Symposium: Torture Justifiable?

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THE PROMISE OF INTERROGATION V. THE PROBLEM OF TORTURE

Steven M. Kleinman, Colonel, USAFR

I. INTRODUCTION

There is very little glamour attached to the work of interrogation. The customers are many and often far afield, which makes it virtually impossible for any head of military intelligence to appreciate the full value that a Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC) can give to the common effort. A CSDIC transcends the sphere of purely military intelligence and becomes the handmaiden of all Departments and Sections, irrespective of service or politics. It may best be described as a universal agency from which intelligence can be obtained for the best benefit of the whole war machine, limited only in its capacity of output by the number of interrogators and staff available to the Organization.1

While the act of torture might be reframed as “coercive means” or “enhanced interrogation techniques,” and may be employed as part of a government-sanctioned program or only by the so-called “few bad apples,” the very concept remains an insidious problem that requires an understanding of its scope and a vision for its resolution. For in a very real sense, this is a problem that transcends any single frame of reference. Nonetheless, the many diverse yet interconnected issues that must be used to form a rational debate on this subject can essentially be divided into three discrete categories: the legal, the moral, and the operational (or strategic).

* The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, Central Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, or the U.S. Air Force. Colonel Kleinman completed his undergraduate studies at the University of California, Davis, where he earned a bachelor of arts in psychology. He subsequently earned a master of science in forensic sciences and a master of science in strategic intelligence at the National University, San Diego, California, and the National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., respectively. In addition, he has completed the Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College through the U.S. Air Force Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. This Article is dedicated to my late father, Colonel Ted Kleinman, U.S. Air Force, whose greatest gift was a legacy of courage and honor, and to my mother, Dorothea Kleinman, who taught me that the world’s most valuable natural resource is compassion.

1 As quoted in Kent Fedorowich, 14 Axis Prisoners of War as Sources for British Military Intelligence, 1939-1942, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 156 (Summer 1999).
Clearly, the substantive legal issues continue to be aggressively argued from both sides and need not be treated here in any depth. In a similar vein, the recent charges of prisoner abuse have already elicited a reexamination of where the national moral compass lies relative to the treatment of prisoners. Thus, this Article attempts to primarily address the operational considerations that have been largely ignored in public and professional debate, with the realization that operational interests can never be fully divorced from either the legal or moral elements.

This assertion was dramatically illustrated when the world awoke to a global media awash with reports and graphic imagery of abuses occurring during the detention and questioning of suspected terrorists and insurgents at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. In response to this media coverage, interrogation suddenly surfaced as a major topic of both professional and public debate and has retained its place in the spotlight ever since. Previously lost in the shadows cast by other intelligence collection disciplines, this served as the impetus for a long overdue examination of the role of interrogation as a critical instrument in fighting the global war on terrorism (“GWOT”) and the counterinsurgency in Iraq. Unfortunately, this important debate was quickly co-opted by politics and passion at the expense of expertise and experience.

Setting forth the premise that interrogation operations are a necessary capability in modern intelligence collection, this Article seeks to accomplish two critical tasks. First, it sets forth a brief yet practical assessment of the state of the art in strategic-level interrogation. This assessment is done in large measure to remove the enduring shroud of misconception that continues to undermine a reasoned examination of the discipline’s role in contemporary warfare. Second, it is not enough to simply bring the craft back from its submersion into the darkness; rather, a proactive and prescriptive approach to the way ahead is necessary and forms the basis for this Article’s second task.

Clearly, strategic interrogation is a collection discipline that has reached a strategic inflection point in its evolution. As a result, decision-makers are presented with three distinct choices that will shape the future of the discipline. First, they can take concrete steps to preclude future controversy by simply ending U.S. involvement in such a controversial and potentially problematic activity. Unless a major investment is undertaken to develop a professional cadre of skilled operators guided by sound doctrine, this may prove to be the most prudent course of action.

Second, activity in this sphere can be limited to tactical or combat interrogation. The interrogation schools operated by the U.S. Army and
Marine Corps continue to produce interrogators who are highly skilled in the fundamentals of tactical field interrogations and who are able to effectively glean intelligence information from low-level sources in a time-compressed environment. However, the nature of this type of training and the demographics of the personnel recruited into these programs have not—and will not—create the type of strategic-level capability required to systematically exploit the unique intelligence potential presented by “high-value targets.” In the GWOT and counterinsurgency effort, the sophistication of the captured personnel and their knowledge of U.S. intelligence methods cannot be overestimated. Similarly, the complexity of the information sought through strategic interrogation (i.e., intelligence that will aid in understanding the adversary’s distinctive centers of gravity) ranges far afield from the type of concrete military information the disciplined tactical interrogator demands of the captured enemy infantryman.

