second prong of the \textit{Vernonia} test, “the character of the intrusion . . . complained of,” which is outside the purview of this Note; for a discussion of this topic, see \textit{id. at} 842.
\item Id. at 849 (citing Tecumseh School’s Application for Funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Program, stating, “types of drugs [other than alcohol and tobacco] including controlled dangerous substances, are present [in the schools] but have not identified themselves as major problems at this time”).
\end{enumerate}
efficacy of the District’s solution to its perceived problem is . . . greatly diminished.”136

Finally, distinguishing the drug testing in Earls from the suspicionless testing in both Skinner and Von Raab, the dissent found that both policies were implemented to save lives rather than to protect the health risks that are associated with drug use.137 The dissent noted the “sad irony” of the schools tutelary and custodial responsibility, which “require[s] them to ‘teach by example’ by avoiding symbolic measures that diminish constitutional protections.”138

According to the dissent, Vernonia was a correct decision for two reasons: (1) the “special health risks” of student athletes; and (2) the school district’s contention that the athletes “were the leaders of the drug culture” that the policy was intended to punish.139 Neither of these reasons were present prior to the school district’s policy in Earls, which the dissenters suggested should be the dispositive factor in holding such a policy unconstitutional.140 Yet while the dissent attempted to distinguish Earls from Vernonia, it failed to mention a significant fundamental right, which was present in both cases, but never considered: parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children.141

D. Do Parents Have a Voice in the Matter?

In both Vernonia and Earls, the parents of the students also refused to consent to the drug testing and were parties to the suit against the school.142 Noticeably absent in the Court’s discussion in either case was

136 Id. at 850 (quoting Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1277 (10th Cir. 2001)).
137 Id. at 851-52.
138 Id. at 855. “That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). Additionally, in T.L.O., the Court had emphasized that children learn as much by example as by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections.
140 Id. at 849.
141 Id.; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000).
142 Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648.
any mention of parents’ interest in controlling the upbringing of their children.\textsuperscript{143} While the Court’s standard of review regarding parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children has not always been consistent, it has recognized that a parent’s right to control the upbringing of their children is a fundamental right protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{144}

However, the Court has not consistently applied a level of scrutiny when adjudicating the parental right to control the upbringing of children.\textsuperscript{145} The plurality opinion in \textit{Troxel v. Granville} labeled the right

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648.
\item \textsuperscript{144} \textit{Troxel}, 530 U.S. at 65-66. Summing up its jurisprudence in this area, in the plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote:
\begin{quote}

The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in \textit{Meyer v. Nebraska}, we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.” Two years later, in \textit{Pierce v. Society of Sisters}, we again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” We explained in \textit{Pierce} that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” We returned to the subject in \textit{Prince v. Massachusetts}, and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”
\end{quote}
\item \textsuperscript{145} The opinions . . . recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.” \textit{Id.} Most rights that are labeled as “fundamental” by the Court will be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, even though it is a fundamental right, the Court offers limited protection of parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children. Deana A. Pollard, \textit{Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional Analysis}, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 454 (2002). The Court has never applied
\end{itemize}
of parents to control the upbringing of their children as a fundamental right, but refused to establish an applicable level of scrutiny. Yet in a prior case, *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, the Court demonstrated the flexibility of its application of the parents’ fundamental rights, and struck down a state compulsory education law when it combined the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights with the parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children. The plaintiff’s argument in *Yoder* challenging the state’s compulsory education law was bolstered by the hybrid challenge.

But the Court’s precedent in hybrid cases is still unclear when challenges are made combining the parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children with an enumerated constitutional right, but the Court’s holdings in *Yoder* and *Troxel* could strengthen a plaintiff’s argument when challenging a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy. If the Court were to consider this fundamental right in the future, its outcome may be different from the few limitations school districts now have following the holding in *Earls*.

E. Limitations on School Districts Post-Earls

The Supreme Court has not suggested that there is any limitation on how far school districts can expand drug testing policies. Nonetheless, there has recently been a push by some states and the federal government to pursue these policies more aggressively. In his 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush proposed federal funding for such programs, stating:

strict nor intermediate scrutiny to the parental right and the strength of this fundamental right is still unclear. *Id.*

146 *See Troxel*, 530 U.S. 57.


148 *Id.* at 233.

149 *Id.* The Court stated, “rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.” *Id.*

150 *Ross*, supra note 144, at 185.


In my budget, I proposed new funding to continue our aggressive, community-based strategy to reduce demand for illegal drugs. Drug testing in our schools has proven to be an effective part of this effort. So tonight I proposed an additional $23 million for schools that want to use drug testing as a tool to save children’s lives. The aim here is not to punish children, but to send them this message: We love you, and we don’t want to lose you.154

While a bill was never promulgated,155 the White House has continued to pursue its aggressive policy toward student drug testing through the Office of National Drug Control, whose director, John P. Walters, has labeled student drug testing as the “silver bullet” in combating student drug use.156 Despite the strong push by the federal government and the Court’s willingness to uphold school district drug testing policies, there has been some restraint shown in not allowing universal drug testing in public schools.157 In 2001, the Northern District of Texas decided the constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing program that applied to all students enrolled in a public school.158


In 2001, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas struck down a school district’s drug testing policy that extended to all students.159 Because this case was decided prior to the Earls decision,

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154 Bush, supra note 16.
155 Empowering Parents and Teachers for a Drug-Free Education Act of 2004, H.R. 3720, 108th Cong. § 2(d) (2004). The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives and proposed $23 million in funding. Id.
158 Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919.
159 Id. at 920 n.1. Prior to the implementation of the policy in question, Lockney Independent School District had established a suspicion-based testing program for all students and staff members who had a reasonable suspicion of being under the influence at school functions. Id. A reasonable suspicion was said to exist when a student or staff member displayed “at risk” behavior. Id. The school district discussed a policy that would apply to students involved in extracurricular activities, but, after debate, the school board made a final decision to subject all students to a suspicionless drug testing program that would require mandatory testing for all incoming sixth graders and monthly testing of 10%
the court used the Vernonia balancing test and determined that the drug testing policy was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{160} The court reasoned that compulsory attendance is different from the voluntary participation in extracurricular activities and it would not be reasonable to subject all students to suspicionless drug testing.\textsuperscript{161}

More specifically, in Tannahill, the court recognized that the general student population should enjoy greater privacy than student athletes.\textsuperscript{162} Additionally, the court distinguished suspicionless drug testing of students from the testing imposed in highly regulated industries, holding that the government did not have a compelling interest in implementing such drug tests in public schools.\textsuperscript{163} Though the district court recognized the good faith attempt of the school district, the court found the privacy rights of students to be more important than the governmental interest.\textsuperscript{164}

While this drug testing policy was declared unconstitutional under the Vernonia balancing test prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Earls, such post-Earls policies may withstand constitutional challenges by

\textsuperscript{160} Id. at 920-22. The school board cited a significant drug problem in the area as its reason for implementing the program. Id.

\textsuperscript{161} Id. at 930-31. In its interpretation on the Vernonia decision, the United States District Court of the Northern District of Texas relied on the Supreme Court’s discussion as to why student athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy than the student population in general. Id. at 929. The Texas Court said that “compulsory attendance at school is much different than voluntary participation in extracurricular activities.” Id.

\textsuperscript{162} Id. “Every child, at least in Texas, must attend school. School attendance does not trigger an instant diminution of rights.” Id. at 929 n.22 (quoting Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989)).

\textsuperscript{163} Id. at 930.

[The] academic studies of a student, while very important, do not embody the immediate and severe life and death repercussions as do the decisions of these employees. A student’s tools of pens, notebook paper, and protractors have never been equated with locomotives, the hazardous chemicals and equipment of a custodian, the firearms or interdiction efforts of a customs agent, or the prescription pads and EKG machines used by a physician.