Finally, the defense and intelligence communities can move to embrace the full potential of strategic interrogation through a major shift in mission, organization, and training commitments, which would far exceed the minimal resources and attention offered by the current paradigm.

II. INTERROGATION: A BRIEF HISTORY

It should not come as a surprise to learn that the interrogation of prisoners is one of the earliest forms of intelligence collection. Examples abound, from antiquity to the present, of circumstances where information derived from interrogations played a key, even critical, role in the outcome of major battles. In one of the earliest recorded instances of prisoner interrogation, the ancient Egyptian forces of Pharaoh Ramses II gathered invaluable information from captured Hittites during the battle of Kadesh. In this instance, the Hittite king dispatched two Bedouins, who presented themselves as deserters, to spread disinformation among the advisors to Ramses II. The operation was effectively neutralized when Egyptian forces interrogated two additional Hittite spies, who ultimately confided that the entire Hittite army waited in ambush beyond the city of Kadesh. This vital information ultimately spared Ramses II what otherwise would have been an inevitable defeat.

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2 See generally George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies 1–2 (Doubleday 2004).
3 See generally Chris Mackey & Greg Miller, The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda 45 (Little, Brown and Company 2004).
Interrogation also played a pivotal role in the ongoing expansion of an empire. During the Second Punic War, Roman troops gained critical intelligence on planned Carthaginian military formations through the interrogation of captured military couriers. This intelligence empowered the Roman commander, Claudius Nero, to launch a preemptive strike that sealed a decisive victory over the Carthaginian forces, thereby enabling Rome to continue in its quest for dominance over the western world.5

Accordingly, a number of history’s leading military strategists have placed a premium on the value of interrogation to commanders. Antoine Henri Jomini, the distinguished nineteenth century Swiss general, detailed the value of interrogation in his seminal book, The Art of War. Along with a system of espionage and reconnaissance, Jomini described interrogation as one of the most reliable sources of intelligence for an enemy.6 Military leaders in the American Civil War shared this view. The value placed on interrogation was evidenced by the fact that the “thorough and coordinated” examination of captured prisoners was often conducted by very senior officers, including such notable figures as Generals McClellan, Meade, and Sheridan.7

The intelligence potential of a systematic interrogation effort was also not lost on America’s adversaries in the twentieth century. Dulag Luft, the Luftwaffe interrogation camp during World War II, proved to be an irreplaceable source of intelligence on Allied air operations. History has recorded the exceptional—and colorful—performance of Hanns Scharff, an interrogator at the camp who deftly obtained high-value intelligence from Allied aircrews. His accomplishments would be noteworthy if only for the incredible volume of intelligence he was able to gather. Equally remarkable, however, were his methods. Rather than compelling his prisoners to reveal classified data through the use of coercive means (as some of his colleagues were known to employ in ruthless fashion), his consistent success was the result of carefully orchestrated, essentially amicable exchanges with his prisoners.

7 Fein, supra note 4, at 73 (quoting PETER MASŁOWSKI, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A CASE STUDY, in U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HISTORY: A SOURCEBOOK 30, 36 (James P. Finley ed., U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1995)).
Drawing upon his mastery of the complex art of interrogation, he offers this observation concerning the timeless value of the discipline as a form of intelligence collection:

As long as wars have been waged on this earth, captors have taken the right to question captives. As long as POWs are interrogated, they will talk. No patriotism, no self-control, no logic gives any man enough strength to repel relentlessly pressed attacks utilizing accumulated combinations of facts and circumstantial evidence.8

The twentieth century witnessed a major transformation in the role of intelligence that reconfirmed the central role of interrogation operations. In a unique retrospective on intelligence, David Kahn, a prodigious author on military intelligence, delineates intelligence into two primary categories: physical intelligence (i.e., intelligence derived from things) and verbal intelligence (i.e., intelligence derived from words). He cites aerial photographs and the bodies of fallen soldiers as examples of the former, while a report on enemy morale or a stolen document outlining adversary mobilization plans are examples of the latter.