\textsuperscript{164} Id. The district court stressed that the student body in general has a higher expectation of privacy than the student athletes in Vernonia, whom the Supreme Court decided had a lower expectation of privacy. Id. The district court also rejected the school district’s rationale for the suspicionless drug testing program, which was that the school district had a significant drug and alcohol problem. Id. The school district’s prior drug testing program had been in place for several years, yet had never encountered a single incident of drug use indicating a drug problem in the school district. Id.
applying the less restrictive reasoning used in Earls. Following the Court’s decision in Vernonia, district courts were split on the issue of how far student drug testing policies could extend. Now, with the more expansive decision in Earls, school districts have again been given no specific limitations as to which students should be subjected to suspicionless drug testing.

In recent years, schools have extended their drug testing policies beyond that of student athletes and students participating in extracurricular activities. Some schools have expanded the reach of their drug testing policies to students who drive to school, while others have expanded the reach to all students enrolled at the school. While the Court has emphasized the importance of limiting students’ exposure to suspicionless drug testing to those students who have voluntarily subjected themselves to privileged activities, the Court’s holding in Earls opened the door to suspicionless testing for an even broader category of students, which could have dangerous implications on students’ rights to privacy while also sending a message contrary to the fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence—guilty until proven innocent.

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167 Earls, 536 U.S. 822.
170 See Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646. The decisions in both Earls and Vernonia spend a great deal of time discussing how lower expectations of privacy are appreciated by our “students” in our “public schools” before going into an analysis of how it applies specifically to athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities. Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 360. Rosenberg states that this general classification of students is telling because there is no reason that a drug testing policy that is made applicable to all students would be given any less deference than that applied to student athletes. Id. In assessing the governmental interest in conducting suspicionless drug testing, the Court first considered how drugs can have more damaging and addictive effects on developing minds than on adults. Id. The Court also considered the effects of drugs on the school population as a whole, the parens patriae interest the school has over the children, and the special need athletes may have in the examination of their physical health and their diminished expectation of privacy. Id. As Rosenberg points out, only the last factor, applying to student athletes, would have an application that would not also apply to the student population as a whole. Id. In Earls, the Court considered the same factors, but made the same exception for students involved in extracurricular activities. 536 U.S. at 838. In reading the Court’s reasoning for students involved in extracurricular activities having a
III. ANALYSIS

Since the introduction of the special needs doctrine in *Skinner* and *Von Raab*, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions have gradually broadened the doctrine’s scope.171 This Part will first demonstrate how a school-wide drug testing policy would likely be upheld if the Court were confronted with the issue today.172 Part III will also discuss the negative effects such a policy would have on America’s youth.173

The cases discussed in Part II of this Note described the route the Court took in diluting the language of the Fourth Amendment to uphold the constitutionality of suspicionless student drug testing.174 Additionally, Part II demonstrated how the Court has been inconsistent in its application and has given great deference to school policies, which cite society’s drug problem with no reference to individualized suspicion in schools.175 Part III.A will discuss how the *Earls* Court disregarded much of the reasoning it used in *Vernonia* to again broaden the scope of student drug testing.176

Part III will look at each element of the Court’s reasoning to demonstrate how the same reasoning would apply to all students enrolled in a public school.177 Part III.B will discuss the social policy of sending a message to schoolchildren that they are guilty until proven innocent, and the importance of preserving the constitutional rights of students in public schools.178 Finally, Part III.C will discuss the possibility of compulsory drug testing at schools and will discuss how a blanket policy such as the national “war on drugs” should not be adequate to substitute for the individualized suspicion that was previously required before conducting searches in schools under the Fourth Amendment.179

lesser expectation of privacy, it is hard to find a meaningful difference between the communal undress experienced in extracurricular activities to that of a required physical education class. Rosenberg, supra note 30.