Kahn asserts that in the course of the first 4,000 years of warfare, physical intelligence provided the preponderance of intelligence for political and military leaders. With the advent of World War I, however, conditions evolved whereby the collection of verbal intelligence—specifically including the interrogation of prisoners—became the predominant mode. This fundamental paradigm shift in the nature of intelligence collection was driven, in Kahn’s view, by a simple battlefield practicality: “It gave enough commanders enough time in enough cases to win perceptible numbers of victories.”9

As the last century unfolded, however, interrogation operations navigated a rocky course. The increasing value placed on verbal intelligence vaulted interrogation to a new level, resulting in the development of vitally successful American, British, and German strategic interrogation programs during World War II that were supported—and valued—at the highest echelons of government. In contrast, interrogation proved a far more modest success during the century’s limited wars. In Vietnam and the first Gulf War, for example,

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9 Kahn, supra note 5, at 39–41.
interrogation became embroiled in controversy, specifically in the case of the Vietnam War (despite many instances of success based on enlightened cultural finesse) and was managed as largely an ad hoc affair in the case of the first Gulf War.

There is no doubt that the role of British intelligence . . . during the Battle of Britain was a decisive one [and] there is equally little doubt that POW [prisoner-of-war] intelligence made a significant contribution to that decision.10

III. INTERROGATION OR TORTURE: THE RAZOR’S EDGE

Although a ubiquitous topic of discussion, the term interrogation can generate an array of emotionally charged images and continues to be a source of significant misunderstanding for both the intelligence professional and the layperson. Physical coercion—from the subtle to the horrific—has all too often been portrayed in the media as a seemingly integral part of, perhaps even synonymous with, the interrogation process. Unfortunately, the history of the discipline is filled with far too many instances where interrogation was simply a guise for torture, and such heinous behavior still remains a tool of intimidation under far too many political regimes.

In the debate over the employment of coercive measures, proponents are quick to argue that the application of limited physical and/or psychological pressures does not necessarily meet the generally accepted definitions of torture. And in theory, they may be correct. The problem lies in the fact that interrogations are conducted in the theater of stark reality, not a virtual world of words. The problematic scenario—and the challenges attendant to rendering a meaningful assessment of what clearly defines torture—introduced by the application of coercive means is eloquently captured by Mark Moyar in Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, a well-researched account of Operation Phoenix conducted during the Vietnam War:

Some people define torture as the infliction of severe physical pain on a defenseless person. . . . I define torture as the infliction of any pain on a defenseless individual because deciding which activities inflict

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10 Kevin Jones, From the Horse’s Mouth: Luftwaffe POWs As Sources for Air Ministry Intelligence During the Battle of Britain, 15 INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 61, 76 (EBSCO Publishing 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
severe pain is an excessively complicated and imprecise business.11

IV. THE PROCESS IS DEFINED BY THE OBJECTIVES

As noted previously, interrogation has been a multifaceted tool employed by one power against another for centuries. Dr. Paul Fein, in his dissertation We Have Ways . . . . The Law and Morality of the Interrogation of Prisoners of War, provides an insightful perspective that facilitates a better understanding of this phenomenon. In this unique study, interrogation is divided into three general categories: (1) interrogation to obtain military information; (2) interrogation in order to convert; and (3) interrogation in order to break the will.12

Interrogation operations conducted by U.S. military forces and U.S. intelligence officers have almost exclusively fallen within Fein’s first category: interrogation to obtain military information.13 In the complex, integrated modern battle space this would be properly expanded to also encompass, at a minimum, the pursuit of political, economic, and technical information.

The second category, interrogation in order to convert, operates from a premise that the surrender or capture of enemy forces falls short of achieving overarching political-military goals.14 As described by Fein, “The prisoner of war was now expected to become one with, or at a minimum to side with, the capturing power.”15 Political indoctrination or reeducation plays a paramount role here and is accomplished through psychological and physical pressures supplemented by hours of compulsory rote memorization of political doctrine. Fein credits the Chinese during the Korean War as the first nation to systematically employ interrogation for political purposes and vice intelligence gathering, describing the event as the “first war in history fought both for ideological purposes and by ideological means.”16

Fein’s third category, interrogation in order to break the will, focuses on a single objective: to compel the prisoner, through any means necessary, to perform an action he would not otherwise accomplish under his own volition.17 While intelligence may be obtained in the

12 See Fein, supra note 4, at 112–36.
13 Id. at 112.
14 Id. at 120.
15 Id. at 121.
16 Id. at 120 (emphasis in original).
17 See Fein, supra note 4, at 129.
course of the interrogation, it is of secondary interest. Instead, the common objective that drives this form of interrogation is the production of propaganda. The often brutal treatment of captured U.S. military personnel held by North Vietnam during the Vietnam War provides a graphic example of interrogations of this nature.18

During World War II, the last conflict fought on a truly global scale, interrogation was conducted by the intelligence services of all parties to the conflict. There was, however, considerable disparity in the methods employed and objectives served. While U.S. strategic interrogators, along with their British military intelligence counterparts, employed sophisticated techniques designed exclusively to gather critical intelligence data, other organizations operated with a considerably harsher and arguably inhumane agenda.

The Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei—Germany’s internal security apparatus) provides one example of this malicious approach. It routinely used interrogation not for the information gathering benefits but as a cruel and highly effective means of mass intimidation consistent with Fein’s third category of interrogation. In his book Piercing the Reich, Joseph Persico provides a graphic characterization of the Gestapo’s methods. The primary objective was intimidation in support of the greater goal of mass subjugation:

Before an interrogation began, the suspect was routinely roughed up for the shock value. The effect of this arbitrary viciousness was to daze, humiliate, and throw prisoners off balance at the outset in the contest of wills with their inquisitors. . . . Once begun, the process was nearly irreversible. If the prisoner had nothing to say under mild torture, the screws were progressively tightened. He might be dead or dying before his tormentors could bring themselves to accept that he did indeed know nothing.19

When intimidation, not intelligence, is the objective, the use of coercive means in interrogation is unfortunately commonplace (and for that very specific purpose it is demonstrably effective). In addition to the Gestapo, Stalin’s secret police apparatus were widely feared for just this reason.20 The criminal nature of such methods aside, the operational

18 Id. at 129–35.
nuance that should not be lost here is this: any truthful information obtained in the course of these interrogations was almost always corrupted by fabricated data, false admissions or identifications, and unfounded speculation, all introduced by the individual being interrogated in the vain hope of ending the torment.

The world’s most sophisticated intelligence services quickly understood this important distinction. Markus Wolf, the former head of the vaunted East German foreign intelligence service, acknowledged this fundamental principle when he observed that “interrogations . . . should serve to extract useful information from the prisoner . . . not to exact revenge by means of intimidation or torture.”

V. THE PROMISE OF INTERROGATION

At its core, interrogation is an intensely focused interpersonal dynamic. While concepts drawn from research in the behavioral sciences have helped shape new and innovative methods, the actual exploitation of a hostile source remains solidly based on the ability of one individual to systematically influence the decision-making cycle of another. In essence, interrogation remains the same managed exchange of information it was when the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu offered his timeless observations on the use of spies more than 2,500 years ago in his classic treatise, The Art of War:

What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

The passage above reflects a unique aspect of interrogation that sets it apart from other means of intelligence collection: its ability to gather intelligence through direct and ongoing contact with the enemy. It does not involve the passive collection of signals or the remote sensing of images. In the course of an interrogation, collectors and analysts are not left to question what was meant by a phrase plucked from the ether by signals intelligence (SIGINT) or the nature of the activities inside a

structure viewed through the lens of imagery intelligence (IMINT). These questions, and those that logically flow from the responses, can be addressed directly by a source—the enemy prisoner or detainee—who can, under the right circumstances, provide immediate answers.

Thus, the primary objective of an interrogation is the collection of actionable intelligence. This is reflected in modern U.S. doctrine that defines interrogation as:

[T]he art of questioning and examining a source to obtain the maximum amount of useable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain useable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. . . . Each interrogation has a definite purpose—to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission.23

VI. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION

In assessing both the promise of interrogation and the problem of torture, there are a number of useful insights that can be drawn from a look at how the craft has evolved over time. Toward that end, a review of the strategies and objectives involved suggest a sluggish evolution marked by two generations separated by a transformation in perspective.

Through most of recorded history, prevailing political powers employed “first generation” strategies that relied heavily on the employment of physical force. In this era, the fundamental objective of terrorizing—and thereby controlling—target populations took precedence over the collection of information. It is of vital importance to note that many of the methods and even some of the devices employed today emerged during what might accurately be labeled the dark ages of interrogation. The waterboard, prolonged standing, forced nudity, sleep deprivation, and exposure to extremes in temperature were all the products of those seeking to terrorize rather than to obtain truthful information. The fundamental outcome of brutal, first generation methods was to force an individual to recant a politically unpopular pronouncement or to cause an innocent individual to admit to fabricated

charges of wrongdoing. In sum, this form of interrogation had everything to do with state security but absolutely nothing to do with intelligence.