171 See supra Part II.C.
172 See infra Part III.C.
173 See infra Part III.B.
174 See supra Part II.
175 See supra Part II.
176 See infra Part III.A.
177 See infra Part III.
178 See infra Part III.B.
179 See infra Part III.C.
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A. The Earls Expansion of Reasonableness and the Flexibility that the Decision Creates for Schools To Impose Drug Testing Policies

While no court has ruled on the constitutionality of a drug testing program as applied to all students since Tannahill, the reasoning in Earls suggests that such a policy might be held constitutional if the issue were to arise in the future. When the Court upheld the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing in Von Raab, Skinner, Vernonia, and Chandler, it was careful to suggest that its decisions were only based on the balancing of the unique factors relevant to each case. However, the Earls decision again left school districts guessing as to how far they can go in administering suspicionless drug tests to their students. To demonstrate, it is first necessary to examine the erosion of students’ privacy interests that occurred between the decision in Vernonia and in Earls.

1. The Nature of the Privacy Interest Intruded Upon

In Vernonia, where the constitutionality of suspicionless testing for student athletes was upheld, the Court first discussed how student athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy because of the communal undress they are subjected to on a routine basis. While the Vernonia Court spent a significant amount of time explaining the diminished privacy expectations of athletes, it quickly dismissed the significance of the student athlete status in Earls. In fact, in Earls, the Court stated that the Vernonia language regarding student athletes was not central to its decision, and in any event, students involved in extracurricular activities are subject to the same types of intrusions as athletes. After determining that the characteristics of student-athletics were not a central issue, the Court defended its prior reasoning and stated that many clubs and activities participate in off-campus travel and communal undress, which lessens the students’ right to privacy. However, as the dissent in Earls points out, it does not make sense for the Court to write...
extensively on an aspect of its reasoning unless it is central to its holding.\textsuperscript{188}

Additionally, the Court’s argument that students’ rights to privacy are lessened because they are already subjected to health tests such as vaccinations and physical exams also goes unfounded.\textsuperscript{189} While students are required to submit to such examinations, these tests are performed by an individual student’s family physician and can be done on the student’s own time.\textsuperscript{190} These tests are not conducted in search of “anything in particular,” and thus, there is nothing to give rise to suspicion.\textsuperscript{191} Such tests do not violate the student’s right of privacy as much as subjecting the student to a random test while at school under the close scrutiny of a supervisor who hovers behind the student providing the urine sample.\textsuperscript{192}

While the Court in \textit{Vernonia} and \textit{Earls} opened the door to school district drug testing policies for students involved in athletics and extracurricular activities, it conspicuously omitted discussion as to whether such a policy should apply to all students.\textsuperscript{193} However, by its broad rationale, any student participating in physical education class, which is mandatory in many states, could be subjected to suspicionless drug testing.\textsuperscript{194} Like the communal undress, which the Court used to justify an eroded privacy interest in the athletic context, students involved in physical education are also required to change clothes and shower for class.\textsuperscript{195}

Participation in physical education class also places students in the same health risk category, due to the physical exertion, that the Court heavily relied upon in upholding drug testing in \textit{Vernonia}.\textsuperscript{196} Like athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities, all students enrolled in public school are required to receive various vaccines and

\textsuperscript{188} Id.
\textsuperscript{189} See supra Part II.C.3.
\textsuperscript{190} Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 312 (1997). In \textit{Chandler}, this was a factor added to the balancing test which diminished the argument for an invasion of privacy. Id.
\textsuperscript{191} Id.
\textsuperscript{192} \textit{T.L.O.}, 469 U.S. at 340.
\textsuperscript{194} Raby, supra note 24, at 1024 (discussing why all students in public schools should be subjected to random drug testing).
\textsuperscript{195} Id.
\textsuperscript{196} Id.
physical examinations, again leaving them subject to suspicionless drug testing following the reasoning in *Earls*.197

2. Character of the Intrusion

The *Earls* Court next determined the nature of the intrusion introduced by the school policy.198 Neither the *Earls* Court nor the *Vernonia* Court gave much weight to students’ rights of privacy, notwithstanding precedent that described privacy as, “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”199 Instead, the Court compared the privacy intrusion to conditions “typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially schoolchildren use daily.”200

This comparison fails to consider important differences between typical urination in a public restroom and the method of drug testing that requires a student to urinate under surveillance.201 One does not typically expect to be monitored while urinating in a public restroom with the expectation of producing a urine sample for inspection.202 Also, one typically urinating in a public restroom is not required to capture his or her urine in a container, which will later be subjected to scientific drug analysis.203 Finally, students subjected to such random testing are often removed during class hours and required to urinate in a designated testing area.204

The Court’s determination of such a limited privacy interest is also contrary to its privacy evaluation in *Skinner*, where it noted that the urinalysis was less intrusive because the urine sample was collected in a medical office and was not subject to close monitoring of a supervisor.205 Also, the testing in *Skinner* was conducted by an anonymous medical practitioner, as opposed to a familiar teacher whom the students would be interacting with on a daily basis.206 These factors, which were directly emphasized in prior case law, were not even considered by the Court in

197 *Id.*
198 *Earls*, 536 U.S. at 832.
202 *Id.*
203 *Id.*
204 *Id.*
205 *Id.*
206 *Id.*
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Valparaiso or Earls.207 As a result, while the Court in Vernonia overlooked many factors it could have considered in evaluating the student’s privacy interest, it gave even less weight to the student’s right of privacy in Earls.208

3. Immediacy of the Governmental Concern

Finally, the Earls Court found a pressing concern by meshing the limited evidence of drug use in the school district with the national concern of a drug epidemic.209 The Court relied heavily on its decision in Von Raab, which held drug testing constitutional on a mere showing that drug abuse is a serious societal problem.210 However, these societal issues were applied in Von Raab on the specific facts of the case, which were “installed to avoid enormous risks to the lives and limbs of others, not dominantly in response to the health risks to users invariably present in any case of drug use.”211

Similarly, the school district in Vernonia cited a drug culture in its schools to support the argument for a need to drug test its students without a prior showing of individualized suspicion.212 It argued that there was substantial evidence of the drug culture among the students, and that the athletes were the leaders of that drug culture; as a result, it also argued that it needed to implement a drug testing policy to identify which students were using drugs.213 As a result, the Vernonia Court allowed the school district to have both sides of the argument—both a justification for the testing by having an identified problem and the burden of identifying the source of the problem.214 Such an allowance leaves students with no protection against suspicionless searches.

208 Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646, with Earls, 536 U.S. 822. The Court determined the invasion to be “negligible” in Vernonia, but the Earls Court, without defining the interest, gave even less weight to students’ privacy interests.
209 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836. The school district, in years prior to the policy’s adoption, had reported to the Federal Government that “types of drugs [other than alcohol and tobacco] including controlled dangerous substances, are present [in the schools] but have not identified themselves as major problems at this time.” Id. at 849.
210 Id. at 850.
211 Id.
212 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
213 Id. at 649-50.
214 Id. In its argument for the implementation of suspicionless drug testing, the Court discussed the burden placed on teachers who would have to identify students who might have problems with drugs. Id. at 648-49. At the same time, the Court justified its decision...
Despite the Court’s insistence that Von Raab, Skinner, and Vernonia were to be interpreted narrowly on the unique facts of each case, the Earls Court interpreted these decisions broadly in an effort to combat the national drug epidemic.\textsuperscript{215} As Justice O’Connor eloquently wrote in her dissenting opinion:

> It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis. But we must also stay mindful that not all government responses to such times are hysterical overreactions; some crises are quite real, and when they are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest that we have said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional rights. The only way for judges to mediate these conflicting impulses is to do what they should do anyway: stay close to the record in each case that appears before them, and make their judgments based on that alone. Having reviewed the record here, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the District’s suspicionless policy of testing all student athletes sweeps too broadly, and too imprecisely, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{216}