The “second generation” of interrogation began to appear over a number of decades during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It did not begin to receive formal institutional recognition, however, until the closing years of World War I, when the British Director of Military Intelligence began to examine in earnest the need to obtain timely and reliable information from prisoners of war. From that beginning, the strategic interrogation programs that would later be developed by the German, British, and American militaries during World War II established, in unprecedented fashion, the potential treasure trove of information that can be obtained from the systematic, outcome-oriented approach to interrogation that relied far more on finesse than on force.

VII. THE PROBLEM OF TORTURE

As the impetus for following up on this promising beginning began to fade shortly after the conclusion of World War II, the experience of Americans held prisoner during the Cold War (especially during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts) and the Soviet show trials gave rise to a new emphasis on designing strategies for resisting coercive methods of interrogation. As a result, the preponderance of United States Government sanctioned research relating to interrogation focused on deconstructing coercive methods with the objective of developing strategies that would protect American servicemen who faced the possibility of being held in foreign governmental detention and subjected to prolonged exploitation. It was during the course of these studies that such concepts as stress positions, sensory deprivation, and dietary manipulation entered into the lexicon of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but then only as an understanding of the threat posed by regimes that flagrantly ignored the rights of prisoners as set forth under the Geneva Conventions.

During this same period, however, the study of non-coercive interrogation methods to support intelligence collection received only modest interest. Interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures established in the Cold War era fell short in building upon the legacy of World War II strategic interrogation operations. Instead, the contemporary interrogation doctrine and training curricula have been developed without the benefit of formal studies into the efficacy of current offensive interrogation methods. In sum, a considerable portion of “what we know” about interrogation—including the numerous
approaches described in the Army Field Manual on interrogation, detecting of deception, and drawing objective meaning from observing nonverbal communication—has never been subjected to scientific scrutiny. There is, in fact, considerable research literature to suggest that many of the current methods are either ineffective or counterproductive.24

When the post-9/11 environment brought about a renewed interest in interrogation methods, existing methodologies and traditional standards of conduct were adulterated by principles of coercive interrogation drawn from the studies of Communist methodologies. It must be repeatedly emphasized that these methodologies focused on compelling a prisoner to generate propaganda—false confessions, for example—for political purposes rather than accurate information to meet intelligence requirements. As the wars of the new century continued, the employment of coercive methods by American interrogators appeared with alarming frequency.

When interrogators—many of whom are very young, possess a limited education, and work with only a superficial familiarity of cultural realities—are pressed into service with training based on outmoded concepts that are largely at odds with the current behavioral science literature, the potential benefits of interrogation will never be realized. Additionally, when these same young men and women are deployed around the world without the benefit of a comprehensive understanding of the art and science of interrogation and without the guiding hand of an inviolate standard of conduct and ethics, the problem of torture is unlikely to be resolved.

VIII. THE WAY AHEAD

To borrow a catchphrase once learned from an Army Ranger, the only things standing between this nation and a transformation in its approach to interrogation and the treatment of detainees are air and opportunity. Both the promise and the problem can be ably addressed through a transition to a “third generation” of interrogation, where strategies underlying the foundation of this new paradigm will be informed by the following considerations:

- Methods will be consistent with long-standing U.S. legal and moral traditions.

24 The author of this Article has worked extensively with behavioral science researchers from academic and research institutions across the nation in the examination of current interrogation doctrine. Works to be published in the coming year will provide a detailed analysis that supports this assertion.
Formal research will, whenever possible, seek to demonstrate the efficacy of methods in an operational setting.

There will be an institutional recognition of interrogation’s complex challenges as on par with those of clandestine collection operations.

Standards of conduct and formal vetting programs will be introduced to limit recruitment to those individuals best suited for dealing with the complexities and ambiguities of interrogation.

The long-term examination of selected high-value sources will take place under exacting standards and subject to appropriate oversight.

Rigorous requirements for initial and ongoing training accompanied by an unambiguous standard of ethics and practices will introduce a new level of professionalism into the interrogation discipline.

The challenges before the new Administration—and indeed before the country—while formidable, are not insurmountable. That these challenges still remain before us is reflective not necessarily of their complexity, but rather of the prior absence of a systematic effort to address them. In this regard, the words of Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, hold true: “There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work, and learning from failure.”