In the history of the Constitution, the Court has been wary of blanket suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment and the dissent was quick to note that threats such as the “war on drugs” should not have superseded the traditional requirement of individualized suspicion.\textsuperscript{217} In fact, prior to the cases discussed in Part II of this Note, suspicionless tests were determined to be per se unreasonable in light of the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{218}

The Vernonia dissent mocked the majority opinion that individualized suspicion is only “usually required”.\textsuperscript{219} As Justice O’Connor wrote, “One searches [the Vernonia majority’s opinion] in vain for recognition that history and precedent establish that individualized

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\textsuperscript{215} See supra Parts II.B-II.C.

\textsuperscript{216} Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 686 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.C.2.


\textsuperscript{218} See supra Part II.C.2.

\textsuperscript{219} Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 676.
suspicion is ‘usually required’ under the Fourth Amendment (regardless of whether a warrant and probable cause are also required).”

B. A Message to Our Children: You Are Guilty Until Proven Innocent

While there is no doubt that the goals of such drug testing policies are well intended, such policies send the wrong message to the youth of America. Constitutional guarantees should sometimes be challenged the most when they are under the guise of working for the benefit of society.

Despite the benevolent intentions of the school districts, these drug tests send a message to children that they are guilty until proven innocent, turning the fundamental American tenet of presumed innocence on its head. Schoolchildren in America are educated at a young age about the freedoms, privileges, and liberties guaranteed by our government, yet are deprived of all of these when they are subjected to suspicionless drug tests in public schools. “[M]any schools, like many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do otherwise.”

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220 Id. The Court recognized that the only exception would be in situations where a suspicion based search would be ineffectual, which it did not consider to be the case in Vernonia.


222 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

223 Brief for Respondent at 17, supra note 221, at 17. This is inconsistent with the Court’s view that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).

224 Jackson, supra note 201, at 695. Adolescents are taught about the values of our society in the home and at school, so it is important for the educators to respect the role they play in preparing students for the responsibilities and expectations of society. Anthony G. Buzbee, Who Will Speak for the Teachers? Precedent Prevails in Vernonia School District v. Acton, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1229, 1230-31 (1996). “The duty to prepare a child for ‘additional obligations,’ . . . must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.

225 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 682.
The Court in Chandler addressed the role of government as a leader by example, quoting prior case law, “Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”^{226} The government does not play a more important role in teaching by example than it does in the public school environment, where children are first introduced to the values of our government.\(^227\) Constitutional rights should especially be protected in the school environment where we are teaching students the value of citizenship.\(^228\) Otherwise we “strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”\(^229\)

Although the Court in both Vernonia and Earls relied heavily on the school’s role as a custodial and tutelary institution that acts in loco parentis,\(^230\) it failed to consider the effect of treating students like second-class citizens and the message such treatment conveys to the students.\(^231\) Additionally, though the Court has established that the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining safety in its school districts, subjecting students to suspicionless testing is neither the most efficient nor the most effective means of achieving such a goal.\(^232\)

C. Compulsory Education Equals Compulsory Drug Testing?

The Court has already extended its special needs analysis to school districts wishing to drug test athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities, but it has not yet decided the constitutionality of a policy that applies to all students enrolled in public schools.\(^233\) Despite compulsory education laws and the Court’s recognition of the importance of education in our society, the Court has been reticent in recognizing education as a fundamental right.\(^234\) While the Supreme Court has not included education as a fundamental right, and thus does not require strict scrutiny be used when examining state laws, most

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\(^{226}\) Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485)).


\(^{228}\) Id.


\(^{229}\) Id.


\(^{231}\) Jackson, supra note 201, at 695.

\(^{232}\) See infra Part IV.

\(^{233}\) See supra Part II.C.

states have concluded that education is a fundamental right under their respective state constitutions.\textsuperscript{235} 

The Court, however, in its recognition of the importance of education in the United States, stated that “education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.”\textsuperscript{236} While such a right may not be enough to require strict scrutiny of state legislation and school board policies, it might outweigh the school’s need to impede on students’ rights to education when it is combined with the parents’ rights to raise their children and students’ rights to privacy.\textsuperscript{237} 

In both the \textit{Vernonia} and \textit{Earls} decisions, the Court refers to governmental needs that apply to schoolchildren in general, but makes narrow holdings based on students’ participation in athletics or extracurricular activities.\textsuperscript{238} In contrast to the situations in \textit{Skinner} and \textit{Von Raab}, where employees of closely regulated industries were subjected to random drug testing, and had the option to seek another job, public school children would not have any other option if they chose to protect their bodily integrity by refusing to submit to suspicionless drug testing.\textsuperscript{239} 

While there is no doubt that students benefit from the education they are provided, such education should not be deemed a privilege when examined in light of compulsory education laws. It is an unnecessary invasion of a student’s right to privacy to be subjected to compulsory drug tests without a showing of an individualized suspicion or a compelling state need.\textsuperscript{240} 

\textbf{IV. CONTRIBUTION} 

While education may be another approach to combating a national drug problem, it is not the role of the federal government to control how school districts deal with their respective disciplinary issues.\textsuperscript{241} School
districts are permitted to make this decision at their discretion.\textsuperscript{242} This Part suggests that the Court should add a fourth factor to its balancing test: parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children. The Court should also implement a strict scrutiny standard of review to apply to the governmental interest prong of the balancing test for suspicionless drug testing policies, which would require the school district to show a “compelling” interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal.\textsuperscript{243}

A. The Proposed Balancing Test

The revised balancing test would take into account: (1) the nature of the privacy interest compromised by students who are subjected to such testing; (2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the policy; (3) the compelling governmental concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them; and (4) the parents’ fundamental Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights to control the upbringing of their children.

1. A Proposed Fourth Prong to the Balancing Test: Parents’ Right to Control the Upbringing of Their Children

In both \textit{Vernonia} and \textit{Earls}, the claims challenging the drug testing programs in question were brought by both the students and their parents.\textsuperscript{244} Because the parents had concerns about the school district violating the privacy rights of their children, they did not sign the consent form allowing the searches. While they were free to refuse signing the consent form, their children were denied the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities. At that point, a concerned parent’s only option was to file a lawsuit or allow his child to be deprived of the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities.

\begin{footnotes}

\footnotetext[242]{Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. “[C]ourts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s program of compulsory education.” \textit{Id}.}


\footnotetext[244]{Bd. of Educ. v. \textit{Earls}, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); \textit{Vernonia}, 515 U.S. 646.}

\end{footnotes}
Pressure to comply with such testing would be even greater in school districts that impose drug testing on all students. Parents would not have a choice in the matter and would have to consent to the testing or send the child to a private school. Despite this concern, the Court’s current stance seems to open the door to such testing in public schools, which leaves parents with very little control over the upbringing of their children.

While the parental interest in their children’s right of privacy is great, the Court does not even consider this interest in *Vernonia* or *Earls*. This should be another factor considered by the Court in its balancing test, especially when the claim is brought by both the student and the student’s parents. The Court’s decisions regarding the parents’ rights to raise their children against the school’s interest in maintaining order have been mixed, but the plurality decision in *Troxel v. Granville* held that it was a fundamental right.

In *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, the Court combined the parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children with an enumerated First Amendment right to defeat the state law. The Court may not have come to the same decision had it simply been a First Amendment challenge or a right of the parents to control the upbringing challenge, but by combining the two constitutional rights, the plaintiffs were able to defeat the state’s compulsory education laws. This type of hybrid challenge should also be available to parents challenging a school district’s drug testing program.

Moreover, the Court needs to be more consistent in its application of the parental right to raise children. Giving such substantial weight to the parents’ right in *Yoder* and *Troxel*, then failing to mention that right in *Vernonia* or *Earls*, creates cloudy precedent for lower courts to follow. Such inconsistency supports the argument that the Court simply applies whatever test it deems necessary to reach the predetermined result of its choice. But giving parents a waiver or an option to opt-out would be a sufficient solution. Some parents may welcome the school’s assistance in monitoring their children, while others may choose to trust their children or handle such issues within the family.

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245 *Earls*, 536 U.S. 822; *Vernonia*, 515 U.S. 646.
247 *Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205.
2. Strict Scrutiny Application to the Governmental Concern Prong

In dealing with the special needs doctrine, the Court has been inconsistent in what standard of review it applies to the governmental concern prong. The two decisions regarding suspicionless drug testing in schools have also been unclear as to what standard the Court will apply. This confusion is understandable considering the competing rights involved in such testing, but to establish a more concrete precedent, the Court must establish a standard of review for such cases. This Note proposes that such drug testing policies be subjected to strict scrutiny.

Under strict scrutiny, the school testing policy would be presumptively invalid, but could be upheld in situations of individualized suspicion and in situations where the school district can establish a prevalent drug problem or individualized suspicion that would require a drug testing program. These situations would give the school district a compelling reason to implement such a program.

Strict scrutiny would be appropriate because of the several rights which are at issue in such testing. A hybrid of both the students’ enumerated Fourth Amendment rights and the parents’ fundamental rights to control the upbringing of their children should be sufficient enough interests for the Court to trigger its strict scrutiny standard of review.

There is no doubt about governmental concerns with drug use, but that does not justify the Court circumventing the language of the Constitution. There is also a national concern regarding adult drug use, but that does not entitle police officers to search every citizen and use the national drug problem to justify the search. The Court has always had a preference for individualized suspicion in its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and as a result, blanket policies such as these should not be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

An individualized suspicion or at least a demonstrated problem in the school district should be proven prior to implementing drug testing. Such offerings of proof would most likely be sufficient to establish a

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249 Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
250 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 681.
“compelling” government interest. The burden of proof should be on the school district to show that there was a drug problem in the district and it had exhausted its options in combating the problem prior to the implementation of suspicionless drug testing.

V. CONCLUSION

With a little more Constitutional protection, well-behaved students like Guy Good may not have to be subjected to such governmental intrusion, and thus, would be more at ease in the school environment. He would not have to sit in nervous anticipation of the next time he will be called to have his privacy violated. His parents would also be assured that their son was in the school’s custody without the threat of having his liberty compromised.

Widespread drug use is undoubtedly a concern among school administrators across the country. In addressing this concern, school districts have implemented policies that threaten students’ privacy rights and also instill the wrong message regarding what expectations all Americans should have of the protections of the Constitution. The Court has manipulated and avoided the language of the Fourth Amendment to reach a result allowing for a diminished constitutional right of privacy for students. This reach can be interpreted to extend to all students who are not only enrolled in school, but are required to attend school due to the state compulsory education laws.

The Court addressed several factors and applied them to a balancing test, but made no consideration of parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children. Student drug testing has been before the Court twice in the past eleven years, and the Court has broadened the scope of the power of school districts each time. Opposite this broadening of power is the diminishing of our schoolchildren’s constitutional rights. The Court should implement strict scrutiny and consider parents in its balancing test before we rob future generations of the constitutional privileges that define America.

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* J.D. Candidate 2007, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A., Journalism, Indiana University-Bloomington, 2001. In loving memory of my grandfather, Charles E. Van Nada, a role model and friend whose teachings through example and unconditional love will never be forgotten. Also, special thanks to my parents for raising us with love and trust, the staff members of the Valparaiso University Law Review for their tireless work, and of course, the trailers for keeping me balanced throughout the writing process.